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FINAL DISSERTATION

**PREVENTING YOUTH VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA: A PUBLIC HEALTH
APPROACH WITH DESIGN THINKING PERSPECTIVE.**

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CASTELLON DE LA PLANA.

ABSTRACT

Globally, there has been an increase in studies aimed at reducing violent extremism. Building resilience has been employed as a preventative paradigm across a variety of disciplines nevertheless, the concept has traditionally concentrated on the persons, with less emphasis paid to structures and organizations. This thesis offers an overview of the threat of violent extremism and radicalization in Kenya, as well as considers the drivers of radicalization, particularly among young people, despite Kenya's efforts to prevent terrorism through various Prevention and counter of violent extremism measures, the government has failed to adequately address the underlying causes of youth radicalization, instead, punitive measures such as mass arrests and extrajudicial murders have heightened tensions and fostered sympathy for al-Shabaab. To achieve a long-term solution, it is critical to begin establishing economic, social, and political inclusion in order to address the underlying factors that drive young people to violent extremism and other forms of violence. To understand youth radicalization and violent extremism I proposed a public health approach with a design thinking perspective in this case more focus will be on societal level factors. Design thinking as a tool has been used to generate analytical techniques and intervention methods to enhance counter and avert violent extremism as well as build resilience, by dealing with unpredictability, complexity, and instability, because it explores the counter-terrorism issue space using a public health approach which can be helpful in prediction and strategic response to prevent violent extremism. It is not only about comprehending tomorrow, but also about having an impact on it.

KEYWORDS: Radicalisation ,Violent extremism, Public health, Design thinking ,Youths Terrorism, kenya.

RESUMEN

A nivel mundial, ha habido un aumento en los estudios destinados a reducir el extremismo violento. La construcción de resiliencia se ha empleado como un paradigma preventivo en una variedad de disciplinas, sin embargo, el concepto se ha concentrado tradicionalmente en las personas, con menos énfasis en las estructuras y organizaciones. Esta tesis ofrece una visión general de la amenaza del extremismo violento y la radicalización en Kenia, así como considera los impulsores de la radicalización, particularmente entre los jóvenes, a pesar de los esfuerzos de Kenia para prevenir el terrorismo a través de diversas medidas de prevención y lucha contra el extremismo violento, el gobierno no ha abordado adecuadamente las causas subyacentes de la radicalización juvenil. En cambio, las medidas punitivas como los arrestos masivos y los asesinatos extrajudiciales han aumentado las tensiones y fomentado la simpatía por al-Shabaab.

Para lograr una solución a largo plazo, es fundamental comenzar a establecer la inclusión económica, social y política para abordar los factores subyacentes que llevan a los jóvenes al extremismo violento y otras formas de violencia. Para entender la radicalización juvenil y el extremismo violento, propuse un enfoque de salud pública con una perspectiva de pensamiento de diseño en este caso, más centrado en los factores a nivel social. El pensamiento de diseño como herramienta se puede utilizar para generar técnicas analíticas y métodos de intervención para mejorar la lucha contra el extremismo violento y evitarlo, así como para crear resiliencia, al tratar con la imprevisibilidad, la complejidad y la inestabilidad, ya que explora el espacio de la lucha contra el terrorismo .

utilizando un enfoque de salud pública que puede ser útil en la predicción y la respuesta estratégica para prevenir el extremismo violento. No se trata solo de comprender el mañana, sino también de tener un impacto en él.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Radicalización, Extremismo violento, Salud pública, Design thinking, Jóvenes Terrorismo, kenia.

DEDICATION

To my dear husband Chibueze Anthony Mbadugha who have always supported my dreams and to my lovely sons and daughter .

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	-African Union Mission in Somalia
AIAI	- Al-Ittihad AlIslamiya
ATPU	-Anti-Terrorism Police Unit's operations
CDC	- Centre of Disease Control
CRT	-Community Response Team
GWOT	-Global War on Terror
HOA	-Horn of Africa
ICU	-Islamic Courts Union
IPK	-The Islamic Party of Kenya
KYEP	- Kenya Youth Empowerment Project
KEPSA	-Kenya Private Sector Alliance
MDG	-Millennium Development Goal
TFG	-Transitional Federal Government
PVE	-Prevention of violent extremism
P/CVE	-Prevention and Counter of violent extremism.
RVE	-Radicalization into violent extremism.
SALW	-Small arms and light weapons

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“We cannot solve a problem the same thinking it was created “Albert Einstein.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY

Violent extremism and radicalization are multifaceted phenomena that advocates and promotes violence related with or justified by specific ideological, political, social, or religious views. Conflicts is the major engine of terrorism, with nations participating in a violent conflict or witnessing high levels of political terror accounting for more than 99 percent of all terrorist-related deaths. The acts of terrorism and violent extremism are confronting reality in the globe and an ongoing threat . Strikes can be directed centrally from a structured organization or network, or by people operating independently with no direct external supervision. The bulk of lethal assaults occur in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, with Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria bearing the brunt of the toll. Violent extremism jeopardizes residents' security and fundamental freedoms all around the globe, hampering many nations' efforts to achieve long-term peace. Many violent extremists recruit marginalized young people and incite them to commit acts of violence. Extremist organizations nowadays have exceptional access to the general audience via the internet, leading to more efficient and effective enrolment, inciting, and propaganda, as well as the purchase of weapons and unrestricted money transfers. Both state and non-state actors may utilize Artificial intelligence

enabled machine learning to generate 'misinformation,' which produce ostensibly authentic film of individuals expressing words they never spoke and have the potential to feed disinformation, divides, and political upheaval.

Violent extremism have poised a security threat in many countries, there are problems in relation to finding a response to combat violent extremism because the violent groups are adapting to changing environment and ,it cannot be forecast only by one variable. For violent extremist movements to emerge and individuals to join them, a convergence of situational, social/cultural, and individual variables is required. With 60 percent of Africa's population under the age of 25 years the extremist groups recruitment and radicalisation into violent groups efforts usually concentrate mostly on youth, it is essential to tackle the variables that propel young people to violent extremism. Radicalization has been a major source of worry across the world. It has been connected to the loss of life as well as generating fear in inhabitants of both developing and wealthy countries. According to Precht (2007), the majority of radicalized adolescents and youths were employed, highly educated, and involved in their communities. Negative feelings of discrimination, political persecution, and the impact of spiritual leaders were important motivators for radicalization. As per Allen (2015), the drivers of radicalization in the British Isles were extremist ideologies that enthralled teenage and young people, and members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) were seen as celebrities. King and Taylor (2011) claims that western Jihadists are driven by psychological issues such as identity difficulties, personality trait and relative deprivation within a group. Most adolescents and youths, according to Erikson 's psychosocial theory, are at the stages of growth where they are striving for an identity. Lynch (2013) discovered that radicalization terrorism has been linked to Muslim adolescents and youth, notably Muslim adolescents and young who seek to cause disturbance and devastation. According to Zenn and Peterson (2014),

Nigerian people joined Boko Haram to protest secular westernisation in Nigeria, notably democratic elections and co-educational learning.

Governments, international bodies, and elite leaders frequently resist the policy and practice adjustments that today's massive young populations needs. Most violent preventive strategies have traditionally viewed youth as a problem to be addressed rather than actors with whom to interact, which leads to an even more profound cause of concern and broad opposition to altering attitudes to young . The pervasive unwillingness of governments and international organizations to adjust policies and viewpoints to the realities of youth has resulted in undesirable and preventable outcomes. According to Urdal and Hoelsher(2009) in Sub-Saharan Africa, an increase in the youthful population aged 15–24 is associated with a substantially lower prevalence of social disturbance. This demonstrates that there must be a reason that motivates youngsters to join violent organizations. Hummer (2015) contends, based on Mercy Corps research, that causes of youth violence are more directly linked to concerns of weak governance and marginalization. To ensure that counter-violent extremism discourse and initiatives do not further dehumanise and condemn young people or entire communities, they must be critically studied and critiqued. Furthermore, there is a need to ensure that this critique does not gloss over the uncomfortable and challenging problems at the heart of the terrorist problem.

There is little question that religious radicalism is on the rise in East Africa. Somalia, which has been embroiled in different types of conflict since 1991, has frequently been viewed as a source of extremism in the area, particularly following the 7 August 1998 assaults on the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. However, further analysis finds that Somali citizens were not responsible for the majority of the occurrences outside Somalia's boundaries. Somalia provides a safe haven, training camps, and opportunity for extremists to combat the 'enemy of Islam,' yet al-Qaeda and subsequently al-Shabaab have carried out assaults in the

region with the help of locals. Simultaneously, al-Shabaab was able to attract Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian people to its ranks in Somalia. The primary issue that this study seeks to address is: what makes individuals, particularly young people, vulnerable to radicals' jihadi ideology and how can the young people be enlightened and prevented from being radicalised to joining violent groups.

In the last 20 years, violent extremism has become a security issue and a national social challenge, with an upsurge in youths being recruited within Kenya and sent to Somalia for training. The al Shabaab organization has been a serious issue in Kenya, claiming responsibility for terror attacks in major cities such as Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, and Mandera on a regular basis, among other places. The Westgate Mall incident in Nairobi in 2013 was a catastrophic attack that killed over 70 people. Kenya's government signed a controversial anti-terror bill into law in 2014, which was heavily criticized by opposition parties as well as Western powers for infringing on human rights by granting powers to crack down on terror suspects, curtailing press freedom, and extending the duration a terror suspect is supposed to spend in detention from 90 days to a year. The identical law had been vetoed twice in the same parliament, in 2003 and 2006, on the grounds that it was discriminatory towards Muslims (Lind et al., 2015). In April 2015, another devastating assault on non-Muslim students occurred at Garissa University College, killing 148 people. This was the country's biggest terrorist incident since the 1998 US embassy bombings, which killed over 200 people. Another incident occurred in the Dusit hotel in 2019, killing 20 people and injuring numerous more. The most tragic feature of this attack was that it was carried out by Kenyans who knew the area well. This emphasized the need of ending religious and racial profiling. Many times, a terrorist was identified as belonging to a particular religious or ethnic community. However, in the aftermath of the terror attack at the Dusit Hotel, it is clear that conditions have changed, forcing a halt to

religious and ethnic profiling of persons from terror-dominated regions. The widely held belief that all terrorists are members of the Islamic community must be abandoned because it is false.

The government introduced strategies and policies to prevent and counter violent extremism but rather no strategies have provided a way to address the long lasting harm and the effects of the individual ,relationships ,families and communities. Majority of dominating policies are more centred on a problem-solving strategy, such as employing education to avoid and combat violent extremism that fails to see the larger picture of systemic issues .The military approach used have proven to be counter productive because the Kenya police often carry out mass raids instead of targeted arrests this keeps the youths so repressed and end up identifying themselves with anything that gives them sense of belonging for instance religion in many cases.Military approach is more focused on suppressing the already planned terrorists to create security space , this have led to increased cycle of violence .

This study aims to explore the more on youths radicalization to violent extremism by investigating and understanding the pulls ,the push factors and propose a public health approach using design thinking perspective on preventing radicalization and violent extremism among the youths . The approach involves multiple discipline such as social services,mental health ,schools and employers this is because the violent extremism problem is not a solely law enforcement problem but a public health problem. Design thinking is a powerful strategy that incorporates communication, comprehension, empathy, framing, prototyping, and testing. It is about identifying and preventing the mechanisms that lead to violent extremism, as well as ensuring that no further escalation or radicalization processes have occurred in the afflicted area. Unlike previous ideas,which might incorporate both the local government and the federal government, state governments, or each operating autonomously, it will include practitioners from a variety of fields to ensure collaboration state government, non-profit organizations, and local government agencies. This can assist with foresight and strategic action to increase counter-terrorism activities among youngsters. .I feel

that the solution will only be found when we actually listen to the youths, include them in driving solutions, and involve them in decision-making by genuinely assisting them after de radicalization and disengagement in discovering their path and identity. An inclusive policy will make it easier to create long-term peace because young people will feel included and active as change-makers.

2. MOTIVATION

After taking a course on introduction to conflict studies I developed a strong interest in understanding violent extremism because of its complexity . This issue piqued my interest because it helps us understand the issue of violent extremism among the youths in East africa particularly in Kenya. For the past 20years we have seen several primarily military tactics to tackle symptom of violent extremism without digging deep to its causes, this has exacerbated tensions and increased sympathy such as human rights violations and stigmatization of the entire identity group based on the few people of its members. It pains me to see young individuals die before their time. This is due to the fact that once the young people are arrested, they are unable to achieve their life's purpose as long as they are arrested once they are released from the police custody most of them vanish leaving their families with more questions than answers. These activities can and have amplified the appeal of violent extremist movements by justifying their own grievances and power dynamics just like what happened in Kenya after 2011 military incursion in somalia by the Kenya defence force to fish out the al shaabab .

Lastly, my personal motivation is to contribute to the UNESCO chair. of peace philosophy in relation to prevention violent extremism and the establishment of long-term peace societal tranquillity . This thesis will provide a more in-depth explanation and

propose a public health approach to preventing violent extremism because prevention needs to go beyond militarism. This chapter will provide an introduction to the study by first presenting the study background and context followed by statement of the problem, the research aims ,objectives and questions the relevance and finally the limitations.

3.STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Terrorism and violent extremism have increasingly become a regional security issue and a foreign policy concern for countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.According to the Global Terrorism Index, Kenya is placed 12th (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2014).This not only has an economic impact, but it is also a source of concern due to the effects on people's well-being. This has had an impact on Kenya's economy and image, particularly in the tourism sector, because many foreign embassies usually advise their nationals not to visit the country due to the terror attacks, resulting in a drop in revenue from the sector, which accounts for 14% of the country's GDP (CNBC Africa 2014, May 27).

Youth radicalization in kenya is an increasing problem, and a better knowledge of the process and the elements involved with radicalization and youth membership in violent extremist organizations is required.It has been associated to causing commotion, murder, drug usage, property damage, lawlessness, and inciting dread among residents. Kenya became a fearful nation a few years ago as a result of repeated attacks by al shabaab ,following military intervention in Somalia in 2011 which fueled al- Shabaab's to expand farther (Elbagir 2015; Torbjörnsson 2017, p. 1) . Widespread corruption and open borders have aided al -Shabaab's

into Kenya, creating a safe haven for militants. Franklin (2017) claims that the war on terror has enabled the Kenyan government to extort funds from donors, particularly the United States . As a result, large-scale corruption has occurred, encouraging Kenyan officials to extend the battle. Franklin goes on to state that, the fact that Al-Shabaab still controls some regions in Somalia and can carry out operations is not because they are particularly skilled or powerful. Rather, Al- Shabaab's is linked to Kenyan corruption and resource mis allocation in a deliberate attempt to prolong the battle with the terrorist group .

Kenya has had much more terrorist strikes than any other country in East Africa such as Garissa University and the mass massacre of commuters on North Eastern area routes. According to (Botha 2014) , there is a widespread belief that Somali ethnic groups living in Kenya, the majority of whom are Muslims, are responsible for terrorist acts .In Kenyan law and CVE strategies, an emphasis on signs of terrorism risk has also predominated. Because Islam is frequently seen as a risk factor for terrorism, many nonviolent Muslims have faced harassment and prejudice from Kenya's security forces. In addition to Islam, ethnic Somali Muslims have been particularly tied to violent extremism. As a result, the Somali people in Kenya frequently faces intersectional discrimination based on both ethnicity/nationality and religion. There have been popular belief that violent extremism is a form of terrorism having an international origin and are intrinsically non -Kenyan in nature however that is not the case .Al-Shabaab has created sleeper cells throughout Kenya and relies on local assistance when carrying out operations, having earned strong sympathy among Kenyans (Botha 2013, p. 6). Kenyan youths are being recruited across the country on regular basis making them more vulnerable than other groups (Botha 2014a, p. 18; Botha and Abdile 2014, p 2)

Violent extremism has become a societal concern for communities and families who have seen their young men and women embrace extremist ideology of groups such as Al-

Shabaab and even sign up as active members. It is clear that Kenyan youths are radicalized in mosques and educational institutions, while others were radicalized in neighbouring nations. The adolescent and youthful energy of experimentation, which may lead to psychological discourse, is a possible hazard faced by any adolescent and young in any culture. As a result, these young people experience a profound sense of not belonging, marginalization, and personal unworthiness (Cachalia, et al., 2016, p. 1-2). This unfavourable perception fosters all deviant traits and poor self-esteem, leading adolescent and young to join organizations that appear to give answers to their issues. As a result, teenagers and young people are more vulnerable to being misled and corrupted by rogue ideologies and dubious teachings, which can lead to radicalization.

Youths are not just the future; they are also one of society's key agents of change and advancement. During their youth, individuals form various social relationships and develop characteristics that define them as the next generation. Regardless of their backgrounds, they play a vital role. Extremists target youths because they are the most vulnerable to social influence owing to their developmental level. There has always been a propensity to consider youths as a problem to be solved rather than the actors and systems that are the root cause of concern. The widespread unwillingness of governments and international institutions to adapt policies and perspectives to youth-driven perspectives has had unintended consequences. Furthermore, the policies are not structured to work with the youths because it is a top-down strategy that believes youths should be more attentive to gaining knowledge, serving the elders, and respect for authority, while those at the top direct how the youths must think and act.

Despite the introduction of various counter terrorism laws aimed at combating youth radicalization, the Kenyan government's attempts have been hampered by the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit's operations (ATPU). Extra judicial deaths and widespread arrests have exacerbated

resentment, particularly among Muslims, who are regular targets of police unit persecution (HRW,2015). Many young Kenyans are frustrated by perceived government neglect and marginalization of religious and ethnic groups, which increases their susceptibility and may lead them to extremist organizations giving both cash and support (VillaVicencio et al., 2016, p. 16).To better comprehend and address violent extremism, particularly in the digital age, more attention have been channelled on radicalization process to joining violent groups there is need to acquire a clear vision on why youths are such an easy target for recruitment into violent organizations and how to prevent it from primary level .It is critical to have a deliberate viewpoint and attitude in order to build and cultivate a real horizon that provides direction and purpose among youths. Focusing solely on the wave of violent extremism is not optimal; instead, understanding the larger patterns, the ebb and flow of energy,time, and the entire seasons, will be beneficial. To achieve clarity, equality, justice, and respect in human interactions, it is necessary to address the natural ebb and flow of human disputes in a non violent manner.

Deployment of criminal justice authorities and use of education has not yielded any long-term and sustainable effect, the situation should be highlighted to the entire society (Thomas 2016). Increased research is critical for developing successful counter terrorism measures to prevent young radicalization.The aim of this study is to have a better grasp of prevention of radicalization and violent extremism among youths in Kenya . A lot of universal interventions such as use of education,sports and building resilience have been use in Kenya but unfortunately it has not yielded positive results leaving criminal justice as the only dominant strategy to counter violent extremism in Kenya up to date.Recently there have been an increase in home-grown radicalization in several parts in the country ,to bridge this gap there is need to use a public health framework to understand prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in order to reduce stigmatization and discrimination as well as build a

sustainable peace by redesign Kenya antiterrorism campaign to address the structural drivers and local recruitment .Include citizens and non states actors in ensuring adherence to human rights and rule of law.I opted to work within a public health context also from the standpoint of design thinking, because this technique spans a wide range of disciplines, such as social services, behavioural health services, schools, youth, the state, and the community as well as employers .Public health and peace building have a practical and theoretical connection because the both pay attention on factors that intersect at the individual ,community, societal and environmental level for example through social ecological model to get a greater comprehension of violence and the impact of alternative preventative measures.

4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

This present studies is based on the problem of increased recruitment of youths into violent groups within the country .Recent narratives on preventing and countering violent extremism evolves around militaristic approach and use of education to curb the menace but then multi discipline approach is needed in order to understand the phenomena as well as to analyse the whole issue.There are five questions that will be used as a guide to understand the research and they are related to the chapters in the thesis.

- 1) How have radicalization and violent extremism been portrayed in kenya?
- 2) what are the causes of increased radicalization and why the youths
- 3) What are the impacts of violent extremism and violent radicalization
- 4)What are the difficulties encoutered while combating radicalization and violent extremism.
- 5)What practical approach can be applied to detect early radicalization and its prevention?

4.1 General Objective

Propose a public health approach which provides practical support in preventing people from being involved in violent extremism and ensuring they receive proper guidance and support while working with along with other sectors such as education, criminal justice, religious groups , nonprofits organizations, and internet) where there are concerns of radicalization that must be addressed in a non violent way .

4.2 Specific objectives

- 1) To investigate and analyse the dominant discourse in violent extremism from a critical perspective.
 - 2) Analyse the conceptual ideas of radicalisation and violent extremism .
 - 3) Determine the Root Causes of Youth Violent Extremism and Radicalization in kenya
 - 4) Highlight the impacts of violent extremism on relationship between the individual and the society.
 - 5) Uncover the challenges in combating violent extremism and radicalization in kenya.
- .

5. JUSTIFICATION AND RELEVANCE

First and foremost, I believe it is critical to accept that violent extremism exists and that it is a public health issue because of the its effects on the people and the society at large. For so long, violent extremism has been cloaked in politics, ethnicity, and religion, making it more difficult to confront the entire issue because more attention is only channelled in one Direction. This study is important because it entails both understanding the route that drives

individuals to violent extremism and treating the underlying factors that encourage vulnerability. Terrorism is harmful to mental health, early mortality, and economic losses, and it undermines the core concepts of public health, which aim to promote people's health and well-being. Despite the impact of terrorism on preventable morbidity and death, population health research has mainly ignored the socio economic drivers of terrorism and risk factors that lead to terrorist actions. Increased study on why Kenyan youths join al shabaab is critical for developing effective counter terrorism tactics to avoid young radicalization. Although contemporary counter-violent extremist activities were envisaged as an attempt to shift towards a more active and constructive perspective to fight violent extremism using non-coercive ways in the pre-criminal domain, they are nonetheless contaminated by their affiliation with counter terrorism operations. A rising body of opinion recognizes that preventing terrorist attacks cannot be limited to traditional criminal justice and judicial measures. We should also look to public health, which is capable of preventing injuries and illnesses, guarding against environmental risks, and encouraging healthy habits and surroundings. Using a public health approach to the situation could be the most effective method to achieve the goal of Counter and prevent radicalization and violent extremism.

Public health employs measures that are typically classified as primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention tries to prevent damage and illness from occurring by limiting exposure to the main cause and boosters of injury and disease (for example, healthy meals and exercise to prevent diabetes). Secondary prevention identifies and treats "pre-clinical" changes that occur prior to illness present and worsens. For example, screening patients for pre-diabetes and urging those who have it to reduce weight is an example of secondary prevention. Tertiary prevention happens after illness has occurred, with the purpose of reducing its influence on lifespan or quality of life. Primary prevention strategies for addressing violent extremism can also include society approaches that help alleviate

changeable hazard (e.g., accessibility of extremist media) and leverage resilience factors (e.g., parental involvement and education) that are scientifically or potentially associated with violent extremism. Secondary preventive techniques may include those aimed at persons who have been recognized as having traits that put them at a higher risk of violent extremism, including exposure to extremist beliefs or closeness to a radical virtual community. Secondary preventative strategies often include counselling and mentorship. Tertiary preventive techniques, like as counselling and intense case management, may be addressed towards persons who have already accepted extremist views or are in touch with violent extremists but are not intending or executing acts of violence.

6.DEFINATION OF TERMS

Al- shabaab -translated as the “youth” in Arabic,this is Al Qaeda linked terrorist group operating in Somalia.

Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida- a terrorist organization created by Osama bin Laden, whose name means "the foundation."

Violent extremism -Endorsement of violence for the sake of achieving radical goals.

Radicalization -a human process in which people acquire radical political, social, and/or religious ideas and desires, and where achieving specific goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is a mental and emotional process that prepares and encourages a person to engage in violent behaviour.

- Deradicalization - The psychological and emotional process or intervention that reduces commitment to and participation in violent radicalization to the point that the participant is no longer at danger of engaging in politically inspired violent conduct.
- Disengagement -The process through which an individual's position or function changes as a result of a reduction in violent engagement, either imposed (for example, jail) or due to psychological considerations (for example, disillusionment)
- Radical -derived from the Latin term radix, which means "root" The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines it as "something new or distinct" (Hornby, 2005).
- Public health- The science and art of promoting and safeguarding health and well-being, avoiding illness, and extending life via coordinated societal initiatives.
- Design thinking- a problem-solving methodology that gives a solution-based approach When used to handle difficult challenges that are inadequately defined or unknown, it is particularly effective since it helps to comprehend human needs involved, reinterpret the issue in human-centric ways, generate multiple ideas in brainstorming sessions, and take a hands-on method to prototyping and testing.
- Youth -persons between the ages of 18 and 34, according to the Kenyan Constitution of 2010.
- Terrorism - Any act of violence or threat of violence, regardless of its motivating factors or aspirations, committed to carrying out a personal and group crime with the goal of attacking innocent people or trying to intimidate them, or endangering their lives, respect, liberties, protection, or entitlements, or revealing the

surroundings or any institution or formal or informal possessions to risks or inhabiting or confiscating them, or endangering a federal resource, or foreign facilities, or threatening the stability (The Convention on Combating International Terrorism,1999).

