An experimental study on the efficiency of auctioning as first-allocation mechanism for emission
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Títol
An experimental study on the efficiency of auctioning as first-allocation mechanism for emissionAutoria
Tutor/Supervisor
Camacho Cuena, EvaTutor/Supervisor; Universitat.Departament
Universitat Jaume I. Departament d'EconomiaData de publicació
2016-07-15Editor
Universitat Jaume IResum
The EU ETS sets national quotas on the pollutant CO2 and allows for the emissions trading, since then many are the researchers who have tested different mechanisms and methods to first-allocation (auction or grandfa ... [+]
The EU ETS sets national quotas on the pollutant CO2 and allows for the emissions trading, since then many are the researchers who have tested different mechanisms and methods to first-allocation (auction or grandfathering) for pollutant allowances. In this paper by mean of experimental methods is tested the auction efficiency when number of firms increases. They (the firms) under-report their maximal emission when permits are auction-off, as is predicted by theoretical model. [-]
Paraules clau / Matèries
Descripció
Treball Final de Grau en Economia. Codi: EC1049. Curs: 2015/2016
Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisDrets d'accés
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
Apareix a les col.leccions
- Grau en Economia [292]