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Metáfora y discurso

Metaphor and Discourse

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Índice / *Contents*

Presentación

El presente volumen monográfico especial de la revista *Cultura, Lenguaje y Representación* supone para los editores del mismo una doble satisfacción. Por un lado, pensamos que el conjunto de artículos presentado aquí contribuye de manera merecida a la difusión y buen nombre de la revista, pues se trata de un compendio de excelentes artículos sobre distintas facetas de los mecanismos de la metáfora y la metonimia y sus funciones en la estructuración y el devenir del discurso en sus diferentes tipos. El foro es más que apropiado dado que la metáfora y la metonimia son aspectos fundamentales de las culturas, los cuales se manifiestan a través del lenguaje y, decididamente, contribuyen a la representación que los hablantes construyen en relación con la comprensión no sólo de textos sino también de situaciones, comportamientos y actitudes, así como el entorno social en general. Por otro lado, ve la luz el resultado de una labor de casi dos años desde la celebración del *II Seminario Internacional sobre Metáfora y Discurso* en la Universitat Jaume I. En él se dieron cita cerca de 50 especialistas procedentes de cuatro continentes y fue el origen de la mayoría de los trabajos que se han reelaborado para el presente volumen. La tarea ha supuesto un largo proceso de selección y reelaboración de los trabajos. Queremos manifestar nuestro agradecimiento tanto al comité de redacción y los coordinadores de la revista, como a la Universitat Jaume I, cuyo servicio de publicaciones apostó decididamente por nuestro proyecto.

Los trabajos compilados son una magnífica muestra de la diversidad de las posibles aplicaciones del estudio de la metáfora y de la metonimia y sus manifestaciones lingüísticas. Algunas contribuciones (Steen, Goschler) inciden directamente en los aspectos metodológicos de la investigación tan necesitados en este campo, planteando cuestiones como la dificultad en la identificación de

Editorial

The present special monographic volume of the journal *Culture, Language and Representation* means a twofold satisfaction for its guest editors. On the one hand, the set of papers displayed here contributes deservedly to the diffusion and good reputation of the journal. It does so since it is an excellent compendium on different facets of metaphoric and metonymic mechanisms and their functions in the occurrence and structuring of discourse in its different forms. The forum is more than adequate, since metaphor and metonymy are fundamental cultural aspects expressed through language. In addition, these manifestations definitely contribute to the speakers' representation of their understanding not only of texts but of situations, behaviour and attitudes, as well as the social environment in general. On the other hand, the result of a work of almost two years sees the light since the celebration of the *II*nd *International Workshop on Metaphor and Discourse* at Universitat Jaume I. Nearly 50 specialists coming from four continents gathered for the event, which was the origin of most of the papers included in the present volume. The task has implied a long process of selection and elaboration of the papers. We are grateful to the committee and the coordinators of the journal, as well as to Universitat Jaume I, whose publishing services decidedly backed up our project.

The volume that now appears constitutes an excellent and diverse sample of applications of metaphor and metonymy study, and their linguistic manifestations. Some contributions (Steen, Goschler) directly tackle some methodological aspects of research – so much needed in this field – by raising questions like the difficulty in metaphor identification as opposed to other rhetorical mechanisms. Others look into central issues concerning the semantic relations that the metaphors and/or metonymies contribute

metáforas frente a otros mecanismos retóricos. Otras entran en cuestiones centrales sobre las relaciones semánticas que las metáforas y/o las metonimias contribuyen a desplegar en los discursos (Otal, Ponterotto, Silvestre, Cislaru). El siguiente grupo de artículos desarrolla estudios basados en corpus, bien para desvelar indicios formales del uso de las metáforas (Cloiseau), bien para mostrar análisis contrastivos aplicables posteriormente a la didáctica de lenguas (Littlemore; MacArthur). No faltan estudios muy ilustrativos orientados al análisis cultural desde diversos puntos de vista, como el de las expresiones idiomáticas (Rodríguez; Molina), la publicidad y su dimensión retórica (Segovia), los contrastes culturales en Internet (Porto, Tokar) o las representaciones metafóricas y sus consecuencias en la práctica social (Todolí; Ribas). De especial interés desde el punto de vista lingüístico son las contribuciones que señalan el valor cultural de la función pragmática de la metáfora en usos conversacionales (Shibashaki), referenciales (Hrisonopulo) o de qué manera la inferencia puede guiar la evolución diacrónica de estos usos (Sullivan). Finalmente, incluimos un análisis de la función metafórica en la obra literaria de Süskind (Gaspar).

La diversidad de los enfoques recogidos en el presente volumen proporciona una visión global y multifacética de los mecanismos lingüísticos de la metáfora y de la metonimia y su imbricación en las representaciones culturales. Como coordinadores del proyecto agradecemos a todos los autores su dedicación y su consideración en el envío de los trabajos.

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Ignasi Navarro i Ferrando,
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to unfold in discourse (Otal, Ponterotto, Silvestre, Cislaru). Another cluster of articles develops corpus-based studies, with the purpose of unveiling formal indications of metaphor usage (Cloiseau), or showing contrastive analyses applicable to Foreign Language Teaching (Littlemore; MacArthur). We also include very illustrative studies oriented to cultural analysis from diverse points of view such as idiomaticity (Rodríguez; Molina), advertising and its rhetorical dimension (Segovia), cultural contrasts in the Internet (Porto, Tokar) or metaphorical representations and their consequences in social practice (Todolí; Ribas). Of special interest from the linguistic point of view are those contributions that signal the cultural value of the pragmatic function of metaphor in conversation (Shibashaki), reference (Hrisonopulo), or how inferential patterns can guide the diachronic evolution of these uses (Sullivan). Finally, we include an analysis of the metaphorical function in Süskind's literary work (Gaspar).

The balanced diversity of the approaches gathered in the present volume provides a global and multifaceted overview of metaphorical and metonymic linguistic mechanisms and their interplay with cultural representations. As coordinators of the project we thank all the authors for their effort and promptness in the handling of their papers.

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Artículos / *Articles*

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Finding Metaphor in Discourse: Pragglejaz and Beyond

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ABSTRACT: This is a methodological paper which addresses three distinct ways in which metaphor can be found in discourse. The first approach concerns the Pragglejaz method for finding metaphorically used words, which involves the canonical case of metaphor identification in cognitive linguistics. The second approach concerns one way in which it is possible to go from words identified as metaphorically used to their related underlying conceptual structures, by means of a five-step procedure. And the third approach focuses on other linguistic forms of expression of metaphor as an underlying cross-domain mapping in conceptual structure, such as simile and analogy. All three approaches are discussed with reference to their application in empirical research on corpus data.

Keywords: metaphor identification, indirect language use, similarity, incongruity, method.

RESUMEN: Este artículo metodológico se centra en los diferentes modos en que el fenómeno de la metáfora puede aparecer en el discurso. El primer enfoque trata el método *Pragglejaz* para identificar palabras usadas metafóricamente, incluyendo el caso canónico de la identificación de metáforas en la lingüística cognitiva. El segundo enfoque describe, mediante un proceso de cinco pasos, una posible forma de acceder a la estructura conceptual subyacente a palabras cuyo uso se ha identificado como metafórico. El tercer enfoque se centra en otras formas lingüísticas de expresar la metáfora concebida como un mapeo subyacente entre dominios en la estructura conceptual, como son el símil o la analogía. Estos tres enfoques se analizan en torno a su aplicación a la investigación empírica en datos de corpus.

Palabras clave: identificación de metáforas, uso indirecto del lenguaje, semejanza, incongruencia, método.

1. Metaphor Identification in Discourse

The identification of metaphor has at least partly been regarded as a matter of finding indirect meaning by both Lakoff (1986, 1993) and Gibbs (1993, 1994). Thus, when somebody says *Sam is a gorilla*, and their utterance does not apply to a gorilla but to a human being, the word *gorilla* has been used indirectly to convey a meaning that differs from its basic, direct application. This is the case even though the contextual meaning of *gorilla* that we have to do with here has become so conventionalized that it has ended up in an advanced learners' dictionary like Macmillan's. This is a dictionary which is based on corpus research, suggesting that the metaphorical meaning may be found frequently enough for it to need description as a conventionalized meaning of the term. The use is analyzed as designating "a big man who seems stupid or violent".

Metaphor may hence be conventionalized to the degree that it becomes part of the language code, at least as this is reflected in cultural repositories such as dictionaries and grammars. Indeed, the conventional nature of linguistic metaphor has been one of the main points of cognitive linguistic research on the phenomenon, and numerous examples have been provided which show that metaphor is part and parcel of our language system and its use (e.g. Lakoff; Johnson, 1980, 1999). This is one of the interesting changes in linguistic metaphor research of the past 25 years, shifting metaphor from its time-honored position of novel and deviant language use to the conventional and the regular.

Conventionalization of metaphor does not mean that it cannot be distinguished from equally conventional non-metaphorical language. It is still possible to make a distinction between the direct and indirect application of a word, or more generally expression, in an utterance. Not many people will deny that *gorilla* has a basic sense which can be directly applied to one sort of referent, a type of ape, as opposed to a derived, metaphorical sense, which can only be indirectly applied to another sort of referent, human beings. Metaphor as indirect meaning and use also holds for other animal metaphors, like *pig* and *bitch*, and for all other metaphors that have been described under such rubrics as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, HAPPY IS UP, or BUSINESS IS WAR. This is the reason why Lakoff, Gibbs and others have adhered to a criterion of indirectness (or to the related notion of incongruity, as in, e.g., Cameron, 2003; Charteris-Black, 2004; cf. Steen, 2007).

Indirectness may be a good starting point for finding metaphor in language, but it is not sufficient. It is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because metaphor is also based on a salient distinction and contrast between the two semantic or conceptual domains involved in the expression, which then also needs to be bridged by some form of semantic transfer from the one domain to the other on the basis of similarity (cf. Cameron, 2003). Thus, *Sam is a gorilla* can be given a metaphorical analysis because it involves a contrast between the domain of gorillas and humans which may be bridged by constructing a similarity between the two. This is different than another form of indirectness, metonymy, where two domains may be contrasted but where the contrast is resolved by contiguity instead of similarity. Thus, in *The White House made the announcement yesterday*, there is a contrast between the domain of buildings and the

people that occupy them, causing a form of indirect meaning. But this is not resolved by metaphorical transfer, but metonymic transfer, via the contiguous relationship between houses and their occupants (for further discussion of metaphor versus metonymy, and similarity versus contiguity, see Dirven and Pörings, 2002).

The criterion of indirectness is also too narrow to capture all linguistic forms of expression of metaphor. If metaphor is defined as a conventional or less conventional mapping across two conceptual domains, as has become customary in cognitive linguistics, it is easy to show that such cross-domain mappings may also be realized by direct language use. Thus, simile and a lot of analogy employ their language in direct ways, in that the words are related to concepts which are directly connected to the intended referents in the text world. One illustration may be provided by the following line from a song by Bruce Springsteen ("I'm on fire"): *Sometimes it's like someone took a knife, baby, edgy and dull, /And cut a six-inch valley through the middle of my soul*. This is a form of a cross-domain mapping which is expressed directly when it comes to relations between words, concepts, and referents: as listeners, we do need to build a text world that contains a knife and a process of cutting in the soul. However, it is also clear that subsequent conceptual analysis has to be done to recover the intended meaning of this cross-domain mapping. Such figures do not use language indirectly but still express metaphorical mappings at a conceptual level of analysis. An inventory of these various forms of metaphor has been proposed by Goatly (1997) and their cognitive linguistic interpretation has been at the centre of attention in Conceptual Integration Theory (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).

The identification of metaphor in language and its use is hence fraught with difficulties (Steen, 2007). In this paper I will discuss some of the issues involved, and report on some of the methodological work I have carried out in various contexts. I will begin with the development and application of the Pragglejaz procedure for finding metaphorically used words in natural discourse, called MIP, which caters for the most frequent expression of metaphor in conceptual structure by metaphorical language (Pragglejaz Group, 2007; Steen, 2002 *a*, 2005 *a*; Steen, *et al*., in press). Then I will continue with one way in which analysts can become more precise in identifying the meaning of a metaphor *as* a conceptual cross-domain mapping (Steen, 1999, in press; Semino *et al*., 2004). And finally I will consider some of the issues that arise when metaphors are not expressed indirectly but directly (Steen, 2007, in press). The latter two sections are two ways in which this paper goes beyond the Pragglejaz method, which explains the title of the paper.

2. The Pragglejaz Method for Finding Metaphorically Used Words

The Pragglejaz Group is an international collective of metaphor researchers who joined forces to examine whether it was possible to devise an explicit and precise method for canonical metaphor identification in discourse. Their name has been derived from the initial letters of their first names:

P eter Crisp, Chinese University Hong Kong, China
R ay Gibbs, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA
A lan Cienki, VU University (Amsterdam) Netherlands
G raham Low, University of York, UK
G erard steen, VU University (Amsterdam) Netherlands
L ynne Cameron, Open University (Milton Keynes), UK
E lena Semino, Lancaster University, UK
J oe Grady, Cultural Logic LLC (Washington DC), USA
A lice Deignan, University of Leeds, UK
Z oltán Kövecses, Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), Hungary

The group has collaborated for six years and attempted to develop a tool for metaphor identification in natural discourse that is both reliable as indicated by statistical tests and valid in that it attempts to make explicit how it makes use of current empirical research in cognitive linguistics, discourse analysis, psycholinguistics, and applied linguistics. The group has published its procedure as Pragglejaz Group (2007; cf. Steen, 2002 *a*, 2005 *a*.

The Pragglejaz group started out on the basis of a preliminary theoretical conceptualization of the nature of the method (Steen, 2002 *b*). This conceptualization involved three issues, including making a choice for a particular theoretical framework, for which a combination was envisaged of the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor with a broad view of discourse analysis. It also implied a decision about the model for metaphor within that theoretical framework, for which the Lakoff and Johnson view of metaphor as a cross-domain mapping was chosen. And a further decision had to be made about the unit of analysis to be adopted, for which the word (or more accurately, the lexical unit) in relation to concepts and referents was preferred (cf. Crisp, Heywood, *et al*., 2002).

Having determined the theoretical framework for the methodological project, an attempt was made to formulate a procedure for metaphor identification. Tentative versions were used for application, testing, and revision, and the final version has now been reported, with a modest reliability test, in Pragglejaz Group (2007). The procedure looks like this:

1. Read the whole text or transcript to understand what it is about.
2. Decide about the boundaries of words.
3. Establish the contextual meaning of the examined word.
4. Determine the basic meaning of the word (most concrete, human-oriented and specific).
5. Decide whether the basic meaning of the word is sufficiently distinct from the contextual meaning.
6. Decide whether the contextual meaning of the word can be related to the more basic meaning by some form of similarity.

After a number of trial reliability tests over the previous years, the goal of publishing the procedure led to its independent application by six analysts to two pieces

of discourse of about 675 words each, one news text and one conversation from the British National Corpus. The reliability of the results was reasonable. About 85% of the words in the conversation and about 75% of the words in the news text were unanimously judged to be *not* metaphorical by all six analysts. Unanimous agreement between all six judges about metaphorical use was obtained for 4% of the words in the conversation, and 7% of the words in the news text. In all, then, there was unanimity about the analysis by six independently operating analysts for 89% and 82% of the cases. If criteria of success are relaxed to include cases where five independently operating analysts agreed with each other about metaphorical or non-metaphorical use, these percentages rise to 93.1 and 91.1, respectively. When these analysts get together to discuss the remaining cases of disagreement, the figures become even more positive.

An example of a stretch of discourse where there was unanimous agreement about non-metaphorical usage according to the criteria of the procedure is the following excerpt from the conversation:

A: So you deny all the studies that prove that...
B: No
A: ... conclusively?
B: And what I'm saying is that...
A: Do you deny those studies?
B: What I'm saying is that y— I probably do <unclear> deny those studies.

Each of these words is not used metaphorically in the sense defined above.

An example of a stretch of discourse where all judges agreed that most of the words were not metaphorically used, but two were, is the following (the number of positive identifications is included in brackets behind the relevant word):

> What i— emerges(6) is depression(6) is a common condition which is under-diagnosed and under-treated.

When we apply the Macmillan dictionary to this excerpt, the verb *emerge* has a contextual meaning of "to become known", but a more basic meaning of "to come out of something or out from behind something". The latter is more basic because it is concrete, as opposed to the abstract meaning of the former. The two senses are distinct, as is reflected by their separate numbering in the dictionary. And they can be related by similarity: when an idea or fact becomes known to people, it is comparable to the physical emergence of a concrete entity. Similarly, *depression* in this context means "a feeling of being extremely unhappy", but its basic meaning designates "an area on a surface that is lower than the parts around it". Again, there is a contrast between the physical and the abstract, and this may be bridged by means of the mapping UNHAPPY IS DOWN.

It is interesting to note here that indirect, contextual meanings do not have to be less frequent than direct, basic meanings. For instance, the emotional sense of *depression* is listed as its first, most common sense by Macmillan. Another complication has to do with the register value of a word. Thus, the concrete basic sense of *depression* is listed

as being formal as opposed to general language use. However, the presence of both senses in the dictionary suggests that they are part of the current language system, albeit with different values, and their joint presence enables their juxtaposition as direct and indirect meanings, of which the latter is based in similarity and therefore metaphor.

An example of a stretch of discourse with less unanimity is the following:

> President Bush the elder's 'new world order(2)' led(6) to(4) the establishment, for the first time, of a Palestinian government, the Palestinian National Authority, on Palestinian soil, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between(3) Jordan and Israel.

Three words are seen as potentially metaphorical by less than five of the six judges: *to, between,* and *order.* Two of these concern prepositions, which are rather difficult when it comes to fixing their basic meanings without further theoretical discussion. Moreover, *to* is preceded by the heavily metaphorical verb *led*, which may have had an impact on its perception as metaphorically used by some analysts.

Less clear cases may be due to analytical error. But they may also be due to the complexities of metaphor and language use. They have proven to be extremely instructive for the improvement of the procedure and its theoretical shoring up. Methodological research is crucial for both theoretical as well as empirical work on metaphor, and it helps increase the reliability and validity of the findings.

The Pragglejaz procedure has been adopted in two research programs on metaphor in natural discourse at the VU University Amsterdam. The first program is called "Metaphor in discourse: Linguistic forms, conceptual structures, and cognitive representations", with four PhD researchers and myself, and runs from September 2005 through August 2010. In the first stage of this program we have analyzed four samples of 50,000 words from a publicly available sample from the British National Corpus, called BNC-Baby. The four samples involve conversation, news, fiction, and science texts.

The second program is called "Conversationalization of public discourse", has the same timing, and involves one other PhD researcher. In the first stage of the second program, two samples of in total 100,000 words were analyzed from two Dutch corpora in one coherent metaphor project. The two registers here are conversation and news. Both programs have employed the Pragglejaz procedure as part of more encompassing method for metaphor identification which we will touch upon in the rest of this paper.

The Pragglejaz procedure has turned out to provide a useful starting point for the corpus-linguistic work which we have begun to do in our two research programmes (Steen, Biernacka, *et al.*, in press). The procedure has shown to be generally applicable to large samples of British English and Dutch. We are also achieving high levels of reliability. But our practical experience has suggested one or two issues which we have had to solve in different ways than those proposed by the Pragglejaz Group.

One issue has to do with the definition of lexical units. The Pragglejaz Group have defined lexical units rather broadly. For instance, they do not make a distinction between the noun *squirrel* and the verb *squirrel* as separate lexical units. This is to be able to say that the verbal form of the word is a metaphorical manifestation of a basic sense that can be found in the noun. This can only be done if both senses relate to the same lexical unit. As a result, lexical units are defined in this broad way.

In our application of the method, we have limited the notion of lexical unit to the relevant grammatical category. We do not treat word forms as lexical units, but only consider as units those grammatical categories and subcategories which can be used to express the same type of referent in discourse, that is, grammatical word classes (verbs to indicate actions or process, nouns to express entities, and so on). This means that we cannot mark the verb *squirrel* as metaphorically used, because there is no more basic sense for that lexical unit with which the contextual verbal sense may be contrasted and compared. The same holds for the conventionalized adjectival use of the noun *key*, as in a *key variable*: this, too, cannot be marked as metaphorical in our approach.

It is important to understand what we are doing here. We are not denying that there is a metaphorical relationship between the two different manifestations of *squirrel* or *key*. What we *are* denying is that these are metaphorical relationships *in use*. To us, they are metaphorical relationships in the language system, which may be described by morphological analysis. Such morphological relationships may even have effects on language processing. However, they are not due to metaphor in use, which we (and the Pragglejaz Group) have defined as pertaining to the direct or indirect expression of a referent by a word. Since the basic meaning of the adjective *key* is simply "important", if its description in advanced language learners' dictionaries like Macmillan's is a reliable source, its referential application to an aspect of a variable is direct, not indirect, for there is no more basic meaning for *key* as an adjective than "important". Therefore, as a matter of lexical use, *key* is not metaphorically used if the lexical unit is restricted to the relevant grammatical category.

