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dc.contributor.authorBarreda-Tarrazona, Iván
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Gallego, Aurora
dc.contributor.authorGeorgantzis, Nikolaos
dc.contributor.authorXefteris, Dimitris
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-17T10:56:47Z
dc.date.available2018-05-17T10:56:47Z
dc.date.issued2015-09-03
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/174723
dc.descriptionPonència presentada en les XXX Jornadas de Economía Industrial. Alicante, 3-4 septiembre, 2015ca_CA
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a catalog competition game: two competing firms decide at the same time product characteristics and prices in order to maximize profits. Since Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) it is known that this one-shot Hotelling game admits an equilibrium in mixed strategies but nothing is known about its nature. We consider a discrete space of available product characteristics and continuous pricing and we fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the catalog competition game for any possible degree of risk aversion of the competing firms. This allows us experimentally test our predictions in both a degenerated and a genuine mixed strategy elicitation mechanism.ca_CA
dc.format.extent20 p.ca_CA
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.relation.isPartOfXXX Jornadas de Economía Industrial. Alicante, 3-4 septiembre, 2015ca_CA
dc.relation.urihttps://editorialexpress.com/conference/XXXJEI/program/XXXJEI.html#6
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/*
dc.subjectcatalog competitionca_CA
dc.subjectHotellingca_CA
dc.subjectmixed equilibriumca_CA
dc.titleCatalog Competition: Theory and Experimentsca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectca_CA
dc.subject.jelD7ca_CA
dc.subject.jelH1ca_CA
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca_CA
dc.relation.publisherVersionhttps://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=XXXJEI&paper_id=39ca_CA
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionca_CA


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