Extremism - refers to political beliefs that are diametrically opposed to a society's essential values and ideals. This might be used to any ideology that favours racial or religious superiority and/or rejects the essential values of democracy and universal human rights in the context of liberal democracies.

Counter Radicalization -Interventions to avoid socio-political radicalization, violent radicalization, or participation in terrorism by people who have already become radicalized

7.METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The methodology used was based on a critical examination of narrative and literature reviews. The majority of secondary data on terrorism, radicalization, and violent extremism came from prior articles ,books and scholarly publications It was also primarily based on prior strategies used to counter and prevent violent extremism, which unravelled the current state of affairs in the problem. The obtained information was employed to develop an empathy map as well as a social ecological framework to understand how variables potentially intersect.

The theoretical framework used in this thesis are social identity theory by Henri Tajfel

(1970) and system thinking theory by professor Jay Forrester (1956).

7.1 Social Identity Theory

This theory provides a wide conceptual approach to understanding human behaviour by drawing on examples and lessons from cultures and communities other than terrorism or violent extremist groups. As a means of explaining intergroup behavior, the theory offers the idea of social identity, based on perceived intergroup status distinctions, this theory predicts specific intergroup behavior. The goal of social identity theory is to identify and forecast the situations under which people see themselves as individuals or as members of groups. The theory also analyzes how personal and societal identities influence individual perceptions and collective action. It asserts that an organization may influence individual behavior by modifying self-identity or a component of self-concept derived from understanding of and personal connection to the group. It may also be utilized to inform analyses of any given terrorism study, as well as group interaction. Humans are sociable creatures by nature. We learn about complaints, rivalries, and conflict through social relationships. The perceived intergroup relationship, as well as the perceived stability and validity of the intergroup status hierarchy, heavily influence an individual's conduct. As a result, the social identity theory provides critical theoretical underpinnings for the prospect of youths radicalization, with a focus on the identification of existing youth organizations as tactical motivating factors in establishing radical behavioral change. Every human being yearns for a sense of connection and identity. Our social connections enable us to share cohesive ties, but they can also create or exacerbate divisions between us and those experiences and discussions, develop world views, adopt narratives, and develop loyalties, exercise solidarity and empathy and nurture enmities about what is right and wrong, true and false, acceptable and unacceptable. We develop friendships

and turn individual goals into group goals through social relationships. They can promote people who are not members of our organization.

7.2 System thinking theory

System thinking theory and human centred approach explores the complex interplay of factors that make young people more vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism in this study. The primary premise of systems thinking theory is that everything is connected and events do not occur in solitude but in response to changing conditions. As a result, systems thinking theory provides us with the ability to see the repercussions of our own actions. The theory delves deeper into the causes that drive occurrences rather than drawing conclusions from the tip of the iceberg where the event is just occurring. It is obvious that in most times of conflict, we are fast to respond without retracing our previous acts that may have led in the current scenario. System thinking theory emphasizes reforming the entire system, as opposed to other traditional techniques, which are more focused on individuals while leaving behind the institutions and structures that make the person susceptible. Given that violent extremism is a multifaceted phenomena, a holistic perspective to events is essential.

System thinking theory enables us to comprehend the interconnectedness and overlap of elements that impact our behaviour, beginning with how we think, communicate, and act. This will allow us to come up with more inventive and innovative solutions to problems. In this scenario, understanding which systems and organizations make youths more prone to violent extremism is more crucial than focusing just on individual behaviour. As per this theory, system behaviour is shaped by the impacts of reinforcing and balancing processes. A reinforcing process causes some system to grow; but, if the reinforcement is not checked by a balancing process, the system will eventually collapse. In addition to the system thinking paradigm, a human centred approach is useful for creating treatments focused at

understanding the elements that make youths vulnerable. Individuals experience things through different lenses, thus to have a better sense of the broader picture, we must immerse ourselves in the shoes of the people who are touched by the situation. At this stage, one will be able to learn more about the people for whom they are designing by remaining vigilant during the observation phase in order to understand what they are thinking, seeing, hearing, doing, and saying in order to develop a directing road to the next step.

The ideation phase begins after establishing an emotional connection with the subject. Creating ideas based on the findings of the first stage by spotting opportunities to design and prototype viable solutions. Given that violent extremism is a complicated reality, is necessary to unravel the variables, pinpoint intervention sites, and evaluate the system's repercussions. The advantage of this concept is that all stakeholders are involved, which makes it simpler to generate ideas and construct an innovative prototype to test.

The final phase is the validation of the ideas in everyday life. This theory has been so effective in most instances because the people whose interests the solution was produced for are at heart and in the process.

8. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Terrorism-related offenses are often viewed as national security problems, and as such, gathering information on the same might be difficult due to the state's concealment for protection purposes. Before even commencing this study, I knew I would face some challenges because the subject of violent extremism in Kenya is still a delicate one and it requires in person field work in order to acquire actual first hand information from the people involved. Nevertheless the statistics were acquired using secondary sources, with the main

constraint being the agencies from whom the data were collected, since this included government and non-governmental organizations. To avoid the difficulties associated with obtaining data from the government agencies, the relevant research materials used in this study were obtained through online library repositories, books, journals, online search engines, library searches, and, most importantly, by assessing the accessible references used in the reviewed research literature on the subject. The data collection procedure was limited to the use of secondary data from non governmental organization and government agencies, like statistical records of violent extremist acts, thereby excluding other vital data collection tools, such as physically interacting with affected regions that could have an important say on immigration, border protection, or how CVE is effective or ineffective.

Another difficulty, or restriction, of the study, is the terminology and definition of radical extremism and terrorism. What or anyone exactly qualifies as an extremist? While this may appear to be obvious, the question of categorization is not as simple as one might imagine. After all, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom champion, as the phrase goes. Similarly, it is difficult to determine if a person who was formerly radicalized has been de-radicalized. How can this be assessed, and how can we be certain? This is a restriction, and while we may look at some indications, such as violent extremism and terrorist radicalization rates, we must remember that we can never completely know another human being's genuine ideas, ideologies, and views. My future studies I would like to be in the field and apply participatory action research so that I can have a clear vision of the concept that we are trying to change from the affected people.

9. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis is divided into four sections, each with an introduction and a conclusion. In chapter one, existing literature on Radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism from different scholars were accessed to understand and have a background information on the problem as far as prevention of violent extremism is concerned. This chapter is further divided into three subsections. First section radicalization and violent extremism which are problem was defined. The second section was to understand youth radicalization followed by the last section which focus more on interventions including the proposed public health approach. The principle authors used in this study are Schimd(2004)(2011) (2014). Borum (2011) (2012) Neuman(2013)(2012) Moskalenko, S. and C. McCauley (2009,) Sageman, M. (2004)(2008)(2011) Kundnani(2012) Sedgwick (2010) among others.

The second chapter focuses on the history of extremism in Kenya, including the al shabaab, youth radicalization, and violent extremism. Several causal narratives of youth radicalization were addressed, and for a more in-depth understanding, I used two case studies, Lamu and Isolo County, to comprehend the complexities of the pulls and pushes of young radicalization in the areas. The impacts of youth radicalization and violent extremism was also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter three went into further detail on how Kenya has been in the forefront of combating extremism in the country, including the implementation of policies and other methods to combat young radicalization, as well as the problems faced. This chapter will highlight the reasons why the Kenyan government's policies appeared to be ineffective, as well as a spike in youth radicalization in the country.

The fourth chapter will propose a public health approach using centre of disease guideline, give the conclusion based on the findings of the third chapter, as well as a summary of the study and recommendations for practice.

CHAPTER ONE : LITERATURE REVIEW

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The current study of the literature gives a summary of the key scholarly debates on radicalization that may lead to (ideological) violence. The review's goal is to understand radicalization as a complicated and dynamic process and the vulnerability of the youths.

The first section will present an overview of academic literature concepts, ideas, and terms related to radicalization. The second section will focus on youth's radicalization of violent extremism, including the causes, patterns, and channels. The third section will focus on the intervention background. The fourth section will define radicalization and violent extremism as a public health problem with the goal of identifying gaps in the literature and suggesting a preventative approach that will not only see youths as a problem to be addressed but will also include the structures and systems involved.

1.1 DEFINING THE PROBLEM:RADICALIZATION

The twentieth century was dominated by the legacy of brutal global wars, colonial conflicts, and ideological confrontations, as well as efforts to build international mechanisms that would sustain global peace and prosperity. Insecurity is not only persistent, but it has also evolved as a key development worry in our day. One and a half million people live and work afflicted by instability, conflict, or huge, criminal organizations behaviour, and no low-income fragile or turmoil nations has achieved even one Millennium Development Goal (UN MDG). New threats, such as criminal gangs and smuggling, social unrest induced by world economic upheavals, and terrorism, have exacerbated long-standing fears about conventional warfare between and within countries. Although most of the world has made tremendous progress in poverty reduction in recent years, there are still regions where poverty persists in regions marked by recurring cycles of political and criminal violence are falling far behind, with their economic progress hampered and human indices stagnating. It may seem inexplicable to people who now live in more peaceful areas how riches in high-income nations and a sophisticated global economy can coexist with tremendous violence and despair in other parts of the world.

Terrorism is a global problem and it is as a result of violent radicalization to violent extremism, which includes both psychological - behavioural components. For millennia, the word 'radicalization' has been used. It is now solely associated with Islamic goals of any sort, including Salafism, Wahhabism, ISIS, Al Qaida, Al shabaaab, and Boko Haram. The term's negative connotations are emphasized primarily. However, the phrase has had various implications in the past. The democrats, socialists, and liberals who fought against royal and imperial powers were known as radicals in the nineteenth century. The radicals of the 1968

generation were young people who questioned modern society's patriarchal institutions. Della Porta and LaFree (2012) emphasize that prior concepts of radicalisation were utilized in research on political violence in the 1970s and showed the interactive and processes in the emergence of violent, often clandestine organisations. The scholarly discussion around radicalization and violent extremism has evolved significantly from the 1970s, when it was used to investigate the formations and behaviours of violent organizations, to the twenty-first century, when was primarily identified with Islamic terrorism. As per Neumann (2013), until the early 2000s, there was almost little discussion of radicalization in writings on terrorism and political unrest. Because of the apparent connotation of justification in those kind of debates, it became difficult to discover the underlying causes of terrorism after 9/11. (Neumann 2013; Kundnani 2012). Schmid (2011 p217), further adds that radicalization studies approach the field of extremism and terrorism by focusing on the processes by which individuals become socialized to engage in political violence without moral restraints.

Radicalization is a phrase used in a cyclical form to describe a person or people who hold extreme political or religious ideas (Al-Lami 2009, p. 2). The vast majority of extant definitions are broad, with an emphasis on society norms and conduct. Radicalization is also defined by Hannah et al. (2008, p. 2) as "the process by which individuals shift their world view over time from a range that society tends to regard to be normal into a range that society tends to consider to be extreme." The issue with this definition, as with many others, is the emphasis on the normal and extreme, as such criteria are defined by society. Furthermore, a person might hold radical thoughts and attitudes that are contrary to cultural norms without acting on those extreme beliefs. As a result, there is a distinction between radicalization and violent radicalization. Whereas radicalization entails holding extreme opinions in comparison to the cultural norm, violent radicalization occurs when such extremist beliefs are coupled by a desire to advocate or commit violent acts (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2009, p. 798). Radicalization is

defined by Rahimullah, Larmar, and Abdalla (2013, p.19) as "the process of gradually adhering to a violent ideology promoting terrorism." Despite differences in definition, most scholars and experts believe that radicalization is a process in which a person experiences a shift, whether in radical views or conduct (Al-Lami 2009, p. 2).

According to Sedgwick (2010), radical, radicalism, radicalization are all terms for the same thing. Much has been written to clarify these terms, particularly since Islamist explosives arrived in Europe in 2004, yet they continue to be a source of conceptual ambiguity. Academics interpret radicalization in different ways which can lead to uncertainty and, as a result, misrepresentation of some groups, resulting in their unjust exclusion from political processes. Sedgwick further explain that radicalization is often regarded as political phenomena and that it is best positioned in relation to mainstream political activity, at least in the setting of democratic countries, but this also indicates that it must constantly be interpreted in real terms. Crossett and Spitaletta (2010) conducted a wide study of psychological and social themes related to radicalization. They describe radicalization as "the process through which a person, organization, or mass of people transitions from legally participating in the political process to using or supporting violence for political goals" (radicalism).

It is critical to distinguish between nonviolent and violent radicalization since not all radicals choose to join violent groups. Githen -Mazer (2012) stresses on differentiating between radicalization and radicalism. Githen-Mazer defines a radical as someone who has a burning urge for major socio political changes, whereas radicalization is described as an increased propensity to pursue and support far-reaching social reforms that disagree with, or pose a clear threat to the current framework. Nonviolent radicalization is defined by Bartlett, Birdwell, and King (2010, p10) as "the process by which individuals grow to hold radical beliefs in reference to the status quo but do not perform, actively aid, or abet terrorist activities referred to as radicals," whereas radicalization is defined as "the process by which individuals decide to

participate in terrorist action or strife referred to as radicals".When della Porta and La Free (2011) examined the use of the word radicalization, they placed a strong focus on the march toward violence (Schmid, 2013).Similarly Odhiambo and others(2015 p49) sees radicalization as a process by which a person or a group embraces progressively extreme political, social, or religious beliefs and ambitions that reject or challenge the existing quo, as well as current notions and manifestations of freedom of choice. Ali, Bwana, and Juma (2015), goes further to explain that if the process results in violent action, it is described to as Radicalization into Violent Extremism (RVE).While Bartlett and Miller contrast 'non-violent radicalization' with 'violent radicalization,' with 'radicalism' and 'terrorism' as their respective end goals (Bartlett & Miller 2012).

Due to several definition of radicalization there is a challenge of knowing where to draw the line definition. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), radicalization may be found alongside deradicalisation and is a property of people, groups, societies, and states. According to Neumann (2013), radicalization may lead to non-violent or legal actions as well as violent or illicit behaviour, and it can be considered as a force for good or evil in the long run, as in the examples of campaigns for basic human rights and women's suffrage. Therefore it is necessary to depoliticize the definition of radicalisation. First and foremost it is not necessary to stigmatize individuals, factions, or mobilizations as especially radicalised or at peril of radicalization, or to create detrimental assessments of one set of beliefs or actions as almost problematic than any other. Secondly, it should allow for a non-judgemental assessment of conflict movements that are not significant enough to be labelled illegal or even abnormal, but can be sociologically linked to more extreme radicalization. Thirdly, it should be recognized that in every pluralist society, some may view an activity as an example of radicalization that requires a reaction, while others believe that the action should be permitted as part of political independence.

As a result, a comprehensive definition of radicalization is required because it allows for the capture of these conflicting dynamics and eliminates the need to separate a phase of radicalization that results in a move to unlawfulness or violence from other phases of radicalization as if they were distinct totally distinct processes. Difficulties distinguishing between these two processes have plagued the British government's Prevent programme since its inception; the first iteration of prevent alternated between defining 'radicalisation' as 'becoming radicalized, to the level of turning to violence' and admitting that only a 'tiny minority of radicalised individuals' become terrorists. Edwards (2014p55) explains that understanding the symbiotic linkages between various strands of radicalization requires a comprehensive emphasis on system and the smaller constituents of conflict. Not only can one group of extremists respond to the activities of another group of extremists, yet diverse segments of the population (including extremists) might react to what they perceive to be a danger to their interests or an injustice.

1.1.2 RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Extremism and radicalism are two concepts that are frequently used interchangeably in everyday life and in scholarly publications nowadays (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). This is hardly surprising in an era characterized by the populist Zeitgeist (Mudde 2004), in which a dualist perspective of social, economic, and political events predominates. This myopic and reductionist tendency may also be found in scientific thought. Recent research reveals that, outside of experimental studies, politicians, journalists, and the general public use these terminology to name numerous social and psychological issues rather freely and consistently. According to study, victims of violent crime are more likely to assign psychiatric

disorders to the culprits activities that deny them any resemblance to themselves and to safeguard their uniqueness (Noor et al., 2019). Such pathways may illustrate why the word 'radicalization' has become popular in the public discourse to describe terrorists (i.e. 'radicalised' persons), highlighting a possible psychopathological core to their political action (Mandel 2009).

Many interpretations used in scientific literature and discourse, seem to be unspecific, the term "radicalization" is oftenly used synonymously with other notions such as ideological radicalism (as an expression of valid political idea), (violent) extremism, (religious) fanaticism, political unrest, and terrorism. The term radicalization has a long history spanning more than two centuries, its definition has shifted over time. According to Bötticher (2017), the term radicalism was initially employed in medical research before being adopted into politics in the 18th century to describe post-glorious revolution progressives in England. It subsequently made its way to France at the end of the 18th century, where it was used to refer to the progressive revolutionaries in Parliament, which is still used by centre-left parties today. According to the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization(2008) radicalism is defined as the raising awareness and dedication to, massive change and reconfiguration of political and social entities. Radicalism has historically been associated with left and right-wing political parties – at times even with moderate conservative and liberal belief systems and includes the radicalization of political and social institutions which entails advocating for significant changes and restructuring of political and societal structures .

To begin, a radical is derived from the Latin term radix, which means "root" The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines it as "something new or distinct" (Hornby, 2005). The term 'radical' goes back to the eighteenth century, according to Schmid,(2005) a radical advocated for fundamental change that gets to the heart of society's structures rather than arguing for smaller, gradual adjustments. Over the course of a century, the phrase has

undergone several alterations. It is now largely related with phenomena of extremism and terrorism. Although policy makers and governments have different absolute definitions, they all agree that a radical is not always a terrorist and that governments should only be concerned with radicals and radicalism that constitute a threat. Radicalism, on the other hand, is a relative concept. This places a person on a spectrum of organized opinion, which is not fixed.

Radicalization in the United Kingdom represents a substantial shift on the spectrum. This spectrum can lessen the risk of radicalization by allowing legislators to place radicals on it and assess their chances of becoming a problem. Neumann (2013, p 874), explains that radicalization is a process through which people become radicals which its significance can shift based on region and period, while on the other hand extremism, is viewed as a dogmatic and closed-minded phenomena that is diametrically opposed to democracy and change. Neumann (2010, p12) goes on to say that extremism may be defined in two ways: "to refer to political ideologies that oppose a society's basic values and principles," and "to refer to political ideologies that oppose a society's core values and principles." Neuman suggests that the definition can be used in any ideology that favours racial or religious superiority and/or rejects the essential values of democracy and universal human rights in liberal democracies. He concludes that the phrase can also be used to characterize the ways through which political players try to achieve their goals, for example by utilizing measures that demonstrate a contempt for other people's lives, liberty, and human rights.

According to Awan and Blakemore (2013), the term "extremist" is often used because it conjures up negative ideas, despite the fact that many persons who were originally branded as extremists are today regarded reformers and acceptable political players. Horgan and Braddock (2010), clarify that a difference is frequently noted between radicalization as a set of views and violent extremism as a behavioural manifestation of those beliefs. The two typically go along, although many people become behaviourally radicalised without being cognitively radicalised

in the same way, and vice versa. In contemporary discourse, radicalisation is described as a process of establishing extremist beliefs and ideas, and thereby, to some degree, it can be used to signify a massive intermediate to terrorism (Borum 2011c), whereas this method is widely condemned because it is neither empirically-based nor helps to clearly explain the processes that contribute to social violence and intensification (Kundnani, 2012; Goodwin, 2014).

According to USAID (2011) Advocating, engaging in, planning, or otherwise endorsing ideologically driven or justified violence to advance social, economic, or political aims is referred to as violent extremism .

There are several conceptions of radicalization, and the word is hotly debated in academic and policy circles. The vast majority of analysts consider it is a vaguely defined concept. It's being used to define diverse phenomena and signifies different things to many different individuals (Schmid 2004b). Distinguishing radicalism and radicalization from common concepts such as extremism is critical if we are to keep the concept rationally helpful and not just a political vessel term used by political actors as pejorative labels to put some distance between the claimed compromise position they claim to stand on and the postulated far-out role of selected political enemies. Mandel (2009 p11), simplifies the relationship between radicalization and extremism by saying, that Radicalization is a (positive) shift in an individual's or collective's level of extremism. At this juncture it is important to differentiate violent radicalization from non violent radicalization According to the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization (2008 p7) Violent Radicalization, is defined as the process of "socializing to extremism that demonstrates itself in terrorism," whilst extremism is described as the "energetic dissent of democratic values and the rule of law," while radicalism does not necessarily dismiss inclusive. They argue that although violent radicalization differs from larger concepts of political radicalism, and that its connection to violent extremism is

likewise problematic ,hence establish the following conceptual framework of violent radicalization as interactions to extremism seen in terrorism.

It is essential to understand that radicalization, or harbouring radical beliefs, is not always criminal or dangerous within itself. Radicalization to violence happens when an individual or organization adopts radical beliefs and starts to consider that violence should be used to promote or progress those beliefs and ideas. These views can be associated with a wide range of perspectives, such as political and religious belief systems. Radicalization is unique to each person and has a proclivity to combine typical cognitive and behavioral characteristics, systemic grievances, and structural grievances politicized through a common ideology or rallying cause that promotes the decomposition process, a term that describes a person becoming increasingly restricted with regard to key political ideas and values. This invariably creates a sense of danger, which leads to instant aggression as a necessary and justifiable action (khudani 2013).

Radicalization to violence is not a problem that affects only people of a certain heritage, community, or faith. Leonard (2003) asserts that Radicalization must first and foremost be viewed as a socialization process in which group dynamics often take precedence over ideology. Islam is not a single entity with the same ideas and practices all around the world . There is no centralized clergy in Sunni Islam, although there is in Shia Islam. As a result, Muslims in various states perceive and practice Islam in ways that are heavily impacted by their surroundings. When examining the core causes of radicalization, the importance of local environment should come before the influence of ideology. The gradual socialization of extremism and, finally, terrorism, which occurs over time and necessitates a long-term group process. Individuals initially internalize feelings of irritation, alienation, anomy, unfairness, uncertainty, and deprivation. Individual interiorization eventually leads to a mental alienation from the society that is blamed for the birth of such sentiments. Individuals then reach out to

others who are experiencing similar emotions, forming a 'in-group.' This process is similar to that of forming an ethno cultural or religious minority group.

Radicalization is a unique process that does not always imply Violence extremism or terrorism, because there is no conclusive or approved method identified in the literature that explains how an individual decides to begin and proceed on a road of radicalization that leads to terrorism. Terrorism has a plethora of definitions in the literature (Bowman-Grieve, 2011; Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., 2007; White, 2009), yet it is nevertheless hidden by much complexity and illusory (Cooper 2001). It is critical to understand the difference between terrorism and violent extremism (Bolz et al., 2012, p. 5; Mahan & Griset, 2013; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011), as well as how they connect to one another. According to Aly (2011, p. 8), there are several "perspectives on what characterizes terrorism: the terrorists the victims and the public's. Furthermore, she claims that when examining counter-terrorism methods, terrorism is classified as either an ideology or a methodology. The ideology underlying violent extremism must be clearly understood and challenged (House of Commons, 2010, p. 6; Joffé, 2013; Liht, Savage, & Williams, 2013; Schmid, 2013), but there are few stand-alone definitions of violent extremism in the literature; and, as previously stated, the term is more frequently used in conjunction with those pertaining to radicalization and terrorism. The combination of these terminologies, as well as the lack of a clear workable definition of violent extremism, raises a number of challenges. These include our capacity to genuinely comprehend and challenge its foundation, as well as comprehend how this should be dealt with within legal structures and judicial systems.

