

Discourses concerning a European political actor consider individuals, parties, coalitions or tendencies situated at the European level and parties or individuals from member-states.

Included here are all of the discourses that concern European institutions, including the gamete of metonymic formations.

Ex.: "Tomorrow, we want to control Brussels" (RPF 1999).

Spanish Political Parties and the Accession to the European Community

Consensus or Coincidence?

Carlos LÓPEZ GÓMEZ

Spain's accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) on January 1, 1986, is considered the most important point in recent Spanish history. It signalled the end of a period of isolation and lack of definition in Spain's foreign policy, anchoring the country in the democratic environment of Western Europe, and thus solving the historical debate about Spanish identity between Europe and the Americas.¹ Spain did not take part in the construction of Europe due to the political rejection of General Franco's regime, but by the time the dictator died in 1975 most Spaniards tended to see Europe as a paradise of political freedom and material welfare: the "solution to the Spanish problem", to put it in Ortega's words. Democratic opposition forces both inside the country and in exile adopted the European institutions as a reference of freedom and democracy, preaching their Europeanism in stark contrast to the isolated official Spain. The death of Francisco Franco in November 1975, and his replacement by King Juan Carlos I, opened up a period of democratic transition that in just three years led to an amnesty for all political prisoners, the legalisation of political parties, a call for free elections and the promulgation of a democratic constitution guaranteeing all fundamental rights and liberties. In the field of foreign policy, Spain became fully integrated into Western Europe by joining the Council of Europe (1977), NATO (1982) and the EEC (1986).²

¹ This paper is presented as a partial result of the work carried out by the Research Group of the *Universidad Complutense de Madrid* on the History of International Relations, coordinated by Professor Juan Carlos Perera Castañares (GHISIRI; www.ucom.es/info/ghisiri/index.htm), and the Research Project *The International Factor and the Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975-1986)*.

² Bassols, R., *España en Europa. Historia de la adhesión a la CE, 1957-85*, Madrid, Estudios de política exterior, 1995; Alonso, A., *España en el Mercado Común. Del acuerdo del 70 a la Comunidad de Doce*, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1985; Moreno Juste, A., *Franquismo y construcción europea (1951-1962)*. *Añhelo, necesidad y realidad de la aproximación a Europa*, Madrid, Tecnos, 1998; Laporte, M.T., *La*

The predominant view on the Spanish transition underlines the spirit of having a *pact* on the reforms that dismantled the previous regime; this relatively peaceful transition and the birth of a new regime were possible thanks to the general *consensus* among the main political and social forces about what had to be done. With the exception of Spain's entry into NATO, which was initially rejected by leftist forces, this idea has also been applied to foreign policy, particularly in relation to the accession to the EEC, which has been described as one of the basic elements of consensus upon which the transition was constructed. In fact, Spain was the first country to apply to the Community (in July 1977), counting on the unanimous support of all parties represented in parliament, which was elected one month before. In those years Europe became a model for the formation of the Spanish democratic system and was seen as the panacea for Spain's historical problems: democracy, modernisation and a return to world politics.³

Two approaches have been used to try to explain the Spanish pro-European unanimity. Berta Alvarez-Miranda compared the case of Spain with the other Mediterranean countries that joined the EEC in the 1980s, Greece and Portugal, where communists (and socialists in Portugal until 1976) were opposed to the integration. Alvarez-Miranda puts the Spanish unanimity down to three factors: 1) a general agreement on the economic advantages, given a previously high degree of economic links with the Common Market; 2) the perspective of the EEC as a guarantee of democracy against any *revolutionist* temptation,

by the need to moderate the programmes of the leftist parties and thereby the attitudes of the conservative ones; and 3) the overcoming of the international isolation suffered under Franco.⁴ Miguel Ángel Quintanilla, for his part, argues that the Spanish political parties did not actually agree on the European policy; their very different standpoints on the target – accession to the EEC – merely *coincided*. Thus, the centrists members of the Union of Democratic Centre were influenced by the ideals of the European Christian-Democrats; socialists and communists saw the EEC as a symbol of democracy after the dictatorship; the conservative Popular Alliance focused on the free market; and the nationalist parties pinned their hopes on the dissolution of the Community States in a Europe of regions.⁵

For public opinion, however, Europeanism was more influenced by cultural motivations than by economic or political ones. Although a vast majority of the population supported Spain's entry into the EEC (68% against 4% in 1979, when the negotiations started), only a small minority considered themselves acceptably informed about what the EEC really was and the effective consequences of joining it (17% in 1979).⁶ Emotional factors weighed more heavily than rational ones in the public opinion's pro-European choice. Getting over the isolation suffered under Franco was something relatively achieved once Spain had entered the Council of Europe. But as the Community had rejected Spain during Franco's life it seemed almost *compulsory* to join it once the obstacle – the dictator – had disappeared, and show the world that Spain really was a democracy equal to any other western European State. Joining the Community was not a *means* to achieving further goals, but it was a goal in itself.⁷