Another issue in our application of the Pragglejaz method has to do with the historical dimension of language and its role in determining what counts as the basic meaning of a word. In their definition of basic meanings, the Pragglejaz Group have listed concrete human-oriented experience in one breath with historically older meanings. Although this is a frequent combination, not all historically older meanings are also the more concrete ones. Thus, a word like *reinforce* exhibits a number of historically attested meanings (*Oxford English Dictionary*), of which two are most relevant here (Steen, Biernacka, *et al.*, in press): (1) to make a building, structure, or object stronger, and (2) to make a group of soldiers, police etc stronger by adding more people or equipment. It turns out that it is the latter, not the former, which is historically older, by almost one century. The two criteria of concrete physical meaning versus historically older meaning may hence yield different results for the analyst who needs to decide about what counts as the basic meaning of a word. In our work we have therefore emphasized a synchronic approach which privileges concrete, human-experience related meanings, without denying that the role of the history of language needs to be verified at a later stage.

There are other issues that also need to be commented on. For instance, the identification of the precise contextual meaning of a word may be rather problematic in conversations, which often become rather vague. By contrast, in science texts, the precise contextual meaning of a word is sometimes highly technical and specialized, which raises other questions. These and other issues are brought to the fore by the consistent and precise application of the Pragglejaz method to large samples of data. We are looking forward to uncovering many more of these details about metaphorically used

words in the future, which may be facilitated by doing the corpus work which we have undertaken at the VU University.

3. Beyond Pragglejaz (1): The Five Step Method

The cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor assumes that metaphors in language use like the ones we have discussed above are expressions of underlying cross-domain mappings which are part of the conceptual structure of language and discourse. The question that arises for the analyst of discourse, therefore, is how we can get from the linguistic expressions of metaphor in discourse as for instance uncovered by the Pragglejaz method to the presumed underlying conceptual structures. I have suggested that getting from the linguistic form of metaphor to its conceptual structure is a fundamental methodological problem and have proposed a five-step framework for addressing the issues involved (Steen, 1999, in press; cf. Semino, *et al*., 2004). Finding metaphor in discourse is not just a matter of identifying metaphorically used words but also of identifying their related conceptual structures.

My attempt at an explicit procedure for the conceptual analysis of metaphor includes the following five steps:

1. Find the metaphorical focus
2. Find the metaphorical proposition
3. Find the metaphorical comparison
4. Find the metaphorical analogy
5. Find the metaphorical mapping

In this section I can only illustrate the basic mechanisms and assumptions that are at work for canonical metaphor identification. For more complex issues, see Steen (in press).

When Tennyson writes *Now sleeps the crimson petal,* it is obvious that the word *sleeps* has been used metaphorically (cf. Steen, 2002 *a*). The Pragglejaz method would say that it is not used in its basic meaning, which pertains to animate entities, but displays another meaning in this context, designating some action or state of the crimson petal which cannot be *sleep*. The indirect contextual meaning is analyzed by setting up some sort of contrast as well as similarity relation with the basic meaning. One candidate for facilitating that analysis is a cross-domain mapping between the domains or spaces of plants and animate beings. Thus, the analyst would have to find some sort of action or state for the crimson petal that corresponds with the situation where animate beings sleep. One possibility would be to say that the crimson petal is inactive.

Each of these comments serves to point to different aspects of the analytical process of deriving an underlying conceptual structure from the linguistic form of the metaphor. These aspects are now presented in more ordered and formalized fashion with reference to the five-step framework. Table 1 shows two columns, with the five steps displayed on the left, and their application to the textual materials on the right.

Table 1
Analysis of "Now sleeps the crimson petal"

Text	*Now sleeps the crimson petal*
1. Identification of metaphor-related words	Sleeps
2. Identification of propositions	P1 (SLEEP$_s$ PETAL$_t$) P2 (MOD P1 NOW$_t$) P3 (MOD PETAL$_t$ CRIMSON$_t$)
3. Identification of open comparison	SIM {$\exists F\ \exists a$ [F (CRIMSON PETAL)]$_t$ [SLEEP (a)]$_s$}
4. Identification of analogical structure	SIM {[BE-INACTIVE (CRIMSON PETAL)]$_t$ [SLEEP (HUMAN)]$_s$}
5. Identification of cross-domain mapping	SLEEP > BE-INACTIVE HUMAN > CRIMSON PETAL *inferences:* GOAL OF SLEEP > GOAL OF BE-INACTIVE: REST TIME OF SLEEP > TIME OF BE-INACTIVE: NIGHT

The first step concerns the identification of the metaphorically used words in the text, and I have shown how this can be done in the previous section. Even though the complete first utterance is the linguistic expression of a cross-domain mapping, or a metaphor, there is only one word that is metaphorically used, and that is *sleep*. In traditional terminology, it is the focus (Black, 1962) or vehicle (Richards, 1936) of the metaphor.

When step 1 identifies metaphorically used words, it identifies terms which express the focus, vehicle, or source domain of the metaphor. It does so by finding those words which are somehow indirect or incongruous in context (e.g., Cameron, 2003; Charteris-Black, 2004). Such words, like *sleep*, therefore form a potential threat to the coherence of the text (Steen, 2002 *b*). However, when it seems possible to integrate them into the overall discourse by some form of comparison or similarity which resolves the incongruity, the words are somehow metaphorical, or related to metaphor. Step 1 is hence explicitly based on the idea that metaphor is a form of indirect meaning that is based on correspondence or similarity.

Step 2 involves the transformation of the linguistic expressions of the text into conceptual structures in the form of a series of propositions. It makes explicit the assumption that metaphor is a matter of thought, not language. This type of conceptual structure for discourse is usually referred to as a text base, which has a linear as well as hierarchical quality (e.g. Kintsch, 1998). In order to indicate its conceptual instead of linguistic status, small capitals are used for its technical representation.

There are several formats for this structure, and discourse psychologists are rather practical about the ways in which text bases may be modeled to suit the purposes of research. In our case, we have added subscripts to the concepts related to the words to the effect that it is clear which concepts belong to the source domain versus the target domain. This preserves the linguistic analysis in step 1, which made a distinction between source domain and target domain language.

The third step transforms the single proposition with concepts from two distinct domains derived in step 2 into an open comparison between two incomplete propositions which each pertain to another conceptual domain. This can be done because we assume that there is some form of cross-domain mapping between the two conceptual domains framing the two sets of concepts distinguished in steps 1 and 2. Step 3 makes this explicit. It states that, for some activity *F* in the target domain and some entity *a* in the source domain, there is some similarity between the activity of the crimson petal on the one hand and the sleeping of some entity on the other hand. Moreover, labeling these two domains as target and source, respectively, suggests that the similarity has to be projected from the sleeping of the entity towards the activity of the petal. These assumptions lie at the basis of most metaphor analyses in the literature.

Several issues are implied by step 3. One involves the formal and conceptual separation of the two domains or spaces already involved in step 2. Another concerns the explication of the idea that was there from step 1, that we are indeed working on the assumption that there is some sort of similarity or correspondence between the two sets of concepts: hence the addition of the operator SIM. In addition, step 3 also postulates that we will need corresponding elements on both sides of the equation, to the effect that there is some activity or state needed for the petal in the target domain, and some agent for the activity of sleeping in the source domain; hence the addition of the open function and argument variables. These are natural additions if we want to align the two domains in order to reconstruct the correspondences between them. They are, moreover, minimal assumptions, in that no new conceptual elements are added to the comparison except the ones that are implied by the original proposition.

Step 4 turns the open comparison proposed by step 3 into a closed comparison which has the formal structure of an analogy (but in fact does not always need analogical interpretation). The open values indicated by *F* and *a* in step 3 have now been interpreted by the analyst. Step 4 thus makes explicit that analysts sometimes have to add new conceptual substance to the mapping between the two domains in order to make the mapping complete. This is often the crucial step of the analysis.

For this particular example, the fourth step also happens to be the least constrained of all steps. Thus, on the side of the source domain, there is one option to fill in the logically most encompassing candidate for the agent of sleeping, which would be "animal"; and there is another option to fill in the most obvious candidate from the perspective of human experience, which is "human". Since the rest of the poem also exploits personification and not animation, the example analysis has opted for the latter. However, this is just for expository purposes. If the analysis aims to capture the meaning of the text as it might function for a reader, then the first line might have to be interpreted in the broadest fashion possible, because readers do not know yet what the rest of the poem will do, and then the notion of "animal" might be preferable.

A similar story can be told for the interpretation of the open target domain value, but we will instead turn to the last step of the procedure. This step transforms the analogical structure derived in step 4 into a mapping structure between two separate domains or spaces. It explicates what has remained implicit in step 4, the precise correspondences between the separate elements in each of the conceptual domains. This does not seem to be problematic for our current example, but that is not always the case.

Step 5 can also add further correspondences which have remained in the background of the analogy until now. Implicit elements of the sleeping schema may be projected onto implicit elements of the crimson petal schema, such as the goal or function of sleeping (rest) which may be projected form source to target to infer that the petal is tired. Or the typical time of sleeping, night, may be projected from source to target to infer something about the time of the real action of the poem. These are examples of inferences which add minimal assumptions about the cross-domain mapping and, if they are accepted, enrich the information that may be derived from it for the meaning of the text.

With step 5 we have completed our sketch of the five-step method. We have moved from the identification of its linguistic form (step 1) through its propositionalization (step 2) to its transformation into an open comparison (step 3), which was then interpreted as an analogical structure (step 4) and fleshed out into a cross-domain mapping (step 5). This procedure explicates various aspects of what analysts do when they say that particular linguistic expressions in discourse are related to metaphorical mappings.

The method offers a framework for further development which may lead to similarly detailed procedures for the other four steps as the Pragglejaz method has offered for finding those metaphor foci in step 1 that are realized by indirectly used words. For instance, the analysis of propositions in step 2 involves an area of research that has received much attention in discourse psychology and linguistic forms of discourse analysis, and the variety of approaches is about as bewildering as the variety of approaches to linguistic metaphor identification which was addressed in the Pragglejaz project. Similarly, analogy, which plays a central role in steps 4 and 5, has been the subject of quite a few psychological and computational approaches which also require consideration before a suitable candidate or synthesis can be formulated. All of these aspects are on the agenda for future research.

4. Beyond Pragglejaz (2): Other Forms of Metaphor

Apart from indirect word use, there are other manifestations in discourse of metaphor defined as a mapping across two conceptual domains, such as simile, analogy, allegory, and so on. I have noted before that simile embodies a distinct linguistic form of metaphor in conceptual structure: it is not indirect language use but displays direct lexical indications that a cross-domain mapping underlies the meaning of the language. Finding metaphor in discourse does not stop at the border of finding metaphorically used words, morphemes, phrases, or constructions: if metaphor is defined as a conceptual cross-domain mapping and language usage is approached as grounded events of discourse, then there is still more metaphor to be found.

Consider the following world-famous sonnet XVIII by Shakespeare as a case in point (Steen; Gibbs, 2004):

> Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?
> Thou art more lovely and more temperate:
> Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May,
> And summer's lease hath all too short a date;
> Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines,
> And often is his gold complexion dimmed;
> And every fair from fair sometime declines,
> By chance or nature's changing course untrimmed:
> But thy eternal summer shall not fade,
> Nor lose possession of that fair thou ow'st,
> Nor shall death brag thou wandrest in his shade,
> When in eternal lines to time thou grow'st.
> So long as men can breathe or eyes can see,
> So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.

The first line sets up a cross-domain mapping by evoking and contrasting two distinct mental spaces, but does not use metaphorical language to do so. The words activate the concepts of I, THEE, COMPARE, and SUMMER'S DAY, and each of these concepts has a direct role in designating their respective referents in the world of the text. The referents in the rest of the poem belong to two distinct conceptual domains or spaces of discourse. One domain or space pertains to the addressee of the sonnet, and the other to summer's days. The point, however, is that both are directly expressed as text topics in their own right. The reader is explicitly invited to set up and compare the elements of the one topic to the elements of the other. This is a cross-domain mapping in usage which does not exhibit indirect meaning as intended by Lakoff (1986, 1993) and Gibbs (1993, 1994): it is not the language that is being used indirectly, but there is one topic which is used to talk about another topic in an indirect way.

As a result, lines 2 through 8 use language that, as a rule, may also be deemed directly expressive of their subject: line 2 uses words that directly express the personal characteristics of the addressee, whereas lines 3 through 8 directly express the properties of a summer's day. The lines do not contain metaphorical language in the sense of being meaningful indirectly, as is the basis of the cognitive linguistic definition of metaphorical language. Instead, they work as non-metaphorical expressions. They are direct instructions for setting up conceptual structures in the domain of the beloved and the domain of a summer's day, respectively, and these conceptual structures require cross-domain mapping by some form of comparative inferencing in order to achieve textual coherence. If the analysts (and the reader) do not carry out these cross-domain mappings, expressions like "more lovely and more temperate" turn incomplete while "rough winds do shake the darling buds of May" lose their point. It may hence be concluded by the analyst that such metaphorical mappings are part of the intended conceptual structure of the text.

It should be noted, though, that the first seven lines also exhibit expressions that do deviate from the locally dominant semantic field. Consider *lease* and *date* in line 4 and

eye in line 5: these are indirectly meaningful when it comes to integrating them into the local discourse topic of a summer's day, which is dominant in these lines. To spell this out for *eye*, the word activates the concept EYE which does not designate a referent "eye" in the text world, for the text world does not deal with eyes but with summer's days. Instead, *eye* is indirectly meaningful; its semantic function for the complete text has to be resolved by some form of analogizing in which the sun in the sky is compared to (or, more generally, related to) the eye in the face of a person. If this does not happen, the part of the text containing *eye* becomes incoherent. Words like *eye* and *lease* and *date*, therefore, can be considered as local linguistic metaphors in the context of a more global topic, summer's day, which in turn functions as the non-metaphorical expression of the source domain that the poem stages for conceptual mapping onto the target domain.

The incidence and interaction between these various forms of metaphor in discourse is not restricted to poetry, although the intricacies of Shakespeare's text may be quite exceptional. In general, however, cross-domain mappings by means of non-metaphorical language are typical of other types of discourse as well, such as education and science (e.g. Gentner, 1982; Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993; Mayer, 1993). To give just one illustration, consider the following scientific text from the early nineteenth century, discussed by Gentner and Jeziorski (1993: 454):

1. According to established principles at the present time, we can compare with sufficient accuracy the motive power of heat to that of a waterfall. Each has a maximum that we cannot exceed, whatever may be, on the one hand, the machine which is acted upon by the water, and whatever, on the other hand, the substance acted upon by the heat.
2. The motive power of a waterfall depends on its height and on the quantity of the liquid; the motive power of heat depends also on the quantity of caloric used, and on what may be termed, on what in fact we will call, the *height of its fall*, that is to say, the difference of temperature of the bodies between the higher and lower reservoirs.

The first section presents the cross-domain mapping by combining the two domains within each of the various discourse units; the second section follows the opposite strategy, and discusses each of the domains in its own terms and orders them from source to target. Opposite orders, from target to source, may of course also be found. The problems that these factors may create for metaphor identification by the analyst, let alone for metaphor processing by the language user, have not been studied in any depth.

One fundamental question for all researchers of metaphor in discourse that is involved here is the question of the unit of metaphor. Several researchers have pointed out that this is a problem which requires more attention (e.g. Charteris-Black, 2004; Crisp, *et al.*, 2002; Goatly, 1997; Kittay, 1987; Musolff, 2004; White, 1996). It may now be clear that this is because units of metaphor can be defined at the linguistic level as well as the conceptual level, and both can happen in several ways. These are different venues to operationalizing metaphor in discourse, and they affect the nature and number of metaphors found in language.

Consider Croft and Cruse's (2004: 213) examples of what they call simile-within-metaphor:

(1) a. Bizarre, angry thoughts *flew through* my mind like *a thousand starlings*.
b. She was standing there, her eyes *fastened to* me like *steel rivets*.
c. Grief *tumbled out of* her like *a waterfall*.
d. This is really *twisting* my brain like *a dishrag*.

From a linguistic point of view, each of these four sentences displays the same pattern: their main verb is used indirectly to convey some sort of action or process between two entities, and the adverbial adjuncts of comparison are used directly to specify the manner of that action or process. The latter takes place by comparing it with the way in which another entity than the one that is the topic of the discourse would typically perform the action or process that is indirectly used. The linguistic analysis would show that there are always these two parts of the cross-domain mapping, with the first part always being a metaphorically used verb. This has to be opposed to the second part, which does not display metaphorically used language but does express a cross-domain mapping. The conceptual analysis would integrate both linguistic parts within one conceptual mapping, with one source domain containing the verbal and the adverbial elements, which would have to be mapped onto the target domain.

There might hence be three ways of counting the metaphors in these data:

1. only the verbs (metaphor as indirect language use)
2. both the verbs and the adverbial adjuncts, but as combination of two distinct linguistic categories (metaphor as indirect as well as direct linguistic expressions of conceptual cross domain mappings; Croft and Cruse's category of simile-within-metaphor)
3. the concepts relating to both the verbs and the adjuncts as belonging to one conceptual structure (metaphor as cross domain mapping)

Analysts of metaphor in usage will have to explain which of these three options they follow.

In sum, metaphor does not have to be expressed by indirect language use at all. Goatly (1997) and Fauconnier and Turner (2002) are helpful sources for cognitive-linguistically inspired discourse analysts who wish to explore this area of research, but they have to take on board more general considerations of discourse analysis, for instance pertaining to the identification of units of discourse at various levels of measurement (cf. Steen, 2005 *b*). With corpora of conversations, news, fiction, and science, we aim to make a beginning with a systematic inventory of the phenomena involved, going beyond Pragglejaz in yet another way.

5. Concluding Comments

Metaphor identification in discourse may be pursued in various ways. In this paper I have sketched three.

The typical approach to metaphor identification in cognitive linguistics has focused on metaphorically used words. I have suggested that the Pragglejaz method may offer a

good tool for cognitive linguists who wish to make their results open for independent comparison, and that its application in large scale corpus work has revealed several issues that need to be addressed.

Another typical concern in cognitive linguistics with metaphor in discourse is the relation between metaphorically used words on the one hand and cross-domain mappings in conceptual structure on the other. Here I have suggested that the five-step method may offer a promising framework for methodological study and application.

A third way in which metaphor may be found in discourse has to do with less typical expressions of metaphor, by analogies and other figures. In cognitive linguistics this area has above all been addressed by Fauconnier and Turner, but their work has only begun to reveal some of the relevant aspects of the phenomena. Further theoretical and methodological work is needed here to make progress that is consistent with the other forms of metaphor identification discussed above.

In all, then, finding metaphor in discourse is an exciting and rapidly changing field of enquiry. My attention to the methodological problems that are part and parcel of this field has only one motivation: to improve the quality of our empirical research. For the question is: when we say that we have found a lot about metaphor in language, are we all talking about the same thing? If we do, we ought to be able to demonstrate this in simple reliability tests where analysts come up with the same findings after they have been given the same instruction. In my experience, this is an extremely hard but worthwhile pursuit.

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Is This a Metaphor? On the Difficult Task of Identifying Metaphors in Scientific Discourse

JULIANA GOSCHLER

ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the problem of metaphor identification in scientific language. In Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphors are often observed on the conceptual level. As in this framework there is no genuine linguistic definition of metaphor, problems occur in empirical work where metaphor identification in texts is required. Although there seems to be considerable agreement in intuitive judgements, most empirical work lacks a method which produces transparent and repeatable data. I will argue that a mixture of two possible identification strategies is often used intuitively: the "truth approach", which marks as metaphorical expressions that are not actually true, and the "meaning approach" that takes the difference between primary and secondary meaning into account. While these intuitive identification strategies might be useful in some discourses, serious problems occur when metaphors have to be identified in scientific language. This is because in scientific theories "truth" is not easily identified and the meaning of a scientific term is sometimes not obvious. I argue for a methodological clear-cut distinction of the two possible approaches to metaphor identification, and for a careful reflection of the possible consequences of the different identification strategies.

Keywords: discourse analysis, metaphor identification, methodology, scientific language.

RESUMEN: Este artículo se centra en el problema de la identificación de la metáfora en el lenguaje científico. En la teoría conceptual de la metáfora, las metáforas se observan a menudo en el nivel conceptual. Como en este marco no hay definición lingüística genuina de la metáfora, surgen problemas en el trabajo empírico donde se requiere la identificación de la metáfora. Aunque parece haber acuerdo considerable en cuanto a los juicios intuitivos, el trabajo empírico carece de un método que produzca datos transparentes y repetibles. Discutiré que una mezcla de dos estrategias posibles de identificación esté utilizada de modo intuitivo: el «enfoque de la verdad», que marca como expresiones metafóricas las que no son verdad, y el «enfoque del significado» que considera la diferencia entre el significado primario y secundario. Aunque estas estrategias intuitivas pueden ser útiles en algunos discursos, los problemas serios ocurren cuando las metáforas tienen que ser identificadas en el lenguaje científico. Esto es porque en las teorías científicas lo «verdadero» no se identifica fácilmente y el significado de un término científico a veces no es obvio. Propongo una distinción metodológica neta de los dos enfoques posibles para la identificación de la

metáfora, así como una reflexión de las consecuencias posibles de las diversas estrategias de identificación.

