Counter-espionage in a context of social welfare maximization
Metadatos
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Metadatos
Título
Counter-espionage in a context of social welfare maximizationAutoría
Tutor/Supervisor; Universidad.Departamento
Orts Ríos, Vicente; Universitat Jaume I. Departament d'EconomiaFecha de publicación
2019-06-17Editor
Universitat Jaume IResumen
The present work theoretically analyzes the interaction between Economic Espionage and counter-espionage in the context in which a firm is willing to enter the market in a particular country, but a specific technology ... [+]
The present work theoretically analyzes the interaction between Economic Espionage and counter-espionage in the context in which a firm is willing to enter the market in a particular country, but a specific technology is needed to produce and compete in that market. The analysis is carried out suggesting and solving a game-theoretic model of imperfect information in which the firm decides an espionage effort in an attempt to obtain that technology and the goverment of the country, taking into account the possibility of espionage, deploys a counter-espionage policy which main concern is the domestic social welfare. The work considers three levels of competition for the domestic market and shows that the equilibrium counter-espionage effort is decreasing with the level of competition. The behavior of the equilibrium espionage effort over the different levels of competition is more complex and it is influenced by the
elasticity of demand in the domestic market. [-]
Palabras clave / Materias
Descripción
Treball Final de Grau en Economia. Codi: EC1049. Curs acadèmic: 2018-2019
Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisDerechos de acceso
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
Aparece en las colecciones
- Grau en Economia [289]