política europea del régimen de Franco, 1957-1962. Pamplona, EUNSA, 1992; Guirao, F., *Spain and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1957*. London, Macmillan, 1998; Moreno Juste, A. (ed.), *España y el proceso de construcción europea*, Madrid, Ariel, 1998; Trouvé, M., *L'Espagne et l'Europe: de la dictature de Franco à l'Union européenne*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang, 2009; Crespo Maclennan, J., *España en Europa, 1945-2000. Del ostracismo a la modernidad*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2004; Sarrüstegui, J. (ed.), *Cuando la transición se hizo posible. El "gobierno de Munich"*, Madrid, Tecnos, 1993; Pereira Castañares, J.C., "Europeización de España / Españolización de Europa: el dilema histórico resuelto", in *Documentación Social* nr. 111, april-june 1998, p. 39-58; Pereira Castañares, J.C., "L'européisme spagnolo (1945-1970): obiettivi e iniziative di una Spagna divisa", in Pistone, S. (dir.), *I movimenti per l'unità europea 1954-1969*, Milano, Jaca Book, 1996, p. 125-149; Cavallaro, M.E., *Los orígenes de la integración de España en Europa. Desde el franquismo hasta los años de la transición*, Madrid, Sílex, 2009.

³ Gooch, A., "El lenguaje político español", in *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, No. 52, 1986, p. 137-152; Pereira Castañares, J.C., Moreno Juste, A., "España ante el proceso de integración europea desde una perspectiva histórica. Panorama historiográfico y líneas de investigación", in *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*, Vol. IX, 1991, p. 129-152; Moreno Juste, A., "Del 'problema de España a la España europeizada': excepcionalidad y normalización en la posición de España en Europa", in Pereira Castañares, J.C. (ed.), *La política exterior de España (1800-2003)*, Madrid, Ariel, 2003, p. 295-317.

⁴ Alvarez-Miranda, B., *El sur de Europa y la adhesión a la Comunidad. Los debates políticos*, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1996.

⁵ Quintanilla Navarro, M.A., *La integración europea y el sistema político español. Los partidos políticos españoles ante el proceso de integración europea, 1979-1999*, Madrid, Congreso de los Diputados, 2001; *id.*, *El misterio del europeísmo español. Enjambres y arispeiros*, Madrid, Síntesis, 2005.

⁶ "La opinión pública española ante la Comunidad Económica Europea, 1968-1985", in *Revista de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, No. 29, 1985, p. 289-396.

⁷ Jáuregui, P., "Spain: Europe as a Symbol of Modernity, Democracy and Renewed International Prestige", in Stråth, B., and Trianda Fyllidou, A. (eds.), *Representations of Europe and the Nation in Current and Prospective Member States. Media, Elites and Civil Society. The Collective State of the Art and Historical Reports*, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, p. 285-319; Montalho Cessi, D., "Il lungo percorso della Spagna verso l'Europa", in *Spagna Contemporanea*, No. 5, 1994, p. 151; Díez Nicolás, J., "Spaniards' Long March Towards Europe", in Royo, S., Manuel, P.S. (eds.), *Spain and Portugal in the European Union. The first fifteen years*, London, Frank Cass, 2003, p. 119-146.

As for the attitudes of political parties, our hypothesis is that they did not only diverge on their idea of Europe. As Quintanilla says, in fact they avoided explaining clearly to the electorate which idea of Europe was at stake. Therefore, the only continuous element in the European discourse from the main leaders was the exigence of accession as Spain's historical right, as a sanction of her *Europeanity* and the success of democratisation. But there was no general debate on the consequences of integration for the different economic sectors or for the country's position on the international scene. In fact, in their public speeches about European policy, the parties tripped themselves up with notorious contradictions. Sometimes this was to justify decisions made by the government in the course of the negotiations, and sometimes to show a radical opposition to such decisions – eventually described as “surrenders”. But there was always evidence of the lack of a coherent and rigorous programme regarding these topics. The Europeanism that the parties proclaimed was extremely *abstract* and *undefined*, just like the Europeanism attributed to public opinion, and, above all, there was the fear that any *Euro-sceptic* declaration would be identified with the former regime's attitude, and presumably lead to a loss of votes.⁸ This can be corroborated with a quick revision of the stakes expressed by the main political forces between 1977 – when most of the parties were legalised – and 1985, when the Treaty of Accession was signed.

The Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) was a heterogeneous centrist coalition created by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez. It governed the country from 1977 to 1982, bringing together figures from the most liberal factions of Francoism and from the former democratic opposition.⁹ It was the UCD government that presented the application to the EEC in July 1977 and conducted the first stage of negotiations, which began in February 1979. From February 1978 the head of this department was Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, who was appointed Minister of Relations with the EEC (he went on to succeed Suárez as Prime Minister in February 1981).