Palabras claves: análisis del discurso, identificación de la metáfora, metodología, lenguaje científico.

1. Introduction

How can metaphors be identified in discourse? In the long history of metaphor research this problem was often neglected, partly due to the fact that most metaphor theories focused on easily identified creative metaphors. Conventionalized metaphors – which people are often not aware of – became of interest for cognitive linguists since Lakoff; Johnson's (1980) claim that metaphors are ubiquitous in language and thought. Lakoff; Johnson's groundbreaking work, however, relies on linguistic examples that have been made up or more or less coincidentally collected. The importance of more systematic empirical work – of using corpora to make more valid claims on the frequency and systematic nature of certain metaphors and therefore give Conceptual Metaphor Theory an empirical basis – has been pointed out by various scholars (Steen 1999 *a*, 1999 *b*, 2002 *a*, 2002 *b*; Deignan 1999, 2005; Charteris-Black, 2004; Semino *et al*., 2004, Stefanowitsch, 2005, 2006).

Many scholars have already described the metaphors that structure texts and discourse (Gentner; Grudin, 1985; Baldauf, 1997; Nerlich *et al*., 2002; Drewer, 2003; Döring; Zinken**,** 2005; Goschler, 2005 *a*). Metaphor in science has been a topic for historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science for decades, but most of the discussion has been rather theoretical. There have been only a few linguistic analyses of metaphor use in scientific discourse (Gentner; Grudin, 1985; Drewer, 2003; Semino *et al*., 2004; Goschler, 2005 *a*). These studies have to face the problem that it is necessary to explain which expressions should be included in an analysis as metaphoric. Although it seems to be intuitionally clear in many cases, it is often difficult to explain why exactly a certain expression is metaphoric and why others are not. I will describe two different approaches which are often used intuitionally. Using three sentences taken from *Science* as examples for scientific language, I will discuss the validity and the shortfalls of these two approaches and argue for a careful and transparent use of a combination of these approaches.

2. Metaphor – Definitions and Identification Strategies

The methodologies that have been used in metaphor analysis in general differ considerably. Whereas most of the earlier work was based on very small corpora that could be handled manually, now efforts are increasingly being made to work with large corpora which can be searched electronically (Deignan, 1999, 2005; Stefanowitsch, 2004, 2005, 2006). In both cases it is necessary to have at least an operational definition

of which expressions to treat as a metaphor. This problem is present no matter if one searches a small corpus manually or if one analyzes a sample of occurrences of lexemes in a large corpus. Most of the time there seems to be an implicit agreement on what to consider a metaphor and what not – and often it seems to be unproblematic. With the exception of some individual problematic cases, the question of how exactly to decide what is a metaphor and what is not has often been evaded.[1]

Lakoff and Johnson's work, which pointed out the ubiquity and importance of metaphor in language and thought, is the starting point of most linguistic studies on metaphor. But it does not provide researchers of metaphors in discourse with a sufficient methodology to produce corpus-based data, hence, valid empirical evidence. Their definition of metaphor is: "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another." (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980: 5) They define metaphors as conceptual phenomena. Linguistic metaphors are in their perspective a secondary phenomenon which support their claim of the existence of conceptual metaphor. This is even more obvious in Lakoff and Johnson's latest work *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999). They speak about terms, structures, and domains, not about words and sentences. It is the very point of their argument to place metaphors on the conceptual level. Although this is indeed the point that makes it interesting to study metaphors in language, it tends to neglect the linguistic side of metaphor. Therefore, their definition is not useful for identifying linguistic metaphors in discourse.

The lack of a proper definition and the related methodological problems has been pointed out by Gibbs (1999), Steen (1999 *a*, 1999 *b*, 2002 *a*, 2002 *b*), and Semino (Semino *et al*., 2004) who are members of the "Pragglejaz" group. This group is working on the so-called "metaphor identification project" in order to produce more comparable data by providing a useful identification tool for metaphor in discourse. This is, to my knowledge, the first and only project that systematically approaches the problem of the identification of metaphor in language.[2] Steen (1999 *a*; 2002 *a*) tries to bridge the gap between linguistic and conceptual metaphor by providing a five-step procedure for interpreting linguistic data. The first step of his procedure – metaphor focus identification – is meant to extract the portions of discourse which are then analyzed. The other four steps are intended to arrive at a complete mapping on the conceptual level. This procedure is one of the very few attempts to give an explicit guideline for metaphor analysis.[3] The first step of Steen's procedure, however, relies on two principles which have already been used in metaphor identification before:

> …the focus is the linguistic expression used nonliterally in the discourse. This means that the focus expression activates a concept which cannot be literally applied to the referents in the world evoked by the text. (Steen, 1999 *a*: 61)

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1. There is a paragraph in Charteris-Black (2004: 35-37) on his method of metaphor identification. This is, however, more of a working definition of metaphor for his specific purposes.
2. One of the few predecessors is Loewenberg (1981). Although her paper is addressing some of the issues raised here it is not concerned with conceptual metaphors and not aimed at corpus work.
3. Another attempt to provide a methodology is going on in the social sciences. The methodology, which is now mostly used to interprete interviews, is called Systematic Metaphor Analysis (Schmitt 1997, 2000, 2003). It is comparable with Steen's five steps.

The two criteria which lead the metaphor focus identification in Steen's procedure are the nonliteral use of language on the one hand and the problem that the expression cannot be matched properly to the referents in the world on the other hand. The first criterion used here is *meaning* and the second one *truth* (or the so-called "referents in the world"). Both of these criteria can cause problems – especially in scientific discourse. I will now describe these two possible approaches to distinguish metaphorical from non-metaphorical expressions in more detail. I will name them the *truth approach* and the *word meaning approach*.

3. The Truth Approach to Metaphor Identification

Most of the time it seems unproblematic to decide intuitionally what a metaphor is and what is not. But where does that intuition come from? Since metaphors are not distinguishable from literal expressions syntactically, we must have some other implicit criteria to decide what a metaphor is. The fact that intuitional decisions about metaphors or non-metaphors do not greatly differ from person to person, or from metaphor analysis to metaphor analysis, even without an explicit method of metaphor identification suggests that most of the time people use the same criteria to identify metaphors.

These criteria that guide intuition are *truth* and *meaning*: Many explanations why an expression is a metaphor imply that the expression is not true. Thus, the first possible approach marks expressions as metaphorical which are not actually true. Therefore, I name it the *truth approach*. It is easy to ridicule this approach with minimal philosophical skills. Of course, we don't know any truth, it is highly questionable if there is something like "truth" at all. But we should take into account the fact that in most cases this approach works quite well. Of course a marriage is not really on the rocks, nobody is actually shooting down someone else's arguments, and Christmas is not (physically) drawing near. For these prominent examples this approach works just fine. It is also useful for analyzing corpus data. Deignan (2005) points out that the researcher sometimes can't exactly know if a certain expression *like cry on someone's shoulder* is meant literally or figuratively:

> Sometimes the same expression may show different types of motivation in different contexts. The above citation of *cry on someone's shoulder* is in fact, very unlikely to be literally true, when a wider context is seen, and it is known that the speaker was a President of the United States, referring to a conversation with another national leader. (Deignan, 2005: 65)

Thus, the criterion of truth can be very helpful in distinguishing metaphorical from literal language. It is, in fact, the only possibility when it comes to expressions that can be either metaphoric or literal. This is because in these cases we are dealing with a problem of reference. If the situation we are referring to by using an expression like *cry on someone's shoulder* actually included the act of crying and a shoulder, then it is a literal statement. If in the situation referred to with *cry on someone's shoulder* included something other than actual crying, and there wasn't any contact with a shoulder, but some kind of complaining instead, then the expression was used metaphorically. A

decision about these expressions requires a certain knowledge about facts in the world. In some metaphor theories which focus on the pragmatic aspects of metaphor use like Searle's *standard pragmatic model* (Searle, 1979) and approaches to metaphor from the perspective of Relevance Theory (Sperber; Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002) this difference has been marked as the difference between sentence meaning and utterance meaning. To decide if sentence and utterance meaning differ, the hearer/reader has to know or infer the intentions of the speaker/writer and/or he has to notice the unappropriateness of a literal interpretation of the sentence. This happens when the hearer/reader detects a clash of what s/he knows about the situation and the sentence meaning.

Practical problems arise especially in two certain fields of discourse: science and religion. Religion relies on what people *believe*. Whether people interpret passages of religious texts as metaphorical or literal depends heavily on their religious beliefs:

> The issue of metaphor identification is not clear-cut in religious texts. We will recall that a metaphor arises from the semantic tension caused by shifting the use of a word from one context to another. Perception of domain shift in the case of religious metaphors may well depend on the belief system of the text receiver. This is because the semantic target is the spiritual domain and individuals will vary in the extent to which they have experience of this. (Charteris-Black, 2004: 176)

Therefore the question whether something is a metaphor or a literal description – like bread and wine being the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Communion – can even lead to schism among religious communities (Charteris-Black, 2004: 175).

Unlike religion, science is supposed to rely on what people *know*. But even most scientists would agree that this "knowledge" is never complete. Maybe it is better to say that in many cases science is dealing with something we don't (yet) know about. Thus, some scientific claims and theories – as well as religious claims – are not as easily identified as metaphors. This is especially true for contemporary scientific theories. In the history of science a great number of metaphors have been used in older scientific theories and discourses: the universe as clockwork and humans as complicated mechanical machines in the enlightenment, the soul and mind as a hydraulic system in Freud's theory of the self, the brain as a telephone switchboard in the first half and then as a computer in the second half of the 20th century. But the identification of these explanations as "mere" metaphors relies on what we know today. Since the theories connected to the metaphors above are not state of the art, they are easily identified as not true and therefore metaphoric.[4] But how do we know this about contemporary theories? And how can we identify metaphors in current scientific texts? Let us consider some examples taken from *Science*:

> Polyn *et al*. now show that reactivation of such stored representations occurs prior to a verbal report of recollection in a free recall paradigm.
> (*Science* 23 December 2005: Vol. 310. no. 5756, p. 1865)

4. This does not imply that every scientific claim which is not true is metaphorical. False claims can be not metaphorical if there is no mapping between two domains involved.

> Dark energy, a hidden force that is blowing the universe apart, had varied dramatically over time and at one point even reversed direction.
> *(Science* 20 January 2006: Vol. 311. no. 5759, p. 316)

> The phospholipids form wormlike micelles in specific concentration ranges of mixed solvent systems, and under these conditions they behave like polymers for electrospinning.
> *(Science* 20 January 2006: Vol. 311. no. 5759, p. 299)

Are these sentences correct – truthful – descriptions of the scientific subject? This question is clearly not a linguistic question and therefore not to be answered by linguists. Does this mean we are not able to investigate metaphors in science? One could come up with a solution to define the scientific terms in a way that makes it possible to distinguish the metaphorical from the literal use of this term. Then one could answer the questions above like this: since the word *store* in the first sentence can only be used for concrete objects, the claim that representations are stored is a metaphor. Or one could likewise say that *store* is a verb that can be used for concrete as well as for abstract things. Therefore the claim is a literal statement. It is questionable if this brings us any further. It is, however, close to the second possible criterion for identifying a metaphor, which is the *meaning* of a word.

4. The Word Meaning Approach to Metaphor Identification

Thus, the second approach to identify a metaphor – the *word meaning approach* – is to take "meaning" into account. Metaphors are not syntactically distinguishable from literal language. Therefore one has to look for metaphorical meaning whether on the level of words and morphemes, or on the level of utterances.

If we consider metaphor on a pragmatic level we argue that a metaphor is a certain kind of utterance. According to the *Standard Pragmatic Model of Metaphor Comprehension* a metaphor is an utterance where the utterance meaning differs from the sentence meaning, as John Searle explains (Searle, 1979). To perceive this difference between utterance and sentence meaning the hearer must take into account her/his knowledge about the world and about the things that are of relevance in the utterance. Thus, we have the factor "knowledge and truth" meshed into the metaphor identification again. While that might be appropriate for normal speakers and hearers, it is not a satisfying scientific criterion to identify metaphors in discourse. Therefore, to analyze meaning on the level of utterances implies judgments about situations and "truth" and is thus a kind of "truth approach".

Hence, it is necessary to analyze the meaning of single words in certain phrases. But here another problem arises: what is the meaning of a word? It has been agreed that a word can have different meanings. Multiple meanings are in fact quite frequent, as dictionary entries show. If a word has two meanings that are totally unrelated we speak of polysemy. Clear cases of polysemy like the German word *Bank* or the English word *lie* are not of interest here. But there are also a great number of words with a so-called literal, sometimes also called primary or core meaning, and a so-called metaphorical

meaning. This is the case for words like *to store, dark, to behave* (all of them used in the examples from *Science* above).

But who decides which the literal or primary meaning of a word is? The difficult situation here is that speakers (and writers of dictionaries) seem to have strong intuitions about this question, and they seem astonishingly consistent. When uncertain about the primary meaning of a word, one can consult a dictionary. Thus, using a dictionary might be a reasonable shortcut to make a decision about the meaning of a word, and thus about its status as literal or metaphorical in a certain context. In fact, this is a methodology that has been used widely in metaphor identification procedures – at least as a first step toward the identification of a conceptual metaphor (Baldauf, 1997: 96-97; Charteris-Black, 2004: 36). Can one apply this methodology on one of the examples from *Science*?

> Polyn *et al*. now show that reactivation of such *stored representations* occurs prior to a verbal report of recollection in a free recall paradigm.
> (*Science* 23 December 2005: Vol. 310. no. 5756, p. 1865)

The word that could have a metaphorical meaning here is *stored*. One could argue that *to store* has a meaning distinct from the one here, where it is not used to describe real items (like in a warehouse or the like), but for *representations*. Looking up the entry for *store* (as a transitive verb) in an online dictionary, the Merriam-Webster Online, confirms this:

1: **LAY AWAY, ACCUMULATE** <*store* vegetables for winter use> <an organism that absorbs and *stores* DDT>
2: **FURNISH, SUPPLY**; *especially* **:** to stock against a future time <*store* a ship with provisions>
3: to place or leave in a location (as a warehouse, library, or computer memory) for preservation or later use or disposal
4: to provide storage room for **: HOLD** <elevators for *storing* surplus wheat>
(http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary, 12.4.2006)

Indeed, the concrete meaning of *to store* is highlighted. Nevertheless, storing can occur not only in a location like a warehouse or library, but also in a *computer memory* (3). If this is one of the literal meanings of to store, why should *stored representations* be metaphorical? Or should we assume that because this meaning is listed as a third meaning it is distinct from the primary meaning listed under (1)? Another online dictionary, Dictionary.com, lists the meaning of *to store* as something you do with the computer under (4):

tr.v. **stored, stor·ing, stores**
1. To reserve or put away for future use.
2. To fill, supply, or stock.
3. To deposit or receive in a storehouse or warehouse for safekeepingg
4. *Computer Science*. To copy (data) into memory or onto a storage device, such as a hard disk

(http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=store, 12.4.2006)

In the online version of the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, however, the computer-linked meaning of *to store* is listed first – suggesting that this is the primary meaning:

> **store** (KEEP)
> verb [T usually + adverb or preposition]
> to put or keep things in a special place for use in the future:
> The data is stored **on** a hard disk and backed up on a floppy disk.
> I stored my possessions **in** my mother's house while I was living in Spain.
> I've stored my thick sweaters and jackets **(away)** until next winter.
> Squirrels store **(up)** nuts for the winter.
> (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=78487&dict=CALD, 12.4.2006)

Therefore, it is still questionable if *store* in *stored representations* is used in its primary or secondary meaning and if the phrase is therefore used literally or metaphorically. It seems that dictionary entries can only confirm or correct a speaker's intuition about the meaning of a word – which is very useful and even necessary if one is not a native speaker of the language one is analyzing – but they can't give us genuinely new information about a word or phrase being metaphorical or not. If dictionaries are to serve as the only source, other criteria must be invented. For instance, one must decide which entry in the list is still a primary and which one is a secondary meaning. Obviously, dictionaries differ and therefore the results of a metaphor analysis would depend greatly on the dictionary that is used. Since entries in most dictionaries are probably also based on speaker's intuition, the intuition of the writers and their informants, dictionaries might be a slightly better source than our own intuition, but the method is not genuinely different. Intuition, however, seems not a satisfying criterion for a scientist, so what we need is a scientific criterion that enables us to identify the primary meaning of a word without any intuition, or a scientific explanation of where exactly the strong intuition comes from. Some dictionaries, however, include more than just intuition in their entries, such as the frequency of the use of a word in its different senses and etymological information.[5]

These things are precisely the factors that could in fact influence speaker's intuition. One possible explanation for our intuition about the primary or literal meaning of a word could be the frequency of a word's use in a certain sense. Alice Deignan's work shows that this criterion is not enough and can even be misleading:

> While non-metaphorical senses may be psychologically primary and historically prior, contemporary corpus data shows that metaphorical senses of some words are used as frequently as, or even more frequently than, non-metaphorical senses. (Deignan, 2005: 94)

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5. Steen shortly discusses the advantages of two dictionaries – the COBUILD English Language Dictionary and the Concise Oxford Dictionary – and points out similar differences in listing orders depending on an estimation of frequency or a logical order (2002 *b*: 24).

For example, Deignan presents a corpus search for the word *hunt* in a corpus:

> ...the sample shows that the use of *hunt* which many speakers might think to be the main use, to talk about pursuing and killing animals, only represents about a third of the sample... (Deignan, 2005: 8)

Thus, the so-called main or primary meaning of a word does not need to be the most frequently used one.[6]

Another argument for the primary meaning of a word is the argument of historical priority. This one comes from historical semantics and has been fleshed out by Eve Sweetser (1990). She shows that if a language has only one established meaning for the word *see* it means visual perception. In a great number of languages, *see* also has the meaning "to know" or "to understand". And in every language where this is the case, the meaning of "visual perception" was there first. Thus, in this case we have convincing evidence for a "primary" meaning.

Some researchers have also pointed out another criterion to claim a primary meaning of a word, namely priority in language acquisition. It has been argued that children learn the primary meaning of a word first. Thus, when they acquire the word *to see*, they learn the meaning of seeing as perceiving something with one's eyes first, and later they learn the secondary meaning of seeing as understanding (as in *I see your point*). Christopher Johnson describes this process as conflation (Johnson, 1999).

Thus, the argument of the meaning first acquired by children as the primary meaning in combination with evidence from historical semantics forms a solid basis for the claim of a primary meaning of a word.[7] If one takes into account different kinds of evidence for the primary meaning of a word, one can collect good arguments for the claim of a primary vs. a secondary (metaphorical) meaning. But besides the practical problem that it is very time-consuming to find that kind of converging evidence for every single word, another problem arises in certain discourses. Again, we get in trouble with scientific language. Child language is not so useful here because children just don't use most of the words that are frequent in scientific language. If they use these words only in one sense (the primary meaning), this would be a questionable basis for an argumentation about scientific terms. Of course it is to expect children do not use *dark* in the sense of *dark energy* as the scientist does. And it is also obvious that we don't find this meaning of *dark* in language of several hundred years ago, because they didn't know about black energy – just like children.

The only thing that can be taken for granted is that we do, then, have two distinct meanings of the word *dark*. This is something we can find in dictionary entries (the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary lists eight distinct meanings for the adjective *dark*).

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6. I would like to thank Daniel Casasanto (Stanford) for pointing out this phenomenon to me in the first place.
7. It is important to note that these arguments are presented here in a kind of backward argumentation: Johnson and Sweetser don't want to show how to discover the primary meaning of a word but show how metaphorical mapping is grounded in experience and how this experience and thus the mapping occurs in many languages and cultures.

Thus, although it is difficult to claim a "primary" meaning of a word based on the order of dictionary entries, the claim that distinct meanings of a word exist is less problematic. If we take it as given that we have two or more distinct possible meanings of a certain word, another possibility to distinguish between the literal and the metaphorical is the distinction between concrete and abstract meaning. This distinction is often seen as identical to the distinction between primary and secondary meaning. Maybe this is because both are based on the same theoretical assumptions. The concrete versus abstract distinction developed directly out of the basic assumptions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory: it is assumed that metaphors are crucial for our structuring of the world, and that metaphoric structuring is based on basic (mostly bodily and sensory) experiences. Therefore, metaphoric mapping occurs in one direction only – from concrete to abstract. This is also known as the unidirectionality hypothesis. This theoretical argument is an explanation for how humans can understand and structure things they cannot experience directly, such as time, economy, or the universe. It is closely connected to the arguments for a primary meaning of a word presented above: historic priority and priority of acquisition, but theoretically it is not just the same argument. It seems to be a logical consequence to say that if a word is used in its abstract sense (as opposed to its concrete sense), and the concrete sense is used to structure the abstract domain, then the word is used metaphorically. But again, this argumentation mixes the conceptual level with the linguistic level. To take a conceptual assumption as a premise for a linguistic assumption is dangerous, because the argument becomes circular and therefore unfalsifiable. Turning around a theoretical point to create a methodology which proves that very point empirically generates a circular argumentation. Thus, if we take the concrete-abstract distinction that was originally a theoretical point to explain metaphor on a conceptual level as the basis for identifying linguistic metaphors in discourse, we can only find concrete-abstract mappings and nothing else.

