The role of representatives of dominant shareholders with the sustainable development through corporate social responsibility matters

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse the effect that directors representing controlling shareholders have on corporate social responsibility (CSR) matters since these investors are the core shareholders in civil law countries, given their high presence on boards. Thus, we analyse the effect of institutional directors on CSR disclosure, but also the impact of the classification of these directors between pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors, depending on if they maintain only an investment relationship with the firm or both an investment and commercial link, respectively. We hypothesise a quadratic relationship between institutional directors and CSR disclosure. We show a curvilinear relationship between institutional directors/pressure-resistant directors and CSR reporting, suggesting that these directors may play two opposite roles (monitoring or entrenchment with managers). However, pressure-sensitive directors do not affect CSR disclosure. These findings indicate that there is an association between board members and strategic decisions. Moreover, our evidence shows that institutional directors do not act in an identical way. Finally, the enhancement of corporate governance depends on the proportion of institutional and pressureresistant directors on boards.