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Identity and Cultures of Peace(s):

a critical assessment of the mainstream discourse on French identity

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To François-Xavier Emile Ramarohetra,
who, by standing up to French riflemen in 1947,
permitted the following pages to be written.

“Home is where the heart is” – popular saying.

“Out beyond ideas of wrong-doing and right-doing, there is a field. I’ll meet you there.” ― Rumi

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This work is labelled with my name, but its content and format embody the inputs of a lot more people and structures.

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyse the nexus between identity, France and peace. It examines the relationship between the construction of French identity and the emergence of cultures of peace(s). This thesis states that the recognition of French alternative identities dismantles the mainstream discourses on French identity, based on essentialist and colonialist ideologies, and contributes to cultures of peace(s) in France. This study uses theoretical content analysis, qualitative literature-based research and discourse analysis from secondary data in order to thoroughly review the concepts of identity and alternative identities, as well as to critically assess French identity, peace theories and practices. The findings of the research indicate that the current French republican system stems from a culture of war and violence, and that peace and alternative identities are intrinsically linked together. This thesis lays the theoretical basis for the transformation of inner and societal conflicts on French identity and the building of cultures of peace(s) in France.

Keywords: Identities, French Identity, Cultures of Peace, France, Postcolonialism.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude vise à analyser le lien entre l'identité, la France et la paix. Elle examine la relation entre la construction de l'identité française et l'émergence de cultures de paix. Ce mémoire affirme que la reconnaissance d'identités alternatives françaises démantèle les discours dominants sur l'identité française, basés sur les idéologies essentialistes et colonialistes, et contribue à l'émergence de cultures de paix en France. Cette étude utilise l'analyse théorique du contenu, la recherche qualitative basée sur la littérature et l'analyse du discours à partir de données secondaires afin de revoir en profondeur les concepts d'identité et d'identités alternatives, ainsi que d'évaluer de manière critique l'identité française, les théories et les pratiques de la paix. Les résultats de la recherche indiquent que le système républicain français actuel est issu d'une culture de guerre et de violence, et que la paix et les identités alternatives sont intrinsèquement liées. Ce mémoire pose les bases théoriques de la transformation des conflits internes et sociétaux sur l'identité française et de la construction de cultures de paix en France.

Mots-Clés : Identités, Identité française, Cultures de paix, France, Postcolonialisme.

RESUMEN

Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar el nexo entre la identidad, Francia y la paz. Examina la relación entre la construcción de la identidad francesa y el surgimiento de culturas de paz. Esta tesis afirma que el reconocimiento de las identidades alternativas francesas desmantela los principales discursos sobre la identidad francesa, basados en ideologías esencialistas y colonialistas, y contribuye a las culturas de paz en Francia. En este estudio se utiliza el análisis del contenido teórico, la investigación cualitativa basada en la literatura y el análisis del discurso a partir de datos secundarios para examinar a fondo los conceptos de identidad e identidades alternativas, así como para evaluar críticamente la identidad francesa, y las teorías y prácticas de paz. Las conclusiones de la investigación indican que el actual sistema republicano francés proviene de una cultura de guerra y violencia, y que la paz y las identidades alternativas están intrínsecamente vinculadas entre sí. Esta tesis sienta las bases teóricas para la transformación de los conflictos internos y sociales sobre la identidad francesa y la construcción de culturas de paz en Francia.

Palabras Claves: Identidades, Identidad francesa, Culturas de paz, Francia, Poscolonialismo.

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PROLOGUE

Dear reader, thank you for willing to delve into my writing. This prologue is not officially part of the intellectual reflection below, but it emotionally fuels its origins. It therefore explains the process that led my endeavour to write this thesis. If you do not wish to read this prologue, I invite you to start from the 'General Introduction' on page 1.

'Where are you from?'
'Where am I from?'

Wherever one goes in a new place and interacts with people, that person is likely to being asked *where are you from?* At first, answering such question seems like a no-brainer reply. For some people, it indeed is. For some others, reflecting on the context they are being asked the question may make them delay the speed of their answer. For another group of people, their answer might be too long to hold on to the end for the one who asked the question. For others, they may simply have no answer. They may even not want to answer. All those types of answers, including the silent one, are valid and understandable. The only task the questioner should be compelled to do is listening actively to care the connection that was just created by asking that question.

I have been asked this question I do not know how many times in the span of my twenty-eight years. My 'Blasian' skin tone and facial features allowed me to be playful and always ask back *where do you think I am from?* The answers I have heard funnily covered perhaps over twenty-five countries from the south-east Asian, Arabic, sub-Saharan African and Latin-American parts of the world. It indeed was funny playing such game at the beginning but turned out sometimes annoying when people could not find the answer and started to make generalization comments when I delivered them my response. It also at times made me uncomfortable giving a reply since I did not really know how to answer. Indeed, I was born and raised in France, but both my parents are originally and ethnically from Madagascar. I have spent the first twenty years of my life in France. However, the eight remaining years are split chronologically as such: four years in the UK, three months in Senegal, one year in Vietnam and two years and a half in Spain, where this thesis was birthed. These life experiences have impacted me to the point that I am sometimes lost in knowing where I am from. Such (radical) change process has been described by Frantz Fanon (1986: 19) and as Amin Maalouf expressed (1998: 34), one of my belongings is touched and it is my whole being that vibrates. Thus, I prefer to locate myself in the above two categories of people who whether delay their answer or have a long list of 'homes' to mention. This may also be due to some anecdotal experiences that have happened to me and have shaken my identification process since I left France to study, work and live abroad. Below are few of them that marked me:

- In July 2013, I was working as a health care assistant in a care home in Wolverhampton and a resident, an elderly Indian looking man, directly came and spoke to me in what I think was Punjabi.
- In 2015 in Senegal, the locals knew I had something very in common with them through music tastes, music knowledge and dancing. Even if I did not look like them in term of skin colour, they knew I had African roots and recognised me in these. Senegalese author Fatou Diome described this embedded link between African people, the sound of the djembe and dancing in her book *Le ventre de l'Atlantique* (Diome, 2003: 194-195).
- In April 2018, a man in the cafeteria of the Universitat Jaume I in Castellón de la Plana asked me "*¿De donde eres, Filipinas?*" (Where are you from, Philippines?) to which I replied "*Francia*" (France). Then the man asked again "*¿Pakistán?*" (Pakistan?).
- In summer 2018, I was walking in Paris with a friend and someone came directly speaking to me in Spanish, asking me if I was Colombian.
- In pictures, I blended in with the students from the Bahnar, Jarai, Rơ Măm, and Xo Dang ethnic minorities of Vietnam, with Bidayuh indigenous friends from Malaysia or look alike a friend with an indigenous origin from the Nasa people of Colombia.

All above anecdotal experiences happened to me after I started living abroad. Indeed, in France Malagasy people are more common and they are recognisable by their facial features and, especially, their surname. Therefore, in France I am French with Malagasy origins. Since I left in 2012 and came back (mainly for holidays or summer work), reflecting on where I am from has thus been a constant questioning to myself. Writing this thesis on identity and cultures of peace(s) in France is therefore a way to cover my need of knowing more about myself and my interests of understanding this identity process that each human being is going through. Moreover, as a French citizen questioning my identity, I wished to undertake this venture in order to make a dent in building cultures of peace(s) in France where French national identity is a long-time conflictual issue. Besides, French national pride has been a topic I have been critical about since listening to Irish humourist George Carlin on ethnic and national pride saying that 'pride should be reserved for something you achieve or obtain on your own, not something that happens by accident of birth. Being Irish isn't a skill... it's a […] genetic accident'.[1] In this sense, the French Football Federation main hashtag *#fierdêtrefrançais* (proud to be French) has been bothering me since the Irish humourist gave me a hand in noticing the French (football) misplaced pride. It is the meaning of being French and how French identity is perceived and approached that I want to critically assess from a peace studies perspective. I endeavour to tackle this topic to personally not have to live again anecdotal experiences as those below, that perpetuate a dominant discourse on French identity:

- When I arrived in Castellón de la Plana for the first time in February 2018, my Spanish housemate knew a French girl was going to live with her. Now that we are friends, she told me that she expected a 'typical French girl' with white skin and brown hair to be her new housemate. When she met me, she was surprised to not be in front of one of those French actresses with a 'touch of elegance' such as Marion Cotillard, Audrey Tautou, Sophie Marceau or Charlotte Gainsbourg.[2]
- In October 2019, my Colombian housemate made a statement, that I did not know how to answer at the time, when I mentioned him the topic of my final master thesis. He said that he felt Colombian and he could not understand how sometimes I could not feel French or was disturbed about it.
- In February 2020 during a meeting reunion with fifteen students and ex-students of the 'Peace Master' in Castellón de la Plana, three of us had a European background -and passport I presume- including me (a Swiss, a Franco-German and a Franco-Malagasy). However, at one point it was recounted the diversity of the group and it was stated that only two persons were coming from Europe. The Swiss and the French-German students were both white-skin coloured. I believe I was skipped in the 'European' counting despite having the French citizenship. I did not reclaim being European on the moment and was surprised by what had happened. However, I did reflect on this little event afterwards.
- In April 2020, my indigenous Nasa Colombian friend had a call and I overheard that she mentioned that she was living with *una chica francesa* (a French girl). I smirked in hearing her saying this because I knew it did not describe entirely who I was. I was wondering how that person on the phone would imagine how I looked like.

Undertaking this thesis on identity, France and peace is thus a project that I mulled over years. The completion of a Master of Laws on the implementation of the human right to peace in 2015 propelled the peace perspective. Participating to the 'National Identity' workshop at ISFIT[3] in February 2019 and to the Malagasy diaspora conference on 'Dual belonging and homecoming'[4] in October 2019 nourished the identity and French identity ones. Publishing an article in an academic journal in May 2020 on the tragic events of Charlie Hebdo encompassed the three perspectives.

This research's purpose, by the end of its last sentence, is to shift the approach to the current discourse on French identity, but also the approach to asking about identity in general. As such,

[1] George Carlin on national and ethnic pride: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIG4-03Gru4
[2] 'Top 10 French Actresses with that touch of elegance': https://www.discoverwalks.com/blog/top-10-french-actresses/
[3] International Student Festival in Trondheim
[4] Zama Paris 2019 – *Double appartenance et retour au pays*

instead of asking *where are you from?*, asking *who are you?* or *what are your experiences?* can help understand fully the person one is asking about. The shift from being proud to being happy (as George Carlin suggested) and grateful of one's identity/ies is also a goal this work aims to prompt.

This thesis is therefore also a reflection *of* and *with* all parts of my being. Spiritual and symbolic identity aspects are inscribed in it. My natal chart says that I am skilled in communication and passing the message through, hence the recurring analysis in connecting and bridging various concepts. I have a simian line on both of my hands, which stresses that matters of the head and of the heart are strongly linked.

While writing this research during the 2020 unprecedented sanitary times where I could only go out for basic human needs, I had to stay home to reflect and research on one of our basic human need: identity. I hope that the unique approach taken in this thesis on the topics of identity, France and peace triggers a keen interest to the readers.

My professor of the International Humanitarian Law module while studying my Master of Laws made the comment on my formative essay that it was a good essay but, especially, there was a different approach that she did not find in the formative essays of the other students. Unfortunately, I failed this subject at the exam for misunderstanding the context and using the wrong laws. Fortunately, I successfully passed at the recess. Now, I wish that you, reader, will say the same after going through this thesis. I hope that you can take something out of it that you did not know, think about or realise before and that it sparks more endeavours towards peaceful coexistence, in France and elsewhere. Finally, I hope that I can pass at the first attempt this time.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

About the topic and I

A clarification must be made to the readers before they continue reading the following pages: this thesis is written with a peace studies perspective. In such approach, the 'situatedness' of the author is paramount to clarify in order to understand from which positions and context the research is being undertaken and towards which direction. In this sense, the pronouns 'I' or 'my' will be referred to when mentioning the author's point of view and input. Indeed, peace studies is defined as such by Johan Galtung, 'the father' of peace studies:

> Peace studies seeks to understand the negation of violence through conflict transformation, cooperation and harmony by drawing from many disciplines, including psychology, sociology and anthropology, political science, economics, international relations, international law and history (Galtung, 2010: 20).

Besides, peace studies put a high emphasis on values. Indeed, theoretical perspectives such as critical theory where values are superior to facts, and constructivism where values are superior to theories (Galtung, 1993) are at the basis of the peace studies analysis. That is why clarifying my personal stance and background on this topic within the prologue and this general introduction is paramount.

In April 2018, I was introduced to the concept of hyphenated identities by Dr Paul Scott who was my professor of the *Conflict Mediation and Negotiation* course in the International Master in Peace, Conflict and Development studies at Universidad Jaume I in Castellon de la Plana, Spain (Peace Master). He mentioned such concept regarding the fact that some people sometimes may not belong to one side or another if they were involved in the process of drawing borders between two countries if they had links to both parts. They were people with hyphenated identities. I instantly felt connected to this idea. Indeed, I was born and raised in France and, thus, I am a French citizen. However, both my parents were born in Madagascar and were naturalised French after they came to study and work in France. At home, Malagasy language is spoken, Malagasy food is eaten, Malagasy music is listened to and danced on, Malagasy people are always present. I was and I am constantly surrounded by Malagasy influences when I am back in my parent's home, in France. Being able to relate to both French and Malagasy identities at any time, at the same time or at different times is how

I embrace my hyphenated identity. Besides, I was born a French citizen and only obtained my Malagasy citizenship in February 2018, after requesting it at the age of twenty-five. My will to request a double citizenship sprouted in May 2016. In October 2016, I mentioned such will to a French work colleague who replied me negatively on my endeavour since I had never lived in Madagascar. I was surprised and started to question myself on my identity and if, indeed, I was legitimate to request the Malagasy citizenship. My relation to a hyphenated French-Malagasy identity is illustrated as such. However, my relationship with my identity, who I wholly am, does not stop there, with these two citizenships and cultural backgrounds. Indeed, I believe and feel that my belongings and affiliations embrace every experiences and encounters that I had the chance to have. The places where I settled, interacted with the locals and lived their daily routine (France, the UK, Senegal, Vietnam and Spain) do feel special to me. These experiences have altered my sense of identity and make me unique. It saddens me that the discourse on French identity does not recognise all of them in my identity and, consequently, me. Indeed, 'to recognise is the key word', to recognise oneself and how one is (Espinosa, 2008:77). By extension, to be recognised is thus a key aspect regarding identity. Therefore, the lack of recognition of mine or anyone else's whole identity, including the French one, when the mainstream discourse on French identity emerges is a critical topic. That is how my interest to research on identity and the discourse on French identity blossomed.

My interest in the concept of peace has always been existent. The sole hearing of the word soothes my spirit. That is why I undertook specialised modules related to its many facets during my law studies, such as international human rights law, international humanitarian law or even the death penalty in law and practice. Enrolling in the Peace Master in Castellón was thus a natural follow-up.

My interest in cultures of peace(s) started after finishing my Master of Laws dissertation on 'The steps to implement and enshrine the Human Right to Peace in International Law'. It grew and intensified while studying in the Peace Master. 'Cultures of peace(s)' is an 'expansion' of the peace studies staple notion of 'culture of peace'. I will explain why this thesis is taking the plural approach below. Johan Galtung regards the culture of peace as a means to foster positive peace (Galtung, 1969) and as an alternative to the culture of war and cultural violence (Galtung, 1990). This latter is part of

Galtung's triangle of direct, structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1969) at the basis of the neglect of basic human needs. My interest of researching about the culture of peace grew especially in analysing its relationship with France and the French context. It intensified throughout the writing process of the final papers of courses of the Peace Master since March 2018. Half of my final works dealt about how France, the French government or the French institutions' features limited the development of a culture of peace in the country, how it impacted the French society and which improvements could be envisioned. I am interested in the culture of peace because this is the concept in peace studies that I believe needs to be fostered to a larger extent to be able to live in peace with all living beings. However, it must be recognised the plurality of cultures that can and, currently, do promote and contribute to peace. That is why it would be *truer* to talk about 'cultures of peace'. Nevertheless, this thesis also embraces the vision of the Peace Master acknowledging the plurality of *peaces*[5]: 'There is no single way of understanding peace – there are as many ways of making peace as there are diverse people and cultures'[6] (Universitat Jaume I, 2013). The pluralisation of the word 'peace' is based on the Peace Master founder Vicent Martínez Guzmán's philosophy for making *peaces*. The Spanish original term is *cultura para la paz* which translates as 'culture for peace' and not 'culture of peace' (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 319), implying an active attribute to the concept. Therefore, perhaps the more adequate term to use towards the building of peace would be 'culture for *peaces*'. Nevertheless, since the study of the culture of peace has only been delved into very recently at the end of the twentieth century (this will be examined in Chapter 3), this thesis embraces the plural concept of 'cultures of *peaces*'. However, the concept of 'cultures of peace' has only been acknowledged academically so far by Elise Boulding (2000). Therefore, this paper proposes the notion of 'cultures of peace(s)' to allow flexibility in the use of the concept.

Identity and cultures of peace(s) are thus two topics that I kept on learning, studying and researching about in the past five years. However, as observed above, it has always been done in relation to France. Indeed, I am naturally drawn to France because that is where I come from and I

[5] In Spanish, the word 'peace' is pluralised (and gramatically correct) from *paz* to *paces*, whereas in English it has not yet been pluralised (and it is not yet gramatically correct).
[6] Original in Spanish : *No sólo existe la paz entendida de una sola manera, sino que hay tantas formas de hacer las paces como diversas son las personas y las culturas.*

want my home place to embrace a peaceful coexistence between subjects on the territory regardless of how they identify. France has a very special relationship with the identity of the subjects living on its soil, whether French citizens or foreigners. France has also its very own approach to peace and, therefore, cultures of peace(s). It is thus interesting to study this relationship, this triangle nexus between identity, France and peace. Besides, it has never been examined before.

According to Johan Galtung (1989), identity is one of the four basic human needs, alongside survival, well-being and freedom. Identity is the one I want to address, within the context of France, towards cultures of peace(s) and through the analysis of the discourse on French identity. Finally, my interest in this topic has grown academically while I also was (and keep!) growing spiritually. Eastern spiritual influences will be regularly referred to throughout the thesis as it helped me reflect on the readings, connect the knowledges and produce a unique work with 'my own touch'. As such, the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism[7] as the basis for right action (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87) are therefore representing in a certain way the four below chapters. Amin Maalouf's 1998 book *Les Identités Meurtrières* (The Murderous Identities) translated as *In The Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong* (2003) also highly influences this thesis. Each part of the Franco-Lebanese author's book[8] reflects in a way each chapter of this thesis as well. Besides, the book is also a spiritual reflection:

> If in the aftermath of Sept. 11 we want to know more facts, we need political analyses, but we are also hungry for general reflection on what human beings are like. "In the Name of Identity" bridges these concerns. […] His book is a heartfelt meditation on identity that begins inside his soul (Lear, 2001).

This thesis is thus a reflection on identity, based on facts and political analyses combined with a meditation on identity led from the heart. I will combine my academic knowledge from peace studies to assess the close relationship between identity and France through peace values that allow human beings to live in peace. Also influenced by Spanish language, this thesis embodies the process of *sentipensar*.[9] It bridges the academic process of thinking (*pensar*) with the experimental process of living and feeling emotions (*sentir*). Peace studies being less scientific than war studies, the peace studies lens of this work reasserts the prevalence of values (that can be linked to emotions) over facts

[7] 'The Buddha always taught that we should practice the Four Noble Truths: 1. There is suffering. 2. There is an origin of suffering. 3. The end of suffering is possible. 4. There is a path to the end of suffering' (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87).
[8] 1. My Identity, My Allegiances. 2. Modernity and 'the Other'. 3. The Age of Global Tribes. 4. Taming the Panther.
[9] Term coined by Saturnino de la Torre. It is defined as "the process by which thought and feeling are put to work together". *Sentipensar* balances the traditional separation between the two concepts.

and theories (linked to rationality) on which war studies rely. Finally, this thesis epitomises John Dewey's quote that 'we do not learn from experience... we learn from reflecting on experience'. Such reflection will hopefully be useful in order to tackle the 'wicked problem' (English, 2014) that the discourse on French identity is. As Margarita Quihuis (2013) stated so well, my aim here is to try to 'make a dent' in it.

Contextualisation of the research

The issue of the discourse on French identity is an old one that originates in the French Revolution of 1789 and that has recently emerged due to the waves of immigration and globalisation. It has, however, re-emerged in the recent years in relation to topics of terrorism and national sports team where the identity of protagonists (or antagonists) was questioned as it affected French people of different backgrounds in different ways. I have written on both topics (Ranaivosoa, 2020). Nevertheless, questioning the identity of French sports representatives symbolises the underlying structural and cultural violence in France that do not conclude in direct violent killings but fuel and perpetuate the malaise situation. The debate between Trevor Noah and Gérard Araud, the French ambassador to the US, after the French men's national football team won the 2018 FIFA[10] World Cup raised such structural issue again (Ranaivosoa, 2020). The exchange between the two men ignited online debates regarding the identity of the French national football team players, especially those who have various cultural backgrounds. Overall, French identity was questioned, again, as well as the political and institutional application of France's republican approach of 'blindness' to colour, creed or culture of French citizens, based on Article 1 of the 1958 French Constitution:

> *La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances.* […].[11]

In this sense, the ideologies on which the French Constitution bases its approach to identity (no distinction between origins, race or religion) dates back to the time of the Enlightenment thinkers

[10] *Fédération Internationale de Football Association*

[11] My own translation: France is an indivisible, laic (secular), democratic and social Republic. It ensures the equality before the law of all citizens without distinction of origin, race or religion. It respects all beliefs. [...]

(with *Les Jacobins* in France) and their concept of universality which remains present in the French Constitution and institutional features. However, it is often forgotten that this movement had a high Christian influence. After the end of the colonization, France had a period where it needed foreigners' help to reconstruct the country. Many people coming from ex-colonized countries migrated to France to assist in its rebuilding. At first, these people were meant to stay temporarily but ended up staying indefinitely. Therefore, the French population started to diversify with the first generation of migrants, but also with the second generation one like myself -or even the third generation one. These latter generations may indeed experience the pros and cons of the universality of the French republican system which generates a mainstream discourse on French identity in France and abroad.

Finally, with the UEFA European Football Championship which should have taken place in June and July 2020, it would have been interesting to examine the reactions of French politicians and citizens on the identity of French players according to their wins, draws or losses. The group stage draw having put *L'Équipe de France* in the 'death group' composed of Portugal, Germany and a Play-Off winner, the uneasy road to a final tournament victory is thus another possibility of stirring up -French- identitarian issues. Besides, on December 3rd, 2019 Amin Maalouf was awarded the National Order of Merit by the French government (Turcev, 2019) for 'building bridges between East and West' and received his award on February 29th, 2020 (Takieddine, 2020). These couple of events combined with the recent Black Lives Matter movement in 2020 shows that this thesis settles in a context where the re-assessment of the discourse on French identity is needed.

Research problem and justification

This thesis aims to extend the already present research on the essentialization problem of French identity. The analysis of hyphenated identities which both challenges and fuels the mainstream discourse on French identity will be briefly critically assessed. The possibility of including French alternative identities -such as postcolonial, hybrid or transcultural identities- in the French context will be examined. To deconstruct the statement '[…] To us [France], there is no hyphenated identity, roots are an individual reality' by Gérard Araud sparked the will to undertake this research under a

peace studies perspective. Indeed, the issue of fusing the two concepts of citizenship and nationality and the institutional denial of embracing two or more different cultural identities in France has been approached from various social fields of study perspectives but not the 'peace studies' one. This topic is relevant *from* and *for* the peace studies' perspective analysis since the French identity debate is still and always ongoing in France. Besides, I believe it is the cultural and structural basis from which marginalization remain present in the country. To a further point, the cultural violence and structural violence in France may also fuel and be at the basis of direct violence in the country, such as the anger of individuals doing terrorist attacks. Direct, structural and cultural violence are three elements part of the violence triangle conceptualised by Johan Galtung (1969), where they all relate to each other. Direct violence is the type of violence 'on the surface of the iceberg'. The type that is perceived physically and directly. It illustrates an immediate deprivation of life. It is fostered by the two other types of violence. Structural violence echoes to systems that allow injustice, discrimination, poverty, inequalities, diseases and power imbalance (Akin Ojelabi, 2010: 55) to take place and hinder certain human beings to enjoy and develop their humanity in its entirety. It illustrates a slow deprivation of life. Cultural violence are the aspects of culture 'that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence' (Galtung, 1990: 291). It illustrates the opacity of the morality of certain attitudes and beliefs. This topic is thus relevant because the hegemonic and dominant discourse of the French republican model has never been approached from the peace studies perspective, to deconstruct the types of violence emerging from it. Alternative to the three types of violence are negative peace, which is defined as the absence of direct violence; positive peace, which is defined as the absence of direct violence as well as the promotion of justice and development to fulfil the basic human needs; and the culture of peace. Therefore, this research is an alternative and aims to analyse to which extent the mainstream discourse on French identity is promoting cultures of peace(s). Thus, shedding light on the nexus identity, France and peace from a peace studies perspective and through the critical assessment of the discourse on French identity will extend the academic discussion on postcolonialism and cultures of peace(s) in France. This study is also justified by the need of setting pathways to reconstruct the concept of French identity from an inclusive and intercultural perspective.

A personal motivation to undertake this study is my interest to learn and dig deep on how the concept of identity is viewed in France and to relate such understanding to the building of cultures of peace(s) (or not) in France. It is also a symbolic reflection *on* and *of* my personal experience. Indeed, I am perceived as a French and Malagasy citizen, enjoying the luck of having two different cultural backgrounds I grew up in as a child. However, the organic relationship between such hyphenated identity and my personal experience of living, studying and working in various places (France, the United Kingdom, Senegal, Vietnam and Spain) may thus be forgotten. As such, it does not reflect the hybrid identity that is now shaping the way I think and behave, where all the places and experiences where I come from (Selasi, 2014) are considered fully.

Thesis statement and research questions

Thesis statement:

The recognition of French alternative identities dismantles essentialist and colonialist discourses on French identity and helps fostering cultures of peace(s) in France.

General research question:

In what ways do alternative identities challenge the mainstream discourse on French identity and to what extent do they promote cultures of peace(s) in France?

Specific research questions:

1- What is identity and what is it composed of?

2- What are the various discourses on identity and their implications?

3- What are the discourses on French identity and their impacts in (French) society?

4- In what ways discourses on French identity reflect a culture of war or cultures of peace(s)?

5- In what ways do alternative identities reflect and foster cultures of peace(s) and contribute to peaceful relationships?

6- How can alternative identities be institutionally and societally introduced and recognised in France through the practice of cultures of peace(s)?

Objectives

General objective

Discuss the significant interest in recognising French alternative identities at the institutional and societal level to foster cultures of peace(s) in France.

Specific objectives

1- Identify the discourses on identity and the implications they have in society.

2- Analyse and deconstruct the discourse on French identity of the French republican model and of French society from a peace studies perspective.

3- Explore the societal role and importance of alternative identities that reflect and foster cultures of peace(s).

4- Propose ways to introduce the recognition of alternative identities in French institutions and society for and from cultures of peace(s).

Aims and outcomes

The aim of this thesis is to bridge the gap and open connections between various theoretical concepts on identity and the related experiences and reflection of individuals on French identity. The type of knowledge this research wants to produce is qualitative knowledge that fills the gaps between the discourses on French identity and cultures of peace(s) in France. The predicted outcomes of the study are:

1- The various discourses on identity are explained and the concept of alternative identities is introduced to readers of the thesis.

2- It is demonstrated that the current French republican model is based on essentialist and colonialist ideologies. It impacts the mainstream discourse on French identity, which is one of the causes of –cultural– violence in France.

3- The positive connection between alternative identities and cultures of peace(s) is demonstrated.

4- Policies and tools to transform the discourse on French identity at the institutional and societal level are found out.

5- The thesis lay out the theoretical basis for the transformation of personal and societal conflicts on (French) identity.

6- The thesis lay out the theoretical basis for a critical assessment of cultures of peace(s) in France

Methodologies and methods

The study will follow a constructionist epistemology and various theoretical perspectives such as critical theory, postcolonialism, hermeneutics and phenomenology. The research methodology will be qualitative throughout the thesis. Theoretical analysis and literature-based research methodologies will be used for the four objectives while critical discourse analysis -of official French sources and documents- will also be employed regarding the second objective. The qualitative content analysis of academic work (books and journal articles), theories and secondary data on identity, French identity and peace knowledge will be reviewed from a variety of field of studies within social sciences including peace studies, philosophy, political science, sociology, history, law and psychology. The connection between findings of diverse sources and fields of study will emphasise the interdisciplinarity of the research. The sourcing of references in English, French and Spanish will emphasize its interculturality. The theoretical analysis and literature-based methodology data approach chosen in this research is justified by the time limit of the work. The thesis aims at laying the theoretical basis for further research -quantitative and empirical- on French identity from a peace studies perspective and a future PhD research on cultures of peace(s) in France, hence the absence of empirical research. Finally, an acknowledgement and clarification must be made regarding the decolonising research methodology. This latter is acknowledged but not used in this research. However, postcolonial methodology is. This is due to the peace studies' methodology employed throughout the research and the European context of France. Peace studies as an analytical approach uses methods of critical theory, postcolonialism and cultural studies. Thus, although acknowledging the decolonising research methodology, peace studies does not challenge the Eurocentric perspective that undermines the local knowledges and experiences of the marginalised or indigenous groups but seeks to engage with the colonial discourse. This allows to recognise the wrongdoings of the past to

create a peace space to develop peace cultures with an improved social situation for all human beings affected by the issue in question. Therefore, the methodology employed does not aim for an eradication of the current discourse on French identity but for its transformation thanks to the dialogical input of various legitimate voices.

Literature review

This research is placed at the intersection of various fields of study in social sciences which, nevertheless, are intrinsically connected to each other in terms of focus and values on which they are based on. Peace studies is the main field of study of the references used, alongside critical theory, postcolonialism and cultural studies. The location of the present case study also leads to narrow these fields of study to the French context. The field of French studies from an Anglo-Saxon perspective with authors on French identity is considered. Social sciences references in French language are also used although in a lesser amount. This is due to time constraint, availability of data and also to reserve such French bibliography for further empirical research. As mentioned, the peace studies theoretical and conceptual framework is the guiding thread throughout the thesis, for critical analysis and future proposals around the discourse on French identity. However, peace studies are mainly present in the Anglo-Saxon and Spanish speaking academic world but not in the francophone one. Thus, the thesis will connect the said fields of study and topics to how they are approached in the French academic world, illustrating the interdisciplinary and intercultural methodology used in the thesis.

The main references used in Chapter 1 encompass authors of postcolonial and cultural studies. Classic authors in postcolonial studies include Homi K. Bhabha who worked on the cultural hybridity theory in his book *The Location of Culture* (1994); Gayatri Spivak who is the author of the well-known essay *Can The Subaltern Speak?* (1988) and wrote about postcolonialism in France (2013) and Frantz Fanon, among others postcolonial French authors, who critically assessed the effects triggered by racism and dehumanization due to French colonial domination in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963). Classic authors in the field of cultural studies that will be recounted are Stuart Hall with his work on cultural identity (1996) and Paul Gilroy who goes beyond essentialisation of culture in

his book *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness* (1993). National identity specialists Benedict Anderson, and his *imagined communities*, and Anthony Smith are also recalled to assess the discourses on identity.

Chapter 2 emphasises French authors that discussed the concept of French identity, starting by Ernest Renan's famous discourse on *What is a nation?* Various French academics have also invested their time in assessing French identity: Patrick Charaudeau (philosophy), Gérard Noiriel and Jean-Francois Berdah (history), Simon Patrick (ethnography), Michel Wieviorka (sociology) and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (political science). These two latter have contributed to a 2007 edited book by Gino Raymond and Tariq Modood on *The Construction of Minority Identities in France and Britain*. A point to highlight is that French authors do not approach French identity from a postcolonial or cultural studies perspective, and neither from a peace studies perspective.

The third and fourth chapters, however, are focused on examining the input peace studies could bring to the current discourse on French identity. Classic authors of the peace studies field include Johan Galtung whose theory on cultural, structural and direct violence (1969; 1990) can help locate the violence in the French identity issue. Vicent Martínez Guzmán's philosophy to make *peaces* and his *epistemological turn* theory (2001; 2005) in peace studies guides the third and fourth chapter of this thesis. Francisco Muñoz's *imperfect peace* theory (2001) will also have an influence in the third and fourth chapter. Paco Cascón Soriano's education for peace with a socio-affective focus (2001) will be a theoretical basis to draft educative proposals to transform interpersonal relationships in French society to facilitate the reconsideration of what it means to be French. John Paul Lederach's *conflict transformation* theory (1995; 1997; 2003) will help conceptualize the path French institutions and society needs to follow to transform internal and societal conflicts generated by the mainstream discourse on French identity. Elise Boulding

Authors who have written about the topics of identity, politics and identity politics include Amin Maalouf, whose book *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong* (2003) relating the experience of having both Lebanese and French cultural backgrounds counter the *Clash of Civilizations* theory (1993) that Samuel Huntington expressed. Besides, Maalouf's work also

contributes to going beyond the mere essentialisation of identities and recommends recognising all allegiances and belongings of each human beings. Tzvetan Todorov's volume *The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations* (2010), Edward Said's *The Clash of Ignorance* (2001) and Ramin Jahanbegloo's *The Clash of Intolerances*[12] all align in the antithesis of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* and will be the basis to theorize the identity issue in the French cultural and social context. Recognition theory will, finally, be a principle thoroughly examined in the fourth chapter to attempt find path to an inclusive French identity. Charles Taylor's politics of recognition (1992) and Axel Honneth's theory of recognition (1992) will be thus relayed. The work of my supervisor, Sidi Omar (2009), on postcolonial identity also highly influences this thesis as it envisions to go beyond the emergence of any type of clash to build a peaceful coexistence.

The current literature on identity with peace studies, postcolonialism and cultural studies perspectives by French authors are scarce and nearly absent. That is where this thesis, and myself as an author locate. French identity has only been discussed by French authors in classical social science fields of study. In this sense, this thesis will point out for further research by French authors in these themes and related to the French context. UNESCO's work and reports on identity and culture (1999; 2002) will also frame this thesis to help, as referred by UNESCO's motto, 'building peace in the minds of men and women'. The classical and updated literature, academic and non-academic work will be sourced from three languages (English, French, Spanish), using the original one whenever possible to not break the flow of the reading experience. Terms in their original (French or Spanish) language will be directly translated into English with the original term referenced in a footnote. This will allow to analyse and interpret qualitatively the content with the meaning intended in the original language to, then, assess to what extent it relates to or can be applied to another -here, French- cultural context. Besides, being fluent -able to read and write academically- in the three languages of research allows me also to think in the three languages and grasps concepts -of identity- that do not exist in the other two languages. This adds to the richness of this research and to the interconnectedness this

[12] The reference in the bibliography is the Spanish translation of the book (*Elogio de la Diversidad*) as I only had the chance to read it in this version. It is interesting to notice the linguistic difference in the translation going from 'The Clash of Intolerances' (negative approach) to 'Praise of Diversity' (positive approach).

paper aims to epitomise. Finally, this thesis does not only rely on published academic work but is also inspired by and continues the research on colonial and identity issues undertaken by ex-Peace Master students Célia Demoor (2014), Sibylle Freiermuth (2015) and Wibke Gehringer (2015).

Limitations of the research

The first limitation of this thesis is the theoretical approach it has. Unfortunately, time and space limits do not allow for the recollection of empirical data for qualitative and quantitative analysis. However, this is being done on purpose and it can spark further theoretical and empirical research based on this thesis. A second limitation is the type of sources and references used in the research. The reflection below is based on the readings that I have been able to make in the space of the six months in 'full thesis mode' added to the eighteen months following the Peace Master's courses and, as a general panorama, the readings and experiences I have made and had in the course of my entire life. In this sense, the impossibility of getting some sources, or their unavailability, whether physically or online therefore also affects the outcomes of this thesis. Besides, the world sanitary condition experienced since March 2020 also added an obstacle to the free flowing of information. Moreover, my personal bias, whether willing or not, and which is reflective of my conditioning, is also a limitation in this qualitative and theoretical research. This thesis does not escape this fact. However, I recognise such bias and I am open to critiques for improvement of this research and my own reflection. Finally, peace studies work towards the transformation of systems of oppression and discriminations due to ethnocentricity, androcentricity and anthropocentricity. Ethnocentricity (especially Eurocentrism) is the notion that this research mainly tackles. Anthropocentricity, on the contrary, is not addressed this thesis. In this sense, this research is very anthropocentric and focus on an issue -identity- affecting human beings. Therefore, the environment and the ecocentric approach of peace studies is not mentioned nor employed in this thesis. However, it can be considered in further research. Regarding the gender perspective aiming to tackle androcentricity, it is briefly mentioned in the first chapter and sparsely encountered throughout the paper. Therefore, a last limit is that it is a research with an anthropocentric and, perhaps, quite

androcentric approach, which may not recollect all the voices needed to transform the discourse on French identity. Despite the fact that I am a coloured woman, I have only been made aware quite late -to my view- of the gender perspective. Besides, I did not have the chance to take the 'Development and Gender' module during the Peace Master course before writing this thesis. Thus, I was not able to refine my knowledge and academic reflection and writing fully regarding gender issues. Nevertheless, I am well aware of this limitative fact that I wish to acknowledge. I also commit to its improvement in any of my further research.

Outline of the thesis

The thesis will be divided in four chapters, reflecting the four objectives.

Chapter 1 will focus on analysing the concept of identity or, rather in plural, identities. Identity is a flexible concept where diverse identitarian elements organically encounter to produce one's own and unique identity as Maalouf (1998) explains. In Chapter 1, identities will be examined through their creation process, through the elements composing this process and through the effects it generates to people and society. Chapter 1 is the examination of the concept of 'Identity' of the triangle nexus 'Identity, France and Peace' (see below).

Chapter 2 on French identity is an assessment of the concept of identity/ies as it is approached in the French context. The creation process and the elements composing French identity which fuel its current mainstream discourse are examined and assessed through a peace studies and postcolonial perspective. The impacts on French citizens and French society such mainstream discourse generate will also be scrutinised in regards of a peace studies and postcolonial approach. Chapter 2 is the examination of the 'right side' (see below 'Identity' and 'France') of the triangle nexus 'Identity, France and Peace'.

Chapter 3 explores the relationship between the alternative identities of Chapter 1 with the peace studies concept of cultures of peace(s). This third chapter aims to demonstrate the theoretical and direct link between the two notions. As such, it can be substantially proven that fostering one will consequently promote the other and that one emerges from the other, in a virtuous circle. Chapter 3

is the examination of the 'left side' (see below 'Identity' and 'Peace', specifically 'alternative identities' and 'cultures of peace(s)') of the triangle nexus 'Identity, France and Peace'.

