Emission trade markets: an experimental approach on grandfathering as first-allocation mechanism
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Títol
Emission trade markets: an experimental approach on grandfathering as first-allocation mechanismAutoria
Tutor/Supervisor
Camacho Cuena, Eva; Universitat Jaume I. Departament d'EconomiaData de publicació
2016-07-18Editor
Universitat Jaume IResum
The main focus of this report is to present the results of an experimental analysis
on the grandfathering as initial allocation scheme under emission trading. The
experimental design of this report takes into account ... [+]
The main focus of this report is to present the results of an experimental analysis
on the grandfathering as initial allocation scheme under emission trading. The
experimental design of this report takes into account an industry composed by only
one firm and another one with three firms, both with exogenous firms’ real emissions.
The main results confirm that this mechanism does not achieve to allocate
the permits that each firm really needs, i.e. there exists over-reporting independently
of the industry composition. We also find that, although firms’ reported emissions
tend to converge to the Nash equilibrium, the existence of competition hinders it and
provokes a non-convergence. [-]
Paraules clau / Matèries
Descripció
Treball Final de Grau en Economia. Codi: EC1049. Curs acadèmic 2015-2016
Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisDrets d'accés
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
Apareix a les col.leccions
- Grau en Economia [289]