Qualitative analysis of Bayes–Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
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http://dx.doi.org/10.106/j.econlet.2010.11.030 |
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Title
Qualitative analysis of Bayes–Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctionsDate
2011-03Publisher
ElsevierType
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionSubject
Abstract
We propose a simple qualitative methodology for improving the understanding of the nature of equilibrium strategies in asymmetric first-price sealed-bid auctions when departures from symmetry are weak. We exemplify ... [+]
We propose a simple qualitative methodology for improving the understanding of the nature of equilibrium strategies in asymmetric first-price sealed-bid auctions when departures from symmetry are weak. We exemplify this methodology through the exposition of three examples already studied in literature (Maskin and Riley, 2000a; Fibich and Gavious, 2003; Bajari, 2001). [-]
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Economics Letters, 2011, March, v. 110 (3)Rights
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