Furthermore, although it seems mostly unproblematic, it is not always clear what is concrete and what is abstract. As I have tried to show in another article, this depends on the level on which a certain thing is described. Different discourses can vary in what they treat as known and concrete and unknown and abstract. Not even the body is always "concrete": when it comes to medical explanations of diseases, cells, genes, or brain functions, these things are described in metaphors with source domains like war, communities, human beings, space and containers, technology, books, and others, as many metaphor analyses by different scholars have shown (Goschler, 2005 *b*). Therefore, especially in scientific language, the concrete versus abstract meaning distinction is sometimes hard to make. Thus, if one wants to produce a water-tight empirical and theoretical argument, the shortcut of defining the concrete as the primary and the abstract as the secondary meaning is not appropriate. But if we accept the assumption that concrete versus abstract meaning is equal to literal versus metaphorical meaning, that seems to allow us get a grip on many of the cases. Let's consider the examples from *Science* again:

> Polyn *et al*. now show that reactivation of such *stored representations* occurs prior to a verbal report of recollection in a free recall paradigm.

Store has a clearly concrete meaning as in *store objects in a warehouse*. Here it is used in a more abstract way, since representations are not objects one could grasp and carry around. Thus, one could argue that this sentence is a good candidate for a spatial metaphor connected with a reification of an abstract thing.

How would the concrete versus abstract meaning criterion work for the second example from *Science*?

> *Dark energy*, a hidden force that is blowing the universe apart, had varied dramatically over time and at one point even reversed direction.
> *(Science* 20 January 2006: Vol. 311. no. 5759, p. 316)

Similarly, one could say that *dark* is here metaphorically used because dark energy is not dark in the sense of *a dark color* or *a dark room*, which would be the concrete or primary meaning. But how do we know this? What does *dark energy* mean exactly? Here we are dealing with another serious problem of metaphor identification in scientific discourse: in order to identify a word or phrase in a sentence as metaphorical, one has to understand the sentence which contains the word or phrase. Even this can be problematic in scientific discourse if the linguist is not familiar with the field in question. If one doesn't know what a scientist means by *dark energy*, one can hardly decide in which sense it is used. The same problem occurs if the researcher doesn't understand the direct context of a word or a phrase. Consider the third sentence taken from *Science*:

> The phospholipids form wormlike micelles in specific concentration ranges of mixed solvent systems, and under these conditions *they behave* like polymers for electrospinning.
> *(Science* 20 January 2006: Vol. 311. no. 5759, p. 299)

It is possible to identify the word *behave* as a candidate for a metaphor, because it is used together with polymers, which are not living beings and therefore cannot "behave" in the concrete sense. Therefore one could argue that this is a personification. However, it is difficult to describe the metaphor, because the whole sentence is not easy to understand if one is not familiar with the scientific claims it relates to.

How can this dilemma be solved? Can the researcher ask the scientist what s/he means by certain words, phrases, and sentences? But to ask if *polymers* really *behave*, or if that is "only" a metaphorical description would mean to go back to asking if the sentence is true, thus, if it describes something that is real in the world. This would mean mixing judgements about truth and word meaning again. Semino, Heymann and Short, who describe the problems of metaphor identification in a corpus of doctor-patient conversations about cancer, also struggle with this problem: They argue that talking about tumors as *travelling* in the body and *coming back* could be metaphorical, assuming that "the concepts referred to by the expressions coming back and travelled do not apply literally (in the relevant discourse world) to the concepts referred to" (Semino *et al*., 2004: 1278). Semino *et al*. combine these considerations about scientific facts with an analysis of the semantic content of the words *coming back* and *travelling*. Thus, they combine the word meaning approach with the truth approach. It seems that there is no way of avoiding this aspect. But I think it is crucial in every point of the metaphor identification procedure to reflect on whether one refers to a violation or alteration of

truth or word meaning. In other words, the researcher has to reflect if s/he uses the *truth approach* or the *word meaning approach* or a combination of both to metaphor identification.

It is very important to distinguish between two processes: the intuitional recognition of a metaphor and the analytical identification of a metaphor in a text or spoken language. Intuitional recognition is based on a combination of knowledge of truth (facts in the world) and the meaning of a word. In order to develop an analytical approach, one has to separate knowledge about facts in the world and semantic knowledge – and in this analytical procedure one can then distinguish between the *truth approach* and the *word meaning approach*. As I have shown already, both approaches work in many cases but cause problems with specific examples or discourses – especially in scientific discourse, as is also shown by Semino *et al*. (2004). Some metaphors can be identified only via the *truth approach*, others only via the *word meaning approach*. Unfortunately, two neatly distinguishable types of metaphor do not exist. Nevertheless, there are tendencies. First, there are sentences with truth conditions. If these truth conditions are violated by facts in the world, we are confronted either with lies or with non-literal language such as irony, sarcasm, or metaphor. To distinguish these types of speech acts we have to take the knowledge and the intentions of the speaker (and the hearer) into account. This is a purely pragmatic problem. Other cases rely more on the use and combination of certain words with certain meanings. Such is the case for most of the examples from *Science*. In these cases, it is necessary to take the word meaning into account. We can find both kinds of expressions in scientific discourse. The problem is that in the case of expressions that can be literal or metaphorical, we might not know the "truth". In the case of semantic violations we have to make decisions about word meaning. Here another problem arises: the problem of understanding the meaning of scientific terms.

5. Conclusion

Metaphor identification is difficult. Although intuition is surprisingly coherent, intuitional decisions always mix knowledge about the world and knowledge about word meaning. This causes problems in scientific discourse, because one has to distinguish between whether the author/speaker is making a scientific or a linguistic point when identifying a metaphor in a scientific text, theory or argument. To claim that a scientific argument is metaphorical because it is not true in reality is a scientific claim and calls into question the appropriateness of the scientific argument. To claim that a scientific term is a metaphor because it represents a secondary meaning of the used word is a completely different point, because it is a linguistic observation. It does not automatically question the scientific term or the argument connected with it. It only gives a clue of what might be a metaphorical conceptualization, and this conceptualization can be more or less appropriate.

Therefore we need more than intuition in the metaphor analysis of scientific texts. The *truth approach* is not sufficient – it has to be avoided or carefully reflected and distinguished from semantic arguments. A consequently semantic argumentation, i.e. the

word meaning approach, would be a better basis for metaphor identification in scientific discourse. But once the researcher tries to find valid linguistic criteria to distinguish metaphorical from literal expressions, another problem arises, namely how to claim one primary meaning for a word. This problem is serious in any context, as has been shown by Steen (2002 *b*: 24-25), but it is extremely serious in scientific contexts, because here normal identification strategies for the primary meaning of a word are prone to fail.

There seems to be no systematic "trick" for identifying metaphors in scientific discourse. Any linguistic analysis, however careful, leaves doubts about what this analysis means for the scientific concepts.[8] Thus, even more stock has to be put in the following steps – in Steen's work step two to five – of the analysis (Steen, 1999 *a*).

What is most important in any identification procedure is to keep the different identification methods distinct. In the linguistic decision about the status of a word or phrase as metaphorical, the *truth approach* and the *word meaning approach* must be clearly distinguished for the analysis. Furthermore, the linguistic criteria for a metaphor must be analytically separated from judgements about a certain scientific discourse or argument. In a further step, these different approaches to metaphor identification can be combined again – maybe as different steps in a procedure such as Steen's (1999 *a*) five-step-procedure. For scientific discourse, however, the evaluation of a scientific argument as metaphorical or literal has to be added. That means that a purely linguistic analysis can't provide information on how exactly the use of certain linguistic expressions and the points made in the text are connected. Therefore, after a metaphor analysis of scientific texts, a critical reading of the texts themselves is necessary.

Thus, I argue for a purely linguistic analysis with purely linguistic criteria for metaphor as the first step in metaphor identification. This, however, can be only the starting point for any work on metaphors in discourse. In order to get to the interesting points of metaphorical conceptualization, more analytical steps have to be added (in Steen's procedure step two to five). For a complete analysis of a certain scientific discourse, different approaches and cooperation with different disciplines seems absolutely necessary.

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8. Whether the metaphors occuring in scientific texts have anything to do with scientific arguments, is another question that can be approached in discourse analysis – but then at least basic scientific knowledge or cooperation with scientists is required. The psychological reality of these metaphors can only be established by means of genuine psychological evidence (for example from experiments).

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Discourse, Semantics and Metonymy

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ABSTRACT: In current research on discourse analysis and on metonymy there is an idea that is missing: the study of the discourse potential of metonymic activity. The reasons for this are to be found, in all likelihood, on the one hand, the still dominant idea that text coherence (also called text cohesion at the lexical level) does take place propositionally and on the other hand, on the also prevalent idea (tightly complementary to the first one) that metonymy is simply a local cognitive phenomenon, of a mainly referential nature. However, the evidence suggests, as will be extensively demonstrated in this paper, that metonymy is pervasive in much of our cognitive and discourse activities. Thus, metonymy may underlie the generation of conversational implicatures and the interpretation of indirect speech acts. It is through the cognitive approach and the application of frame semantics that we are in the position to offer a more plausible explanation of the discourse coherence phenomenon. After introducing the various approaches to semantics and justifying the convenience of a maximalist approach, I discuss the role of metaphor and above all the role of metonymy in discourse, as a pervading source of inferencing and coherence.

Keywords: metonymy, metaphor, discourse coherence, implicature, ICM.

RESUMEN: En la investigación actual sobre discurso y metonimia todavía no existe una investigación importante sobre el potencial discursivo de la metonimia. Las principales razones hay que buscarlas en la perspectiva proposicional predominante en que se explica el fenómeno de la coherencia y por otro lado el papel de la metonimia, que se encuentra relegado a un fenómeno cognitivo simplemente local. Estas dos perspectivas se complementan y refuerzan para pesentarnos un panorama incompleto. Sin embargo la evidencia nos demuestra que la metonimia tiene un papel predominante en la generación de implicaturas conversacionales y en la interpretación de actos de habla indirectos. La lingüística cognitiva, la semántica de marcos, nos ofrecen los instrumentos para una explicación más plausible de la relación entre discurso y metonimia. Una vez justificada la conveniencia de elegir un enfoque maximalista en semántica, se discuten el papel de la metáfora y más en profundidad el papel de la metonimia en el discurso, como fenómenos que impregnan las actividades de inferencia y coherencia discursivas.

Palabras clave: metonimia, metáfora, coherencia discursiva, implicatura, ICM.

1. Introduction: Semantics and Discourse

There are many ways of doing semantics. We have formal semantics, which makes use of principles of logic in looking at concepts in terms of classes of items subject to logical operations and definable in terms of intensional and extensional meaning. We have interpretive semantics, in which lexical items can be arranged according to their capability to combine with one another on the basis of selection restrictions (e.g. such atomic concepts as +/- human, +/-living, etc.). There are also paradigmatic approaches like Coseriu's lexematics whereby lexical items are arranged onomasiologically according to their inherent semasiological structure. Other approaches, like Wierzbicka's analysis and the cognitive semantics approach come closer to providing rich semantic characterizations for each lexical item or for the conceptual constructs associated with them. Wierzbicka believes that the essentials of world knowledge can be captured in definitions by means of a set of universal, atomic concepts that she calls "semantic primitives" (e.g. small, big, kind, good, do, etc.). Cognitive semantics has taken two forms: idealized cognitive models theory (Lakoff, 1987), and frame semantics (Fillmore; Atkins, 1992, 1994). In cognitive semantics concepts are complex structures consisting of a number of elements and their associated roles (e.g. in a buying frame, we have a buyer, a seller, a market, merchandise, and money).

It is possible to divide all these different ways of dealing with semantics into two basic approaches: one, we will call the minimalist view, and the other the maximalist view. Only cognitive semantics fits the latter category, since it tries to capture all the complexities of conceptual organization. I will argue that, precisely because of these ambitious goals, only a maximalist approach can be productively used to account for discourse activity.

2. The Maximalist Approach

Let us consider Lakoff's account of the notion of mother (Lakoff, 1987). By way of contrast, we will start by providing Wierzbicka's definition of the same concept as created on the basis of her set of primitive universals (Wierzbicka, 1996: 154-155):

X is *Y*'s mother. =
(a) at one time, before now, *X* was very small
(b) at that time, *Y* was inside *X*
(c) at that time, *Y* was like a part of *X*
(d) because of this, people can think something like this about *X*:
"*X* wants to do good things for *Y*
X doesn't want bad things to happen to *Y*".

Wierzbicka's definition, although apparently strange, has the value of being couched in terms of (primitive) universal notions like 'at one time', 'before', 'now', 'part of', 'small', 'inside', 'good', and others. It provides us with a way to identify the notion of the relation mother-child without making direct use of non-universal concepts like

'birth' or 'taking care of'. However, the definition, as it stands, misses a lot of the richness of what we know about mothers, as evidenced by a number of extensions of the concept: 'surrogate mother' (i.e. a woman that gives birth to a baby on behalf of another woman), 'biological mother', 'foster mother', 'adoptive mother', 'stepmother', etc. While biological mothers and surrogate mothers carried their babies inside their wombs, foster mothers and adoptive mothers only take care of them. Still, in a sense the different kinds of mother are mothers, although they do not comply with all the aspects of the definition. A surrogate mother bears a baby, but there is no reason why she should want good things to happen to the baby just because at one time the baby was inside her. However, a foster mother, who has not had the baby inside her, is expected to love and care for her child.

A maximalist approach also takes into account metaphorical and metonymic uses of concepts. For Lakoff (1987, 1993) a metaphor is a set of correspondences (what he calls a conceptual mapping) between two discrete conceptual domains: one of them, called the source, allows us to understand and reason about the other called the target. Thus, in ARGUMENT IS WAR we see people arguing as contenders in a battle who plan tactics, attack, defend, counterattack, gain or lose ground, and finally win or lose (e.g. *She had been gaining ground throughout the debate, but then she faltered and her opponent was able to beat her*). A metonymy is considered a domain-internal conceptual mapping, as in *She loves Plato*, where "Plato" stands for Plato's work.

Now consider these sentences:

(1)
- (a) My wife mothers me.
- (b) She mothers her children well.
- (c) Necessity is the mother of invention.
- (d) Spanish is my mother tongue.
- (e) My mother is not married to my father.
- (f) She's my grandmother on my mother's side.

Sentences (1.a) and (1.b) are based upon the idea that mothers take care of their children. The difference is that (1.a) is a metaphorical use of the notion whereas (1.b) is a literal use. In fact, in (1.b) it is taken for granted that the protagonist is the biological mother of the children that she takes care of (on some interpretations, there is the possibility that she is not the biological mother). In (1.c) the idea that mothers give birth to children is used metaphorically to help us reason about the relationship between necessity and invention (necessity is at the origin of invention). In (1.d), the mother tongue is the language that you learn from your mother as a native speaker: again there is a metaphor that exploits the birth connection between mother and child. In sentence (1.e) the speaker seems to take for granted that most people think that children are usually born within the bonds of marriage and it is in this context that his remark makes sense. Finally, (1.f) calls upon the idea that one's mother is the closest female ancestor.

The full meaning impact of all these sentences can only be accounted for on the basis of a richer description of motherhood than the one provided by a minimalist analysis. A maximalist analysis, like the one provided by Lakoff (1987), postulates at

least five cognitive structures that seem to cluster in our minds to account for all aspects of our understanding of the notion of mother: the birth model (cf. *biological mother*, *mother tongue*, *Necessity is the mother of invention)*, the nurturance model (cf. *adoptive mother*, *foster mother*, *She mothers me*), the marital model (cf. *My mother is not married to my father*), the biological model (cf. *surrogate mother*), and the genealogical model (cf. *She's my grandmother on my mother's side*). What is more, there are important pragmatics and discourse consequences of this form of maximalist analysis. Take the following extensions of the previous examples:

(1')
- (a) My wife mothers me; in fact, she spoils me and I just love that!
- (b) She mothers her children well; while she prepares their meals, she bathes and puts them to bed.
- (c) Necessity is the mother of invention, and, as everybody knows, a skinny woman named Poverty is the mother of Necessity.
- (d) Spanish is my mother tongue but for me English is like a mother tongue too.
- (e) My mother is not married to my father, but I don't care much.
- (f) She's my grandmother on my mother's side, but in my mind she's closer to me than my own mother.

Mothers in taking care of their children often give them everything they ask for. This is generally regarded as negative since children also need discipline (note that mothering well is incompatible with spoiling a child); but this negative association does not carry over to the metaphorical extension (1'.a), since in the context of adults the discipline element is not present. Example (1'.b) makes some relevant connections with the standard notion of mothering a child well. However, note the impossibility of:

(1''.b) She mothers her children well; in fact she spoils them!

Explaining why (1'.b) is possible while (1''.b) is not requires a maximalist account in which genuine motherhood is connected not only to nurturance but also to the discipline of children. This apparently trivial aspect of the semantic organization of linguistic expressions, i.e. that metaphorical extensions of concepts only make use of partial conceptual structure for the metaphoric source, has important discourse consequences in terms of an account of the discourse potential of expressions.

3. The Role of Metonymy in Discourse Meaning and Structure

The study of metonymy is also part of the maximalist approach to meaning to the extent that it is possible to argue that metonymic connections are part of our conventionalized knowledge of the world. Think of the metonymic association between hands and labourers (*We need two more hands here*), instruments and players (*The piano has the flue*), customers and orders (*The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill*), authors and their works (*I like Shakespeare*), a controlling entity for the entity that is controlled

(e.g. *The buses are on strike*), and actors and their roles (*Hamlet was superb last night*), among many others.

One of the main concerns of cognitive linguists working on metonymy has been to provide clear definitional and typological criteria which separate metonymy from metaphor and from literal uses of language (cf. Barcelona, 2000; Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000). More recently, some work has been devoted to the connection between metonymy and pragmatic inferencing (cf. the collection of papers in Panther; Thornburg, 2003). Some of the crucial findings in these studies are the following:

1 Metonymy is a pervasive phenomenon in language that goes beyond cases of referential shifts commonly attested the literature (e.g. ORDER FOR CUSTOMER, INSTRUMENT FOR PLAYER, CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED, etc.). Thus, it is proposed that there are several kinds of non-referential metonymy: (i) predicative metonymies like *Mary is just a pretty face* (meaning 'Mary has a beautiful face' and implying that her beauty is her only relevant attribute to the exclusion of others like intelligence; cf. Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000); (ii) propositional metonymies like *She waved down a taxi* (meaning that she stopped a taxi by waving at it) (cf. Lakoff, 1987); (iii) illocutionary metonymies (e.g. *I can buy you a bicycle*, where the speaker's ability to buy an item stands for his guarantee that he will buy the item; cf. similar proposals in Thornburg; Panther, 1997; Panther; Thornburg, 1998); (iv) and situational metonymies (e.g. *The poor dog left with its tail between its legs*, where part of a conventional scenario stands for the full scenario in which the dog is beaten and probably humiliated in such a way that the animal has to leave to avoid further harm; cf. Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002).
2 Kövecses; Radden (1998) introduce for the first time the notion of high-level metonymy, where both source and target are generic cognitive models (e.g. INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION as in *He hammered a nail into the wall*). Ruiz de Mendoza; Pérez (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) have studied the full semantic import of many grammatical phenomena on the basis of possible underlying high-level metonymies. Thus, it is possible to explain some asymmetries in the use of resultative predicates on the grounds of the semantic constraints imposed by high-level metonymic mappings. Consider the application of the high-level metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION (first identified by Panther; Thornburg, 2000) to account for the infelicity of **Fall asleep* versus *Don't fall asleep*. The difference in meaning between the two sentences (and their degree of felicity) is evident from the following respective paraphrases based upon the proposed metonymy: 'act in such a way that as a result you will fall asleep' (which is hardly feasible), and 'act in such a way that as a result you won't fall asleep'. It is also possible to find a metonymic motivation for such phenomena as the subcategorial conversion of nouns (e.g. *There were three Johns at the party*, ENTITY FOR COLLECTION), the recategorization of adjectives (e.g. *blacks*, *nobles*, PROPERTY FOR ENTITY), and modality shifts (POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY, as in *I can see the mountain from my window*, where "I can see" means 'I actually see because the conditions allow me to see').