To comprehend the issue, it is necessary to understand when, why, and how people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being prepared to employ or actively support terrorist violence against civilians. The issue of radicalization, literature is approached from a variety of perspectives. One school focuses on how so-called "weak" persons are

philosophically and psychologically moulded by terrorist recruiters, leading to their becoming murderers or even suicide bombers. Another approach emphasizes how young people seeking adventure and a (in their opinion) good cause seek out terrorist groups on their own or act in concert with or on their behalf in pursuit of personal satisfaction and acceptance by violent extremist organizations. Sometimes, rather than becoming an individualist terrorist, the radicalizing individual radicalizes as part of "a bunch of men" who share shared experiences (like feeling alienated in a diaspora situation). The journey from radicalization to violence is complex and unpredictable, affected by a variety of personal and communal, social and psychological elements. Although it is commonly considered that recruiting precedes radicalization, there have been situations when recruitment preceded radicalization while some individual who accept radical beliefs do not inevitably become terrorists. However there is no one factor that may describe the radicalization of a person or group of persons. The operation is the outcome of a distinct personal journey intersecting with a system of ideas rationalizing the use of brutality, which may be intensified by a felt moral danger or harm to the individual's identity and fuelled by virtual and physical social networks.

1.2 YOUTH RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM .

Youth radicalization to violent extremism is a worldwide issue that poses a danger to peace, security, and stability (Campelo et al., 2018; Neve et al., 2020; Rolling & Corduan, 2018). Terrorism has had a significant impact on youth, both as victims and perpetrators. Concerns have grown in recent years about the large number of young individuals drawn into extremist movements. Extremist groups throughout the world rely on young people to fill up

the numbers that support their causes, and hence have a special emphasis on recruiting young people, making the youth more vulnerable than other groups. The African youth bulge, as well as the plethora of socioeconomic difficulties it brings to civilizations. Henderson (1993) asserts that there is a definite correlation between nations having a "young" population and governmental repression, because increased governmental repression has been connected to a rise in violent extremism. The United Nations Development Programme discovered in a 2017 research based on interviews with hundreds of voluntary recruits to Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram that the route to violent extremism is defined by social and economic exclusion, injustice and inequality.

Muslim teenagers from 12 to 19 have, for example, been implicated in Western terrorism schemes (Simcox 2017). However it is essential to understand that radicalization, or harboring radical beliefs, is not always criminal or dangerous within itself. According Borum (2012) , Recruitment activities can be part of the radicalization and violent extremism process, however not all radicalized individuals are recruited. However, there is still controversy among modern researchers concerning the nature and scope of terrorist recruiting, at least as it relates to militant jihadist-Salafism. For example, Marc Sageman (2008) has maintained that there is no such thing as recruiting to armed jihad or al-Qaida. He argues that "enlistment" (people joining because they want to) is the mechanism through which new militants arise. He claims to have data showing that approximately 90% "join the jihad" through friendship and kinship. While it is legitimate to say that conventional recruiting, such as that conducted by the military with a dedicated budget and people, may not be significant, It is almost unavoidable that Islamist militants appear to be actively seeking new supporters, activists, and members, as well as actively attempting to persuade others to embrace their point of view. That is, after all, merely a larger definition of recruitment. If this is correct, some of the claimed distinctions may be due to how they do it rather than whether they do it at all. The concerns cannot be

answered here, but the concept of recruitment is presented to separate it from radicalization and to imply that there may be some policy benefit in examining a wider, rather than a narrower, definition of recruitment as it pertains to violent extremism.

Radicalization to violence happens when an individual or organization adopts radical beliefs and starts to consider that violence should be used to promote or progress those beliefs and ideas. These views can be associated with a wide range of perspectives, such as political and religious belief systems. Radicalization to violence is not a problem that affects only people of a certain heritage, community, or faith. Nevertheless, it has been stated that the Islamic State has been especially good at attracting youth, appealing to a sense of togetherness and connection to lure new recruits (Juergensmeyer, 2018; Roy, 2017; Simcox, 2017).

Indoctrination, brainwashing, isolation, extreme ideology, rejection of the established order, and suppression of freedom of speech are all part of the radicalization process. This is not confined to one type of extremism; white nationalist and far-right organizations target adolescent kids through music, fashion, and social platforms (Miller-Idriss 2018). There is little question that the spread of radical or extremist ideas among youths is a key contributor to the emergence of conflicts that impede economic growth and development, scientific and technical advances, democratic consolidation, and social cohesion on the African continent. In South Africa, for example, xenophobia radicalized numerous youth organizations, resulting to heinous crimes and hate of other humans. Al-shabab extremists' operations in Kenya, Somalia, and other East African nations endanger development and prosperity, they exploits the socioeconomic, political, and cultural frustrations of many Kenyan youth, who are prone to recruitment to violent extremist organizations owing to many macro- and micro-level causes (Villa-Vicencio, BunchananClarke, and Humphrey, 2016, p. 18).

There are a lot of radicalized ethnic militias in Cameroon and Chad that are particularly hostile to other ethnic groups, and their home governments are hiding under rule by

bigger ethnic groupings. Similarly, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, rebel commanders radicalized hundreds of young people in the struggle for dominance of the countries' resources. Nigeria is not immune to these types of security concerns, such as young radicalism. This is due to the presence of several youth organizations advocating for resource control, religious fanaticism, and ethnic intolerance. The reasons why people engage in violent extremism and groups utilizing violent terrorism remain a source of debate, with experts unable to reach an agreement on the fundamental mechanisms of radicalization. According to Odhiambo et al (2015) in their study *Domestic Radicalisation in Kenya*, they explain that 'Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) like Al-Shabaab terror organizations cannot continue by themselves without youthful recruits. Radical groups are very aware of the issues that Kenyan youth face, and they design their recruiting techniques to exploit adolescent weaknesses. Radicalization can be violent or peaceful, depending on the outcome or repercussions of the process. It should be noted, however, that the majority of material on the radicalization process among youths concentrates on violent extremism (Hogan & Braddock 2013). In Africa, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria have both targeted young people, radicalizing and training them for terrorist acts in East and Western Africa, respectively (Berman 2014).

Borum (2011, p14) contends that there are several paths into and out of radicalization, each of which is influenced by a number of circumstances. He goes on to say that radicalization is not the consequence of a single choice, but rather a dynamic process that gradually pulls an individual into a devotion to violence over time. Meanwhile, some researchers, such as Odhiambo and colleagues (2015), contend that there is no singular road to extremism since each instance follows a unique path of radicalization. A lot of theories for youth radicalization have been presented to comprehend several facets of youth radicalization, to begin with is 'bunch of guys' theory according to Sageman's (2004; 2011) radicalization is the result of close-knit groups and shared social relationships. Atran (2008),

claims that radicalization can also occur through familial relationships, or by persons growing up in the same area, attending the same school, mosque, madrasa, or participating in sports together. It is crucial to remember that youth radicalization can occur outside the home, these are important venues where friendship networks are formed and where extremist ideology and like-minded people are exposed. As a result, friendships form and individuals serve as sounding boards for their collective frustrations (Bazex & Mensat, 2016; Schuurman & Horgan, 2016).

Youths might also be exposed to adult role models and recruiters through these networks, who can be revered and regarded by their younger counterparts (Vidino 2007). The structure of a social network influences the network's value to its members. Smaller, more tightly knit networks may be more valuable to a radical organization than larger networks with many loose ties to individuals outside the primary network. More open networks (those with several weak relationships) are more likely than closed networks with many redundant ties to provide fresh ideas and possibilities to its members (Wheeler 2009). Today collective crisis plays a critical role in radicalization, these challenges can be scaled all the way up from erosion of person's intellectual health social belonging, and the fraying of household as well community protection and cohesion in the aftermath of trauma experiences. The collective trauma transforms into collective memory and culminates into a system meaning a group can define who they are and where they are going as a form of survival.

Secondly deprivation theory which looks at how perceived injustices and grievances are intensified and reinforced as individuals progress through different stages of their lives. For example, according to (Bouzar & Martin, 2016; Schuurman & Horgan, 2016), grievances and feelings of injustice can be triggered by events ranging from the death of a family member to viewing on-line content of women suffering who remind one of their mothers or other family members and experiencing discrimination. When examining violence (political or otherwise) in

the developing world and lower socio-economic status groups, the relative deprivation hypothesis is one of the most commonly used. Neve et al. (2020) likewise agrees that deprivation, as well as the presence of individuals with prior links to the jihadist network, contributed to the radicalization process, and that criminal members earned prestige in the youth group by being active in jihadism.

On the contrary Beck(2008) argues that grievances are not sufficient explanation for why some impulses get organized into long-term movements while others do not. Certain politically driven people reach a tipping point where their potential energy is channelled into violent action. A subgroup may have a biological proclivity toward instrumental aggressiveness. However, regardless of whether aggressive behaviour is physical, mental, or verbal; committed by individuals or groups; directed toward others, self, or inanimate objects; associated with mental illness, antisocial personality traits, or cultural, political, or religious views, most definitions include an element of overt violent behaviour, having the goal to cause injury, pain, or damage (physical). To be present in causal connection, deprivation theory demands a set of environmental factors, a certain interpretation of those conditions, and a violent reaction to that interpretation. Even a basic examination reveals that political violence happens in some locations when citizens are seen to be deprived of certain resources.

Thirdly criminological theory which has focused on the problem of youth criminality, According to Holt et al. (2018), several criminological theories have tight linkages and overlap with current theories of radicalization. Studies, for instance, have investigated radicalization using criminological ideas such as social control and social learning. Social control theory has been important in understanding how weaker social links might work as a risk factor in terms of susceptibility to radicalization, whereas social learning theory has demonstrated how radicalization to violent extremism is influenced by social ties. According to (Loeber & Farrington 2000), young people who are approaching critical periods in their lives in terms of

social identity development and psychological ability, social bonds and their relationships to others impact their developmental paths and impact behavioral outcomes. Lösel et al., (2018) contends that, this is applicable to the radicalization process. Criminologist Robert Agnew (2010), goes on to say that terrorism is the result of personal and social pressures coming from rage, shame, and helplessness, all of which are exacerbated by a feeling of grievance - comparable to process theories of radicalization.

Bouzer and Martin (2016) further explains that, radicalization can lead to violence due to the following factors: underlying psycho pathological disorders and personal vulnerabilities related to stigma and existential fragility, a specific personality profile, the possibility of suicidal tendencies, in relation to the country's historical and political context, the rationality or irrationality of the passage to the terrorist act, understanding of the notion of cognitive distortions Lynch (2013), adds that terrorism, radicalism, and extremism have been intertwined with concepts of identity, integration, segregation, and multiculturalism. Lynch goes on to say that Intense emphasis on the criminal justice system and strategy, as adopted by British authorities, can culminate in marginalization and alienation of communities, resulting in a broken urban cohesion. Furthermore, Meeus (2015) asserts that young Muslims or young people with an unsure heritage and a religious orientation are more inclined to move closer to radical Islam and jihad due to a religious problem-solving perspective, as well as a self-definition as a religious seeker, which steers this potential identity change in the direction of religious conversion. Social movement theory provides a framework for understanding radicalization by emphasizing the larger dynamics and processes of political mobilization. Social networks are a significant mechanism for grievance transmission, recruitment, and mobilization (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008a), and social network analysis is one of the more prominent analytical approaches to understanding and countering radical groups.

Radicalization, as a drive toward increased conflict, may be observed in both populations and the government itself. The history of intercommunal riots, pogroms, and genocide shows that communities may be radicalized to the extent of fanaticism and violence. State reactions to radicalisation are also kinds of radicalization. When the people supports the intensification of confrontation involving internal or external opponents, the state might become radicalized by altering laws or even declaring war. Political conflicts can also be radicalized by attempts to control them: when the governmental status quo is pressured by the emergence of a new political player (perhaps a protest movement supported by popular mobilisation), redefining the new entrant as illegitimate ('violent,' 'terrorist') intensifies the level of prompt dispute while trying to make the longer-term political threat less severe easier to handle (Edwards 2009).

In terms of recruitment the use of narratives is extremely crucial in extremist propaganda. Narratives relate to the stories as told rather than the occurrences shown (Cobley, 2014; Corman, 2016), implying that the same sequence of events might be used as the foundation for numerous narratives based on the narrator's storytelling choices. It is hardly surprising, then, that narratives are an important component of extremist communication. Extremism studies, like other areas, have undergone a 'narrative turn' (Nünning 2012): Over the last decade, a growing body of research has identified and studied the narratives transmitted by extremist actors, as well as their possible significance in the radicalization processes of both right-wing (Allchorn 2020b; Braouezec 2016) and jihadist extremists (e.g. Ingram 2017a; Schmid 2014). The tales of heroes and villains, of a small clique of heroes triumphing over a great government with a hidden plan to rebuild its population, of David vs Goliath, of a "war to end all battles" and an identity crisis, of destiny or God's will. Social media plays a significant influence in the susceptibility of youths to radicalization. As per Gill and Corner (2015) Young

radicals, are much more likely to use the internet as well as other virtual platforms than adults charged with terrorism.

Similarly according to Odhiambo and colleagues (2015), the key platforms used by extremist are the internet, universities, and colleges. Radicalization of youth and recruitment into violent extremism are social and economic issues. This has been demonstrated by the fact that over 40% of al Qaeda terrorist acts in the United Kingdom between 1999 and 2009 were carried out by university or college students. The increased accessibility of the internet platform has also greatly aided this system, with an individual having his mind washed' in the privacy of his own household and, more importantly, on his home computer, following his life choice to plug into a web page, with no tension from anybody else. According to Odhiambo et al. (2013), Al-Shabaab employs a variety of media to propagate its message. Aside from traditional radio, the internet is the most widely utilized medium of communication since it is the quickest and most cost-effective option to reach a large audience. The online is popular among young people, and Islamic organizations such as Al-Shabaab utilize its internet communities and chat rooms to attract new members. The Internet is especially enticing to young people since many terror websites are flashy and well-designed. The importance of conversations via Skype and other online platforms is highlighted in Callimachi's (2015) and Erelle's (2015) investigative research concerning ISIS recruiting of Western persons. Young radicals, as per studies, are much more likely to use the internet as well as other virtual platforms than adults charged with terrorism (Gill & Corner 2015).

Contrary (von Behr et al .,2013) argues that no link has been shown between the consumption of and networking around violent extremist online content and the acquisition of extremist ideology and/or participation in violent extremism and terrorism. They go further say that it is not the reason of youth radicalization and that internet only serves as an alternative for other methods of interaction and engagement . These considerations suggest that rather than

being cyber-dependent, the process of youth radicalization should be understood as cyber-enabled (Gill et al., 2015, Taylor et al., 2017; Pauwels & Schils, 2016). Given the significant importance that social media currently plays in creating social ties and relationships with others, which can impact young behaviours and actions (Boyd 2014; Pauwels & Schils 2016), this is all the more crucial to youth radicalization. Violent extremist organizations develop a better understanding of their prospective students. The groups' sophisticated, complex social media strategies support their fundamental narrative. Numerous prospects for enrolment are young people, who are receptive not just because of their philosophy or religion, but only because the recruiter taps to underground aspirations for recognition and the opportunity to make a big contribution to a supposedly main causes.

1.3 COUNTER AND PREVENTION OF RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Countering violent extremism became a widely recognized strategy, implying not only military war but also a clash of ideas. The change in nomenclature from terrorism to violent extremism has also allowed for an examination of the core reasons of violent extremism. Since 9/11, EU member states have utilized the idea of radicalization to explain why young people join terrorist organizations. The transition to a Preventative strategy to mitigate indicated a shift in perspective. These countermeasures comprised military intervention, heightened policing authority, and the development of security agencies. Following numerous high-profile

instances of 'locally based' terrorism in Western nations in the mid-2000s, the emphasis began to shift. In 2003, Great Britain started its counter-terrorism strategy Contest, with a unique strand devoted to preventing people from being terrorists or supporting terrorism. And then there was the 'EU Resolution on Countering Terrorism,' which was approved in March 2004, and the 'EU Course of Action on Fighting Terrorism,' which was adopted later that year. The idea of radicalization gained popularity in EU policy circles in 2006 when the European Commission launched the Expert Group on Violent radicalization

Counter /prevention of violent extremism is a set of techniques and suggestions for responding to and preventing violent extremism. On a national and local level, it seeks to address the core drivers of violent extremism and to prevent recruitment to extremist organisations (Mastroe and Szmania, 2016, p. 2; U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2017). According to Neumann (2011, p.18), strives to capture an infinite range of activities that governments and non state actors engage in to avoid radicalization. Speeches, flyers, social media campaigns, round table talks, community development, youth leadership efforts, education and training for community leaders and law enforcers are all part of this. Because of the wide range of domains that CVE is designed to cover, this might be difficult to design an effective strategy. As per Romaniuk,(2015), assessing and evaluating the performance of Counter violent extremism has proven to be difficult due to a lack of precise data and the difficulties in identifying negative impacts, such as terrorism prevention .

Defining Prevention of violent extremism and averting radicalization can be difficult due to the amount of literature that uses these words, as well as inconsistencies in the meanings of both violent extremism and radicalization. An essential conceptual distinction can be made between ideological and behavioural interpretations of extremism, which means it can relate to "political opinions which are completely contrary to a current societal basic principles." It may also refer to the means used by individuals to accomplish any political objective. Terrorist

organizations such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda have formed a global understanding of what constitutes violent extremism in recent years, and this understanding has influenced domestic and international responses and prevention efforts. Many people associate the phrase with highly radical ideology, unbridled violence, and excessively restrictive countries. Nonetheless, despite the recent increase in jihadist-inspired activities and the explosion of initiatives to minimize violent extremism perpetrated by jihadists, the word violent extremism does not refer to a single philosophy, religion, or political aim.

According to McCants and Watts (2012) countering violent extremism has become a popular term used by most governments, non-governmental organizations and scholars to refer to a non-coercive attempt to reduce involvement in terrorism. McCants and Watts further states that there is lack of clear definition of countering or prevention violent extremism because it ranges from stopping people from embracing extreme beliefs that might contribute to terrorism to reduce strong participation for terrorist groups. This has made it harder to evaluate the whole idea of counter violent extremism because it is based on assumptions on what works. Hence leading to conflicting and counter-productive programs.

Similarly Hogan (2014) affirms that many counter violent extremism strategies cannot define what they are preventing since they vary throughout the globe aiming at changing the behaviour to challenging the ideas and beliefs. Violent extremism is a multifaceted social and criminal issue. Over the last decade, there has been a growing urge to avoid radicalization at all levels of society, especially in schools. However, given the lack of scientific backing and unclear ideas about what to focus on, there has been some skepticism regarding how to effectively address these concerns (Kundnani, 2012, 2014; Sedgwick, 2010; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Furthermore, the notions of radicalization and extremism have

traditionally been associated with security policy and have not been explicitly related to work in areas such as education, social work, or healthcare (Sieckelinck et al., 2015).

According to Thomas(2014 p.2), countering and preventing violent extremism is prevalent because it seems to suggest a solution using soft-power strategies which try to intervene before violence happens however, Ramalingam and tuck(2014) argue that despite huge investment by World nations in offering practical solutions, measuring the impact of the initiative is challenging (Veldhuis 2012).

The fast expansion of research aimed at averting violent extremism has resulted in a large yet fragmented corpus of literature spanning various fields and disciplines such as Psychology(Jasko, LaFree and Kruglanski, 2016), psychiatry(Sestoft, Hansen and Christensen, 2017), public health(Weine et al., 2016), education(Ghosh, Chan, Manuel and Dilimulati, 2016), social work(Robinson, Gardee, Chaudhry and Collins, 2017), and criminology .When it comes to psychology Obviously, much more focus is on individual analysis, both cognitive capacity and cognitive style which impacts violent conduct. Studies have found a link between cognitive ability and aggression, and it has been proposed that there may also be a link between cognitive style and an individual's proclivity to join a terrorist organization.For instance when people feel a loss of personal importance (for example, as a result of social rejection, inability to accomplish, or abuse), the need to reclaim significance may drive them to adopt extreme measures.Public health or social work emphasize more on community-based or societal-level issues.This generates fascinating studies but makes it more difficult to develop a clear, unified narrative on prevention. Due to the present tendency of subsuming prevention into a broad body of Prevention /Counter violent extremism methods, as well as the vast and continuously rising body of literature, there is an urgent need to get a better understanding of the current state of the prevention literature.

Within the East African setting, the Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE II) campaign in Kenya was and still one such endeavour to mitigate the danger presented by Violent extremism. The STRIVE II initiative was undertaken over five years ago in target counties to lower the danger of radicalization and recruitment. The Programme team used Horgan's (2009) definition of radicalisation as the "social and psychological process of gradually experienced commitment to extreme political or religious ideology" (p.152), but separated such processes from enrollment and participation in a violent extremist organisation (Khalil, Horgan and Zeuthen 2019). This fostered collaborative relationships involving law enforcement and affected communities, with a concentration on proactive joint problem resolution to foster trust and collaboration while addressing the present conditions that contribute to public safety concerns. It is absolutely vital, according to Silk (2012), to develop connections, provide knowledge, and build trust.

However, its drawbacks have been documented through research (Schanzer, Kurzman, Toliver, & Miller, 2016). Community members report that if they see anything questionable or communications that suggest a risk for ideological violence, there are often no clear pathways to get advice from trusted members of their community. They also note that there are no many programs and practitioners where prospective bystanders may connect with those who can assist them in terms of interpreting the problem and halting the problem before it becomes a crime. Many individuals reported being afraid to call law enforcement. Community participation on CVE may have generated severe unintended consequences, such as the social stigma of Muslim populations, as seen in Kenya, particularly among Somali groups (Romaniuk 2015, p.16). Similarly Thomas (2008pp. 4-5), adds that some CVE initiatives had the effect of establishing Muslims as a "suspicious group," yet they were being perceived in a homogenous and cohesive manner that other cultures are not. According to Weine, S., and Braniff, W. (2015), CVE is widely seen by civil rights groups and certain

community members as a government scheme that restricts people's liberties. According to Osman (2013), one of the issues has been that CVE policy makers and practitioners do not have acceptable means of articulating their objective in a broader sense. As a result, they are open to assaults from community members and civil liberties activists who regard CVE as having no benefit and only harming people to their communities. Members of the group have stated that they do not want their interaction with the government to become even more securitized, nor do they want to be stereotyped as a questionable community. They oppose CVE measures because they see them as law enforcement-driven.

Current CVE initiatives, are primarily focus on Islamic extremism, targeting Muslim populations in ways that might encourage distrust and exclusion (Kundani 2009, p. 23) they risk indirectly contributing to increasing prejudice against Muslims. Such profiling just serves to enhance pre-existing notions of social marginalization (Chin, in Lombardi, Ragab, and Chin 2014 p. 13).The prevalent narrative for interpreting violent extremism, as with terrorism, is that of transnational Islamic networks posing a threat to the Western world (Nasser-Eddine, et al., 2011, pp.15-16). Counter violent extremism operations ought to be more precisely focused on the preventative and mitigation components . The activities include projects, guidelines, and interventions that encourage the inclusion of at-risk individuals and communities and engage them to minimize exposure to the things that cause and influencers of violence as well as the progression of violence, whereas intervention activities incorporate initiatives, regulations, and interventions that represent youth and adults who are thought to be at risk of becoming involved a violent act but are in the pre-criminal space, which in public health framework it is categorized as primary prevention (O'Connell, Boat, & Warner 2009).

In terms of the literature gap, Borum (2011) contends that while academics and policy-makers around the world have made massive efforts to gain an insight into the mechanisms by which persons, especially the youths, define themselves with individuals with

violent extremist ideas that present a global challenge, the research on the likely incentives for young people to consent to radicalization and recruitment into domestic terrorism is lacking.

In addition to that there is little research on why and how various individuals become radicalized and advance to or not join violent extremist organizations. Youth radicalization in Kenya is on the increase, despite the fact that several young people have been jailed, convicted, or even killed (Chitembwe, Okoth, and Matanga, 2021). The government's policies, techniques, and initiatives to discourage the threat and deal with individuals found guilty may have had unintended repercussions. Kenya sought to decrease young people radicalization in the aftermath of a wave of terror attacks on its land. Although Kenya government adopted building of individual resilience which is crucial in preventive discourse, because it provides a perspective on prevention that respects the potential and activity of individuals and groups. However, there is no clear structure for resilience in the face of violent extremism in addition to that it is difficult to determine whether programs are beneficial because most people involved in preventive programs do not usually engage in an evaluation or review of their efforts. what is currently lacking in the Counter and prevention of violent extremism sector is an evidence foundation that clearly points to risk and protective variables that might influence public health program development.

