Environmental policy instruments: technology adoption incentives with imperfect compliance
comunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadata
Title
Environmental policy instruments: technology adoption incentives with imperfect complianceDate
2010Publisher
Springer VerlagISSN
0924-6460; 1573-1502Bibliographic citation
Environmental and Resource Economics (2010) vol. 47, no. 2, p. 261-274Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionSubject
Abstract
We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect ... [+]
We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms’ incentives to invest, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications. [-]
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- ECO_Articles [688]