Chapter 4 builds on the findings of the first three chapters to attempt to sketch the theoretical and practical basis for the introduction and implementation of French alternative identities in the French institutional and societal contexts. This chapter relies on more 'practical' sources than the other three as it recollects field practices on cultures of peace(s) and peace education in France. Chapter 4 is the examination of the 'top sides' of the triangle nexus 'Identity, France and Peace' (see below).

The 'bottom side' (see below 'Peace' and 'France') of the triangle nexus 'Identity, France and Peace' is not specifically examined in this thesis and can also be mentioned as one of its limitations. Nevertheless, the quasi inexistence of cultures of peace(s) and peace studies in France is often referred throughout the thesis, especially in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. The need for further practice and research on cultures of peace(s) in France is emphasised in Chapter 4.



The thesis embodies the critical and constructive perspectives of peace studies. The critical perspective aims to carry out an analysis-diagnosis, make visible and denounce the different types of violence that occur in the world: it is exemplified in Chapter 1 and 2. The constructive perspective works on the research, visibility and proposal of alternative ways of relating between human beings and/or with nature: it is exemplified in Chapter 3 and 4. It must also be highlighted that the chapters

are going from 1 to 4 from the more general to the more specific, the number of pages dedicated to each chapter reflecting the refining of the analysis.

Finally, the general conclusions recall all the findings of each chapter to connect them between each other in order to draft recommendations and sketch lines of further research.

CHAPTER 1: IDENTITIES

1. My Identity, My Allegiances (Maalouf, 2003)

1. There is suffering (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87)

1.1 – Introduction

The concept of identity has been dealt with since decades by various 'big' names of the social sciences and humanities fields. The aim of this chapter is to review the work and the advances in the identity discussion of some of these recognized authors with the objective of framing the theoretical basis on which the rest of this thesis will rely. In this sense, this chapter will lay the foundations of how identity is understood in this work and of what it is made and composed of through the micro -personal- and macro -socio-cultural- levels of identification processes (1.2). A section of this first chapter will also shed light on the mainstream illustrations of socio-cultural and political identity (1.3). Finally, a last part will examine the emphasis on difference (1.4) emanating from such mainstream discourse on identity and relate how such alternative identities emerge from and impact the current globalized -places in the- world in which they are found. Therefore, this first chapter is conceptualized as the helm that guides the rest of this work in order to settle its theoretical basis, delimit its scope and mark the path to be followed. As Hop-o'-My-Thumb[13] did by marking his trail with stones to not get lost and be able to come back home, here this first chapter marks the theoretical trail with identity concepts to not get lost in the immense pool of identity and identities.

On the fact that one can be lost regarding one's identity, it means that one does not know where one belongs. As such, this is exactly the moment when the questioning on identity rises. Zygmunt Bauman (1996: 19) raises this point well when asserting that "One thinks of identity whenever one is not sure of where one belongs […]. 'Identity' is a name given to the escape sought from that uncertainty". 'Belonging' means that a relation with other human beings is thus affecting

[13] French fairytale. Original title : *Le petit Poucet*

the individual in doubt. The location of that individual may positively or negatively alter the connections with similar others depending of socio-cultural variables:

> One thinks of identity whenever one is not sure of where one belongs; that is, one is not sure how to place oneself among the evident variety of behavioural styles and patterns, and how to make sure that people around would accept this placement as right and proper, so that both sides would know how to go on in each other's presence (Bauman, 1996: 19).

Nevertheless, if one does not know where one belongs or places oneself then the question of identity could thus turn into the question of identities. Identity can be understood as logical and numerical concept or as a qualitative concept (Shoemaker, 2006: 40). However, relating the former understanding of identity to the issue of a person not knowing to place oneself can link these two notions together, falsely linking identities to a quantitative concept. Indeed, it cannot be understood as such since identities are qualitative as well. Therefore, identity and identities are part of the same entity that is malleable indefinitely, quantitatively and qualitatively.

The goal of this first chapter is to decipher the components of identities going from the micro level, personal and individual process of identification to the macro level and socio-cultural process of identification. It also serves to answer the sub-research questions of our research problem:

- *What is identity and what is it composed of?*
- *What are the various discourses on identity and their implications?*

As Stuart Hall expressed:

> Identity is such a concept - operating 'under erasure' in the interval between reversal and emergence; an idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be thought at all (Hall, 1996: 2).

Here, the concept of identity in this thesis will not be addressed in the 'old way'. Nevertheless, the old ways need to be taken in account to tackle key current issues regarding such concept.

Besides, as the French linguist Patrick Charaudeau (2009) mentioned, there are various approaches to the question of identity. Within the social sciences and humanities fields, identity is indeed widely researched in the sociological, cultural, anthropological, psychological, political and historical branches; each one having its proper assumptions and methodologies. In this first chapter, the sociological, cultural and political aspects and expressions of identity will be reviewed to lay the

theoretical basis on which the second chapter will be then explored. The peace studies approach will also be present throughout the chapter as a guiding thread.

To choose to name this chapter in the plural form ('identities') rather than in the singular one ('identity') is done in order to recognize the plurality of types of identities present on earth. The amount of diverse identities is, in fact, equating to the number of human beings on this planet if it is to be taken in account the plurality of personalities, backgrounds and experiences. Indeed, Amin Maalouf states that 'people's identity is unique to them as individuals' (2003: 2). Since both Maalouf's and my statements focus on human beings, such anthropocentric approach will limit the scope of this thesis, void of ecocentric perspective nevertheless paramount from a peace studies prospect. Identity is, however, closely linked to reflexion *from* human beings, *for* human beings and *on* human beings -and *on* living beings when the *purpose* serves human beings. In this sense, questions of human identities are reflections made to locate the origins, processes of formation and transformation of identity. It also reflects on the relationship between each other, between the 'postulate' and the 'project' as Bauman mentioned it: '[…] identity has the ontological status of a project and a postulate' (Bauman, 1996: 19). In the current state of the question, human identities have been critically engaged as a process of transformation by "anti-essentialist critique of ethnic, racial and national conceptions of cultural identity and the 'politics of location'" (Hall, 1996: 1). Their goal was and still is to reclaim their own identification from their perspectives and experiences instead of the colonialist, Eurocentric, patriarchal and, also, anthropocentric dominant discourses, framing our understanding of culture and identity (Omar, 2009). In this chapter (and in general in this thesis), the "need for a further debate about 'identity'" (Hall, 1996: 1) is to approach identity and identification processes from a peace studies perspective, acknowledging the diversity of experiences and understandings on identity, in order to build cultures of peace(s).

1.2 – The identification process

1.2.1 – At the micro or personal level

‘In its primary meaning, the noun ‘identity’ refers to the relation each thing has to itself and to no other thing’ […] (Shoemaker, 2006: 40): this is what this following sub-section will examine. The relation a person has with oneself and to no other thing or being regarding the concept of identity. In this sense, needs are a notion an individual must fulfil for oneself to survive. Identity as a need will be explored for this purpose. Then, the notion of the subject will be analysed, especially its agency in relation to power.

1.2.1.a – Identity as a basic human need

This paper will rely on the academic work of researchers from the peace studies and economic fields, Johan Galtung and Vicent Martínez Guzmán (peace studies); and Manfred Max-Need, Antonio Elizalde, Martin Hopenhayn (economics) to explore the meaning of identity as a basic human need.

According to Johan Galtung identity is considered as a basic human need, alongside well-being, security and freedom (1989). Vicent Martínez Guzmán relates these four basic needs as mandatory to fulfil to foster a culture of peace and walk away from a culture of violence (2001: 71). Identity is also a non-material (and thus theoretical but also spiritual) need (Galtung, 2010) which depends on the structure in which it unfolds.

The economic theorists Manfred Max-Neef, Antonio Elizalde and Martin Hopenhayn have developed their proper understanding of fundamental human needs in their 1986 book *Desarrollo a Escala Humana* (Human Scale Development) where they introduce the difference between needs, which are constant, and satisfiers of those needs, which are changing. Identity is considered by the three theorists as the eighth axiological need, axiological as in based on human values, alongside - and in this order- subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, idleness, creation and freedom. Here, it can be noted that the first two (subsistence and protection) and the last two needs (identity and freedom) recall Galtung’s four basic human needs (well-being, security, identity and freedom), with the first two being changed to another name. According to the economics researchers, identity is a basic human need based on value, on what is right and ought to be. As the eighth axiological need, identity is also related to the four existential needs of the ‘Matrix of needs

and satisfiers' (Max-Neef, Elizalde and Hopenhayn, 1989): being, having, doing and interacting. The following needs of existential category -existential referring to the existence of human beings- will be delved into throughout this research: the sense of belonging and differentiation (being); language, values and norms (having); recognize oneself (doing) and maturation stages (interacting).

Since this sub-section is examining human needs, it is interesting to briefly mention and connect these above two approaches to psychologist Abraham Maslow's 1943 work on the hierarchy of needs. Indeed, since comparation is based on violence, the parallels I want to highlight is the one between Maslows's physiological, safety, love and belonging/esteem and esteem/self-actualization needs and Galtung's and Martínez Guzmán's respective well-being, security, identity and freedom needs. Finally, the 'Needs Inventory' of the Center for Nonviolent Communication (2005) does not include 'identity' as a need in its list. However, it encompasses the needs of 'connection' and 'meaning' that may represent the 'identity' need. The specific needs of 'connection' relating to identity are 'belonging', 'community', 'to know and be known', 'to see and be seen', 'to understand and be understood' while for 'meaning' it is 'self-expression'. Here, 'meaning' and 'self-expression' as a need could refer to the fact that the identification process can be a relation of the individual with oneself; that one can reflect on one's own identity, and choose who one is and where one comes from. Nevertheless, the 'connection' needs listed above demonstrate that, indeed, identity is not only a matter of the individual alone. This will be analyzed thoroughly below. Thus, let's see to what extent this individual agency goes.

1.2.1.b – Agency: the notion of subject

In this part, the examination of the personal identification process will depart from Stuart Hall (1996: 2) questioning: 'to what set of problems, does the *irreducibility* of the concept, identity, emerge?' Then, his own response to the question also provides a part of the analysis of agency of the subject:

> I think the answer here lies in its centrality to the question of agency and politics. […] By 'agency' I express no desire whatsoever to return to an unmediated and transparent notion of the subject or identity as the centred author of social practice (Hall, 1996: 2).

'Irreducibility' means to what most little particle or entity can someone's identity be analysed. In this sense, if observed in the microscope, 'identity' would, according to Hall, be essentially composed of agency and politics. Since essentialism is part of those mainstream discourses on identity, the 'irreducibility' of identity should not be dealt with. However, it is interesting to do so for the sake of analysis. Politics is part of the socio-cultural identification process and will be examined below. On the contrary, agency departs from the individual (and one's power) to later being related to others' agency. The importance of the analysis of agency can be related to the concept of subject which, according to French sociologist Michel Wieviorka (2007: 41), has 'been emerging in an increasingly forceful way in recent years […] importance of which in the work of the social sciences […] can be placed at the very centre of the analysis in so far as it provides an instrument enabling us to consider invention and inventiveness, creativity and involvement'. To invent, to create and to be involved means that subject has a certain power to do things. This concept of power applied to the subject was discussed by French philosopher Michel Foucault in his book *Power/Knowledge*, where he asserted that 'individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application' (1980: 98). Therefore, if every individual has agency and, by correlation, have a power within, it means they can attract and reject. People are and have energies. They interact with each other to find their meaning within the world. They thus have to connect to be able to locate themselves as they and others deem right: identity being the 'simple idea' in which one 'more or less self-consciously locate' oneself in the social world (Preston, 1997: 4). Such physical -but also theoretical and spiritual- process is also found in social psychology in the identity-building mechanism where 'for there to be an awareness of identity, a *difference* must be perceived and a certain *relationship* with the other must be established'[14] (Charaudeau, 2009). The perception of a *difference* is linked to the phenomenological principle of alterity (Charaudeau, 2009) where identity is construed with the acknowledgement of an alternative perspective. Such alternative point of view emanates from the 'attraction' and 'rejection' movements with which the *relationship* is established (Charaudeau, 2009). There is thus an energy field between various subjects which influences their own personal identity. This 'relational' aspect

[14] My own translation. Original quote in French : *pour qu'il y ait prise de conscience identitaire, il faut que soit perçue une différence et que s'établisse une certaine relation vis-à-vis de l'autre.*

of the energy field is expressed when people 'define themselves in dialogue or in contrast with others' (Belangér and Verkuyten, 2010: 144) so they can be accepted by these others, as well as their potential as subjects (Wieviorka, 2007: 41). It is thus a social construction of the concept of identity that is taking place. It emanates from the fundamental relationship and interaction between subjects or 'inter-subjectivity' where 'a subject is seen as a product of social relations whose identity is formed and transformed in the context of dialogue and negotiation with others' (Omar, 2009). Even if it would be more in accordance with the peace studies perspective to talk about an identity 'dialogue' instead of and identity 'negotiation' (which will be dealt with in the third chapter), the next chapter will delve into the cultural, political and social identification processes.

1.2.2 – At the macro or socio-cultural and political level

As seen previously, the identification process happens at the micro or personal level. In this sub-section, it will be examined how it is taking place at the macro or socio-cultural and political level. The macro level of the identification process is limited to these three dimensions as they are the ones that are highly influential in the discourse on the French identity (to be analysed in chapter 2). Historical or anthropological dimensions of the identification process may also be mentioned but would remain in the 'back seat' of the analysis. Before delving into such inquiry, it is interesting to reflect on the differences between the three but also on their relationship. In this sense, the connection between the social and the cultural dimensions manifests as sometimes blurred but nevertheless real, as Wieviorka (2007: 36) states it:

> The question [of separation between the cultural and the social] might have remained theoretical if the implementation of multiculturalist policies had not provided an answer, or rather, two answers. What does this signify? It is a question of knowing how far the analysis has to distinguish between declarations or demands of a cultural nature (by which I mean, for example, that my identity be recognised in the public sphere), and the concerns or expectations of a social nature (for example, I challenge the social inequality to which I am subjected). To amalgamate these two registers is to confuse dimensions which everyone, from personal experience, knows very well to be distinct, but to separate them completely implies that there is no direct link between them. However, research demonstrates that they are constantly linked.

'Policies' and thus also politics have been 'added' to this relationship mix between the two first dimensions. The blend of the three blurs even more the deconstruction of the macro level of the

identification process. Nevertheless, such mix of socio-cultural and political aspects is essential in constructing meaningful identities towards cultures of peace(s):

> actually identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not 'who we are' or 'where we came from', so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves (Hall, 1996: 4).

Gender, culture, politics, society and language are elements of the socio-cultural and political identification process that will be analysed in this sub-section. However, it is crucial to examine the role of intersectionality (of those elements) before studying their features.

1.2.2.a – Intersectionality of identification categories

The concept of intersectionality was coined in 1989 by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her article 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex'. Being a black Afro-American lawyer, feminist and critical race theorist, she wanted to pinpoint the consequences emerging from the 'tendency to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis'. According to her, the use of an exclusive and 'single-axis' analysis leads to a distortion of experiences lived by the person -in this case, Black women in America- and their marginalisation (Crenshaw, 1989: 139-140). Intersectionality was a term employed at its outset as a 'metaphor of intersecting categories of discrimination'. It was later recuperated by contemporary feminist theory as a paradigm to study and stress social phenomena of oppression. Intersectionality answers the theoretical demand and need of analysing and reading various categories of oppression simultaneously. It thus 'captures how oppressions are experienced simultaneously' and 'theorize the convergence, co-constitution, imbrication, or interwovenness of systems of oppression' (Carastathis, 2014: 307). Although it emerged from the experience of oppression, intersectionality also affects the building of one's identity as it stresses the hierarchies of power and privileges among different categories of identity analysis. The theoretical metaphor became mainstream between 2015 and 2017 and started to influence activist spheres in their practices. Its creator reminded its primary aim of making room for 'more advocacy and remedial practices to create a more egalitarian system' (Coaston, 2019). Regarding the topic of this research paper, intersectionality is an essential aspect of the identification process to consider.

Indeed, with today's globalisation era and with the emergence of more and more diverse identification categories, no human being can state their belonging to only one type of category. Whether it be gender, race, class or political affiliation, the intersection of identification categories does influence their social locations and, consequently, the processes of identification. These categories are now to be examined.

1.2.2.b – Identification categories: gender, culture, society, politics, language

The five categories to be reviewed here are all key identitarian marker. Gender being recently one of the most voiced about and visible in activist spheres, it however is not a key framework of analysis in this thesis. Nevertheless, Judith Butler's gender performance and gender performativity notions will be useful in grasping the mechanisms of identification in the other categories. Culture, society and politics are the main framework of analysis of this research. Their intersection will also be studied. Finally, language is the category that links all other categories since identity emerges from but also construct the lingual way of expression.

Gender is briefly discussed here considering Judith Butler's differentiation of gender performance and gender performativity. She defines gender in regards of identity as

> in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceede; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time -an identity instituted through a *stylized repetition of acts* (Butler, 1988: 519).

Gender is thus, according to a constructed identity, fruit of the performance of one's acts and practices presented to the world. Such performance of acts produces effects that reflect an image and 'consolidate an impression of being' a man, woman or any other gender (Big Think, 2011). She therefore defines gender identity as 'a performative accomplishment compelled by social sanction and taboo' (Butler, 1988: 520). Gender identity is thus the product of one's behaviours (gender performance) meeting other human beings interpreting such conducts according to their own experiences and framework of gender analysis. Gender identity is therefore the product of a dialogue between the encounter of actions and experiences. Today, gender is a key marker in the constructed identification process. Although it is not considered as a framework of analysis in this paper, Judith

Butler's gender performance and gender performativity introduces the dialectic crucial aspect of the identification process applicable to other identity categories.

Culture is one of the categories of analysis and also an essential identity element. Etymologically, 'culture' comes from the Latin verb *colere* translated as to 'inhabit', 'cultivate', 'protect' and 'worship' (Martínez Guzmán, 2001). Here, the emphasis will be put on the 'cultivation' meaning since, as Sidi Omar (2009) explains, it 'refers to something that is created by the intervention of humans, and is not something pre-given'. Such 'intervention' implies that there is an action or actions in the way it is conceived, and that probably such actions are shared or include a relationship between the humans involved. The shared part of culture is another feature to highlight. Indeed, Vauclair and al. (2014) citing Matsumoto and Huang (2008) recall that 'culture is usually defined as a shared meaning system, in terms of values and beliefs, among members of a cultural group who have been subjected to the same cultural socialization experience'. Tzvetan Todorov (2010: 419) also indicate such shared characteristic of culture as it 'refers to common representations, thus shared by at least two human beings – mostly, however, by a far larger number of people'. Todorov also points out that the 'spreading' of culture through communication -thus language- is what makes common representations 'cultural'. He then asserted two characteristics of culture where each subject exhibits characteristics of multiple cultures and each culture is subject to change. The cultivation characteristic of culture represents the location where cultures meet -within the individual. It then affects the shared characteristic of culture, the very content of these cultures being thus influenced by each other and within the subject, bearer of cultures and multiple identities. Therefore, these two characteristics of culture go against the -somehow quantitative- "'positivist' conception that posits culture as a catalogue of ideas and a set of conditionings that mould and determine the collective and individual identities" (Omar, 2009 citing Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1967). Warren and Fassett (2014: 7), from communication studies, mentioned that 'we each occupy a variety of cultural locations' and therefore, 'all communication occurs within a nested, interwoven system of cultures [global, racial/ethnic, economic, sexual, gendered, dis/abled, political, religious, and others]'. It thus seems that cultures are born, reproduce and expand in a kind of space between people, the same meeting point between

gender performance and performativity. French philosopher Etienne Balibar (1994: 57) raised the question of such space:

> Would it not then be enlightening to functionally treat notions of culture and, even more so, cultural identity, as terms that today designate a form rather than a content or an object? Better still: an empty space, vacant for a multiplicity of contents and objects, and determined by the intersection of discourses [...]?[15]

In this sense, there is no 'pure' culture and all cultures are 'mixed' or 'hybrid' (Todorov, 2010: 420) and in 'perpetual transformation' (Todorov, 2010: 55) within that space. Besides, it is such constant transformation that allows cultures to remain alive since it is in an ongoing state of change. Sidi Omar's take on ('trying to know') culture can be paralleled to the above analysis of the relational aspect of identity when 'culture(s)' is replaced by identity in the below quote:

> […] cultures do not emerge and develop out of some pre-given and fixed essences, but in complex, intersubjective (hybrid) and dynamic processes that are embedded in power relations. […] Therefore, in trying to know culture, the question should not be what culture is but how the language of culture is used and for what purposes, i.e., discourses on culture (Omar, 2009).

Culture and identity therefore unfold in the same manner. They are also intertwined when addressing the need for cultural identification (Todorov, 2010: 422), cultural identity being 'the feeling of belonging to a cultural group […] bases on common values, joint history, language and tradition (Salo-Lee, 2003 citing Liebkind, 1994). Culture (and cultural identity by the same token) is also linked to society and politics. Since culture 'encompasses diverse practices, social institutions and discourses', it is elaborated in the political sphere of the identification process. As it is 'cultivated and constructed […] shared, dialogical and collective' (Omar, 2009), it also takes place in the societal one.

Society and culture are thus narrowly connected. They are constructed in relationship to one another. Therefore, these two make part of the ingredients constructing the product of identity as well. Indeed, cultural identity is linked to moves in society and that is why socio-cultural identity and some features of cultural identity may be evoked with regards to the social identity ones (Balibar, 1994). Preston defines these moves as the 'complex series of social process' to which identity is the outcome

[15] My own translation. Original quote in French : *Ne serait-il pas alors éclairant de traiter fonctionnellement les notions de culture et, plus encore, d'identité culturelle, comme des termes qui désignent aujourd'hui une forme plutôt qu'un contenu ou un objet ? Mieux encore : une place vide, vacante pour une multiplicité de contenus et d'objets, et déterminée par l'intersection des discours […] ?*

(Preston, 1997:4). Charaudeau defines these moves as the 'crisis' that modern societies go through, whether identity crisis, cultural crisis, generational crisis, crisis in education, citizen crisis, community crisis, etc (Charaudeau, 2009) which affect the construction of socio-cultural identity. These moves, complex processes or crisis are the result of the interaction between the collectivity and individualism or the 'increasing desire on the part of individuals to choose their identity, including that of community' (Wieviorka, 2007: 35). Preston reasserts the societal aspect intrinsic to identity:

> Identities are socially made, they are not a private consumer construct from available elements. The particular person will confront a dense sphere of relationships with others, and in the background will stand collectivity. One could think of identity as a shifting balance between what is privately remembered and what is publicly demanded. Identity is thus always shifting. It is never fixed (Preston, 1997: 5).

Society can be equally defined as community or collectivity. However, the former may be more closely linked to society as being cultural, with individuals having common -shifting- features between them. The latter may then be more closely linked to society as being political, with individuals enjoying collected rights and duties that are publicly expressed and that can also shift through times. Such shifts are due to politics and the objectives behind political discourses.

Agency and politics are, according to Stuart Hall, the irreducible notions of identity. The role of politics in the identification process appears thus necessary to analyse. For Hall, politics is "both the significance in modern forms of political movement of the signifier 'identity', its pivotal relationship to a politics of location - but also the manifest difficulties and instabilities which have characteristically affected all contemporary forms of 'identity politics'" (Hall, 1996: 2). Identity arises from discourse and the representations stemming out of it. Therefore, since one's identity is constructed within the space where socio-cultural and political elements meet, it is also influenced by one or various specific political frames. An individual's identity is thus

> produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion […] (Hall, 1996: 4).

Hall, then, explains further the crucial role of difference (which will be thoroughly examined later in this chapter) in identity construction:

> Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked, identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is

> only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks […] (Hall, 1996: 4).

The discourse on the Other is one of the facets of politics that is detrimental to the constructive aspect of identity and may therefore reinforce essentialism in the formation of the concept. The Other is the individual that is considered as an object and does not enjoy agency and freedom (Marotta, 2011: 191). Such Other is constructed via the politics of representation which questions how identities are produced through practices of representation (Grossberg, 1996: 90). This representation of the Other connotes generally a negative feature of that Other. It is an individual that is feared, hated, and resented to the extent that it is preferred to be politically objectified. The individual and socio-cultural identity can thus be formed in relation to an 'enemy' (Lear, 2001) dictated by political discourses essentialising identity. The way identity is approached in the politics of the collectivities in which individuals belong is a crucial point in whether fostering cultures of peace(s) or cultures promoting hate, indifference and, ultimately, war. Language is essential in cultivating these identity categories through a peaceful lens.

'Identity in many aspects is shaped by language and conversely, language choices may relate to identity' (Crawford et al., 2014: 88). Language is thus one of these notions influencing who one is. It is a system of representation which metaphorically makes accessible the social meanings of the world. Culture is transmitted through language and, therefore access to 'reality' is permitted. Nevertheless, it is interesting to wonder of what 'reality' it is talked about. Thus, language shapes our understanding of the world, and the concepts we use are not only descriptive, but they also imply normative judgements. There is a relationship with the other parties we are interacting with through language and it forms itself like an agreement. As seen above, meaning is a human need (Center for Nonviolent Communication, 2005). Through this relationship created through language, meanings are thus socially constructed. Therefore, because of such social construction, the need of meanings can also be deconstructed. Language is at the heart of the individual but also the collective construction of the subject (Charaudeau, 2009). It is therefore at the heart of the micro level of identification regarding agency of the subject. It is also at the heart of the macro level one, linking the elements of gender, culture, society and politics. Language being the most used mode of

expression is thus closely linked to the performance and utterance of acts creating gender. The relationship between language and culture is understood as the former being a part of one's cultural identity and reinforcing the subject's 'identification and bond with a particular group' (Salo-Lee, 2003). The relationship between language and society is highlighted with respect to the fact that language is 'both personal and social'. Language plays a role in social identity as it 'denotes the various ways in which people understand themselves in relation to others' (Crawford et al., 2014: 88). As Preston (1997: 7) notes too, identity and the 'social construction of complex identities' are respectively carried and accomplished in language and 'made and remade in routine social practice'. The relationship between language and politics is enlightened in the identity role of the former through discourse, as Charaudeau (2009) explains:

> Another point of view is based on the idea that language is not the whole of culture. Indeed, one might wonder whether language has an identity role or whether what is called *discourse*, the use that is made of language, through the act of enunciation that implements it. Against such widespread idea, we should dissociate language and culture, and associate discourse and culture.[16]

Political discourses on identity are split into a dichotomy: essentialism and constructivism. These discourses are at the basis of any conflictive identity situations, whether personal or socio-cultural. They are examined in the next sub-section.

1.2.3 – Essentialism versus constructivism

After the exploration of the micro and macro levels of identification, one of the common features of identity that was acknowledged in each category is that it is a relationship matter between a subject and another subject or other subjects as a group. It is thus an ongoing constructing process. Nevertheless, the essentialist discourse discards this approach by emphasizing identity as originating from few and fixed elements instructed by observed natural and generalised processes.

Essentialism is the theory built on the belief that each entity possesses a basic array of characteristics that if all other superficial or 'accidental' (Cartwright, 1968) characteristics were

[16] My own translation. Original quote in French: *Un autre point de vue repose sur l'idée que la langue n'est pas le tout de la culture. En effet, on peut se demander si c'est la langue qui a un rôle identitaire ou ce que l'on appelle le discours, c'est-à-dire l'usage que l'on fait de la langue, à travers l'acte d'énonciation qui la met en œuvre. Contre une idée bien répandue, il faudrait dissocier langue et culture, et associer discours et culture.*

stripped down, the 'basic' ones would remain deep down as the essence. When applied to identity, such theory views the concept as 'something substancial, pre-given and inmutable' (Omar, 2009). This is a dominant understanding of identity, rooted in biological and cultural essentialisms which respectively underline biological differences and an original fixed culture and history from which the subject comes from (Omar, 2009). A psychological definition of essentialism qualifies essentialism as 'discrete' and exclusively binary with impossibility of having a middle ground, even less of a blurred in-between state (Crawford and al., 2014: 89). In this sense, looking for the essential aspect of an entity is to undertake the 'quest of the origin', its 'authenticity' as Charaudeau (2009) explicated. Nevertheless, he asserts that such 'quest' is a dangerous fantasy since

> If, however, there is a collective identity, it can only be that of sharing and therefore of the production of a collective meaning, but of a shifting sharing, with blurred borders, a sharing in which multiple influences intervene (Charaudeau, 2009).[17]

Therefore, by going through the 'quest of origin' or identity reduced at the core element, the pursuit of identity crosses path with many other elements to which it nourishes itself along the way. Marking the trail with stones, like Hop-o'-My-Thumb did, allows to remember the elements of one's identity. Sometimes, a certain trail may be stressed with more stones when 'strategic essentialism' is taking place. This concept was introduced by Gayatri Spivak as she proposed the 'strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest' (Spivak, 1996: 214). Strategic essentialism aims to emphasize an identity category in order to disturb the hierarchies of power and privileges emerging from domination of certain facets of gender, race, class or any other identity category. The term was coined to define a political practice that could help the struggle against any type of identitarian oppression. In this sense, 'strategic' essentialism could also be interpreted as 'pragmatic' essentialism (Eide, 2016). Strategic essentialism thus bases the practice of identity politics and the critical and effective actions of marginalised individuals against dominant hegemonic political discourses on identity. Strategic essentialism and identity politics can thus be the basis of one's identification process either for a lifetime, or just for a moment. In any way, since many roads will

[17] My own translation. French original : *Si, cependant, il y a une identité collective, ce ne peut être que celle du partage et donc de la production d'un sens collectif, mais d'un partage mouvant, aux frontières floues, d'un partage dans lequel interviennent des influences multiples*

be marked by stones throughout one's lifetime, it is thus an identity map that needs to be drawn and built. This constructivist approach to identity permits to lead oneself to one's various constructed emotional, physical or spiritual homes where one is fully recognised. This construction process will now be clarified.

Patrick Charaudeau (2009) stated that 'language is both at the heart of the individual and collective construction of the subject'[18] while Sidi Omar (2009) citing Manuel Castells (1997: 29) reasserted that all identities are constructed 'from a sociological standpoint' (Omar, 2009). Peter W. Preston added that

> the social construction of complex identities is accomplished in language, and identity is thus fluid, subtle and widely implicated in patterns of thought and action. Identity is not fixed, it has no essence and it does not reside in any given texts or symbols or sacred sites. It is carried in language and made and remade in routine social practice (Preston, 1997: 7).

Then, Stuart Hall may have resumed and encompassed how the construction of cultures relates to the construction of identities in the following quote:

> In common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. In contrast with the 'naturalism' of this definition, the discursive approach sees identification as a construction, a process never completed - always 'in process'. It is not determined in the sense that it can always be 'won' or 'lost', sustained or abandoned (Hall, 1996: 2-3).

It is thus affirmed that identity and identities are created via a constructivist approach, whether it be social or cultural. Stuart Hall (1996: 3) also qualified the identification process as 'conditional, lodged in contingency'. Therefore, identity is like an energy always in movement and can also be contradictory. Indeed, as Patrick Charaudeau (2009) asserted, identity construction is taking place because of the contradiction of an individual between the desire to feel special and unique and the wish to belong to a group or a collective. This tension between seeking uniqueness and belonging illustrates the attraction and rejection movement mentioned previously. He adds that this paradox is built on the premise that 'we need the other, the other in his-her-their difference, to become aware of our existence'[19] (Charaudeau, 2009). Nevertheless, as he also mentioned, 'identity is a matter of

[18] My own translation. Original quote in French : *langage est au cœur de la construction aussi bien individuelle que collective du sujet.*
[19] My own translation. Original quote in French : *Nous avons besoin de l'autre, de l'autre dans sa différence, pour prendre conscience de notre existence.*

permanent construction against a backdrop of history'[20] (Charaudeau, 2009). In this sense, colonial history may sometimes, if not always, influence the subject and his-her-their agency. The purpose of the 'identity-construction process' analysis is thus here stated by Sidi Omar (2009):

> The key question, however, is whence, why and for what purpose identities are constructed. This means that the recognition of the constructedness of identity is not necessarily the end of analysis, and what is needed is an investigation of the power relations involved in identity-construction processes. In other words, emphasis should be laid on the social construction of identity, and primarily the social, cultural and political contest for identitarian hegemony, whereby social groups strive with one another to articulate, rearticulate, appropriate, contest or have control over certain identity definitions and interpretations.

The power relations in favour of a hegemonic and essentialist identitarian construction process is what postcolonial theory on identity seeks to engage with by reviewing the concept of an 'integral, originary and unified identity' (Hall, 1996: 1).

1.2.4 – Extending the constructivist approach: postcolonialism

Postcolonialism is defined as the 'caesura left after the brutality of colonial rule and decolonisation wars' (Spencer: 2006: 134). It intervenes in the cultural, political and social spheres of identity formation and sheds light on the Other who, in fact, holds a more complex identity than presupposed by the essentialist thinking (Spencer, 2006: 121). This complexity arose because postcolonialism unlocked the possibility of approaching identity experiences and representations through a non-Western lens: the 'Oriental' one. Edward Said's theory on Orientalism (1978) came into friction with Western essentialist and, also, constructivist perspectives on identity. Indeed, he initiated the reflection on the origins of knowledge in the colonial context. Traditionally based on Western epistemology, identity representations of colonial subjects were now to be dealt with taking into account their personal experiences (Bhambra, 2014: 116). Thus, even if postcolonialism is an extension of constructivism, it embodies a contestation of such approach based on Western views and its hegemonic discourse. Postcolonialism goes against essentialism and proposes to go beyond constructivism by interrupting and contesting Western discourses of modernity. It does so through the establishment of other forms of narratives and enunciation based on the experiences of the

[20] My own translation. Original quote in French : *L'identité est affaire de construction permanente sur fond d'histoire.*

colonised subject (Bhambra, 2014: 116-117 citing Bhabha, 1994). As such, a re-articulation of what modernity is and its political outcome emerges (Bhambra, 2014: 117) and constructive processes of identity are rearticulated by the same token. The emergence of postcolonialism thus implies an encounter of supposedly opposed perspectives, discourses and, therefore, identities. However, by 'going beyond', postcolonialism does not discard the contribution of constructivist process of identity. It considers it and the subject's postcolonial experience is inserted in the process to produce a new identity mix from such tension. Thus, postcolonialism asserts the unfixed, shifting, fluid and hybrid facets of identity (Bhabha, 1994; Omar, 2009). It also permits to examine the concept of identity taking into perspective the in-between and blurred space that essentialism and constructivism do not allow. The influence postcolonialism has on the strategic social positioning of the subject (Hall, 1996: 3; Omar, 2009) may however upset or generate a profound reflexion process within such subject, especially when one is located in a Western context where mainstream discourses on identity prevail.

1.3 – Mainstream illustrations of socio-cultural and political identity

The principal constituents of identity regarding cultural, social and political spheres have been inspected in the past section. These three domains have been chosen for analysis as they will guide this research in critically assessing the mainstream discourse on French identity in the next chapter. Indeed, socio-cultural identity is one of the main facets of how French identity is conceptualised with the features of language, culture and society administered by the political entity of the centralised state. This section will thus analyse four illustrations of socio-cultural identity: national identity, citizenship, ethnic identity and hyphenated identity; with a sub-section in the middle examining the co-terminality of national identity and citizenship. The political aspect linked with these identities will also be stressed in regard to the peace studies perspective. These four examples are considered as 'mainstream' as they can be encountered in the majority of the current (nation-) states in the world. 'Mainstream' as possessing one type of these identities, or the other, or both may influence the difficulty of one's daily life and even, at times, the continuation of one's life.

1.3.1 – National identity or nationality

Examining what national identity is means that what a nation is must first be inspected. This will then allow to understand what national identity is. The critical assessment of this latter concept ends this analysis. The work of Benedict Anderson in 1983 *Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* will be recalled in the definition of a nation, while Anthony D. Smith's 1991 book *National Identity* will be the basis for an understanding of the components of national identity. Finally, the critical analysis of nationality (and of citizenship and ethnicity by the same token) by Tharailath Koshy Oommen in his 1997 book *Citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity* will lead the take of this paper on such concept.

According to Anderson (1983), the definition of a nation is 'an imagined community'. Finite boundaries, sovereignty and deep and horizontal comradeship are the basic elements of the national imagined community (Preston, 1997: 35 citing Anderson, 1983) with the 'vernacular print language' being the basis of a nation (Preston, 1997: 10-11). In a 2006 revised edition of Anderson's book, nation was defined as 'an imagined political community'. 'Political' implies that a nation is thought in the aim of administering a group of people in a certain way to achieve certain goals based on certain values. It is '*imagined*' as those people gathered under a same political project 'will never know most of their fellow members' (Anderson, 2006). Therefore, a nation is an abstract concept that attempts to bring to people's realities the -imagined- veracity of common features. Some of these features such as language can narrowly link diverse people, as '[…] the essence of a nation is that all individuals have much in common' (Anderson, 2006: 6 citing Renan, 1882). Nevertheless, it is quite restricting to reduce it to features that cannot transcend physical or emotional realms and reach the spiritual one as stated by Ernest Renan in his 1882 lecture 'What is a nation?'. Taking into account Anderson's definition of a nation, the identity of individuals belonging to an 'imagined political community' may thus seem as abstract as what a nation is. According to Smith (1991), national identity is defined by the grouping of a number of characteristics such as a historic territory, a mass culture, common myths, common economy and common legal rights and duties. Smith also underlined the central role of

myths, memories, values and symbols in the constitution of a national identity (Smith, 1986). The political aspect of national identity can be sensed by the 'narrative of conquest, defence, liberation and loss' implied by the historic territory and common myths where the "'Others' play a role" (Dijkink, 1996: 11). The construction of national identity can thus be understood as arising from war, blood spilled and trauma resulting from confrontation with other nations of people (Dijkink, 1996; Charaudeau, 2009). A pattern of national identity is that it is also 'continuously rewritten on the basis of external events' (Dijkink, 1996: 5). Therefore, it is constantly (re)constructed. From 'mass culture', it can also be deducted that national identity is a source of cultural identity. For some people, national identity signifies 'home' or 'roots' as well (Salo-Lee, 2003: 250). Home and roots suggest that there is an emotional bond between the individual and the nation, whether it be through the historic territory, the culture, the myths or the rights and duties. Tharailath Koshy Oommen in his 1997 book *Citizenship, nationality and ethnicity* intended to reformulate such definition of national identity and nation. According to him, nation is a territorial entity where the people living on it have an emotional attachment. Such territory is thus an ancestral or adopted territory that the inhabitants would call 'homeland'. In this sense, nationality is the representation of a collective identity, and communication -through a common language- is necessary to sustain such nation. A nation is thus the combination and the fusion of a delimited territory and a common language. A national of a place is thus a person that morally identify with such territory and language, but also overall to its culture. Oomen (1997: 22) finally concludes that 'if a group of people feel that they are a nation, they make one'. However, in the present day, national identity is often confused with citizenship. The elements of citizenship will be examined in the next sub-section while the amalgamation of both nationality and citizenship concepts will be scrutinized in the one afterwards.