1.4 VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM AS A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM

War and violence have heightened awareness of psychological damage. The reified concept of post-traumatic stress disorder has aided in the justification of healthcare access for asylum seekers and refugees, civilians subjected to war but trapped in conflict zones, veterans returning from combat, and victims of violent abuse, crime, rape, or violent attack, or natural catastrophes (Jacobs, Burns, & Gross, 2003). Radicalization and extremism are both characterized as possible antecedents to violence (either collectively or singly) and so presented as crucial chances for intervention and prevention. Extremist violence already has personal and population-level health consequences, making it a critical issue for public health and highlighting the need for preventative policies and programs that address both of these domains. Some have argued that radicalization is a psychological issue rather than a religious one, this has been supported by (Bhui et al., 2014) through a research done in United Kingdom to understand radicalization as well as to avoid violent radicalization, they discovered that there was a link connecting extremist sympathies and "being youth, in full-time education, relative social exclusion, and having a propensity towards depressive symptom. As we all know, depression is characterized by negative emotions, a sense of despair, and impulsive and impatient behaviour. For instance individuals driven by the ideology of a certain group who act alone were discovered to have mental illness and frequently acting from a combination of pessimism and paranoia. Youths have always been easy targets by the extremists because of their impulsive decision-making and trouble anticipating outcomes, which may push them to seek alternatives that they incorrectly believe would empower them. Furthermore a desire for

religious significance may drive individuals to terrorist causes, just like others may join a gang to boost self-esteem and for safety .

Contrary (Dom et al., 2018) argues that there is scanty evidence that terrorists have a high frequency of mental problems. According to Bhui, James, and Wessely,(2016), they contend that terrorist organisations may be reluctant to recruit people with mental illnesses if doing so is believed to jeopardize their purpose. However, Corner, Gil, and Mason, 2016) argues that lone actors and group terrorists may differ on the basis of radicalization paths, group dynamics, and mental disorder prevalence rates. According to De Foster and Swalve, (2017), they claim that there limited body of findings on the association between radicalization and psychological health, however mainstream press and some governmental policies suggest that perpetrators' mental health status is frequently associated with violent (terroristic) acts; this is then seen as a result of failures in mental health systems. This stereotype prejudice commonly manifests itself in society, when mental diseases are associated with hazard and violence. It is critical that psychologists and mental health experts are aware of the data on this difficult issue in order to accurately enlighten public opinion and better influence their professions.

Terrorist activities resulting from violent radicalization have a direct public health impact, including deaths, bodily injuries, and psychological damage. Rather than focusing just on data from convicted terrorists and criminal justice analyses, because the process of violent radicalization and its consequences for populations are not completely understood (Atran 2003). Understanding the risk and protective variables for violent extremist ideologies and the paths to terrorism is essential for promoting societies free of such temptations. However, the risk factors for radicalization are mostly unclear. Weine and Ahmed (2012) discovered that risk may be comprehended not just personally, but as a characteristic of the family and community in their ethnographic research on Somali- Americans to uncover risk and protective variables. One risk factor identified by their research was an inaccessibility to social and mental health

services among community members. (Bhui, Everitt, & Jones 2014) brings extra risk factor of probable convergence between radicalization to psychological distress. Several socio economic variables, including inadequate cultural integration, prejudice with a consequent sense of inequality and injustice, social inequalities, and low social cohesiveness or gang violence, have been postulated to encourage radicalization (Alcalá, HeSharif, MZSamari,2017). Furthermore, vulnerable people may have several requirements. As a result, addressing vulnerability to extremist ideas or groups may be just one of several variables requiring action to lessen the levels of violence. The scholarly previous studies on public health responses to terrorism, radicalization, and extremism are expanding at an astonishing rate. Unfortunately, this expansion is not the product of fresh scientific discoveries, but rather of a political and scholarly need to understand what motivates people to be involved in terrorism.

A growing consensus acknowledges that conventional law enforcement and prosecuting measures alone can not be enough to prevent terrorist activities. Countering violent extremism entails a variety of prevention and intervention strategies aimed at increasing communities' and individuals' resilience to radicalization toward violent extremism, providing non violent pathways for expressing grievances, and educating populations about the risk of enrolment and radicalization to violence. However it is also important to also look into public health which is responsible for illness and injury prevention, environmental protection, and encouraging healthy habits and surroundings. Understanding the risk and protective variables for violent extremist ideologies and routes to terrorism is crucial for fostering communities free of such appeals. According to (Bellis et al., 2017a; Eisenman & Flavahan, 2017) Violent extremism seems to have shared risk and protective characteristics with other kinds of violence. The concept of preventive interventions is therefore connected to a highly accurate assessment of risk and protective variables that are targeted for change. Additionally, susceptible persons may have several necessities. Individual, environmental, and social risk factors make youths

prone to radicalization to violent extremism, according to literature on radicalization and violent extremism. Individual risk factors include psychological vulnerability as well as personal ambiguity about identity creation. Environmental elements include social networks such as family and peer groups, which can support radical attitudes and acts. The influence of group polarisation and social exclusion, geopolitical circumstances, and larger political and ideological narratives are all societal risk factors. Hence, mitigating susceptibility to extremist ideologies or organizations may be simply one of several variables requiring intervention in order to decrease the rates of violence.

1.4.1 WHY PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH AND DESIGN THINKING TO TACKLE VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM

Public health seeks to study the broader factors of recruitment in susceptible communities and to discover the paths to radicalization. There is no single road from radicalization to violent extremism, and each person's experience is unique. Recent conceptualizations see it as a multi-step process with mutually reinforcing stages (McCauley, C Moskalenko, 2008). However, most people begin the process of radicalization to violent extremism in one of three areas of their lives: social relationships (e.g., changing behaviour or appearance to align with a specific group); ideology (e.g., assertions of self righteousness over, or animosity towards, those certain communities); or criminality .

Public health approaches entail intimate ties with the community, activities at the population level rather than only via health institutions, and interventions aimed at reducing risk factors and promoting protective factors. The goal is to change the distribution of risk variables in a community so that fewer people reach the threshold for having considerable risks and acquiring the illness. This technique has been used to prevent violence in general (Mikton,

Butchart, Dahlberg, & Krug, 2016), as well as behaviors such as suicide, violence, drug use, criminality, and, more recently, radicalization and terrorism (Bhui et al., 2012).

According to the UK Faculty of Public Health, public health is "the science and art of promoting and safeguarding health and well-being, avoiding illness, and extending life via coordinated societal activities .Extremist violence has both personal and population-level health implications making it a serious public health concern and highlighting the necessity of preventative strategies and programs that act in both of these realms.Counter and prevention of violent extremism community initiatives may not have to be constructed by criminal justice, as has been the presiding modus operandi thus far, but might alternatively be defined by a public health structure. The World Health Organization defines public health as "any organized actions (public or private) to prevent disease, enhance health, and extend life among the general population." Its actions attempt to create circumstances for individuals to be healthy, and it focuses on entire communities rather than patients or diseases. As a result, public health is concerned with the entire system rather than just the elimination of a specific illness. (World Health Organization 2016).

Many modern measures to combating violent extremism lack proof of success, which can weaken their efforts. Numerous initiatives have culminated in profiling, prejudice, and anger among the people they were supposed to serve, and others have been demonstrated to worsen an individual's sense of loneliness and encourage violent action. Employing a public health approach to the problem may be the most effective strategy to achieve the goal of combating and avoiding violent extremism.Scholars such as Romaniuk (2015) postulate that it was difficult to determine whether programs were beneficial because most people involved in preventive programs do not usually engage in an evaluation or review of their efforts.He goes on to say that supporting the ongoing creation and refining of evidence-based policy, methodologies and programs needed to be evaluated on a regular basis.

Public health encompasses a wide range of disciplines pertinent to countering and preventing violent extremism , including psychiatry, psychology, sociology, communications, education, and public policy .Each of these traits combine to make healthcare system a potentially useful framework for comprehending the many facets of violent extremism instead of just viewing it from one point of view .Public health viewpoint examines fundamental issues such as, Where does the problem begin and how can the problem be avoided before happening in the first place.Public health professionals perform out their work in a variety of ways, including planning and implementing community-based projects, managing operations, undertaking research and evaluation, and making policy recommendations. Nevertheless while practitioners may not be engaged in all processes, knowing each step and why it is important to have the intended impact on community health is beneficial in selecting and designing preventative methods.

A growing research base for changing and preventing violent extremism shows interventions that focus on enhancing protective qualities such as problem-solving or decision-making abilities, as well as discussing ideas like as personal identity and belonging. Although there is evidence that resilience programs can improve mental health and well-being in the short term, further research is needed to understand the impact of these interventions on diverse demographic groups and violent extremism. Empirical facts support the impact of programs that promote peace and diversity by enhancing inter cultural awareness, fostering pluralist ideals, and promoting multiculturalism and human rights.As part of public health initiatives, framing the prevention of violent extremism community programs as a public health approach may help preventative and intervention programs to get access to additional resources. Community safety is critical for both public health and law enforcement. It may also be beneficial to embed programs in existing institutions that are integrated into community life rather than adding new organizations that are or appear to be part of security apparatus.

Other areas frequently use public health as a framework, with or without genuine public health expert engagement.

Sociologists are increasingly turning to public health to explain a wide range of social contagions, and Islamic militancy is no exception for example Baltasiu, (2004) explains that insights from a growing corpus of research on "social contagion phenomena" such as trends, fads, rumours, civil strife, and progressive ideas are based on public health model and practices. According to (De Jong 2010 Heath 2002) a public health strategy is likely will reduce the danger of social stigma linked with stereotyping, there is minimal experimental proof of forecast validity. Understanding people and groups histories, identities, and tales, cultural impacts on socialization and effective resettlement, and public and community support for counter-radicalization are all required for this method. It will be critical to assess the predictive value of these potential risk and protective variables. There is significance, for example, in comparing public sentiments for violent radicalization to levels of political activity in the same community, and in investigating their respective effects on health as well as on violent and non violent protest.

Public health is relevant because it is not just a theory ,it is already occurring .The Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States already sees a public-health approach as a collaborative action by mental health, drug, psychosocial, and criminal justice practitioners as a means to prevent violence in general. The public health approach is distinct from the preceding counter-violent extremism framework. First, it advocates for a multidisciplinary, state-led strategy that promotes collaboration among state and local governments, non profit organizations, and federal resources. Previous projects were generally driven by local governments, the federal government, or a mix of the two. Although there have been some instances of vulnerable individuals and communities refusing to participate with local bodies because they did not trust the federal officials involved. To offset this difficulty,

the state might function as a buffer, channelling funds, political, and human resources at the national level that may not be accessible in smaller communities. Second, the term prevention is usually used instead of opposing, because prevention implies proactive activity that reduces risk factors instead of often-difficult and not always effective attempts to contradict an ideology. More emphasis is placed on avoiding targeted violence, which elevates violence above ideology and encompasses any type of deliberate violence perpetrated towards defenceless communities for a particular political or ideological motive. Finally, the preventative model is consistent with a public-health strategy since it necessitates the participation of several disciplines such as social services, behavioural health services (including mental health and drug addiction experts), schools, and businesses.

Because it provides for the demarcation of proper duties and responsibilities among stakeholders, this clearly demonstrates that the problem is not merely a law-enforcement issue. By elevating non-security responsibilities to prevent targeted violence, governments and municipalities will be able to maintain these initiatives through non-law enforcement measures.

Taking into consideration the complexity of radicalization ,violent extremism and terrorism . Rosenhead and Mingers, (2001) contends that we are confronted with "dynamic conditions comprised of sophisticated systems of shifting issues that intersect with one another, rather than challenges that are autonomous of one another." This sort of challenging problem space as per (Rittel and Webber 1973) is known as "messes." Rosenhead and mingers goes on to describes the messes as those with inherent complicated interconnections and dynamic complexity. They also highlight that individual problems can be solved but if they are components of the mess ,individual problems cannot be included because they will interact. Deep uncertainty is the source of surprises and shocks in a system, as well as the primary cause of discontinuity in a system's strategic space, in the context of counter-terrorism.

It emphasizes the complex social elements that necessitate an empathetic approach in order to reveal the connections and processes that enable the genesis of violent extremism(Masys, 2016) To address the intrinsic complexity of issue areas, new strategies and methodologies have emerged. Design thinking, system and complexity methods develop as a response to traditional methodologies' incapacity to deal with the human and social dimensions of issue situations.According to Stares, P.B., and Yacoubian, M. (2007), the public health model of terrorism/ extremism is a metaphor that conveys the underlying complexity , they compare terrorism to a virus, similar to Al Qaeda, which mutates. Design thinking ideas have been used in holistic approaches to healthcare and illness to address instability, unpredictability, complexity, and ambiguity.This is compared to a dragonfly. 'Information from these dozens of distinct viewpoints travels into the dragonfly's brain, where it is synthesis into a vision so brilliant that the dragonfly can see in practically every direction at the same time .

Tetlock and Garner (2015) conclude that because radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism are complex phenomena, it is necessary to generate multiple viewpoints and combine them, just as the public health approach design thinking is important for projecting. They go on to say that design thinking is a strong method in the counter-terrorism issue area because of the aspects of perspective-taking, discussion, synthesis, empathy, framing, ideation, prototyping, testing, and evaluation.According to Donald Schön and K. Dorst (1983;2011) designers study the problem and its background, and may reinterpret or reorganize it in able to find a specific frame of the problem which provides a road to a solution.During the design process, the designer's attention often oscillates between their comprehension of the issue situation and their concepts for a remedy in a process of problem and solution co-evolution (Dorst and Cross 2001) (Wiltchnig, Christensen, and Ball 2013)

1.6 CONCLUSION

The problem of violent extremism, is widely defined as politically and ideologically driven violence that purposefully targets civilians and non-combatants, it is also one of the most persistent dangers to global security. It is important to note that recruitment to violent extremist organizations is influenced by a number of variables, which some scholars have classified as "push" and "pull" factors. The term "push factors" refers to "negative social, cultural, and political characteristics of one's sociocultural surroundings that contribute in 'pushing' vulnerable individuals down the road of violent extremism. Poverty, unemployment, discrimination, political and economic marginalization are also examples of motivating factors (Zerem and Podder 2011, p.63; Hassan 2012). Pull factors, on the other side, "attract" people towards an organized group. Collective ideology, brotherhood and sense of connection, notoriety, and opportunities for renown are examples of pull factors that correlate to the positive traits or advantages of the group (Hassan, 2012). As possible pull reasons, Ranstorp (2016, p. 4) lists a sense of enthusiasm and pleasure, individual salvation, connection to a purpose, and a glamorized perspective of ideology. Traditional approaches to combating/preventing violent extremism created within criminal justice frameworks have been criticized, and new practice is frequently not evidence-based and lacks explanation or assessment.

Until now, counter and prevention of violent extremism has mostly been done by police departments and guided by criminal justice systems. Most strategies aim to target just individuals who are already planning or conducting terrorist actions, or those involved in the criminal justice system, ignoring the larger demographic base from whom terrorists are recruited, as well as the groups with which they are affiliated. The utter lack of agreement on how to identify the current strategic danger demonstrates that we are still trying to understand its nature, let alone devise an effective response. As a result, in order to tackle this new threat, the old toolbox of public security measures must be modified and supplemented because it was created to confront foes from another century. It is consequently critical to distinguish violent extremism from other terms. It is critical that the government, academia, and community debate violent extremism together and in a framework that is both relevant and consistent. This, in turn, will help attempt to build strong policies about violent extremism and its prevention. If violent extremism is understood and addressed in the same way as terrorism, and is not defined within its context, efforts to combat violent extremism will solely focus on preventing physical acts of terror, rather than working at the grass roots level and combating the belief systems that drive individuals to commit such acts.

Counter and preventive measure of violent radicalization and extremism operations must begin to stress tactics and analytic processes that recognize Islamic extremism's unusual and international characteristics. The suggested technique also reduces the potential of stigma associated with profiling, which has no empirical proof of predictive accuracy. Thus, paths to violent radicalization can be best defined if public health research studies promising new social and behavioural sciences factors such as social inclusion, exclusion, cultural identification and acculturation, stigma, discrimination, and political participation. Combating and preventing radicalization and violent extremism necessitates substantial new measures that go beyond criminal justice and are integrated into public health

policy and practice. Terrorism's tactic includes inciting a severe counter-response that strengthens claims of discrimination, estrangement, and injustice against certain communities.

To prevent violent extremism, one must first grasp its foundations. Antiterrorism methods are built on knowledge of and experience with violent extremism. Work with communities to understand the meaning of radicalization and how to assess it is essential as part of a comprehensive research initiative to study what radicalization could look like. Listening to those we wish to impact and formulating and implementing policies based on the lived experience of civilian professionals and those entrenched in evidence will be required for prevention of violent extremism. In addition to that reframing the discourse regarding radicalization out of one regarding law enforcement to one about young people's health may also assist overcome some of the hostility to present tactics.

A public health strategy allows for multi-purpose programming, such as combating violent extremism as part of a larger framework for addressing other young well-being problems such as orientation, mental well being, and gender violence. A public health strategy may also be able to evade the shame related to criminal justice involvement, which is viewed as identifying a questionable group. Finally, by using current public health resources, a public health strategy may open up new avenues for organizing and supporting Counter and prevention of violent extremism initiatives. However it is vital to note that the public health strategy exists to supplement and not to replace criminal justice authorities, especially if people have become more inclined to join and participate in organized groups or personal individual activities in support of terrorist organizations. The public approach also aims to minimize anxiety and deliver practical, evidence-based information to the general public, so that everyone may view themselves as part of a solution rather than being excluded or feeling like they are part of the suspicious population.

CHAPTER TWO

YOUTH RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA

"As a people, we must work together to drain the swamp of violent extremism and deny it space to radicalize Kenyans." (2012, President Uhuru Kenyatta).

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will be broken down into sections. The goal of this chapter is to understand radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya, including the history of the problem, the elements that contribute to it, and the intervention technique employed to address among the youths. . The goal of this study is to investigate and comprehend why there has been an increase in youth radicalization in Kenya by answering the following research questions: how have radicalization and violent extremism been depicted, what are the underlying narratives, and why do interventions appear to be counterproductive.

2.1 METHODOLOGY

Secondary data was used in this study, which is defined as "the use of existing information to find answers to research questions" and was used to "apply a different perspective or new theoretical emphasis to the previous research issue (Jonker, 2010)" (Long-Sutehall, Sque, & Addington-Hall, 2011, p. 336). The utilization of secondary data in this research allowed for the inclusion of various diverse factors related to Kenya's strategy to counter violent extremism, both directly and indirectly, providing a deductive depiction of the factors herein. Secondary data were gathered and discovered using online database repositories, website search engines, university libraries search, and, most importantly, by assessing the readily accessible sources cited in the relevant review on the subject (Terrell 2015).

In terms of the data target, which was the youths used in this study, sustaining analysis was very core and necessary throughout the research study process (Flick 2014), resulting in the need to further search the available literature information found as per the following criteria.

- 1)The data gathered in the included material must have been addressing youth radicalization and counter-violent extremism in the strict sense, rather than violent act, conduct disorders, peace, or security in the broad sense, because research has shown that success factors differ across the various sub-domains included in such broad purviews (Denoeux & Carter, 2009).
- 2)The included study had to address the topic of youth radicalization and prevention of violent extremism in Kenya, with the assumption that the Kenyan context was unique from others.

2.2 BACKGROUND

Following Kenya's independence in 1963, President Jomo Kenyatta established a one-party administration that held him in power via massive corruption until his death in office more than a decade later. Kenya was dominated by an even more worrisome kleptocracy when Daniel Arap Moi took over as the successor. Moi repeatedly rebuffed requests for a multi-party political system, but finally relented in response to "Western pressures to withhold economic support" (Vittori et al., 2009, p. 1081). This was a significant precedent for Kenya's present counter terrorism approach for one major reason: it produced widespread belief that Kenya was untenable on its own. Whether or not this was true, both Kenya and Foreign friends, like the United States, recognized the value of assistance funds and resources. Muslim estrangement in Kenya persisted during this time period. The formation of a few major politically oriented organisations was facilitated by multi-partyism. Because the Muslim community was ostensibly included in each of these parties, it chose to form its own political party, which stirred debate throughout the state. Since Kenyatta's reign, politics in Kenya have never been founded on religion. There was no need to prioritise religion as long as Muslims remained inconsequential (Vittori et al.,2009).

The question of Islam as a challenge to Kenya became significant in the national political arena for the first time. The ensuing reaction gave rise to what is undoubtedly the radical Muslim community that is still a component of present anti-terrorism policy. Muslims on Kenya's coast were even more united as their isolation and irrelevance began to give way to prejudice and hatred. The IPK was still active, and it provided a place for Muslims to air their grievances about the political system. Vittori and his colleagues (2009) further asserts that the assembling of these Muslims instilled nearly irrational dread in the administration, resulting in frequent violent encounters with police in the early 1990s. This may have propagated extreme

thought within Kenyan Muslims, but the world society paid little attention to it. Terrorism had hitherto been a domestic concern, with threats from Kenya's Islamic community having little direct impact on American or world interests.

Kenya has seen a number of recent terrorist incidents, the most prominent being the 1980 terror assault at the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, which was owned by a Jewish block firm. Twenty individuals were killed, and more than 80 were injured. The incident was placed on the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). According to some news accounts, the Kenyan attack was motivated by Kenya's part in allowing Israeli rescuers to refuel in Nairobi after evacuating Israeli captives from Entebbe Airport in 1976. (Kiruga, 2013). For years, the Kenyan government has associated "violent extremism" with "Islamic radicalization." This is partly due to Kenya's working relationship with the United States and its efforts to restrict the Muslim minority (Mogire and Agade 2011). Following 9/11, the Kenyan government joined the worldwide "war on terror," enacting different legislation and establishing counterterrorism facilities in Kenya. In the Kenyan context, the war on terror has mostly targeted Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization which has functioned in Kenya for several years. Kenya became a prominent player in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) were assaulted in 1998, killing hundreds and signalling a shift in US foreign policy. Terrorists widely suspected of being linked to the embassy attack detonated a bomb at a hotel on Kenya's coast in 2002 while simultaneously firing a ground missile at an Israeli commercial aircraft, nearly missing the target. Al-Qa'ida affiliates specifically target Kenya for its involvement in the Global War on Terror, and there have been several small-scale assaults, demonstrating that the surrounding dangers to regional security may only serve as an even larger predictor of future issues. It has become evident that the instability caused by terrorism in Kenya is not limited to the borders of the nation. Kenya's current anti-terrorism policy ignores the country's history and geography, making it fundamentally unsound. Kenya's

topography is critical to understanding its current relevance in the fight against terrorism. The country is located on Africa's eastern coast, with direct access to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Kenya is also surrounded by five other countries: Somalia, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. While each bordering state poses unique concerns to Kenyan security.

Kenya's political structure and institutions have been formed by tribe and clan culture, which has resulted in ethnic-focused bloodshed on multiple occasions (Hornsby 2012, p. 1-2). In 1992, the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was established. According to Prestholdt (2011), the IPK was popular among young Muslim males until President Moi accused it of spreading Islamic fundamentalism. Inter-tribal conflict persists in Kenya 25 years later, and in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 disputed national elections, Kenya once again dominated the headlines as new inter-ethnic violence killed hundreds. As per Hornsby (2012) when it comes to tribal animosity it is not anything new in Kenya it has been rampant since before independence, and successive Kenyan administrations have intentionally used this enmity for their own advantage. Every election since the inception of a multi-party system in 1991 has been marred by tribal enmity, with the 2007/08 elections wreaking the most havoc as political parties exploited pre-existing ethnic animosity.

Kenya has had most ethnic and tribal conflicts leading to higher number of violent extremist organisations like al Shabaab, al Qaeda, and ISIS. These organisations flourish on broad complaints along tribal lines and among individuals who have little confidence in authority, creating a more susceptible breeding environment. Kenya is frequently regarded as the economic and transportation engine of East Africa, with a GDP growth rate of around 5% over the last seven years. Kenya has achieved great progress in economic growth, technology and innovation, and development since winning independence from British colonial authority on December 12, 1963. (Provost, 2013). The unrest in Somalia has resulted in an upsurge of Somali refugees to Kenya, as well as an increase in the threat of al-Shabaab members trying to

enter Kenya claiming to need shelter (Goldman, 2014), making Kenya home to one of the world's largest refugee camps, Dadaab, which as per the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) houses over 245,000 registered refugees (UNHCR, 2017). The development of al-Shabaab as a violent extremist organisation is fraught with ambiguity. While spillovers from Somalia's lengthy conflict undermine Kenya's security and stability, the interplay of external and internal pressures is more nuanced than an external stress frame may indicate. Since Kenya increased its military involvement in Somalia in 2011, ostensibly to protect the country from attacks by the Somalia-based jihadi organization Al-Shabaab, attacks have multiplied, ranging from the siege of Nairobi's Westgate shopping center in September 2013 to village massacres and targeted killings of police and religious figures. While expanding its military commitment in Somalia, Kenya's administration was reluctant to identify and respond to Al-Shabaab's in the country's growing deadly instability. The death of Ahmed Abdi Godane in an American air strike on 1 September 2014 according to Maruf and Joseph (2014) appeared to be a watershed point in the Harakatal-Shabaab al-brief Mujahideen's brutal history. Many expected that the death of al-charismatic al-Shabaab and the brutal commander would herald a harsher collapse and shrinkage of the organisation in the aftermath of the AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) attack in southern Somalia. Instead, al-Shabaab has maintained its transformation, which began more than a year before the emir's assassination, losing territorial control in certain regions of southern Somalia while launching a sweeping insurgency in Kenya's borders and coastal districts. If their narrative was to be believed, al-Shabaab plans to expand its conflict across the region.

