Emission trade markets: an experimental approach on grandfathering as first-allocation mechanism
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Title
Emission trade markets: an experimental approach on grandfathering as first-allocation mechanismAuthor (s)
Tutor/Supervisor
Camacho Cuena, Eva; Universitat Jaume I. Departament d'EconomiaDate
2016-07-18Publisher
Universitat Jaume IAbstract
The main focus of this report is to present the results of an experimental analysis
on the grandfathering as initial allocation scheme under emission trading. The
experimental design of this report takes into account ... [+]
The main focus of this report is to present the results of an experimental analysis
on the grandfathering as initial allocation scheme under emission trading. The
experimental design of this report takes into account an industry composed by only
one firm and another one with three firms, both with exogenous firms’ real emissions.
The main results confirm that this mechanism does not achieve to allocate
the permits that each firm really needs, i.e. there exists over-reporting independently
of the industry composition. We also find that, although firms’ reported emissions
tend to converge to the Nash equilibrium, the existence of competition hinders it and
provokes a non-convergence. [-]
Subject
Description
Treball Final de Grau en Economia. Codi: EC1049. Curs acadèmic 2015-2016
Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisRights
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
This item appears in the folowing collection(s)
- Grau en Economia [289]