The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result

García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel

dc.contributor.author	García-Segarra, Jaume
dc.contributor.author	Ginés-Vilar, Miguel
dc.date.accessioned	2016-06-13T07:07:22Z
dc.date.available	2016-06-13T07:07:22Z
dc.date.issued	2015
dc.identifier.citation	GARCÍA-SEGARRA, J.; GINÉS-VILAR, M. The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result. Operations Research Letters, 2015, vol. 43, no 5, p. 476-478.	ca_CA
dc.identifier.issn	0167-6377
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10234/160630
dc.description.abstract	There is a fundamental tradeoff between Pareto optimality and monotonicity in bargaining games. We show that there exists no solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity for n≥3 agents. The result extends the impossibility theorem of Roth (1979) by removing the symmetry axiom.	ca_CA
dc.description.sponsorShip	The authors wish to thank Carlos Alós-Ferrer and an anonymous referee for their useful comments. Financial support from projects ECO2011-23634Ministerio de Educación, PREDOC/2007/28Fundación Bancaja, E-2011-27Pla de Promoció de la Investigació de la UJI, ACOMP/2014/269Generalitat Valenciana, and Convenio de Colaboración 4678/2011 Programa de Excelencia Bco de España are gratefully acknowledged.	ca_CA
dc.format.extent	3 p.	ca_CA
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	ca_CA
dc.language.iso	eng	ca_CA
dc.publisher	Elsevier	ca_CA
dc.relation.isPartOf	Operations Research Letters, 2015, vol. 43, no 5	ca_CA
dc.rights	Copyright © Elsevier B.V.	ca_CA
dc.rights.uri	http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/	*
dc.subject	bargaining	ca_CA
dc.subject	pareto optimality	ca_CA
dc.subject	monotonicity	ca_CA
dc.subject	symmetry	ca_CA
dc.title	The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result	ca_CA
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	ca_CA
dc.identifier.doi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.06.008
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess	ca_CA
dc.relation.publisherVersion	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167637715000814	ca_CA

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