However, in response to the danger posed by Al-Shabaab, Kenya has increased security measures since 2014. It has launched police raids in majority-Somali neighbourhoods, strengthened administrative restrictions on refugee populations, enacted new security legislation, and granted the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit (ATPU) broad authority to locate and

imprison terror suspects. These reactions stem from a language and understanding that sees foreigners, specifically Somalis and Muslims, as a problem, both within and in terms of war spillovers from Somalia. However, rather than bolstering security, these solutions coincide with an ugly politicisation of escalating violence, intensifying persistent ethnic and regional differences that build and frame Kenya's violent system especially in regions known to have higher numbers of radicalization.

2.2.1 THE AL SHABAAB

Al-Shabaab is a violent Islamic organisation that has been fighting the Somali transitional government since 2006. The toppling of dictator Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991, which resulted in a governmental breakdown, Somalia's political environment has been volatile and unpredictable. Battling warlords and clan disputes heightened tensions and exacerbated the country's already precarious state. The pre-al-shabaab network, which included Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI), Sharia courts, and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), filled a political void and established some law and order. However, there appears to be considerable agreement that the organisation arose from a network of Afghan war veterans and small militias backing the formation of Shari'a courts in Somalia (Hansen, 2013, p. 6). The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) administered Somalia from Kenya until the Somali parliament convened in 2006. The TFG was obliged to compete with the ICU, and Ethiopian soldiers invaded Somalia in 2006 in an attempt to undermine the ICU's influence and support. The strategy was clearly failing since it failed to remove ICU's philosophy. Instead of weakening ICU support, the invasion strengthened extremist resistance to the TFG (Abukar, 2015, p.30).

According to counter terrorism expert Rob Wise (2011, p. 4), the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia from 2006 to 2009 led to the advancement of al-ideology Shabaab's of an Islamic state in Somalia, while also converting the group from a comparatively small Islamic movement into the country's most powerful and radical group. After being classified as both an insurgent group and a terrorist organization (Hansen , Gaas, and Dunn, 2009), the organization matured into a major actor in the Islamic Courts Union and evolved into an entity conducting local administration. It is not the first time al-Shabaab has changed dramatically. Since its inception as an urban militia defending the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu, the Salafist jihadi Islamic organization has undergone various modifications, always leaning heavily on its Somali nationalist roots (Barnes ,Cedric and Hassan ,2007). As part of the ICU, al-Shabaab was forced from Mogadishu by the Ethiopian assault, first into the rural districts of central Somalia, and subsequently south, pursued by its adversaries. Rebuilding to dominate several rural towns and villages in Bay, Bakool, and the Shebelle valley, as well as seizing many vital coastal ports, notably Barawe, and forging allies with local sheikhs and their militias along the way, in 2008, al-Shabaab gained control of the port city of Kismayu. Though it battled to retain territorial and political dominance in portions of central Somalia, al-power Shabaab's remained virtually uncontested in the south, and it remained a danger to Mogadishu's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) following Ethiopia's withdrawal.

Al-Shabaab has used guerrilla tactics such as bomb attacks and assassinations. Although Al-Shabaab originated as a terrorist organisation focused on internal politics within Somalia, the group has gradually shifted from Somali state politics to East African regional politics after blatant threats against Ethiopia and now Kenya. The region's backing for the TFG in Mogadishu has contributed to this transition. In 2006, Ethiopia's military ouster of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a faction of Somali Islamists, from the government provoked Al-Shabaab threats against Ethiopia. In the previous years, Al-Shabaab has directly threatened

Kenya, at least in part since Kenya has moved to combat piracy, demonstrating Kenya's increasing involvement against foreign dangers. Kenya has likewise made concerted efforts to safeguard its border from armed factions. In recent years, Al-Shabaab has refined its terror tactics and talents, and it is now by far the bloodiest guerrilla force functioning in the Horn of Africa (Daniela ,2009). The threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Kenya is no longer only perceived, but rather an actual threat. Al-blatant Shabaab's threats against Kenyan statehood have increased in the recent year. In January 2010, for example, the group produced a song warning Kenya of its presence: "We have arrived at the border,we'll enter Kenya, and Inshallah, we'll make it to Nairobi.When we arrive, we will battle and kill since we have plenty of weaponry". The statements provided by refugees and NGO workers in Dadaab, one of Kenya's refugee camps, ensure the Kenyan government that Al-Shabaab has not only crossed the border, but has penetrated the nation and is expanding within it.Kenya has already been a victim of a terrorist attack and has had enormous pressure from foreign players such as the UK and the US to combat terrorist networks infiltrating the country, thus one can begin to put together the current position of Kenya's response to migrants. Kenya's approach to suppressing refugee populations outside of camps and sealing the border is not endorsed by humanitarian organisations, but it is an evident response to a crisis and threat to national security. What is unexpected is the claim that the Kenyan government has initiated a scheme to recruit Somali refugees in Dadaab to return to Somalia and battle Al-Shabaab.Officials from the Kenya government, however, refuted the charges. The Local officials and officials in Somalia maintained and acknowledged that the claims are true.

Since 2010, al-Shabaab has been on the decline and has lost huge territory, such as the port of Kismayo, a vital commercial hub (MHD, 2012). The joint efforts of African Union troops, Kenyan and Ethiopian armed forces, and other foreign players, notably the United States, who were involved in intelligence-led air strikes and Special Forces commando

operations resulted in the loss of power and support (Bryden, 2014, p. 1, Chonka, 2016). Despite the recent upheaval, al-Shabaab remains a viable danger in both Somalia and neighbouring nations (Williams, 2014). However the rising threat posed by Al-Shabaab has focused attention on immigrants, as well as heightened scrutiny of populations whose "Kenyan-ness" has previously been questioned, including Kenya's sizeable native ethnic Somali minority. Long before Westgate in 2013 Nairobi's significant Somali-speaking community - the bulk of whom were born and reared in Kenya - and Somali urban refugees were the subject of state and popular repression. Despite continued increases in counterterrorism research, both the academic world and the mainstream media outlets have widely overlooked the situation in Kenya, a nation plagued by ongoing terrorist assaults by the Somali terrorist organization al-Shabaab (Botha, 2014a, p. 1). In 2016, al-Shabaab carried out 48 assaults in Kenya and is accused of carrying out nine more (Global Terrorism Database, n.d.). Due to the obvious group's increasing popularity among Kenyan youth, several of the crimes were conducted by natives (Adow, 2015). The existence of Al Shabaab is a serious security threat that also jeopardises Kenya's prosperity (Cachalia, Salifu, and Ndung'u, 2016, p. 1).

Notwithstanding the military efforts of the Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Somali Federal governments, as well as the participation of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces with US and allied forces, al-Shabaab's in the Horn of Africa (HoA) has remained tenacious during the previous years. Kenya's approach to combating domestic recruiting to al-Shabaab remains focused on law enforcement control and monitoring. As a result, many Somali groups face regular clampdowns, coerced confessions, and discriminatory profiling tactics, the negative impacts of which are exacerbated by the country's ongoing tribal and clan-based hostilities.

2.3 YOUTH RADICALIZATION IN KENYA

Youth radicalization is a global problem, and its consequences have been linked to terrorist acts and militia activities that endanger national security. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), AlShabaab, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) have all targeted adolescents in their activities (Wise, 2011). There are large areas of Africa in which normal state government has been interrupted or savagely challenged, sometimes for extended periods for example Nigeria's government which has been battling the Boko haram. Numerous areas of the continent remain appealing to international and domestic jihadist groups, which may become saprophytic on domestic armed conflicts, capitalizing on ideological aspects to local grievances. While there has been an intrinsic breeding soil for radicalization, the doctrinal underpinnings and financial support of violent extremist organizations are located outside of the region. To the extent that any legislation on radicalization and violent extremism has resulted in such problems being overlooked, it is highly improbable to achieve its goals, and a more sophisticated and nuanced strategy is needed. (Tadesse 2016).

Since October 2011, the radicalization and terrorist recruiting of young people in Kenya has posed a concern to the security of Kenyans and tourists to the nation. The situation was aggravated in October 2011 by KDF raids into Somalia to drive out al-Shabaab, and it now threatens the safety of Kenyans and tourists to the nation (Attah-Asamoah, 2015). Al-Shabaab terror organizations immediately pledged to retaliate the Kenyan government's conduct, and have since carried out more than 133 terror attacks in various districts of Kenya, murdering over 264 people and critically wounding 925 others (ATPU, 2014). Terrorists have targeted shopping centres, religious institutions, mosques, and public transportation. Al-Shabaab members in Kenya have mostly carried out the retaliatory strikes. These cells are made up of young Kenyan men who were first groomed by al-Shabaab rebels and transported across the

porous Kenyan-Somali border for indoctrination and preparation to fight Somalia's TFG (Botha, 2014).

The Somali ethnic minority, primarily composed of Muslims, are often regarded as being the most responsible for terrorism in Kenya (Botha, 2014). Recruiters have begun to target university students (Ochieng, 2015). Kenyan security authorities' attempts to stop terrorism have not been effective in preventing the radicalization and enrolment of young people. Kenyans face searches and screenings anytime they use services in public venues such as retail malls, public transit, places of worship, and outdoor facilities. Fear and insecurity are fostered in the people as a result of their incapacity to perform positive social and nation-building activities. Youth radicalization and indoctrination into domestic terrorism is a social and economic issue. However there is a lack of clarity in the research on this topic about the reasons young Kenyans consent to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism against fellow Kenyans.

The complexity of radicalization appears to have gone beyond the traditional recognized actors. As the world becomes more technologically savvy, extreme organisations improve their methods of recruiting adherents and disseminating their message. This, in a sense, has been facilitated by the internet world made available to us by contemporary technology. In the recruiting and propagation of extremist narratives, online indoctrination has taken precedence. The connectedness that technology has provided benefits not only in the administration of day-to-day tasks, but also those seeking to connect with extremist networks. The use of the internet by Al-Shabaab and its influence in the East African area, notably in Kenya, has gotten less attention in scholarly literature and larger analytical discourses, limiting most material to media accounts.

Two major studies on Al-Shabaab's use are noteworthy: 'Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged Sword' by Menkhaus (2014) and '#Westgate: A Case Study: How Al-Shabaab

Used Twitter During an Ongoing Attack' by Mair (2016), both of which focused on the use of social media as a propaganda tool, assisting radicalisation and recruitment processes. Studies on internet radicalization and recruiting are challenging and constrained by the following factors: First and foremost it is vital to comprehend the radicalization and recruiting processes that precede one another. Is the individual, for example, recruited online before getting radicalised, or does the individual radicalise before being recruited? (Sageman, 2008). A difficult background in Kenyan internet recruiting operations includes people who may be compelled or inadvertently join these networks. For example, young individuals who are persuaded into employment prospects online and then led into a series of events or chat forums by the recruiter and so radicalised.

Secondly, regarding the radicalization or recruiting process as wholly isolated to the internet realm is a restriction. For example, many radicalizations or recruiting procedures have an offline component. Apart from the internet radicalization procedures, this entails the existence of a physical communication person or group. According to Simon (2016), such a situation may differ from the idea of lone wolves, which is prevalent mostly in the West, where adolescents are radicalised or recruited alone online. Due to a dearth of recorded examples, the context of lone wolves or the self-radicalised online has been regarded as unusual in the Kenyan setting. The internet offers radical recruiters a fertile recruiting field and allows them to communicate with individuals who cannot be reached via traditional means (Weimann 2014). This has provided terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda with three critical advantages: Promoting their message, which allows for recruiting and financing; terrorism-related training and teaching; and information conduits that may be used to plan and carry out terrorist actions.

Banda (2018 p37) observes that terrorist organisations primarily target young people because they are prone to recruitment and are currently in the process of establishing their political "selves," making them more susceptible to various forms and ideologies of radicalization.

Because they experience several obstacles and frustrations, youths are more idealistic. The author goes on to say that the presence of inspirational preachers capable of delivering convincing speeches not just at Mosques, but also in educational establishments, universities, and even jails, is a significant aspect in the radicalization process. Banda's study, while touching on religious variables that play an important part in radicalization, fails to find religious institutions that might be used to restrict radicalization.

According to Odhiambo et al. (2013), Al-Shabaab employs a variety of media to propagate its message. Aside from traditional radio, the internet is the most widely utilised medium of communication since it is the quickest and most cost-effective option to reach a large audience. In Kenya, the environment for internet radicalization is new and fertile, since many young people confront challenges such as unemployment, isolation, persecution, and marginalisation. These variables determine the temperature for a radicalization kiln that helps make extremism and violence. Another stimulant is the country's tremendous increase in internet use. The Islamic organisations such as Al-Shabaab utilise its social media and discussion forums to attract new members. It is apparent that youth radicalization is a complicated phenomenon that requires a multifaceted approach to address. Radicalization and subsequent terrorist actions have socioeconomic and theological roots that must be addressed.

2.3.1 RADICALIZATION AND CULTURE OF YOUTH VIOLENCE

Culture is among the most contentious terms in academia. Culture refers to a system of mass consciousness with significant presence and introspection rooted in concrete social group value systems, beliefs, and symbolic systems (Lincoln and Guilot 2004, Pp3-4). According to Geertz (1983), culture must be viewed as a set of meaning rather than values. Values are important and long-lasting belief systems or values and principles shared by groups of people

from same culture that define what is positive and negative and provide the critical legality of social arrangements. The term "culture of youth violence" refers to the violent behavior and attitude acquired through socialization that youths rely on to carry out violent activities. This refutes the concept that a given society or group acculturates younger generation to be violent in dealing with societal issues. Though some African societies have age groups that teach some people in the society to be protectors in order to safeguard their villages, groups, and societies from eventual attacks.

Academic studies and practical work had also approached radicalization at both the cognitive and behavioral levels, according to Pisoui and Ahmed (2016,p2) it is critical to look into the connection in both radicalization and youth violence. Prior to globalization, radicalization and violence manifested themselves on the national and local levels through intra and cross and tribal wars and conquests. There is significant concern about rising levels of violence motivated by social, political, or religious factors. In some cases, this entails intentional procedures of attracting individuals to participate in ongoing conflicts or indoctrinating people to undertake a destructive act in their respective regions or globally.

In times of rapid social change, radicalization may occur. This has been linked to an increase in negative health outcomes such as youth violence and interpersonal violence (Okasha, 2005; Turecki & Brent, 2016). Rapid social change continues to threaten the mental and physical well-being of young people around the world, fueling social polarization through increases in social imbalances, identity fragmentation, and shifts in communication patterns (Dasen 2000; Elgar et al., 2015). Because of these social changes, new groups have been able to recruit young generation into belief systems and acts of violence, such as racial profiling, mass executions, and terrorist attacks.

2.3.2 CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION AMONG THE YOUTHS


Domestic reasons of terror attacks have their beginnings in each national history. There is no one profile or rationale for this. It is always a mix of forces - political, social, and economic that are inextricably linked to regional and worldwide events. The primary question is why would someone want to engage any violent extremist organization and risk death or capture. According to Bradbury (2010), youths are influenced towards radicalization and terrorism due to their living situations, which are driven by the harsh environment, such as a lack of food, water, housing, education, and clothes, making it easier for recruits to attract the youths to Al-shabaab training.

According to Tadesse (2016), youth radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism have been frequently related to the changing politics and authenticity of the region, continuing to gain its ability to gain power from the Developed nation and progressing from a peripheral intrusion to a central strategic threat over the course of recent history. Tadesse goes on to state that radicalization has spread further as a result of the economic downturn, violent conflicts, and an absence of powerful and legitimate states. It happens quickly when citizenship rights are not extended to all people in a community or when the government is not the main actor rallying to provide necessary services. Africa's central challenge is to develop accountable, capable governments capable of delivering security and inclusive growth. People have been particularly vulnerable to radicalization and terrorist group as a result of historical injustices and grievances. According to numerous intelligence reports, some of the most heartlessly radical terrorists commit atrocities in order to rectify injustices committed against them or seek revenge of wrongdoings against them or their families (Tadasse 2016).

Lindley (2011) concurs that promises of addressing the desires of youths their desire for exploration, personal satisfaction, and acceptance leads them to Al- Shabaab membership. All of these elements combine to create excellent circumstances for recruitment and indoctrination

into extremism and terrorism. Before getting enrolled, the recruits are truly in a bad situation. They have a psychological belief that they will achieve their own goals after being hired. According to religious leaders and young people, the Criminal Justice System plays a significant role in radicalization, particularly in the coastal region, northern Kenya, and Nairobi. Police brutality against suspects, inadequate investigation, a lack of intelligence, and persistent harassment of Muslim youths exacerbate the issue. Here is a summary of some of the factors that increase youth vulnerability to being easily radicalized by the extremists.

Figure 1 Summary of factors that make youth more vulnerable (Goldman2018)



It is critical to recognize that radicalization has become a threat in today's political and societal arenas, serving as a main culprit of terrorism and violent extremism. According to Goldman 2018, Over 50,000 individuals from more than 100 countries travelled to participate in the Islamic State as well as other terrorists' groups in the Africa and the Middle East in 2017. Goldman further argues that the surprising statistics demonstrate a clear connection between both radicalization and terrorism. Whereas the media portrays them as suicidal, ruthless, and violent delinquents, it is important to note that during new recruits and radicalization, terrorist cells use a variety of variables and influences to sell to the youth.

Besides the factors that may push the youths to joining the violent extremism group below are the several narratives on why Kenyan young people get radicalized, making it impossible to generalize .

2.3.1.2 Narrative of marginalisation

When compared to other regions, the majority of Muslim populations in Kenya come from disadvantaged areas (Botha 2013: 14). Extremist organizations believe that the coast's complaints have been weakened politically, economically, and culturally, and hence they seek to break free (Glazzard, Jespersen, Maguire and Winterbotham, 2017). Uneven growth and discrimination of Somalis and Muslims are not new forms of discrimination. Sadly, it dates back to early pre/post-independence Kenya and has remained until the present day. Kenya embraced the British style of governance after independence, resulting in a centralised type of government with political power centred in Nairobi. Because the capital was primarily

Christian, and in the style of the colonialists, Islamic territories were put second on the national agenda. Because of this early prejudice, Muslims felt excluded and excluded from the country. It also prompted the authorities and non-Muslims to question Muslims' patriotism. This view was bolstered by the fact many Kenyans of Somali heritage advocated for a separate country with the option of self-government.

An AlShabaab video urged on Kenyan Muslim young people to identify their injustice and join their struggle (Anderson 2014). The government's exclusionary policies may lead to youths adopting alternate measures, such as violent extremist organisations, in order to feel included and have a voice. Al-Shabaab militants exploited issues related to long-standing grievances among communities in Northern Kenya, the Coast Region, and Eastleigh, Nairobi (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Botha, 2014; International Peace Support Issue Brief No. 2, 2015; Lind et al., 2015). This encouraged the Kenyan government to investigate marginalization, hardship, and historical injustices committed by past administrations of the Republic of Kenya rather than counterterrorism. Botha (2014) repeated the marginalization narrative, concluding that there was considerable evidence of disparity ethnic or religious and geographical location, along with a lack of access to essential services, and that this aspect contributed to marginalization, which subsequently encouraged radicalization. According to Onuoha (2014), the prevalence of discriminating beliefs on grounds such as ethnicity, theology, patrilineality, social infrastructure, and even leadership has contributed to the growth of young radicalism. Contextual and circumstantial variables such as flow of migrants to common areas such as refugee camps, metropolitan centres, counties, and cities have brought together individuals from various backgrounds, enabling for speedier circulation of ideas across the country. This has also resulted in a greater spread of radicalism. (Christmann, 2012) .

Nonetheless, the Kenyan government's affirmative action policy encouraged the recruitment of Kenyan Somali professionals to important government posts, opening up prospects for government jobs and higher education (Lind et al., 2015). The marginalization narrative receives little support, following the terror assault on the Nairobi Dusit D2 Hotel on January 16, 2019, in which 26 people were killed, including five terrorists, and numerous more were gravely injured, the incident was orchestrated by young Kenyans (Kenya Police Website, 2019). The 23-year-old Kenyan male who hailed from Central Province of Kenya (deemed not marginalised) as well as the son of a KDF soldier, and had been declared missing by his parents since 2015 after completing his high school education, and was living with his wife, who was also not from a marginalised community, but from Kenya's Western Province. They rented a property on an estate outside Nairobi, and neighbours gossiped about their lavish and clandestine lifestyle (Kenya Police Website, 2019). Residents recognized him because of the fancy automobile used to carry the terrorists to the hotel to perform the attack, which was broadcast on the news. Neighbours called the cops, who tracked him down and arrested him. There are so many cases of youths coming from non marginalised communities who have been radicalised outside the recognized radicalization hot spots.

2.3.2.3 Poverty and unemployment narrative

Although a lack of socioeconomic affluence among youths could be a primary cause of extremism, what causes its absence is unequal development. When concentrating upon the most radicalised places, it becomes clear that a lack of development renders these communities more vulnerable. With a lack of even development, general access to basic necessities and services becomes limited, making access to all these facilities unevenly dispersed within a country. High unemployment rates have been linked to young Kenyans' vulnerability to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism. Odhiambo (2014) goes on to say that

just 51% of the population has completed elementary school, meaning that the majority of the county's population is unqualified for specialised labour and solely works in tourist hotels along the county's high coastline. The majority of skilled labour in the county is drawn from other areas of Kenya.

According to a February 2012 United Nations study, then-United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (United Nations 2012), young people were increasingly fearful of a future without work, with the youth doubting that the education they obtained would completely prepare them for professional life. According to the UN study, young people complained about the last in and first out from work in enterprises, leading to high rates of youth unemployment throughout the world—with such rates climbing in Kenya from 11.9 percent in 2007 to 13 percent in 2009. However, there is no empirical proof that individuals radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism in Kenya did not have occupations, necessitating more study to determine the link between these two characteristics. In the Kenyan scenario, evidence from the Garissa University terror assault revealed that one of the terrorists killed was a college graduate a former law graduate who worked in a local bank and whose dad was a Kenyan government worker (Counterterrorism Centre List of Terror Incidents in Kenya, 2015). Botha (2014) discovered that 33% of individuals who joined al-Shabaab were working and 17% were in school when they were recruited.

When it comes to poverty, According to Shetret et al. (2013), poverty in the coastal and northern region is typically high, with an average incidence of 62 percent, and 70 percent in Mombasa alone, and unemployment rates of 40 percent. There was agreement that unemployment and an overall absence of economic opportunities was a key cause of widespread insecurity and might contribute significantly to opening paths to violent extremism within persons in vulnerable local populations, (Shetret et al. 2013). The link between poverty and unemployment, as well as radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism, is found

in the extremist recruiting process, which is based on promises of jobs and cash rewards of up to USD 1000 per month (Odhiambo et al ,2012) Corruption is a major factor. For example, the 2010 plundering of the Youth Fund (United Nations, 2012) established by the Kenyan government was connected to the poverty narrative of radicalization (International Peace Support Center, 2015; Lind et al., 2015). The fund was established to build programs around the country to address the issue of young unemployment (International Peace Support Center, 2015; Lind et al., 2015). The fund was reportedly plundered by government officials, leading to young dissatisfaction (International Peace Support Centre 2015; Lind et al., 2015). According to Lind et al. (2015) and the International Peace Support Center (2015), the young people are not happy with the rate of corruption in the country because it leaves them poor and jobless. In addition to that most youths think that they have nothing more to lose by choosing to join the militants of al-Shabaab, because they are promised money and a better life. Botha (2014) discovered that respondents' radicalisation was not motivated by poverty. Botha stated that there was proof of ethnic and geographical disparity, as well as a lack of access to essential amenities; this issue added to marginalisation, which enabled radicalization.