1.3.2 – Citizenship or civic identity

While nationality is the inclusion in a cultural community, citizenship represents the belonging to a political collectivity (Alfonsi, 1997: 53), therefore revealing Anderson's redefinition of a nation ('imagined political community') as somehow confusing too. Delving into the constitutive

elements of citizenship means the need to define what a state is and the relationship it has with its civic subjects. The state is an entity legally constituted providing its residents protection in terms of internal security and against external aggressions (Oomen, 1997: 33). According to international law, a (sovereign) state must possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933). Since it is first and foremost a legal entity, it thus theoretically does not include a moral component -contrary to a nation that is culture-based. However, since objectivity is only viable until a certain point, moral attributes are, of course, included in the process of a state creation and the elements of a civic attitude. Citizenship is the membership of an individual to a community of political equals (Preston, 1997: 10-11 citing Meehan, 1993). 'Permanent population' being cited before 'defined territory' implies that citizens define the state prior to territory and therefore have an ascendant legitimacy in its making. Tzvetan Todorov (2010: 82) specifies the straightforwardness of what citizenship or civic identity is with the fact that an individual is either a citizen of a country or is not, which does not apply to cultural traditions (nation) or spiritual values (religion). This objective clarity of the definition of citizenship can nevertheless be today blurred and romanticised through confusion with nationality, especially within states built as nation-states. Such amalgamation will now be scrutinized.

1.3.3 – The (con)fusion between national identity and citizenship

The main (con)fusion in mainstream discourses on identity is the one between nationality and citizenship. Indeed, this (con)fusion will also be scrutinized in Chapter 2 where French identity will be critically assessed and deconstrued. This amalgamation is due to the interchangeability of the concepts of nation and state. While their common feature is territory, a nation is a moral entity –a 'psycho-cultural' concept- and a state is a legal entity -a 'politico-legal' concept-. Both can exist without the other but when the two coincide they form a nation-state (Rejai and Enloe, 1969: 143). The concept of nation-state originates from Western Europe where 'political programmes of republican democracy' were designed by Scottish and French Enlightenment theorists in the shift to

contemporary and modern era (Preston, 1997: 33-34). The co-terminality between nationality and citizenship rose because of these intellectual elites which interpreted 'nationality' in the aim of constructing a state where the mass population had little influence but could identify themselves to common language, myths and symbols (Alfonsi, 1997: 61). In Chapter 2, I will examine how these commonalities were mainly imposed in the French case. This fusion between nation and state is thus undertaken in order to merge and homogenise the concepts of culture and state. Indeed, according to Etienne Balibar (1994), cultural identity is often mistaken for national identity, and it is particularly visible within the discourses of international institutions which define identity through nation and culture. As such, governmental institutions' goals in doing so is the standardisation of their population to maintain and expand their control over it. However, some nations do not always seek the state they have been linked to and some nations may renounce to become states (Oomen, 1997: 16). It is, nonetheless, impossible to deny that the co-terminality between nationality and citizenship is nowadays a part of everyday life: co-terminality being used at the institutional, academic and societal levels (Oomen, 1997: 14). Indeed, the idea of one nation, one state -thus the fusion of nationality and citizenship- has become hegemonic. Oomen's analysis of the actual reality of population's -cultural- feelings of belonging within states permits to realise that the nation-state and thus the linguistic fusion of national identity and citizenship is a means to pursue the domination of certain -Western- elites and their colonialist, imperialist and capitalist projects. Indeed, very few states -if not none- can claim that they are composed of one nation. Since 'a nation is a community in communication in its homeland' (Oomen, 1997: 33), nationals of the 'imagined communities' that do not know and thus cannot communicate with their fellow members would therefore not even be able to agree on a legalisation of their nation as a state. Therefore, it is more accurate to use the qualification of one state, several identity groups -whether being nations, tribes, religions or collectivities. As Oomen (1997: 34) stated, 'most states today are multi-national, poly-ethnic, or a combination of the two; these states are communities of citizens'. The issues that are at stake with the concepts of nation and states are the notions of identity and equality. Both are deemed as human needs and the generation of the nation-state concept may be an attempt to cover both needs. As nationality may cover the identity

need, it can also be exclusive and generate inequality whereas 'citizenship can essentially be inclusionary and equality oriented' (Oomen, 1997: 35). When nation is being conflated with the concept of ethnie (fusing nationality and ethnicity), the notion of race subsumed to ethnicity (Oomen, 1997: 13) thus enters the equation of identity and equality where race could be defined as nation. Oomen adds on the trickiness of the issue of reconciliating identity with equality:

> The pursuit of equality and identity co-exists and competes, and the real issue is how to reconcile the two. […] If nationality and ethnicity are essentially group identities, citizenship is an individual identity. But very often, group identities (race, caste, religion, language, region) are invoked as the basis for acquiring citizenship identity. Reconciling these competing perspectives -the individual and group bases of citizenship- poses a durable challenge in the contemporary world (Oomen, 1997: 35).

Ethnicity or ethnic identity will now be examined.

1.3.4 – Ethnic identity

A very brief paragraph will be devoted to the analysis of the ethnic identity stemming from the people group entity of 'ethnie'. Indeed, in the case of France, national identity and citizenship are the two most referred mainstream representations of French identity. Ethnic identity and ethnicity are rarely mentioned since French laws forbid to classify publicly French people with an ethnicity. Only within the private realm of informal conversations that any ethnic belonging is referred to, for instance when the 'origins' of a French person is asked. Anthony Smith (1986) cited six characteristics of an ethnie: a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. These features parallel the moral component of the definition of a nation (Oomen, 1997: 19-20). Oomen (1997: 20) also asserts that 'ethnie is a passive nation and nationality is active ethnicity'. This implies that, according to the concept of an ethnie, the grouping of people does not need an active agent for the individuals to feel part of such group. The 'common myth *of descent*' (emphasis is mine) and the 'sense of solidarity' are the variant aspects to the concept of nation. 'Descent' and 'solidarity' are indeed spiritual and moral attributes that lack in the definitions of national identity and citizenship. These missing features could well indeed be the 'glue' binding individuals beyond the sole physical and symbolical traits of national identity and citizenship. Alike nation, ethnicity is also a facet of cultural identity. When one possesses several cultural identities that may overlap (for instance, a French national and citizen of

Malagasy descent like myself), the intersection of cultural belonging and civic identity may unfold in various ways within the individual -especially when backed up by political and moral ideals (Todorov, 2010: 52-54). The emergence of hyphenated identities is an illustration of this.

1.3.5 – Hyphenated identity

'Hyphenated identity' is a term coined by Horace Kallen in his 1915 essay 'Democracy Versus the Melting Pot' (Forna, 2016) when he mentioned the term 'hyphenated' American. Hyphen is the link between two cultural identities: self-identified by or imposed on a subject. It can be used to refer to nationalities, citizenships or ethnicities identity categories. The hyphen can link two identities from a same category or from two categories. It can also be used in reference to a membership to a religious community or other cultural groupings. However, its use is nearly always used in relation to two belongings that are supposedly opposed and not compatible. Recalling Samuel Huntington 1993's essay, hyphenated identity is applied with two civilizations that apparently clash. Ayse Caglar qualifies such usage as an assumption of conjunctions that are 'potentially conflictual and problematic' with a "dual cultural 'membership' […] source of dual 'loyalties'". Such hyphenation of various cultural memberships is based on 'the most basic identities that people possess' (Caglar, 1997: 175) that can range from ethnic identities, nationalities (whether confused with citizenship or not) or religious. Therefore, conflictual cultural belongings are illustrated by hyphenated identities such as French-Algerian/Franco-Malagasy (or any ex-French African colony), British-Pakistani (or any ex-British non-Caucasian colony), German-Turk, European-Muslim or Afro-American. These examples illustrate an underlying political domination affecting the social and economic wellbeing of the members of one culture over the other. Indeed, a Franco-British, a Franco-German or a Franco-American may consider oneself hyphenated more for cultural than political reasons. Such underlying political domination of a Western cultural background over a non-Western one requires the hyphenated individual to employ 'some specific forms of double-consciousness' (Gilroy, 1993: 1) of one's position according to the social context in which one is. Nevertheless, hyphenated identity is deemed as an essentialisation of the cultural identity of an individual (Caglar,

1997: 175). It reduces the individual to belonging to two cultures that that person may legally and visibly demonstrate. It does not take in account the variables that affect this person's other cultural belongings, such as spending an extended amount of time in another cultural setting or following a religion that is not related -or that can supposedly also be conflictual- to the two hyphenated cultures. Thus, while aiming to reflect the constructive approach to identity, hyphenated identity, on the contrary, essentialises it to a certain extent. This essentialisation has, however, been used as a first step to support political purposes of 'de-essentialising' the very much essentialised concept of nationality -often confused with citizenship and ethnicity. It helped resisting a dominant group insisting on assimilation of a dominated group. It also allowed individuals to reject 'the dichotomizing pressures of choosing between nationalities' (Hamann and England, 2011: 208). People with self-asserted hyphenated identity may therefore be governed by biculturalism, which would be illegitimate to assume when hyphenated identity is imposed. Biculturalism is 'an understanding and competencies in two cultures' (Vauclair and al., 2014 citing Nguyen and Benet-Martínez, 2007). It generally is illustrated by being fluent in two languages and being able 'to behave appropriately in two different cultural settings' which stem from the strong identification of the subject to both cultures' values and beliefs (Vauclair and al., 2014). Therefore, a difference can be noticed between the behaviours of the subject according to the environment experienced. Differences *per se* do not have any positive or negative essence. They just are. It is the way they are perceived and acted upon by a human being, a group or an entity that can affect positively or negatively other human beings. When differences are emphasized, they are put under spotlights. This can have, as said, positive or negative results. Such emphasis on difference and its political impacts will be scrutinized in the next section to, then, stress the importance of going beyond it.

1.4 – The emphasis on difference

The title of this section originates from Stephen Spencer when he asserted that:

> The movement towards more individualistic and fragmentary views of identity has emerged with increasing emphasis on difference (Spencer, 2006: 115).

'Individualistic and fragmentary views of identity' depict an approach void of peaceful values, therefore not fostering cultures of peace(s). The concepts of cultural difference and cultural diversity will be first examined before examining the political impacts of the emphasis on difference. Then, analysing the distinction of the prefixes of 'multi' and 'inter' taking a peace studies perspective will lead to explore alternative identities that go beyond the emphasis on difference.

1.4.1 – Cultural difference and cultural diversity

The distinction between the two concepts has been addressed by Homi K. Bhabha in his 1994 book *The Location of Culture*:

> Cultural diversity is an epistemological object – culture as an object of empirical knowledge – whereas cultural difference is the process of *enunciation* of culture as 'knowledgeable', authoritative, adequate to the construction of systems of cultural identification. If cultural diversity is a category of comparative ethics, aesthetics or ethnology, cultural difference is a process of signification through which statements *of* culture or *on* culture differentiate, discriminate and authorize the production of fields of force, reference, applicability and capacity (Bhabha, 1994: 34).

Here, it is observed that there is a substantial distinction on the approach of the variety of cultures. Diversity views culture as an object but difference views it as a process. Diversity regards culture as epistemological and empirical while difference regards it as enunciative. Diversity considers culture as a knowledge whereas difference considers it as knowledgeable. It is highly important to underline such interpretative distinction as the choice of words and language used constructs our understanding of the world. Cultural difference viewing culture as knowledgeable means that some cultures are thus, on the contrary, not knowledgeable and therefore less valuable. Eduardo Galeano's poem *Los Nadies* (The Nobodies) reflects this differential and judgemental approach when qualifying The Nobodies (and by extension their culture) as those:

> […] Who are not, even when they are.
> Who don't speak languages, but rather dialects.
> Who don't follow religions, but rather superstitions.
> Who don't do art, but rather crafts.
> Who don't practice culture, but rather folklore. […].[21]

[21] Original version is in Spanish. Available on: http://www.losnadies.com/poem.html
[…] Que no son, aunque sean.
Que no hablan idiomas, sino dialectos.
Que no profesan religiones, sino supersticiones.
Que no hacen arte, sino artesanía.
Que no practican cultura, sino folklore. […].

This value judgement is not present in cultural diversity where cultures are only understood as knowledge. They are taken as they are. They are unprocessed. Therefore, there is no production of an '*enunciation* of culture' that can refer to a discourse on cultures. When such discourse becomes authoritative and dominant, it favours 'cultural supremacy' that is 'produced only in the moment of differentiation' (Bhabha, 1994: 34) and thus fuels the mainstream discourse on identity, based on cultural differences. As such, the mainstream discourse on cultural differences maintains the dichotomy and the hegemony between cultures:

> The enunciative process introduces a split in the performative present of cultural identification; a split between the traditional culturalist demand for a model, a tradition, a community, a stable system of reference, and the necessary negation of the certitude in the articulation of new cultural demands, meanings, strategies in the political present, as a practice of domination, or resistance. […] The enunciation of cultural difference problematizes the binary division of past and present, tradition and modernity, at the level of cultural representation and its authoritative address. (Bhabha, 1994: 35)

Cultural diversity is thus preferable to encourage since it recognises 'cultural contents and customs' and foster 'cultural exchange' and the 'culture of humanity' (Bhabha, 1994: 34). Nevertheless, alike previously mentioned hyphenated identity, cultural differences may also, at times, be employed to support political purposes of resistance to a dominant order. The topic of culture in international relations theory may also be perceived as a challenge or hinderance to diplomacy between countries. In this sense, cultural difference may as well fuel the cliché illustrations and behaviours of countries' representatives, thus, contributing to the mainstream discourse of the representation of such or such country. Michel Wieviorka considered cultural difference as an issue that had become prominent in many societies and that, in some cases, it even was 'in a position to challenge world order, and the functioning of many countries, possibly even of many regional or local political systems' (Wieviorka, 2007: 33). Next will be examined some of the political impacts of the emphasis on difference on identity.

1.4.2 – Political impacts of the emphasis on difference

It is known from the feminist argument that *the personal is political*[22]. Therefore, the personal matter of identity is political. Since it is also a social and cultural matter, 'a work in progress, a negotiated space between ourselves and others', it is thus 'intensely' political (Spencer, 2006: 26). Identity is political because it is a reflection of power relations and the emphasis on difference may enhance or weaken a status of domination. The section below discusses a selected number of political impacts of the emphasis on difference influencing the way people approach and conceive their identity. Given the postcolonial scope of the paper, the examples considered relates to impacts emanating from colonial and imperialist political assumptions.

1.4.2.a – Political-cultural identity

Political-cultural identity is a conception of identity encountered in the work of Peter W. Preston which provides 'a particular answer to the wider question of the relationship of individual and collectivity':

> The idea of political-cultural identity expresses the relationship of individual selves to the community considered as an ordered body of persons. In schematic terms, we are looking at the way in which private identity is expressed within the public world, with thereafter a broad concern for how we acquire such an identity, how it changes and at what costs (Preston, 1997: 9).

In this paper, this concept is employed to recall but not analyse the relationship the individual has with the community nor how does personal identity -though intrinsically linked to socio-cultural identity- manifest in the public and political sphere. The concept is, however, taken in account to emphasize the critical role politics play in the building of one's identity, in regards of culture. Indeed, culture affects politics but also -if not mainly- politics affect culture. Politics impact how culture is lived and experienced whether in joy, sorrow or struggle. Therefore, politics of peace, cooperation and living together in relation to the topic of identity (and, also, in general) are more desirable in building cultures of peace(s). It is thus reminded through political-cultural identity that cultural identity is political and, to a further extent, that identity, in all its facets, is political. The next part will review three effects of the politicisation of identity.

[22] Phrase also popularised by Carol Hanisch in her essay 'The Personal is Political' (1969). Available at: https://webhome.cs.uvic.ca/~mserra/AttachedFiles/PersonalPolitical.pdf

1.4.2.b – Identity politics, diaspora and fragmentation

First on the line to be examined is identity politics which is expressed as ‘an appreciation for politics as the art of living together’ (Phelan, 1989: 170 cited by Spencer, 2006). In less romanticised terms, identity politics is a term referring to a political approach emphasizing a prioritisation of concerns most relevant to one’s particular facet of identity: cultural, social, racial, ethnic, religious, sexual or other. Such prioritisation leads the subject to form political alliances with other subjects having the same priority concern. The promotion of their identity politics may in this sense sometimes discard the ‘bigger picture’. The interests of a larger community than theirs may be put on hold until this identity politics group’s demands are satisfied. To a certain extent, interests and consequently needs of humanity as a whole may be dismissed by identity politics. This paper joins Sidi Omar (2009) in acknowledging that identity politics embraces ‘an essentialist attitude in projecting and promoting the identities of its constituencies’ -reminding Spivak’s strategic essentialism. Indeed, even if identity politics is employed to support political purposes of resistance to a dominant order, as stated previously with hyphenated identity and cultural differences, asserting and demanding the recognition of the authenticity of an identity (Omar, 2009 citing Kruks, 2001: 85) is a case of an essentialist approach to identity. In this sense, by categorising human beings as subjects of one, two or more countries but in exclusion of the other ones, the world states system combined with international relations theory remains a mainstream approach to identity, despite being based on constructivist approach.

Second effect to be examined of the politicisation of identity is the concept of diaspora. Diaspora is defined as ‘a group of people who spread from one original country to other countries’ (Cambridge Dictionnary) or ‘people settled far from their ancestral homelands’ (Merriam-Webster). The politicisation within the diasporic identity lays in the reasons why diaspora people spread and settled far from their original homelands. Cohen’s five types of diaspora -victim, labour, trade, imperial and cultural diasporas (Cohen, 1997)- demonstrate that colonialist and capitalist aspects were foundational in their creation. These hegemonic ideologies are established on political interests that

favours a group of population over another. Therefore, the existence of a diaspora can be viewed, in a sense, as the healing of a wound that such population in its ancestral lands has suffered. The 'intentionality of identity' of diaspora expressed by Lawrence Grossberg (1996: 92) shows that moving from an original land can be a political choice. Since, as he continues, 'diaspora links identity to spatial location and identifications', it is a field where supposedly conflictual cultural identities may meet and, perhaps, consequently disturb the political agendas of the political elites of the 'receiving' countries. Spencer expresses it well:

> The 'diaspora space' is a critical concept created by the tensions of power between old and new identities, in which the parameters of inclusion, exclusion, otherness and belonging are challenged (Spencer, 2006: 191).

The third and final effect of the politicisation of identity to be examined is fragmentation bringing forth the presence of multiple identities (Grossberg, 1996: 91). According to fragmentation theory, identities are composed of partial fragments of several identities of the individual or of the different social categories of which the individual belongs to, as well as the combination of the two (Grossberg, 1996: 91). This theory has been, however, thoroughly criticised. An example that has gone beyond the mere fragmentation of identities leading to the observation of multiple ones is the 'Third Space' (Bhabha, 1994) where an energy field of forces permits various elements to come and transform together. These elements thus go beyond their mere 'combination, accumulation or synthesis' (Omar, 2009). Amin Maalouf (2003: 2) also negated the compartmentalisation of elements of identity and superposition or addition of diverse affiliations. However, an intersection between the elements can be observed. It is their hybridity in coming together that critically reassess fragmentation. While hybridity is an alternative identity that will be analysed below, the emergence of multiple identities due to fragmentation is the approach generally mentioned by mainstream discourses on identity. Next part will cover two political impacts of the emphasis on difference that may turn out in complicated or negative experiences for the subject.

1.4.2.c – Situational ethnicity and acculturation

Situational ethnicity is the conduct of choosing to embrace one's identity in the way that it will not affect the wellbeing of oneself. It is principally linked to people who could identify themselves as hyphenated. Hamann and England gave it a clear description:

> […] individuals can also choose to change identities (or at least to attempt such a change) to avoid the hazards, real or perceived, that come with not doing so. Making such situational identity shifts involves a kind of realpolitik orientation - in brief, "because I cannot change the inequality of statuses available to me, I will seek to be identified with the one that is least disadvantageous." The use of situational identity is an adaptation to the hierarchical political ecology of identities rather than a contestation of them (Hamann and England, 2011: 206).

This situational identity allowing to embrace one's ethnicity or other type of belonging may affect the subject in various ways. It is first an extra (demanding) effort to think, feel and act on the need of switching one's behaviour according to the context in which one finds oneself. When acted upon, it can turn out positively in the fact that the individual may feel more at ease with the identity chosen to be embraced in any given environment. Nevertheless, it can also turn out negatively as it can lead to acculturation. Indeed, as Belangér and Verkuyten (2010: 143) expressed, 'changes in self-definition and identification are considered a salient aspect of the acculturation process'. Acculturation is the assimilation to a culture different than the one of the individual, culture that is generally dominant. Therefore, when one favours one facet of one's identity according to one's surroundings, one represses one's whole identity. Such repression depicts a form of cultural violence, having its origins in the societal and institutional structures in which the individual is. 'Intercultural positionality' between the contact zones of one's various cultural belongings (Gilroy, 1993: 6) can allow one to occupy the space between identities falsely painted as mutually exclusive, even if it is viewed as 'a provocative and even oppositional act of political insubordination' (Gilroy, 1993: 1). Nevertheless, when an individual stays for a long time in the same environment, it is hard to extricate oneself of the -long- homogenic and hegemonic process of assimilation that rejects the use of any *multi*cultural or *inter*cultural matters acknowledging diversity.

1.4.3 – Prefixes 'multi' and 'inter'

This sub-section will briefly highlight the signification of the prefixes 'multi' and 'inter' from the peace studies perspective, and to what extent they emphasize difference or acknowledge diversity.

While the prefix ‘multi’ means ‘many’ or ‘several’, the prefix ‘inter’ can mean ‘between’ and ‘among’ but also ‘mutually’, ‘reciprocally’ or ‘together’.

‘Multi’ is thus a prefix that discerns the variety of any matter, for instance as in a ‘multidisciplinary field of study’ or a ‘multicultural country’. Here, the prefix only recognises the -passive- presence of diverse aspects. Such recognition, however, depending on the way it is acted upon can connote a subjective signification which can result in either positive or negative but tangible effects affecting people. For example, a multicultural country bears several cultures. However, the way the government of such country handles how people from several cultures can live together defines the extent to which this government embraces more the cultural differences concept or the cultural diversity one. It is when multiculturalism is not handled well by a country’s government or by entities dealing with a multiculturality of individuals or groups, that I agree with Dutch conservative politician on the fact that multiculturalism usually ends up being a major theme of political disagreement (Baudet, 2015: 270). However, I believe it is possible to practice the alternative of interculturalism to go beyond such mere political disagreement.

The prefix ‘inter’ goes beyond the state of acknowledgement of diversity by making the diverse entities interact between themselves. The -active- mutuality, reciprocity and togetherness embodied in this prefix connotes the will to ensure that all matters work out fine as an ensemble. ‘Interdisciplinarity’ and ‘interculturality’ thus means that the several disciplines and cultures found in the ensemble interact among each other in order to build positive and tangible effects affecting people. For instance, the field of peace studies is based on interdisciplinarity and interculturality since there is no one discipline nor culture that has more legitimacy over the other to define what peace is (Martínez Guzmán, Comins Mingol and París Albert, 2009: 95).[23] In this sense, Ramin Jahanbegloo (2007: 18) also stated that no one culture could neither explain the whole reality, since there is only a plurality of realities conditioned by particular interpretations within a given social and historical context. Thus, peace studies aim to transform the realities of conflicts through the interactions of

[23] My own translation. Original in Spanish: *[…] no hay una única disciplina ni una única cultura que tenga la “patente” de la paz.*

cultures, disciplines and people in order to build cultures of peace(s). This 'intercultural paradigm' is a *sine qua non* condition (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 18) for a united humanity in diversity.

When applied to culture, this linguistic analysis permits to realise the slight difference between multicultural/ism/ity and intercultural/ism/ity. While the former can emphasize the 'tension between equality and difference', the latter can foster 'the reconciliation of the right to be different with the right to be equal' (Caglar, 1997: 178). Besides, as interculturality may sometimes be deemed as a threat to national pursuits (Salo-Lee, 2003: 250), intercultural contact between diverse people may be weakened for national governments to keep a hold of its population. We are all multicultural and thus have multicultural -not multiple- identities. Going beyond such mere realisation –or as Gilroy (1993: 7) stated: 'Getting beyond these national and nationalistic perspectives'– to build cultures of peace(s) requires interactions between these multicultural subjects. Such interculturality can transform conflictual and violent societies into peaceful societies. It can also transform the individuals' own assumed mainstream identities into alternative identities that goes beyond emphasising difference by celebrating it instead.[24]

1.4.4 – 'Going beyond' the emphasis on difference: alternative identities

The action of 'going beyond' a given, assumed or mainstream identity implies a will to reconstruct such identity that was critically assessed and deconstructed beforehand. Indeed, from a peace studies perspective, it is essential to consider both the critical and the constructive perspectives since there is a possibility that it results in a reverse effect if only the former is taken into account. The constructive approach gives the incentive to go beyond and engage with what *supposedly* is from an external subject/entity point of view of a matter to, then, acknowledge and recognise what *really* is from the subject's own experience of the matter. The process of 'going beyond' and engagement with mainstream discourses on identity will be examined through the concepts of 'Third Space', 'in-betweenness', 'suture' and 'intersection' suggesting the existence of a *specific field* where identities are produced. Two alternative identities outcomes of such engagement will be then analysed: hybrid

[24] Celebration of differences and of 'each person's gift to humanity' are part of the 'formula for peace' alongside 'equality, equity and mutual respect' Galtung (2011: 6).

identity and transcultural identity. This paper limits its analysis to these two alternatives since they are currently the most academically referred to, until perhaps other alternative cultural identities come to the fore. Finally, societal and institutional impacts of the existence of alternative identities will be briefly assessed, both in theory and on the ground.

1.4.4.a – *Specific fields*: Third Space, suture, in-betweenness, intersection

The dichotomy of the discourses on identity between essentialism and constructivism at the basis of any conflictive identity situations mentioned above has been critically assessed by postcolonial thinkers. After the end of the colonial era and due to mass human migration movements and the explosion of technological advancements linked to globalisation, it has been suggested that identities would be generated not from the dichotomy but through other fields of creation. Homi K. Bhabha talks of such a 'Third Space' where the meaning of identity is produced through enunciation between the sender and receiver of the message:

> The pact of interpretation is never simply an act of communication between the I and the You designated in the statement. The production of meaning requires that these two places be mobilized in the passage through a Third Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the specific implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot 'in itself' be conscious (Bhabha, 1994: 36).
>
> The intervention of a Third Space of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open, expanding code. […] It is that Third Space, though unrepresentable in itself, which constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated rehistoricised and read anew (Bhabha, 1994: 37).

'Third Space' is thus not only an alternative space ('passage') where identities are generated. It is also an alternative discourse ('enunciation') that allows a freed, 'ambivalent' -but also polyvalent-, 'open', 'expanding' interpretation and constitution of identities where the cultures are not essentialised ('no primordial unity or fixity'). Cultures and their meanings are in constant building and reconstruction ('rehistoricised and read anew') in such *specific field* where the subjects can unfurl their identities at peace. Bhabha's *specific field* of 'Third Space' echoes a(n inner) peace space, where one's identitarian belongings meet, dialogue, recognise and care for each other actively. 'This is where peace is built' (Abarca Obregón, 2019) and violence transformed.

The concept of '*suture*' developed by Stuart Hall (1996) also refers to this *specific field*. He alludes identity to 'the meeting point' or 'the point of *suture*' of the dichotomy between discourses and processes to which the social and cultural subjects are and take part (Hall, 1996: 5-6). Identity is thus the result of discourses and processes which are sewed together. In medical terms, suture is the action of stitching together the edges of a wound. In this sense, identity is the result of the sewing or bridging of culture(s) that seemingly may not coincide or be in harmony in the way they are taught or practiced but may find edges to be brought together. Culture paralleled to a wound[25] is a reflection out of the scope of this paper, but identity paralleled to the creation of bridges between cultures is a reflection that I have already initiated (Ranaivosoa, 2020). This *suture* or identity bridging diverse cultures together thus generates alternative identities *within* and *by being* such *specific field* of production of identities. This concept is however to be taken with care as *suture*, 'identity' or 'belongingness' may stay in the theoretical field and not impact the reality of people:

> […] even if the belongingness, the 'suturing into the story' through which identities arise is, partly, in the imaginary (as well as the symbolic) and therefore, always, partly constructed in fantasy, or at least within a fantasmatic field (Hall, 1996: 4).

'Third Space' and *suture* are two concepts elaborated by two great thinkers in postcolonialism and cultural studies fields. They, however, represent a rather theoretical approach to the *specific field* of identity generation. With the notion of 'in-between', Homi Bhabha also conceived another representation of such *specific field*:

> This 'part' culture, this *partial* culture, is the contaminated yet connective tissue between culture – at once the impossibility of culture's containedness and the boundary between. It is indeed something like culture's 'in-between', bafflingly both alike and different (Bhabha, 1996: 54).

By reformulating the 'connective tissue between culture' as the 'idea of living between cultures' (Marotta, 2011: 192), the concept of 'in-between' or 'in-betweenness' may be employed to linguistically make the *specific field* more tangible to popular wisdom. 'Between' is the adverb defined as the space separating two entities. Therefore, 'in-betweenness' is generally supposed to be happening with two cultures: the host society and the country of origin (Marotta, 2011: 193). Within a host society, such 'in-betweenness' can nevertheless be perceived negatively as even if migrants

[25] The 'wound' metaphor can echo Thich Nhat Hanh's epigraph of this chapter that 'there is suffering'.

'feel comfortable moving between cultures, their sense of difference is heightened in social situations in which they are in the minority' (Marotta, 2011: 193). Thus, 'in-betweenness' embodies the feature of the *specific field* where alternative identities are generated. However, it seems to be limited to the 'movement' of the subject going from culture to culture, hence reflecting in a way fragmentation and multiple identities. Indeed, to move from one culture to another may make oneself dizzy in switching instead of stitching cultures and, consequently, provoking internal violence and not inner peace. Indeed, 'the inner war inside each individual […] is the seed from which all other conflicts grow' (Chopra, 2005: 222). Nonetheless, 'in-betweenness' can turn out useful in slowly mainstreaming and making it easy for the general population to understand the concept of the *specific field* of alternative identity generation:

> This movement between here and there illustrates that […] cultural identity is not confined to a specific place or time. The in-betweenness of […] identity makes home a transnational experience (Marotta, 2011: 194).

Perhaps the *specific field* that may be more easily popularised is intersection, reminding the theoretical framework of intersectionality. Here, 'intersection' implies 'intersection of discourses' where an 'empty' and 'vacant' space is created to host and be filled with a 'multiplicity of contents' as Balibar expressed (1994: 57). Nevertheless, the intersection space differs from the 'Third Space'. Indeed, intersection is blank, clear and void, waiting for content to be placed into it while the 'Third Space' is a process where the content is performatively uttered. Intersection is passive while the 'Third Space' is active.

Thus, while the differences between the conceptual depth of these four *specific fields* may seem minor, the alternative identities generated within them are important to know and understand to analyse the extent to which they reassess mainstream discourses on identity.

1.4.4.b – Hybrid identity

In biology, hybrid is the noun of the offspring coming from the mix of two species. As an adjective, hybrid is defined as of mixed character and coming from different elements. The biological perspective calls to mind the essentialist one where confronting two aspects which merged in one entity or identity raises the questions of knowing which belonging prevails over the other according

-or not- to the context. Here, the term will be approached from postcolonialism, as an adjective completing the noun ‘identity’ and highlighting the mix character of cultures within it. This paper will also align its understanding of hybrid identity to French philosopher Bernard Andrieu’s one. Before addressing the postcolonial perspective, the examination of hybrid identity from a sociological approach is interesting to take into account, in particular the work of Anthony Giddens and Vince Marotta:

> Local traditions are joined to a host of additional cultural forms from abroad presenting people with a bewildering array of lifestyle options from which to choose […] established identities and ways of life grounded in local communities and cultures are giving way to new forms of 'hybrid identity' (Giddens, 2001: 64).
>
> These new hybrid identities are not fixed, but fluid, and they are strategically used to negotiate life in global and multicultural societies. Over the last two decades, scholars in cultural and ethnic studies have used the term 'hybridity' to explain and interpret the experiences of those who live across two or more cultures (Marotta, 2011: 190).
>
> Hybridity assumes a free-floating actor who voluntarily chooses between identities and positions; being and representing her or himself as hybrid, as the 'remix generation' is doing, is seen as one choice among many (Marotta, 2011: 196-197).

The nexus between agency and hybridity is analysed in these above paragraphs. Indeed, the subject has various options to voluntarily choose from in a strategic way to negotiate his-her-their identities and positions as hybrid. Agency is ‘the ability of people individually and collectively, to influence their own lives and, the society in which they live’ (Marotta, 2011: 197). The agency and choice factors of the individual in defining oneself as hybrid is eminent in these sociological approaches to hybrid identity. I argue that such denominator is neither fully right nor fully wrong. It depends on the goal and/or the situation intended for a hybrid identity to flourish. Indeed, embracing hybrid identity as a choice is a means of resistance against mainstream discourses on identity. The concept of ‘hybrid’ may thus parallel the concept of ‘queer’ or ‘no label’ within gender studies. Besides, hybridity is one of the key elements of postcolonial studies where identity is defined as fluid, free from being rooted in any given cultures (Spencer, 2006: 191-192), such fluidity taking place in the ‘Third Space’. Sidi Omar’s take on hybridity from a postcolonial perspective asserts the need of ‘going beyond’ the emphasis on differences of mainstream discourses as it

> contribute[s] pedagogically and critically to constructing new forms of belonging and identification that go beyond the cognitive constraints imposed by hegemonic discourses on identity (Omar, 2009).

Going beyond hegemonic discourses means that it must be understood and embraced by individuals the fact that subjectivities (in thoughts or experiences) are not 'ontologically essential' but 'mere social constructions' *purposely* (my addition and emphasis) labelled as innate and natural (Omar, 2009). Indeed, hybridity is the result of 'profound changes that have taken place as a consequence of cross-cultural interaction, colonialism, globalisation and growing migration' (Omar, 2009), changes that have affected some populations and thus individuals more negatively than others. Therefore, this construct and theorisation of hybrid identity and all terms that represent this free mixing of cultures within one human beings -syncretism, creolisation, *métissage*, *mestizaje* (Gilroy, 1993: 2; Omar, 2009)- is one of the many ways to free oneself of the constraining demand of fitting into a box and, consequently, resisting to hegemonic classifications. As Caglar (1997: 172) expressed it, hybrid identity is one of the 'revolutionary antidotes to essentialist constructs of culture, identity and ethnicity'. Hybridity interpreted as an 'analytical tool and a critical approach' as well as 'an educational strategy that seeks to interrogate and overcome essentialist discourses on identity and culture' (Omar, 2009) are also other elements that sustains the agency factor present in having -and choosing- a hybrid identity.

When hybrid identity is not the result of a choice but of a state resulting from the free and flowing being and mixing of people and cultures, it illustrates what any human being is, even if one does not reclaim nor realises it. When one's identity is reclaimed and chosen by the person, it is then fine to leave them be identified as such. It is fine as well to propose the possibility of being identified as having a hybrid identity and let the dialogue be open, discarding the result-oriented process of negotiation. This such free, flowing and malleable approach to hybrid identity reminds Bernard Andrieu's perspective on hybridity as the 'uncertainty in being' where identity is 'provisional', and the norm is 'culturally unstable' (Andrieu, 2011: 22). To accept and be comfortable with uncertainty and nonattachment[26] thus characterise hybrid identity. By being fluid but also sometimes 'troubled' (Andrieu, 2011: 24), -hybrid- identity may be compared to water. It is vital. Hybridity allows to embrace the changes according to context and the pressures that are being experienced without having

[26] Spiritual state defined as 'a state of freedom that preserves and even increases your love for another' (Chopra, 1997: 192), thus by extension for oneself.

to feel any violence and naturally, such as when liquid water transform in gas at over 100 degrees Celsius or in ice at under 0 degree Celsius. The water metaphor illustrates such easiness of adaptation to changes.[27] This metaphoric approach of identity as water reminds Paul Gilroy's 'Black Atlantic' (1993). The 'Black Atlantic' being the ocean of identities where ships can be equated to individuals. These individuals are the mobile elements navigating in such shifting watery space, connecting and intersecting the fixed places of identities (de Certeau, 1984: 117; Gilroy, 1993: 16-17). This watery space is the *specific* hybrid space where one's identity can surf, travel and change directions according to the experiences one goes through. Nevertheless, as Andrieu stated, hybridity is a 'utopic' concept to be accepted as social norm (Andrieu, 2011: 27). In any case, hybridity is not seeking to be normalised but seeks to reinvent normality in its everyday constructive process (Andrieu, 2011: 31).

As mentioned, hybrid is an umbrella term like queer. However, cultural origins of a subject may be more visibly and in practice salient than gender and sexual expressions. The transition towards global acceptance is far from achieved from both alternative concepts. In regards of identity approaches, perhaps the concept of transcultural identity can be the first step to help recognise the validity of alternative identities as well as their mainstreaming in popular wisdom.

1.4.4.c – Transcultural identity

Before delving into what transcultural identity refers to, the linguistic meaning of the prefix 'trans' will be highlighted to, then, interpret and analyse the discourse on transcultural identity.

'Trans' comes from Latin and signify 'across', 'beyond' or 'through'. The prefix 'trans' thus also embodies an alternative to the prefix 'multi' as it does not equal to only the sum of the 'multi' parts. The 'transdisciplinarity of peace studies' is an example of such feature (Galtung, 2010: 24).

Transcultural identity thus linguistically fits as an alternative identity that goes beyond the emphasis on difference as one's identity is seen through the crossing and intersection of diverse cultures. Transnational (identity) may at times be used as a synonym of transcultural (identity).

[27] This easy adaptation to changes is also epitomised in a famous quote by Bruce Lee: 'You must be shapeless, formless, like water. When you pour water in a cup, it becomes the cup. When you pour water in a bottle, it becomes the bottle. When you pour water in a teapot, it becomes the teapot. Water can drip and it can crash. Become like water my friend.'