The UCD included in its programme Spain's incorporation into the EEC and this goal was developed as a priority. Nevertheless, neither its internal documents nor its leaders' public declarations clearly conveyed

the concrete reasons for this policy, nor the project of European construction that the party upheld. According to Suárez, the Spaniard's determination to join the Community was grounded in the conviction of “forming part of Europe”, despite the fact that at the time only a minority of European States belonged to the EEC.¹⁰ In the rhetoric of the public discourse, this *Europe* was presented under the label “*political project*”. Javier Rupérez, the foreign affairs parliamentary spokesman, stated that the Communities were “the project of life, in common with some other countries that share the same ideological structure and aspirations and have the same cultural and political approaches”.¹¹ In 1978 the First National Congress of the party officially approved Europeanism as a *political option*, matching the preference of the majority of Spanish people.¹² Minister Ignacio Camuñas even identified Euro-scepticism and Francoism when he stated in parliament that being opposed to the country's accession to the EEC would be “reactionary”.¹³ Yet for UCD leaders it was not so clear exactly *which* Europe they wished to join. Asked by the press whether he preferred a market-based Europe or a political union, Calvo-Sotelo simply opted for “the existing one”.¹⁴ Calvo-Sotelo declared himself to be satisfied with the European Treaties currently in force, seeing no need to revise them, while his partner, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, chairman of the Parliament and the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, advocated a complete reform of the Treaties in the way proposed by the Tindemans Plan. Camuñas summarised the question in parliament with these words: “They talk about different models of Europe: Europe of the peoples, Europe of merchants, Europe of workers, Europe of the companies... [..] we, men of the Union of the Democratic Centre, are contented with working for a pluralist, free and democratic Europe.”¹⁵

As the UCD's theoretical programme on Europe was not very well defined, we must search for clues in how they managed relations between the EEC and the government. The first thing we see is that although Spain had entered a new stage in its relations with Europe once

⁸ López Gómez, C., “Los españoles y la Comunidad Europea (1975-1985): partidos políticos, grupos de opinión, prensa”, in Ribagorda, A., Pallot, R. (eds.), *Historia en marcha. Nuevas líneas de investigación sobre la España contemporánea*, Madrid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2008, p. 91-114.

⁹ About the history and the composition of UCD, Hurreaus, C., *La Unión de Centro Democrático y la transición a la democracia en España*, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1995; Alonso-Castrillo, S., *La agnosta del centro. Historia de la UCD*, Madrid, Alianza, 1996.

¹⁰ Declarations to *Financial Times*, 22/2/1978, quoted in Suárez, A., *Un nuevo horizonte para España. Discursos del Presidente del Gobierno, 1976-1978*, Madrid, Presidencia del Gobierno, Servicio Central de Publicaciones, 1978, p. 175.

¹¹ Rupérez, J., “Europa y lo europeo en los propósitos internacionales de la UCD”, conferencia at the Seminar *Spain in Europe: Political, Economic and Social Aspects of Integration to the EEC*, Cuenca, UCD, 19-21 October 1979.

¹² *La solución a un reto. Tesis para una sociedad democrática occidental*, Madrid, UCD, 1979, p. 178-179.

¹³ *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso (DSC)*, Plenary Sessions, 21, I Session, p. 1100.

¹⁴ *Diario 16*, 30/11/1978.

¹⁵ DSC, Plenary Sessions, 21, I Session, p. 1048 and 1101-1102.

democracy was established, the UCD's negotiating style was the same as the style that had been used under Francoism since the 1960s and for the Commercial Agreement signed with the EEC in 1970, as well as its later re-negotiation. There were purely institutional contacts, a lack of attention to the specific interests of the concerned States and a scarce readiness to exchange sectorial concessions. There was also a tendency towards a blocking of the process and a lack of imaginative alternatives to the interruption of negotiations. It was an ineffective policy, in short, which simply continued what had been done before Franco's death.¹⁶ Likewise, the perspective was much more economic than political, and Spanish experts and diplomats fiercely defended their positions on sensitive aspects such as transition periods for industry and agriculture, particularly concerning exports that were vital for the Spanish economy. On this subject, the government assumed the position of the employers' organisation, the CEOE, saying they would not renounce certain interests under any circumstances ("Yes to Europe, but not at whatever cost", was the CEOE's slogan).¹⁷ Prime Minister Suárez never felt any great enthusiasm for European matters, and he delegated decisions to his ministers and advisors. The fact that negotiations were not carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – something the socialist opposition disapproved of – made it difficult to comprehend their political dimension.¹⁸ Consequently, the UCD government had no response to France's obstacles to the Spanish application (the strength of Spain's agricultural sector intimidated farmers from southern France), and the Franco-Spanish strain blocked the process. UCD leaders reinforced the idea that they were negotiating with a Community of Nine, not with any particular country. When negotiations were almost frozen between 1980 and 1982, some UCD members protested against the French attitude. But nothing was done, apart from accusing France – for example, at the UCD II Congress, held in Majorca in 1981 – of "transferring its own problems to the applicant countries".¹⁹

¹⁶ Marquina, A., "La política exterior de los gobiernos de Unión de Centro Democrático", in Tusell, J., Soto, A. (eds.), *Historia de la Transición 1975-1986*, Madrid, Alianza, 1996, p. 189; Papell, A., *Ideas para un partido de centro. Análisis ideológico y crítico*, Madrid, Unión Editorial, 1979, p. 156.