3 Metonymy interacts with metaphor in significant ways. Goossens (1990) was the first cognitive linguist to address this issue in his article "Metaphtonymy". However, he used limited evidence coming from a small body-part corpus and his findings have only partial value. Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002) have provided the most detailed and systematic account of interaction patterns in which metonymy plays a role. Their proposal is based upon the formal distinction between two basic metonymy types and the conceptual operations which hinge upon them. In *Nixon bombed Hanoi*, "Nixon" stands for the United States air force under his command, a subdomain of 'Nixon' ; this is a case where the metonymic target is a subdomain of the source, or a target-in-source metonymy. In *The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill*, the order is a subdomain of the customer who has placed the order; this is a source-in-target metonymy. In the first case, we have a cognitive operation of reduction of the amount of conceptual material that is needed to find the right referent for the expression (since the actual referent is a subdomain of the source, the target is conceptually smaller for the purposes of the Metonymic operation). In the second case we have an operation of conceptual expansion (the source gives us access to a conceptually richer target). Within the framework of a metaphoric mapping, Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002) postulate that metonymy plays a subsidiary role. It may either expand or reduce the metaphoric source or the metaphoric target. These examples will illustrate the four patterns (there are of course a number of subpatterns, since the reduction operation may work on the whole source and target or on just part of it):

- Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source: *He beat his breast*, uttered in a situation in which the protagonist has not actually beaten his breast. The source has the underspecified situation in which a person beats his breast as an open show of sorrow about something wrong that he has done.
- Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric source: *She's my soul*, where "soul" stands for a subdomain of 'soul', i.e. 'the essence of my existence', in the metaphoric source. The target has the person that we are talking about.
- Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric target: *She caught my ear*, where 'ear' in the metaphoric target is the instrument of hearing that stands for 'attention'; catching an object is a way of getting hold of it and maps onto the idea of obtaining someone's attention.
- Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric target: *She won my heart*, where 'heart' stands for a cultural subdomain of heart, i.e. 'love'. The source has a person that wins a prize while the target has a lover that obtains someone's love.

What is missing in current research on metonymy is the study of the discourse potential of metonymic activity. The reason for this is to be found, in all likelihood, in the still dominant idea that metonymy is simply a local cognitive phenomenon, of a mainly referential nature. However, the evidence suggests, as pointed out above, that

metonymy is pervasive in much of our cognitive activity. Thus, it may underlie the generation of conversational implicatures and the interpretation of indirect speech acts:

(2)
(a) How did you go to the airport? -I stopped a taxi.
(b) It's getting colder here [addressee closes an open window]

In (2.a) the answer "I stopped a taxi" does not fully address the first speaker's question. But we know that it is part of a conventional scenario (or idealized cognitive model) pertaining to the use of taxi services: within that scenario, stopping a taxi is a precondition to take the taxi and ask the driver to take you to your destination. From the point of view of metonymy, the act of stopping a taxi provides us with a point of access to the whole scenario, in such a way that the person asking the question may reason:

[1] 'If he stopped a taxi, this means he took a taxi and he gave the driver instructions to take him to the airport; so, he took a taxi to go there'

In (2.b) we also have a conventional scenario that differs in quality from the one specified for (2.a). In effect, what we have in (2.b) is an action scenario based upon what Leech (1983) called the pragmatic cost-benefit scale, i.e. the idea that, because of accepted social norms, we are required to minimize cost and maximize benefit for others while maximizing cost and minimizing cost to selves. In the context of that action scenario, the addressee of an utterance like (2.b), which seems to point to the speaker's discomfort, is expected to do all he can to change the situation to the speaker's benefit. What speech act theorists call the "illocutionary force" of this utterance is ultimately calculated on the basis of a metonymic operation whereby part of an action scenario stands for the whole of it. The reasoning process may take the following form:

[2] 'If the speaker makes a remark about a costly state of affairs that affects him negatively, this means that he wants to draw my attention to such a state of affairs so that I have the opportunity to act in such a way that cost to the speaker is minimized even if I have to maximize cost to myself; since I think it is an open window that makes him feel cold, the speaker expects me to close the window for him'.

Gricean pragmaticists, (cf. Bach; Harnish, 1979; Grice, 1989) would address the problem of the inferential process used by the first speaker in (5.a) by postulating a pragmatic principle or maxim that regulates the process and produces an implicature. In this case, the maxim of relation ('be relevant') would apply and direct the addressee to look for a relevant answer connected to the information explicitly given.

Neo-Gricean pragmaticists, like Levinson (2000) would deal with this implicature-derivation process on the basis of some sort of conventional heuristics that is part of our reasoning equipment. More specifically, Levinson (2000: 31-35) proposes three heuristics (i.e. reasoning systems) that lie at the basis of implicated meaning:

(i) First heuristic: "What isn't said, isn't"; e.g. in *There is a blue pyramid on the red cube*, this heuristic licenses inferences like these: 'There is not a cone on the red cube'; 'There is not a red pyramid on the red cube'.
(ii) Second heuristic: "What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified"; e.g. in *The blue pyramid is on the red cube*, this heuristic licenses inferences like the following: 'The pyramid is a stereotypical one, on a square, rather than, e.g., a hexagonal base'; 'The pyramid is directly supported by the cube (e.g. there is no intervening slab)'; 'The pyramid is centrally placed on, or properly supported by, the cube (it is not teetering on the edge, etc.)'; 'The pyramid is in canonical position, resting on its base, and not balanced, e.g. on its apex'.
(iii) Third heuristic: "What is said in an abnormal way, isn't normal; or marked message indicates marked situation"; e.g. in *The blue cuboid block is supported by the red cube*, this heuristic licenses the inferences: 'The blue block is not, strictly, a cube'; 'The blue block is not directly or centrally or stably supported by the red cube'.

Examples like (2.a) and (2.b) above would seem to be explainable by the third heuristic, since they are marked messages that call for a special interpretation procedure.

Relevance theorists, following Sperber; Wilson (1995), would account for (2.a) and (2.b) in a different way. For them, the answer "I stopped a taxi" is meaningful in context provided that the second speaker has the intention of putting particular emphasis on the fact that he had to take a taxi. There may be a number of reasons. Imagine a context in which the speaker would have preferred to be given a lift by a friend and felt frustrated that he had been turned down. The sentence "I stopped a taxi" is more meaningful (i.e. it creates a broader range of what Sperber; Wilson call "contextual effects" in the addressee's mind) in this context than simply stating the less marked form "I went by taxi". In Relevance Theory it is taken for granted that when we communicate we try to strike a balance between processing economy and contextual effects (i.e. modifications of the addressee's cognitive environment by adding, taking away or changing the information that is manifest to him). An utterance like "I stopped a taxi" requires greater inferential activity than the more straightforward "I went by taxi"; the greater effort involved has to be compensated by extra contextual effects.

Even this brief account of the Gricean and post-Gricean standard explanations of inference reveals one fundamental problem: the three accounts are capable of accounting for the outcome of inferential activity, but have nothing to say about the nature of such an activity. Thus, in all cases we know (because a conversational maxim is violated, or because there is a conventional heuristic, or because the speaker tries to achieve relevance) that we have to engage in special interpretative procedures when faced with examples such as (2.a) and (2.b), but we are not told what those procedures are like. I suggest that metonymic mappings, like those postulated by cognitive linguists, are a clear case of such procedures.

This proposal is consonant with another previous proposal made by Ruiz de Mendoza; Pérez (2001) in the sense that metaphor and metonymy are to be listed among the cognitive mechanisms used by speakers to produce explicatures. In standard Relevance Theory, it is postulated that explicatures are derived on the basis of the

development of the initial assumption schema provided by the utterance. Thus, in *We are ready*, finding a referent for "we" (e.g. 'my brother and I') and completing the utterance to specify what it is that the protagonists are ready for (e.g. 'for the show'), is part of the explicature-derivation activity. Implicatures, on the other hand, require more complex reasoning schemas with implicit premises and implicated conclusions, as in the following exchange uttered in the context of a party:

(3) What time is it? -Most of the guests are leaving now.

The answer to the first speaker's question is relevant only if we bring into the reasoning schema the implicit assumption that guests will leave when they feel that it is getting too late for them or they have had enough. The conclusion is that it is time to finish the event.

Ruiz de Mendoza; Pérez (2001) have argued that metaphoric and metonymic mappings produce explicatures based on the blueprint provided by the linguistic expression. Thus, the shift from 'shoe' to 'shoelaces' in *He didn't tie his shoes well*, would be a development of the initial assumption schema provided by the expression and would not need to import implicit premises from the context to fill in a reasoning schema.

However, in my proposal, even implicature-derivation is a matter of metonymy. The difference is that the metonymy is not of the referential kind, but simply a situational metonymy. In the case of reasoning schema [1], it is a low-level situational metonymy, based on a specific scenario with specific conventional information about taking taxis. However, in the case of [2] we have a high-level situational metonymy based on a generic action scenario, i.e. the result of abstracting away common structure from many situations in which speakers are directed (requested, order, suggested, etc.) to do things.

Understanding metonymy is also crucial in order to explain some phenomena of discourse cohesion. It may be useful to consider the GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC and the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymies, which have been identified by Panther; Thornburg (2000) as a high-level metonymies with an impact on English grammar. Compare:

(4)
(a)
A: What's that bird?
B: It's a robin.
(b)
A: What's that noise?
B: It's a burglar.

As Panther; Thornburg (2000) point out, the *What's that N?* construction, when used metonymically, has two senses, the taxonomic, as in example (4.a), and the causal, as in (4.b). The taxonomic sense is regulated by the metonymic GENERIC IS SPECIFIC: this allows us to paraphrase A's utterance in (4.a) as 'What kind of bird is that?'. The causal sense has a metonymic grounding in the EFFECT FOR CAUSE mapping, which yields a different kind of paraphrase for A's utterance in (4.b): 'What's

the cause of that noise?'. Panther; Thornburg note that while the English grammar makes it possible to repeat the Noun Phrase instead of making use of the anaphoric pronoun in (4.a), this is not the case for (4.b), and correlate this difference in grammatical behaviour with the difference in the underlying metonymic mappings:

(5)
(a) That bird is a robin.
(b) *That noise is a burglar.

To Panther and Thornburg's account, it is possible to add one more observation in terms of discourse connectivity. Cohesion has often been treated as a grammatical phenomenon, in contrast to coherence that was based on world knowledge (e.g. frames) and was therefore purely conceptual. However, the fact that anaphora, one of the procedures to create cohesion (Halliday; Hasan, 1976, 1989), may depend on metonymic activation, seems to point to a different treatment of the issue, one in which cohesion is seen as being conceptually grounded. This may apply to all other cases of anaphora:

(6) I love my family. They do all they can for me.

It is very well known that singular words which refer to groups of people (e.g. *police*, *family*, *government*, *team*) can often be used as if they were plural. They can also be used in the singular form, depending on how we want to think of them. Note that using the singular anaphoric pronoun in (6') would not be as appropriate:

(6') I love my family. ?It does all it can for me.

However, the singular form is better on other occasions:

(7) My family is great (cf. ? My family are great)

There is a relationship between the foregoing discussion and one crucial finding in the context of what has been called metonymic anaphora (e.g. Stirling, 1996), i.e. anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun phrase. The finding was first made by Ruiz de Mendoza (2000) and has been considerably refined in Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002). It is the fact that anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun phrase always makes use of the matrix (or most encompassing) domain of the metonymic mapping. Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) have coined the label *Domain Availability Principle* (or DAP) to capture this idea: only the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping is available for anaphoric reference.

The issue of anaphora in connection to metonymy was first raised by Fauconnier (1985) and Nunberg (1995) who give partial answers to the problem. Thus, Fauconnier believes that there is a pragmatic function that connects a metonymic source and its corresponding target, and that anaphora usually selects the metonymic target (i.e. the intended mental representation), especially if the target is animate (e.g. in *The ham*

sandwich is waiting for his bill, the target is animate and would be selected as the antecedent for an anaphoric pronoun, as in *The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill and he is getting restless*). If the source is animate, then it serves as the antecedent (e.g. 'Napoleon', rather than 'Napoleon's navy', is the antecedent in *After Napoleon lost at Waterloo, he was banished to St. Helena*). However, this analysis is incapable of determining the potential antecedent when both source and target are either animate of inanimate:

(8) Terminator (i.e. Arnold Schwarzenegger) has just been elected governor of California. Will he be up to the job?

(9) I love the book (i.e. its contents). I'll read it a second time.

Nunberg (1995) tries to come to terms with the issue of metonymic anaphora by making a distinction between two different types of linguistic mechanism: "deferred indexical reference" and "predicate transfer". The former is the process by means of which an indexical is used to refer to an object that corresponds somehow to the contextual element chosen by a demonstrative. The latter occurs whenever the name of a property that applies to something in one domain is used to refer to the name of a property that applies to things in another domain (Nunberg, 1995: 111). He gives the following examples:

(10)
(a) This is parked out back.
(b) I am parked out back.

The two sentences are produced while the speaker is holding out a key. Sentence (10.a) is a case of deferred indexical reference, where the demonstrative pronoun "this" is used to refer to a car. Sentence (10.b) illustrates predicate transfer since a property of cars (i.e. cars may be parked) is attributed to a person. According to Nunberg, the distinction between deferred indexical reference and predicate transfers is enough to explain cases of metonymic anaphora:

(11)
(a) This is parked out back and may not start.
(b) ??This only fits the left front door and is parked out back.
(c) I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes.
(d) * I am parked out back and may not start.

In deferred indexical reference, a conjoined predicate must be semantically connected to the deferred referent, like 'the car' in (11.a), whereas in predicate transfer the conjoined predicate must express a property of the element that receives the property, i.e. the driver/owner in (11.c). However, this account cannot be applied to all cases of metonymic anaphora. The main problems lie with the notion of predicate transfer:

(12)

(a) Shakespeare (i.e. a book by Shakespeare) is right there on the top shelf. Could you please hand it over to me?

(b) The kettle (i.e. the contents; the water in the kettle) is boiling; please, turn it off.

In (12.a) we have a case of what Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) have called double metonymy, AUTHOR FOR WORKS FOR MEDIUM, where AUTHOR and MEDIUM are matrix domains, so "it" in (12.b) refers back to the medium of presentation of Shakespeare's works (e.g. a book). It must be borne in mind that semantic compatibility between the metonymy and the predicate of the expression is what makes us select the second and not the first matrix domain for the anaphoric operation (cf. *Shakespeare is on the top shelf; I would read him/it if I were you*, where "him" has the matrix 'Shakespeare' as its antecedent, and "it" the book, but in the two cases we mean 'Shakespeare's work'). If we wanted to apply Nunberg's analysis to (12.a) we would have to postulate a predicate transfer whereby a property of books (i.e. being stored on shelves) is applied to Shakespeare. The adjoined predicate 'hand over' would have to express a property of Shakespeare, since it is 'Shakespeare' that has received the new property. But evidently this is not the case. The adjoined predicate expresses a property of books (books can be handed over).

In (12.b) the predicate transfer would give the property of 'boiling' to the kettle; the adjoined predicate 'turn off' would have to express a property of kettles. However, it is not kettles but the fire that we use to heat the water that is turned on or off.

The Domain Availability Principle captures all cases of metonymic anaphora. In the case of Nunberg's example *This is parked out back and may not start,* "this" points to an object (the key) that is to be considered a subdomain of the car to which it belongs, the car being the matrix domain. In this interpretation, *(it) may not start* makes use of the matrix domain for the anaphoric operation. Note that because we have deferred reference, it would be impossible to say **This key is parked out back*.

The case of *I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes* is different. The car is a subdomain of the owner of the car, so we have a metonymy from owner to possession, where the matrix domain 'owner' is referred to anaphorically in the conjoined sentence.

Example (12.a) is a clear case of the DAP: one of the two the matrix domains, i.e. the one that combines with the predicate 'be on the top shelf' (the medium of presentation of Shakespeare's work) is used for the anaphoric operation.

Finally, (12.b) is a more complex case. In principle, it is the matrix domain 'kettle' that is referred to by "it" in "turn it off". However, when we say "turn the kettle off" what we mean is turn the heating source off (e.g .the fire). However, the concept 'kettle' still retains its status as the matrix domain in the case of the conceptual association between 'kettle' and 'fire', so the use of "it" is appropriate and abides by the DAP.

4. Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to outline what may be a productive and 'bridge building' approach to research in discourse studies. The combination of the most relevant pragmatic principles, from which discourse studies should never divert, with the insights of cognitive semantics, mostly the application of the immense potential of metonymic grounding, as shown in the last section of this paper, can result in a very fruitful set of discoveries that affect discourse in its central issues.

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Conceptual Metaphor and Text Development: a Narratological Perspective

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ABSTRACT: This study attempts to analyse the structural role of metaphor in a specific text-type. For this purpose, we chose a specific genre, a popular magazine about scientific topics, the *National Geographic* (*NG*), and one of the typical texts of that magazine, the story of a natural disaster, an earthquake. Hypothesizing that every text displays a specific metaphoric configuration that will, in a sense, constitute the metaphorical identity of that text, the study explains how we can identify in a specific text the structure of its metaphorical relations. Having identified the conceptual keys which link the experiential domains activated by the text in the conceptualization of a disastrous event like an earthquake, the study then explores the interaction between common metaphorical conceptualizations and their text-specific configurations through narrative processing. Using a Labovian framework, the research perspective attempts to describe how the metaphoric conceptualization of earthquakes is linked to text development and narrative processing. Thus, working along the interface between cognition and discourse, the study demonstrates the utility of uncovering ***in text*** the relationship between universal human conceptualization, social experience and discourse structure.

Keywords: conceptual metaphor, narrative structure, Labov, discourse, social experience, text cohesion, *National Geographic*.

RESUMEN: Este estudio pretende analizar el papel structural de la metáfora en un tipo de texto específico. Con tal propósito, hemos elegido un género específico, una revista de divulgación científica, *National Geographic (NG)*, y uno de los textos típicos de dicha revista, el relato de un desastre natural, un terremoto. Con la hipótesis de que cada texto dispone de una configuración metafórica específica que, en cierto sentido, constituye la identidad metafórica del texto, el estudio muestra cómo podemos identificar en un texto específico la estructura de sus relaciones metafóricas. La identificación de claves conceptuales que ligan dominios experienciales activados por el texto, al conceptualizar sucesos como los terremotos, nos permite explorar la interacción entre conceptualizaciones metafóricas y sus configuraciones específicas a lo largo del proceso narrativo. Un enfoque Laboviano nos permite un intento de describir la connexion de la conceptualización metafórica de los terremotos con el desarrollo narrativo. Así, la interfaz entre cognición y discurso muestra la utilidad de descubrir en el texto la relación entre conceptualización humana universal, experiencia social y estructura del discurso.

Palabras clave: metáfora conceptual, estructura narrativa, Labov, discurso, experiencia social, cohesión textual, *National Geographic*.

1. Introduction

The rationale behind this study lies in the hypothesis that conceptual metaphor (CM) has a structural role in text organization and development, and that this role is intrinsically related to genre or text-type, an issue discussed by Barcelona (1995), Caballero (2003), Ponterotto (2000, 2005); see also Otal Campo; Navarro i Ferrando; Bellés Fortuño (2005).

It has been suggested that when conceptual metaphor is present in text, it has a functionally complex role. To begin with, the role of CM is obviously cognitive, in that it helps organize the essential information content of the text; secondly, it is also affective, since it orients readers' evaluations of that informational content; thirdly, CM has a pragmatic role, because it directs the movement of the discursive phases of the text, thereby consolidating the text structure.

The aim of the analysis is two-fold. First of all, the intention is to analyze the structural role of metaphor in a specific text-type. For this purpose, we have chosen a specific genre, a popular magazine about scientific topics, the *National Geographic* (*NG*), and one of the typical texts of that magazine, the story of a natural disaster. Hypothesizing that every text displays a specific metaphoric configuration that will, in a sense, constitute the metaphorical identity of that text, it will attempt to explain how we can identify in the text types of this genre the structure of metaphorical relations. As an additional query, this research perspective seeks to verify if there is some connection between narrative structure and the presence of cognitive metaphor, and how that interaction is related to reader expectations and reader reception. Using a Labovian framework, it will attempt to understand how cognitive metaphors appear in specific configurations at specific moments of the narrative structure. This step should allow us to understand the text from the point of view of its reception. In other words, we shall propose that text decoding depends on how the reader grasps the interaction between common metaphorical conceptualizations and their text-specific configurations through narrative processing.

2. Metaphorical Conceptualizations of Natural Phenomena

In classical Cognitive Metaphor Theeory, a CM is the result of a mapping between a source domain (SD) and a target domain (TD). For example TIME IS MONEY emerges from the mapping of SD: money with TD: time. As argued in many studies of CM, however, a mapping between SD and TD is never total. Some aspects of the domains are

selected by the basic conceptualization involved. Thus, of all the semantic and cognitive possibilities that a particular domain can evoke, some aspects emerge as salient while others remain latent. This cognitive phenomenon has been referred to as "highlighting", along with its obvious corollary operation, "hiding" (see Lakoff; Johnson 1980, Kovecses 2002). Lakoff; Johnson (1980:10) claim that:

> The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another (e.g., comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of battle) will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept.