However, this paper is not using the transnational wording as it inevitably connects it to nations and states. It thus can engender a generalisation due to the discourses on national identity and citizenship, hence minimising the role of culture (thus language and customs) in shaping one's behaviour. The analysis of transcultural identity will be undertaken from Vauclair and al. (2004) work on transculturalism, which is exemplified by 'individuals with multicultural experiences'. Such occurrence takes place due to the increase in intercultural contacts linked to globalisation and human migration and generally within culturally diverse Western societies. Vauclair and al. (2004) define transculturalism as 'the notion that people can develop an understanding of culture that transcends or goes beyond specific cultures by combining elements of more than one culture'. Indeed, intercultural contacts take place in that ('Third' or *specific*) space where individuals from diverse cultures meet. These people are being transformed in such space. Their understanding of cultures, identity and, to a larger extent, meanings in life are being challenged in this fluid and malleable energy field where various cultural elements encounter. These understandings continue to be put in question while the individuals multiply intercultural contacts and keep being internally challenged. When these individuals realise such occurrence, they evolve in the understanding of themselves and on the fact that their cultural identity is and will remain in a perpetual change throughout their life. Indeed, it is more a personal aspect of identity that is stressed in transculturalism and not a social one:

> In terms of identity, transculturalism results not so much in a social, but a personal identity based on the multiple intercultural contact experiences that can have a long-lasting effect on a persons' values and worldview (Vauclair and al., 2004).

In this sense, focusing on the personal development of identity of each individual may be a first step in transitioning to a more popularised understanding of alternative identities:

> In sum, it is rather a personal than a social identity because multiple cultural experiences result in a self-definition in terms of personal beliefs, norms and values rather than in identification with a particular group (e.g., in terms of nationality) that indicates group belongingness and differentiation from dissimilar others […] (Vauclair and al., 2014).

Indeed, with hybrid identity being closely linked to postcolonialism, it may repel fierce, explicit or implicit hegemonic and colonial discourses on identity professed by individuals that may or may not realise the negative and effective power of their thoughts and words. Hybrid identity and transcultural

identity are, however, theoretical concepts with which subjects can identify themselves. The next part will assess to which extent this theories impact people's reality.

1.4.4.d – Impacts of 'going beyond': reality of alternative identities

Claiming to be or have an alternative means not fitting in the box or not following the general rules. At times, the minority of people claiming so have been labelled as anarchist, communist, witches, wanting to 'divide and conquer' or even mentally ill. For such claim, some of these minorities have been cut off society or persecuted. Hybrid and transcultural identities are alternatives to mainstream discourses on identity. They generally do not fit in institutional and societal rhetoric on the matter, due to the prevalence of national identity, citizenship and ethnic identifications relying on essentialist features. Institutionally, national identity is a means to undo hybridity (Andrieu, 2011: 193). Therefore, as long as national identity and citizenship (and ethnic belongings in some countries) will remain mainstream ways of identifying oneself, alternative identities will persist in the background of the identification process when not given legal acknowledgement. Indeed, hybrid or transcultural identities are not accepted institutionally but they are also rarely recognised nor understood by society, whether asserting a hegemonic discourse or ethnic and communitarian separatism (Spencer, 2006: 192). Alternative identities are considered threats to essentialist discourses, whether mainstream or not. However, some critiques on hybridity have asserted that it supported an essentialist thinking since it 'implicitly legitimates race thinking' (Spencer, 2006: 193-194 citing Young, 1995) or "encourages the view 'that all group-based identities are essentialist'" (Spencer, 2006: 193-194 citing May, 2004: 133). To my view, it is understandable to base the approach of hybrid from essentialist features since it has to start from somewhere to construct the hybrid identity. As the goal is to 'go beyond' essentialism and the cultural difference approach, it is that aim towards which hybrid identity -and alternative identities in general- tends to that values said identity. Chapter three will explore to which extent such goal is analogous to the building of cultures of peace(s). Thus, the real and tangible positive impact of alternative identities is still to be observed at a global scale. However, the personal realisation of one's hybrid or transcultural identity can allow

the subject to blossom, especially when encountering other subjects alike in an open-minded and open-hearted society. On the contrary, realising such internal changes may challenge the subject when confronted to an external unsupportive environment, whether it be family, community, society or country. While it may be personally -though not socially yet- fulfilling and interesting to reflect theoretically on the process of alternative, hybrid and transcultural identity construction, it must not be sat back on these advancements (Spencer, 2006: 194). Indeed, theory must be followed by practice with, then, practice re-nurturing theory and continuing indefinitely this cycle. However, perhaps the finding that theorists on alternative identities could always rest on to argue their point is that hybridity is a fact and not just an intellectual construct as it addresses the reality of human beings being inextricably intertwined (Spencer, 2006: 194 citing Back, 2000: 450). Besides, the world in which we are living is a social environment of hybridisation and cultural mix with a constant transformation of identities (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 30).

1.5 – Conclusion

The development of this thesis' first chapter on 'Identities' provided answers to the sub-research questions that seek to know what identity is, what it is composed of and the implications of the various discourses tied to it. This chapter permitted to, first, demonstrate that identity is a human need. It is thus mandatory to have it fulfilled for human beings to feel at peace with themselves and the environment that surrounds them in order for them to generate cultures of peace(s). This feature of identity is crucial to address and emphasize. Indeed, the search for identity, what one is capable of doing for it and keeping it is the foundation and underlying reason of many wars, novels and movies plots. Therefore, the neglect of the fulfilment of this human need can foster violence.

The chapter then developed identity as a process: the identification process activated by the agency of the subject. The composition of this process regarding cultural identity at the macro-level encompasses the intersectionality of various identification categories. Five are examined: gender, culture, society, politics and language. All categories intersect and interconnect. Such movements make identity alive. It is in constant transformation. When identity is powered by politics, political

discourses shape it. When it is shaped by essentialist views, identity is claimed as stable. However, when a constructivist approach shapes identity, it is formed with the interactions of the above-mentioned categories and formatted to change. By 'going beyond' the mere interaction within a set -Western- context, postcolonialism discourse acknowledges the diversity and relativity of experiences impacting how one identifies. Indeed, the essentialist mainstream discourse on identity leads to mainstream types of identities with which subjects may not actually identify with. The neglect of such identity need for some subjects generates tension and resistance in the societal field. The claim for recognition of the diverse experiences impacting identity generates alternative types of identity based on the alternative discourses which foster cultures of peace(s). The following table summarises the findings of this chapter. Other alternative discourses, geometrical dimensions and energy have been purposely included in this table for further reflection. Indeed, the identity space is infinite and the identification process is ongoing in an individual's existence as Bhabha observed the '*dimension of depth* that provides the language of Identity' emerging from an acknowledgement of one's inwardness, one's depth of character and profundity of oneself (Bhabha, 1994: 46).

<table>
<tr><td>What is identity?</td><td colspan="4">Human Need</td></tr>
<tr><td>What is identity composed of?</td><td colspan="4">Agency
Gender, Culture, Society, Language
Politics</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">What are the discourses of identity?</td><td colspan="4">Discourses</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Mainstream</td><td colspan="2">Alternative</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Essentialism</td><td>Constructivism</td><td colspan="2">Constructivism</td></tr>
<tr><td>International Relations Theory</td><td>Postcolonialism</td><td>Other Alternatives</td></tr>
<tr><td>Visualisation of Discourses and geometrical Dimensions</td><td>1D</td><td>2D</td><td>3D</td><td>4D/5D</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="8">What are the impacts of discourses on identity?</td><td colspan="2">Multiculturality</td><td colspan="2">Interculturality</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Cultural differences</td><td colspan="2">Cultural diversity</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Negotiation, Debate</td><td colspan="2">Dialogue</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2">National Identity, Citizenship, Ethnicity, Hyphentated Identity</td><td colspan="2">Hybrid Identity, Transcultural Identity</td></tr>
<tr><td>Organic, fluid, malleable specific field</td><td>Energy</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Internal identity conflicts due to external environment pressure</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Political movements of resistence and revendication</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Cultural violence, Culture of conflict and competition, Culture of war</td><td colspan="2">Cultures of peace(s)</td></tr>
</table>

The next chapter will examine Identities in the French context, scrutinizing the discourses on French identity and how they relate to cultures of peace(s).

CHAPTER 2: FRENCH IDENTITY

2. Modernity and 'the Other' (Maalouf, 2003)

2. There is an origin of suffering (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87)

2.1 – Introduction

The concept of identity has been explored and examined thoroughly in the last chapter with the aim to understand its formation, composition, the various discourses related to it and their impacts in society. The aim of this chapter is to focus on the formation, composition and discourses on identity in relation to the French context. As such, an analysis of French identity through the perspective of peace studies will be undertaken. Such approach is indeed pertinent since the matter of French identity -and even rather French national identity- has been dealt with previously by French academics but mainly in the areas of history (by Gérard Noiriel and Jean-François Berdah), anthropology (by Christian Bromberger), sociology (by Dominique Schnapper, Michèle Lamont and Pierre Birnbaum), politics (by Michel Giraud and Patrick Weil[28]) and philosophy (by Étienne Balibar and Michel Onfray[29]). It is however important to highlight that these mentioned academics all come from a Western and Caucasian cultural background. In this chapter my aim is to bring new reflections on the discourses on French identity from a peace studies approach, with an eye to laying theoretical basis to consider the construction of French identity towards cultures of peace(s). First, a section of this chapter (2.2) will explore the origins of the mainstream discourse on French identity. It will review the historical origins of the current mainstream approach of French identity then examine the various aspects that unification and universalism features bring to it. The current mainstream discourse on French identity is based on a construction dating back to the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, it also mainly stems from events from the twentieth century. Key dates and discourses expressed in this

[28] He is a French historian and political scientist, author of the book '*Être français : Les quatre piliers de la nationalité'* (Being French: The Four Pillars of Nationality). I am not using this book as a source to my work as I did not have a chance to have access to it.

[29] He participated to a debate on national identity on French TV (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-82GfIOAmw&t=717s). I am however not using this video as a source to my work.

latter century will be chronologically scrutinized. This section (2.2) will, in a sense, reply to Bromberger (1993) when he wondered if there was a 'specifically French way of posing the problem of identities, whether territorial, social or ethnic'.[30] Another section of this chapter (2.3) will assess the implications of this mainstream discourse. The paradox observed in respect of French identity will be critically analysed on its theoretical grounds and the visible impacts it causes. Scrutiny of what *Frenchness* means will demonstrate to what extent it is linked to the neglect of a postcolonial approach in the construction of French identity. This section will, in a sense, reply to Bromberger (1993) when he wondered how to finally 'give an account of the paradox that characterizes the contemporary French situation'[31] in regards to French identity. Finally, another section will look at the alternative discourses on French identity (2.4) by academics, French institutions and society. It will then explore the concept of a hybrid French identity.

The goal of this chapter is thus to briefly recount the historical, cultural and social construction of French identity to, then, critically assess the impacts of characteristics emanating from a past context when applied to the present globalized French context. These impacts will be approached from a peace studies perspective throughout the chapter to assess if they display features of a culture of war or cultures of peace(s). By extension, it will be assessed whether French identity stems from and promotes cultural violence or cultural peace. Therefore, this chapter allows to answer the sub research questions of our research problem:

- *What are the discourses on French identity and their impacts in (French) society?*
- *In what ways discourses on French identity reflect a culture of war or cultures of peace(s)?*

2.2 – Origins of the mainstream discourse on French identity

2.2.1 – Historical origins: the Jacobins

[30] The question in his article is 'Has there been a specifically French way of posing the problem of identities, whether territorial, social or ethnic?'. My own translation. Original in French: *Y a-t-il eu une manière proprement française de poser le problème des identités, qu'elles soient territoriales, sociales ou ethniques ?*

[31] The phrase in his article is 'Finally, how can we account for the paradox that characterizes the contemporary French situation'. My own translation. Original in French : '*Comment rendre compte enfin du paradoxe qui caractérise la situation française contemporaine'*.

Going back in history to try to find out the origins of the mainstream discourse on French identity will not constrain this research to go back in Antiquity times where Gaul was ruled by the Roman, nor the following period when *Charlemagne* (Charles The Great) was ruling the Franks, neither the Medieval Ages or the *Renaissance*. At the earliest, the mainstream discourse on French identity may be related to the ideas that arose during the Age of Enlightenment, from 1715 to 1789. This latter year witnessed the period of social and political upheavals in France leading to the French Revolution from which the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was born. Indeed, the current mainstream discourse on French identity is based on the ideas purported by the political group of the Jacobins during the French Revolution which promoted the Jacobinism ideology. The historical analysis undertaken here will thus begin from the end of the eighteenth century. Before delving into the analysis, it is interesting to reflect on Christian Bromberger's assertion in 1993 that historical concept is not in favour of the acknowledgement of identities. This would imply that the social sciences field of history and their specialists exclude the concept of identity. However, the peace studies and philosophy for peace approach of Martínez Guzmán (2001: 113) acknowledges human beings' competencies to pursue war, violence and exclusion but also how to make *peaces*. Therefore, the study of history is of value in building cultures of peace(s). In this sub-section, a brief review of the links between the French revolutionary period, Jacobinism ideology and the current mainstream discourse on French identity will be undertaken. The mainstream discourse will also be critically assessed in regard of a peace studies approach.

Before 1789, the *Ancien Régime* was the political and social system that was in order in the Kingdom of France since the late fifteenth century. There was no national identity nor citizenship during this period, but every individual was a subject of the king of France. The individuals' rights and status stemmed from the clergy, the nobility and the Third Estate. The French Revolution was stimulated by a vehement movement against the connection between the Catholic Church and the *Ancien Régime*. A philosophical vision stemming from the French Enlightenment theorists that also prompted the French Revolution was the will to live together (Jeannot, Tomc and Totozani, 2013: 66 citing Noiriel, 1992). Such desire to live together motivated the Jacobins to undertake a unification

movement of the French people as a French nation. The Jacobins was a political movement that became very influential during the French Revolution. It was founded by anti-royalist individuals and then it expanded as a national republican movement. The fact that its functioning period covered the Reign of Terror may also be a hint to understand the extent to which such movement was based on a culture of war and cultural violence. Jacobinism ideology imposed the 'rule of central government on political constituencies and peripheral groups' (Wieviorka, 2007: 33). Modern France has been constructed and based on this ideology which fought against local particularisms that established the idea of nation in other places in Europe. Therefore, 'state supremacy' and the 'abstract equality' of individuals was promoted by such political vision, rejecting the 'community roots' of the subjects by the same token (Bromberger, 1993). Nevertheless, here, the *imposition* of an ideology which only set up an *abstract* concept (equality -that thus may not be applied nor observed in reality in the individuals' daily life) and also favoured the *rejection* of a part of identity of the subjects illustrate the neglect of alternative ways of thinking or identification. The expression of these alternative and different life aspects was confined to the private sphere (Bromberger, 1993). People expressing their different aspects were even persecuted when denounced or outed in public during the period of the Terror where anyone not loyal to the revolution and Jacobinism was arrested and executed. A first step to erase diversity among French people was to homogenise the communicative ways, by turning the nation monolingual. This desire to standardise the French language was not a stand-alone feature of Jacobinism. The unification of language, culture and France as a nation was part of the wider goal to unify France under a Republic that would treat equally its citizens and enable them to enjoy more freedom. Having common features such as language, culture or feeling as one in the nation of France would, supposedly, foster fraternity between the French subjects. These three elements are examined in the next sub-section.

2.2.2 – Unification: language, culture, nation

The unification of France through language, culture and as a nation was an objective of the Jacobins through the Republic since France was primarily made of 'many provinces with their own

customs and their own rules' and, therefore, their own language (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 48). French language was promoted as the representative of the Republic, the new political and social system put in place by the proponents of the Revolution:

> The French language […] was intrinsic in defining the republic during the French Revolution. In particular, language functions as a strong symbol of national identity because it was viewed as a means of unifying the French people at a time when the nation and nationalism were being defined (Cohen, 2012).

There is indeed a link between French language and national identity within the historical emergence of the *idea* of a French nation. Since it is through common shared characteristics individuals are meant to identify as members of one community, here French language is distinguished to be the 'vehicular language' of the French nation (Jeannot, Tomc and Totozani, 2013: 65). French language was used as 'the central instrument in evoking a unified citizenry to build a new national identity for the republic'. French was the only official language in the centralised Republic. Therefore, any provincial languages were forbidden to not foster internal incongruences or distractions to the objective of building a unified nation (Cohen 2012). Such repressive and suppressive measure of this period, however, amounts to a form of cultural violence when considering nowadays' peace studies perspective. As of today, even if the French current Constitution from 1958 in its article 75-1 (Conseil Constitutionnel, 2009) recognises regional languages as France's heritage, there are remnants of this invisible cultural but also structural violence. Indeed, regional languages are only promoted by the state and the regions to a certain extent. Unlike in Spain[32], they are not used in the daily lives of citizens and mainly serve as touristic attractions. There are no issues *per se* with the state of regional languages in France, but it is interesting to wonder the reasons why of their legal status, especially in relation to cultures of peace(s).

Besides the homogenisation of the language in France, culture was also to be unified to become one French culture. Regional cultures present before the Revolution such as the Bretons, the Normans, the Alsatians, the Corsicans, the Occitans or the French Basques -to only name a few- were to be relayed to the background, while 'French culture' placed in the foreground. This construction of French culture was, sadly, carried out violently:

[32] Euskera, Galician, Catalan or Valencian are regional languages that have co-official or recognised status.

> The existing "hexagon" was the result of a long series of wars and conquests involving the triumph of French language and culture over what once were autonomous and culturally distinctive communities. The assimilation of Gascons, Savoyards, Occitans, Basques, and others helped to sustain the myth that French overseas expansionism in the nineteenth century, especially to North and West Africa, was a continuation of the same assimilationist project (Fredrickson, 2003).

Thus, although widely known as stemming from the colonial era of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 'assimilationist project' may have actually started within France itself during the Revolution with the intent to build a homogenous French culture. It may not be acknowledged as such but assimilationist policies towards French regional cultures were adopted by the French Republic during the Revolution. Fresh French ideas, culture and administration were therefore first enacted on the national territory before aiming to export them abroad, first in Europe then in colonial territories (Kumar, 2006: 422).

In this way, the building of the French nation is the result of two unifications (language and culture), delimited on a given territory (France) and covered by an imposed ideology (Jacobinism and its centralised strong and powerful republican state). It is interesting to also mention the 1882 lecture of Ernest Renan, '*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*' (What is a nation?), to examine the components of the building of a nation and here particularly of the French nation. The analysis Krishan Kumar does of Renan's lecture highlights the prominence of war in building the nation: 'But it is not just triumphs and glory but also, and perhaps more so, defeats and trials that make the nation' (Kumar, 2006: 415). In this sense, Renan (1882) wrote:

> One loves in proportion to the sacrifices that one has committed and the troubles that one has suffered.
>
> "Suffered together", I said, for shared suffering unites more than does joy. In fact, periods of mourning are worth more to national memory than triumphs because they impose duties and require a common effort.

The influence of war and suffering in the building and unification of the French nation is thus an aspect that points out the violent basis on which the French nation and, consequently, French national identity are established. This French belligerent element rose first within its own territory to then help build 'French national consciousness' through neighbouring countries such as Spain or Germany (Kumar, 2006: 416).

Finally, the colonial period continued this 'tradition' which still impacts the current mainstream discourse on French identity nowadays. Therefore, this paper is proposing, in a sense, to find

alternative ways to unify other than war and mourning, but rather unify in diversity (and not differences) through peaceful interactions, dialogue and joy. As mentioned by Renan in 1882, approaching the concept of nation -and consequently national identity- as 'a soul' or 'a spiritual principle' is perhaps an aspect to reconsider from a non-Western approach to work towards cultures of peace(s). Nevertheless, in his same lecture, he also declares that:

> The modern nation is therefore the historical result of a number of facts that have converged in the same direction. Sometimes unity has been achieved by a dynasty as was the case in France (Renan, 1882).

The Jacobins 'dynasty' has indeed left the republican ideology to the current French state with its core concept of universalism, which will be examined in the next sub-section.

2.2.3 – Universalism: the republican ideology

After having focused on the original ideology (Jacobinism) that generated the unification of the French nation through a common language and a common culture, I will now examine the French republican ideology that stems from Jacobinism. The concept of 'universalism' which is a flagship of the French Republic will also be deciphered as the 'descendant' of the unification process.

A first characteristic to note regarding the concept of Republic in France is that by unifying language and culture to build a nation under the legal framework of a Republic, the Jacobins wanted to build a French nation-state. The co-terminality between nation and state is built by interpreting nationality in a broad sense where 'those who resided within the territory of the state and accepted integration into the cultural community of France, for instance by adopting the French language, were given French citizenship' (Alfonsi, 1997: 63). As such, the connection between republicanism (citizenship) and nationalism (national identity) was built socio-psychologically but not conceptually (Alfonsi, 1997: 70). The objective of the Jacobins was to fuse in the minds of Frenchmen and Frenwomen the concept of being French as having the same roots, language and culture. This would 'naturally' be translated in the acceptation of the republican ideology of state supremacy and universalism. This was strengthened throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries:

> The French Revolution, the First and Second Empires, and the Third Republic went on reinforcing a unified state and republican ideology tried to impose the political myth of the citizen, defined by his/her political contract with the nation state, free and equal with regard to their rights, independent of any other sense of belonging (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 48).

The French citizen is therefore the basis of the French republican ideology. It is still reflected today in the second article of the current French Constitution of the fifth Republic where the principle of the Republic is 'government of the people, by the people and for the people' (Conseil Constitutionnel, 2009). It is a 'contractual conception' and not ethnic or cultural conception of the nation (Bromberger, 1993) that highlights the specificity of the French Republic. The citizens are the 'logs' that are needed to maintain the Republic -the 'fire' in the chimney- alive. However, as explained above, citizens had to be formatted via the common moulds of language and culture to fuel the republican 'political common project' (Schnapper, 1991 cited by Bromberger, 1993). This original policy was developed by the intelligentsia of the Jacobins, who disregarded regional characteristics and the richness of diversity findable in France, to conduct an integration process towards the 'fabrication of French people' as united citizens supportive of a 'common republican project' (Bromberger, 1993). A common political project must be accepted by the totality of the population to be called common. When it is imposed, even in the aim of a common or universal good, it cannot be deemed peaceful or based on cultures of peace(s). At its outset, the republican ideology promoted equality amongst its citizens although such equality applied only to a certain type of people at the time (such analysis is out of the scope of this paper).

Uniformizing linguistic, cultural, social and political systems was the way to achieve such goal. Then, other values became also advocated:

> The ideology of the Third Republic went on to popularise the civic value of freedom, equality, fraternity and justice, thanks to educational reform […] and to military service (compulsory for all in 1907), an enterprise of national amalgamation blurring internal borders and the differences developed (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 50).

With military service being compulsory, war has effectively been a dominant feature of the republican ideology of building a French nation-state. However, the most effective way to reach uniformity was through the implementation of a compulsory, free, public, secular (*laïc*) and culturally neutral school system that provided universal language and culture. The universal school institution was also a proponent of a meritocratic ideology (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 51), that supposedly allowed all French citizens to have a chance to climb up the social and/or political ladder if it was their personal ambition. Therefore, the universalism of the French Republic was illustrated by the uniformity,

equality, neutrality, compulsory requirement and gratuity of its social features and public sphere. As a result, it consigned any type of differences to the private domain. A culture-blind, creed-blind and 'colour-blind basis' was hence operated in the Republic (Silverman, 2007: 65). This colour-blindness and universality of features continued to be the foundation of the Republic beyond the Third Republic until the present days. During the colonial times, it also 'served as the basic template for moulding the French citizen model at home and in the colonies' (Kumar, 2006: 422). Here, a change of geographical context of the application of French republican values must be thoroughly scrutinized as it reinforced the 'visibility' of a double standard of the actual implementation of these values (see next section). This impacted and still affects the actual acknowledgement of a French identity, whether as a citizen, a national or both. There was indeed already a twofold application of the rights and duties of citizenship within metropolitan France before colonisation by excluding women from enjoying some rights that men did. This dualism or double standard of universalist discourse on French identity has changed and developed due to historical evolutions linked to the postcolonial era, immigration movements and globalisation. The next sub-section will recall these key dates.

2.2.4 – Key dates leading to the current mainstream discourse on French identity

In the past three sub-sections, I highlighted the unification process of the French nation combined with its formalisation illustrated by the universalism of the French Republic. These aspects established the basis of the mainstream discourse on French identity at the end of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, from the nineteenth century until today, the notions of nationality and citizenship have gone through some legal and conceptual changes which affect the institutional and social reception of what it means to be French today.

The chronological changes of the concepts of French nationality and citizenship during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be briefly discussed to pinpoint the periods where French identity was constructed towards the domination of some French people over others. Indeed, 'national homogeneity' of the French people lasted little after the start of the second colonial empire, after the Napoleonic wars from 1830 onwards. It became even a 'myth' during the twentieth century since

'immigration, Europe and globalisation imposed other issues, such as multiculturalism and cultural differences as new values' (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 48). Nonetheless, the 'French ideal of equality and citizenship' where 'the state refrain from making distinctions based on race or ethnicity' is a principle that is both found in the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and in the current 1958 French Constitution (Oppenheimer, 2008: 736-737). The work of French historian Jean-François Berdah on 'Citizenship and National Identity in France from the French Revolution to the Present' (2006) will be recalled to briefly highlight the changes underwent by citizenship, nationality, equality and universalism.

From the French Revolution to the end of the nineteenth century, the republican principle of *jus soli*, the right of soil, granted French nationality to any individual who was born on French territory. The end of the nineteenth century saw the French government considering extending French citizenship to foreigners:

> the government and members of Parliament were particularly interested in the question of foreign concentration in France and the opportunity of incorporating immigrants in the French nation in order to revitalize both the French nation and the French army (Berdah, 2006: 145).

As mentioned previously, such move to enhance the French military demonstrates that French identity was and continues to be based on war needs, moving away from a peaceful way of acquiring it. The French Foreign Legion which permits foreigners to obtain French citizenship after a certain number of years of military service is an illustration of such process. Besides, despite acquiring French citizenship through the military or the legal process dictated by French nationality law, immigrants were considered French nationals only to a certain extent. Indeed, in 1889, the Third Republic's Parliament reinvented the republican principle of *jus soli* by adopting the double *jus soli* where 'a foreigner born in France automatically obtained French citizenship if one of his parents was also born in the country or through majority if neither of them was born in France' (Berdah, 2006: 145). Then, after the end of the Third Republic and during the dictatorship of Marshall Pétain in the Second World War, the principle of *jus soli* was put into question (Berdah, 2006: 147). The discourse on French identity was on its way towards the institution of a double standard.

The Fourth Republic fostered foreign immigration to encourage the reconstruction of the country after the Second World War, which stimulated the French melting pot and led it to its 'golden

age' thanks to the 'Glorious Thirty Years' of economic development. Foreign communities were rapidly integrated. The republican school system also allowed foreigners to socially climb the French ladder (Berdah, 2006: 150). This social and economic harmony ceased with the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962) which prompted the repatriation of the French community settled in Algeria since 1830, as well as with the unemployment that resulted from the economic crisis in 1973. Political debates on whether immigrant workers had to return to their countries of origin were taking place, with the argument that French citizenship had to be reassessed since the already present 'unemployed poorly qualified workers' were not able to integrate (Berdah, 2006: 150-151). Nevertheless, changes in French nationality law were refused until 1993 when a new nationality code was issued which also put sand in the wheels of French naturalisation process:

> Naturalization became more difficult to acquire and absurd situations arose with French citizens of the second and even third generation being forced on many occasions to prove their citizenship, as for instance individuals belonging to old French families who were born in the colonies before 1958 or 1960 (Berdah, 2006: 151).

As Wihtol de Wenden stated, despite the fact that 'republican values [universalism, equality] have been reasserted in the criteria and conditions for integration' and the acquirement of French citizenship and nationality, 'new challenges emerged when France realised progressively that it was a country of settled immigration, rooted in Europe and in a globalised landscape' (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 52). While writing these lines, I am realising that if I was born only a few months earlier, I could have not enjoyed French citizenship and nationality until my majority which could have affected my personal and professional trajectory. Indeed, I was born in France in May 1992 and my Malagasy parents obtained French citizenship in March 1992. If they had obtained it after my birth, I would have had to wait until my eighteenth birthday to enjoy French citizenship. Therefore, my childhood experiences may have been different from what I actually had. It may also have had constructed my personality in other ways -or maybe not. In any case, this is a reality that many French citizens may not realise if a thorough critical reflection on their own identity, others' identity and on the French -republican- history is not engaged with.

The French demographer Patrick Simon resumes well the chronological review undertaken:

> Since the late nineteenth century, the nationality code has combined the right of birthplace (*jus soli*) and right of blood (jus sanguinis) […]. […] The key concept behind the attacks against the nationality code is that citizenship should reflect and foster national sentiment (Simon, 2013: 211).

While 'right of blood' reminds here the essentialist conception of identity, 'right of birthplace' can, on the contrary, echo a quite impartial and objective way of acquiring French identity. Both approaches are indeed found in the two opposite poles of the nationality spectrum. 'Mixing' the two may have been the French way of having a fair system to allow foreigners to obtain French citizenship. Nevertheless, it does not take in account the French society's opinion on the matter and can thus foster a double standard found in the republican principles. The creation of the Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Codevelopment in 2007 may have wanted to redefine what 'being French' means, but the negative reactions from the French society ensured its abolition in 2010. Nonetheless, the launch in 2009 of a national discussion on national identity can be considered as a tool to take in account any French citizen's opinion on French national identity, its formation and scope. It can also serve to highlight the 'prominence to the question of loyalty, which weighs constantly on immigrants and their descendants' in the answers (Simon, 2013: 203) which may emanate from the unification process undertaken in the past. The rigidness of the discourse on French identity remains thus the same mainstream one, despite the 'hyper diversity' of its members:

> […] the French national identity remains more or less unchanged. In 2012 it is still expected that cultural identities will remain settled in the private sphere of life without the need for public or political recognition. The recent debate on national identity and the 2012 presidential campaign have clearly shown that the definitions of "Frenchness" that have been most heatedly promoted do not, unfortunately, offer an inclusive perspective for ethnic minorities, but instead stigmatize those who allegedly are not "French enough" and who are threatening the national cohesion by their "broken Frenchness" (Simon, 2012: 14-15).

Therefore, the integration process of foreigners is essential in the attempt to build a unified French nation (Berdah, 2006: 152). However, this republican model of integration is rarely critically assessed and even less reconsidered. Besides, the academics who addressed French national identity and the contested concept of *Frenchness* have 'paradoxically ended up locating the essence of French culture in chateaux, monuments, literature, and revolutionary events' (Hecht, 2001). This generalisation of what *Frenchness* and the French nation are may even at times become visibly illogic -if not comic- when French citizens proceeding from French ex-African colonies are taught 'our ancestors the Gauls' (Diome, 2001: 89).

This paradox thus witnessed is the reflection of an incongruence between what is theoretically praised and what is practically experienced. The interview of a French man of Algerian origin by sociologist Jean Beaman exemplifies such incongruence:

> There's the theory and there's the practice. . . . There was a French philosopher named Renan who said that every day you have to want to be French. You accept living together. It's a community of the future. . . . For me, being French is a desire, a desire to live together despite our origins. That is the theory, but in practice being French when you are of immigrant origin . . . of Swiss or Swedish or British origin, there isn't a problem. You're viewed as French, and no one talks about integration. However, if you're of maghrébin origin, that's different. There are barriers. And in the eyes of others, you see that you are not always considered French (Beaman, 2017: 66).

Barriers and the lack of consideration are some implications of the mainstream discourse on French identity. These implications will now be scrutinized.

2.3 – Implications of the mainstream discourse on French identity

The past section brought to the fore the Jacobins revolutionary ideology and the unification process used to set up the concept of universalism which founded the origins of the mainstream discourse on French identity based on the republican ideology. Finally, a chronological review of the formation of current mainstream discourse on French identity demonstrated that societal implications arose due to a double standard emanating from the application of the republican ideology of the French Revolution within present day French globalised context. This section will delve into the societal impacts of such paradox, both theoretically and practically. It will also examine *Frenchness* or the *idea* of a French identity neglecting postcolonial -and, thus, peace studies- perspective(s).

2.3.1 – Theoretical paradox between past origins and present situation

This sub-section will confront the foundational concepts supported by the republican ideology, universalism and unified national identity in France, with the realities of the privileges enjoyed by a certain type of French culture and the effects of immigration. To a certain extent, this sub-section is taking into account Tzvetan Todorov questioning 'how can various cultures coexist within a single State? […] In more concrete terms: what place should be allocated to minority cultures within a country such as France?' (Todorov, 2010: 422). While universalism was examined in the last section, the double standard of the republican ideology will be scrutinized here, followed by an

analysis of the incongruence between the correlation of mainstream French national identity and immigration.

2.3.1.a – The double standard of the republican ideology

This double standard of the French republican ideology originates from the universalism it aimed to build at its premises. Universalism reversed itself by implementing the discrimination it fought against. The interesting critical aspect to examine is whether it did so knowingly or not; however, it is out of the scope of this research to delve into this issue. Nevertheless, since Jacobinism and the republican ideology emerged from a homogenised intelligentsia of rich, bourgeois, white French men, it is clear that ideas that have emerged of the Jacobins may have only taken into account their members' experiences and overlooked the opinions of poor, peasants, coloured and female French people. This double standard or 'particular paradox' of republican ideology is predominantly unrecognised by politicians, academics or within the French school and military system but has still been critically assessed in recent years (Silverman, 2007: 63), especially in the activist sphere. Nonetheless, it remains to be critically analysed towards building and reconstructing French identities and society from a peace studies and cultures of peace(s) perspectives. Indeed, the double standard of the French republican ideology emerged especially during and after the colonial period, where the visible diversity was turned into visible and excluded differences:

> It is little understood, however, that the Republic's cherished values of secularism and freedom of speech historically have a darker side. The civil liberties which are now idealised emerged during a period of colonial rule. […] France's iconic law on the freedom of the press passed in 1881 and still enforced today, was designed in part to exclude France's Muslim subjects. The law protected the rights of all French citizens, explicitly all those in Algeria and the colonies but excluded the subjects who were the majority of the population. […]. In colonial Algeria […], "citizens" were all those who were not Muslims and the term musulman or indigène usually overlapped (Ghilès, 2014: 2).

> This conception was to have significant consequences for debates about citizenship and nationhood in the post-imperial period, with the arrival of millions of non-European former subjects into the home country as immigrants. French governments of virtually all political persuasions insisted that immigrants should conform to the basic model of secular republican citizenship; religious symbols and practices, especially non-Christian ones, were to be kept private, away from the public realm, including that of public education (Kumar, 2006: 422).

The double standard of the republican universalism of the French state will be critically assessed through a deeper analysis of secularism and of *laïcité* in the case of France.

Double standard of French republican ideology is one of the issues that highly affects current French citizens coming from a religious and/or cultural background different from a Caucasian Christian one. Indeed, France and its governments pride itself of having a neutral culture, free from religious influences, thanks to the 1789 Revolution. However, French governments keep financing religious institutions deemed as belonging to the French cultural heritage (Baudet, 2015: 363). Thus, if in practice, religious entities are supported on such premise, it means that, in theory, the French Republic also validates such premise. In this sense, 'equality' and 'freedom' -the two first French motto words- could also be examined and critically assess in regard of a possible double standard in the implementation of the republican values.

Secularism and *laïcité* are both synonyms of the principle of separation of the government of a state with religious institutions. Nevertheless, *laïcité* is a specific feature of the French Republic and stems from secularism. *Laïcité* is only observed in France and not in secular states. For instance, France is a secular or laic (*laïc*) state whereas the United States is only secular and not laic. The work of Tarik Modood and Riva Kastoryano (2007) on secularism will be recalled first to highlight its features relating to the characteristics of *laïcité*.

Secularism is a feature of Western societies and, as being thought as a defining aspect of modernity, it has widely become hegemonic in those societies (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 13). It separates the public realm of policies applying to citizens against the private realm of belief and worship followed by them (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 14). Secularism arose from the Western states' wish to break their long relationship with religious entities (mainly Christian ones) in order to move from a powerful religious community structure to a modern, legitimate and universal political community (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 18). As Modood and Kastoryano emphasize:

> The 'universality' of secularism lies in the principle of equality according to which there is no domination of one religion (the majority, therefore the national) over other religions in a de facto minority situation (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 19).

Such universality is thus a principle in secularism that compels the state to remain neutral in the face of religious matter and treats its citizens equally in the public realm -especially in relation to religious concerns. However, it is crucial to point out that the idea of a state neutrality and public equality is a source of contradictions (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 19), especially in the case of France. The

private/public or state/religion distinction is drawn differently in France from other secular states, with the concept of *laïcité.*

Laïcité is the 'fuel' nourishing the French republican 'fire' by burning its citizens 'logs' against each other. I already analysed this concept in a work of mine (Ranaivosoa, 2020) where I stressed that *laïcité* was generated during the Enlightenment era but differs from secularism with its active substance:

> secularism is usually described as more tolerant towards public visibility of religion; a secular state plays a passive role and allows religious symbols in the public domain. In laicism the state plays a more active role by excluding religious symbols from the public domain and thus confines religion to the private domain (Tarhan, 2011).

The features of French *laïcité* is thus an active specificity of the country compared to other secular states. Indeed, According to Modood and Kastoryano (2007), in France:

> […] the state actively promotes the privatisation of religion (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 16)

and

> […] religion is (*pace* republican ideology) one of the fundamental cleavages in French society and its social, cultural and institutional representation (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 28).
>
> In France, a republican state does not just separate itself from civil society but it leads civil society by creating a political culture that is opposed to clericalism, or perhaps even to 'Catholic culture' (*esprit*). For the French Republic, *laïcité* is considered an active movement from a community ruled by the Church to a society ruled by law, and thus integral to modernity (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 17).

In this above quote the public structure has 'a hand on' the private one. It actively leads and dictates what is and how should the private -religious- sphere be. Besides, religious structures (private sphere) and state (public structure) rely on each other:

> Furthermore, if the public and private spheres mutually shape each other in these ways, then however 'abstract' and rational' the principles of a public order may be, they will reflect the 'folk cultures' out of which that particular order has grown. If this is the case, then there can be no question of the public sphere being morally, ethnically or, indeed, religiously neutral. Rather, it will inevitably appeal to points of privately shared values and a sense of belonging found within the (religious and non-religious) communities that make up society, as well as to the superstructure of conventions, laws and principles which regulate it (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 21).
>
> If we recognize that the public sphere is not morally neutral, that the public order is not culturally, religiously or ethnically blind, we can begin to understand why oppressed, marginalised or immigrant groups may want that public order […] to 'recognise' them, to be 'user-friendly' to the new folks (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 22)

There is an institutionalisation of difference even though the republican ideology is meant to be 'blind' to difference:

> Since 1990, following the passionate debates concerning the place of religion in French society aroused by the headscarf affair, successive interior ministers, who are at the same time ministers of religion from both the Left and the Right have worked to create representative Islamic institutions (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007: 27).

Through the creation in 1991 of the Council of Thought on Islam or in 2003 of a French Council of the Muslims Faith, French governments have ongoingly tried to institutionalise difference, especially regarding the religion of Islam. It is thus an institutionalisation of difference that also somehow echoes an 'Orientalist' behaviour. On the contrary, an institutionalisation of diversity, recognising the legitimacy of religions and cultures, would echo an inclusive approach proper to cultures of peace(s). This principle of *laïcité* is an illustration of the differentiation between the public and private sphere, the former one priming in the republican ideology.