¹⁷ ABC, 19/4/1978; *Ya*, 22/12/1978; *Ya*, 6/8/1976. Interview of GHISRI with Raimundo Bassols, Spanish Ambassador to the EEC in 1977-1982, 21/4/2008

¹⁸ When socialist senator Fernando Morán accused Calvo-Sotelo of not paying enough attention to the positions of key member States like France, the minister answered that such political matters were not his business. DSC, Foreign Affairs Commission, 19, Constituent Session, p. 1574-1575.

¹⁹ Chamorro, E., *Viaje al centro de UCD*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1981, p. 201; Trouvé, M., *La diplomatie espagnole face à l'Europe (1962-1986): enjeux, stratégies et acteurs*

In short, the European policy of the UCD government was characterised by the split between a Europeanist public discourse – invoking the political union of the continent's peoples, more than economic benefits – and the hard reality of the struggle for national interests, both on the Spanish side and in other member States. Finally, the UCD government ended up a victim of its own optimistic predictions at the beginning of the process when they announced that accession could be obtained by 1983. Such haste was electorally motivated and, as Calvo-Sotelo himself would reveal later, attempted to send out to the public an impression of diligence.²⁰

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) was the main force of opposition before 1982, and was in government, led by Felipe González, from 1982 to 1996. While the UCD lacked a concrete discourse on European integration, in the 1960s and 1970s the PSOE was already used to dealing with the Common Market in its programmes. Though the socialist stakes were quite critical at first, the links between the anti-Francoist opposition and the European institutions created an identification between Europeanism and democracy that was to make entry into the EEC a target not to be waived. Yet within this aspiration was the aim of somehow transforming the existing community, so that it could become the seeds of a socialist union in Western Europe. Their model of Europe was the Europe of workers, which was to be achieved through the internal transformation of the institutions, in cooperation with the European left, becoming an alternative to the Cold War blocks and build a bridge to the Third World.²¹ Moreover, during the late 1970s the PSOE ideologically evolved towards moderation in its political and economic programme. In 1979 it removed marxism from its ideological foundations, as González was aware that they could not win elections while the electorate continued to view them as a radicalised, anti-capitalist group.

When negotiations with the EEC started, the socialist spokesman Manuel Martín announced in the Parliament that they would be "watchful". European policy, he said, should not abide by party interests: it was an issue that concerned the whole of the State, so the PSOE would not accept any temptation for quick negotiations;

²⁰ *de l'adhésion de l'Espagne aux Communautés européennes*, Doctoral Thesis, Université Bordeaux III, 2004, p. 578-579.

²¹ DSC, Foreign Affairs Commission, 44, Constituent Session, p. 1576; interview of Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo in *Diario 16*, 30/11/1978.

²² Morán, F., *Una política exterior para España*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1980, p. 33; Ortuño Anaya, P., *Los socialistas europeos y la transición española (1959-1977)*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2005, p. 161-162; Carabantes, A., *Balances y futuro del socialismo*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1984, p. 185.

"accepting whatever" (from the Community) in order to politically "capitalise on the accession"; nor the use of the negotiations to create a banal image of Suárez as an internationally renowned statesman. He also stressed the need for the government to share information with the rest of the parliamentary groups and to collect their opinions in order to define the Spanish position in Brussels.²² When the process became blocked in 1980, criticism mounted against the UCD government, which had not understood that negotiations were held on a bilateral front, particularly with France, and that bad relations with this country were hindering the negotiations.²³

When the socialists won the elections, new Prime Minister Felipe González declared that accession to the EEC was a priority to achieve before the next elections.²⁴ A political impetus was to be given to the process: the Ministry for Relations with the EEC disappeared and negotiations went under the control of the Minister of Foreign Relations, Fernando Morán. González himself addressed all Prime Ministers of the Community, demanding from them a "clear attitude" on the Spanish question. Direct pressure was applied on each concerned country through embassies, and there were also campaigns aimed at changing public opinion in those countries more reluctant to the enlargement.²⁵ Above all, it was essential to face relations with France, on the one hand, and to get support from the German Federal Republic, on the other, as any internal reform of the Community would in the end depend on Germany's disposition towards increasing its contribution to the EEC budget.²⁶ A great effort was made to improve relations with France, profiting from the ideological match with François Mitterrand's presidency, and a series of encounters between ministers and farmers' associations from both countries reduced the French distrust.²⁷ Obtaining German support demanded a realistic turn in the PSOE's attitude on the Cold War: in 1982 the Spanish socialists had been opposed to joining NATO, refusing the insinuation from UCD members that it could help in some way to get acceptance from the EEC. But in 1983 socialist

leaders realised how much the GFR appreciated the Spanish contribution to the Western defence, and González expressed to Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn his "understanding and solidarity" regarding the deployment of the Pershing-2 euromissiles. Only a few weeks later, in the European Council held in Stuttgart, the GFR made reform of the Community budget conditional on the successful enlargement to Spain and Portugal.²⁸