As suggested in Ponterotto (1987), a cognitive metaphor is a sort of astigmatic eye, which changes focus according to specific orientation. Focusing means naturally that while one element is foregrounded, other elements are pushed into the background. For example, if one looks at the articles in the *NG* related to the topic of climatology, specific conceptualizations seem to emerge. Let us consider the description of rivers and their behaviour. In a study by De Zuane (2005), a macrometaphor for geographical phenomena was identified in the CM: NATURAL PHENOMENA ARE PERSONS, to which a series of sub-metaphors seem to be related, such as A RIVER IS A PERSON, A RIVER IS AN ENEMY, A RIVER IS A MOTHER. Examples of similar utterances which we have found in other articles of *NG* are:

A RIVER IS AN ENEMY (destructive)	1. ...flooding that over the centuries has killed hundreds of thousands of people" (Zich 1997:10) 2. The river rose 25 feet and thousands of acres of paddy fields were ruined. (O'Neil 1993: 2)
A RIVER IS A MOTHER (nurturing)	1.From the plains of Anatolia to the eastern Sahara, rivers are lifeblood to this arid region Middle East Water (Vesilind 1993: 38) 2. This unique freshwater system is the pulsing heart of northern Botswana's wilderness (Lanting 1990: 8)

Thus, the texts in the *National Geographic* seem to highlight one or the other of the two contrasting images: destructive enemy and nurturing mother. However, a careful observation of the texts reveals that both CMs are sometimes present in the same text. For example, when describing the consequences of river overflow and flooding, a text may tell the story of how the river as a source of life is transformed into a tool of destruction. This phenomenon of highlighting/hiding could be represented in the following way:



3. Analysis

I shall attempt to demonstrate this by means of analysis of the earthquake story found in the *NG* article: *Earthquake: Prelude to the Big One* (Canby 1990; see appendix).

3.1. Conceptual Structure: the Role of CM

If we search for the figurative expressions which seem to refer to conceptual metaphors, we can note that three CMs seem to characterize the text:

CM1: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A BASEBALL PLAYER
CM2: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A SOLDIER
CM3: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A MUSICIAN

Evidence for the identification of these metaphors lies in the numerous words and phrases chosen for the description of the earthquake which are part of the lexical sets

relating to the experiential domains of games and battles and to the perhaps less frequent but very salient set of lexical terms belonging to the domain of music and musical instruments. Some examples follow:

FIGURATIVE UTTERANCES	CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR
These *players* were tiring reaching the *breaking point*. Their *game* was in the *last inning*.	AN EARTHQUAKE IS A BASEBALL PLAYER
…*destroying* most homes and turning Main street into a *ghost town*. Hollister…Waves rolling north roiled the ground-… *shattering* Victorian houses…They *shook* San José…	AN EARTHQUAKE IS A SOLDIER
Here the waves found soil *in tune with their own vibrations and strummed it like a guitar string*	AN EARTHQUAKE IS A MUSICIAN

Thus, by way of choice of figurative utterances, the text activates CMs related to the experiential domains of 1. Sport, 2. War and 3. Music.

If we utilize the macrometaphor which seems to characterize our text type, NATURAL PHENOMENA ARE PERSONS, we could suggest that a kind of hierarchical relationship organizes the set of metaphors.

NATURAL PHENOMENA ARE PERSONS	NATURAL PHENOMENA ARE PERSONS	NATURAL PHENOMENA ARE PERSONS
SPORTS	WAR	MUSIC
LIFE IS A GAME	LIFE IS BATTLE	LIFE IS A SYMPHONY
AN EARTHQUAKE IS A BASEBALL PLAYER	AN EARTHQUAKE IS A SOLDIER	AN EARTHQUAKE IS A MUSICIAN

This aspect can be explained by the suggestion found in Lakoff; Johnson (1980) that metaphors can be described by their place in a hierarchy organized according to various levels of abstraction. We can also note Charteris-Black (2004: 245) who explains:

> *There are several advantages to placing individual metaphors from different domains of language use within a hierarchical model. The first of these is economy of description. If we can account for many metaphors with reference to a smaller number of conceptual metaphors, and many conceptual metaphors with reference to a still smaller number of conceptual keys, we will arrive at a more economical model for the description of metaphor. This permits us to understand cross-domain similarities in ways of conceptualising experience.*

3.1.1. Conceptual Keywords as Cross-domain Links

Now the following question arises. How are these CMs related to each other in the textual space? Are they competing for interpretive control? Or rather are they complementary, co-constructors of meaning and co-orienters of reader interpretation? To answer this question, we would like to refer to the analytic suggestions made by Charteris-Black relative to cross-domain similarities. In his 2004 study, he posits the existence of conceptual keys which link domains of social experience; e.g. politics, press-reporting, or religion. For example, he notes that discourses of sports reporting, politics and religion share the notion of *struggle*. In the domain of politics, we can find metaphors deriving from LIFE IS A STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL; in the domain of press reporting, we find ECONOMIC LIFE IS A STRUGGLE FOR PROFIT; in the domain of religion, SPIRITUAL LIFE IS A STRUGGLE FOR SALVATION. Charteris-Black (2004: 246) clarifies this point in the following way:

> *These conceptual keys show that each of these discourse types has metaphors that communicates a fundamental outlook that characterizes the discourse. The notion of a struggle is shared across the domains—but the specific domain determines the salient discourse goals of the struggle. In politics the discourse goals are social ideals and values, in sports reporting they are victory in competitive sport, in financial reporting they are profits and in religion they are attaining a place in paradise. There is a superordinate conceptual relation between these discourses since they all share the notion of the struggle as necessary to achieve these objectives.*

In the earthquake text, if we consider social events like sport, war and music as experiential domains, we can note that events within those experiential domains (games, battles and symphonies) have a similar event structure. The events all present:

1. *an initial phase*, which announces the main motifs of the event;
2. *a development stage*, in which activity is augmented and heightened, and which includes moments of tension, contrast and opposition;
3 *a restoration phase*, which resolves tension and moves towards conclusion and silence.

The following table clearly summarizes the similarity of event structure in the three domains that emerge in our text: sports (baseball game), war (battle) and music (symphony).

Experiential domain		SPORTS	WAR	MUSIC
Specific Event		Baseball game	Battle	Symphony

Phases of event structure	1. Announcement of event 2. Development (acceleration of energy, activity and tension) 3. Deceleration (restoration of harmony and move to conclusion)	1. Warm-up 2. Competition 3. Victory and end of play	1. Call to arms 2. Combat 3. Victory and cessation of combat	1. Announcement of basic motif 2. Increase and contrast of voices 3. Restoration and conclusion

Thus, all three events (baseball games, battles and symphonies) share similar structural aspects which allow them to be forceful candidates for source domains of a CM.

3.2. Discursive Structure: the Role of CM in Narrative Movement

3.2.1. Establishing the Referential Framework

As argued in Ponterotto (2005) when discussing advertising, headlines or titles have the function of establishing a framework for discourse reference. In this case, the title activates reference to the cataphoric, exophoric and anaphoric levels related to the social discourse about earthquakes.

The cataphoric reference regards the noun phrase *Prelude to the big one*. As people familiar with American culture will easily recognize, the noun phrase refers to the giant earthquake that is hypothesized to eventually strike Los Angeles. The exophoric reference resides in the noun phrase *the big one,* embedded in the cataphoric reference, which has become a fixed and repeated utterance in American discourse, carrying affective connotations of anxiety and fear regarding past and future earthquakes. The anaphoric reference is to a specific earthquake which occurred on October 17, 1994, the topic of this article.

That referential frame however is also sustained by the subtle role played by the lexical term *prelude* which seems to trigger all three referential operations. The lexeme *prelude* functions therefore as a cross-referential keyword, cohesively constructing the overall referential perspective.

Moreover, it should be remembered that the word *prelude* has a polysemic nature, encoding the meanings: 1. something that comes before; 2. a technical term for a short piece of music; 3. an introductory or opening performance or event. The word *prelude* is part of the lexical set normally associated with many experiential domains, including sports, war and music. It could be suggested then that, for this specific text, the word *prelude* functions as a key concept which links the three domains. The perception of similarity between the three domains by readers whose encyclopaedia includes

familiarity with the structure of the events of sports, war and music is in a sense cued by the word *prelude*, as in the following table:

Experiential domain	SPORTS	WAR	MUSIC
Shared key Concept	*Prelude*	*Prelude*	*Prelude*
Phases of domain structure	1. Warm-up 2. Competition 3. Victory and end of play	1. Call to arms 2. Combat 3. Victory and cessation of combat	1. Announcement of basic motif 2. Increase and contrast of voices 3. Restoration and conclusion

This procedure then, which tries to describe interrelationships between apparently unrelated domains of experience, is based on the identification of a conceptual key. The initial referential framing around the event of earthquakes, which triggers reader assumptions about implicit meaning, is anchored in reader recognition of conventional social patterns of events. This aspect emerges also from the study by Ruiz de Mendoza and Diez Velasco (2005), who note:

> *Inferential activity is regulated by cognitive operations. A cognitive operation is a mental mechanism whose purpose is to derive a full semantic representation out of a linguistic expression (or another symbolic device, such as a drawing) in order to make it fully meaningful in the context in which it is to be interpreted.*

Thus, we have identified:

- the conceptual metaphorical structure of the text;
- the event structure of the experiential domains;
- the referential frame introduced by the title;
- the shared key concept linking the domains.

By putting it altogether, we derive the following description of the relationship between common metaphorical conceptualizations and text-specific configurations:

Experiential domain	SPORTS	WAR	MUSIC
Specific Event	Baseball game	Battle	Symphony
Shared key Concept	*Prelude*	*Prelude*	*Prelude*

Phases of domain structure	1. Warm-up 2. Competition 3. Victory and end of play	1. Call to arms 2. Combat 3. Victory and cessation of combat	1. Announcement of basic motif 2. Increase and contrast of voices 3. Restoration and conclusion
CONCEPETUAL METAPHOR	AN EARTHQUAKE IS A BASEBALL PLAYER	AN EARTHQUAKE IS A SOLDIER	AN EARTHQUAKE IS A MUSICIAN

Finally, we can note that other lexical terms in the text along with the word *prelude* function to contribute to the cross-domain metaphorical structure; for example, the word *waves* and the word *vibrations,* which belong to the lexical sets associated both with the domain of music and with the domain of physics.

3.2.2. Establishing the Narrative Structure

How does conceptualization move from one possibility to another? In other words, how is it that at one moment, one element is highlighted while the other elements remain hidden? How does a formerly covert element come to centre stage?

Let us remember that this movement occurs in discourse. I would like to suggest therefore that it is determined by the interaction of metaphoric conceptualization and discourse structure. On the one hand the metaphoric configuration is stable and sustains the phases of the discourse. On the other hand, the text orients the metaphoric conceptualization and directs the discourse movement among the options made available by the specific metaphorical configuration.

As previously mentioned, although the *NG* speaks about scientific topics taken from various sub-fields of geography, it is nonetheless a popular journal addressed to non-expert readers. One will find therefore that its discursive format, rather than being totally argumentative, as in a scientific journal, is often basically that of narrative. A *NG* article tells stories, and often those stories recount the vicissitudes of a disastrous natural event, like an earthquake, a flood, a destructive bolt of lightning, etc. Consequently, it would be logical to analyze the *NG* text from the perspective of narratological theory.

The *NG* articles often include a story segment typical of news reporting. For example, the story of the article under scrutiny, the earthquake which occurred in California in 1991, emerges as a newsworthy event typical of press reportage. Now according to some researchers, news stories have a structure similar to that of oral narrative (cf. for example Bell, 1991; Thornborrow; Fitzgerald, 2004). Thus new stories have often been analyzed according to the narrative structure proposed by Labov (1972) and Labov; Waletsky (1967).

Following Labov, oral narratives are usually comprised by six phases: *abstract, orientation, complicating actions, resolution, evaluation* and *coda*. The evaluation phase is either an autonomous phase or a discursive thread embedded in other phases, as in the

case of this earthquake story. If we tried to divide our textual segment about earthquakes into the grid of a Labovian narrative structure, highlighting at the same time the figurative expressions, we would derive the following:

Abstract	Like thousands of other good Californians, Lee and Terry Peterson had gone to the third game of the World Series that evening to see the Giants try *to bounce back* against Oakland at Candlestick Park.
Orientation	Eighteen kilometres beneath that home and peak *another contest was playing*, *in an arena* known as the San Andreas Fault. Here two enormous *plates* of earth's crust had been locked in a *planetary pushing match* since the Great Francisco earthquake of 1906. These *players* were tiring reaching the breaking point. Their game was *in the last inning*. The Petersons found their seats at Candlestick Park. Expectantly, they watched the teams warm up. The clock hands reached 5:04. Deep beneath the Petersons' mountain home a section of weak rock *snapped*. The two sides of the San Andreas *shot* past each other. Simultaneously the west side of the fault rose, lifting the mountain themselves.
Complicating actions	The *ripping w*as unstoppable. For about eight seconds earth's crust unzipped at more than two kilometres a second, 20 kilometres to the north and south. The bucking Santa Cruz mountains *flicked the Peterson house off its foundation,* racking it like an eggshell. The faulting *released a frenzy* of seismic waves. They set the seismometer needles scribbling around the world and carried a *lethal* message to Californians. Waves rolling to the south *bludgeoned* the city of Santa Cruz, only 16 kilometres from the epicentre. They *took its commercial heart and snuffed four lives*. The waves *smacked* into Watsonville, *damaging or destroying* most homes and turning Main street into *a ghost town*. *They mutilated* Hollister and *churned* the rich sediments of the Salinas valley. Waves rolling north *roiled* the ground beneath picturesque Los Gatos, *shattering* Victorian houses and half the business district. They *shook* San Jose, but most buildings held. The waves *swept up* the peninsula, rattling securely planted cities, such as Palo Alto and Menlo Park. At Stanford University they found old, brittle structures and *twisted and cracked* them. Ahead lay Candlestick Park packed with 62,000 fans and ripe for *disaster.*
Resolution	The waves *shook* the Patersons and other bewildered spectators. But Candlestick sits on bedrock and it defeated the waves. Now the waves were weakening. With little effect, they *jiggled* Southern San Francisco and towns across the bay. A *tiring vanguard* of waves reached San Francisco's old Market Street area and marina district and Oakland's busy waterfront. These areas sit on man-made fill. Here the waves found soil *in tune with their own vibrations and strummed it like a guitar string*. More waves arrived and pumped in more energy. The earth grew alive and *danced*. The *vibrations* flowed upward into the buildings and highway structures. Picking up the *rhythm,* soil and structures *swayed to the strengthening beat like partners in a dance* Marina buildings *buckled*; many fell.

	Column joints supporting Oakland's Interstate 880 failed, and 44 slabs of concrete deck, each weighing 600 tons collapsed on cars below. The waves *pushed* the Oakland end of the Bay Bridge 18 centimetres to the east and a 15 meter section crashed into the level beneath.
Coda	Within 15 seconds the *vibrations* faded. But 63 persons lay dead or dying. Some 3,800 others suffered injuries requiring medical attention. The *waves damaged* more than 24,000 houses and apartment buildings as well as 4,000 businesses. At least a thousand structures faced demolition. Measured in adjusted dollars, property damage approached that of the dreadful temblor of 1906, which unleashed 60 times as much energy. The Loma Prieto damage exceeded that *inflicted* by Hurricane Hugo during the hours it *lashed* the Southeast.

We can note, first of all, that each of the main narrative phases seems to focus primarily on one of the three CMs. In fact, the CMs which seem to be tied to the narrative phases are:

Orientation	CM: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A BASEBALL PLAYER
Complicating actions	CM: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A SOLDIER
Resolution	CM: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A MUSICIAN

What we can readily observe is the apparent shift in metaphor focus from narrative phase to narrative phase. As one metaphor is foregrounded in a specific narrative phase, the others shift to the background. It is then within the narrative movement that the process of highlighting/hiding is achieved.

Finally, we could suggest that the narrative perspective activates an evaluative judgement of the events which emerges from a kind of metaphorical synthesis: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMPETING FORCES. In other words, this CM functions as superordinate metaphor or what Charteris-Black (2004: 246) calls the "fundamental outlook", adding further cohesion to the three basic CMs and their related experiential domains, thereby establishing a point of view on the narrated event.

Now according to Labov (1997), storytellers use the abstract phase of the narrative enterprise to posit the scenario in the realm of credibility. Often this grounding of story events in real-world experience is repeated in the coda. The abstract establishes time and place frames by reference to an actual baseball match. The coda presents a list of the damages left by the earthquake. Thus the entire narrative sequence could be described as follows:

Abstract	Narrator posits story within the realm of credibility (Real baseball game)
Orientation	CM: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A BASEBALL PLAYER

Complicating actions	CM: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A SOLDIER
Resolution	CM: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A MUSICIAN
Evaluation	CM: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMPETING FORCES
Coda	Narrator concludes story within the realm of credibility (description of aftermath)

By doing so, we can then remark that the narrative phases of the earthquake story are characterized by different levels of metaphoricity.

Narrative structure	Level of metaphoricity
Abstract	Very low
Orientation	High
Complicating actions	Very High
Resolution	High
Evaluation	High
Coda	Low

Thus, we can note that the central phases of the narration show high levels of metaphoricity lending vividness to the narration. This could be due to the fact that the CM has an iconic function by way of evocation of a visual image which coincides with the source polarity of the mapping between source and target domains (SD: baseball player = TD: earthquake; SD: soldier = TD: earthquake; SD: musician = TD: earthquake).

4. Conclusion

The results of this analysis of an earthquake story in the *National Geographic* are essentially that:

1. The choice of the word *prelude* functions as a conceptual key within the referential frame established by the title and as cross-domain link.
2. This text is characterized by specific conceptual metaphors: An EARTHQUAKE IS A BASEBALL PLAYER, AN EARTHQUAKE IS A SOLDIER, AN EARTHQUAKE IS A MUSICIAN.
3. These CMs refer to given experiential domains (Sports, War, Music) which display cross-domain similarities both in their event structure and in the lexical sets associated with them.

4. Within the narrative mode of the text, the CMs interact tightly with the phases of the narrative structure and contribute therefore to text development.
5. In this text, the central phases of the narrative structure are highly figurative.
6. The evaluative strategy of the narrative is embedded in all phases of the narrative linking the experiential domains and their relative CMs through a conceptual perspective represented by the CM: AN EARTHQUAKE IS A STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMPETING FORCES

In general, we can say that the study has attempted to demonstrate that a text can display a specific metaphoric configuration, which will constitute, so to speak, the metaphorical identity of that text. Moreover, it lends further support to the hypothesis that conceptual metaphor has a cohesive function in many texts, thereby contributing to discourse organization and reader interpretation. Finally, working along the interface between cognition and discourse, the study demonstrates the utility of uncovering ***in text*** the relationship between universal human conceptualization, social experience and discourse structure.

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Appendix

The Earthquake Story

(onset of article by Canby 1990 in the *National Geographic*, entitled *Earthquake: Prelude to the Big One?)*

Like thousands of other good Californians, Lee and Terry Peterson had gone to the third game of the World Series that evening to see the Giants try to bounce back against Oakland at Candlestick Park. Far south of the park the Petersons' new frame home, their pride and joy, clung to a shoulder of the Santa Cruz Mountains near a dark peak named Loma Prieto.

Eighteen kilometers beneath that home and peak another contest was playing, in an arena known as the San Andreas Fault. Here two enormous plates of earth's crust had been locked in a planetary pushing match since the Great Francisco earthquake of 1906. These players were tiring reaching the breaking point. Their game was in the last inning.

The Petersons found their seats at Candlestick Park. Expectantly, they watched the teams warm up. The clock hands reached 5:04.

Deep beneath the Petersons' mountain home a section of weak rock snapped. The two sides of the San Andreas shot past each other. Simultaneously the west side of the fault rose, lifting the mountain themselves.

The ripping was unstoppable. For about eight seconds earth's crust unzipped at more than two kilometres a second, 20 kilometres to the north and south. The bucking Santa Cruz mountains flicked the Peterson house off its foundation, racking it like an eggshell.

The faulting released a frenzy of seismic waves, They set the seismometer needles scribbling around the world and carried a lethal message to Californians.

Waves rolling to the south bludgeoned the city of Santa Cruz, only 16 kilometres from the epicenter. They took its commercial heart and snuffed four lives.

The waves smacked into Watsonville, damaging or destroying most homes and turning Main street into a ghost town. They mutilated Hollister and churned the rich sediments of the Salinas valley.

Waves rolling north roiled the ground beneath picturesque Los Gatos, shattering Victorian houses and half the business district. They shook San Jose, but most buildings held

The waves swept up the peninsula, rattling securely planted cities, such as Palo Alto and Menlo Park. At Stanford University they found old, brittle structures and twisted and cracked them.

Ahead lay Candlestick ark packed with 62,000 fans and ripe for disaster. The waves shook the Patersons and other bewildered spectators. But Candlestick sits on bedrock and it defeated the waves.

Now the waves were weakening. With little effect, they jiggled southern San Francisco and towns across the bay.

A tiring vanguard of waves reached San Francisco's old Market Street area and marina district and Oakland's busy waterfront. These areas sit on man-made fill. Here the waves found soil in tune with their own vibrations and strummed it like a guitar string.

More waves arrived and pumped in more energy. The earth grew alive and danced.

The vibrations flowed upward into the buildings and highway structures. Picking up the rhythm, soil and structures swayed to the strengthening beat like partners in a dance.

Marina buildings buckled; many fell. Column joints supporting Oakland's Interstate 880 failed, and 44 slabs of concrete deck, each weighing 600 tons collapsed on cars below, The waves pushed the Oakland end of the Bay Bridge 18 centimetres to the east and a 15 meter section crashed into the level beneath.