The public sphere includes the legal domain, representing the equality principle, and the social domain which is contained within the legal framework but is not reduced to it. An individual's cultural and collective identity belongs to the social rather than the legal order (Todorov, 2010: 423). Thus, what signs of cultural identity are acceptable in the public sphere that are not offensive to 'secular eyes'? (Silverman, 2007: 59). Then, this would mean who is that person having the 'secular eyes'? This reminds the 'Orientalist' glasses of Edward Said (BBC, 2018). According to Max Silverman (2007), "France continues to 'veil' itself in a mythical past concerning the Republic and race' and there is a 'need to demythologise republican memory and expose the hidden mechanism [and hidden ideology] of the [French] republican model for a proper understanding of the present' (Silverman, 2007: 61). Silverman explains Shmuel Trigano's essential paradox of Enlightenment universalism (1982) as such:

> In other words, by attempting to convert the other into the same, the boundaries of the other are, paradoxically, fixed ever more firmly. Hence, the very fact that the Jew [or someone having any other cultural background today] must undergo the process of transformation and assimilation in order to become a citizen […] is a permanent reminder of the essential difference between Jews [or someone having any other cultural background today] and 'natural' Frenchmen and women in the first place […] (Silverman, 2007: 61).

He then claims that 'it could be generalised to explain a fundamental paradox concerning the French republican model of the nation' (Silverman, 2007: 61) since it could also reflect the same model applied to colonised subjects, thus revealing the 'objectifying, racializing, essentialising and

dehumanizing gaze at the heart of French universalism' (Silverman, 2007: 62). This addresses the issue of race within the French republican ideology:

> 'Race' […], from the outset, was built into the very fabric of republican nation and returns in distorted form today, particularly in debates on immigration, […], national identity and so on (Silverman, 2007: 62).

The 'double discourse of republican law' (Silverman, 2007 citing Bancel, Planchard and Vergès, 2005) echoes the double standard that is found in *laïcité* and other areas of the republican public sphere, such as the concept of freedom of expression (Ranaivosoa, 2020). This cleavage between what is allowed in public and what remains in the private sphere parallels the division between what is neutral and subjective. The French Republic claims to treat equally and neutrally all its citizens. Indeed, the French citizen is universal and identitarian belongings and allegiances presumably belongs to the subjective and intimate sphere (Simon and Zappi, 2005: 5). However, as the intimate touches the personal, denying such subjective belongings and allegiances characteristics of the universal French citizen would mean denying their need of connection and, in the end, their humanity. Any suppression or denial of human needs amounts to a form of cultural violence.

As mentioned above, the public sphere includes a social order. Such order amounts, however, not to equality but to a sort of 'superiority' as those who are -truly- deemed as French may be in reality those who are more loving and loyal to French culture (Todorov, 2010: 423). Indeed, in the republican model in France, 'different cultures, in the sense of national or ethnic belonging, are not on the same footing'. French culture and traditions are privileged than those of coming from minorities (Todorov, 2010: 422). Even though the public sphere is universal and indifferent to subjectivities and leans towards neutrality, it contains assumptions of how such universality and neutrality looks like, due to the context in which these values have emerged from (Simon and Zappi, 2005: 5). Indeed, in the Revolution, the pre-defined mould of a French citizen was a white upper-middle class man while today it officially encompasses any person holding a French identity card. Nevertheless, 'behind the indifference to differences lays in fact a hostility to expressions of those differences'[33] (Simon and Zappi, 2005: 6). Such paradox is stated well:

[33] My own translation. Original in French : *Derrière l'indifférence aux différences pointe de fait une hostilité aux expressions de ces différences.*

> In other words, the more the state insists on uniformity and the neutrality of the public sphere, paradoxically the more it renders visible the very differences it wishes to erase; the more it insists on invisibility, the more it construct the visibility of particular differences (Silverman, 2007: 67).

'The opposite of love is not hate, but indifference' – Elie Wiesel. Therefore, by choosing indifference to diversity, the French republican system is not basing its values on love and, therefore, not on the understanding[34] of the differences. Consequently, the absence of understanding cannot stem from and foster cultures of peace(s). Indeed, the French republican laws determine who are French subjects. However, having a French citizenship does not ensure one's *full* acceptance, institutional and societal, as a French person (Beaman, 2017: 69). There is indeed a discrepancy between the ideal French person of the Republic and how such concept historically evolved. The sources of such inconsistency lie in the domination relationship of the pioneers of the Republic -and its upholder today- over the minorities found in it. As such, the French Republic amounts to a hegemonic ideology (Simon and Zappi, 2005: 7). This domination relationship becomes thus the basis for identitarian strategies, being the product and support of identity struggles (Giraud, 1987: 65). The double standard remains the principal unacknowledged paradoxical issue of the French republican ideology. It reflects Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1993) when dealing with identity and nationality matters, especially when it supposedly conflicts with recent movements of immigration.

2.3.1.b – The nexus between national identity and immigration

As recalled in the previous section, the unification process in France undertaken during the French Revolution aimed at building a French nation, united under a common culture and language. The French citizen of the Republic was to be the representative of this unification, each citizen being equal in rights and duties in the French nation-state. Nevertheless, this is a theoretical ideal. The nation-state is a theoretical ideal where the citizens affiliated to it are also theoretically ideal. Joining such ideal of united members of a nation-state is, however, a challenge in practice, especially in Western 'theoretical' nation-states where high volumes of immigrations (for any reasons) is

[34] This reflection is based on Zen Buddhist master Thich Nhat Hanh's teachings where 'understanding is the foundation of love' (Nhat Hanh, 2016: 92).

observable. In the French case, a paradox emerges from the nexus between national identity and immigration.

The term citizen primarily defined one's allegiance to France from the Revolution to the 1970s. The French postcolonial writers and thinkers could evidently stress the present double standard between a French citizen of Caucasian descent and one from a non-Caucasian one. However, during the 1970s, the concept of a 'French national identity' emerged. The link up of *identité* and *nationale* (*identité nationale*) is a recent francisation coming from the United States (Mauger, 2007: 79). *Identité nationale* was, at its premises before its paradoxical relation with immigration, an illustration of the political divide between working class citizens and the alliance of dominant elites from opposite political camps (Mauger, 2007: 80). Such hierarchy among members of French society was pursued in the nineteenth century since national identity was a means to generate 'cohesion by incorporating individuals through citizenship, while at the same time excluding other individuals'. Citizens and non-citizens were the main legal divide followed by the paradoxical but unacknowledged hierarchy among French citizens based on gender, ethnicity and race (Simon, 2013: 204). *Identité nationale* today represents one of the pillars of the far-right political party in France. It is linked to the national security discourse where any miscellaneous events involving (non-Caucasian) foreigners is deemed as a threat (Mauger, 2007: 82). When brought together, *identité nationale* and immigration produce a negative discourse on immigration and permit to leave in the background social issues in France (Mauger, 2007: 82). In this sense, such delamination exemplifies the structural and cultural violence present in social issues in France with the absence of policies based on cultures of peace(s). Since in the 1970s immigrants were welcomed in France mainly for labour reasons but not to be considered future members of the French nation. Immigration had and continues to have difficulties in being legitimated and, consequently, the recognition of diverse belongings as well (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 53). The nexus between national identity and immigration illustrates the paradox of the co-terminality of nationality and citizenship (Alfonsi, 1997: 65-66).

The practical implications of such paradox will now be examined in the next sub-section.

2.3.2 – Practical illustrations of the paradox

The societal and practical implications of the institutional and theoretical paradox are illustrated by the unification policies of assimilation and integration, which nevertheless keep on maintaining a double standard applied to members of French society.

2.3.2.a – The ambivalence of the integration policy

French republican model was essentially assimilationist during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries where French culture and customs were spread in French territory (metropolitan or not) and had to be adopted by the individuals that wished to be considered French citizens. This assimilationist policy was abandoned in the 1970s for an integration policy aimed at the high number of immigrants that stayed in France after filling the shortage of labour they had primarily came for. This policy intended to allow immigrants to obtain French citizenship with a view to discarding the colonialist aspect the assimilationist policy held. However, although not openly acknowledged as such institutionally and even societally, the French republican approach to integration is considerably influenced by assimilationism (Simon, 2013: 208) of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

French demographer Patrick Simon attests of the ambivalence of the policy of integration by its colour-blindness, stemming from the double standard of the republican ideology, that stigmatizes expressions of diverse cultural belongings:

> The problem lies in the restrictive definition of this national identity: it ends up excluding visible minorities and Muslims from the national community. The French model of integration pretends to be colorblind and to ensure cohesion through a process of soft assimilation, that is, civic integration and cultural convergence to the mainstream (Simon, 2012: 15-16).

> The discourse underlying integration policy rests on an ambivalent vision of the ever more visible signs of the multicultural character of French society. The concrete signs of belonging to ethno-cultural or religious minorities in the public arena are rapidly stigmatized as an expression of 'communitarianism' and such minorities receive injunctions to return to the collective norm (Simon, 2013: 209).

Besides, the means to achieve integration (Simon, 2013: 209) illustrate a way to homogenise the members of the French nation-state, recalling the assimilationist policy and therefore a culturally violent way of acquiring French identity. First, proficiency in French remains an essential element to become French. Second, the dispersion of immigrant population and the gradual weakening of community ties illustrate a will to dilute the connections between members of a same ethnic,

community or religious origins. Since connection is a human need, breaking it amounts to its denial and therefore to structural and cultural violence. The emphasis on the individualised relationship with the state as a citizen, finally, embodies the universalist ideology. The homogenisation process undertaken by integration policy is a hidden assimilationist process since it believes that by breaking the connections with one's cultural origins, one will more easily embrace and integrate in -thus assimilate- French culture, customs and practices.

The school system in France is considered as one of the crucial institutions of integration where members of minority groups can converge, 'melt and dissolve' within the majority population (Simon, 2013: 210). Therefore, even if France is a multicultural society, the republican model of integration lacks the flexibility needed for diverse cultural groups to harmoniously live together. Minority practices are tolerated but to the extent that they do not disturb the majority population way of life (Simon, 2013: 210).

The discourse on national identity coming from the far-right is at the basis of the ambivalence of the integration policy. Far-right discourses on national identity started to be mainstreamed by right wing President Nicolas Sarkozy before and after his elections and continue to hover French national identity debates. The update of the concept of *identité nationale* stemming from a peace culture approach is needed for inclusive and non-discriminatory French institutions and society. To move from an integration to an inclusion policy would illustrate such change.[35] This integration policy was aimed in the 1970s at first generation immigrants. Nowadays, the French born children of these immigrants, whether they were born of foreign or naturalised French parents, are undoubtedly French citizens. However, in practice they may still be subject of hidden double standards arising from the contradiction of feeling French but not looking French.

2.3.2.b – Pluri-affiliations dilemma: feeling French but not looking French

The identity focus of the paper point towards multiple allegiances and belongings. However, in the French context, affiliations are generally geared toward people having a 'double identity'

[35] Annex 3 illustrates the difference between inclusion and integration (as well as with assimilation, exclusion and segregation).

stemming from a double cultural heritage which are supposedly contrasting. This supposition fuels the theoretical paradox which emerge in practice through the presumed, 'problematic' and 'pathological' cultural conflict that would divide an individual inside (Giraud, 1987: 59). As such a conflict within an individual would mean that one would not be 'stable' in honouring their citizen part of the republican contract. That citizen could fail in remaining loyal to the 'nation of France'. Nevertheless, recalling Huntington's terminology, there is no 'clash' of affiliations within the person, but questioning may arise to that person due to the way French institutions frame French identity. It is up to French institutions and society to accept and embrace the fact that it is not a contradiction, but an irreversible process with the globalised state of the world. Giraud's denial of the possibility of mixing foreign and French cultures within an individual (Giraud, 1987: 62) grounds the pluri-affiliation dilemma stemming from such essentialist approach.

Even though pluri-citizenship is allowed under French nationality laws, the republican institutions have a fear of dual loyalty as a hindrance to national cohesion. Such fear is unfounded and emanates from the ambivalent integration model which is challenged by institutional and societal discriminations (Simon, 2013). Indeed, even if these individuals enjoying pluri-affiliations are legally French and internally feel French, external perceptions of French identity -based on the concept of national identity examined above- reminds them that certain visible and audible attributes make that they do not look or sound French. As such, they are not regarded as 'being French' (Simon, 2013), both surreptitiously by French republican system and institutions and sometimes openly by members of French society. The institutional denial of the concept of 'hyphenated identity' in the French context illustrates this phenomenon. Hyphenation has indeed been publicly rejected by Gérard Araud, French ambassador to the US, when he dismissed the plurality of affiliations of the French members of the French national football team after their FIFA World Cup win in July 2018, even if those members actually combined and openly -but not publicly- expressed multiple belongings and allegiances (Ranaivosoa, 2020). However, French men's national football team members are famous figures representing France on the international plane and are mostly referred to as French in public appearances. On the contrary, French citizens with pluri-affiliations may be described as 'French on

paper' (*Français de papier*) or 'involuntary French' (*Français malgré eux*) in contrast to those defining themselves -and popularly ending up being defined as- 'ethnic French' (*Francais de souche*). Consequently, visible difference leads to an 'ethnicised practice of relations' in French institutions and society such as frequent targeted identity controls, institutionalised racism, amalgamations of the cultural group as a homogeneous group or the refusal of opportunities to individuals as a result of group stereotyping (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 55). Frantz Fanon asserted such institutionalised racism decades ago as part of the French collective unconscious with 'the myth of the bad nigger' (Fanon, 1986: 92). The emphasis on -cultural- difference reasserts the -perception by others of the- 'Otherness' of an individual thwarting his-her-their *Frenchness*. When one is permanently asked where one is 'from *from*' (Tazzy Phe, 2016), implying the request to know the origins of one's ascendance, it may raise inside oneself questionings about one's identity. With a French person with pluri-affiliation, the question of one's *Frenchness* is raised and the mismatch between the -practical- reality and factuality of French identity and its -theoretical- *idea* emerges.

2.3.3 – *Frenchness* or the *idea* of a French identity

Frenchness today is closely linked to the notion of what it means to be French, and

> What it means to be French today is inextricably linked with some notion of what it means to be worthy and unworthy and with how these definitions of worth are articulated around notions of morality, culture, socioeconomic status, race, and nation (Lamont, 1995: 364-365).

Since French Revolution, the French Republics have intended to spread France's language and culture, whether within metropolitan France or abroad in its colonies, as part of a missionary purpose where the *idea* of a '*mission civilisatrice*' emerged (Kumar, 2006: 422). France has indeed a specific *idea* and a high esteem of the role it holds of itself regarding other countries, 'civilisations' or cultural groups. The notion of *idea* is pivotal here in understanding the conceptual framework from which French identity originates. It can indeed draw back to when Karl Marx expressed that 'France is the only country of the ''idea''; that is to say, the idea it has of itself' (Kumar, 2006: 426 citing Rubel 1960: 139). Such *idea* emanates from the imagination of the members of the French 'imagined political community' or nation. It emanates from the image the French nation has of itself, which can be deemed paradoxical when its members themselves may not know each other.

Pierre Birnbaum book titled *La France imaginée* (literally 'The imagined France', officially translated as 'The Idea of France') or President Charles de Gaulle having 'a certain idea of France' shows the 'continuing stream' of works and discourses on the *idea* of France illustrating the extent to which it is imprinted and imagined in French minds (Kumar, 2006: 426). Consequently, such *idea* of France is reverberated in the *idea* of a French identity or what is *Frenchness*. In this sense, French culture, its survival and stance compared to others is what is at stake. As it is believed to be a 'high culture', *Frenchness* or French identity expresses a 'cultural superiority complex' as France struggles to compete with other nations in the political or economic spheres (Cohen, 2012).

France aims thus to establish French culture as an internationally valued feature first by promoting and cultivating French language, which is nowadays overcome by English even if it remains the working language of many international institutions (Cohen, 2012). Nevertheless, this will and *idea* of shining internationally hides the double standard of the republican ideology. Indeed, the attempt to 'export' French culture and language abroad to counter American hegemony is hypocrite when compared to the protection of the neutrality of the public sphere from cultural diversity with the ban on headscarves in French schools (Silverman, 2007: 60).

Frenchness or the mainstream discourse on the *idea* of French identity is all about sticking to the power France have or had at the international level. Therefore, the use of other languages or the celebration of cultural belongings reflecting other allegiances threaten the unity that France is trying to maintain to stay within countries that culturally dominate the world. The neglect of the postcolonial perspective of what *Frenchness* is may thus be a feature of the *idea* construction of French identity.

2.3.4 – Neglect of the postcolonial perspective

This sub-section will briefly examine to which extent the little or repressed presence of French postcolonial academic literature reverberates in the discourses on French identity. The following citations introduce the place postcolonialism holds among French academics:

> In mainstream hexagonal theory, there is a degree of resistance to what is perceived as postcolonial theory (Spivak, 2013: 223).

> Fanon is hardly discussed in France (and when he is 'the readings are negative') (Silverman, 2007: 64).

> The French intellectual tradition enjoys an ambiguous status in postcolonial studies these days (Taoua, 2003: 149).

These above citations do not imply that French academics supported colonial project. On the contrary, these sentences omit to mention that French thinkers addressed the colonial ideology with other theories such as poststructuralism or postmodernism (with the work of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan) which questioned the issues of agency, subjectivity, hegemony and discursive practices (Taoua, 2003: 149). Even if the classification of these thinkers is considered as 'post', their questioning of going beyond 'structuralism' or 'modernism' instead of 'colonialism' may underline why France has not moved on completely yet from its colonialist and imperialist attitudes towards its ex-colonies.

These above French thinkers differ from French writers coming from the ex-colonies (such as Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor) who prompted the pan-African independence movements and were animated by an anti-colonial thought. Therefore, the contestation of the colonial project by French intellectuals holds the names of other theories than postcolonialism, as in poststructuralism, postmodernism or anti-colonial thought. Indeed, 'the most influential cultural pioneers in postcolonial studies have been active in English departments' (Taoua, 2003: 149). Since the concept of identity has mainly been addressed by these Anglo-Saxon thinkers, it logically follows that the concept of French identity has not been investigated as profoundly from the postcolonial theory. Besides, as little is written about the francophone Caribbean and ex-colonies in Africa compared to the anglophone ones, 'French literary studies have been slower to become cross-cultural and interdisciplinary' (Taoua, 2003: 150). This parallels the fact that the mainstream discourse on French identity struggles to recognize the multiculturality of the members of the French Republic. It also demonstrates the institutional, societal and academic lack of interculturality and interdisciplinarity necessary for the building of cultures of peace(s) (Martínez Guzmán, Comins Mingol and París Albert, 2009: 95).

The republican and imperialist narrative on French identity has been accounted and established as the 'normative one' (Spivak, 1988: 25) and became inherent to the understanding of French identity by most of the French society. This is an illustration of the cultural violence of the

hegemonic discourse on French identity. The building of cultures of peace(s) must endeavour to introduce alternative discourses on French identity in popular wisdom to transform such cultural violence.

2.4 - Alternative discourses on French identity

This section will recollect some attempts by academics, French institutions and society of reconsidering and reframing the discourse on French identity that tackle the mainstream approach, by considering the plurality of voices and experiences of the French citizens.

2.4.1 – Postcolonial and French civil society inputs

Despite the absence of significant postcolonial French thinkers, considering postcolonialism theory in the reframing of French identity -alongside anti-colonial thought or poststructuralism and postmodernism- is critical. Indeed, postcolonialism not only opposes and resists colonialism but it attempts to go beyond it. The voices and experiences of the colonised are considered to let themselves be defined according to their views:

> Post-colonialism is a complex field of discourse, constituted by responses to colonialism, slavery and the master discourses of empire […] It is the voice of the oppressed emerging and talking back with well-chosen words – a critical assault on the western conceit that it can constitute the colonial Other in its own form (Spencer, 2006: 122).

Since postcolonialism is mainly present within Anglo-Saxon world, postcolonial identity regarding the French context will be approached from postcolonial thinkers that have endeavoured such reflection.

The work of Gayatri Spivak on the concept of the 'subaltern' and on *Postcolonialism in France* is an effort that needs to be considered for alternative discourses on French identity. Indeed, within the homogeneous, hegemonic and universalist French republican system, French citizens must be referred as only French. Therefore, heterogeneous, alternative, minoritarian and particular contributions are rejected. In the French case, immigrants in the 1970s -the 'subalterns' today- that came to support the French economy are, however, not welcomed to contribute to the diversification of the French culture while they have to adapt or integrate to it. In this sense, indeed, 'the colonized

subaltern subject is irretrievably heterogeneous' (Spivak, 1988: 25). Nevertheless, even though Spivak speaks of a subaltern 'position without identity' (Spivak, 2013: 236), I argue that they do have one, but they first must recognise it themselves to be later acknowledged institutionally. The possibility to think and speak for themselves is perhaps, however, a first issue to work on.

Regarding French thinkers' alternative discourses on French identity, it must be highlighted that even if French postcolonialism is lacking, francophone Caribbean Frantz Fanon's book *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) may be deemed as 'the birth of post-colonialism'. Fanon's reflection addressed the identity struggle of the colonial subject (Spencer, 2006: 123). Fanon's perspective has, however, been considered at times as 'militant' and 'antiFrench' thus against the republican discourse (Hannoum, 2019).

French civil society inputs on alternative discourses on French identity were, however, the most outspoken in the recent years. The rejection of -neo-colonial practices of the French Republic and to be recognised postcolonial subject with *full* French citizenship are claims made by *Les Indigènes de la République* (The Indigenous of the Republic), a call which converted into an association and a political movement. It formalised as a political party in 2005 (Hannoum, 2019). Their demands embraced 'a postcolonial critique of French national identity, Republicanism and ethnic relations policies' (Grewal, 2011: 222), which the French government attempted to fulfil.

2.4.2 – The attempt by the French government

The briefness of this sub-section will illustrate the insubstantiality of the French government attempts to open the dialogue to transform the mainstream discourse on French identity.

The creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Codevelopment in 2007, embodied the then conservative French government's will to initiate a debate with French citizens on the theme of national identity. In November 2009, a circular officially launched 'the great debate on national identity' mainly held on internet and among focus groups throughout the country, with the leading question: 'What does it mean to be French?' (Jeannot, Tomc and Totozani, 2011: 63-64). Although the internet website may have generated a substantially

interesting involvement, it only served as a platform for participants to express their point of view without actual interactions between them. Consequently, it was not used in order to draft new approaches to French identity that could be embodied in a law. Such platform thus did not amount to an active 'Third Space' where elements could meet each other and interact. It only served as a passive stage to recollect the diversity of opinions of French citizens, which nevertheless turned out as an engaging process of reflection. Connection and interaction between these opinions was the missing piece of the French government endeavour. It may, however, have been successful in the focus groups that were conducted.

Nevertheless, this attempt by the Sarkozy government to engage with the topic of French national identity was as hypocrite as the Republic it represented in regard of the denial of the French colonial past and therefore its impact on French identity of current French citizens:

> And for those who claim different memories, Sarkozy reminds them they don't have to "stay in the national territory." In other words, there is no room or even tolerance for redefining the nation or citizenship, and there is no place for subaltern recollections. The colonial past is what it is – grandiose and worthy of pride. And if some people do not like it, they should leave. The condition for staying, in the final analysis of citizenship, is the acceptance of the collective memory (Hannoum, 2019).

This attempt by the French government can metaphorically refer to Rosa Freedman's section 'Look! We did something: [South-Africa and Israel]' in her 2014 book *Failing to Protect: the UN and the Politicisation of Human Rights*. A parallel may thus be made with the failure of the French government to thoroughly redefine French identity.

Changing the educational program in the school system by recognising alternative memories of the colonial past would be one of the more effective way to reconsider French identity from cultures of peace(s) at the institutional level. In the meantime, members of the French society are taking actions to do so at the personal level.

2.4.3 – By individual members of French society

The recurring conflicting matter in regard to French identity is the duality of loyalties that some French citizens may have when they proceed from a cultural background different from the Caucasian and Christian one. By duality, I mean that in France hybridity is a concept that is far from being mainstreamed. Therefore, a primary step of accepting dualism must be undertaken. In this

sense, double identity, dual citizenships or hyphenated identity could be already considered as a kind of alternative discourses within the French context; even if, as explained in the past chapter, they may be mainly used to claim the improvement of one's condition linked to identity matters:

> Per this lens, we can consider self-asserted hyphenated identity as an agentive response on the part of the immigrant to contest rather than accept the assimilation policies of a nation or a school. (Hamann and England, 2011: 208)

Indeed, the mere double allegiance that one could express can be bothering for some segments of French institutions and society. On the contrary, this double loyalty may be deemed 'complementary' by the ones holding it. However, it is 'a privilege attached to the condition of migrants' and the immigration movement which not all French citizens proceed from (Simon, 2012: 9). Here, the word 'privilege' is utilised. Despite the negative connotations and experiences that can stem from such condition, privilege must be approached positively to be able to transform the mainstream discourse on French identity towards an alternative one. Thus, the criticisms on dual nationality/citizenship/cultural belonging being in competition due to the assumed cultural 'clash' must be transformed into 'a new paradigm' (Simon, 2012: 9) to

> provide a resolution to the problem of determining whether one is from "here" or from "there," replacing it with "both" (Hamann and England, 2011: 208)

Such change must be taken at the personal level where one recognises and accepts who one is.

The recollection of definition of what 'French is' or what 'French ain't' by Jean Beaman (2017) based on views and experience of individuals having French and Maghrebin belongings shows a diversity in the expression of French identity: hyphenated and combined identity (French and Maghrebin), neither French nor Maghrebin and only Maghrebin. It is interesting to note that no section of her work highlights expression of French identity as 'only French'. Indeed, these individuals may not feel 'French *French*' and may always have to reassert their French status if asked where they are from -*from*- (Beaman, 2017: 72-73). Nevertheless, the various types of expression of French identity collected shows that when given the reflexion opportunity, the recognition and acceptance of one's identity is asserted, although influenced by the cultural roots in which one grew up. Having the possibility of reflexion, here, joins Spivak thought on whether one can speak for oneself. However, when one is capacitated with it and allowed to express it,

> the identity of the individual is never totally imposed on oneself from the outside, by the existing people within the context in which one finds oneself. It is always the expression of a subject's choice (Giraud, 1987: 62).[36]

Therefore, there are pre-imposed identities, but when the capacitating and liberating conditions are reunited, the subject can have the possibility to choose and formulate one's own identity. Such choice should be respected by the institutions and society. Nevertheless, such breach in the mainstream discourse on French identity can only grow when interactions and connections happen between the individual members of French society. This next step for transformation could take place at the local and community level, such as it took place with the focus groups of 'the great debate on national identity', in order to build strong links between French citizens *regardless of but in recognition of* their cultural proceedings. In France, this transformative step was proposed and introduced by youths proceeding from immigration and living in metropolitan suburbs:

> However, some new topics, mostly brought by the *beur* movement, have been introduced in the debate: plural citizenship, collective identities, dissociation between nationality and citizenship (the so-called 'new citizenship', established by participation in local life, here and now, independent of nationality […]) (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007: 54).

The recognition for plural and 'new' citizenship, collective identities and what is experienced in local life may call to go beyond the mainstream discourse and considerate a hybrid type of French identity.

2.4.4 – Going beyond: hybrid French identity

The recognition of the hybrid identity of (some) French citizens is far from being acknowledged at the French institutional and societal level; it may, however, have some seeds to grow from at the personal level.

French philosopher Bernard Andrieu resumes well how hybridity is considered at the institutional and societal levels:

> By destabilizing the being installed in an identity stasis and remaining the same, the being comes to consider the hybrid as an intruder, a danger or a virus. This produces an alien hunt, hunting the mutant and the monster in order to maintain the social body in what would be its pure identity. [...] The hybrid could be considered as a lesser being because its essence is shared, and its body divided. In a hierarchy

[36] My own translation. French original : *L'identité de l'individu ne lui est jamais totalement imposée de l'extérieur par les existants déjà là dans lesquels il prend place. Elle est toujours l'expression d'un choix du sujet*.

> of living beings, its downgrading, if not its ontological stigmatization, would find a direct echo with the mestizo as a mixed, impure being (Andrieu, 2011: 28).[37]

Nevertheless, a possibility to go beyond the mainstream discourse on French identity, whether it be essentialist or constructivist, may be perceived at the personal level. The experiences recounted in the 'Neither French nor Maghrebin' section of Jean Beaman article (2017) illustrate features of hybrid identity addressed in Chapter 1:

> Travel to Algeria influenced his view of himself as neither French nor maghrébin, but rather an occupant of some space between the two (Beaman, 2017: 79).
>
> Their sense of otherness leaves them between two cultures (Beaman, 2017: 79).
>
> "We are sitting between two chairs" (Beaman, 2017: 79).

The repetition of 'between' in these three examples recalls the *specific field* of 'in-betweenness' where identity is generated. The presence of 'some space' between the two French and Maghrebin identities allows to sense a hypothetical 'Third Space'. The point would be for the subjects to appreciate it. By realising it, they may even be able to undertake a *suture* of the two identities, thus generating the hybrid French identity. However, it is critical to tread lightly with the likelihood of feeling as not fitting into French or Maghrebin society:

> "You are never 100 percent either way" (Beaman, 2017: 79).
>
> In contrast to Diana, who claims a combined French and maghrébin identity, Ahmed feels he has none (Beaman, 2017: 80).

While cultural belongings are only recognised within the private sphere and hyphenated identity is rejected institutionally, hybridisation of culture has been considered in France:

> It does indeed present the dual politico-ideological advantage of enabling the discussion of cultural identities while at the same time promoting mixing or hybridisation and therefore the dissolution of minorities or constituted groups […]. The reference to hybridisation involves the recognition of the existence of processes of cultural innovation; we observe the existence of cultural actors but actors who have no propensity whatsoever to form groups or minorities which are likely to demand collective rights or multiculturalist type of policy (Wieviorka, 2007: 40).

The attention paid to hybridisation thus amounts to a certain extent to the policy of integration, with the aim of diluting remnants of cultural affiliations not aligning with the republican mainstream

[37] My own translation. Original in French: *En déstabilisant l'être installé dans une stase identitaire et en restant le même, l'être en vient à considérer l'hybride comme un intrus, un danger ou un virus. Ce qui produit une chasse à l'étranger, au mutant et au monstre afin de maintenir le corps social dans ce qui serait sa pure identité. […] L'hybride pourrait être considéré comme un moindre être, car son essence est partagée et son corps divisé. Dans une hiérarchie des êtres vivants, son déclassement, sinon sa stigmatisation ontologique, trouverait un écho direct avec le métisse comme un être mélangé, impur*.

discourse on French identity. Indeed, hybridity and hybrid identity from the peace studies and cultures of peace(s) perspectives acknowledge and embody the *full* mix of both -or all- identities to generate something unique, that combines 'the best from all' (Galtung, 2010: 30 and 2011: 5) :

> Maybe I am asking for too much, wanting to be both 100 percent Algerian and 100 percent French. But I can't choose between them. I want to combine the best parts of both into something great (Beaman, 2017: 79).

Learning to appreciate one's own and others' particular and beautiful features is essential to foster peace culture. Formal and informal education on identity is a long-term work to undertake to generate identities stemming from and working towards cultures of peace(s).

2.5 – Conclusion

This second chapter permitted to shed light on the prominence of the French republican ideology on the current mainstream discourse on 'French Identity'.

The republican discourse in France mainstreams French identity under its principal feature: universalism. When applied to the notion of French identity, universalism of the republican ideology only recognises French citizens. These subjects who hold a legal allegiance to France, however, have been historically moulded into the French citizens the Jacobins and their ideology had in mind at the dawn of the French Revolution: abled, wealthy, white men. Nevertheless, the universalist ideology that aimed to unify the French language and culture to build the nation of France today did so under an essentialist discourse on identity, since regional particularities were to be erased. The fusion of the concepts of national identity and citizenship is another example of such unification process. The French colonial era continued such unification stream. When colonisation ended, the universalist discourse on French identity persisted and evolved by emphasizing differences. The prominence of the separation of the public and the private sphere is exemplified in the French notion of *laïcité.* However, this generated a paradox in the conception of French identity and double-standards applicable to certain (classes of) French citizens. The institutionalisation of difference changed visible diversity into visible *excluded* difference. The institutional rejection of hyphenated identity and other pluri-allegiances that are publicly expressed demonstrates firm position of the French republican system on French identity by being 'blind' to difference. The assimilation and integration policies

attempted and still attempts to dissolve these differences. Although in doing so, the universalist republican ideology keeps 'eating its tail'. Therefore, if metaphorically the animal representing the French Republic is a snake, it would perpetrate the vicious circle of the mainstream discourse on French identity impacting negatively French society and the daily experiences of some of its members.

Another discourse linked to the universalist republican one is the historical and substantial discourse which emphasizes the symbolic feature of French identity. *Frenchness* or the *idea* that is made of French identity is based on past glories and defeats that reassert the *grandeur* and superiority that France has of itself and, consequently, French people have of themselves and of France. The Enlightenment and the French Revolution, from which the seeds of the current framework of universal human rights were planted, or Napoleonic wars, are historical events that fuel such discourse. The internationally assumed and nationally cultivated features of French language and culture also feed the high value of *Frenchness*.

These two above types of mainstream discourses on French identity largely reflect a culture of war and violence where diverging cultural belongings are held in conflict and competition. The following features illustrate the violence present in the construction of French identity before the colonial era: the Reign of Terror (direct violence), the imposition of an abstract equality that rejects particularism (structural violence), homogenisation of language and culture (structural and cultural violence), nation built on (the Napoleonic) war(s) and defeats (direct violence) and the institution of the military service (structural violence). The colonial era *per se* is a clear example of the three types of violence, while ongoing colonialism nowadays pursue these kinds of violence through 'reinforcing police effectives, bringing up troops, and setting a reign of terror which is better adapted to its interests and its psychology' (Fanon, 1963: 208). After the end of colonisation, culture of war and violence of the mainstream discourse on French identity is reflected by the indifference to cultural diversity of the universalist Republican ideology. It is 'blind' to difference and neglects the various possible experiences that French citizens may have regarding the formation of their identity. The assimilation and integration processes that followed the end of colonisation are impacts that may not at first reflect

cultural violence. The critical assessment undertaken in this chapter however proved the contrary. Mainstreaming French identity under a past ideology that was exclusive implies impacts in the current French context reflecting cultural and structural violence: a hegemonic definition of French identity which may discriminate and a negative security discourse focused on -supposed negative impacts of- immigration which impede the positive transformation of social issues in France.

Finally, a commonality of the above discourses on French identity is the disregard for a postcolonial discourse on identity. Even though such alternative discourse is present -although to a limited extent- in French literature, it is not popularly promoted and may even be negatively perceived as demeaning French *grandeur*. In 2009, French government's attempt to redefine French national identity may only have been pursued for political gains -and for the sake of redefining it without the will to have real, legal and societal impacts. The substantial alternative discourses on French identity for now can only be promoted by civil society and via the individual reaffirmation of the uniqueness of the French identity of each French citizen. Thus, this chapter can be resumed as such:

> What is at stake is indeed a redefinition of the nation, a questioning of the Republic, and, with it, citizenship in a postcolonial France where descendants of a colonial history live now as citizens and not subjects. The context is no longer that of a postwar France, but a multicultural one where the concept of "Frenchness" itself needs to be redefined (Hannoum, 2019).

However, instead of encouraging a 'multicultural' France, working towards an 'intercultural' one will foster alternative identities stemming from and contributing to cultures of peace(s). The next chapter will explore how alternative identities relates to cultures of peace(s).

3. The Age of Global Tribes (Maalouf, 2003)

3. The end of suffering is possible (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87)

3.1 – Introduction

The concepts of identities and French identity have been respectively dissected and inspected in the past two chapters, focusing on the features of identity' and France and the 'right side' of the nexus identity, France and peace. This chapter will focus on the 'left side' of the nexus by delving into the relationship between identity, here more specifically alternative identities, and peace, here more specifically cultures of peace(s). The objective of this chapter is thus to explore the societal role and importance of alternative identities in fostering cultures of peace(s). It also aims to find out if alternative identities emerge from the presence and implementation of cultures of peace(s). The sub-research question that will try to be answered is the following:

- *In what ways do alternative identities reflect and foster cultures of peace(s) and contribute to peaceful relationships?*

The central theme of this chapter is therefore the study and examination of peace in all its facets, various notions, and associated fields of study. Such analysis will always be done with having in mind the framework and characteristics of alternative identities. The analysis of the relationship between the concepts of peace and alternative identities can be undertaken from two perspectives: which features of alternative identities relate to and are found in the notions of peace, cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships (and vice versa), and which features of alternative identities do not embody these peace-related notions (and vice versa). In other words, the two possible approaches are resumed as such:

- In the characteristics of alternative identities, what amounts or what does not amount to (cultures of) peace(s)?

- With the features of (cultures of) peace(s), what is or what is not related to alternative identities?

The hypothesis in this chapter suggests that alternative identities reflect and promote cultures of peace(s) and contribute to peaceful relationships more than it does not. Therefore, the focus of the analysis will examine the aspects of alternative identities that relate to these peace notions. Such positive approach stems from the finding of chapter 2 where the mainstream discourse on French national identity amounted to a culture of war and conflict. It thus logically follows that the absence of institutionally recognised and societally widely acknowledged alternative identities (whether hybrid or transcultural) in France is linked to the absence of implemented cultures of peace(s) in the country. This positive approach is also taken to step away from such finding in Chapter 2.

This Chapter 3 is structured as such: a first section will delve into what peace is and its features (3.2) by analysing characteristics of peace studies and peace research (3.2.1), cultures of peace(s) (3.2.2) and peaceful relationships (3.2.3). A second section will assess more deeply the features of alternative identities (3.3) which will take into account findings of Chapter 1 and examine characteristics of international identity. A third section will then examine the nexus, the relationship and similarities between peace features and alternative identities ones (3.4). The fourth section will afterwards aim at 'verifying' the findings of the third section: it will analyse how conflict features (and what amounts to war) cannot be related to alternative identities (3.5). Finally, the last section will conclude on this chapter's findings (3.6).

3.2 – Peace features

In his 1992 book *Peace: An Idea Whose Time Has Come*, Anatol Rapoport listed six conceptions of peace and their concomitants: peace through strength, balance of power, collective security, peace through law, personal pacifism and revolutionary pacifism (Rapoport, 1992: 162). The latter three conceptions embody the characteristics of Galtung's positive peace, which goes beyond the mere absence of the three types of direct, structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1969). Positive peace promotes and creates positive contents, structures and cultures that satisfy basic human

needs and foster the restoration of justice and peaceful relationships amongst other. The culture of peace (also called peace culture or cultural peace), alternative to cultural violence (Galtung, 1990), is a feature of positive peace and will be examined below.

