Individual Characteristics vs. Experience: An Experimental Study on Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma
Visualitza/
Impacte
Scholar |
Altres documents de l'autoria: Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Ainhoa; Pavan, Marina; Sabater-Grande, Gerardo
Metadades
Mostra el registre complet de l'elementcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
INVESTIGACIONMetadades
Títol
Individual Characteristics vs. Experience: An Experimental Study on Cooperation in Prisoner's DilemmaAutoria
Data de publicació
2017-04-20Editor
Frontiers MediaCita bibliogràfica
BARREDA TARAZONA, Iván; JARAMILLO GUTIÉRREZ, Ainhoa; PAVAN,Marina; SABATER GRANDE, Gerardo. Individual Characteristics vs. Experience: An Experimental Study on Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma. Frontiers in Psychology (2017), v. 8, article 596Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00596/fullParaules clau / Matèries
Resum
Cooperative behavior is often assumed to depend on individuals’ characteristics, such
as altruism and reasoning ability. Evidence is mixed about what the precise impact
of these characteristics is, as the subjects ... [+]
Cooperative behavior is often assumed to depend on individuals’ characteristics, such
as altruism and reasoning ability. Evidence is mixed about what the precise impact
of these characteristics is, as the subjects of study are generally randomly paired,
generating a heterogeneous mix of the two characteristics. In this study we ex-ante
create four different groups of subjects by factoring their higher or lower than the median
scores in both altruism and reasoning ability. Then we use these groups in order to
analyze the joint effect of the two characteristics on the individual choice of cooperating
and on successful paired cooperation. Subjects belonging to each group play first 10
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games with ten random partners and then three
consecutive 10-round repeated PD games with three random partners. In all games,
we elicit players’ beliefs regarding cooperation using an incentive compatible method.
Individuals with high altruism are more optimistic about the cooperative behavior of the
other player in the one-shot game. They also show higher individual cooperation and
paired cooperation rates in the first repetitions of this game. Contrary to the one-shot
PD games where high reasoning ability reduces the probability of playing cooperatively,
the sign of the relationship is inverted in the first repeated PD game, showing that
high reasoning ability individuals better adjust their behavior to the characteristics of the
game they are playing. In this sense, the joint effect of reasoning ability and altruism
is not linear, with reasoning ability counteracting the cooperative effect of altruism in
the one-shot game and reinforcing it in the first repeated game. However, experience
playing the repeated PD games takes over the two individual characteristics in explaining
individual and paired cooperation. Thus, in a (PD) setting, altruism and reasoning ability
significantly affect behavior in single encounters, while in repeated interactions individual
and paired cooperation reach similarly high levels independently of these individual
characteristics. [-]
Publicat a
Frontiers in Psychology (2017), v. 8Drets d'accés
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Apareix a les col.leccions
- ECO_Articles [692]
Els següents fitxers sobre la llicència estan associats a aquest element: