Experimental duopolies under price guarantees
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Other documents of the author: Fatás, Enrique; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Máñez, Juan A.; Sabater-Grande, Gerardo
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http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/00036846.2011.568398 |
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Title
Experimental duopolies under price guaranteesDate
2011-09-14Publisher
Taylor & FrancisBibliographic citation
Applied Economics (2013), vol. 45, no. 1, 15-35Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleSubject
Abstract
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price- ... [+]
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the ‘aggressive’ price-beating type. [-]
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info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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- ECO_Articles [697]