'Violence and war, conflict and peace, all have one thing in common: they are relational'; with peace taking place 'between actors, as a peace structure, with peace culture' (Galtung, 2010: 21). Analysing peace studies and peace research characteristics is to assess the actors and the structure while analysing cultures of peace(s) is to assess peace culture. Peace is also the condition of possibility of human relationships and, at the same time, a goal to be reached. It is a 'transcendental' condition realised through 'human interrelation' (Martínez Guzmán, 2006: 348). This supports the examination of peaceful relationships features. A nexus with peace knowledge (Reardon, 2000), the holistic interrelation (Segal de la Garza, 2019) between peace studies, peace research, peace education and peace action (Jenkins, 2019) can be done in regard to alternative identities. Peace action embodies the blossoming of peaceful relationships, peace education characterises the development of cultures of peace(s) and peace studies and research equals what follows in next sub-section.

3.2.1 – Peace studies and peace research

Within peace knowledge, peace studies and peace research amount to the academic and higher education area (Segal de la Garza, 2019). Therefore, it may sound more appealing to a more closed circle of peace workers, perhaps, even a more elitist one. However, these two facets of peace knowledge allow to draw theoretical understandings of the concept of peace. This sub-section will focus on three theories of peace studies and peace research that may enlighten the relationship between alternative identities and peace: peace seen as the successful transformation of conflict as theorised by Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach, the features of an imperfect peace brought out by Francisco Muñoz and the crucial epistemological turn in peace studies of Vicent Martínez Guzmán.

The transformation of conflict and the 'transconflict actions' (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 33) have been respectively researched by Lederach and Galtung. According to the latter, peace

studies is about repairing relationship on all levels, moving beyond conflict resolution and shifting to teaching and practice of conflict transformation and reconciliation (Barash and Webel, 2013: 22). According to Lederach, 'conflict transformation is a way of looking as well as seeing' (Lederach, 2003: 9). It allows a new perception of the conflictual situation based on dialogue, exchange and active listening which brings together individuals and/or groups with divergent interests. Conflict transformation allows recognition of the existence of a variety of truths, reflecting the diversity within society and subjectivity of the conflict actors (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 58-59). The transformation of a conflict, instead of its resolution or management, involves its stakeholders in actions and tasks that are meant to transcend the conflict (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 33). This conception of peace aims to work the 'constructive perspective of social transformations' and the elimination of the structural causes of the conflict (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 56). The prefix 'trans' emphasised in this approach to peace is used to go through and beyond the conflict by creating something new with the input of the stakeholders to the conflict. The name of Galtung's peace network 'Transcend International' reflects this aim of bringing a more peaceful world and transforming conflicts non-violently (TRANSCEND International). This transformative aspect parallel the way Lederach sees peace as not merely 'a stage in time or a condition' but 'a dynamic social construct' (Lederach, 1997: 20). However, the dynamic aspect of peace means that it is also changing and imperfect.

As Francisco Muñoz recalled, conflicts are an 'inevitable social and biological reality' and it contributes to the dynamics of human history by having been present 'in all societies and human activity'. Conflict stimulates the 'search for solutions' and is a 'source of creativity and constant renewal' (Muñoz, 2006: 46). In this sense, if conflict is defined as such, then peace also bears the same features. Using the adjective *imperfect* to qualify peace understands it as 'unfinished' and 'procedural', with peace being a 'presupposition that is both recognised and built from day to day' (Muñoz, 2001). Peace is thus constructed and constantly in construction. The peace experienced at a moment X may be way different from the peace of the moment Y (or moment X +1 second/minute/hour/day/week/month/year). The value of an *imperfect peace* is as such:

> This approach enables to achieve various objectives. Firstly, it affords us a global – not fractioned – understanding of *peace*. Secondly, it facilitates access to all its realities. Thirdly, it opens up better and greater research possibilities: it explicates them, explains them and gives them greater relevance; it makes them more accessible. Fourthly, it allows a greater promotion of ideas, values, attitudes and conducts of *peace*. Last but not least, it serves as a guide on the practise of *peace*, its enhancement and the advancement of its power (Muñoz, 2001).
>
> 'Imperfection' allows us to approach the humane, where positives and negative aspects, along with successes and errors, can coexist (Muñoz, 2001).
>
> Finally, we believe that *imperfect peace* could be a useful instrument for allowing peace researchers to join the debate and the construction of new paradigms through which to comprehend and construct more peaceful, just and enduring worlds (Muñoz, 2001).

This latter quote bases some of the characteristics of peace research as being a transdisciplinary field establishing multi-disciplinary links by adopting a worldview approach (Muñoz, 2006: 51). Besides, the inter- and transdisciplinary nature of peace research methodology allows the 'construction of a new paradigm that surpasses the partiality and fragmentation imposed by distinct disciplines […] to study the moments of peace and the forms of violence manifested in contemporary societies' which requires the 'development of new epistemological strategies' to transform and turn what *is* into what *ought to be* (Muñoz, 2006: 51).

Vicent Martínez Guzmán's epistemological turn in peace studies is contributing to this paradigm change. Researcher in the field of philosophy for peace, he asserted that as humans and from a transcendental perspective,

> we are capable of reconstructing these moral intuitions that we all have about what would be the alternative conditions that would make possible the transformation of conflicts with a decrease in all levels of violence (direct, structural and cultural) and with an increase in the levels of positive peace, that is, of justice[38] (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 44).

He thus listed fourteen points of the epistemological turn based on his philosophy of peace studies as being the *reconstruction of the human capacities to make peaces* (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 112). All fourteen points are significant in fostering and building peace (knowledge). However, only six will be highlighted here. They will be helpful in understanding the relationship between alternative identities, including the 'hybrid identities' which 'serve to cover how unique and diverse we are personally and collectively' (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 328), and (cultures of) peace(s). Those six

[38] My own translation. Original in Spanish: *[…] somos capaces de reconstruir estas intuiciones morales que todos tenemos sobre cuales serían las condiciones alternativas que posibilitarían la transformación de los conflictos con una disminución de todos los niveles de violencia (directa, estructural y cultural) y con un incremento de los niveles de paz positiva, esto es, de justicia.*

points are: moving from objectivity to *intersubjectivity* and mutual interpellation [point 1]; the knowledge shift from being a relation between subject and object into a *relationship between subjects, between peoples*, who can have their own say [point 3]; the shift from neutrality regarding values to an epistemology committed with their interaction and acknowledgement of the different ways of peaceful coexistence [point 5]; the acknowledgement of humans' possibility and capacity of doing things in different ways and to reconstruct these competencies to live in peace, which make pacifists the *true* realists [point 7]; the rejection of the false dichotomy between reason and care to overcome the hegemony of the use of reason by talking about feelings, emotions, care and tenderness [point 8]; the shift from a 'neutral' justice to a solidary and 'caring' one where people relate with multiple identities. Indeed, the old social contract denied diversity and saw every being as formally equal. The new contract allows for each and everyone to be considered in the plurality of one's identity [point 9][39] (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 114-115). Martínez Guzmán's fourteen points demonstrate the philosophical reconstruction of the possibilities of shifting from a culture of violence and war to cultures of peace(s) (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 264). In relation to identity, he also characterises a dynamic and shifting sense of what it means to be oneself as it is embodied within 'a bunch or bundle of peculiarities' (Martínez Guzmán, 2005) and not as a static essence.

Philosophical approach of peace has also been researched by other peace researchers. Here will be briefly mentioned the work of Wolfgang Dietrich on transrational peace philosophy. He categorised four peace families (the energetic, the moral, the modern and the postmodern). These peace families allow to view peace in a holistic manner and *trans-rational* way where rational aspects of modern science on peace is transgressed to acknowledge all kinds of interpretations of peace (Dietrich, 2014: 48).

Thus, what these peace theories all agree with is that (social) conflict and peace must not be understood from a 'single theoretical approach' but also practically and from multiple disciplines (Lederach, 1996: 9). The plurality of peace studies and research consequently reverberate on the

[39] Translation based on Egidio de Bustamante's translation of Martínez Guzmán's 14 points of the epistemological turn. Translation can be found in the Covid-19 Slack of the online and ultimate intercultural seminar of the UJI Peace Master year 2019-2020 on May 13th, 2020. Original in Spanish can be found in Martínez Guzmán's *Filosofía para hacer las paces* (2001).

plurality of cultures of peace(s) and societies. Pluralism, whether in society or peace, equals to openness and require a voluntary and *reciprocal recognition* based on the dialectic. This process stems from a deep consensus aimed at transforming conflict. Thus, plural societies and cultures is 'not mere fragmentation' but is made up of voluntary and multiple associations and affiliations (Martínez Guzmán, 2003: 26). An illustration of this pluralist feature linked to peace knowledge is cited by Elise Boulding (2003: 87-88) where she recommends three dimensions of citizenships to achieve by 2032: the local or ethnic/cultural, the national and the international. Since there is still twelve years to go to reach this deadline, the focus today, in 2020, in this paper will first be to delve into and thoroughly understand what culture(s) of peace(s) is/(are).

3.2.2 – Culture(s) of peace(s) features

As acknowledged in the introduction of this thesis, the inclusive approach embodied by this paper is the recognition of cultures of *peaces*, based on Elise Boulding work on Cultures of Peace - that inspired the peace psychology take on building cultures of peace (De Rivera, 2009)- and Vicent Martínez Guzmán's philosophy to make *peaces*. In this sense, this research aims to manifests a pluralist perspective. Nevertheless, this sub-section will both examine the cultures of *peaces* from this above-mentioned approach and the United Nations and UNESCO's culture of peace. Indeed, the former approach was fostered and reflected upon the latter one. Besides, United Nations and UNESCO's culture of peace is the institutional tool that most probably can be recognised and promoted by sovereign states, such as France. In this regard, it is also crucial to highlight that, in this paper, culture of peace is not taken from a state-based approach because the State[s] builds a 'peace fortress' within its borders and 'the peace provided by the State[s] is not opposed to the use of force' (Lejbowicz, 2006 : 63). Neither does this paper aligns with a culture of peace or peace understood in international law. Indeed, the presence of many low-intensity conflicts in the world questions the extent to which international (humanitarian) law succeed in imposing their logic of inter-state pacification when state institutions cannot impose a culture of peace (Lejbowicz, 2006: 64). Finally, a culture of peace needs time and cultivation, which states cannot impose from one day to another.

Indeed, it presupposes a 'universal model of fair and equal trade' within and outside the state's borders (Lejbowicz, 2006: 68). Besides, the use of force to guarantee internal civil peace is more consistent with a culture of war (Lejbowicz, 2006: 70). Therefore, 'culture of peace' defined by the United Nations and UNESCO and 'cultures of peace(s)' understood by academic and philosophical views will be related here. A quick historical review of the emergence of the notion of 'culture(s) of peace' will be done before examining it:

- **1986**: 'The discipline we now know of as "peace studies" began shortly after the Second World War. However, the idea of using education to create a culture of peace was only introduced in 1986 (by Filipe MacGregor)'[40] (De Rivera, 2009: v).
- **1986**: The Seville Statement on Violence is adopted to 'refute scientifically the myth that violence is biologically predetermined in humans' (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 25).
- **1989**: UNESCO held an International Congress in Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast) dedicated to the theme "Peace in the mind of men and women" where it adopted the vision of peace being more than the end of armed conflict and a behaviour.
- **1992**: 'the UNESCO Executive Board discussed the contribution to be made towards the promotion of a culture of peace, in the light of the United Nations Secretary-General's *An Agenda for Peace*' (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 11).
- **1993**: The Forum for Education and Culture held in San Salvador led to the establishment of the UNESCO Culture of Peace Programme in El Salvador (Lacayo Parajon, Lourenço and Adams, 1996; Symonides and Singh, 1996: 11).
- **1995**: UNESCO twenty-eighth session of the General Conference adopted the transdisciplinary project 'Towards a Culture of Peace' (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 12).
- **1996**: Publication of the volume *From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace* in UNESCO Peace and Conflict Issues Series.
- **1999**: United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace. It is the fundamental document of the culture of peace adopted by United Nations General Assembly.
- **2000**: International Year for the Culture of Peace designated by the United Nations of which emerged the *Manifesto 2000 for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence* produced by Nobel Peace Prize laureates.
- **2000**: Publication of Elise Boulding's book *Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History*.
- **2001-2010:** International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (resolution 53/25) was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly for the first decade of the 21st century.

The 'main' milestones of the emergence of culture(s) of peace are briefly recalled here with United Nations/UNESCO and academic documents mentioning culture(s) of peace.

[40] 'The first reference of the "culture of peace" comes out in 1983 at the III Congress of Theology "Christians for Peace and Poverty" organized by the Association of Theologians John XXIII in Madrid. The same year was founded in Lima the Peruvian Association on Studies for Peace under the leadership of Father Felipe Mac Gregor. The General Assembly of the United Nations declared 1986 International Year of Peace and, in this occasion and in a joint venture of the Peruvian Ministry of Education and UNESCO-Peru, the book "Culture of Peace" was published in October 1986' (*The History of the Culture of Peace* by Federico Mayor Zaragoza in CEIPAZ)

The focus is made on the last fifteen years of the twentieth century as it is when the notion was greatly emphasized in these types of documents. It also illustrates and parallels the involvement and crucial role of Federico Mayor Zaragoza, head of UNESCO from 1987 to 1999, in the promotion of culture(s) of peace. Besides, with the September 2001 dramatic events in the United States, negative peace and peace through war have mainly been used in the world instead of positive peace and culture(s) of peace, despite the 2001-2010 International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence. The United Nations designating the current decade 2013-2022 as the International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures engages with Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1993). It may also illustrate the extent to which the more philosophical notion of culture(s) of peace has faded to focus on a more practical concept of rapprochement of cultures which, nevertheless, embodied culture(s) of peace. Indeed, between 2001 and 2019, few steps to implement culture(s) of peace have been taken by the UN and UNESCO. It is only at the end of 2018 and throughout 2019 that the theme came back to the fore since the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace was in order (Chowdbury, 2019). This historical review has mainly highlighted the -nonbinding- legal framework of culture(s) of peace, thus also illustrating my international law background. The features of culture(s) of peace will now be highlighted from this legal framework, the peace psychology volume *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace* edited by Joseph de Rivera and published for the 10th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace and other academic works.

When talking about culture(s) of peace, it is as important to focus on what culture is as what peace is. The last sub-section reviewed peace. Chapter 1 examined culture: something created and cultivated by the interventions of human (Omar, 2009). The culture(s) of peace refers to a metaphor where a plant (here, peace) is cultivated to allow it to take root and blossom to bear fruit (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 33). The end goal of the culture(s) of peace is to avoid the violent aspect of conflicts (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 34) since they are an inherent part of life.

The notion of a culture of peace is a complex one as it can be approached from various perspectives. That is why speaking of cultures of peace may be more appropriate 'to contribute both

to the development of the concept and to the development of the cultures suggested by the concept' (De Rivera: v). A commonality that is to underline is the symbolic aspect of the notion of culture(s) of peace as being 'a dynamic process based on democratic principles' (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 13), due to the changing, flexible and not static aspect of culture. As 'culture is a system with interacting parts', the change of any element is necessarily affecting the other elements. Thus, talking about a 'global culture of peace' or 'the different cultures of peace developed by different nations or communities' (De Rivera, 2009: 3-4) is accurate as long as the systemic aspect is acknowledged.

Another feature and 'underlying spirit' of culture(s) of peace (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 11) is the respect of cultural diversity in all its dimensions: from the 'ethical dimension and principles of solidarity, burden-sharing as well as respect for each other's culture and moral values' (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 19). The prioritisation of 'cultural contacts, exchanges and creativity, at national and international levels, as a means of encouraging recognition of respect for others and the ways in which they differ' (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 11) and the emphasis on cultural pluralism and intercultural dialogue of the transdisciplinary project 'Towards a Culture of Peace' (Symonides and Singh, 1996: 12) illustrate this aspect.

Peace psychologists also have qualified the cultures of peace framework incorporating inclusiveness, respect for difference, participation by different groups, meeting identity needs and cultural sensitivity (Wessells, Schwebel and Anderson, 2001: 351).

There is also a nexus to be made between culture(s) of peace and human rights. The culture(s) of peace consists of an interactive triangle between democracy, human rights and development: a virtuous circle where the synergies that are formed are irresistible and invulnerable (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 37). Elements of the set of ethical and aesthetic values as well as attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour of culture of peace encompass features of exchange and acceptance: tolerance, acceptance of differences, communication and understanding between diverse groups, free flow of information and knowledge, dialogue, respect, life in full vibrancy, pluralism, cultural diversity, etc (Roche, 2003: 107-115).

Another nexus between culture(s) of peace and nonviolence is also mandatory to highlight. Eastern approaches to peace highly influence such understanding of culture(s) of peace. The 'Tangled Hierarchy of Love/Sharing/Compassion/Sustainability/Peace Consciousness' (Annex 1) may thus equal to a different approach to a culture of peace (Chopra, 2006: 15). Nevertheless, cultural peace is characterised as 'not a set of peaceful, non-violent representations of a reality' but as the extent to which it 'affects behaviour in conflict' (Galtung, 1996: 77). In this sense, Martínez Guzmán stated that the construction of new ways of cultivating human relationships and new cultures to make *peaces* and foster cultural dialogues[41] were needed (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 68). These peaceful human relationships' traits are now reviewed.

3.2.3 – Peaceful relationships

The concept examined in this sub-section is valuable in finding another layer to the nexus between identity and (cultures of) peace(s). According to John Paul Lederach:

> Here, peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships. […] Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct (Lederach, 1997: 20).

Thus, the transformation of identity conflicts presupposes the reach of peaceful relationships. The past two sections have inspected the processes and stages of peace knowledge and culture(s) of peace. This sub-section will briefly examine the features of the peace epistemologies of Ubuntu, Satyagraha and Buddhist approaches to peace (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 71-73) fostering peace(ful relationships). This sub-section takes thus a more spiritual approach to peace while the past two encompassed a more rational and emotional one. Peace epistemologies coming from South America, such as Sumak Kawsay, are also recognised as significant in building peaceful relationships as the African and the two Asian above-mentioned. However, the South American type is not examined as this paper has a postcolonial lens and not a decolonial one, which many South American

[41] My own translation. Original in Spanish: *[…] necesitamos construir nuevas maneras de cultivar las relaciones humanas. Necesitamos nuevas culturas para hacer las paces que promuevan diálogos culturales.*

epistemologies foster and stem from. Features of exchange, connection and acceptance will be stressed in the three epistemologies.

Ubuntu is a South African life philosophy expressing the importance of humanity as whole, with the feeling of belonging to something bigger which is translated by openness and availability to others (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 71). Its diversity of definitions attest of the predominance and importance of human connection. Desmond Tutu qualified it as having to do with 'what it means to be truly human, to know that you are bound up with others in the bundle of life'. He continues saying that one is human because one belongs, and that Ubuntu is about wholeness (Hailey, 2008). The South African government's definition of Ubuntu also illustrates the exchange, connection and acceptance features that may also be related and impact the approach of discourses on identity:

> […] a spirit of mutual support. Each individual's humanity is ideally expressed through his or her [or their] relationship with others and theirs in turn are people through other people. It also acknowledges both the rights and responsibilities of every citizen in promoting individual and societal well-being (Hailey, 2008: 3).

Satyagraha, although born in South Africa, is the invention of Indian peace activist Gandhi. It designs the mode of thought and action fighting against oppression and discrimination. Politically, Satyagraha is translated as the refusal to obey to a law considered unjust while accepting the incurred penalty. Using such nonviolent tool is done in the aim to reach a new level of social truth and build healthy relationships between people having opposing points of view, despite the possibility of being punished (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 71-72). The Sanskrit meaning of Satyagraha exemplifies acceptance: 'Satya' means 'the way things are' or 'the state of being or truth' and 'graha' means 'to grasp, to understand or to capture' (Martínez Guzmán, 2006: 341). Thus, this concept helps 'self-realisation', the 'construction of the being itself and everything related to one's multiple trials with truth' (Martínez Guzmán, 2006: 342). The relationship between means and end in Satyagraha reveals the importance of connection while the exchange feature is displayed by the recognition of the absence of actual opponent or enemy:

> The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree (Jack, 2005: 88).
>
> Whenever you are confronted with an opponent, conquer him with love (Jack, 2005: 96).

> In the dictionary of *satyagraha* there is no enemy (Jack, 2005: 96).

Finally, Buddhism contains many ideas which are sources of peace. Twenty strong points for peace are recounted by Johan Galtung, including *anatta* doctrine which opposes the fragmentation concept as there is 'no individual soul' (Galtung, 1985: 3). Buddhism contradicts the idea that an individual is a specific and unique being to propose the unity of all living beings. Unity within diversity is put at the fore. In this sense, the answer of a Buddhist person to the question "Is it this or that?" would be "It is this AND that". The dialectic breaking the binary opposition is regularly mentioned in Buddhism, as well as impermanence. Both elements permit the imagination of a space for complexity to be allowed, differences to be integrated and interdependence to be emphasized (Gatelier, Dijkema and Mouafo, 2017: 72-73). The following quotes by Thich Nhat Hanh, zen Buddhist master, and his Holiness the Dalai Lama display the exchange, connection and acceptance features necessary for the building of peaceful relationships:

> Peace is not simply the absence of violence; it is he cultivation of understanding, insight and compassion, combined with action (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 5).
>
> As my friend Martin Luther King Jr. wrote. "All life is interrelated. We are all caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied into a single garment of destiny" (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 6).
>
> The spiritual teachings of all traditions help us cultivate the seeds of compassion, nonviolence, inclusiveness, and reconciliation (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 6).
>
> To build community, it is important to accept the insight of interbeing, of interconnectedness (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 175).
>
> The practice method of contemplating with loving-kindness and compassion can bring great ease and happiness (Nhat Hanh, 2011: 53).
>
> Love does not discriminate (Dalai Lama, 2000: 53).
>
> Love and compassion are the moral fabric of world peace (Dalai Lama, 2000: 147).
>
> Since experience and knowledge are impermanent and subject to disintegration, the mind of which they are functions is not something that remains constant and eternal (Dalai Lama, 2000: 156).

These epistemological knowledges demonstrate that all kind of knowledges must be recognised at all levels (global, national, local, personal) for peaceful relationships to blossom. This right to a collectivity's own knowledge, the *right to be different*, is part of Vicent Martínez Guzmán's epistemological turn in peace studies (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 280). As human relationships are

characterised by plurality, peaceful relationships are possible when individual and collective identity construction is recognised because of those human relationships:

> In short, our conception of human beings in relation to making peace(s) recognizes that the constitution of our own personal and collective identity is always done through interactions with other identities and human groups. […] Nevertheless, through the fostering of our humility, terrastrialness and frailty, interdependence can also lead to organizing ourselves both and politically, and can generate the transformation of conflicts through peaceful means (Martínez Guzmán, 2005).

Cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships are thus built and regenerated through a virtuous circle composed of creativity and alternative thinking that allows to positively transform any conflict, including identity conflicts:

> If the solution to the conflict were within mainstream thinking, then that solution would probably already have been found, and enacted. When this is not the case, a reasonable hypothesis would be that sufficient creativity is needed to transcend mainstream thinking (Galtung, 1996: 80).

Peace studies and research have helped in theorising alternative hypotheses to transcend mainstream thinking. The observation of the flourishing of alternative identities is one of them.

3.3 – Alternative identities features

This section will very briefly recall a couple of characteristics of hybrid and transcultural identities, the alternative identities that have been studied in Chapters 1 and 2, in order to highlight some negative aspects they may entail. It will then be examined the concept of international identity, another type of alternative and newly coming identity that will help to analysing the nexus between (cultures of) peace(s) and alternative identities of the next section.

Hybrid and transcultural identities are concepts that have emerged due to the tremendous wave of immigration movements and globalisation in the world. The technological and internet revolution added to the rise of the flying industry are the aspects that have permitted a lot of people to diversify their experiences and understanding of the world. This accumulation of cultural experiences added to the original cultural background(s) of the individual may provoke internal identity conflicts. The ‘emotional turmoil’ and ‘sense of attachment and detachment’ experienced by the subject is due to the internal elements in movement and emerging depending on the topic, person or place they are interacting with (Crawford and al., 2014: 98). Nevertheless, hybridity and transculturality of a person may not always equal to openness to differences:

> Individuals from the dominant culture may also become 'hybrid' by selectively appropriating minority cultural practices, symbols and ideas, but this process does not lead to genuine openness and the abandoning of some of the dominant cultural practices, values, and symbols. […] Furthermore, the remix generation may also be less interested in upsetting the status quo […] (Marotta, 2011: 197).

The characteristics of the three types of 'international identity' may help in understanding in what ways alternative identities can have a role in disturbing the status quo and contribute to (cultures of) peace(s), peaceful relationships and societies. The conception of 'international identity' by Holly Arrow and Norman D. Sundberg (2004) is defined as:

> those aspects of a person's sense of self that transcend national boundaries - relates to three truths about people articulated by Kluckhohn and Murray (1953, p. 35): Every person is in certain respects like *all* others, like *some* others and like *no* other.

The three truths are associated with the three types of international identity. First, every person being like *all* others amounts to 'global-human identity' (Der-Karabetian and Balian, 1992) arising from the recognition and the 'world-mindedness' (Sampson and Smith, 1957) of everyone being like all other people (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 55). Defining features include identification with all peoples of the world and transcending national boundaries (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 55). Second, every person being like *some* others can sound slightly exclusive at first. It relates to the person's social identification with a large social group and recognises that for many aspects of self, one is like some people and unlike others, regardless of other people nationalities (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 55-56). Religious identity is the most common example of this type of international identity. Finally, every person being like *no* other is a complete reflection of today's globalised world. People have indeed unique individual networks and idiosyncratic connections with other people and places across the world (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 55). Such 'personal set of connections' implies a 'more individualized, interpersonal aspect of international identity' (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 56). It involves the relational self (Brewer and Gardner, 1996). It is thus talked about an 'ego-centered network' which is unique and based on personal experience and history. It involves people, places and events that create personal and emotional connections to the subject (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 56-57). Therefore, it becomes possible for an individual to feel as belonging and coming from those peoples, places and experiences. This latter thus also echoes Taiye Selasi's TED Talk titled *Don't ask where I'm from, ask where I am a local* where she stated that one's experiences is where one comes

from. Nevertheless, these three types of international identity may not be developed by *all* people around the world, since each subject's privileges -or lack of- and personality may influence its emergence or not (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 61). Moreover, even if global-human identity 'promotes working for the good of the whole', some 'people who see themselves as "world citizens" may not fully appreciate or respect national differences' (Arrow and Sundberg, 2004: 63), as it was evoked above. In this sense, analysing the extent of the openness to differences of individuals having an international identity is also necessary to measure if they disturb the status quo and promote (cultures of) peace(s) and peaceful relationships and societies. This is out of the scope of this paper, but next section will analyse the theoretical nexus between (cultures of) peace(s) and those alternative identities.

3.4 – Nexus between (cultures of) peace(s) and alternative identities

The analysis of the nexus is based on the findings of Chapter 1 and 2 of this paper as well as the assessment undertaken in the past sections of this Chapter 3.

The recompilation of peace and alternative identities features has permitted to extract thirteen aspects to examine the nexus between the two notions. Eleven of the aspects are shared between at least one element of each notion while two remain in peace features (at least in this analysis). Peace features elements are peace studies and research, culture(s) of peace(s) and peaceful relationships. Alternative identities features are hybrid, transcultural and international identities with the latter being divided in the three types above-mentioned. The thirteen aspects of analysis are acceptance/recognition [1], openness/cultural diversity/creativity [2], process [3], space [4], inter- (interculturality, interaction, exchange) [5], no dichotomy [6], dialectic [7], pluralism [8], movement (active/dynamic) [9], trans- (transdisciplinary, going through and beyond) [10], connection [11], dialogue [12] and healing [13]. The latter two aspects are only found in peace features in this analysis. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that such analysis is not exhaustive and only aims to open the reflection on the relationship between peace and alternative identities and the influence that they have on each other. In this sense, this analysis is not complete and can be improved or changed.

The findings highlight that the nexus can be divided in three prospects: the aspects that the three peace features and at least one alternative identities feature tick (aspects from 1 to 5, in light green in the table below), the aspects that two peace features and at least one alternative identities feature tick (aspects from 6 to 11, in light blue in the table below) and the aspects that only peace features tick (aspects 12 and 13, in purple in the table below).

While peace studies and research tick all the boxes, hybrid identity is the main type of alternative identities ticking the majority of boxes. While culture(s) of peace(s) and peaceful relationships are respectively lacking three and four boxes to tick, transcultural identity, global-human identity and international personal links each only tick two or three boxes. For the peace features, more literature review and research may fill up the gaps. However, for the identity types, it may be trickier to find the qualitative connections to the lacking aspects. The social identity element is the only alternative identity not being linked to any aspects (in red in the table below). This emphasize the 'exclusiveness' of being 'like *some* other' that may fuel a *clash* between those who are in and those who are out. Finally, a certain 'exclusiveness' (in yellow in the table below) is visible in all elements except for hybrid identity, transcultural identity and peaceful relationships (in green in the table below). Such 'exclusiveness' depends however on how they are approached and managed by the entities and individuals concerned. This overall 'exclusiveness' aspect is also more salient with the three types of international identity and stress the extent to which international identity can still embody a certain type of domination and cultural hegemony.

Below is a recapitulative table of the nexus analysis. Annex 2 demonstrates the specific aspects that each element of peace and alternative identities features embody.

NEXUS: Peace and Alternative Identities		PEACE features			ALTERNATIVES IDENTITIES features				
		Spiritual approach	Rational and Emotional approach		Alternative Discourses on Identity		International Identity		
ASPECTS for comparison		Peaceful relationships	Culture(s) of Peace(s)	Peace Studies/Research	Hybrid Identity	Transcultural Identity	International Personal links	Global-Human Identity	Social Identity
INCLUSIVENESS	Acceptance, Recognition	x	x	x	x			x	
	Openness, Cultural Diversity, Creativity	x	x	x	x				
	Processus	x	x	x	x				
	Space	x	x	x	x				
	Inter- (Interculturality, Interaction, Exchange)	x	x	x	x	x	x		
	No dichotomy	x		x	x				
	Dialectic	x		x	x				
	Pluralism		x	x	x				
	Active, Dynamic, Moving		x	x	x	x			
	Trans- (Transdisciplinarity, going through and beyond)		x	x		x		x	
	Connection	x		x			x	x	
	Dialogue		x	x					
	Healing	x	x	x					
EXCLUSIVENESS			x	x			x	x	x
			x				x		
							x		
							x		

Source: my own elaboration.

It thus visually appears from this nexus analysis table that alternative identities, especially hybrid identity, have a close connection to peace features, with Annex 2 showing to which extent. Therefore, peace and alternative identities share mutual elements and the possibility of each other to emerge and foster the other one is highly thinkable. A brief counter-nexus of this finding will be undertaken in the next section to support and argue it.

3.5 – Counter-Nexus: connections between what peace and alternative identities are not

This counter-nexus will serve as an attempt to verify the veracity of the findings of the past section. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that there is no true truth, only a plurality of realities. Therefore, this nexus and counter-nexus are only attempting to understand the theoretical mechanisms and links of peace and alternative identities to later bring them into realities.

Reminding Galtung (2010: 21), it is acknowledged that violence, war, conflict and peace share a relational aspect. The difference between them is how such relationality is run. In the other side of the spectrum of peace studies and research are found war (studies) and nationalism. Patriotism and nationalism, ideologies embedded in the notion of attachment (Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti, 2009: 725), create the concept of national identity. This latter is criticised has being the root of ‘mass-based violence associated with identity wars’ (Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti, 2009: 722). National identity

is also often approached from a sentiment of superiority and generates a culture of competition and contest (Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti, 2009: 729), whether it be in the military, sports or even cultural realms. Besides, according to Reardon (1985) war and violence are justified because of fear of diversity, which is translated with the fear of identity loss at the cultural level (Comins Mingol, 2003: 101). All these above aspects of war and nationalism demonstrate a dichotomic and competitive approach to relationships which does not amount to the 'unity in diversity' and cooperative ones found in peace features. Besides, these ideologies do not embody a nonattachment feature that allows individuals and their identity to move freely in peace as highlighted previously. Thus, the verifying counter-nexus has in this aspect a positive result.

Cultural violence and colonialism features are then to be analysed in regards of culture(s) of peace(s). According to Fanon (1963), violence is colonialism's natural state. Therefore, any aspects experienced as colonialist -whether by the colonised or the coloniser- do not amount to the peace features of 'healing'. Even if no alternative identities feature was found as 'healing' in the previous analysis, the impossibility of auto-definition imposed by colonialism -and *Orientalism*- leaves to think that alternative identities, especially the hybrid one, allow a sort of 'healing' (space) and self-realisation.

The mainstream concepts of 'objectivity, neutrality and lack of commitment to values' found in Western societies have erased and 'continued dominating, excluding and marginalizing other knowledge, wisdom, cultures and modes of understanding' (Martínez Guzmán, 2005). This verifies the lack of inter-subjectivity and diversity that, however, illustrates both culture(s) of peace and alternative identities.

Finally, conflicts are often seen as an obstacle to peaceful relationships and not as a positive 'catalyst' to work towards these latter. As Dietrich (2014: 50) recalls, 'individuals mostly perceive peace as the harmonious flow of all existing things, as long as they are not asked about religious, cultural, societal or political values and norms'. By omitting the often critical and conflictual social and political topics, individuals would therefore neglect Lederach's 'inherent to life' aspect of conflict. Besides, not talking about religious, cultural, societal or political topics in the case of identity

amount to their certain essentialisation and mutual exclusivity (Crawford and al., 2014: 89), two aspects that peace and alternative identities do not epitomise.

3.6 – Conclusion

This chapter aimed at opening a new reflection on the connection between peace and identity, especially the alternatives of hybrid, transcultural and international identities. Such research and reflection have indeed never been undertaken before. Thus, this chapter is a sketch for further research on the relationship between peace and alternative identities. It is also an investigation that will support and fuel the reflections of next Chapter 4 since the hypothesised finding at the beginning of this chapter is confirmed. Therefore, it can be affirmed that alternative identities (hybrid, transcultural and international) stems from and foster cultures of peace(s) and also contribute to peaceful relationships.

The examination of theoretical and practical features of peace allowed to gather aspects for comparation with alternative identities features. The thirteen aspects found exemplify a *reciprocal recognition* between the subjects through exchange, connection and acceptance. Peace studies and research embody all thirteen aspects. On the contrary, few aspects were not found in cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships. It, however, may seem understandable since peace studies aims at examining theoretically the two other peace mechanisms. However, the theories used in this chapter all come from Western white men and it would be interesting to find out aspects stemming from more diverse backgrounds, for inclusiveness. The world of academia being also Westernised, it appears a challenging task nonetheless an exciting one.

'Inclusiveness' is also the 'mother' aspect to which the thirteen aspects refer to. 'Exclusive' features have also been found in some of the peace and alternative identities ones, except peaceful relationships, hybrid and transcultural identities. Therefore, an emphasis on hybrid identity must be highlighted. Indeed, the analysis demonstrated that it nearly ticked all the peace features boxes, except the 'trans-', connection, dialogue and healing aspects. Nevertheless, the analysis is mainly a textual one and it cannot be denied. Hybrid identity spirit aims to go beyond the mere multiplicity of identity

elements to make them interact and connect in dialogue, in the view of healing the individual and, consequently, society in their identity conflicts.

The counter-nexus confirmed the incompatibility of any war, violent, colonialist or competitive features with, obviously, the peace ones and, therefore, the alternative identities ones. Thus, alternative identities do not stem from and foster cultures of war, violence, colonialism or competition (and vice-versa). Sadly, France exemplifies such cultures, as found in Chapter 2. The introduction of alternative identities, specifically hybrid identity, in the French context would thus help the positive transformation of such cultural state. Chapter 4 will now inspect how it can be done institutionally and societally.

CHAPTER 4: FRENCH -ALTERNATIVE- IDENTITIES

4. Taming the Panther (Maalouf, 2003)

4. There is a path to the end of suffering (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 87)

4.1 – Introduction

The last three chapters examined the concepts of the two 'top sides' of the nexus triangle between identity, France and peace. Chapter 1 focused on the immense topic of identity. Chapter 2 focused on the 'right side' of the triangle with the nexus between identity and France. Finally, Chapter 3 focused on the 'left side' of the triangle with the nexus between identity and peace. This Chapter, Chapter 4, is the last of this thesis. It focuses on the 'bottom side' of the triangle with the nexus between France and peace. This chapter aims to continue the constructive perspective of peace studies in this paper. Indeed, the first two chapters took a critical approach to the identity issue in France while Chapter 3 and this one are attempts to draw constructive paths towards its peaceful transformation.

The means exposed below aim at finding ways to introduce institutionally and in popular wisdom within society the concepts of alternative identities, specifically hybrid identity, in France. This would go along with the introduction and practice of cultures of peace(s) in France. This last chapter aims at answering the sub-research question:

- *How can alternative identities be institutionally and societally introduced and recognised in France through the practice of cultures of peace(s)?*

To institutionalise into French norms the concept of alternative identities is unthinkable and almost impossible to establish from one day to another. Indeed, introducing the concept itself would require a bold move from French (high positioned) politicians and is far from being possible. It is, thus, the cultivation in the long term of the notion cultures of peace(s) that will lead to their legitimation and legalisation. Thus, the seeds of French alternative identities must be planted from the bottom up with the practice of cultures of peace(s), which, as Payam Akhavan expressed, will 'transform cultures

from the bottom up' (Social Justice Initiative, 2020). This will facilitate the understanding of the need to accept and include French alternative identities.

In the last chapter the visible correlation was sketched between alternative identities and culture(s) of peace(s). Therefore, working towards the institutional and social recognition of alternative identities can be done by fostering culture(s) of peace(s). Thus, French alternative identities can be introduced by promoting cultures of peace(s), peace studies or peaceful relationships but also by supporting the concept itself of alternative identities -content wise- at the societal level. Whether to introduce alternative identities 'directly' or 'indirectly', the processes to be undertaken must be examined at the various levels of society: macro (institutional), meso (societal, community) and micro (interpersonal, intrapersonal). At the macro level, a paradigm change in French policies would need to take place. At the meso and micro levels, the concept can be introduced and promoted through interpersonal contacts and interactions, through deep and honest dialogue aiming at understanding each other's point of view.