Within 15 seconds the vibrations faded. But 63 persons lay dead or dying. Some 3,800 others suffered injuries requiring medical attention. The waves damaged more than 24,000 houses and apartment buildings as well as 4,000 businesses. At least a thousand structures faced demolition.

Measured in adjusted dollars, property damage approached that of the dreadful temblor of 1906, which unleashed 60 times as much energy. The Loma Prieto damage exceeded that inflicted by Hurricane Hugo during the hours it lashed the Southeast.

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REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS CULTURALES DE LA UNIVERSITAT JAUME I / *CULTURAL STUDIES JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITAT JAUME I*

Metonymy and Anaphoric Reference: Anaphoric Reference to a Metonymic Antecedent in *Dude, Where's My Country, Stupid White Men, The Da Vinci Code* and *Deception Point*

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ABSTRACT: Departing from the postulates of Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators on *metonymic anaphora* (Ruiz de Mendoza 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez 2004), this paper analyzes some of the most outstanding cases of anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent in four best sellers. Antecedent selection turns up problematic in certain cases. These difficulties are considerably reduced, however, by means of the distinction between simple and double metonymies, and some constraints and principles that govern the selection of the anaphoric referent: Constraint on Metonymic Anaphora, Domain Availability Principle, Domain Combinability Principle, and Domain Precedence Principle. The operation of mappings and principles is described through the analysis of real language examples. The phenomenon of metonymic anaphora is surveyed along with cases of *implicative reference*, through which these scholars account for otherwise problematic cases of anaphoric reference. Ruiz de Mendoza's is a highly comprehensive approach as far as metonymic anaphora is concerned, but further research should be carried out regarding its relationship with implicative reference.

Keywords: metonymy, anaphoric reference, implicative reference, CMA, DAP, DCP, DPP.

RESUMEN: Partiendo de los postulados sobre anáfora metonímica de Ruiz de Mendoza y sus colaboradores (Ruiz de Mendoza 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez 2004), el presente artículo analiza algunos de los casos más significativos de referencia anafórica a antecedentes metonímicos en cuatro *best sellers*. La selección del antecedente se muestra problemática en algunos casos; sin embargo, estas dificultades se ven reducidas considerablemente con la distinción entre metonimias simples y dobles, así como varias constricciones y principios que gobiernan la selección del referente anafórico: Constricción de Anáfora Metonímica, Principio de Disponibilidad de Dominios, Principio de Combinabilidad de Dominios y Principio de Precedencia de Dominios. La operabilidad de estos mapeos y principios se describe detalladamente en este artículo mediante una selección de ejemplos reales. El fenómeno de anáfora metonímica se analiza en conjunción con casos de *referencia implicativa* mediante los que estos académicos dan cuenta de casos de

referencia anafórica que podrían llegar a ser problemáticos. El enfoque de Ruiz de Mendoza demuestra ser exhaustivo y completo en lo que respecta a la anáfora metonímica, aunque parece necesario llevar a cabo más estudios versados en su relación con casos de referencia implicativa.

Palabras clave: metonimia, referencia anafórica, referencia implicativa, CMA, DAP, DCP, DPP.

1. Introduction

The study of metaphoric and metonymic ICMs as conceptual organization devices has brought the attention of many ever since the emergence of the cognitive paradigm (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987).[1] Since then, ICMs have been tackled from rather different perspectives. Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002: 490), for their part, define ICM as:

> A cognitive structure, which is idealised for the purpose of understanding and reasoning, and whose function is to represent reality from a certain perspective. […] The term ICM, in being all-encompassing, designates any concept constructed on the basis of what we know about the world.

The study of metaphor early became the focus of many studies. Interest in metonymy, however, had a later awakening with a focus on the typology of metonymies, their definitional traits, their differences with metaphors (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff; Turner, 1989; Langacker, 1993; Croft 1993; Kövecses; Radden, 1998; etc.), as well as on the potential of metonymy to explain inferential processes and implicated-explicated meaning (Panther; Thornburg, 1998; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002).

Nevertheless it has been claimed (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1997; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004) that the distinction between metaphor and metonymy has not been clearly drawn by many authors, as most studies provide just "working definitions" that fail to fully provide thorough distinguishing criteria between them. This group of scholars developed their own account of metonymy with a high predictive potential on the grounds of a series of rather simple distinctions and constraints. These distinguishing criteria stem from a single distinction based merely on domain internal-external mappings. All other criteria proposed previously by authors like, say, Lakoff (1987), Lakoff; Johnson (1989) – e.g. *predicative metaphors vs. referential metonymies* – or Croft (1993) – e.g. *domain highlighting* – become thus side-effects of this domain internal-external distinction.

Ruiz de Mendoza (1999), Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002), and Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) define metonymy as a conceptual mapping within a single domain, which establishes a strong opposition with metaphor – this requires domain-external mappings.

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On the grounds of this domain-subdomain inclusion relationship, these scholars put forward two kinds of metonymies that encompass all instances found in discourse: *source-in-target* and *target-in-source* metonymies.

In source-in-target (S-IN-T) metonymies the source domain is a subdomain of the target domain. The source domain provides a point of access for the mapping that, via a domain expansion process, ends in the target domain.

In target-in-source (T-IN-S) metonymies the target domain is a subdomain of the source domain. The latter provides a point of access for the mapping that, via a domain reduction process, ends in the target domain. In both cases, the main domain is known as the matrix domain.

Besides having a communicative import (e.g. being intentionally vague, saving the speaker/hearer extra processing effort, etc.), this dichotomy clearly shows the impact of metonymies on all linguistic levels. For example the T-IN-S/S-IN-T distinction is relevant to provide explanation for linguistic phenomena like cases of anaphoric reference to metonymic antecedents. As shown in this study, Ruiz de Mendoza's account on metonymy demonstrates that the principles underlying anaphoric reference are not totally *grammatical*, but work on the basis of conceptual processes.

1.1. Metonymy and Anaphora

The scientific community has attempted to offer solutions for most intricate examples of anaphoric reference to metonymic antecedents, but many of them remain at a surface descriptive level as no proper explanations for the motivation of the analysed phenomena seem to have been provided yet (Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002). In this regard, Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2004) overcome the shortcomings of previous accounts on this topic (e.g. Nunberg, 1995; Stirling, 1996) by putting forward a further distinction between simple and double metonymies (i.e. metonymies working with one and two matrix domains respectively) and propose a series of constraints and principles that govern the use of anaphora with both kinds of metonymies, namely: *Constraint on Metonymic Anaphora* (CMA), *Domain Availability Principle* (DAP) (both working for simple and double metonymies), *Domain Precedence Principle* (DPP), and *Domain Combinability Principle* (DCP) (which apply in double metonymies). Furthermore, they include the notion of *implicative reference*, which allows them to account for apparently problematic cases.

Their contentions are substantiated through a wide series of examples (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004). Nevertheless, most of them may not be considered "real" in that they are created *ad hoc* to illustrate their proposals, which might be envisaged as a shortcoming in attesting the empirical value of their approach.

It will be the main aim of this paper, then, to provide their approach with empirically attested evidence by probing their contentions through a series of usage-based real English language examples.

Further evidence will also be provided regarding how this T-IN-S/S-IN-T distinction and the domain-inclusion relationship allow Ruiz de Mendoza to account for virtually

any instance of anaphora to a metonymic antecedent. In order to do so, this study will draw on his theory of metonymy and his postulates on the principles that govern metonymic anaphora in single and double metonymies.

Both kinds of metonymies and their underlying working principles will be analyzed with the help of a series of examples of metonymic anaphora extracted from a corpus made up by four best sellers. The instances presented in this paper are thus *real* samples of metonymic anaphora involving demonstrative, personal, possessive, relative pronouns, and possessive adjectives. Our examples, therefore, can be considered real-language-use pieces of evidence of the comprehensiveness and predictive potential of this account of metonymy.

2. Method

A total of 77 examples containing instances of anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent and implicative reference of anaphoric devices to specific frame elements were compiled in order to substantiate our claims. Cases of simple and double metonymies wherein one matrix domain or subdomain work as the antecedent of any of the anaphoric devices listed above were searched in Michael Moore's *Stupid White Men* (SWM), *Dude, Where's My Country?* (DWMC), and Dan Brown's *The Da Vinci Code* (TDVC), *Deception Point* (DP), which compose the corpus of real written language used in this study.

3. Results and Discussion

The principles postulated by Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators must be understood as general rules underlying the relationship between metonymies and anaphora in cases which an anaphoric pronoun makes reference to a metonymic antecedent. These principles interact with one another in a way that, when more than one hold in the same example, they may render it more acceptable than in cases where only one of them applies. This interaction becomes even more obvious when double metonymies are involved. In these cases, although the DAP continues to apply, the DCP and DPP play a crucial role.

3.1. DAP and CMA. Simple Metonymies

The *DAP* is the strongest principle and the only that applies in single and double metonymies. It states that "only the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping is available for anaphoric reference" (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 304). The matrix domain is preferred in anaphoric reference because it is usually more clearly profiled, unambiguous, and informationally richer. The *CMA* is a general restriction to metonymic mappings that applies in terms of economy and relevance for the hearer, as it prevents

cases of metonymic anaphora from entailing an excessive processing effort. According to the CMA:

> Whenever anaphoric reference is made to a metonymic noun phrase, the anaphoric pronoun cannot have an independent metonymic interpretation, different from the one assigned to its antecedent. In most cases this formulation of the CMA amounts to stating that the anaphoric pronoun cannot be metonymic itself. (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 308).

Generally, the CMA caters for cognitive economy by avoiding the activation of two different metonymic mappings in cases of metonymic anaphora. More specifically, it prevents cases wherein a metonymy works as the antecedent for an – in turn – metonymic anaphoric pronoun whose metonymic interpretation is different from that of the antecedent in question.

Consider the following examples; (1) is the original example extracted from SWM, and (1'), (1''), and (1''') are further developments of the metonymy proposed in order to show how DAP and CMA work:

(1) He [Bush] bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did. (SWM)
(1') Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then *he* discovered Hussein's hiding place.
(1'') *Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then *he* came back to the air base.
(1''') *Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then *they* came back to the air base.

(1) conveys a T-IN-S RULER FOR ARMY metonymy where the ruler (matrix domain) is selected for anaphoric reference as predicted by the DAP (cf. Figure 1). Although (1') presents a metonymic anaphoric pronoun, it is not ruled out by the CMA, as the metonymic mapping in the antecedent is not different from that of the pronoun. It could be stated that as long as the same metonymy develops in the same stretch of discourse (including anaphoric pronouns) anaphoric pronouns can be metonymical themselves. (1') also follows the DAP, as the reference is still made to the matrix domain of the metonymic mapping (Bush). On the contrary, even though (1'') follows the DAP (the pronoun draws on the same RULER FOR AIR FORCE metonymy), the sentence is not acceptable because it flouts the CMA: the anaphoric pronoun would require a different metonymic reading from the one developed by its expected antecedent so as to be compatible with the extended sentence. Thus, in this kind of metonymies, the DAP and CMA also govern the compatibility of predicates with such pronouns (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004). Finally, (1''') is not acceptable because, despite it follows the CMA, it makes reference to the target domain, i.e. to the subdomain of the metonymic mapping, thus flouting the DAP. In this regard, and as far as the English language is concerned, the DAP proves indeed a rather valuable tool to determine which of the metonymic components operates as the matrix domain. In this example, "Bush" cannot count as a subdomain of the air force – that is, the commander-in-chief as a part of the whole US air force – because it is the only metonymic antecedent eligible for anaphoric reference.



Figure 1: T-IN-S metonymy

Since the CMA is a constraint rather than a principle *per se*, it will not be further referred to in the remaining of this paper so as to devote special attention to the actual principles at work in each example – it must be born in mind, nevertheless, that it still applies in the examples tackled in this section.

In the rest of it, a series of examples illustrate the functioning of the DAP in simple metonymies in order to ascertain whether their acceptability is predicted by Ruiz de Mendoza and his co-workers' account on metonymic anaphora.

Examples (2) to (5) convey T-IN-S metonymies wherein personal and relative pronouns act as anaphoric devices referring to the matrix domain of the metonymic antecedent (that is, the source domain), thus following the prescriptions of the DAP:

(2) No, I'm talking about a perceived notion that we Americans are supporting *Israel* in *its* oppression of the Palestinian people. (DWMC)
(3) It took the bankruptcy of *Enron* before thousands of *its* conservative employees […] woke up. (DWMC)
(4) That's why, on behalf of 234 million Americans held hostage, I have requested that *NATO* do what *it* did in Bosnia and Kosovo… (SWM)
(5) Thanks to those who helped me research and pull *this book* together and keep *it* as timely as possible. (SWM)

Example (2) involves a COUNTRY FOR ARMED FORCES T-IN-S metonymy in which the matrix domain (Israel) is selected as the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun, thus following the DAP. Example (3) is an instance of a COMPANY FOR MANAGEMENT T-IN-S metonymy whose matrix (source) domain is selected as the referent of the anaphoric pronoun in compliance with the DAP. Example (4) works according to an ORGANIZATION FOR ITS MEMBERS T-IN-S metonymy. The fact that the anaphoric pronoun here refers to the matrix domain – the organization – and not directly to its representatives – e.g. by using *they* – indicates that (4) follows the DAP. Finally, (5) instantiates a T-IN-S metonymy (BOOK FOR CONTENTS) where the matrix-source domain is the physical book and the target domain is identified with the book *contents* (comprehensively written, elaborated, and "pulled together"). In accordance with the usage of *book* in (5), this metonymy – which also develops in the pronoun – makes reference to the contents, but the anaphoric pronoun – following the DAP – still makes reference to the matrix domain.

The following examples convey S-IN-T metonymies (cf. Figure 2) active in the antecedent of different kinds of anaphoric reference devices. Notice that the matrix domain corresponds to the target domain in S-IN-T metonymies. Consider first examples (6) and (7):

(6) […] he flagged down *a gypsy cab* and offered *him* a hundred dollars to take him home. (DWMC)
(7) Assuming this was just another one of those talking *ex-military heads who* had sprung up all over our networks, I was ready to keep flipping. (DWMC)

In (6) the DAP applies in a S-IN-T metonymy (CAR FOR DRIVER) whose matrix domain (the taxi driver) becomes the antecedent of the anaphoric personal pronoun *him*. The use of *him* – in compliance with Kövecses and Radden's (1998) principles of *general cognitive saliency* via the "controlling entity over controlled entity" pattern – rules out the taxi itself as eligible for the matrix domain. It is important to note how this metonymic mapping paves the way for a simple and quick inferential process from taxi to its driver within our frame knowledge of taxies in particular and vehicles in general. Example (7) shows a HEAD FOR LEADER S-IN-T metonymy where the target domain (leader) is identified with the matrix domain. This example follows the DAP, as it is the target domain that is used for anaphoric reference; hence the use of the relative pronoun *who* instead of *which* (which would make reference to the source domain).



Figure 2. S-IN-T mapping

Now consider example (8), which presents two different metonymies that work together to yield the full sense of the Texan's utterance:

(8) A telephone rang sharply behind her, shattering the silence of the hallway. Startled, Gabrielle turned. *The sound* was coming from the closet in the foyer – *a cellphone* in the pocket of one of the visitor's coats. ''Scuse me, friends,' a Texas drawl said in the den. '*That's me'* (DP)

The use of *that* in (8) might be regarded as a common case of deictic reference through which the demonstrative calls for the ringing cell phone. However, it might also be argued that the demonstrative makes reference to the sound (the ringing of the cell

phone), as it is a perceptually outstanding feature in the context of the example: The cell phone is in the hallway, and its ringing sound becomes more relevant in that it is what actually reaches the room where the Texan and other people are reunited, thus interrupting their conversation and making the Texan utter his statement. This second interpretation entails a high-level EFFECT FOR CAUSE S-IN-T metonymy wherein the target-matrix domain (the cell phone) is identified with the *cause* of the sound, whereas its *effects* (the ringing) remain as the source-subdomain. Even though the matrix-cause domain is usually preferred as the antecedent for anaphoric reference, the instance under analysis is somehow more intricate given that the demonstrative seems to make reference instead to the subdomain (that is, the ringing sound). This seems possible because, in accordance with the contextual information, both domains are available for the anaphoric reference expressed by *that*. Finally, the fact that the *effect* and not the *cause* is selected as the antecedent for the demonstrative is corroborated by the *local perceptual prominence* acquired by the sound of the telephone (source and subdomain of the mapping) over its origin (the cell phone).

According to this line of reasoning, *that* triggers an EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy that leads us to the cause of the sound – i.e. the cell phone. This referent is still active in our mind when we reach the pronoun *me*, thus paving the way for the inferential process required for the correct understanding of the OWNER FOR POSSESSION T-IN-S metonymy activated by the personal pronoun in the example. In this metonymy, as predicted by one of *principles of general cognitive saliency* (owner prevails over the possession in the selection of matrix domain of a metonymic mapping), the source domain identified with the owner acts as a point of access leading to the target domain – that is, the possession or cell phone.

3.2. Double Metonymies. DAP, DCP and DPP

Simple metonymies are not the only kind of metonymies in common discourse. Some more complex examples involve two mappings from two sources to two targets connected by one shared domain. These are cases of *double metonymies* (Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004), and can be regarded as two intertwined simple metonymies with one common domain but with two different matrix domains.

Although the DAP also applies in double metonymies, this principle on its own fails to fully account for the relationship and hierarchy among domains, especially when determining which is the matrix domain available for anaphoric reference. In this respect, Ruiz de Mendoza and his co-workers have proposed two additional principles to predict the matrix domain selection for anaphoric reference in double metonymies: the *DCP* and the *DPP*. These principles are arranged in a hierarchy at the top of which there lies the DAP (as it is the only one that applies to both kinds of metonymies and rules the matrix domain selection in all examples of metonymic anaphora), followed by the DCP and then by the DPP. The degrees of acceptability of particular examples may depend on the principles they meet or override, and the hierarchical rank of such principles (Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez, 2004). The prevalence of the DCP over the DPP seems to be due to

its semantic nature, as opposed to the more formal grounds of the DPP. Both of them predict the selection of the matrix domain available for anaphoric reference in double metonymies, but on different grounds. The DCP states that:

> Whenever two domains are available for anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun, we intend to select the domain that is semantically more compatible with the predicate of the sentence containing the anaphoric pronoun. (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 311).

According to the DPP:

> In cases of double metonymic mappings, unless the predicate combines better with the final matrix domain, reference is preferably made to the initial matrix domain. (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 312).

The importance and applicability of these principles is better perceived through specific examples. In (9), two metonymic mappings are necessary to account for the intended meaning of the italicized words:

(9) "Captain," Sophie said, her tone dangerously defiant, "the sequence of numbers you have in your hand happens to be one of the most famous mathematical progressions in history." Fache was not aware there even existed a mathematical progression that qualified as famous, and he certainly didn't appreciate Sophie's off-handed tone. "*This* is *the Fibonacci sequence*," she declared, nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache's hand. "A progression in which each term is equal to the sum of the two preceding terms." (TDVC)

Example (9) presents a demonstrative pronoun acting as a cataphoric referential device. According to the context provided in the example, *this* makes direct reference to *the piece of paper in Fache's hand* ("This is the Fibonacci sequence," she declared, *nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache's hand*").[2] However, Sophie's words also seem to identify *this* with the Fibonacci sequence – the inferential process necessary for the understanding of this example requires a double metonymical mapping exemplified in Figure 3.

Firstly, the piece of paper referred to by Sophie becomes the source-matrix domain of a T-IN-S metonymy (CONTAINER/PIECE OF PAPER FOR CONTENT/WRITING) that entails a domain reduction process whose target is the actual inscription in the paper. Secondly, the target domain of the first T-IN-S metonymy becomes the source domain of a different S-IN-T metonymy wherein the writing is conceived of as a sample of the actual progression (SAMPLE FOR SEQUENCE). This second metonymy entails a domain expansion process leading to the actual sequence (the second target-matrix domain).

The existence of two matrix domains poses a problem in determining which of them is selected as the actual referent for the cataphoric *this*, as both of them might at

2. In *The Da Vinci Code*, Sophie is a cryptographer who has just deciphered a sequence of numbers and has identified it as the beginning of "the *Fibonacci sequence*". Sophie wrote the sequence of numbers on a piece of paper and, as described in the example, hands it in to Fache, the captain of Paris police department.

first sight qualify as proper referents. The explicit reference to the piece of paper in the example ("*nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache's hand"*) suggests that *this* may select the first matrix domain (the piece of paper) as its referent, thus following the prescriptions of the DPP, but flouting the DCP. Albeit the DCP ranks hierarchically higher than the DPP, the context makes explicit the reference to the initial matrix domain, thus sanctioning it as semantically acceptable in this example.



