An experimental study on the efficiency of auctioning as first-allocation mechanism for emission
Metadatos
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Metadatos
Título
An experimental study on the efficiency of auctioning as first-allocation mechanism for emissionAutoría
Tutor/Supervisor
Camacho Cuena, EvaTutor/Supervisor; Universidad.Departamento
Universitat Jaume I. Departament d'EconomiaFecha de publicación
2016-07-15Editor
Universitat Jaume IResumen
The EU ETS sets national quotas on the pollutant CO2 and allows for the emissions trading, since then many are the researchers who have tested different mechanisms and methods to first-allocation (auction or grandfa ... [+]
The EU ETS sets national quotas on the pollutant CO2 and allows for the emissions trading, since then many are the researchers who have tested different mechanisms and methods to first-allocation (auction or grandfathering) for pollutant allowances. In this paper by mean of experimental methods is tested the auction efficiency when number of firms increases. They (the firms) under-report their maximal emission when permits are auction-off, as is predicted by theoretical model. [-]
Palabras clave / Materias
Descripción
Treball Final de Grau en Economia. Codi: EC1049. Curs: 2015/2016
Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisDerechos de acceso
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
Aparece en las colecciones
- Grau en Economia [292]