Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals
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Otros documentos de la autoría: Attanasi, Giuseppe; García-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Montesano, Aldo
Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemcomunitat-uji-handle:10234/9
comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/8643
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/8644
comunitat-uji-handle4:
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Título
Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposalsFecha de publicación
2012Editor
LLC “СPС “Business Perspectives”ISSN
1998-6041; 1998-605XTipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
http://businessperspectives.org/journals_free/ee/2012/ee_2012_04_Attanasi.pdfVersión
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreement making as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with ... [+]
This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreement making as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, we propose our theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity. [-]
Publicado en
Environmental Economics, v. 3, n. 4Derechos de acceso
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Aparece en las colecciones
- ECO_Articles [693]