2.3.2.4 Narrative of loose borders, refugee flood, and Islamic extremism

Religion is frequently related to extremism and is viewed as a primary contributor to the propagation or belief in extremist conceptions of any religion. As for extremism in Kenya, the situation is similar to that in many other parts of the globe, with Muslim youths being brainwashed into believing that wars in Afghanistan, Iraq , and other countries in the Middle East are part of a worldwide campaign against Islam, necessitating the need for 'Jihad' against

this campaign. Islamic radicalism in Somalia was discovered to be slowly spreading into Kenya, and al-Shabaab militants had established a cross-border presence and a secretive network of support amongst Muslim populations in North East Kenya, the Coast Region, and Eastleigh this is an area where many ethnic somalis have been residing. Botha (2014) believed that al-Shabaab was motivated by a radical interpretation of Islam that had an external basis, and so its advancements were beyond Kenya's control. This viewpoint is critical since al-Shabaab is a terrorist organization affiliated with al-Qaeda that is known to utilize religion to achieve its objectives. Madrassas, on the other hand, were used to radicalize young children, while mosques served as distribution centers for jihadi materials and an enrollment hub to link youths to Lamu and Kiunga, where they would be further radicalized, with their national identification cards and birth certificates confiscated and burned (International Crisis Group briefing, 2014). To bolster the notion of Islamic radicalism, Botha (2014), claims that religion (Islam) inspired 87 percent of respondents to join. This was the most highly rated factor.

Kenya's porous and poorly maintained border controls, which are also thinly inhabited and contain several unstable neighbors, have been recognized as a contributing cause to homegrown extremism, along with the significant migration of refugees into Kenya. Following the collapse of Mohamed Siyad Barre's administration, political displacements and the establishment of refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya to alleviate the problem of displaced persons from Somalia also contributed to the increase of young radicalization among the Al-Shabaab (Onuoha, 2014). The indoctrination and recruitment of young people towards Muslim extremism has been blamed for homegrown terrorism in Kenya (Botha, 2014; International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). The International Crisis Group Briefing (2014) stated, with evidence from face-to-face interview sessions with Muslim preachers, government leaders in Northern Kenya, Nairobi, and credible information, that Islamic extremism leads to religious and social conservative ideology and intolerance, which serve as precursors to homegrown

terrorism. A number of Islamic Sheikhs, for example, have advocated for television bans, while other Muslims have gone about closing down pubs, prohibiting the sale of cigarettes, and imposing dress standards (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). In another case in the North Eastern Province, Muslim clerics closed down public film rooms in Mandera town, stating that the videos were offensive and of bad influence to the younger generation (International crisis group briefing ,2014).

However , several concerns were raised by scholars that needed to be investigated. This is because, on December 7, 2012, one of the several terror acts perpetrated in Kenya since 2011 occurred in a mosque following Friday prayers. A grenade was hurled into a mosque, exploding and killing numerous Muslims and wounding many more. One of those critically injured was a Member of Parliament for that region, a Muslim and Somali himself, who was attending prayers at the mosque (Counterterrorism Center List of Terror Attacks, 2014). Against this context, there is still a knowledge gap in terms of comprehending the rationale for killing Muslims.

2.3.2.5 The Narrative of Labelling and Revenge

Kenya became an appealing target for terrorists due to inadequacies in its counterterrorism efforts. According to Patterson (2015), the trigger was the global war on terror (GWOT), with relation to national politics, security in the region, and the international community. Because of its ties to Western nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel, Kenya has witnessed worldwide terrorist occurrences. The bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 1998, which killed 212 people and wounded

4,000 more, the majority of whom were Kenyans, was mentioned. This signaled the beginning of extraordinary terrorist incidents and other types of provocation against the Kenyan government, although through a proxy. The al-Qaeda terrorist organization claimed responsibility and explained the assault as a punishment for Kenya's ties with the United States and Israel (International Peace Support Center Issue Brief No. 2, 2015; Patterson, 2015). Kenyan Somalis or Kenyan Muslims thought to be terrorists have been considered as a key in the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan into domestic terrorism (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2012). Lind et al. (2015) agreed, claiming that in Kenya, politicians, security services, and other government institutions, as well as certain Western officials, felt that the Coastal and North Eastern communities were predominantly made up of terrorists. This belief was held by participants in Kenya's counterterrorism landscape (Attah-Asamoah, 2015). While agreeing with the tagging argument, Lind et al. discovered that during terror incidents, security crackdowns were focused in regions dominated by Somalis and Muslims, whether Kenyans or Somalis.

However, researchers discovered that al-Shabaab radicalizers and recruiters had targeted coastal Muslims in Kenya and Tanzania, with evidence that strikes in North Eastern Kenya were planned in advance by Kenyan Swahili and Somali jihadists, perhaps with the knowledge or approval of Muslim leaders in those locations (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). Botha (2014) discovered substantial proof to support religious motivations for joining al-Shabaab (87 percent of respondents), as well as some even greater evidence that Islam as a religion had been under attack (97 percent). When security actions are primarily aimed towards Somalis, particularly Muslim inhabitants, as Lind et al. (2015) claim, the labelling narrative is sure to emerge and persist. One example is the non-Somali terrorist: Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, a Muslim convert from the Luhya ethnicity in Western Kenya, was charged in connection with

two explosives; he pled guilty and convicted and given a life sentence in September 2012. (Lind et al., 2015).

2.3.2.6 lack of kenyan identification cards

The historical misunderstanding of Somalis and Muslims has resulted in a sense of being less Kenyan. The sense of second-class citizenship continues, particularly among individuals from the Coastline and North Eastern areas. Despite the fact that they were born and raised in Kenya, fellow Kenyans, particularly police personnel, see them as 'foreigners.' Specifically, since the surge in instability during Kenya's invasion of Somalia, Muslim individuals have been urged to "go home," are frequently dismissed as fellow Kenyans by government officials, and have been unjustly imprisoned. Because of this treatment, Somalis and Muslims have been identified as the primary perpetrators of extremist acts. Consider how Kenyans reacted against and harassed Somali and Kenyan-Somali persons after the activation of an explosive material in Eastleigh, Nairobi, on November 18, 2012. This was not the first time people have responded against Somalis. On 30 November 2012, an angry crowd packed with stones and sticks attacked Somalis residing in Eastleigh following the grenade attack on St Polycarp Church, which killed one child and wounded nine others. At least 13 Somalis were hurt during this event, and the property was damaged (Bosire, 2012).

2.3.2.7 Operation “Usalama Watch”

This operation was launched in 2014 in response to a series of assaults in Nairobi and Mombasa. The operation was designed to weed out extremist groups in various parts of the city. However, it turned out to be a Somali-only operation, with Police Officers focusing on Somali-majority communities such as Eastleigh and South C. According to Human Rights Watch

(HRW 2014) investigation, the April 1 round-up operation was replete with atrocities. State security forces raided houses and apartments, buildings, and shops, robbed mobile phones, money, and other goods, harassed and extorted residents, and detained thousands of people, such as news reporters, Kenyan citizens, and humanitarian relief workers, without charge and in deplorable conditions for periods far exceeding the 24-hour limit set by the government. The captives faced persecution and lived in horrific circumstances in detention centres reminiscent of British prison camps during colonialism. Even after verifying their legitimacy in the nation, most of the prisoners had no notion what would occur to them or why they were kept. Many perceived this as an extortion expedition, since the police personnel may imply or demand cash in order to clear or release them swiftly. Bribery and extortion were prevalent throughout the operation, and several victims detailed how this was accomplished. The report goes on to detail how the group has been branded and depicted as "terrorists" by the State's xenophobic narrative, and how other Kenyans have been psyched against them.

2.4 CASE STUDY LAMU COUNTY



Photo credit

Voice of America.

Lamu has long been seen as a prospective entrance point and even staging ground for Al-Shabaab operations aimed at both locals and tourists. Lamu shares a northern border with the Republic of Somalia. Al-Shabaab has used complaints over marginalisation and historical injustices, land ownership issues, and young unemployment to radicalise and attract youth into its ranks. On September 11, 2011, a British man was slain and his wife was abducted from a hotel north of Lamu, near Kenya's border with Somalia. Three weeks later, Marie Dedieu, a French national residing in her own home on Manda Island, was kidnapped by ten alleged Al-Shabaab agents and taken to Somalia, where she perished. Two weeks later, on October 13, 2011, two Spanish humanitarian workers were abducted from the Dadaab refugee camp in nearby Garissa County, and their driver was killed by suspected Al-Shabaab militants. According to Odhiambo et al. (2015), after the Kenya Defence Forces invaded Somalia in 2011, Al-Shabaab pledged to respond. Al-Shabaab took credit for the June 2014 attack in Mpeketoni, 50 kilometres south of Lamu town, which killed 60 people, as well as

further raids on 5 July that year in Hindi (mainland Lamu) and Gamba in neighbouring Tana River County.

Mpeketoni is a tiny town and municipal division in the Lamu District of Kenya's Coast Province. It is a settlement program initiated in the 1960s by Jomo Kenyatta, the first head of state of Kenya, near a freshwater lake carrying his name. Mpeketoni and its surrounds were once inhabited by Swahilis known as Wabajuni, as well as a tiny hunting and gathering tribe known as Wasanye or the Sanyes, which is now nearly extinct. This location is mostly populated by the Agikuyu tribe, an agricultural community. The Luo and Kamba tribes, as well as the indigenous Swahili people, may also be found in Mpeketoni. The attacks on Mpeketoni, a tiny beach town near Lamu, a famous tourist destination, have recast Kenya as an East African terrorist hotspot. While their underlying causes are being debated, the Mpeketoni assaults are notable in that they demonstrate growing changes in the tactics of various terrorist organisations in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Unlike prior assaults, the operators were discriminating in their victim selection. Men were slaughtered, but women and children were exempted, implying that these organisations were trying to enhance their image. The bombings killed 60 people and harmed Kenya's tourism industry, which was already reeling from the impact of earlier attacks.

The attacks mostly aimed at members of the local Kikuyu population as well as other non-Muslims. The government settled the majority of the Kikuyu people in the region in the late 1960s and gave them title deeds, which most locals do not have. Al-Shabaab said it was retaliating for the deaths of Muslim clerics in adjacent Mombasa County by unknown assailants, and it also defined Mpeketoni as a community controlled by 'Christians' who had evicted the region's 'original' Muslim residents (Shmuel,2015).The Mpeketoni bombings highlighted a new dynamic in the county's recruitment and mobilization of Al-Shabaab fighters.

According to survivors and witnesses questioned by the media, the assailants were a mix of Somalis, Arabs, English-speaking, and local people also known as the mijikenda.

Lamu's indigenous inhabitants, like those in other Coastal counties, lack title documents. Following Kenya's independence, President Jomo Kenyatta's administration relocated Kikuyu people from the interior to the Lake Kenyatta settlement program in the Mpeketoni district of Mainland Lamu. The majority of these folks received title deeds while some of them became absentee landlords. These reasons have left the local Swahili, Arabs, Korei, Boni, and Orma people feeling cheated out of a fundamental source of production. These historical inequities and land problems were recognized by the 1999 Commission of Inquiry into Kenya's Land Law System and the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, but have yet to be rectified. Wilner and Dubouloz (2010) agree that leadership family tree and heritage exacerbate the issue of historical injustices. First, tribalism and nepotism have a strong influence inside the clans and tribes. These have been part of local history narratives over time, and Al-Shabaab has exploited them to justify assaults against nonlocals and Christians in the area who are perceived as "invading Muslims territory."

Lamu County, among other historical injustices, has low levels of education, inadequate infrastructure, food insecurity, limited access to health care, and limited access to water. According to Botha (2014), al-Shabaab has leveraged these variables to attract and activate Lamu youths into its ranks. The Al-Shabaab exploited the deeply ingrained disaffection among the people of Kenya's coast and north-eastern regions. This coincides with (Bouzar & Martin, 2016; Schuurman & Horgan, 2016), thoughts on grievances and feelings of injustice can be triggered by dissatisfaction .

Unless these problems are addressed, Al-Shabaab will continue to exploit them. Al-Shabaab has been a key source of recruitment in the county. This is fueled by the county's high youth unemployment caused by low academic achievement, as well as a

reduction in tourism caused by continuing attacks by extremist groups in various regions of the country, the introduction of restrictions by the government, and travel restrictions issued by other states. Some important sources in Lamu, for example, stated that when tourism declined owing to travel restrictions placed by Western nations against the island, numerous individuals employed in the hotel and fishing businesses lost their employment. Many of those impacted were beach boys and dhow workers who used to transport visitors deep sea fishing, seeing the dawn and sunset, and visiting other islands in the Lamu archipelago. They were suddenly unemployed, idle, and without a source of money. Idle and jobless adolescents, such as these former hospitality employees, may be deemed susceptible and "ripe" for indoctrination by extremist organisations with the hope of financial gain.

Al-Shabaab in Somalia targets young people, they radicalize and training them for terrorist acts (Berman 2014). This is evident especially when youths travel to Mombasa in search of better chances due to the island's limited income-generating options. Some are invited by relatives and friends, while others travel alone to try their luck. As a result, some Lamu people wind up residing in Mombasa's Majengo informal housing, which have been identified as one of the most active AlShabaab agents and recruiters. This becomes the point of interaction and exposure for Al-Shabaab recruiters and sympathisers. The vulnerability of youths and the general population has become a key motivator for extremist groups. Louise (2015) emphasizes this point, noting that corruption has made a significant contribution to denying numerous youths' access to essential and fundamental amenities such as employment and education leading them to turn to non-state stakeholders like the extremist to meet their needs. As a result, it is appropriate to say that bribery has contributed to the exclusion and marginalization of the populace, who now feel compelled to dispute the status quo.

According to the Commission on Revenue Allocation (2013), Lamu is one of Kenya's most marginalised counties, with a poverty rate of 31.6%. Mengeastab (2011) agreed with these

assertions by arguing that youths' lack of empowerment may lead to both social and economic crimes. Youth unemployment leads to aggressiveness and extremism. The majority of the youths in Lamu County cited unemployment, a lack of equal opportunities, and general poverty among the youths. With this as a burning issue among youths, they seek alternatives such as youth radicalization, where they are guaranteed jobs, income, and the ability to make a living(Osman 2014).

Aside from socioeconomic problems and frustrations, Lamu locals complain about difficulty in obtaining identification cards and passports. They must go through verification, which is not needed of other populations in the nation. Lack of Identity cards, in particular, causes extra issues because it is impossible to create a savings account or acquire official work without one. As a result of not having identification cards, their movements are restricted, and they face arrest, extortion, and harassment from security authorities, who often castigate them for being non-citizens. Furthermore, scholars and policymakers have identified detentions, beatings, and mysterious deaths at the hands of security personnel as a common driver of Violent extremism in lamu county.

Lamu County, like the rest of the Coastal regions, is plagued by fanatical religious leaders. It has been remarked that Kenya's route to violent extremism started with the spread of Wahhabism in the country. Wahabism is a Salafi perspective that influences much of the primary theological viewpoint of jihadi organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. This dates back to the 1990s, when humanitarian organizations supported by Saudi Arabia, such as al-Haramain and the Young Muslim Association, established madrassas in northern Kenya and the Coast, with the majority of graduates getting grants to study in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. When they returned to Kenya, they established more madrassas and organizations that taught Islamic fanaticism. Some of these fighters returned to Kenya and are accused of recruiting Kenyans for Al-Shabaab (Osman 2015). According to the head of the Kenya

Muslims National Advisory Council, recruiting of Kenyans into Al-Shabaab began in 2005, with Mombasa, Kwale, Lamu, Nairobi, and Isiolo being the primary targets.

According to Hendel(2015) he claims that Islamic core beliefs influence politics, this is evident when youths are barred from leadership and politics, particularly when Imams and Sheikhs have an advantage in advising their followers on who to vote for in elective politics, thus discriminating against the youth. The recruiting was taking place in mosques, Habeck (2010) argues that false prophets and religious leaders who misinform their followers about Islamic teachings, which leads to religious radicalization. However, it is thought that it is taking place in private homes and that it is also attracting non-Muslim individuals. It is critical to be sensitive to the potential of stigmatizing groups and to define at-risk populations as historically informed as feasible. Notably, the paths and outcomes of violent extremism are as diverse as the extremists themselves. Individual variables, group dynamics, societal structures, and the environmental factors in which terrorism happens all influence the likelihood of an individual being attracted to violent extremism. According to Mandeep and Murray (2016), joining violent extremist organisations is a reasonable decision that a person makes based on a cost/benefit analysis. The costs and rewards of involvement are assessed. If the advantages outweigh the expenses, the individual chooses to engage.

2.4.1 CASE STUDY 2 ISILO COUNTY



Photo credit

Institute for Security Studies (2020)

Isiolo is a modern county ,it is located in the upper eastern area of Kenya. Isiolo County links Marsabit County toward the north, Samburu and Laikipia Counties towards the west, Garissa County to the south, Wajir County to the north east, Tana River and Kitui Counties to the south, and Meru and Tharaka Nithi Counties towards the south west.It is also 285 kilometres north of Nairobi, the capital. The town was built up around the surrounding military camps, with many residents descended from former Somali troops who participated in World War I, as well as other Cushitic-speaking pastoral villages and the Ameru community.The shortage of natural resources, notably pasture and water, is frequently blamed for conflict in Isiolo, as is rivalry for rights and access of these resources. Other conflict causes include the existence of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and environmental change, particularly drought, which continues to put further strain on diminishing resources.The pastoralists' dispute has evolved over time, and new factors are at work. Politics surrounding a decentralised government system, land and border issues, land use conflicts between

agriculture, wildlife protection, and new infrastructure projects under the Vision 2030 have all contributed to strife in Isiolo. In recent years, Isiolo County has produced a number of significant economic and political improvements.

Nonetheless, the country has a number of persistent issues as a result of recurrent violent conflict and other forms of human insecurity, such as Violent Extremism and Radicalization. Violent extremism has so far been taking hold in Kenya's Isiolo County, putting the huge region as the country's core of youth radicalization. Pressures to respond swiftly to violent extremism and criminal challenges are stretching the county's capacities and resilience. Isiolo is among the counties most affected by the threat of young recruitment to extremist organisations. Some local school children have gone missing, and whose whereabouts have been tracked to Somalia. Despite the county's remoteness from the Somali border, al-Shabaab has discovered breeding soil to radicalise and recruit young people, according to Guyo (2020). He credits this to Isiolo's strategic placement outside of what is often seen as the radicalization region, apart from the violent extremism hubs of Nairobi and the country's coastline and northeastern areas. Isiolo has lately emerged as an important recruiting ground for Al Shabab, ISIS, and a transit route for recruits heading to Somalia and Libya, and also returnees, being deployed in Kenya and possibly neighbouring Uganda and Tanzania. It is estimated that around 200 teenagers from Isiolo have joined Al shabaab since 2013. As a result, specialized security troops - the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) - were sent to Isiolo County.

The January 2019 attack on an office and hotel complex in Nairobi, Kenya, was the first not directed by an ethnic Somali since al Shabaab launched serious cross-border operations in 2010. There were 21 fatalities. Two recognized terrorists who took part in some of Kenya's bloodiest atrocities have ties to the northern regions of Isiolo and Mandera. Abdirahman Abdullahi, the son of a Mandera chief, took part in the strike at Garissa University. In addition to that Isiolo County was home to Salim Gichunge, one of the deceased during the Dusit D2 hotel

assailants and the suspected mastermind. Ali Salim Gichunge, also known as Farouk, was a 26-year-old Kenyan who went to a Catholic school and whose predominantly Christian Meru ethnic community had no links to Somalia. Gichunge, the son of a Kenyan military commander, became radicalised when he was working at a hotel Internet café in the town of Isiolo. He was able to obtain fresh materials online as well as visit Facebook. He began learning the Arabic language and other subjects. Many people in Isiolo were hesitant to talk about him for fear of drawing the notice of the authorities (Guyo 2020).

Previously, security personnel focused their efforts in areas of the country where Muslims predominated. However, the extremists are recruiting a massive influx of Kenyans with no family ties to Somalia. Al Shabaab recruiters have been recruiting young, jobless males outside the ethnic Somali community in the area for years. According to Kenyan security sources, he led four other terrorists, along with at least one non-Somali deployed as a suicide bomber, the attack killed everyone (Miriri, 2019). The recruiters were mostly indigenous Kikuyus who had embraced Islam, and cash and gifts were frequently offered, often under false pretenses. It is now much more difficult since al Shabaab has demonstrated its versatility by enrolling from outside the typical locations. These new members have widened the extremists' reach and hampered Kenyan security officials' efforts to stop them.

Youths in Isiolo tend to join violent extremist groups because high levels of unemployment and poverty are related to historical marginalisation. Neve et al. (2020) agrees that deprivation, as well as the presence of individuals with prior links to the jihadist network, contributed to the radicalization process, and that criminal members earned prestige in the youth group by being active in jihadism. Grievances peculiar to their ethnic groups, such as land grabs on Kenya's coast, were another motivator for young people to join violent organisations. Ethnicity, political conflicts, and unequal distribution of resources are all factors that violent extremist organisations use to create enticing stories that target vulnerable youths, al Shabaab

enticed recruits by providing cash or promises of job, according to researchers who interviewed defectors. On the contrary Beck(2008) argues that grievances are not sufficient explanation for why some impulses get organized into long-term movements while others do not. Certain politically driven people reach a tipping point where their potential energy is channelled into violent action.

According to Guyo (2020) families,of the affected individuals disclosed that , tiny presents have been used to enticed some young men. Individual preference has also been identified as a factor that drives youths to join violent organisations. The large amount of youths dropping out of school, along with high illiteracy levels and a lack of skills,life challenges, misinformation, peer pressure, personal decisions, depression/stress, or a yearning for adventure or inquiry has led to the youth resorting to drug and substance misuse, rendering them vulnerable to illegal activities.Family issues emerge as a lack of parental obligations, strict parenthood, relatives collapse, and, in certain cases, rejection by family.Religious ideology was found to be completely missing.However, young people and police officers considered that religion contributed to radicalization as a result of misreading of religious teachings.

According to Guyo (2020) the problem of violent extremism has evolved into a business. Young individuals are detained, and ATPU police demand a large sum of money. Those who can pay the bribes are released, while those who cannot remain behind jail until their parents can afford to buy their freedom.Being impoverished in Isiolo appears criminal since if one is detained and unable to afford the massive bribes demanded by ATPU agents, the individuals will be held in detention for longer than is legally permitted duration . This has resulted in young people repression because they believe their rights have been violated, and as a result, they join violent organisations in order to exact retribution.

2.5 IMPACTS OF YOUTH RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA

2.5.1 REDUCED ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

The coastline region is well-known as Kenya's tourism hotspot. For decades, international and local travellers have been drawn to Mombasa and Kwale by the bright sandy beaches and stunning scenery, as well as historical buildings and other tourist attractions. According to UNDP Kenya (2017), the two counties have also been major vacation destinations, putting Kenya on the map of global tourism and vacation destinations. However, with the growth of violent extremism and terrorist acts targeting the coastal region, particularly after 2010, the tourist sector, which fuels the region's economy, has experienced a significant collapse as travel advisories have increased and the security situation has generally deteriorated.

The tourist sector accounts for around 27 percent of Kenya's GDP, and the increase in the frequency of terrorist attacks, along with the unfriendly climate of radicalization along the coast (hospitable to violent extremism), has resulted in a loss in tourism profits.

Many companies in impacted areas have closed as a result of extremism's economic impact. As a result, poverty, unemployment, and different sorts of crime rise. This is consistent with Hogan and Braddock's (2013) observation that youth radicalization decelerated a region's economic activity.

2.5.2 INCREASED INSECURITY

According to Buigut and Amendah (2016), for every one percent rise in terrorist attack fatalities, there is a 0.082 percent decrease in tourist arrivals, which translates to 1487 tourists and 155.8 million Kenya shillings yearly. The decrease in tourist arrivals can be related to insecurity as a result of terrorist actions. Terrorist assaults by the Somali-based terrorist organization Al-Shabaab have contributed to the collapse of the tourist sector, as the coastline area is the country's tourism hub (Odhiambo et.,al 2013). Radicalization in the coastal counties of Lamu, Mombasa, and Kwale (among many others) has created a favorable environment for cross-border terrorist attacks in the region from 2009 to the present, with the most recent attack taking place on January 5, 2020, at Camp Simba (a Kenyan-American military base) in Lamu. In a research "Learning Institutions' Vulnerability to Terrorism," Odhiambo et al. (2015) argue that terrorists who attack learning groups want to cut down on the number of institutions transmitting views allegedly contradictory to their worldview. Other problems, like as drug trafficking, criminality, criminal groups, and human trafficking, also add to insecurity, particularly in Garissa, Mombasa, and kwale. The criminal groups occupy a vital intersection for political extremism and political violence among regional politicians, commercial warfare among regional business competitors, drug trafficking, and, quietly, extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council.

