• closedAccess   Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems 

      García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Springer-Verlag (2017-12)
      Some bargaining solutions may remain unchanged under any extension of a bargaining set which does not affect the utopia point, despite the fact that there is room to improve the utility of at least one agent. We call this ...
    • closedAccess   The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result 

      García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Elsevier (2015)
      There is a fundamental tradeoff between Pareto optimality and monotonicity in bargaining games. We show that there exists no solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity for n≥3 agents. The ...