Once bilateral problems were overcome, the negotiations took on a faster pace in 1984. A new EEC regulation on Fruit and Vegetables in November 1983 permitted the fixing of negotiating positions on this delicate chapter. The European Council of Fontainebleau (June 1984) solved the budget matters, and British reluctance ended when Spain opened Gibraltar's "fence". More chapters of the negotiations were progressively closed (the setting of transition periods of seven years for the free movement of Spanish workers in the Community and the exportation of fruit and vegetables) and the Accession Treaty was finally signed on June 12, 1985.

Although the final accords did not satisfy most of the actors involved (especially farmers, who called for demonstrations in several cities), the PSOE expressed an extremely triumphalistic discourse, returning to traditional rhetoric about the overcoming of isolation and the identification between European integration and democracy. The fact that the Treaty had been concluded in a rush so it could be signed before the next elections (according to some trade unions and employers association) was overlooked, even though the PSOE had warned against *capitalisation* on the European policy only a few years before. Entry to the EEC would be the main argument in the socialists' campaign in 1986.²⁹

The conservative Popular Alliance (AP) was created in 1976 as a federation of seven parties, led by former Francoist minister Manuel Fraga. Its electoral results were poor in 1977 (16 seats in the Parliament), but in 1982 it became the main opposition party after the collapse of the UCD.³⁰ Like the other political forces, by the dawn of the

²² DSC, Foreign Affairs Commission, 18, I Session, p. 16.

²³ Arévalo, J.C., "Política exterior de España: descalificación absoluta", in *El Socialista*, No. 253, 14/4/1982.

²⁴ *El País*, 1/12/1982.

²⁵ Trouvé, M., *La diplomatie*, op. cit., p. 607.

²⁶ These were the guidelines of action presented by Minister Fernando Morán in the Parliament. DSC, Foreign Affairs Commission, 11, II Session, p. 9.

²⁷ Morán, F., *España en su sitio*, Barcelona, Plaza & Janés, 1990, p. 54-70; Reventós, J., *Misión en París. Memorias de un embajador*, Barcelona, Península, 1993, p. 170-175; Vornis, C., "L'histoire réconciliée: Les relations franco-espagnoles 1983-2005", in Vornis, C., Aguilari, M.A., 1983-2003. *Veinte años de diálogo hispano-francés. Veint años de dialogue franco espagnol*, Diálogo, 2003, p. 8-47.

²⁸ González Sánchez, E., "Las negociaciones de adhesión de España a las Comunidades Europeas: enero 1983-marzo 1984", in *Revista de Instituciones Europeas*, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 478; Preston, P., Smyth, D., *España ante la CEE y la OTAN*, Barcelona, Grifalbo, 1985, p. 162-173; Marks, M.P., *The Formation of European Policy in Post-Franco Spain. The Role of Ideas, Interests and Knowledge*, Avebury, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 1997.

²⁹ Message of Prime Minister to the nation, *El País*, 30/3/1985; Speech by the Spanish Prime Minister, *El País*, 13/6/1985; *El Socialista*, No. 378, 1/4/1985.

³⁰ About the history of AP, López Nieto, L., *Alianza Popular. Estructura y evolución de un partido conservador (1976-1982)*, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1982; Dávila, C., *De Fraga a Fraga. Crónica secreta de Alianza*

democratic regime the AP expressed its support for Spain's entry to the EEC.³¹ All seven founding parties mentioned in their statutes European integration as a primary objective in foreign policy. Yet this was not based on the appreciation of economic advantages but on cultural and historical considerations: Spain was a part of Europe and so it had to be recognised by being admitted to the EEC. Therefore, the AP's first electoral programme interpreted entry into the EEC as a "policy of prestige" and also as the obtention of Spain's "identity in the concert of nations".³² This *abstract Europeanism* was at odds with the reality of a European Community where every State defended its own interest. So when difficulties arose between Spain and the EEC, even before the start of the negotiations (for reasons such as the limitations imposed on Spanish iron and steel exports, or the expulsion of Spanish fishermen from EEC waters), the AP complained about the egoistic trend the EEC had adopted, "betraying" the broad-mindedness of the "fathers of Europe".³³

But when negotiations started and all actors – especially the employers, politically close to the AP – began to realise how much the concrete accords with the EEC would affect their activities, the AP's idealistic view on the construction of Europe radically changed into a State-based approach, where everyone fought bitterly for his own good. This new *realistic* approach referred to the way Spain had to negotiate with the Community, but also to the perception of the EEC as a space of economic competition.³⁴ The AP prescribed for the Spanish negotiators

Popular. Barcelona, Plaza & Janés, 1989; Baón, R., *Historia del Partido Popular. I. Del Franquismo a la Refundación*, Ibersaf, 2001; Penella, M., *Los orígenes y la evolución del Partido Popular. Una historia de AP, 1973-1989*, Salamanca: Caja Duero, 2005; Velo De Antelo, J.M., *De ayer a hoy. Los orígenes del Partido Popular*, Gailand Books, 2010.