2.5.3 DISPLACEMENT AND FEAR OF UNKNOWN

Massive relocation of people from their homes to other locations as a result of extremism is eroding the life of the community and destroying customary cooperation. Extremism has a detrimental effect on women's mobility, social protection, and access to services. Several women are left as home leaders, and a sizable percentage are widows. Many women have

become homeless as a result of displacement, making them more vulnerable to exploitation. The most dangerous and often unnoticed consequence of extremism is on the psychological level. Death of loved ones has a mental and sociological effect on these women as well. People who have been exposed to violent extremism on a regular basis develop a dread of everything and absorb trauma. This can result in psyche change, mental dissolution, and lack of trust in oneself and others. The most dangerous and often unnoticed consequence of extremism is on the psychological level. Individuals who are exposed to violent extremism on a regular basis develop a dread of everything and absorb trauma. This can result in psyche change, mental dissolution, and a lack of trust in oneself and others. Concerning the education sector, with the advent of extremist assaults, pupils in both elementary and secondary schools have not gotten enough quality education as a result of repeated attacks due to a lack of teaching instructors. The burden on instructors who chose to stay has been significantly raised; a teacher who previously taught fewer than 10 classes per week would now be required to give 30 lessons per week to make up for the shortfall (Osman, 2015). Normally, the teacher-student ratio was 1:60, which was poor even then, but when the teachers called it quits in Mandera, the ratio more than quadrupled to 1:120, affecting a total of 91,000 kids (Osman, 2015). This has resulted to an education crisis impacting thousands of children and young adults. This persistent worry has a harmful impact on children's motor and psychological development.

In addition to that, psychological trauma, especially torture and even murder at the hands of security personnel, has left many people dissatisfied with this type of treatment. Such activities have been carried out for decades against Somalis living in Kenya, and are generally tied to radicalism and assaults. Unfortunately, this ruthless approach has dominated Kenya's reaction to extremism, particularly those associated with Al-Shabab, and Somalis have indeed been victims of this type of treatment. As a result of this extended situation of unresolved grievances and disputes, or its effects on the socialisation process, internal wars and conflicts in

Somalia have offered a place for larger groups such as Al-Shabab with which individuals might affiliate.

2.6 CONCLUSION

In truth, it appears that there is no one path that people take to join extremist groups like Al-Shabaab. Some of the identified push and pull variables have failed to adequately explain why some people become violent extremists while others with comparable histories and in similar situations do not. More research is needed to understand why certain people become violent extremists and how to effectively handle this situation. Many counter-violent extremism efforts have failed, in part because they have failed to adequately investigate the combination of push and pull forces with other ones. Because of this narrow emphasis, interventions have been based on a limited knowledge of the complexities of violent extremism.

The factors are so intertwined that it is impossible to identify a single issue as the primary cause of radicalization, the most prominent underlying reason of radicalization was religious ideological effect through distorted teachings of the Wahhabi-Salafi ideology that emphasizes jihadism, which recurred as a common factor among Muslims who become radicalized. The national government's tough security techniques in combating terrorism have not solved the problem and must be reconsidered. The Criminal Justice System plays a significant role in radicalization. Police violence against suspects, inadequate investigation, a lack of intelligence, and persistent harassment of Muslim youngsters exacerbate the issue. The national

government's tough security techniques in combating terrorism have not solved the problem and must be reconsidered. The criminal justice system must take more steps to address the problem of radicalization.

The Lamu and Isiola case studies demonstrates that there is no one road to violent extremism hence, programs and efforts targeted at preventing people from participating in extremist organisations, as well as those targeted at rehabilitating them, should be multifaceted. The chapter focused on the continued trend of online recruiting of youth into Al-Shabaab organisations, showing how well the extremist network uses the internet environment and specific vulnerabilities among young people to drive them into these networks. With the rising popularity of smartphone and internet use among young people, it is critical to consider it not just as the source of radicalization, but also as a mechanism by which extremist views may be readily conveyed to susceptible young people. Recognizing the significance of human choice in issues such as violent radical beliefs or extremism, we must also be concerned for, and offer direction to, youths who are establishing their personal critical thinking, independence, and viewpoints on significant events and problems. For example, vulnerable people may engage in internet chats with others who actively sought to indoctrinate them and take them into less open online spaces to talk about issues that include how to arrange for and take trips to Somalia, Syria, or Libya, as well as how to execute attacks on tough and soft aims in Kenya.

Effort should be implemented in place to correct past atrocities. As a result of past injustice, the youth feel smothered when it comes to fighting for employment. Radicalization should be tackled via a multi-sectoral approach, as should economic deprivation, underemployment, and youth concerns. There ought to be a line of command among police personnel and agencies that investigate and punish radicalization incidents. Efforts and initiatives to improve poverty and literacy should be implemented in the afflicted areas, since

radicalization is no longer limited to the recognized regions, but is now occurring across the country, with the creation of new hot spots. The case of Isiolo county the overlapping of push factors are evident making it a breeding ground for alshaab because they leverage the existing conflicts and problems in the county to attract the young people. Religious motivation is less in Isiolo because we have seen people from non muslim population being recruited in Isiolo.

Chapter three will present the approaches applied in Kenya to counter violent extremism and radicalization in Kenya as well as the challenges faced.

CHAPTER THREE

COUNTERING AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE CHALLENGES IN KENYA.

3.0 INTRODUCTION.

This chapter focused more on the counter violent approach applied in Kenya and policies to improve youths lives to stop the radicalization in the affected regions as well as the challenges faced .The majority of Africa's counter-terrorism and CVE tactics are based on global counter-violent extremism and terrorist initiatives spearheaded by the United States and other Western nations.Kenya has been in the forefront of combating violent extremism and terrorism since the bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 1998. However, the first aim was to combat terrorism and violent extremism by the employment of military means. As more young people joined violent extremist organisations, this strategy became counterproductive. The failure of state-led measures to halt the worldwide expansion of violent extremism activities has changed the policy focus on combatting violent extremism and terrorism to now-adopted multi-stakeholder alternatives.

In Kenya, the government has created a number of administrative, policy, and legal CVE and counter-terrorism techniques for gathering intelligence to prevent and respond to incidents of terrorism and violent extremism. The tactics have been implemented at the community, regional, and federal levels, with the goal of reacting to the changing nature of terrorist and violent extremist attacks.Following the Westgate Mall incident in 2013 and the

Garissa University College attack on April 2, 2015, Kenya's government modified its state-led counter-terrorism methods and began pursuing less military measures. The government began working with non-state entities to define concepts like terrorism, violent extremism, radicalization, and counter-terrorism initiatives.

The right knowledge of how to cope with each circumstance that leads to terrorist attacks resulted from the conceptualization of these phrases. De-radicalization initiatives, for example, began to appear. De-radicalization initiatives were developed and implemented as whole-of-society strategies that targeted grassroots community members, religious leaders, youth local leaders, community-based organisations, and respected Islamic scholars whose task is to hold educational dialogue with potential extremists in order to persuade them to denounce and abandon radical ideas or ideologies. The government has employed de-radicalization initiatives such as information collection, mentorship for youths involving them in skills training, sports activities, and training. This chapter will answer the study's research questions on why there has been an increase of youths radicalization despite the government efforts to prevent it.

3.1 GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND APPROACHES TO SOLVE PROBLEMS AND IMPROVE LIVES OF THE YOUTHS

While there is no one clear road to violent extremism, it has made creating guidelines in Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya difficult. Groups like Al-Shabaab clearly leverage perceived historical, social, and political complaints and draw on severe Islamic interpretations to craft propaganda narratives, whereas Kenya has embraced softer, community-driven counter-violent extremism approaches to augment the difficult security protocols that characterize Counter-Terrorism. These softer, community-driven initiatives are intended to

address structural marginalisation, the collapse of the family and community systems, the expansion of criminal gangs, young joblessness and corruption, human rights violations, individual and communal trauma, and other causes. However, to combat extremist violence in Kenya, the Kenyan government and various members and organisations representing nonstate actors embraced multi-stakeholder initiatives. Some of the measures that various entities (State and non-State actors) are adopting concurrently to drain swaths of terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya are listed below.

3.1.1 NATIONAL YOUTH POLICY

In 2003, the Kenyan government formed the National Youth Policy Steering Committee to develop policies and initiatives targeted at enhancing the quality of life for young people. The group created the National Young Policy (2006), with the purpose of encouraging youth engagement in political processes as well as communal and civic activities. The policy called for the establishment of a National Youth Council to aid in the coordination of youth organisations, the design of youth programs, and the continuous review of the execution of youth-focused policies and programs, as well as mobilising, sensitising and organising youth to solidify their voice in political, financial, and socio-cultural activities. Kenya's government established this strategy in an effort to alleviate problems and enhance the lives of its young. Schneider and Ingram (1993) define the targeted young as dependents who are politically weak but positively created as deserving of benefits and protection.

3.1.2 YOUTH ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT FUNDS.

The Ministry of Public Service, Gender, and Youth Affairs oversees the state corporation. It was first published in the Kenya Gazette in December 2006, with the goal of expanding economic possibilities and youth involvement in Kenya. It also aims to provide work chances for Kenyan youth through entrepreneurship and by motivating them to be job creators rather than just job seekers. Kenya's government established the Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP) in 2010. It was a four-year initiative aiming at increasing youth employability and capacity by providing adequate training and apprenticeships in the business sector. Over a four-year period, the programme targeted 11,000 youngsters in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. The government chose the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) to carry out the project. There has been no review of its effectiveness or benefits to the recipients (Government of Kenya, 2010). However, according to Sikenyi (2017)'s study, the YEDF projects were hampered by mismanagement, corruption, a lack of supporting implementation mechanisms, and imprecise qualifying criteria. The youths interviewed indicated that they found it exceedingly difficult to obtain funds from the foundation. This initiative is unlikely to have solved the difficulties of the targeted youth recipients. This corresponded to Schneider and Ingram's (1993) discovery that public policies do not always address public policy challenges.

3.1.3 JOBS FOR THE YOUTHS (KAZI KWA VIJANA)

The World Bank also collaborated with the government and contributed funding to the project. The Kenyan government initiated this project, which was put into the country's 2009 budget under the youth entrepreneurship development funds. Its goal was to offer money to youth through public works projects and to combat youth unemployment. Unfortunately, the money

was plundered by strong government operators, prompting the World Bank to cease financial assistance (Government of Kenya, 2009).

3.1.4 STRATEGY OF “NYUMBA KUMI”

Community partnership with state police to achieve secure neighbourhoods has existed since the 1970s, despite its obstacles. It has occasionally bordered on vigilantism, with illegal acts such as break-ins and neighbourhood extortions (Mutahi, 2011). The Nyumba Kumi' program is a Kenyan community policing effort that was resurrected in the aftermath of the 2014 and 2015 terrorist attacks in Kenya with the purpose of preventing crime and promoting stronger police-community cooperation. It was hoped that the resurgence of the Nyumba Kumi would lead to increased community awareness of suspicious persons and/or actions that may lead to terrorist indiscriminate attacks (Masese, 2007).

According to Ole Lenku (2013), the approach was incorporated into community policing to guarantee that the present village system led by a village elder was reformed into Nyumba Kumi (10)homes with a defined leadership structure accountable for the security of the associated households). The one-year project aims to increase institutional and community ability to resist radicalization and violent extremism, as well as to strengthen the National Counterterrorism Centre's capacity to apply radicalization methods and participate in effective counter-violent extremism engagement. The project created information, education, and communication materials to raise community awareness about violent radicalization and extremism; it provided training and guidance for trainers who work with youth and women; it supported interfaith dialogue and increased tolerance and unity between and within groups; and it supported community awareness about violent extremism (Government of Kenya, 2015).

However, the Nyumba Kumi effort was widely attacked as yet another government's attempt to justify stereotyping Ethnic Somalis, Kenyan Somalis, and Muslims in the country, and it stayed high in public discourse and rhetoric while failing to take root (Masese, 2007)

The reaction was split due to the reality of multiculturalism and urbanization (therefore the metropolitan location), which meant that individuals and/or families may be wrongly labeled as terrorists due to their variety from the rest of the population (Masese, 2007). The imminent failure of the Nyumba Kumi initiative to gain traction as a Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Violent Extremism initiative demonstrated that community policing necessitates an investment and special attention to problem analysis and problem-solving, facilitation, community organization, dialogue, mediation, and resolving conflict, resource identification and use, networking and linkages, and cross-cultural competency.

Despite the implementation issues, there is still a commitment to community policing efforts across the nation, both as a CVE strategy (UNDP, 2015) and in an effort to curb run-away crimes, with ongoing reports of beneficial, if minor, results. As a result, a more beneficial method for comprehending the possibilities of resurrecting a better Nyumba Kumi' initiative model would come from communities across the country that have recognized the normative situations for community policing that seem to be most likely to positively impact CVE and run-away crime in the neighbourhoods.

3.1.5 Bill No. 30 of 2003 AGAINST TERRORISM

This bill was defeated twice in the same parliament, in 2003 and 2006, on the grounds that it was oppressive to Muslims (Lind et al., 2015). Muslim preachers encouraged Muslim members in parliament to reject the measure, arguing that it was intended to anger and alienate Muslims. In Kenya, this was the first statute dealing with terrorism. It was approved by Kenya's parliament, however only after an agreement with Kenyan Muslims. Muslims and Kenyan

Somalis are negatively framed communities that say that their own government treats them with mistrust and as second-class citizens (Lind et al., 2015). According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), specific groups learn from the conceptualization of particular issues and policy implementation approaches. As a result of such implications, policies fail to provide the desired results. The goal of this act was to outlaw all organized crime groups.

3.1.6 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM (NSCVE)

President Uhuru Kenyatta introduced Kenya's national policy to combat violent extremism in September 2016. President Kenyatta stated that the NSCVE policy will combine resources from the government, commercial sector, and civil society to confront terrorism and violent extremism, and that it will prioritize de-radicalization above military methods. President Uhuru further stated that the battle against terror must be conducted in a variety of techniques and tactics, with rehabilitation and disengagement of returning foreign terrorist combatants being crucial. The National Counter-Violent Extremism Strategy was intended to prevent young people from joining Alshabaab and to reintegrate those who defect from the terror organization. In summary, the NSCVE paved the way for national approaches to returnee de-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration based on risk assessment and counter-radicalization frameworks.

3.1.7 COUNTY ACTION PLANS (CAPS)

This strategy was created to provide value to Kenya's NSCVE. At the county level, the goal was to invalidate violent ideas (Adala and Nzau 2018). The action plans are intended to coordinate both government and non-state efforts in the creation and execution of community-

level counter-violent extremism policies. This is motivated by the need to be able to recognize the threats presented by terrorists and violent extremists who exploit local dynamics, as evidenced at the national and regional levels.

3.1.8 DE RADICALIZATION AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

In Kenya, the majority of radicalized youths who joined various terror groups abroad are now returning as returnees. The majority of them appear to be interested in reintegration. However, with a significant population of returnees making their way back into the country illegally, the government, according to Rosenau(2005), needs to collaborate with relevant members of the non-state actors to assist in dealing with the issue - lest the returnees mutate and become a security threat to Kenya's national security. De-radicalization programs often address intellectual issues while preventing the attraction of hard force (militancy); altering attitudes and attempting to reintegrate affected individuals into the society. As per Renee and Garfield (2007), the decision to de-radicalize was frequently made by the individual, and connection to role models was frequently noted as a significant aspect in detaching from radical ideologies. These programs primarily targeted people's attitudes, beliefs, and actions.

The amnesty project prioritises counselling and recovery, as well as the protection of individuals who have surrendered. The program was marketed as a counter-violent extremism method, with the goal of rehabilitating former militants and de-radicalizing the cultures in which they remain. A screening procedure for returnees has been devised as part of the amnesty scheme to ensure that former militants do not join new terror or extremist organisations. The State authorities' vetting procedure attempts to first determine the level of

commitment and accountability of these ex-combatants, as well as where they will be reintegrated back into society once they have passed the vetting process.

3.1.9 STRATEGIC EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS(EWS)

Conflict early warning systems have consistently been recognised as critical to effective conflict prevention by the United Nations and international organisations. Early warning frameworks have always been utilised in security and charitable circles, according to Amutabi (2018), but the notion of conflict early warning founded on a human security perspective was new. The Kenyan 2010 constitution recognized an alternative judicial system as a method for conflict resolution, which included informal and non-formal early warning systems. Kenya, on the other hand, is still working to establish a credible informal early warning system against terrorism and other types of violence. The issue is that in Kenya, terror cells are frequently established inside communities, and recruiters are frequently known to locals but not to government organizations. According to Adala and Nzau (2018), both state and non-state actors must spend extensively in tactical early warning systems to successfully confront terrorism and violent extremism.

3.2 CHALLENGES OF FACED BY KENYA GOVERNMENT IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM.

Aside from the policies from the government ,the manner in which governments respond is determined by the extent of government authority over the area. Primarily from the standpoint of short-term security, by "eradicating" the "issue" of suspected terrorists. This includes kidnappings and extrajudicial deaths. Respecting human rights while combating violent extremism and terrorism has proven especially challenging under military authority. One explanation is because the military's primary goal is to gather more evidence to create a criminal trial.Unfortunately, the government has been unable to eradicate the problem due to a lack of capacity and training, as well as a history of poor relations between the state, its security services, and the general populace across the continent.The connection between security officials and citizens has been strained in several counties, including as Lamu, Isiolo, and Somalia. This has been exacerbated by police harassment, with some locals viewing the police as "above the law."

3.2.1 LACK OF PROPER TRAINING ,PROGRAM MONITORING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK.

The ever-changing techniques and technologies employed by terrorists pose a significant challenge to counter-terrorism measures.Concerns about the pattern prompted the government to send more anti-terrorism officers toaffected regions. However, the deployment does not appear to address concerns about internet radicalization and young recruitment into violent extremism. This might explain why the use of force and the establishment of community-police collaborations against violent extremism have failed to deter al-Shabaab recruitment in

kenya. The actual issue in dealing with terrorism, according to many Kenyans, is continuous ethical, professional, and capability inadequacies. In most cases we have seen where by community leaders are given funds without much trying in some communities. Lack of policy assessment, for example, Nyumba kumi has never been examined, and no one knows what the consequence of the strategy will be. Another cause is the inability to implement county action plans. For example, Isiolo county was supposed to create its own county action plan, but it was never completed owing to a lack of resources.

In most of the regions there is lack of early warning education which have been left solely for the national intelligence security. In the case of Lamu, analysis found that the early government security reaction to the Lamu assaults in June and July 2014 was extremely delayed. Police and other security services were chastised for arriving hours late to the scene of the assaults, despite being stationed close, and for being unprepared, with poor coordination and equipment (insult injury, 2014)

3.2.2 POLITICISATION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The government's capacity to detect and intercept the majority of terrorist activity has been hampered by the politicized struggle against al-Shabaab, haphazard and impulsive military actions, intelligence leaks, and an apparent lack of proper training and equipment (Ndung'u, 2015). Kenya's counter-terrorism efforts will be ineffective if the country remains as bitterly divided as it has been in past years. Partisan politics, alleged marginalization, and discrimination have significantly split Kenyan society across tribes and regional lines across the country. According to Singo (2018), he asserts that after the contested 2017 elections, several opposition figures advocated for the secession of sections of the nation

controlled by opposition supporters, arguing that there was no need for the country to stay united in the face of electoral injustice. With such a desire for secession, violent extremist organisations such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) emerged, posing a severe challenge and threat to Kenya's CounterTerrorism and CVE measures.

The Kenyan government's desire to combat Al-Shabaab has resulted in human rights breaches and ethnic discrimination by security personnel (KNCHR 2015: 4). The Kenyan government, committing ethnic and religious profiling, collects up terror suspects, the most of whom are Somali, and deports them to Somalia or dispatches them to refugee camps after subjecting them to assaults or bribery (Ombaka 2015). Claims of human rights breaches, particularly in ethnic and religious profiling, as well as extrajudicial murders in counterterrorism activities, constitute an additional problem. Since the security personnel and the state weakening Kenyan Muslims, Al-Shabaab has found it easy to become their messiahs from tyranny (Anderson 2014). Ethnic profiling, harassment, and exploitation have driven disadvantaged youngsters in Kenya to turn to groups like Al-Shabaab in order to live (Atta-Asamoah 2015: 6). Human rights groups and the government are both wary of one another. Because the state has accused these groups of supporting terror suspects, their ability to assist disadvantaged and underprivileged populations is curtailed (Hellsten 2016).

Weak state security intelligence has hampered follow-up on Al-Shabaab actions, causing civilians to lose faith in the state's capacity to combat terrorism. The National intelligence service NIS indicated that they had previous knowledge of the Westgate Mall attack and handed it on the police agencies, who did not act on the intelligence. The police excused themselves by claiming that the intelligence was ambiguous and hence they were unable to act. The NIS is failing to offer intelligence for security and is only concerned with regime survival (Ombaka 2015).

3.2.3 OVER RELIANCE OF THE WEST FOR FUNDS

One of the most significant problems and sources of resistance towards the government's counterterrorism and CVE tactics in combating violent extremism and terrorism is the perception that the policies are mostly pushed by the West through different financial schemes. One of the most significant problems and sources of resistance to the government's counterterrorism and CVE tactics in combating violent extremism and terrorism is the perception that the policies are mostly pushed by the West through different financial schemes. According to Mogire and Agade (2011), as a consequence of this, the techniques tend to prejudice one sector of the public, primarily Muslims, against the government, who see the worldwide war on terror as an attack on Islam, headed by the United States.

The US government provided Kenya with \$100 million in counterterrorism help in 2015. This increased assistance was more than double the sum granted in 2014. Between 2010 and 2014, the government got more than US\$-141 million in counterterrorism help from the US. Nonetheless, despite such widespread backing, the efficiency of Kenya's counter-terrorism actions remains in doubt. The threat posed by al-Shabaab, for example, has not abated, and many feel the group is now as powerful as it was when it struck the Westgate mall in September 2013 and Garissa University in April 2015. The United States offered more financial and training assistance to Kenya's security forces. While there was no doubt that Kenya required the assistance, the donor nations must recognize that increasing funding for security services will not address inner ethical and professional inadequacies (Ndung'u, 2015).

3.2.4 CORRUPTION

Kenya is regarded as the second most corrupt nation in East Africa, trailing only Burundi, and is only 29 levels off from becoming the most corrupt country in the world. Corrupt government personnel prefer receiving bribes to doing their jobs in a fair and transparent way. The police force is often recognized as being one of the most corrupt organisations in the country, thanks to widespread corruption. Some officials in Kenya's security services are implicated in corruption, which has made anti-terrorism operations profitable. Mwangi (2017) states that throughout Operation Usalama Watch in Nairobi, namely in the Eastleigh region, the police apprehended persons who were unlawfully in the country. The same folks, however, purchased their release by paying the police. Ndung'u (2015) observes that, in addition to disjointed and hurried military and policy reactions to terrorism, corruption continues to be a major concern. Terrorism has boosted government budgetary allocations, yet this raises severe concerns about the administration of those resources. The Kenyan government boosted financial allocations to the military and police to US\$2.28 billion in the 2015/2016 budget forecasts. In the fiscal year 2014/2015, these values increased by \$2 billion. The government also budgeted an additional US\$106.38 million to the Kenya police, as well as an additional US\$170.21 million to the defense and intelligence sectors (Ndung'u 2015). Endogenous corruption, in particular, is indeed a major impediment to Kenya's security forces' ability to combat terrorism.

3.5 CONCLUSION.

Deeds of violent extremism seem to be extremely rare. This raises some issues in terms of recognizing the pathways that motivate people to engage in such horrific acts and generating evidence on which acts best reduce the dangers and repercussions of violent events.

The field of Counter violent extremism appears to lack a focus on program evaluation. Due to the government's stance toward combating and preventing radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya, there has been an increase in young radicalization leading to membership in violent extremist organisations. According to the policies and methods implemented, the employment of law enforcement is still popular and widely employed in the afflicted regions and among particular people in the country. Although several causal narratives were covered in the previous chapter, structural push was also underlined in this chapter. Lamu's structural difficulties, for example, are mostly ignored. Most extremist activities in Kenya are categorized as terrorist attacks, as controversial as this may seem to due to the constraints of trying to define terrorism; it is impossible to discuss counter-terrorism and violent extremism prevention methods without discussing counter-terrorism and violent extremism prevention methods.

For many years, violent extremism was thought to be an external problem originating from a certain religion, affecting solely the Muslim and Somali populations residing in the capital city and other designated hot spots. However, the narrative appears to be shifting, as seen by the terror assault at the Dusit Hotel in 2019 pulled out by three Kenyans from non-marginalized areas and one Somali. There have recently been fresh incidents of youths being detained from different sections of the country that were never reported a few years ago. New cases are emerging, with people from highly-educated as well as middle-class households. This raises the question of what the youths really cite to justify radicalization. The state's security posture has not changed. If local conflicts over identity, land, and politics continue to provide fertile ground for al-Shabaab, this enables extremist groups to utilise violence to polarise and divide, therefore constructive solutions which promote unity and equality become less likely.

