The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result
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Metadades
Títol
The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s resultData de publicació
2015Editor
ElsevierISSN
0167-6377Cita bibliogràfica
GARCÍA-SEGARRA, J.; GINÉS-VILAR, M. The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result. Operations Research Letters, 2015, vol. 43, no 5, p. 476-478.Tipus de document
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersió de l'editorial
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167637715000814Paraules clau / Matèries
Resum
There is a fundamental tradeoff between Pareto optimality and monotonicity in bargaining games. We show that there exists no solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity for n≥3 agents. The ... [+]
There is a fundamental tradeoff between Pareto optimality and monotonicity in bargaining games. We show that there exists no solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity for n≥3 agents. The result extends the impossibility theorem of Roth (1979) by removing the symmetry axiom. [-]
Publicat a
Operations Research Letters, 2015, vol. 43, no 5Drets d'accés
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