Market games as social dilemmas
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Altres documents de l'autoria: Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Ziros, Nicholas
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Market games as social dilemmasData de publicació
2018-11Editor
ElsevierCita bibliogràfica
BARREDA-TARRAZONA, Iván, et al. Market games as social dilemmas. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, 155: 435-444.Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268118302634Versió
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
In an experimental exchange market based on Shapley and Shubik (1977), two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange. In this context, ... [+]
In an experimental exchange market based on Shapley and Shubik (1977), two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange. In this context, although the Nash equilibria of the game involve zero or minimum trade, we obtain intense trade close to levels that maximize social welfare. Going a step forward, we implement communication within pairs of traders from the same (horizontal) and opposite (vertical) sides of the market. Overall, we find that horizontal communication tends to reduce bids whereas vertical communication has no effect. [-]
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