Violations of human rights, lack of accountability, ethnic discrimination, bribery, and restrictions on the work of human rights organizations are fuelling residents' anger while also increasing people's distrust, resulting in more instability than security. Because of these

complaints, abuses, and distrust, young people may seek protection and safety from Al-Shabaab. Given this, it is critical to evaluate these policies to determine if they help or hurt society. The level of collaboration between government forces and local people determines the effectiveness of counter-violent extremism activities (Hastings, 2004). In Kenya, the latter is paradoxical due to a lack of collaborative counter-extremism activities. In this regard, counter-terrorism actions have increased extremism, making it one of the country's most significant challenges. Rather than allowing violent organisations to seize this position, the state and society must show marginalised communities that they are capable of recognizing and resolving problems. Trust, dedication, and patience are required for security enhancements and community policing activities.

Corruption in Kenya must end since it is creating substantial suffering among residents when only a few individuals benefit at the expense of others. Some political leaders perceive violent extremism as a business, which is why they always politicise it, particularly during election seasons, in order to get sympathy from those who have been hurt. Corruption in government programs, as well as in the lack of accessibility of youth funds owing to a large number of protocols to be followed is a problem. Governments have traditionally spent more on the military (to secure their rule) than on police and the greater criminal justice system (including the judiciary and prisons). Addressing the fundamental causes is not just the responsibility of security services. It requires an all-government strategy, beginning with competent governance and ensuring equitable access to critical public goods.

Lack of a defined framework has proven to be an issue in the country since they rely on foreign entities to offer them rules that come with the cash in most circumstances. However, most policies are not assessed in order to establish the outcome and what works or does not work. Lamu, for example, became the location of substantial counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism (CVE) activities, endorsed and encouraged by a global community

concerned about Islamic radicalization. To have a greater impact on CVE, the Kenyan government must change the way it interacts with and treats different races and tribes. Only then would it be able to prevent more casualties among the general populace.

Making society more cohesive, with fewer split "we vs them" stories, would make it harder for violent extremist organisations to flourish, especially when they utilise identity problems and government difficulties to attract new cohorts. Government officials and Kenyan politicians in general, on the other hand, like to promote tribal hostility during election seasons for political gain. The Kenyan government may improve social cohesion by putting tribal and ethnic matters first. Kenya's government can strengthen its defences against the rising number of persons who join violent extremist organisations.

This chapter reported on the investigation's research question's findings. The fourth chapter concludes the public health approach and gives research recommendations.

CHAPTER FOUR

PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH LEVERAGING DESIGN THINKING

4.0 INTRODUCTION

The scope of CVE ought to be widened beyond religion, ideology, or motive, and integrate the endeavour into broader violence prevention efforts. If there are injustices underlying the belief systems that drive individuals to become violent, it may be claimed that CVE activities are simply aimed at preventing people from being violent in response to such injustices, rather than truly resolving those injustices. Many modern measures to combat violent extremism lack proof of success, which can weaken their efforts. Many programs have resulted in profiling, prejudice, and anger in the people who were supposed to benefit from them, and some have even been demonstrated to worsen an individual's sense of isolation and encourage violent conduct. Many of these difficulties might be addressed and mitigated by a public health strategy. However, due to prior conduct, critical stakeholders are frequently hesitant to engage in programs sponsored by counterterrorism groups.

A public health guideline employs concepts (mostly socio-behavioural) to assist researchers in better gaining a better understanding of the health issues under investigation, and it is essential to the creation of programs and evaluations. Models of public health prevention for violent extremism may target a wide variety of political, societal, economic, and historical reasons or grievances that can produce and maintain the circumstances for violent extremism.


Public health approaches entail close ties with the community, actions at the population level rather than just through health agencies, and interventions aimed at reducing risk factors and promoting protective factors. The goal is to change the spread of risk variables in a population so that fewer people exceed the threshold for having major risks and developing illness. This approach has been applied to the prevention of violence as a whole (Mikton, Butchart, Dahlberg, & Krug, 2016), as well as to behaviors such as suicide, violence, drug use, crime, and, more recently, radicalization and terrorism (Bhui et al., 2012).

Instead of focusing just on what individuals do in a given situation, it is important to identify and change the policies and conditions that contribute to the behavior. This chapter provides a proposal based on the findings on how current health and public health guidelines could be used to develop and support CVE programs in Kenya. It is important to understand that shifting CVE into a public health guideline is not the same as finding roles for public health professionals. As each society and jurisdiction develops, it should find its own leadership, and CVE approaches may emerge from faith-based, civic participation, mental health, social services, or other sectors, rather than public health. However, public health as a framework is frequently used by other sectors, with or without the involvement of actual public health professionals.

The public health guideline also employs theory (primarily socio-behavioural) to assist researchers in better grasping the nature of the health problems under investigation, and it is essential for the creation of programs and performance reviews. Opportunity theory model, which refers to the fact that the chances accessible to individuals within a community or institution are shaped by the social organisation and structure of that entity (Cloward & Ohlin, 2013); resilience theory, which examines an individual's or group's ability to adapt to stress and adversity (Yates & Masten, 2004); and socio-ecological model theory are a few case studies of

socio-behavioural theories that have been used in violence prevention research (Bronfenbrenner, 1988; Stokols, 1992, 1996; Stokols, Lejano, & Hipp, 2013).


4.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH LEVERAGING DESIGN THINKING TO PREVENT YOUTH RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM




Public health encompasses a wide range of disciplines related to CVE, including psychiatry, cognitive science, sociology, communications, education, and government policy. Public health specialists carry out their work in a variety of ways, including designing and carrying out community-based programs, dispensing services, undertaking studies and evaluations, and making policy recommendations. All of these characteristics combine to make public health a potentially useful framework for comprehending the different aspects of violent extremism. Shifting CVE into a public health guideline is not the same as finding roles for public health professionals. As each society and jurisdiction develops, it should find its own leadership, and CVE approaches may emerge from faith-based, civic participation, mental health, social services, or other sectors, rather than public health. However, public health as a framework is frequently used by other sectors, with or without the involvement of actual public health professionals.

The Centres for Disease Control (CDC) identified four key components for developing a public health plan to address health risks, including violence prevention. The first step is to define the problem using trustworthy data, and at this point, it's best to know who is at risk, what individuals are at risk of, when the problem is most probable to occur. In nutshell Understanding the scope of the problem entails analysing information like the number of violent behaviours, injuries, and deaths. Data can show how regularly violence happens, where it occurs, patterns, and who the perpetrators and victims are. Police statements, medical examiner documents, vital records, hospital infographics, public records, population-based survey data, and other sources can provide this information. People are products of their surroundings. For counter violent extremism program to be a success it will be dependent on addressing the core causes of violence, violence should be viewed as a symptom to be handled rather than a driving cause.

In this study the focus was on youths who are more vulnerable and easily targeted by the extremists in Isiolo and Lamu county kenya. Based on the case studies it is evident that risk factors can vary depending with individuals as well as the grievances presented in the region. This information is critical for determining the best course of action. Below is an illustration of the first step of defining the problem using an empathy map to be able to understand





The second phase is to identify risk variables as well as protective factors. Question often asked are what are the risk factors in the problem and also protective factors. With the (CDC) social-ecological model, it will be simpler to identify both individual and community level determinants, as well as large society level issues, in order to understand what truly makes individuals and groups more vulnerable than others. It is important to note that during this level one can be able to identify overlapping factors that makes the process of coming up with a solution complex. Once the factors intersect, to form a mess, it is important to untangle the mess

	Risk factors	Protective factors
Individual level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Loneliness *Anger *Hostility towards others *Psychological disturbance *Lack of employment *Substance abuse *Childhood Trauma 	Psychological support .
Relationship level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Family rejection *Lack of family support. *Influence from family members. *History of violence 	*Family support.
Community level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Police harassment. *Inadequate social service *High levels of crime *Poverty *Limited economic opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Education *Empowerment *More Job opportunities *Social wellbeing
Society level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Cultural norms *Stigma *discrimination Economic inequality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Social connectedness *Cohesion and recovery

The third stage builds on the knowledge gained in the first two processes to produce hypotheses about possibly viable therapies and program implementation. Question such as where and how one will get information is always ask. Information should be taken from

previous approach . The fourth stage is for implementation; at this point, the persons who will profit from the program, such as parents and educators, will be identified. However, many prevention practitioners may lack the skills or resources required to carry out steps one, two, and three, which include knowing where and how to look for the analyses of others. When implementing effective strategies or programs, practitioners are frequently provided with training and/or technical assistance to ensure that the strategies are implemented as intended.

According to Eissmenn's presentation (Weine et al., 2016), the entire counter violent extremism effort should be described as preventing violent extremism rather than combating it. Eisenman, Further states that universal prevention strategies frame violent extremism as a challenge for all populations, and such strategies are based on the belief that all communities have chances for violence prevention. Public health employs approaches which are commonly classified as primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.

Primary prevention programs could be broadly defined as community-level methods that mitigate changeable risks, such as restricting access to extremist media and limiting social exclusion and isolation. This can be accomplished delicately without stereotyping or profiling individuals, but rather by employing data-driven methods to recognize individuals at risk. Primary prevention seeks to avoid disease and injury before they occur by reducing exposure to the factors that cause and promoters of disease and injury (for example, healthy eating and workout to prevent diabetes). The majority of the population that has not engaged in undesirable behaviours linked to violent extremism is the focus of primary prevention. Several activities, such as community programs and collaborative media campaigns, are used at this stage to decrease risks and enhance coping mechanisms for persons, families, and communities. Primary prevention should most likely be led mostly by education and social regulation sectors, with community stakeholders involved and informed by a comprehension of the psychosocial dynamics at work.

Secondary prevention detects and treats "pre-clinical" changes that occur before illness manifests and progresses. For example, testing people for pre-diabetes and trying to encourage those who have it to lose weight is an example of secondary prevention. Secondary prevention focuses on a segment of the population thought to be at peril for violent behavior. Secondary prevention strategies may include those aimed at people who have been recognized as having characteristics that put them at a higher risk of violent extremism, like exposure to extremist ideologies as well as closeness to a radical social network. Secondary prevention strategies could include counselling and mentorships.

Tertiary prevention strategies, such as psychosocial interventions and intensive case management, may be directed at persons that have already accepted extremist ideologies or who are interacting with violent extremists but are not making plans or carrying out acts of violence. The goal is to steer them away from the course of violence. Deradicalization programs, for example, can help manage and rehabilitate criminals who have already demonstrated evidence of a crime and violent extremist behavioural patterns these activities are typically housed in CVE-specific initiatives.

After adopting the public health approach it is important to incorporate prevention and interventions. Prevention is a proactive community-wide effort to create healthy communities by addressing possible problems before they become major issues. It is critical to create a safe space in order to have an honest conversation and to encourage communities to establish a welcoming and supportive environment in shared spaces such as houses of worship, service agencies, and associations. Civic engagement can assist individuals to develop a set of competencies and abilities that will enable them to be more well-informed and efficient members of their local communities. Parental support encourages good youth growth by increasing familial involvement and support in order to facilitate difficult discussions with their

children. Teaching media literacy and online safety brings awareness among parents and young people about the various types of messages on the internet.

When it comes to intervention, it is essential to form a Community Response Team (CRT) which consist of multi-disciplinary experts capable of dealing with persons at-risk , potentially dangerous behaviour patterns, and violence. The CRT's mission is to evaluate people of concern and to establish relationships with educational, mental wellbeing, law enforcement, and social services agencies. The team also offer necessary, interventions that incorporate procedures from crisis intervention and risk evaluation. Through Listening, providing comfort, suggesting alternatives, and following up .In case of any situation that exceeds the CRT capacity, the troubled individuals are referred for continued care and support. .

4.1.1The CDC's 10 Essential Public Health Functions to Combat and Prevent Radicalization and Violent Extremism

The ten Essential Functions of Public Health is to provide guidance on how the public health approach, power structure, and workforce can help prevent extremist violence.

Monitoring .	At this stage it is important to assess whether local resources meet Counter violent extremism requirements.In most cases risk and protective factors for violent extremism may overlap with those in those certain areas of concern for public health such as community health, resilience, as well as
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	intervention and prevention.
Diagnosis and Investigation.	Definition of radicalisation and violent extremism from the community should be considered to check if they understand the problem. At this stage addressing the youths who are more vulnerable to violent extremism at an early stage through psychosocial and mental health programmes.
Educating, Informing, and Empowering.	<p>Young people's radicalization, which leads to violence, has an effect on their well-being, as well as the well-being and security of their populations and the world at large, because it challenges society's democratic values. The risk of this type of radicalization must be recognized and avoided through early interventions that can help young people become more resilient to extremism and the application of violent action.</p> <p>In environments where fake news story and misinformation are common, educating the general public about how tackling violent extremism is a component of developing healthy communities should be a top priority.</p> <p>Conducting media campaigns, trainings, Sports, Arts and workshops to raise awareness of the issue as one for populations to address may be appropriate. According to (Glik,2007), it is critical to use information and communication sciences to ensure that messages are not stigmatised.</p> <p>To build successful programs, communities must be empowered through participatory planning of CVE initiatives and supported in taking responsibility for their efforts.</p>

<p>Activating Community Partnership.</p>	<p>Working in partnership with the community is vital.integrated approach characterised by active, seamless interaction between government agencies and local partners involved in collaborative action Partnerships improve the way non-governmental and community organisations and government collaborate to identify strategies and resources, assisting sectors in incorporating CVE into their activities, and working as a team to develop integrated prevention and intervention plan, as well as clear roles and responsibilities for each stakeholder.</p>
<p>Policy Development.</p>	<p>Building programs to combat violent extremism necessitates policy changes that shift violent extremism prevention programmes away from sole reliance on criminal justice and more towards mental wellbeing, education, youth development, as well as other human services.</p> <p>This stage requires direct participation of policymakers from these different sectors, who have previously played minor roles in CVE policy development.</p>
<p>Enforcing laws that protect people.</p>	<p>Review, evaluate, and reassess Counter violent extremism related laws and policies to protect civil liberties and reduce stigma, because every new intervention plan must operate within the law.</p>
<p>Connecting to providing care.</p>	<p>It is critical at this stage to identify those who require mental health care or social services as well as to look for ways to refer them to service suppliers. Public health can also provide assistance on the well-known systematic issues that obstruct or enable access to psychological health and social services. Intervention programs, for example, should recognize and address</p>

		barriers to utilisation, such as stereotyping, cost, cultural and linguistic competency, transportation, and child care.
Providing competent workforce	a	The current public health, mental health, social service, and education workforce is not sufficiently trained in matters of violent extremism or even violence reduction more broadly, it is necessary to design appropriate initial and continuous training and oversight to upgrade their capacities and skills.
Evaluation.		Through program evaluation training, distribution of program evaluation results to practitioners both regionally and nationally, and highlighting the critical value of evaluation in all programs, evaluation should be a component of a quality improvement cycle. This is accomplished by creating a logic model based on the socio-behavioural theory that depicts the intended connections between inputs, actions, output data, and results for the recently developed targeted program. The evaluators and interveners can use this logic model to know what works as well as to develop measures and hypotheses for the prospective CVE intervention study.
Researching .		Despite the fact that current program design and evaluation are based on prior and continuous investigation on violent extremism as well as CVE is important because Violent extremism and radicalization pathways are dynamic therefore frequent research ought to be done to update the preventive strategies.

4.2 CONCLUSION

Kenya's initial counter-terrorism strategies relied on hard/militaristic power to combat acts of terrorism and violent extremism. As even more young people joined terrorist organizations, this strategy became ineffective. Terrorist activity and violent extremism also began to rise, with educational institutions, sites of worship, shopping malls, and various bus terminals becoming targets. As a result of the failure of state-led strategies to decrease the increase of violent extremism and terrorism, policy on tackling violent extremism and terrorism has shifted to now-adopted multi-stakeholder approaches. Furthermore, the icy connection between the government (state officials tasked with implementing counterterrorism strategies) and representatives of non-state agents has resulted in the strategies' failure. For example, the terror attack on the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi on January 15, 2019 could have been avoided if the government had implemented proper intelligence dissemination measures from non-state actors.

Tackling violent extremism necessitates groundbreaking initiatives that go beyond criminal justice and into public health policy and practice. As a system of thought for a public health strategy to mitigating violent extremism, the Ten Essential Public Health Services are proposed. A public health approach opens up opportunities for multi-purpose programming, such as addressing violent extremism as part of a larger platform for addressing other youth well-being issues such as identity, mental health, and gender violence. A public health approach could also be able to alleviate the stigma that comes with criminal justice involvement, which is regarded as recognising a suspect community.

The focus of public health has shifted beyond negative framing (i.e., attempting to prevent poor consequences) and toward fostering positive outcomes such as health and well-

being. To assist change the regular pattern, communities must concentrate in fostering trust, education, and creating better conditions. Those sectors do not receive enough attention or funds to encourage investing in the initiatives that yield the best results. People who have put CVE programs in place should be able to discuss the actual problems they and their communities have experienced. Communities served need not to be persuaded about the need for action, since they already know it and should be permitted to have a leading role in defining it. What the precise risk is and exactly how to deal with it It is critical not to generalise and to enable communities to determine whatever the threat of violent extremism signifies to them, as this will always vary depending on location and demographics.. Enhancing organisational partnerships, from a public health standpoint, goes beyond increasing and improving linkages and collaborations between governmental and non-governmental organisations because it includes improving partnerships between NGOs in the community, regardless of government involvement. Public health professionals could also teach local leaders how to form and sustain partnerships, as well as how to acquire additional resources from outside funders and grants.

CVE program performance should be measured in terms of the outcomes, metrics, or proximate variables that should be employed. Assessing outcomes will need a greater knowledge of risk and protective variables, evaluation methodologies, and finding possibilities for preventative programs by evaluating primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention initiatives. When it comes to performance measurement, it is vital, and there are numerous problems in performance evaluation. For example, the finest results may not be the simplest to measure, leading to a false feeling of security since measured outcomes appear to be good while unmeasured outcomes appear to be bad. For example, the finest results may not be the simplest to quantify, creating a false feeling of security since measured outcomes appear to be excellent while unmeasured outcomes appear to be awful. However, monitoring, assessment, and

efficacy measurements can all be manipulated at times. As a result, rather than the agency reviewing itself, CVE policymakers should fund for an independent evaluation. Finally, by utilising existing public health resources, a public-health approach may open up new avenues for coordinating and funding CVE programs.

The public health approach exists to supplement, not replace, criminal justice agencies, particularly if people have become more inclined to join and participate in established groups or individual specific actions in endorsement of terrorist organizations. The public approach also aims to alleviate fear as well as provide practical and evidence-based information to the general public, so that everybody can see themselves as a component of the solution rather than being excluded or feeling like they are part of a suspect community.

4.3 SUMMARY

The problem of violent extremism is one of the most persistent dangers to global security. Recruitment to violent extremist organisations is influenced by a number of variables. Some scholars have classified as "push" and "pull" factors, or negative social, cultural, and political characteristics. Until now, counter and prevention of violent extremism has mostly been done by police departments and guided by criminal justice systems. Most strategies aim to target just individuals who are already planning or conducting terrorist actions. It is critical that the government, academia and community debate violent extremism together because this is no longer a government problem alone rather it requires a multi sectoral approach in order to give everyone voice and contribute toward one common goal of a sustainable solution to ending youth violent radicalization and violent extremism.

There has been an increase in young radicalization leading to membership in violent extremist organizations. Some of the identified push and pull variables have failed to adequately explain why some people become violent extremists. The national government's tough security techniques in combating terrorism have not solved the problem and must be reconsidered. The Criminal Justice System plays a significant role in radicalization. According to the policies and methods implemented, the employment of law enforcement is still popular. It is impossible to discuss counter-terrorism and violent extremism prevention methods without discussing anti-extremist strategies. Terrorism's tactic includes inciting a severe counter-response that strengthens claims of discrimination, estrangement, and injustice against certain communities. For many years, violent extremism was thought to be an external problem originating from a certain religion. New neighbourhoods are emerging, with people from highly-educated as well as middle-class households. If local conflicts continue to provide fertile ground for al-Shabaab, constructive solutions will become less likely. In addition to that radicalization is no longer limited to the recognized regions, but is now occurring across the country. Efforts and initiatives to improve poverty and literacy should be implemented in affected areas. There ought to be a line of command among police personnel and agencies that investigate and punish radicalization incidents.

Some political leaders perceive violent extremism as a business. Addressing the fundamental causes is not just the responsibility of security services. Kenya's government can strengthen its defences against the rising number of persons who join violent extremist organisations. The Kenyan government may improve social cohesion by putting tribal and ethnic matters first. Tackling violent extremism requires groundbreaking initiatives that go beyond criminal justice and into public health policy and practice. A public health approach opens up opportunities for multi-purpose programmes, such as addressing violent extremism as part of a larger platform for addressing other youth well-being issues. Public health research

studies promise new social and behavioural sciences factors such as social inclusion, exclusion, cultural identification and acculturation, stigma, discrimination, and political participation. In conclusion the public health approach exists to supplement, not replace, criminal justice agencies. Monitoring, assessment, and efficacy measurements can all be manipulated at times. The public approach also aims to alleviate fear as well as provide practical and evidence-based information to the general public.

4.4 RECOMMENDATION

A public-health approach focuses diverse fields on lowering specific risk factors could be an effective way to begin slowing the spread of this perplexing plague. This study recommends that law enforcement, policymakers, and the general public be educated about the complexities of violent extremism, because violent extremism is influenced by a variety of political, cultural, societal, and religious factors and is not solely motivated by criminal motivations or other orchestral and financial factors. Kenya's government must recognize the scope and density of the challenge of oppressive operations by publicly condemn security forces abuses, and dedicate to taking all necessary steps to put an end to these abuses. In addition to that the government should ensure that Kenyan security personnel are retrained in effective policing in accordance with best practice, and that they have sufficient resources to respond to Kenya's security challenges in an effective and lawful manner.

Investing in information technology is highly recommended because it can add value to and improve the relationship between communities and security agencies. Communities and security services interact effectively via platforms such as WhatsApp to share social problems and exchange ideas on issues other than security, which improves their relationship. More resources should be invested in peace promotion and readjustment initiatives that emphasize rapprochement themes through radio, television, and film programs in official, national, and

indigenous languages, specifically designed to counter-narratives and messages that promote youth radicalization.

Grants should be made sustainable .The communities should be allowed to develop activities that are relevant to their social context. Grants should be constructed in such a way that the beneficiary can use a portion of the grant to make a business investment or to run a profit-generating activity. A portion of the financial gain can then be allocated to the intended initiative. Afterward on, some of the profits from the activity or business can be saved for future expansion, while others can be used to continue implementing peacebuilding initiatives this will make the program or initiative sustainable.This will reduce the overreliance of the donors ,because we have seen some projects come to an abrupt end due to lack of sustainable grants.

Corruption was also cited as a major problem ,the people of kenya and the government should end corruption because it has been discovered that it is negatively impacting most projects due to a lack of funds that are stolen by a few individuals who are presumed to oversee the programs, thus stopping the projects. Due to a history of fraud and lack of transparency, many donors who would like to partner with affected communities are scared.

When it comes to project evaluation, it is necessary to involve the government. This will aid in determining what works and what does not, as well as what should be done in the future.

When it comes to the use of the internet, youths and the internet are inextricably linked; they are the largest consumers. They are exposed to a high volume of violent content online, as well as extremist and xenophobic behavior. According to my observations, the government and society are making fewer efforts to address hatred and incitement occurring online particularly on Facebook and twitter, this must be addressed while upholding freedom of expression. Youths can always be educated on civic responsibility and how to avoid content that incites,

attracts, or pulls them to consume non-educational content online, as well as how to respond in nonviolent ways.

In conclusion, youths should be included in policy making from the ground up, especially when it comes to decision making, and should be permitted to engage actively in politics.

Recommendation for future studies.

It is critical to conduct research into why some youths do not proceed joining violent extremist groups after being radicalised; this could aid in identifying a protective factor that could be used in preventive measures.

Engage in local studies and evaluations to determine what works. The further we fully comprehend the local causes and evolution of violent extremism, as well as what appears to work to reduce it, the more efficient we will be in dealing with this problem.

The phenomenon of youth radicalization via the internet needs to be researched since online radicalization has evolved into a rough terrain in counter-radicalization. Extremists are increasingly using it for indoctrination and dissemination of extremist content.

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