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dc.contributor.authorGranell Monsonís, Sara
dc.contributor.otherSabater-Grande, Gerardo
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Jaume I. Departament d'Economia
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-20T10:29:47Z
dc.date.available2017-09-20T10:29:47Z
dc.date.issued2017-06-13
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/168871
dc.descriptionTreball Final de Grau en Economia. Codi: EC1049. Curs acadèmic: 2016/2017ca_CA
dc.description.abstractIn this paper it is shown an experiment to test if the random incentive system (from now on RIS) works or not under extreme conditions. As it will be displayed, this mechanism is studied in two scenarios. The first case evolves the simplest experiment in which the subjects only have six decision problems and they know that only the last one will be really played to determine their payments, so the rest are hypothetical. The second one exposes the same six tasks, but under the random mechanism, so each decision has the same probability to be played and to determine the final payment to subjects. This study offers a positive conclusion of the RIS because there are no significant differences between these two treatments.ca_CA
dc.format.extent26 p.ca_CA
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.publisherUniversitat Jaume Ica_CA
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/*
dc.subjectGrau en Economiaca_CA
dc.subjectGrado en Economíaca_CA
dc.subjectBachelor's Degree in Economicsca_CA
dc.titleOn the validity of the Random Incentive System: an experimental testca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisca_CA
dc.educationLevelEstudios de Gradoca_CA
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessca_CA


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