The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.06.008 |
Metadatos
Título
The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s resultFecha de publicación
2015Editor
ElsevierISSN
0167-6377Cita bibliográfica
GARCÍA-SEGARRA, J.; GINÉS-VILAR, M. The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result. Operations Research Letters, 2015, vol. 43, no 5, p. 476-478.Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167637715000814Palabras clave / Materias
Resumen
There is a fundamental tradeoff between Pareto optimality and monotonicity in bargaining games. We show that there exists no solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity for n≥3 agents. The ... [+]
There is a fundamental tradeoff between Pareto optimality and monotonicity in bargaining games. We show that there exists no solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity for n≥3 agents. The result extends the impossibility theorem of Roth (1979) by removing the symmetry axiom. [-]
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Operations Research Letters, 2015, vol. 43, no 5Derechos de acceso
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