Nevertheless, it is socially felt that culture in France is a culture of protest and contest, hence a culture of conflict and war. Indeed, whenever a new law is enacted without consent from even a small part of the population, strikes movements (*mouvements de grève*) are likely to happen. There is not a culture of 'for something' but a culture of 'against something'.[42] Thus, the culture in France is more of negative peace than positive peace. Some reflections alike came from my Colombian housemate who lived in Lyon for two years and noticed that when saying the antonyms of words (from her point of view), French people add the negative 'not' (*pas*) to the adjective in question (*c'est cher/c'est pas cher*) when speaking; whereas in other languages (cf English and Spanish) there are specific words for that antonym (expensive/cheap – *caro/barato*). This illustrates the approach to peace in France highly linked to security and neutrality (Vaïsse, 2004: 331-332). Such approach goes against the commitment to peace values of Vicent Martínez Guzmán's epistemological turn. Such turn is probably what is needed in France: a paradigm shift on the topic of French identity and, also,

[42] This reflection came out while discussing with Barbara Torrente, a peace master student and French citizen, on 27th May 2020. Maurice Vaïsse's 2004 article on 'A Certain Idea of Peace in France from 1945 to the Present Day' reaffirms that pacifism has never took off in France and that a culture of anti or against prevails.

on the approach to peace and the cultures of peace(s). It can take place only with a systemic change and transformation at multi layers and interactional levels theoretically (first) and practically (second), both nourishing each other in a virtuous circle.

This paradigm shift towards the construction of cultures of peace(s) in France to introduce French alternative identities is needed, for positive peace to blossom and transform the structural violence (Muñoz, 2001) present in France. This chapter will thus sketch the staple concepts to implement at the macro-institutional level (4.2) and the ones at the meso-societal and micro-interpersonal levels (4.3) needed for French alternative identities to be accepted. As Lederach's pyramid of conflict suggested (Lederach, 1997: 39), the type of interventions must be undertaken by different actors in various layers in society: from top leaders, through middle range actors to the grassroot essential ones. A brief recollection of actions and interventions currently present in France will be also highlighted (4.4) which will lead to consider what could be the next steps to undertake (4.5). The conclusion will gather the findings of this chapter (4.6) before advancing to the general conclusions of this thesis.

4.2 – Staples to implement at the macro-institutional level

The classical tradition of European social theory affirms the apprehension of the social world in a rational way via discourses in the public sphere aimed at resolving questions of ordering society (Preston, 1997: 3). 'Ordering society', however, does not always equals to peace. Thus, discourses in the public sphere aimed at peace presupposes the recognition of equality and dignity of all (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 28): dignity of all people and cultures and the equality of access to -peace- education.

4.2.1 – Recognition

> […] without the *moral conviction* that there is a duty to recognise and value the distinct cultural identity of the Other, the foreigner, the immigrant, the asylum seeker, immigration policies will fail and civic peace will remain a distant dream. We have to understand, following Lévinas, that we are morally responsible for preserving these differences, as they are constitutive of our own global humanity. A failure to do so will dehumanise us further (Audard, 2003).

Recognition is the first duty that must be established at the macro-institutional level. However, there is a paradigm shift to build in the *moral conviction* of French institutions, by going from embracing the moral concept of tolerance -but implementing a politics of forgetting (Hannoum, 2019; Spencer, 2006: 204)- to embrace the moral concept of recognition.

Indeed, even if tolerance promotes respect towards each other in the negotiation of solutions (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 40), it can also have a negative connotation. Indeed, Galtung (2010: 30) defines tolerance as 'space for them as well' which is 'not good enough' in going beyond dualism; and Maalouf (1998: 68) is 'not satisfied' with it as he wishes to be considered in his full identity. Dictionary definitions define tolerance as 'capacity to endure pain or hardship', 'sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one's own' or 'the allowable deviation from a standard' (Merriam-Webster). It also means 'willingness to accept behaviour and beliefs that are different from your own, although you might not agree with or approve of them' or the ability to deal with something unpleasant or annoying, or to continue existing despite bad or difficult conditions' (Cambridge). It therefore appears that the knowledges as such are accepted but the content of the variety of knowledges is ignored. With tolerance, there is thus an ignorance of the actual knowledge which are, however, formally accepted. Ignorance fuels perceptions. Therefore, perceptions may replace knowledge and, when a 'clash' is taking place, it is a *Clash of Perceptions* (Cataldi, 2011). Sidi Omar (2015) proposed to tackle ignorance by going beyond such *Clash of Ignorance* (Said, 2001). Indeed, ignorance is not only the 'accidental unconsciousness'[43] but it is constructed and is perpetuated through the social and cultural normalisation of some knowledges and lack of knowledges which become generalised 'common sense' after some time and serve political and social end (Omar, 2015: 204-205). Omar also adds that etymologically 'recognition' derives from *re-cognoscere* in Latin. The prefix *re-* means 'again' and *cognoscere* means 'to know'. Therefore, 'to recognise' means 'knowing again' and 'recognition' presupposes a 'continuous process of knowing and understanding each other in a critical and self-reflective manner'. On the contrary, *tolerans* in Latin means 'hold on and endure' and, thus, can suppose 'an attitude of moral or cultural superiority

[43] Original in Spanish: *falta accidental de conocimiento*

and indifference' (Omar, 2015: 207). This traditional view of tolerance is based on the fusion between cultures and values which make differences and distinctions disappear (Audard, 2003), equating the French approach to being blind to difference.

This paper aligns with Sidi Omar's proposition of the critical interculturality which implies a mutual recognition[44] beyond the mere and passive tolerance (Omar, 2015: 207). The mutual recognition was advised by Frantz Fanon (1986: 217) to break the vicious circle of denying the other; and the critical interculturality can be related to Axel Honneth's structure of relations of recognition including love, rights and solidarity (Honneth, 1995: 95). However, his theory emphasises on self and interpersonal recognition. Even though the capacity for self-recognition is an important issue (Hall, 1996: 8), this sub-section will focus on recognition at the macro-institutional level and will rely on Charles Taylor's work on the politics of recognition. Taylor's reflection interests this research as it draws on the 'supposed links between recognition and identity' where

> identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves (Taylor, 1992: 25).

Taylor considered recognition as a 'vital human need' (Taylor, 1992: 26). It is thus equalled in this paper to identity, which is also a basic human need as observed in Chapter 1. At the end of the eighteenth century, the change in the understanding of identity with the emphasis on individual identity affected the conception of the concept of recognition (Taylor, 1992: 28). Recognition was thus illustrated by the politics of universalism and equal dignity with the 'equalization of rights and entitlements' as all human beings are 'equally worthy of respect'. Nevertheless, the existence of 'first-class' and 'second-class' citizens remains an issue to be theoretically and practically avoided with such politics (Taylor, 1992: 37-39), as witnessed in France. On the contrary, the politics of difference emerged with the development of the modern conception of identity. The politics of difference recognises the unique identity and the distinctness of an individual or group from any other else. However, such difference still remains 'assimilated to a dominant majority' which goes against an 'authentic' recognition of identities and the needs linked to it. The universalist views on which the

[44] Lola Akin Ojelabi (2010) also used this term as 'mutual recognition and acknowledgement of needs and interests is critical to the resolution of cross-cultural conflicts'.

politics of difference relies upon may explain this lack of full recognition (Taylor, 1992: 38). This paper sides with Taylor's approach where *true* recognition acknowledges the dialogical character of human life, hence the dialogical character of identity, as 'people do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own' but 'through interaction with others'. This dialogical approach to human life was however never visible in Western, mainstream and modern philosophy (Taylor, 1992: 32). As Taylor stated, identity, who one is and where one comes from, is defined 'in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things [our significant] others want to see in us' (Taylor, 1992: 33).

In relation to peace studies and cultures of peace(s) perspectives, defining identity 'in dialogue with' rather than 'in struggle against' should be preferred. This latter definition is sadly more observed in France. A kind of 'general recognition' of differences is acknowledged with the politics of equal dignity and difference as 'socially derived identity' are built on social categories taken for granted. However, a kind of *generally particular* recognition (equalling 'unity in diversity') is not yet observed in France as 'inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn't enjoy this recognition *a priori*' (Taylor, 1992: 34), yet.

Recognition in France is based on differentiation. The public and general recognition does not emphasize the importance and 'moral requirement' of cultural identity, whether people come from minorities of the provinces or immigration (Audard, 2003). Nevertheless, Catherine Audard (2003) argues that it is not all 'doom and gloom'[45] and that hope and possibilities for a change 'have not all been completely exhausted'. The balance between universality and particularity can be achieved, though with challenges, if 'universality is attributed only to the political institutions of the state and not to the cultural tradition within which they have emerged'. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Christian influences of the French Republic would need to be, first, acknowledged to, second, be dropped. Audard's proposition to reach such balance is to use 'this ambiguity to open up another vision of the "civic nation", a polycentric one within which differentiated sub-national communities could

[45] Rosa Freedman's 2014 book *Failing to Protect: The UN and the Politicisation of Human Rights* also contains a chapter called 'It is Not All Doom and Gloom'. Moreover, the last three chapters of her book are alternatives proposals, as such as this Chapter 4 is suggesting.

flourish'. She calls for a multicultural citizenship to be considered as it would strengthen the individual's attachment to republican and democratic values. She also emphasizes that with a hypothetic French multicultural citizenship to become reality, 'group-differentiated rights should always be seen as rights of the individual' to be 'conducive to integration in the long run and not a source of division and hostility'. The word 'integration' could be replaced by 'inclusion' to embrace peace studies and cultures of peace(s) perspectives. She concludes that the issue regarding French identity is a moral one, impeding any attempt of inclusion in France:

> The moral problem, which is at the basis of multicultural citizenship is then clearly formulated: how to create peace and solidarity within a fractured *polis*, between divided allegiances, fragmented identities, where daily fears of the otherness of the Other are obstacles in the quest for inclusion? This is a truly moral problem, not simply a political one (Audard, 2003).

Whether an inclusive approach to French identity would be called 'multicultural citizenship' or French alternative/hybrid/transcultural identities as proposed in this research, the common aim and demand of these proposals follow Charles Taylor's point that 'we all *recognize* the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their *worth* (Taylor, 1992: 63-64). This -moral- institutional recognition aims for a reconciliation between France and its historical past which fuels a French divided society (de la Rey, 2001: 251). Recognition also endeavours towards the reconstruction of the French social fabric. As it is a moral issue, the paradigm shift must first happen in the minds of French people, through grassroot moral work, with the personal recognition of the identity depth present in each French human being and the moral importance of being true to oneself (Taylor, 1992: 29-30). Personal identity map and identities visual representation for understanding oneself (Sirin, Katsiaficas and Volpe, 2010: 22) can be the first step to a *generally particular* recognition. The French education through its school system is the institutional means that can induce a paradigm shift. Primary and secondary schools as well as university departments must rely on an inclusive and intercultural (as in beyond multicultural) curriculum. This latter would take in account both colonisers and colonised historical, sociological, political, philosophical or gendered (amongst others) points of views to avoid only relying on 'dead white males' contributions (Taylor, 1992: 65-66). Recognition of the pluralities will lead to the reconciliation of the multiplicity. The practice of interculturality and the institutionalisation of peace education are the means to achieve so.

4.2.2 – Peace education

As Federico Mayor Zaragoza, UNESCO ex-General Director stated, 'education is THE solution' to build the defences of peace in the minds of humans; such education taking place all along one's life in an interactive way (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001: 6). However, when examined more closely, education curricula are often constructed from a violent and competitive perspective; leaving on the side educative notions, readings and practices based on peace values (Fernández-Herrería and López-López, 2014: 118). Peace education must be implemented, instead of the current universal education based on the hegemonic discourse of French history and culture (Chapter 2), to proceed to the paradigm change. Indeed, peace education stems from and fosters cultures of peace(s) contexts. Thus, when the social and political context is one of a culture of war, conflict and contest, education is not undertaken with peace values. Since it has been demonstrated in Chapter 3 the close link between peace knowledge and alternative identities, it is thus logical to assume that conveying peace knowledge and values can lead to the acceptance and recognition of alternative identities.

Ian M. Harris (2004) defines peace education as the teachings about peace, what it is and how to achieve it. He states that peace education has five main postulates: explaining the roots of violence, teaching alternatives to violence, adjusting to cover different forms of violence, seeing peace itself as process and acknowledging that conflict is omnipresent (Harris, 2004: 6). As peace educators attempt to address different forms of violence in different social contexts, peace education may not clearly be named as such in those social contexts (Harris, 2004: 7). It may thus take various shapes as in international education, human rights education, development education, environmental education and conflict resolution education which can embody both approaches of negative and positive peace to a certain extent (Harris, 2004). Peace education has also some controversy because of the word 'peace' that can be seen as a synonym of quiet and passive, against the possibilities of war and the war (economic) system in which many countries rely upon. 'Peace' may also be seen as too idealistic and utopic.

France is one of the countries not implementing peace education namely yet as such. Only international education, human rights education and conflict resolution education can be perceived within the French education system, whether in primary and secondary schools or universities. Regarding universities, only one denominated Master in Peace Studies currently exists in Paris, however it is highly focused around security, humanitarian and conflict management studies. Development education and environmental education are, however, nearly absent of French curricula.

Development education, based on Paulo Freire's *conscientization* on the various forms of structural violence, aims 'to build peaceful communities by promoting an active democratic citizenry interested in equitably sharing the world's resources' (Harris, 2004: 12). 'Resources', here, probably mean economic ones. However, it can also imply cultural and political ones. Sharing these latter two therefore suggest a recognition and teaching in popular wisdom of all cultural and political means available. Consequently, it would amount to practicing cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships. It would thus facilitate the introduction and acceptance of alternative identities in France. French pedagogue and researcher Philippe Meirieu expressed why he thinks the French school system is failing:

> Teaching about peace and citizenship are seen as lessons whereas, in fact, it is a way of life. It is not about what we learn but how we learn it: the pedagogy of cooperation should take precedence over the pedagogy of competition. However, it is not yet the case in our schools. Too much emphasis is placed on the transmission of raw knowledge. It is a question of culture[46] (Aide et Action, 2016).

In the same interview on the fundamental role of schools regarding peace education, Patrice Clerc, a former trainer in the French National Education system, also gives his perspective on the failure of the French school system to implement peace education:

> At the moment, the school is based on a logic of individualization, a logic of war. It is a model that does everything possible to value some and devalue others. Since our economic system is already negative, if the education system is the same, […] there will always be a feeling of imbalance. However, for this change to happen, we have to make a philosophical and political choice. It is our whole society that has to be rethought[47] (Aide et Action, 2016).

[46] My own translation. Original in French: *L'enseignement à la paix et à la citoyenneté sont vus comme des leçons alors que c'est une manière de vivre. Ce n'est pas ce qu'on apprend mais comment on l'apprend : la pédagogie de la coopération devrait primer sur celle de la compétition, mais ce n'est pas encore le cas dans nos écoles. On reste trop sur une transmission de savoirs bruts. C'est une question de culture*.

[47] My own translation. Original in French: *Pour le moment, l'école est basée sur une logique d'individualisation, une logique de guerre. C'est un modèle qui fait tout pour en valoriser certains et en dévaloriser d'autres. Déjà que notre système économique est négatif, alors si le système éducatif est pareil, […] il y aura toujours un sentiment de déséquilibre. Mais pour changer ça, il faut faire un choix philosophique et politique, car c'est toute notre société qui doit être repensée.*

An interesting question to be asked, however, can also be raised: if educating about peace or its variant does not blossom and end up failing, can an 'inclusive citizenship' (Salo-Lee, 2003: 252) still be observed within (French mainstream) population? Salo-Lee answers as such:

> Construction of "intercultural identity" is a developmental continuum along which people travel. The role of educators in facilitating intercultural learning process is important. The path to a truly multicultural society requires, in education, a wholistic intercultural approach which goes beyond the mere exposure to differences (eg. multicultural classrooms per se) to the whole educational system and learning environment. In that approach teachers are also part of the learning community (Salo-Lee, 2003: 252).

The 'wholistic intercultural approach' that is recommended to go beyond (cultural) differences and recognise and appreciate (cultural) diversity may thus be the 'in-between' step before any hypothetic *holistic*[48] peace education be taught in France. For both 'w*holistic*' approaches, the roles of educators, the educational system, the content and the format of teachings are emphasized. In terms of format, Sidi Omar recommends to also practice intercultural education with peace education to foster the acquisition of competencies that will allow learners to relate effectively with people of other cultures and peacefully transform conflicts (Omar, 2015: 206). In terms of contents, he states the importance of rethinking knowledges available in textbooks with the 'integration of wide-ranging knowledge about other cultures' that promotes a 'cosmopolitan ethic' (Omar, 2015: 206). Indeed, if mandatory educational materials can 'offer students multiple readings that reflect the plurality, diversity and cultural hybridity of contemporary societies', it would influence highly the way pupils and students view and understand the world around them. It is indeed not only what is present within textbooks or discourses that influence worldviews but also, and especially, what is omitted (Omar, 2015: 207). The French educational system is an example of the presence of such omission of perspectives which reverberates in the everyday experiences of its citizens. Paulo Freire qualified 'education' as a political act. When education is geared from and towards war and competition at the macro-institutional level, it is at the meso-societal and micro-interpersonal levels that the paradigm shift must start, with political acts towards peace.

4.3 – Means to implement at the meso and micro levels of society

[48] Term taken from the PhD research 'La praxis de educación para la paz desde la paz holística' by Dr. Gloria María Abarca Obregón (2014).

[For the culture of peace] 'it is not only States that must be mobilized, but all actors of civil society (jointly with the military and the churches), for the United Nations' actions at the dawn of the third millennium'[49] (Prera-Flores and Vermeren, 2001 : 14). This 'philosophy for the culture of peace' quote can be applied to alternative identities and, thus, demonstrates the need for actors at the meso-societal and micro-inter/intrapersonal levels to be mobilised and act towards a paradigm shift in France. This entices to put in practice the 'fractal' element of Adrienne Maree Brown's *emergent strategy*, where the relationship between small and large is defined as 'how we are at the small scale is how we are at the large scale' (Maree Brown, 2017: 52). That is why 'there is a direct link from interpersonal violence to interstate wars' (Galtung, 2011: 5).

There are so many ways and means of actions that the following proposals and findings are only a grasp of what could help in opening the discourse on French identity. All means working for cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships can help towards such turn, but the crucial aspect is that they need to take place within a systemic change.

Cultures of peace(s) can be put in practice through the 'socialization of all citizens into a common political culture' as Alfonsi (1997: 70) states; a common political culture of peace, as supported by this research. This would foster a 'democratic citizenship' (Alfonsi, 1997: 70), equalling to Audard's multicultural citizenship or Salo-Lee's inclusive citizenship. Such socialization must be carried out through social and collective meaningful actions by people aiming to reach common objectives (Alfonsi, 1997: 81). To have common objectives regarding a hypothetical peaceful coexistence means the necessity of paradigm shift in consciences. It requires a turn from the hegemony of mainstream discourses as much from those who are advantaged by them as those who are suffering from them. The shift is to be done linguistically, philosophically and practically.

To go from *liberté* (freedom) to *libération* (liberation, in reference to Freire) embody a linguistic and, consequently, philosophical shift. In France, *liberté* is a notion highly valued as it is part of the national motto *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* (Freedom, Equality, Fraternity). Nevertheless,

[49] My own translation. Original in French: *[Pour la culture de la paix] ce ne sont pas seulement les Etats qui doivent être mobilisés, mais tous les acteurs de la societé civile (avec les militaires et les églises), pour les actions des Nations Unies à l'orée du troisième millénaire.*

it may not permit the full freedom (of expression, for instance, where a double standard applies) of all French citizens as it still has a firm background in French republican values. *Liberté* may thus actually connote, to a certain extent and for certain people, a sort of oppression to which one needs to be liberated from. Paulo Freire's works on critical pedagogy such as *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970), *Education for Critical Consciousness* (1973) or *Learning to Question: A Pedagogy of Liberation* (1992) are thus staples books that could be promoted more widely to French population. The title of the latter work emphasizes the criticality of *libération* in opposition to the uncritical acceptance of *liberté* in France. To refrain from what Freire called *banking education* must be introduced and established in France to reach liberation. The education shift must also be built on the language, experiences and skills of the learners ('educatees') rather than only being imposed on them by the teachers ('educators') and their culture (Rugut and Osman, 2013: 23). 'Going beyond' *liberté* towards *libération* is also illustrated by the Centre for Story-Based Strategy in an initiative called *#the4thbox* where the difference between equality and equity is explained in two boxes, then the alternative of liberation is drawn in a third box. The 4th box is then an opening to envision new other possibilities to the first two boxes, that contain rather than unleash, but also to the third one to recognise the infinite potential of human beings (see Annex 4). These boxes may also indirectly refer to the dimensions proposed in Chapter 1. The first two boxes of equality versus equity refer to mainstream discourses on identity, such as national identity and citizenship, while the third box of liberation amounts to alternative identities, such as the hybrid and transcultural ones. The fourth box of any other possibility embodies any identity that stems from and foster cultures of peace(s). It could also lead to creating a fifth or more boxes. It is also interesting to remark that 'equality' (*égalité*) is the second word of the French motto after 'freedom' (*liberté*). It thus also demonstrates the paradigm shift that is deeply needed in France.

This turn must also be worked at the meso and micro levels in every concept where double standards and dualism are observed. To go from 'd*u*al to d*i*al', from double standards and dualism to dialectics and dialogue, is a change in approaches to implement. Fostering dialogue, which emphasises understanding of the other's point of view and not debate, which is a space for different

arguments to formally encounter, must be implemented in every area at the community and interpersonal levels. As examined in the past section, one's identity not only arises on its own, but it is also constructed by the recognition -or misrecognition- of others. Identity is not worked out in isolation but 'through dialogue, partly internal, with others' (Audard, 2003). Dialogue is not only important regarding the politics of recognition but also regarding the building of peace. Since, the link between peace and alternative identities was demonstrated in the last chapter, approaching dialogue and dialectics from the peace concept or the alternative identities one will foster automatically the other. Indeed, Todorov stated that he would choose dialogue over identity as dialogue allow distinct voices to be heard, especially when taking place between cultures (Todorov, 2010: 425-426). According to Ramin Jahanbegloo (2007), dialogue (and therefore also dialectics) must take place at various levels. Dialogue at the intra and inter-civilisational level will allow intellectuals to reflect, exchange and expand their thinking. Intercultural dialogue must then be put in the top priorities of political practice (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 31), through education, development and dialectics. Finally, fostering interreligious dialogue must be also practiced in order to find a common ground with nonviolence. These three levels of the practice of dialogue is part of what Jahanbegloo calls the 'intercultural paradigm'. This paradigm shift is a *sine qua non* condition (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 18) to allow the universal (humanity) and the particular (diversity) to interact peacefully in a same space. Such peaceful state arising from the meeting of the universal and the particular is possible. Indeed, the case of Al Ándalus and the 'paradigm of Cordoba' in Spain witnessed such cultural complexity with the full coexistence of three religions in a symbiotic and plural society that practiced religious humanism (Jahanbegloo, 2007: 63-70). Besides, as Galtung (1985: 2) stated, diversity and symbiosis are necessary conditions for peace. The reconstruction of narratives within cultures will also foster their dialogue (Martínez Guzmán, 2006: 25). However, dialogue and dialectics must first be practiced from the bottom up. Dialogue at the grassroot level will foster conflict transformation through a transformative practice and reverberate at the higher institutional level. Dialogue and dialectics will shift the approach to peace in France from conflict management/prevention or peacekeeping and conflict resolution or peacemaking to conflict transformation or peacebuilding.

This change of paradigm can only take place with an alternative to current and traditional education in France, as peace education is.

In the last section, peace education was approached in its theoretical content. However, practical methods of peace education differ from the theory and include the socio-affective approach, the communicative ecological model, the reconstructive-empowering approach, the socio-critical one and education in and for conflict (Herrero-Rico, 2020: 496). The latter two are the approaches examined in this section. Freire's socio-critical approach was reviewed above. It bridges the theoretical implementation at the macro-institutional level and the practical implementation at the meso-societal/community level. Paco Cascón's approach to educate in and for conflict and the importance of *provention*[50] is now to be examined. Indeed, it is an illustration of a possible and easy practical implementation of peace education in small groups and interpersonal relationships. It builds on Galtung's conflict formula of the addition of attitudes/assumptions, behaviour and contradiction to be transformed with the peace formula of empathy, non-violence and creativity (Galtung, 1996: 79). Cascón recommends having a positive view of conflict as it is 'inescapable' and 'inseparable from human relationships' (Cascón, 2001: 3). He also understands conflict as a process and highlights the various attitudes parties to a conflict can have such as avoidance, submission, competition, compromise or cooperation (Cascón, 2001: 6-7). The way of acting stressed in this paper is the practice of *provention*: 'intervening in the conflict when it is at its very earliest stages, without waiting for it to develop into a crisis' (Cascón, 2001: 11). The change of prefix from 'pre' to 'pro' (from prevention to *provention*) illustrates the negative to positive approach shift. Cascón suggests a set of skills and strategies to practice *provention*: group-building in an environment of appreciation and trust, fostering communication, consensus decision-making and working on cooperation (Cascón, 2001: 12-15). This approach appears to be well suited to be practiced at the meso and micro levels of the French societal context. The availability of a French version of Cascón's work can lead to envision a possible implementation in France. Even if it is not directly a peace values approach, it is a positive approach of conflict. Departing from a conflict approach, it can thus help the paradigm shift from a

[50] Term coined by John Burton.

culture of negative peace to a positive peace one, going from a culture of war and contest to cultures of peace(s). Going beyond a culture of contest is a work that Michael Karlberg has delved into in 2004[51] and up until today as I had the chance to listen to in an online conference in May 2020 (Social Justice Initiative, 2020). This may bring tools to complement this present work that aims to go beyond the culture of war in France through cultures of peace(s).

The practice of cultures of peace(s) must first be implemented in close circles such as family and close interpersonal relationships. As such, it can help change the paradigm from the grassroot level. An ethics of care must be practiced at the inter-personal level as 'for above all a culture of peace would be a culture of caring' (Reardon: 2001, 85). Cascón's emphasis on the reach of cooperation reflects the importance of an ethics of care within relationships. The attention to multiplicity, the absence of winners or losers and the priority put into the attention to the needs (Comins Mingol, 2007: 93) are aspects that will foster peaceful relationships and, consequently, the recognition and reconciliation with diverse identities.

Finally, at the micro-intrapersonal level, spiritual action can also be undertaken to facilitate the paradigm change. Indeed, an internal positive and peaceful change will resonate externally. As His Holiness the Dalai Lama stated on the basis for world peace: 'genuine peace, genuine lasting world peace, can be achieved only through inner peace' (Dalai Lama, 2000: 142). Practicing internal spiritual actions will help in achieving external 'good' and 'appropriate' actions through understanding, deep listening and loving speech (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 88). Carrying out for each day of the week the seven practices for peace (being-thinking-feeling-speaking-acting-creating-sharing for peace) as advised by Deepak Chopra (2006: 24) will transform individuals and help them acquire virtues to be elicitive peace/conflict workers (Dietrich, 2014: 54).

French alternative identities have been equated above as multicultural, inclusive and democratic citizenships. Elise Boulding (2003) stated that one is not born but becomes a citizen through the 'process of social learning and personal growth'. The recognition of French alternative identities at all levels of society thus implies a challenging paradigm change:

[51] He published a 2004 book titled *Beyond the Culture of Contest: From Adversarialism to Mutualism in an Age of Interdependence*.

> Our challenge is to learn "how things work" so we can exercise that citizenship. School systems must play in increasing part in this, along with those critically important bodies in the civic arena: non-governmental organisations especially INGOs (Boulding, 2003: 87-88).

The next section will examine the current French endeavours and entities that work towards those French alternative identities and cultures of peace(s).

4.4 – What is there already?

The previous sub-sections, sections and chapters all have encompassed a qualitative analysis. This section and the next one, however, will rely on both qualitative and quantitative analysis. This section will mostly list and briefly examine academic reflections, organisations and processes that are currently acting towards the paradigm shift mentioned above, in the aim of introducing alternative identities and the practice of cultures of peace(s) in France. The next section will mostly list and briefly explore the next steps to implement this paradigm shift, taking into account the reflections undertaken in this paper and the findings of this section.

Alternative identities such as hybrid and transcultural identities are not recognised in France. They are neither a topic largely talked about, whether academically, in practice, in the activist sphere or institutionally. It is indeed more discussed, argued and protested against the paradox and double standard that French citizens proceeding from diverse cultural backgrounds other than Caucasian and Christian are suffering from, because of the French universalist republican framework. Besides Catherine Audard's work on the politics of recognition in France, two other academic works on the politics of recognition and hybrid identities in France will be examined to find out the limits of their applications.

French sociologist Bernard Bier (2007) has worked on the politics of recognition as an analysis category for youth public action. His hypothesis is that a politics of recognition established could help answering social challenges in France and a reflection on its potential and limits could help constitute a new public action norm. He joins what was examined in Chapter 2 by highlighting the French difficulty to approach questions of recognition due to the universal republican model, illustrated by the nearly inexistent French works on the recognition topic. He also noticed the literal

deviation of the French translation of Charles Taylor's book[52], demonstrating the reluctance of the concept of recognition in French institutional, societal and intellectual areas (Bier, 2007: 54). He, however, sides with the concept. He acknowledges the opportunities it allows to undertake analysis from 'plural and evolutive' approaches on identification and democracy topics and to go beyond 'the concept of knowledge reduced to a dominant model, which for a long time in France resulted in the virtual monopoly of "formal education" and the concealment and invalidation of other forms of knowledges, as well as "non-formal" or "informal" learning'[53] (Bier, 2007: 63). He supports the concept of recognition in allowing plural identities to enter the public space and debate, and the reparation of 'humiliating' institutional wrongs (Bier, 2007: 63).

Regarding, hybrid identities, the issue impeding their acceptance may lay in the specificity of French vocabulary which distinguishes between hybridity (*hybridité*) and hybridisation (*hybridation*). This leads to the preference of using the notion of 'diversity' instead of the 'hybrid' concept to 'to go beyond the dialectic of identity-otherness and to assume the diverse and shifting character of cultural subjects'[54] (Sauvaire, 2012). The approach taken on diversity as 'the understanding of cultural processes as they are experienced and interpreted by diverse and interacting subjects'[55] and its definition as 'the movement by which an individual or a group understands itself as a plural, changing, mobile subject, sometimes in a contradictory or marginal way, in relation to other subjects and in relation to cultural works and practices' (Sauvaire, 2012) demonstrate that the acceptance of alternative identities is not a closed path in France. It just may need to take a deviation and overcome obstacles. The medias are one of the main obstacles, especially when right wing newspapers, such as Le Figaro, publish articles on the fear of hybrid identities pervading French society (Mandeville, 2010). The promotion of peace journalism can help tackle such type of negative approaches.

[52] 'Multiculturalism and "the Politics of Recognition"' was translated as *Multiculturalisme. Différence et démocratie* (Multiculturalism. Difference and democracy).
[53] My own translation. Original in French: *une conception des savoirs réduits à un modèle dominant et qui s'est traduit longtemps en France par le quasi-monopole de l'« éducation formelle » et l'occultation et l'invalidation des savoirs autres, ainsi que des apprentissages « non formels » ou « informels ».*
[54] My own translation. Original in French: *dépasser la dialectique de l'identité-altérité et d'assumer le caractère divers et mouvant des sujets culturels.*
[55] My own translation. Original in French: *la compréhension des processus culturels tels qu'ils sont expérimentés et interprétés par des sujets, eux-mêmes divers, en interaction.*

The other path that can also be taken is the promotion of peaceful relationships, cultures of peace(s) and peace studies in France. This path is more present in academic, activist, practical and institutional spheres; even though they remain in small amounts due to the culture of war and contest prevailing in France. Below are listed various endeavours working towards peace knowledges and practices.

In the research and academic sphere, there is only one Master in Peace Studies in France at the University Paris Dauphine. However, it aims 'to develop an international, legal and managerial approach to conflict management' with 'an approach similar to political science and international relations masters'. Therefore, with the 'Dauphine touch' focusing on 'learning the basics of decision-making models and game theory' (Association Peace Studies Dauphine), it does not seem to rely much on the theories of peace studies and the philosophical and critical approaches linked to it. Despite this inexistence of peace studies/philosophy for peace section in France, an Open Education Unit on the culture of peace is available at the University of Evry-Val-d'Essonne. An Open Education Unit is a cultural openness module aimed at all students whatever their field of study. Finally, two institutes composed of many French researchers on peace exist: the Institute on Peace Research and Documentation (*Institut de Documentation et Recherche sur la Paix*) and the Research Institute for Non-violent Conflict Resolution (*Institut de recherche sur la Résolution Non-violente des Conflits*). Since this latter institute focuses on nonviolence and not peace itself, it demonstrates the French approach to the negation of violence and conflict rather than a positive perspective to transform them. The establishment of a census of university training in France related to non-violence (Starringer, 2018) shows that slightly less than a hundred academic courses are offered. It would be interesting to qualitatively analyse the content of these courses in terms of a peace studies and philosophy for peace perspectives.

In the activist sphere, organisations can be found working on peace advocacy, providing peace resources or also offering courses on peace education and nonviolence. Amongst them are *Mouvement de la Paix*, *Graines de Paix*, Culture of Peace News Network Français (CPNN Français), *Mouvement pour un Alternative Non-violente*, *Coordination pour l'éducation à la non-violence et à*

la paix or the *CREA-Apprendre la vie* (*Cercle de réflexion pour une 'éducation' authentique*). This latter is an illustration of critical pedagogy with a 'French touch'.

Such a 'French touch' is also visible when it comes to education practices in France. Indeed, education is rarely linked to the concept of peace, but focuses more on the development of the pupils through practical activities. Freinet pedagogy, conceptualised by French couple pedagogues Célestin and Élise Freinet and present in 26 French schools (ICEM, 2016) exemplifies this focus. The Montessori pedagogy, conceptualised by Italian physician Maria Montessori and present in 200 French schools (Association Montessori de France), also focus on children's ability to lead their own development through practical activities. Although these two pedagogies draw near peace education, their content will not be reviewed in this paper. The association *Inversons La Classe!* advocates for a 'flipped classroom' where the teaching logic would go 'from face to face to side by side' (Inversons La Classe). The aim is to strengthen student/teacher relationships, differentiate teaching ways, reveal students to be actors and producers of their knowledge and deepen the learnings (Inversons La Classe). Considered as a philosophy more than a methodology (Classe Inversée), it closely echoes Freire's pedagogy as it focuses on exchanges and interactions. As such it aims at breaking away from *banking education* to 'liberate education' (Classe Inversée). Finally, the association *Enseignants pour la paix* (Teachers for peace) gather teachers advocating for peace education and peace culture.

Finally, a couple of endeavours will be mentioned at the institutional level. *Vers Le Haut* (Upwards), launched in 2015, is the first French think-tank dedicated to youth and education. It aims to 'tackle the educational crisis by capitalizing on what works'. This fairly recent think-tank seems to embrace a quite resolutive and negative approach to the educative environment rather than a transformative and positive one. Their written reports that interest the topic of this research indeed all have a negative concept within their titles: *Living, growing, building together: ideas & actions against the "clash of incultures"*[56] (Vers Le Haut, 2016); *Young people facing the temptation of radicalization: what to do?*[57] (Vers Le Haut, 2018); *Peaceful Transition: Educational Ideas and*

[56] My own translation. Original in French*: Vivre, grandir, construire ensemble: idées & actions contre le "choc des incultures".*
[57] My own translation. Original in French: *Les jeunes face à la tentation de la radicalisation : que faire ?*

Actions to Cope with Violence[58] (Vers Le Haut, 2019). Nevertheless, their goal-oriented approach to reach solutions based on achievement observed in the French context is an interesting aspect to recollect current practical endeavours in France. However, their recurrent focus on violence omits the examination of roots of the conflict leading to violence, in order to transform it positively. Their latest report *Education, a mayor's matter*[59] (Vers Le Haut, 2020), launched on the occasion of the 2020 French municipal elections and presenting 50 inspiring educative actions carried out by municipalities, is a bridge to acknowledge the 141 local collectivities members of the network Mayors for Peace France (AFCDRP, 2018). Members of this network work for 'conflict prevention through substantive work and actions for culture of peace' (AFCDRP). This endeavour may be the institutionally highest active, effective and the most explicit in favour of peace in France and, consequently, to the inclusion of alternative identities. The next moves to continue and expand these previous ones are briefly explored in the next section.

4.5 – What are the next steps?

As mentioned in the previous sections, the introduction and acceptance of alternative identities in French society will unlikely be achieved from one day to another. Whether from the top down, the bottom up or the mix of both, decades, if not perhaps up to a couple of centuries (or more), will be necessary to proceed to the paradigm shift. Thus, the change must and probably will happen *lentement mais sûrement.*[60] The most assured and gentle way to do so is thus by working on cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships in France, in a systemic way.

The peace studies' *imperfect peace* theory states that 'a peaceful society […] encourages the relationship of its comprising individuals through the processes of its socialisation (kindness, language, education, etc.)'. These processes of socialisation are a synonym of the interactive format needed to build cultures of peace(s) and peaceful relationships. Kindness, language, education or the media make part of the content ways and means to construct them (Symonides, Janusz and Singh,

[58] My own translation. Original in French: *La transition pacifique : idées et actions éducatives pour faire face à la violence.*
[59] My own translation. Original in French: *L'éducation, une affaire de maire*
[60] French expression: 'slowly but surely'

Kishore 1996). Actions from the bottom up will influence decisions from the top down, then reverberating on actions and decisions from the bottom up, then nourishing this circle. Like theory fuelling practice and vice-versa, the circle must continue so it becomes virtuous and not vicious. Continuation, promotion and expansion of the above endeavours are the three steps to undertake towards the systemic paradigm shift.

At the institutional level, the continuation and expansion of the work and advocacy of Mayors for Peace France is to be more promoted. Interacting with *Vers Le Haut*'s conferences and intervention to introduce peace education to their range of topics may turn out fruitful.

In the educative practice sphere, Freinet and Montessori pedagogies must be continued, promoted and expanded. However, these schools are often not public ones and require substantial financial input to access them, therefore making them exclusive. Professors teaching in a 'flipped classroom' philosophy may thus be a point to foster more. It would be also interesting to make an introductive link between professors teaching this way and the association of Teachers for Peace, to reinforce the effectivity of both. It is also intriguing to wonder how many teachers and professors of both are initiated, knowledgeable or practice Freire's critical pedagogy. In anyway, the implementation of peace and intercultural workshops and activities should be introduced in their teaching program, in the aim to work and imagine how it would be to live together in a future with 'a world at peace'[61] (Boulding, 2002: 51).

In the activist sphere, advocacy, workshops and trainings in cultures of peace(s), intercultural dialogue, conflict transformation and nonviolence must also continue, be promoted and expanded. However, theses NGOs and associations may also sometimes, if not often, rely on volunteers and have financial issues. Therefore, their economic and philosophical survival may be a constant struggle.