³¹ Lopez Gómez, C., "Europeísmo y oposición: Alianza Popular y la adhesión de España a la CEE (1976-1985)", in *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, No. 29, 2007, p. 279-296.

³² AP, *Electoral Programme, 1977*. Other documents expressing the same views are: Unión del Pueblo Español, *Statutes*, art. III; Acción Regional, *Political Programme* (February 1977), VI; Foreign Policy; *Presencia y propósito de Unión Democrática Española, 1975; Elanamiento para una reforma democrática*, Madrid, GODSA, 1976; *Manifiesto de Alianza Popular, 1976*.

³³ Cf. for instance the articles Fraga Iribarne, M., "Europa vista desde Atenas", in *ABC*, 5/1/1978; Ruiz Gallardón, J.M., "Atención al tema de Europa", in *ABC*, 20/9/1977; Ruiz Gallardón, J.M., "Moral de mercaderes", in *ABC*, 1/9/1977.

³⁴ Herrero y Rodríguez De Miñón, M., "Sobre la unión europea. El punto de vista español", conference at Rutgers University (Pennsylvania), September 1985. Also Fraga Iribarne, M., *España y Europa*, Barcelona, Planeta, 1989; Fraga Iribarne, M., "Esa Europa que nos espera", in *ABC*, 12/6/1985; Martes, A., "España en la nueva Europa", conference in the Club Siglo XXI, Madrid, 22/5/1986; Arelliza, J.M., "La advertencia de Giscard", in *ABC*, 15/6/1980.

"infinite patience, temperance, no braggings at all, cautious and cold actions".³⁵ The AP urged the government to bargain with the EEC, exploring the weak points of the latter. Spain should forget about a precise date for the accession and concentrate on getting the best possible conditions.³⁶ As the negotiations went on, the AP feared the government had given up before the EEC on sensitive issues such as agricultural exports, so it tabled a motion in the Chambers with the "basic objectives" to be achieved in the Treaty, which matched the objectives expressed by the employers. The AP was especially worried about the treatment Spanish wines and vegetables would receive after accession. The immediate application of VAT, which the UCD government accepted as a commitment in 1982, was seen by the AP as a negative surrender that would weaken the Spanish position.³⁷

The AP's criticism became tougher in the last months of the negotiations, when agreements were reached on the most delicate chapters. The AP's men deemed that the terms of the accession were detrimental for Spain, and parliamentary spokesman Miguel Herrero even insinuated that Spain should delay its entry to the EEC and wait for a more favorable occasion. He even stated that the EEC would turn out to be "bad business" for Spain if transition periods for agriculture were longer than for industrial products.³⁸ In spite of this wave of criticism in the public discourse, the principle of the accession to the EEC was not seriously questioned by the AP at any time. The attempts to modify this policy were mere anecdotes. In 1980, Guillermo Kirkpatrick, the AP's secretary of international relations, proposed a future *renegotiation* of the accession, like Britain had recently requested, in case national interests were not appropriately defended in the Treaty, but he made clear that this did not imply that the party renounced Europeanism.³⁹

When the text of the Treaty was made known to the public, the AP's response was a fierce attack against the government for all the concessions it had ended up accepting. The AP's statement foresaw an economic disaster in regions like the northern coast, affected by a reduction of milk and bovine production, the disappearance of 75,000

³⁵ Fraga Iribarne, M., "Europa: ideal político", in *ABC*, 29/3/1985.

³⁶ *Soluciones para una década. Libro blanco de Alianza Popular, 1981*, p. 272-276.

³⁷ *Diario de Sesiones del Senado*, Plenary Sessions, No. 80, II Session, p. 4011-4022; Ramirez, M., "AP ante la integración del sector agrario en la CEE", in *Alianza*, No. 10, September 1984; Communiqué of AP Executive Committee, 26/11/1984.

³⁸ Communiqué of AP Executive Committee, 18/2/1985; Herrero y Rodríguez De Miñón, M., "España entre la Comunidad Europea y la Alianza Atlántica", conference at Oviedo University, 18/1/1985; *Id.*, "La OTAN como instrumento de política interior", conference at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, 27-3-1984.

³⁹ AP, *III Congress, 1980*, Motions, Programmes, Statutes, p. 47 and 56.

jobs in the Canary Islands (as this region was not to be included in the Agricultural Policy) and a dark future for the Spanish naval sector.⁴⁰ Herrero condemned the losses for Cantabric farmers, Galician fishermen and producers of wine, cotton, fruits and vegetables in numerous regions.⁴¹

But despite these pessimistic predictions (which in most cases did not come true), the AP did not hesitate to vote for the ratification of the Treaty. Thus, although they claimed not to agree with the terms of the accession, the move itself was a "historical event", which meant "the return of Spain to history instead of isolation". The discourse was similar to that of the PSOE, with the nuance that for the AP it was not a success of the government but of the whole nation.⁴² In conclusion, the AP disliked the Treaty, but refusing the accession was not a conceivable option. The public would have seen it as a sign of Euroscepticism and it might have been a reminder of the Francoist background of the AP's founders, at a time when the party was supposedly evolving to the political centre.