Figure 3. PAPER FOR WRITING/SAMPLE FOR SEQUENCE

Now consider the double metonymy involved in (10):

(10) The wealthy did everything they could to encourage this attitude. Understand that in 1980, only 20 percent of Americans owned a share of stock. *Wall Street* was the rich man's game and *it* was off-limits to the average Joe and Jane. And for good reason — the average person saw *it* for what *it* was, a game of risk, and when you are trying to save every dollar so you can send the kids to college, games of chance are not where you place your hard-earned money. (DWMC)

(10) involves two T-IN-S metonymies linked by the target subdomain of the first mapping, which becomes the source domain for the second one as shown in Figure 4:



Figure 4. PLACE FOR INSTITUTION FOR ACTIVITY DEVELOPED IN IT

Wall Street is a street in lower Manhattan where the New York Stock Exchange is located. However, in the example, *Wall Street* is not conceived as the physical place but rather as *a game*, an activity (the stock exchange) that is not available for the average middle-low class due to the high amounts of money necessary to get involved in it. The double metonymical mapping develops as follows: The first metonymical mapping goes from the physical street onto the financial institution physically located in this street. The mapping in question is embodied in a PLACE FOR INSTITUTION T-IN-S metonymy wherein the physical street is the source and first matrix domain, and the institution (Stock Market) qualifies as the target subdomain. In the second T-IN-S metonymical mapping (INSTITUTION FOR ACTIVITY DEVELOPED IN IT) the institution becomes the *source* domain and qualifies as the second matrix domain available for the anaphoric reference of the pronoun *it*. Hence, this second domain-reduction process leads to the actual intended meaning of *Wall Street*, i.e., the activity developed in such an institution – e.g., the Stock Market movements and exchanges – which is, in turn, conceptualized metaphorically as a game of chance. Due to the specific way in which *Wall Street* is used in this example, the first matrix domain (place) is discarded as the antecedent selected for the anaphoric reference of *it*, which flouts the DPP. The DCP applies instead, as the institution (second matrix domain) seems more semantically compatible with the predicate of the sentence in which *Wall Street* and *it* are found.

3.3. Implicative Reference

Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators have proposed what they call *implicative reference* to account for apparently problematic cases when dealing with some examples of metonymy and anaphoric reference under their approach (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004). According to their postulates, a first look at this kind of examples may (mis)lead us to regard a metonymy as the antecedent of an anaphoric device which, instead of referring to the matrix domain, appears to make reference to one subdomain – thus flouting the DAP.

They suggest that, very often, in these cases no metonymic reference is made to either domain: a closer examination reveals that the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun does not refer to the metonymy (the DAP does not apply and thus cannot be flouted), but to an element in a frame previously activated in the sentence. In order to describe the importance of implicative reference in explaining these cases, a series of these "problematic" examples ((11)-(14)) will be analyzed in accordance with their proposals.

(11) *The New York Times* reported that *they* were quickly called together by officials from the Saudi Embassy… (DWMC)

Accordingly, in (11) there is no anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent, for the pronoun *they* does not refer to the subjects reporting the information in question, which would qualify as the target – and subdomain – of a T-IN-S metonymy, thus flouting the DAP. Instead, *they* refers to the group of professionals working at The New York Times. By mentioning *The New York Times*, the author automatically activates a frame

wherein all elements become potential referents for the anaphoric pronoun. Hence, *they* sanctions only one of these implicated frame elements (i.e. the group of professionals) as its intended antecedent.

It seems common to find cases of implicative reference when collective nouns are used as potential antecedents for anaphoric reference devices (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez 2004). This is corroborated in many of the examples extracted from Moore's books, as instantiated by (12) and (13) below:

(12) The United States Congress tried to put economic sanctions on Hussein's country, but *the White House* quashed the idea. *Their* reasons? According to [...]. (DWMC)
(13) *The right* knows this because *they* look at the numbers, *they* read the reports, and *they* live in the real world that has become increasingly liberal in the last decade or so. And *they* hate it. So, in the tradition of all propagandists, *they* lie. (DWMC)

In these examples the antecedent for *they* is not the target of the three T-IN-S metonymies of the kind INSTITUTION FOR PERSONNEL-IN-CHARGE ((12)), and ORGANIZATION FOR ITS MEMBERS ((13)). The DAP is not overridden because no reference is made to a metonymic element, but to a frame element activated by *the White House* and *the right* respectively. These personal pronouns take the antecedents *personnel-in-charge of the White House* and *the members of the right*; however, these are not referentially available via metonymic mappings but via implicative reference. Notwithstanding this, metonymic anaphoric reference might have been rightfully used in these examples by using *its* instead of *they*, thus referring to the source and matrix domains of each metonymy and following the DAP. It follows then that metonymy and implicative reference may be used *interchangeably* as evidenced in examples (12') and (13').[3]

(12') The United States Congress tried to put economic sanctions on Hussein's country, but *the White House* quashed the idea. *Its* reasons? According to [...]. (Modified from DWMC)
(13') *The right* knows this because *it* looks at the numbers, *it* reads the reports, and *it* lives in the real world that has become increasingly liberal in the last decade or so. And *it* hates it. So, in the tradition of all propagandists, *it* lies. (Modified from DWMC)

Implicative reference occurs not only with personal pronouns, but with other kinds of anaphoric devices like, for example, relatives as in (14) and (15):

(14) There would be no pipeline. The Taliban were out the loot, and *the companies who* supported you had now lost millions themselves on all the prep that went into this lucrative pipeline. (DWMC)
(15) Most of these were *countries* (such as Tonga, Azerbaijan, and Palau) *who* always get picked last for United Nations volleyball games [...]. (DWMC)

As in previous examples, in (14) the use of *who* hints at the fact that the item sanctioned as its antecedent is not an element of the UNION FOR ITS MEMBERS T-IN-S

3. The metaphor underlying *the right* has been left unexplained to focus on the main concern of this study.

metonymy underlying the use of *companies*. Note that for the matrix domain of the metonymy to be licensed as the antecedent in compliance with the DAP, *which* should have been employed instead. However, the use of *who*, which in case of a metonymic interpretation would break the DAP, suggests that this is a case of implicative reference to a frame element activated by *companies*: Our frame knowledge of company structures (particularly their power distribution and tasks) allows us to pick the management committee of those companies as the antecedent for *who*. Similarly, in (15) the U.N. representatives of each country constitutes the antecedent of *who*, which is accessed through implicative reference.

The discussion above shows how Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators' theory explains these apparently problematic cases by way of the activation of two alternative operations; it seems possible that speakers or writers may select as the antecedent for anaphoric reference either the matrix domain of a metonymy or an implicated element of a frame activated by the use of certain terms.

3.3.1. Metonymy and Implicative Reference in Interaction

However, it is also possible to find metonymy and implicative reference in interaction within the same stretches of discourse. The following example shows how a metonymy and a case of implicative reference may draw on the same antecedent, albeit through different inferential paths:

(16) The New York Times reported that they were quickly called together by *officials from the Saudi Embassy*, *which* feared that *they* might become the victims of American reprisals. (DWMC)

The use of *which* here might seem grammatically incorrect, as its expected antecedent should be *officials from the Saudi Embassy*, which compels the use of *who*. The fact that *which* is used instead suggests that the actual antecedent is not *officials from the Saudi Embassy*, but only *the Saudi Embassy*. Nevertheless, *they* is used immediately after making clear reference to the officials. This apparent contradiction poses no problem and has indeed a simple explanation. Metonymy and implicative reference are combined in this example. *Which* makes reference to the source of a T-IN-S metonymy of the kind INSTITUTION FOR ITS MEMBERS, and follows the predictions of the DAP. *They*, however, does not make reference to the target domain of the metonymy (i.e. the officials). It is a case of implicative reference to an element of the frame activated by *the Saudi Embassy* and thus does not involve any metonymical antecedent.

Examples (17) to (20) below show how anaphoric phenomena may help to uncover different conceptualizations of reality in the same piece of discourse:

(17) Reluctantly, they finally agreed — but then they sought to block *the investigative body* from doing *its* job by stonewalling *them* on the evidence that *they* sought. (DWMC)

(18) […] what if, during the late 1990s, the Republicans had let the *FBI* do *its* real job — protecting the lives of our citizens — instead of having *them* spend countless hours investigating the sex habits of the president […]? (DWMC)

These examples show how the source domains of these two ORGANIZATION FOR ITS MEMBERS T-IN-S metonymies (*the investigative body* in (17), the *FBI* in (18)) become the antecedent of the possessive adjective *its*. These metonymies, however, do not seem to work as reference points for the third person plural pronouns in the examples. These pronouns make reference to the members working in each organization/association; namely, the members of the investigative body and the FBI agents. This is so because, whereas *its* refers anaphorically to the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping, *they* and *them* take their referent from an element of the particular frame activated by the investigative body and the FBI respectively.

In the light of these examples – provided that anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent and the implicated reference to a frame element are accepted as two *distinct* and *complementary* processes –, Ruiz de Mendoza's proves a highly comprehensive approach with compelling explanations for many examples of anaphoric reference that could not be easily tackled before.

Nonetheless, further reflection on the nature of both phenomena might lead us to consider an alternative option. It could be contended that most – if not all – of the discourse items that purportedly activate a given frame in the mind of the interlocutors might also count as the source of a metonymic mapping in most of these examples. Take, for instance, example (11'):

(11') *The New York Times* reported the case in all detail.

The analysis of *The New York Times* in (11') would "normally" call for a T-IN-S COMPANY FOR EMPLOYEES metonymy wherein the source-matrix domain is the company and the target domain is the actual employee or employees in charge of the report. As far as this sentence is concerned, there seems to be little doubt about *The New York Times* acting as a metonymic device. However, consider again example (11):

(11) *The New York Times* reported that *they* were quickly called together […]

The New York Times here is no longer regarded as the source and matrix domain of a metonymic mapping potentially eligible for anaphoric reference, but as a discourse stretch activating a given frame (e.g. *journalism*) of which certain elements (the journalists) are sanctioned as the anaphoric antecedent.

It is certainly arguable whether the expansion of these examples to facilitate the introduction of an anaphoric device might be a reliable test for the application of the DAP; and hence for the classing of the sentence as a case of metonymic anaphora (if the DAP holds and reference is made to the matrix domain) or implicative reference (if the DAP is flouted). The point here, however, is that the classing of certain examples as cases of implicative reference seems to be made somehow "*a posteriori*" once the DAP does not hold, which entails an *a priori* consideration of the item referred to as a metonymic mapping. That is to say, in certain examples, as (11') and (11), it seems as if cases of implicative reference were classed as such once the anaphoric device in hand does not take on the matrix domain of a potential metonymic antecedent.

Perhaps it might be necessary to develop a bit further the nature of the connections between metonymic anaphora and implicative reference to a frame or script element (as well as their most common appearance loci in discourse).

Some examples are indeed plain cases of implicative reference, as in "The mushroom omelette was too spicy. He left without paying" (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 306; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002: 129), which these scholars quote from Stirling (1996: 82). In it, the use of *he* in the second sentence is licensed by the activation of the *restaurant* script. However, there are more obscure cases of implicative reference, for example: "I called the garage and they will have the car ready by tomorrow" (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 314). While no metonymy seems to be involved in the first example, these scholars propose that, in the second one there is indeed a T-IN-S metonymy; nevertheless, they hold that *they* does not select it for anaphoric reference, but rather one *part of* the frame activated by *garage*.

Another noteworthy point here is that it might be possible to contend – just as in Koch's (1999) approach to metonymy, which basically proposes that metonymic mappings take place within frames – that further metonymic mappings may underlie these cases of implicative reference. These metonymic mappings, however, would not be active until the very moment of the use of the pronoun in the sentence.

In the case of (11), for example, it could be argued that *The New York Times* triggers off the frame of *journalism*; nevertheless, no metonymic mapping might be active as far as the use of *The New York Times* is concerned. The metonymy would apply once the anaphoric pronoun *they* was used. This *frame* might thus be taken as the *domain* over which metonymic operations are performed. After all, the selection of the subjects in charge of the reporting is but the selection of *a part (or parts) of* the frame-matrix domain.

Consequently, this process might be considered as a T-IN-S PART FOR WHOLE metonymic mapping. Interestingly enough, since *they* still makes reference to the subdomain of the relationship, the DAP does not apply either. The important issue to be born in mind here is that it might be possible that the phenomenon of implicative reference to a frame element does not hold the same cognitive status as metonymic mappings.

Ruiz de Mendoza's approach is fairly powerful and comprehensive, and it easily explains many previously troublesome cases; all the examples analyzed in this study as cases of implicative reference may well be accepted as such, which allows for a neat explanation of these phenomena. Nonetheless, it might be interesting to provide a thorough sketch of the cognitive processes that yield the activation of (i) a metonymy (with one of its elements being sanctioned as the antecedent of an anaphoric device) and (ii) a frame element working as the antecedent of an anaphoric device.

A detailed description of the processes (both *cognitive* and *linguistic*) that underlie both phenomena might cast some more light on this issue. It might be useful to draw finer distinctive lines between the *functioning* of *cognitive* operations like metonymic mappings or the triggering of frames, and the way in which they are actually *reflected* in *language*. This description, besides, might yield some conclusions concerning whether there is some kind of cognitive or linguistic gradation as regards "metonymic anaphora" and "implicative reference".

That linguistic structure does not reflect conceptual structure in full detail should be taken into account in this regard, as the aforementioned principles might apply to language, but may not necessarily do so in such a strict way in our minds.

4. Conclusion

In compliance with the aims of this paper, empirical evidence regarding the comprehensiveness and systematicity of Ruiz de Mendoza's approach to metonymy and anaphora has been provided by means of the analysis of a series of real examples in English extracted from a database of four books.

The distinction between T-IN-S and S-IN-T metonymies proposed by Ruiz de Mendoza has shown highly functional to account for certain examples that would have posed problems for other accounts on the same phenomena. Likewise, this approach shows indeed how metonymy has an impact on grammar – i.e., how the principles underlying anaphoric reference are not fully grammatical but deeply grounded on conceptual processes.

The theoretical contentions and analytical procedures proposed by these scholars regarding the application of a metonymic antecedent or an element of a previously activated frame in certain cases of anaphoric reference have also been illustrated with commented examples. The relationship between metonymic anaphora and implicative reference – as well as their interaction in discourse – has been dealt with in more detail, with the resulting conclusion that further research is needed in this particular area, as the borderlines between both phenomena seem to overlap in a number of cases.

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Metonymic Modelling of Discourse, Discourse Modelling of Metonymy. The Case of the Place-Name Based Metonymies

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ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the way metonymy contributes to the construction and understanding of social objects and of discourses related to them. The analysis is based on an empirical study of place-name based metonymies on the grounds of discourse analysis and cognitive linguistics. It is shown that metonymy lays out referential nets characterized by the variability of anaphora and predicate agreement, as well as by the agglomeration of coreferential units. These nets outline discourse sites and provide both a relevant support for text interpretation and a flexible ground for text progression.

Keywords: metonymy, discourse, coherence, place name, social object, cognitive tool.

RESUMEN: El presente artículo trata de cómo la metonimia contribuye a la construcción y la comprensión de objetos sociales y los discursos relacionados con ellos. El análisis se basa en un estudio empírico de metonimias basadas en topónimos, desde una perspectiva de Análisis del Discurso y Lingüística Cognitiva. Se demuestra que la metonimia despliega redes referenciales caracterizadas por la variabilidad de la concordancia entre anáfora y predicado, así como por la aglomeración de unidades correferenciales. Dichas redes perfilan los lugares del discurso y proporcionan tanto el fundamento para la interpretación del texto como una base flexible para la progresión textual.

Palabras clave: metonimia, discurso, coherencia, topónimos, objeto social, herramienta cognitiva.

1. Introduction

Metonymy is one of the "basic characteristics of cognition" (Lakoff, 1987: 77). It may also have the "function of understanding": through its providing of coherent models of the world, it helps to understand complex and/or abstract notions (Radden, 2005: 26). Besides, metonymy is ubiquitous, in so far as it operates at quite a number of linguistic structure levels: phonology, syntax, vocabulary, pragmatics, etc. (Barcelona, 2002; Radden, 2005).

This paper aims at analyzing the way metonymy contributes to the construction and understanding of social objects and of discourses related to them. I propose a study of country-name based metonymies (*Russia gives France old documents; Great-Britain beat Canada 2-1*, etc.) – but other place-name based metonymies will be addressed too – from a discursive point of view. I adopt a bidirectional approach: on the one hand, I assume that these metonymies rest on social object-constitutive discourse; on the other hand, I argue that they play a crucial role in discourse cohesion and development. Discourse is understood here as a socioculturally situated language production, determined by the dialogical (Bakhtine, 1977) relation between texts.

Although a lot of things have been said about metonymy – and at least the same amount remains to be said – I won't discuss here the notion of metonymy itself; I will simply take on A. Barcelona's definition (Barcelona, 2002: 208), broad enough to suit the dynamics of the data used in this paper: "A metonymy is a mapping, within the same overall cognitive domain, of a cognitive (sub)domain, called the source, onto another cognitive (sub)domain, called the target, so that the latter is mentally activated."

I will deal with metonymy as a *cognitive tool*, *i.e.* an instrument that supports thinking processes, categorization and world representation (see Paveau, 2006). Cognitive tools give rise to shared cognitive patterns; for this reason, their use presupposes cooperation and intersubjectivation. These tools may have a linguistic aspect; it is the case for the metonymy. In this regard, cognitive tools represent the interface between object-world and language.

My analysis is based on an empirical study on the grounds of discourse analysis (which studies texts in their relationship with other texts and with the sociocultural context), cognitive linguistics and text linguistics. The corpus I will work with consists of British and American newspapers (*The Guardian, The Times, The Washington Post*), of Web news and various world-wide English speaking newspapers.

I will begin with general remarks on place-name based metonymies; these remarks will tackle with conceptual, linguistic and ontological aspects. I then will examine the mechanism of reference assignment, in order to determine the types of mappings and conceptual relationships that are established in discourse. I will next question the way metonymy contributes to social realities discourse construction. Last but not least I propose a text and discourse analysis focusing on the metonymic use as a discourse-derived mechanism.

1. Place-name Based Metonymies. General Remarks

1.1. "Liberia cries" and Other "Wall Street is in a panic"

It is not hecatombs, but a special type of metonymy that I'd like to examine here from the conceptual structure and reference point of view. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, chapter 8) argue that examples like "Wall Street is in a panic" are instances of a general principle – *i.e.*, the idealized conceptual model (ICM) 'PLACE for INSTITUTION' – which applies to an open-ended class of cases. Indeed, such structures are very frequent, and all kinds of place names seem to be concerned. One more ICM they mention is

'PLACE for EVENT':[1] "Do not let Nicaragua become another Vietnam". These are what I will call *place-names based metonymies* (PNB).

Nevertheless, these two ICMs do not allow generalization of all the cases of place-names metonymization. From a referential point of view, for "Liberia cries" or "Great-Britain is in mourning" (Cruse, 1996), a different conceptual model seems imperative: 'PLACE for PEOPLE'. And it is not clear how to conceptually represent utterances like "Great-Britain moved four points clear at the top of the table after they beat Canada 2-1". Should one propose 'PLACE for TEAM'?

The conceptual modelization of place-names based (PNB) metonymies raises some problems. First of all, the potentially infinite multiplication of ICMs is not the best way to account for language and cognition; it is one of the most serious criticisms that can be opposed to Lakoff and Johnson's associationism (cf. Papafragou, 1996). Moreover, one has to justify not only the multiplication of ICMs, but also their selection process. Why 'PLACE for INSTITUTION', for instance? Fass (1997) considers that utterances like "Britain tried to leave the Common Market" ('PLACE for INSTITUTION'?) are cases of metonymy in metaphor. Stern (1968, cited by Fass, 1997) proposes the structure 'Place-names for Inhabitants or Frequenters' for "Great Britain announced", although it is usually not the people, but the government (an institution) that "announces", as my empiric data confirm. These disagreements are not surprising since PNB metonymy description is generally not based on empirical data.

What seems to be clear with PNB metonymies is that the concept of 'PLACE' serves to process various metonymic mappings, just as the same concept gives birth to 'MORE is UP'; 'HAPPY is UP' (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980: 147). One may stipulate that some concepts are more prolific than others within the metaphoric process. 'PLACE' and 'UP' acquire a status of basic concepts in metaphoric-metonymic processing. In fact, all the ICMs 'X, Y, Z is UP' or 'PLACE for X, Y, Z' are developments of a single one-fold model.

1.2. Linguistic and Ontological Material for PNB Metonymies

One may notice that, in all the examples illustrating PNB metonymies, the 'PLACE' concept is semiotized by a proper name.[2] Common-name based metonymies, like "the country/city is in mourning" (Cruse, 1996), are not impossible. But it appears that proper names represent the most salient linguistic material for PNB metonymies in the news.

Still, it is worth mentioning that only some kinds of place-names may generate the type of metonymies exposed above. Thus, the plain meaning of "The Mississippi isn't saying anything" is "the river does not speak", unless "Mississippi" is also an institution name, a town name, etc. PNB metonymic mappings are specific to names of countries, of towns, of regions, of states or buildings. The metonymic use of place-names seems to be determined, at least to some extent, by the ontology of their reference domain.

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1. The 'PLACE for EVENT' cognitive model will not be analysed in this paper.
2. This is the list of the names used by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) to illustrate 'PLACE'-based conceptual models: The White House, Washington, The Kremlin, Paris, Hollywood, