Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors
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Show full item recordcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8648
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8649
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadata
Title
Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional DirectorsDate
2018Publisher
WileyISSN
1035-6908; 1835-2561Bibliographic citation
PUCHETA‐MARTÍNEZ, María Consuelo; GARCÍA‐MECA, Emma. Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors. Australian Accounting Review, 2018Type
info:eu-repo/semantics/articlePublisher version
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/auar.12262Version
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionSubject
Abstract
Our main objective is to study the effect of institutional directors on firm performance, distinguishing directors according to whether they maintain business relationships (pressure‐sensitive) or not (pressure‐resi ... [+]
Our main objective is to study the effect of institutional directors on firm performance, distinguishing directors according to whether they maintain business relationships (pressure‐sensitive) or not (pressure‐resistant). Our results show that in weak regulatory and low investor protection environments, institutional directors have a negative impact on corporate performance. Our evidence shows that this negative effect is mainly driven by the role of pressure‐resistant directors and not for those directors representing mainly banks and other financial institutions with a long‐term investment horizon. These findings have implications for numerous parties, such as institutional investors, regulators, potential new board members and other corporate governance reform proponents, who frequently examine board characteristics to assess the effectiveness of boards in value‐creation policies. [-]
Description
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/auar.12262. This article ... [+]
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/auar.12262. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. [-]
Is part of
Australian Accounting Review, 2018Investigation project
Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness / ECO 2017-82259-RRights
Copyright © John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
This item appears in the folowing collection(s)
- COFIN_Articles [213]
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