The legalisation of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in April of 1977 was one of the landmarks in Spain's transition to democracy. From an ideological standpoint, the PCE's view of the EEC was quite similar to that of the PSOE in the 1960s and early 1970s: the Common Market was seen as a capitalist construction that had to be completely transformed. This stake changed as the party progressively got rid of Moscow's ropes in the 1970s. At its VIII Congress, held in Paris in 1972, the PCE accepted for the first time an association between Spain and the EEC once Franco's regime had disappeared. In his report, secretary general Santiago Carrillo noted that the Common Market was not necessarily an enemy of the working class, but it could be used as an instrument of the internationalisation of producing forces. Besides, there was the fact that commercial exchanges between Spain and the EEC were increasing, and with its acceptance of the EEC, the PCE "laid the foundations for a policy of defence of the national interest".⁴³ What was really behind this change of attitude was the need to find a common space with the rest of the democratic opposition when everyone was more or less convinced that the dictatorship was crumbling. In 1974 the PCE created the *Democratic Board*, an association of anti-Francoist parties, with the participation of important figures from the Europeanist

groups, such as Enrique Tierno Galván or José Vidal-Beneyto. The other aspect of this new policy was the dissociation from Soviet interests and the acceptance of the democratic system for the struggle for power. This new trend, shared by the communist parties from France and Italy, was proclaimed in 1975 with the name of *eurocommunism*.

From this perspective, the PCE supported Spain's entry into the EEC because the Community was the response to the necessary integration of strategies by European communist parties, and also because a united Europe could become an autonomous actor on the international scene, not subdued by any of the military blocks, with a capacity to promote the real economic independence of Third World countries.⁴⁴ But when negotiations started, the PCE expressed criticism very similar to the AP's (and to that of the PSOE before 1982), demanding from the government a steely defence of the national interest in topics such as the right of Spanish workers to move to other EEC countries (Greece's Accession Treaty was a negative precedent, as it included a clause that delayed this right for seven years, as would happen later to Spain). Another example was the participation of all parties and social actors in the definition of the Spanish positions (the PCE proposed in parliament the creation of a Consultative Council formed by workers, employers and the regional governments).⁴⁵ On several occasions the communist spokesmen urged the government to avoid delays in the accession, and in the electoral programme the party even promised to fulfill it before 1984 if they were in government.⁴⁶ But other times they reproached the government for moving too fast on such a delicate matter and for using the date of accession as trump card for the next elections.⁴⁷

What the PCE really disapproved of when it came to the government's haste was the *ambiguous* link between NATO and the EEC. The PCE had been the most radical opponent to Spain's entry to the Atlantic Alliance, and PCE leaders insisted that it would not

⁴⁰ Carrillo, S., *Eurocomunismo y Estado*, Madrid, Crítica, 1977, p. 60; Carrillo, S. et al., *La propuesta comunista*, Barcelona, Laia, 1977, p. 40; PCE, *IX Congreso*, 1978, Political Motion; *Mundo Obrero*, No. 27, June 1979; PCE, *X Congreso*, July 1981, Central Committee Report.

⁴¹ Carrillo, S., Sanchez Montero, S., *PCE*, Bilbao, Albia, 1977, p. 105-106; DSC, Foreign Affairs Commission, 1, I Session, p. 19, 7, I Session, p. 12, and 18, I Session, p. 13. DSC, Plenary Session, 21, I Session, p. 1103; Montero, L., "La situación de los inmigrantes en el Mercado Común", in *Mundo Obrero*, No. 52, December 1979.

⁴² DSC, Foreign Affairs Commission, 18, I Session, p. 12-13. PCE, electoral programme, 1982.

⁴³ DSC, Plenary Sessions, II Session, p. 10211; PCE, Economic Committee, *Las negociaciones de adhesión a la CEE*, July 1984; "España ante la CEE", in *Mundo Obrero*, No. 268, February 1984.

⁴⁰ *Alianza*, No. 18, 15/6/1985 and No. 19, 1/7/1985.

⁴¹ DSC, Plenary Sessions, 221, II Session, p. 10196.

⁴² DSC, Plenary Sessions, 222, II Session, p. 10261; Verstrynge Rojas, J., "España y el destino de Europa", conference at the Club Siglo XXI, Madrid, 17/4/1986.