Finally, in the academic sphere, moreover than the three steps mentioned above, deepening of the knowledge on the nexus between peace, alternative identities and France is also a necessity. Indeed, too little is found on the topics of cultures of peace(s), philosophy for peace and peace studies

[61] Galtung (2011: 10) reasserted this necessity by rephrasing Gandhi's quote 'Be today the future you want to see tomorrow' into 'Image the future or you will never get there.

in France. The topics of French hybrid and transcultural identities is also a niche to be deepened and expanded. The lack of resources coming from French authors on all these topics is visible in this paper. As change starts at the micro level, the personal steps that I can undertake towards the paradigm shift is the translation in French and spreading of this research paper. Taking further the research on the nexus between identity, France and peace from various social sciences and humanities fields of study can be revealing. Assessing the theoretical and practical state of cultures of peace(s) in France may also help in drafting recommendations to recognise all French identities. I wish to undertake this endeavour through a PhD research, co-tutored by the Doctoral School in Peace Studies at the Universitat Jaume I and a French Doctoral School in political science or sociology. By doing this, a bridge and dialogue between diverse philosophies and perspectives on peace could take place, with each entity influencing on the becoming of each other. In this sense, a connection or link between the Peace Master at the Universitat Jaume I in Castellón de la Plana and one or more French Universities could also be created, to foster intercultural knowledge exchange. This would help the registration of more French students into the Peace Master since only thirteen French students registered in the Peace Master over the span of twenty-five years. This would then promote and expand its philosophical teachings and contribute to the paradigm shift in France.

4.6 – Conclusion

This final chapter of this research paper examined how alternative identities could be introduced and acknowledged in the French context where a mainstream discourse on identity prevails. The chapter represented the constructive approach of the peace studies perspective the thesis embodied after reviewing identities (Chapter 1), critically assessing French identity (Chapter 2) and exploring the links between peace and alternative identities (Chapter 3). The main finding of this Chapter 4 is the need of a paradigm shift in France. The necessity to gear towards positive peace and cultures of peace(s) in French institutions and society is crucial in order to consider the recognition of French alternative identities. Indeed, French alternative identities cannot be recognised and blossom in the current French context dominated by a culture of war and contest. Therefore, cultures

of peace(s) must be cultivated in France before French alternative identities can be officially and widely accepted. This would allow French people of diverse cultural backgrounds to be at peace with themselves and live in peace with each other in a context of structural and cultural peace.

For this, a (U-)turn is required at all levels of society in France and in all aspects influencing French people consciences. Such change must happen in a systemic way linguistically, philosophically and practically. Indeed, the domination and influence of the use of French language do not allow a full recognition of hybridity but allow diversity. In this sense, instead of mentioning a French hybrid identity within French alternative identities, it may perhaps be used the term 'French diverse identity/ies'. However, such term would not encompass the legal affinity a person would have with France. A French multicultural citizenship, a French inclusive citizenship or a French democratic citizenship may be terms to be used to acknowledge French alternative identities. However, these terms would only operate and serve their aims when a critical and active politics of recognition is established in France.

For such policy to take place, there is a need of an institutional, social and personal moral commitment, responsibility and conviction of the French people to shift from *liberté* to *libération*, from dualism to dialogue, from conflict prevention/management/resolution to conflict transformation and, to exemplify the current French paradigm, from 'going against' to 'going beyond'.

Before a complete turn, shift or change in minds, perhaps what is needed for a start is an openness to another way of life, *w*holistically dedicated to peace and its values. Education and specifically peace education are the way to achieve so. The French endeavours dedicated to peace education and culture(s) of peace(s) are sparse and *francisées* (Francised, or perhaps rather fr*e*nchised). However, they are well present. This gives a basis and hope -one of the 'essentials for peace' alongside care, according to Betty Reardon (2001: 85)- to continue working towards inclusive French alternative identities and peace; and each day is a new opportunity to express ourselves, look, act and behave in their favour (Maalouf, 2003; Nhat Hanh, 1991: 71).

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This thesis starts from the premise of the study of the triangle nexus between identity, France and peace. This has never been studied altogether from a peace studies perspective, especially since peace studies is very much absent in the French context. The general objective stated in the introduction to 'discuss the significant interest in recognising French alternative identities at the institutional and societal level to foster cultures of peace(s) in France' and the specific ones all have been fulfilled throughout the four chapters. The specific objectives were:

1- Identify the discourses on identity and the implications they have in society.

2- Analyse and deconstruct the discourse on French identity of the French republican model and of French society from a peace studies perspective.

3- Explore the societal role and importance of alternative identities that reflect and foster cultures of peace(s).

4- Propose ways to introduce the recognition of alternative identities in French institutions and society for and from cultures of peace(s).

The first chapter focused on identities and, as being the longer chapter of the thesis, it is the entrance of the 'funnel analysis', encompassing and touching various theories that were useful for the next chapters. As such, identity is a human need but also a process where various components of identification are used towards political aims that fuel essentialist and constructivist discourses on identity. The constructivist discourse is then recalled as having been expanded with the postcolonial discourse on identity which expands the alternative discourses on identity, on the contrary to the mainstream essentialist or the constructivist based on international relations theory. The first key finding of the first chapter is the naming of mainstream types of identities (nationality, citizenship, ethnicity and hyphenated identity) related to the mainstream discourses. Alternative types of identities (postcolonial, hybrid and transcultural identity) which are related to the alternative discourses on identity aim to go beyond the mainstream discourses and identities. Based on constructivist

approaches, they are expressed through the analysis of existing postcolonial theories such as Homi Bhabha's third space and its extension to encompass the existence of a general *specific field* where identity is constructed. Such field or space has been named under various appellations in the academic sphere. This thesis recalled them (Third Space, in-between, suture, intersection). However, it was done in order to emphasize the existence of such field or space where one is free to be who one wants to be in relation to all the components of one's identity. The re-examination from a peace studies approach of key concepts in identity and identities studies (such as cultural difference, cultural diversity, multiculturalism and interculturalism) permitted to propose a more positive approach to the political impacts of the emphasis on difference. As such, topics of identity politics, fragmentation, situational ethnicity, acculturation and the diaspora phenomenon where examined and their negative aspects in relation to their resistance to mainstream identities were drawn out. On the contrary, the thesis' finding of promoting alternative identities implies the transformation of a firm resistance to mainstream (discourses on) identities towards a flowing, fluid and malleable espousal of one's plurality of identity facets. These alternative identities are named under various types such as the postcolonial and hybrid or the transcultural one. These may reflect a *truer* identity of a person, alongside the 'higher' and spiritual dimension identity aspect. This latter would however imply reaching another level in nation-states' open-mindedness in recognising a type of identity free of oppression. Indeed, the truthfulness of one's identity tends to be oppressed in the current nation-states system. Nation-states do rely on mainstream discourses on identity in their attempt to build national and state cohesion, which is often implemented in an oppressive, dominant and imposing way where structural and cultural violence are often present. Chapter 2 deepened the 'funnel analysis' by reviewing the case of French identity.

The French Republic is a system, an ideology and a framework that was implemented since the 1789 French Revolution in order to homogenise the management of the French state and notably of the French population, through the creation, unification and universalisation of French attributes, nationality and citizenship. Chapter 2 allowed to bring to light four key findings. The first is a reconfirmation of previous academic findings in which the republican concepts of universalism and

laïcité are deemed as a constraint in the official recognition of French citizens' other cultural and religious belongings. Chapter 2 bases its first finding on this premise and by adding a peace studies perspective to it. As such, the values of the French Republic are qualified as a mainstream and hegemonic discourse in regards of French identity, where a French citizen must be moulded under assumed and invisible criteria dating back to 1789. In this sense, the universal, 'colour-blind' and laic values are theoretically, constitutionally and socially inscribed in institutions and popular wisdom. However, in practice, these values are not always observed or exercised by French institutions practitioners or French people. The values are practiced in a way that creates some oppression towards certain types of French citizens. Indeed, those values have been established in a period where the 'common' French citizen was a Caucasian and Christian man. These values have been conserved over 231 years until today. They have gone through many war and violent periods and have not profoundly changed -yet- of signification despite enduring colonisation and its effects -such as immigration- after it ended. This is due to the unacknowledged continuation of colonialism. Indeed, colonisation -a practice- may have ended but the ideology of colonialism is still present in France. The presence of such ideology demonstrates the absence of a profound state of peace and the practice of cultures of peace(s) in France as 'besides chaos, then the next great enemy of peace is ideology (Chopra, 2006: 174). The second finding of this chapter reflects the peace studies lens of analysis of this thesis. Chapter 2 highlights the negative culture of war, violence, conflict, competition and contest that the French Republic stems from and fosters. The third finding of the prevalence in the French context of the *exclusive idea* of what is French or *Frenchness* may explain the negative approach demeaning other cultures, religions and ways of life that, at first, do not seem to fit with the French one. This garners wider implications where the perpetration of an hegemonic and colonialist ideology (the French Republic) in a postcolonial era produces an effect -whether conscious or not, whether wanted or not- of domination and oppression of some French citizens (Caucasian and Christian influenced) over others (non-Caucasian and/or non-Christian influenced). Thus, French people coming from different cultural and/or religious backgrounds than the mainstream 'C²'[62] one may have difficulties

[62] Caucasian and Christian

to be fully included in certain institutional and societal spheres of their everyday life in (metropolitan) France. This is often observed in the paradox and double standard applied in concepts such as *laïcité*, the freedom of expression, or the integration policy in France and self-identification where to be French is a public matter and implies leaving other cultural and/or religious belongings to the private sphere. The absence in official discourses and texts of the concepts of hyphenated and, even less, of hybrid identity (and alternative identities in general) in France demonstrates the neglect of postcolonial theories and practices in the French institutions. This is the fourth finding that Chapter 2 highlights. Such French postcolonial absence is also underlined regarding the academic sphere. Chapter 2 has deconstructed the nexus between identity and France -the 'right side' of the triangle nexus'- and revealed a negative, colonial and hegemonic aspect to it.

Chapter 3 switched to the 'left side' (identity and peace) of the triangle nexus and aimed at exploring and reflecting on the relationship between peace features and alternative identities in order to find possible inherent links. Indeed, intrinsic connections have been found between the mainstream discourse on French identity, which negates any type of alternative identities, and cultural violence. Thus, this third chapter delved into the new reflection on the probable links between alternative identities and cultural peace from a peace studies perspective. Alternative identities are encompassed through the analysed postcolonial hybrid and transcultural identities and with the wider concept of international identity which is declined in three sub-divisions. The analysis of the relationship between peace and alternative identities in Chapter 3 is primarily the examination of correlation between theoretical features of peace, including peace studies and research, culture(s) of peace(s) and peaceful relationships. The key finding of this chapter is the confirmation of the positive relationship between peace and alternative identities, where both stem from and foster each other in a continuous virtuous circle. By extension, alternative identities therefore also stem from and foster cultures of peace(s) and contribute to peaceful relationships. The overall inclusive aspect that link the two concepts is the presence of *reciprocal recognition* through the characteristics of exchange, connection and acceptance found in both. From a peace studies and philosophy for peace perspectives, *reciprocal recognition* embodies peace values as it promotes mutual respect and peaceful coexistence regardless

of individuals' backgrounds and experiences. Such finding reconfirms the findings of Chapter 2 where the non-recognition of any type of alternative identities in France corroborates with the omnipresence of a culture of war/violence/conflict/competition/contest and the absence of a deeply peaceful coexistence in France, where people proceeding from diverse backgrounds and experiences reside. Such cultural violence in France especially regarding the topic of French identity or French heritage is visible in the French policies that involve ex-colonies countries (i.e: The issue with Madagascar of the Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean or the still-use of CFA franc in fourteen Western and Central African countries). It reaffirms the finding of Chapter 2 of the presence of a French colonialist ideology. However, such statement is rarely brought to light by medias or in the (French) academic sphere and remain a profound issue that the French government has still to recognise and work on. The French activist sphere is the only light of hope that envisions and practices the knowledges on cultures of peace(s) and peaceful coexistence in France.

Chapter 4 examined these types of endeavours existing in France and how they could be implemented institutionally and in popular wisdom. The first three chapters found that a mainstream and hegemonic discourse on identity in France impeded the recognition of alternative identities, which are an illustration and promoter of cultural peace and peaceful coexistence. The key finding of Chapter 4 is the necessity of a paradigm shift in France. This would transform the cultural violence observed in French institutions and (metropolitan) society towards the building of cultures of peace(s) that would permit the acknowledgement and acceptance of French alternative identities. Indeed, since these alternative identities cannot be implemented directly into the French current republican system, the U-turn (or even 'YOU turn') needed is one at the individual micro-level. In this sense, consciences of French people need to shift linguistically, philosophically and practically. This would allow a ripple effect at the institutional level where the shift in values would turn from *liberté* (freedom) to *libération* (liberation), from dualism to dialogue/dialectics, and from conflict prevention/management/resolution to conflict transformation.[63] Such a model change would enable the appreciation of French alternative identities, whether French hybrid, transcultural or international

[63] I have already worked on such a paradigm shift of the French republican frame in the full paper of my abstract on 'An African World Cup victory?' (Ranaivosoa, 2020). Annex 5 shows the various areas where a shift is needed.

identities. Nevertheless, the 'French touch' or *Frenchness* of these alternative identities might have to remain in such paradigm shift for sustainability. This is due to the deep-rooted culture of the *idea* in France and, also probably, to the specificity of the French language and its interpretations of certain words. In this regard, the following terms equivalent to alternative identities would be more suitable to the French context: French diverse identities, French multi/inter/pluricultural citizenship or French (inclusive) democratic citizenship. The tools to achieve this paradigm shift is in the institutional implementation of a necessary politic of recognition in France. Such recognition must encompass broad issues such as colonialism and its effects to the specific matter of recurring double-standard police random identity check-up. Nevertheless, the implementation of a politic of recognition in France signifies a shift in the government political approaches of social problems in France. The steadier and more sustainable way of accomplishing this ideal is through education and, specifically, peace education. However, given the state of the obligatory, universal and laic values of the French institutional and official school system, it is also tainted of republican -hegemonic and colonialist- ideology. As mentioned previously, the French activist sphere is where the paradigm shift can plant its most powerful seeds. Even if the endeavours are scarce, they must continue and be made sustainable. Nevertheless, this paradigm shift must take place in a systemic way. In this regard, the French academic sphere is perhaps the first concerned in drafting more theoretical paths to do so.

By undertaking this study through these four chapters, this thesis succeeded in mostly answering the general research question and backing up the thesis statement raised in the introduction. 'Mostly' is used here as, indeed, the thesis statement of the dismantling of essentialist and colonialist discourses on French identity by French alternative identity is only theoretically previewed but would require further empirical research. Most of the general research question also found adequate answers. However, since alternative identities are not yet very well known in French popular wisdom, the extent to which it promotes cultures of peace(s) is also only a theoretical preview that would need more empirical research.

This leads to highlight the general limitations of this thesis. Since it is a theoretical research, it would undoubtedly benefit from an empirical research on the triangle nexus between identity, France and peace to be correlated afterwards with this thesis. Another limit of this research is the peace studies perspective taken that mainly relies on Western academic sources and may not convey the large array of peace epistemologies available. This has also been limited due to time and space restriction.[64] Besides, academia is based on a Western concept, especially in human and social sciences which are 'the products not only of the Enlightenment, but also of the post-Westphalian state system, from 1648 onward, in Europe' (Galtung, 2010: 23). Therefore, despite the fact that this work -written from my Westerner point of view- has been highly influenced by Southern and Eastern perspectives, these two non-dominant approaches may also be surreptitiously Western influenced. Moreover, the sources of this research have all been recollected and reflected from three different languages (English, French and Spanish). The thinking process was made in each language according to each source, which allowed me to grasp the meaning of the concept fully in its original tone. However, the concepts had to be translated and written in English. Therefore, it is possible that some interpretations and meanings have been lost in the process due to the absence of equal meaning, time limit or also language abilities; French being my mother tongue, English and Spanish being respectively my second and third ones. Besides, English, French and Spanish are the three 'colonial' languages. In this sense, another limit of this thesis is its inability of recollecting sources coming from languages proceeding from French ex-colonies. As such, the absence of sources in Arabic, Wolof, Soninke, Bambara or Lingala -to name only a few- also limits this study. Besides, with extra-time and the help from relatives for translation, I could have also looked for sources in Malagasy language on the subject. Last but not least, the gender approach -crucial in identity matters- has also been omitted in a substantial part of this research, which has been however already recognised in the general introduction. Indeed, the bibliography of this thesis is approximately composed of only 32% women authors compared to 54% of men authors, with 14% of other sources. This is due to the presence and availability of diversity within academic authorship but as well due to how I personally

[64] This thesis was written for its majority during the Covid-19 pandemic confinement that started in March 2020.

directed my research with the sources and time I was given. The ‘race’ approach is, in the sense, also a limitation of this research. The percentage of references used is approximately divided as such: only 20% of authors proceed from a non-Caucasian background compared to 58% from a Caucasian one, with 22% of other sources. Finally, the intersection of these limits demonstrated that approximately 38% of the bibliography of this research comes from Caucasian men, 20% from Caucasian women, 11% from non-Caucasian men and 9% from non-Caucasian women; with 22% of other sources. As such these numbers are a basis for improvement in any of my future research endeavours.

Limitations entice further research. I mentioned four times the fact that some reflections were ‘out of the scope’ of this paper’s research. As such, culture paralleled to a wound; the application of equality by the French Republic since 1789; the purposefulness of the discriminating universalism of the French Republic; and the extent to which individuals with international identity disturb the status quo and foster cultures of peace(s) are all theoretical based and literature-based research that can be done. Nevertheless, empirical research is the main further study that can be undertaken to measure the extent to which the mainstream discourse on French identity is perceived amongst French officials and French society. Indeed, theory is only a tool to organise reality in social sciences. Thus, this thesis is only (re)assessing and (re)organising what is already there to undertake the next steps. Conducting ‘dialogues on French identity’ (to the contrary of the ‘debate on national identity’) in the aim of fostering reflection and critical thinking among participating French people and towards the building of inclusive and diverse communities in France is an exciting fieldwork to start. An empirical quantitative research can also be carried out through surveys to scratch the surface of the understanding of the topics of identity and alternative identities by a small random segment of French society. This can then be correlated to another empirical qualitative research that would aim French students (citizens, nationals or both) proceeding from the Peace Master. Such qualitative research would be conducted through interviews and focus groups. The aim would be to examine the impact of a peace studies training on the identity reflection of French subjects. Nevertheless, surveying a random segment of French society and choosing to interview French Peace Master students will

probably leave a gap in the knowledge produced. The former type of subjects may certainly have little to no approach to alternative identities and peace studies while, on the contrary, the latter type may well be acquainted to these topics. The surveys will quantitatively scan the understanding of French identity and alternative identities in France, while the interviews and focus group of French Peace Master students will qualitatively dig deep on such understandings. Finally, further research could be undertaken parting from the premises of the triangle nexus of France and peace with either one of the other basic human needs than identity: survival, well-being and freedom. Replacing 'peace' with 'violence' in the nexus would also open even more research from a peace studies perspective. Below is a recollection of these possible research paths:

Nexus of current research	Identity, France and Peace	Peace focused (construction perspective)	Identity and cultures of peace(s): critical assessment of the mainstream discourse on French identity
Nexuses for further research	Survival, France and Peace		France's military regarding cultures of peace(s)
	Well Being, France and Peace		France's social system and cultures of peace(s)
	Freedom, France and Peace		Discourses on 'Freedom' in relation to cultures of peace(s) in France
	Identity, France and Violence	Violence focused (deconstruction perspective)	Cultural violence in identity matters by French institutions and society
	Survival, France and Violence		La Francafrique = the violent survival connection between France and its African ex-colonies
	Well Being, France and Violence		Types of violence proceeding from the economic and political well being of the French state
	Freedom, France and Violence		Types of violence in the French discourses on freedom

Nevertheless, before delving into the bigger pool of above research topics, it is mandatory to 'finish the job' that this thesis started by analysing the 'bottom' side composed of 'peace and France' of the triangle nexus identity, France and peace. Such endeavour could lead to a deeper research on the theory and practice of the cultures of peace(s) in France, sparked by this thesis.

The general conclusions, limitations and propositions for further research reported by this thesis finally guides the following recommendations and suggestions for policy and practice in France. A first recommendation is to reconsider the discourse of the French nation-state. By this, I suggest rethinking about the goals of the French state project and let go of the term 'nation-state'. Indeed, France is not a homogenous nation-state (it can be argued that it has never really been). Therefore, through the fusion of French nationality and citizenship it restricts its subjects' relationship to their own and unique identity. A second recommendation linked to this issue is for the French state (through its governmental institutions) to start opening and diversifying the possibilities of identification of French subjects. The available option to have a double citizenship is already a

positive opportunity to do so, however, such possibility needs to be obtainable from the second country too. I do not approve for various cultural and/or religious belongings to appear on a French identity card. Nevertheless, I would suggest for official discourses, laws, educational curriculums and institutional practices to not discard -and even recognise- those affiliations when they are expressed by French subjects. French governments must find a way to reassess French identity, in a French way.[65] The third recommendation is for such French way or *Frenchness* to be redefined and newly exercised from cultures of peace(s) instead of a culture of war. This would be beneficial regarding the topic of French identity but also many other socio-cultural, political and economic ones. I would suggest further to undertake this paradigm shift first 'at home' in France -inwardly- so it can later blossom 'abroad' in other countries. Indeed, what is sowed is always ripped afterwards. In this sense, French identity -and other- issues and conflicts originate from migration waves, colonisation era and the ongoing financial and human input in arms and French military which, at the end of this vicious circle, come back to (metropolitan) France. Transforming the still present colonialist ideology in France is mandatory to undergo this paradigm shift. The fourth recommendation is to nurture the French way of going beyond colonialism. Indeed, postcolonialism is linked to the Anglo-Saxon world and decolonialism to the Latin-American one. Even if anticolonialism seems to me embodying a quite negative aspect with the prefix 'anti', promoting more anticolonial authors that expressed themselves in French and continuing such radical writing nowadays by alive French writers is a step to go past colonialism in France. Besides, the word radical comes from 'root' and means 'to relate or to affect the fundamental nature of something'. Therefore, employing and fostering radical anticolonial discourses will affect -and positively transform- the foundation and roots of colonialism and cultural violence in France. The fifth recommendation concerns changes in economic investment policy by the French government for France to stay a country powerhouse but become one from a cultures of peace(s) strategy. The economic shift must take place through the de-financing of war institutions such as the military, investment and involvement in arms trade towards the refinancing and increased monetary contributions in -peace- education, intercultural/interreligious projects and environmental

[65] David Oppenheimer reflected on a part of the subject in his 2008 article 'Why France Needs to Collect Data on Racial Identity... In A French Way'.

commitments.[66] As Gandhi stated, 'peace will never come until the great powers courageously decide to disarm themselves' (Settel, 1997: 108). Finally, the sixth and last recommendation is directed to individuals' practice to initiate and support the paradigm shift. In these globalised times, I suggest for every French subject (regardless of how they are related to France) to master the French language but also a minimum of two others, if possible, including one language proceeding from one of the French ex-colonies. This would foster open-mindedness of the French subjects regarding diverse worldviews, realities and, by extension, truths. This suggestion can be followed as well by French subjects through the mastering of Western/French philosophy and opening up to non-Western ones from African, Asian and Latin-American continents.

In any way, whether at the institutional-macro, societal-meso or personal-micro levels, practicing peace values -here, perhaps, in a French way- requires a deep open-mindedness, deep questioning, deep experiences and, especially, deep commitment.[67]

[66] Buddhist zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh (2004) addressed such move to 'replace desctrutive weapons by planetary solidarity' (Chapter 14) to the United States, Russia, China and countries producing arms.
[67] The later three requirements (deep questioning, deep experiences and deep commitment) come from Arne Naess concept of 'deep ecology'.

EPILOGUE

Dear reader, I hope that you have enjoyed and managed to extract anything valuable to you in the previous pages that embody my thesis. I thank you for your effort in reading my humble attempt to make a dent in building peace in France which could potentially foster more peaceful interactions in the world. The following lines are not officially part of the above thesis, but they will close the loop of this academic and very much personal endeavour. I will mention below theories, thoughts and reflections that I could not include in the thesis or part of it that I had to remove, but I still wanted to share with you here. Like at the end of a movie when you waited the whole credits to scroll to have the cut scenes or the bloopers, I hope to make this epilogue an extra enjoyable experience to understand the full emotional context of writing this work.

Regarding Chapter 1 and the theme of 'Identities', I would like to make an extra connection between the work of Vicent Martínez Guzmán, Deepak Chopra and Amin Maalouf; who were staple authors of this thesis. On identity, Vicent Martínez Guzmán stated that:

> "Identity" comes from Latin language of the family of *idem* and means "to be the same". [...] "the same" does not always mean "the same [thing]"[68] (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 327).

The difference between being 'the same' [oneself] and being 'the same' [thing] is substantial as it evokes the differentiation between approaching identity from a relational subjectivity and non-relational objectivity. Relational subjectivity also leads to understand identity/ies to a deeper spiritual realm. Deepak Chopra has put into words:

> The way of peace tells us that our true identity is at the level of spirit and nowhere else. All other identities are temporary. […] For me as an individual to be free, I have to confront myself with questions about who I really am, and this is done in large part by examining the layers of false identity that I mistakenly call me (Chopra, 2006: 39).
>
> When there is pressure from one side, we identity with it; when there is pressure from another, our identity shifts (Chopra, 2006: 47).

This latter quote makes a parallel with Amin Maalouf's hierarchy of identity elements that changes with time and context and thus influences behaviour. He exemplifies this shift with the identification process of a fascist and homosexual Italian in fascist times (Maalouf, 1998: 20-21). Such kind of situation can often happen when an individual is entangled between many belongings. John Green may have indicated one way of positively transforming such situation when saying that 'you have to get lost before you can find yourself' (Green, 2008). Identity is a *tangled* issue, 'a tangle of matter and energy' (Chopra, 2006: 13) and it must be tackled from all its parts in a systemic way. As Chopra (2006: 15) explains, a tangled hierarchy of identity would be a redefinition of identity. Such redefinition is ongoing and permanently changing as the Buddhist 'recycling' *gatha*[69] mentions: 'In the garbage, I see a rose. In the rose, I see the garbage. Everything is in transformation. Even permanence is impermanent' (Nhat Hanh, 2011: 137).

Regarding Chapter 2, critics on universality from international law -consequently applied to the French republican system- had also been stated by my LLM thesis supervisor, Dr Rosa Freedman:

[68] My own translation. Original in Spanish: *"Identidad" viene del latin de la familia de idem y significa "ser el mismo". [...] "el mismo" no significa siempre "lo mismo"*. The noun 'thing' in brackets has been added to the English translation to grasp the difference between Spanish meanings of *"el mismo"* and *"lo mismo"* that cannot be directly translated.
[69] 'Gathas are short verses that we can recite during our daily activities to help us return to the present moment and dwell in mindfulness' (Nhat Hanh, 2011: 115).

> The notion that international human rights represent universal values fails to take in account that those norms predominantly stem from the powerful countries that created the law. Just because the language is couched as universal, with grandiose statements about the rights applying to 'everyone' and 'all human beings', does not mean that this is actually the case (Freedman, 2014: 39).

Therefore, my personal and academic interests and mentoring have been quite coherent along the way. This strengthen my will to continue in this path. Besides, I believe that the culture of war witnessed in France is deeply printed in its DNA. This is perhaps due because of the French language that shapes French culture and its underlying, undermining and hierarchising vision of foreign cultures, especially non-Western ones. For instance, the noun 'chauvinism' which is 'the strong and unreasonable belief that your own country or race is the best or most important' originates from the French word *chauvinisme*, based on French soldier's name Nicolas Chauvin who glorified all things military and became devoted to Napoleon. Nevertheless, it is not all doom and gloom and it can be found a (French) light of hope amongst French writers in French language. Pierre Weil, a French psychologist dedicated to world peace wrote *L'art de vivre en paix. Manuel d'éducation pour une culture de la paix* (The art of living in peace. Handbook on Education for a Culture of Peace). This contrasts the essay of Patrick Weil, a French historian and political scientist, who wrote about 'The 4 pillars of nationality' (*Les 4 piliers de la nationalité*). I had never heard of both authors and books, and I am now wondering which book any French person would choose first to read. The intriguing coincidence is that both authors are named 'P. Weil'. However, they are each placed in opposite sides of the culture of war/culture of peace spectrum. From one 'P.Weil' to the other 'P.Weil', a shift is present. This is this shift that is necessary in France, as explained in Chapter 4. A first shift in awareness is essential (Chopra, 1995: 95). A shift in consciousness (Freire's conscientisation) is then required. Finally, a shift in willingness is critical to permit change to take place. This would allow France to move up, from the 44th place out of 140, to higher ranks on the Happy Planet Index.[70]

On this whole identity topic, the final question to ask is if one is *actually* thinking for oneself and exercises their critical thinking. With his 'the only think I know is that I know nothing' quote, Socrates initiated the necessary labour of making people think and not banking the teachings in empty heads. While making people think is an action done towards peace, banking education has a violent constituent in it. As Vicent Martínez Guzmán stated, we have the abilities to act in either direction. Johan Galtung joins him in this vision as 'the human spirit is capable of accommodating cultures of war and cultures of peace' (Galtung, 2011: 6). A same vision is present in Buddhist thoughts where we have the seeds of compassion (and thus peace) and the seeds of violence within us (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 1). We can either water the seeds of violence or cultivate seeds of compassion. The latter must be the path to take as 'once we have a path [the path of the Buddha], we have nothing more to fear' (Nhat Hanh, 2003: 140). Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that we have many paths because of living many realities and, therefore, experiencing many truths. 'Life is a gift, experience is the beauty': This is the Yogi Tea quote that I read on Wednesday April 15th of 2020. After experiencing living in France, the UK and Spain in Europe; Senegal in Africa and Vietnam in Asia; I am entangled in an application process to possibly grasp what it means to live in Colombia, South America. If it is confirmed, I will have experienced many realities and truths in a few years, and my identity will have transformed as well. As Chopra (2006: 76) stated 'we are here to discover who we are […] that's life central mystery'. Reconstructing normativelly, theoretically and practically ways of living in peace should be everyone's life central purpose, with the concept of care -and, consequently, love- at its basis:

> What science can't explain, it doesn't see. This includes beauty, devotion, faith, inspiration, nobility, compassion, empathy, fate, intuition, and love itself (Chopra, 2006: 118).

To conclude this epilogue, I would like to give an update on my situation as of September 2020. I have finished writing the four chapters at the beginning of July 2020. I obtained a short-term contract in Paris as a social worker with the association *France Terre D'Asile*, working with foreign

[70] Data available at: http://happyplanetindex.org/

unaccompanied minors for the two summer months. I worked in a place located in the 10th *arrondissement* where many people from African and Asian decent live and work. This allowed me to experience a routine in a French neighbourhood composed of diverse backgrounds after over eight years living abroad. Funnily (or not), I was asked (again) when working in this neighbourhood: 'Are you Indian?'. The man who asked the question walked away when I answered negatively, which saddened me in realising that my deeper identity, who I really am, did not interest beyond only knowing my ethnic background. Indeed, there are still a lot of work to reconstruct the look and attitudes expressed towards others to continue building a more peaceful world:

> I know it is not realistic to expect all our contemporaries to change overnight the way they express themselves. But I think it is important for each of us to become aware that our words are not innocent and without consequence: they may help perpetuate prejudices which history has shown to be perverse and deadly.
> For it is often the way we look at other people that imprisons them within their own narrowest allegiances. And it is also the way we look at them that may set them free (Maalouf, 2003: 22).

During this time, I also had the chance and took the time to visit Parisian monuments: the Eiffel tower (introduced to the world at the 1889 Universal Exposition which exposed the French colonial empire), the *Arc de Triomphe* and the army museum (epitomising the French culture of war), the royal castle of Versailles and the Pantheon (epitomising the pride of the idea of the uniqueness of the French culture). When taking time in the boutique shops of these monuments, I had a look at the books relating the history of France. All of them, especially the ones directed to kids, very briefly mentioned the episodes of colonisation and the independence of the colonies in a couple of pages. These pages were also often sugar-coated and did not attempt to engage in critical thinking on the concept of colonisation *per se*. This is part of one of the reasons why French identity and its current republican discourse -underlying a colonialist discourse- is still a deep-rooted issue. It needs to be tackled through the deconstruction of the culture of war in France and reconstructed with cultures of peace(s). French cinema was also part of this informal French culture bath this summer. *Tout Simplement Noir* (Plain Black) is a comedy movie that helped my reflection on what it means to be French. *La Cravate* (The Tie) is a documentary movie that delved into the daily life of a far-right political activist during the 2017 French presidential election, which can help empathise with individuals that engage in some extremist positions. Indeed, 'peace is attained by telling your story' (Galtung, 2010: 25). Documentary movies as this one or Deeyah Khan's 2015 documentary movie 'Jihad: A Story of the Others' must be screened more often to a larger public to foster empathy and, therefore, cultures of peace(s). Perhaps writing and publishing books on 'how to understand' (whether X, Y or Z) can also foster this goal, since 'understanding is the foundation of love' and 'the right gift' to ever give someone (Nhat Hanh, 2015: 92). I offered myself this introspective gift when I bought the book *Comment comprendre les malgaches? Guide voyage interculturel* (How to understand Malagasy people? Intercultural travel guide) when going to an exposition at the *Musée du quai Branly – Jacques Chirac*, a Parisian museum featuring the indigenous art and cultures of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas, this July 2020. It would be interesting to analyse to which extent such museum embodies an 'Orientalist' perspective. I also continue my personal training on gender by completing the UNWomen 'I know gender' free courses on its online training centre and commit to include this perspective in all my future behaviours and endeavours.

Finally, reflecting on this (personal) research journey, I would now answer the prologue question *Where are you from?* in a simple way that does not lead to a personal mental strain. The shift goes from *I am French but […]* to *I am F… Fine with all my being, and it includes being French*.

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Annex 1



Figure 2.

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Annex 2

NEXUS: Peace and Alternative Identities		Peace features			Alternative Identities features				
		Spiritual approach	Rational and Emotional approach		Alternative Discourses on Identity		International Identity		
		Peaceful relationships	Culture(s) of Peace(s)	Peace Studies/Research	Hybrid Identity	Transcultural Identity	International Personal links	Global-Human Identity	Social Identity
INCLUSIVENESS	Acceptance, Recognition	self-realisation (Satyagraha	recognition of respect for others and the ways in which they differ	conflict is inherent to life (CT), commitment, acknowledgement of the different ways of peaceful coexistence (ET)	Truth = hybridity is a reality			identification with all peoples of the world, recognition and 'worldmindedness'	
	Openness, Cultural Diversity, Creativity	openness and availability to others (Ubuntu), unity within diversity (Buddhism)	respect of cultural diversity, creativity, respect for difference, cultural sensitivity	right to be different, diversity within society, go through and beyond the conflict by creating something new (CT), source of creativity and constant renewal, opens up better and greater research possibilities (IP)	Generate something unique				
	Process	impermanence (Buddhism)	culture of peace needs time and cultivation, the extent to which it 'affects behaviour in conflict'	conflict transformation is a way of looking as well as seeing, constructive perspective of social transformations (CT), 'unfinished' and 'procedural', construction of a new paradigm (IP)	uncertainty of being, non attachment				
	Inter- (Interculturality, Interaction, Exchange)	one's humanity though other people and relationships (Ubuntu), All life is interrelated, inescapable network of mutuality (Buddhism)	interactions of cultures, disciplines and people, cultural contacts, exchanges	relational, condition of possibility of human relationships (CT), intersubjectivity, interaction of values (ET)	between' and 'among' but also 'mutually', 'reciprocally' or 'together'	multiple intercultural contact experiences	relational self, ego-centered network		
	Movement: Active, Dynamic		a dynamic process based on democratic principles, systemic, interactive triangle between democracy, human rights and development, life in full vibrancy	active transcendance of conflict by stakeholders (CT), dynamic social construct (IP), the 14 points of the (ET) is a moving concept	not fixed, organic, fluid, malleable	internal elements in movement			
	Space	the bundle of life (Ubuntu), imagination of a space for complexity to be allowed (Buddhism)	virtuous circle where the synergies that are formed are irresistible and invulnerable	the dynamic sense of identity that I propose – the significance of what it means to be "ourselves" – is like a bunch or bundle of peculiarities that characterize us.	Active *specific fields* : 'third space', 'in-betweenness', 'suture' . Passive: Intersection				
	No dichotomy	breaking the binary opposition (Buddhism)		positives and negative aspects, along with successes and errors, can coexist (IP), possibility and capacity of doing things in different ways, rejection of the false dichotomy between reason and care (ET)	many ways to free oneself of the constraining demand of fitting into a box				
	Pluralism		emphasis on cultural pluralism, pluralist approach	existence of a variety of truths (CT), access to all its realities (IP), consider the plurality of one's identity (ET)	pluri affiliation = dilemma = disturb status quo				

	Trans- (Transdisciplinarity, going through and beyond)		transdisciplinary project 'Towards a Culture of Peace'	peace as a 'transcendental' condition realised through 'human interrelation', transformation of conflict, 'transconflict actions', moving beyond conflict resolution towards reconciliation (CT), transdiciplinary, worldview approach (IP)		understanding of culture that transcends or goes beyond specific cultures by combining elements of more than one culture		transcending national boundaries	
	Connection	humanity wholeness, bound up with others (Ubuntu), unity of all living beings, interbeing, interconnectedness (Buddhism)		global – not fractioned – understanding of peace, surpasses the partiality and fragmentation imposed by distinct disciplines (IP), relationship between subjects, between peoples (ET)			unique individual networks and idiosyncratic and emotional connections with other people and places across the world	like *all* other	
	Dialectic	against oppression and discrimination, relationships between people having opposing points of view (Satyagraha)		people have their own say (ET)	resistance against mainstream discourses on identity				
	Dialogue		emphasis intercultural dialogue, participation by different groups, communication and understanding between diverse groups, free flow of information and knowledge	dialogue, exchange and active listening (CT), talking about feelings, emotions, care and tenderness (ET)					
	Healing	build healthy relationships, nonviolence (Satyagraha)	meeting identity needs, nonviolence, Seville Statement on Violence	peace studies is about 'relationship repair on all levels' (CT), reconstruct competencies to live in peace (ET)					
EXCLUSIVENESS	1		State[s] builds a 'peace fortress' within its borders and 'the peace provided by the State[s] is not opposed to the use of force'	higher education / elitist			like *no* other, based on personal experience and history	people who see themselves as "world citizens" may not fully appreciate or respect national differences	like *some* other
	2		culture of peace or peace understood in international law				privileges and personality		
	3						selectively appropriating minority cultural practices, symbols and ideas, but this process does not lead to genuine openness		
	4						remix generation may also be less interested in upsetting the status quo		

Source: My own elaboration

Annex 3



Source : https://www.thinkinclusive.us/inclusion-exclusion-segregation-integration-different/

Annex 4



Annex 5

Current French Republican/Hegemonic frame	Alternative/Counter-hegemonic frame
Liberty	Responsibility/Interdependence
Equality	Equity/Politics of recognition
Fraternity	Mutual support/Partnership
Universalism	Particularism
only Public sphere	include Private sphere
Citizen	Subject
Assimilation/Integration	Cultural diversity/Recognition of cultural heritage
'Blind' to difference	Open to difference