⁴³ Estruch, J., *Historia oculta del PCE*, Madrid, Tems de Hoy, 2000, p. 224; *VIII Congreso del PCE*, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1972, p. 18-24.

necessarily make things easier regarding the EEC.⁴⁸ In June 1983 the PCE's Central Committee held a debate on how the party should react to the PSOE's pro-NATO position. Carrillo, who had left the post of secretary-general after the disastrous results of elections in 1982, and other members said they could not accept joining the EEC through the "funnel" of NATO and the party should propose to the whole of the country "a pause", to debate and consider whether it was really convenient to join the EEC. The motion was rejected by the majority on the basis that the electorate would understand it as "a reconsideration of the PCE's European policy". The party's official magazine immediately published an editor's note saying that the PCE's Europeanism was not to be questioned.⁴⁹

When the Treaty was signed, the PCE's position was not as critical as might have been expected, given the long transitory periods imposed for Spanish workers. The party's spokesmen accepted some faults in the text as a small price to pay for achieving the recognition of Spain's *Europeaness*. They even boasted about the "responsible support" they had provided during the process. Spain escaped at last from the isolation where the "reactionary classes" had kept her for centuries. The parliamentary spokesman, Pérez Royo, justified the PCE's vote for the ratification on its profound "symbolic value".⁵⁰

Disagreements about the EEC were at the heart of several splits in the PCE during those years. The most radicalised pro-Soviet members left the party in 1984 and founded the so-called Communist Party (PC), which was economically supported by the Soviet Union. The party denounced the EEC as an "imperialist process" and "an instrument of the bourgeoisie to expand its political and cultural hegemony". The "Europe of workers" was for them a mere illusion, and the entry to the EEC was the cause of a breakdown of small enterprises and a secondary role for the Spanish economy.⁵¹ Another case was the Spanish Workers Party-Communist Unity (PTE-UC), created by Carrillo in 1985, which

⁴⁸ Carrillo, S., "No a la OTAN", in *Mundo Obrero*, No. 84, July 1980; Declarations of Manuel Azcarate, PCE secretary of Foreign Relations, to *Mundo Obrero*, No. 122, April 1981; Iglesias, G., "Europa, autonomía o decadencia", conference at the Club Siglo XXI, Madrid, January 1986; "Achtung! Euromissiles, de entrada", in *Mundo Obrero*, No. 228, May 1983; PCE, *Report from the secretary general to the Central Committee*, 28/6/1983.

⁴⁹ PCE, *Central Committee Meeting*, 28/6/1983; "España y la CEE", in *Mundo Obrero*, No. 238, July 1983.

⁵⁰ "El PCE ante el acuerdo de Bruselas", in *Mundo Obrero*, No. 327, April 1985; "Nuestro europeísmo", in *Mundo Obrero*, No. 338, June 1985; DSC, Plenary Sessions, 221, II Session, p. 10212.

⁵¹ Partido Comunista, *Tesis del Congreso de la Unidad de los Comunistas*, Madrid, January 1984, p. 8-9.

rejected the Treaty as well and strongly attacked the PCE for gagging those who tried to question it.⁵²

As we have seen, within the Spanish political scene there was a plurality of perceptions and interpretations of European integration, from the Europe of workers preached by communists and socialists to the State-based community defended by the conservatives. We have proved, however, that such discourses changed depending on the circumstances.⁵³ On the other hand, there was no agreement nor internal negotiation between the parties in order to design Spanish policy on Europe. In Mathieu Trouvé's words, the fact that all parties were Europeanist gave the Community a mythical dimension and *banalised* the whole European question.⁵⁴ All parties shared pro-European stakes, but there was no real *consensus* between them.

When the perspective of the accession became real after elections in 1977, all parties concurred on the defence of Spain's historical right to take part in the political construction of Europe, viewing the EEC not only as an economic organisation but as the institution that had to validate Spain's *Europeaness* and the success of the transition to democracy. Notwithstanding, as difficulties arose in the negotiations, the European question became an instrument that could be capitalised on in the political struggle, and the opposition was usually unsatisfied with the way the negotiations were carried out. This explains, for instance, the fact that the PSOE government was criticised on the same grounds that they had earlier used to condemn the UCD (poor defence of the national interest, narrow-minded electoralism, lack of information to the civil society). The socialists justified continuation in NATO because of the *ambiguous link* with the EEC, which they had vigorously refused a few years before. Also the attitudes of the AP and the PCE were filled with contradictions.

Dominant Europeanism was intellectually *uncritical*, as the role of Spain in the future united Europe, or the preferable political form for such union, were never discussed. It was also *opportunistic*, as most parties kept their stakes on Europe as vague and hazy as public opinion was supposed to see the EEC: more as a symbolic satisfaction than as a solid project for foreign policy.

⁵² *Asamblea para la Unidad de los Comunistas, 19-20 de Octubre de 1985*, Madrid, Ahora, 1985, p. 34.

⁵³ For limitations of space, nationalist parties have not been included in this study.

⁵⁴ Trouvé, M., "La diplomatie espagnole face à l'Europe", in Dumoulin, M., Ventura Diaz, A. (eds.), *Portugal y España en la Europa del siglo XX*, Fundación Académica de Yuste, 2005, p. 193.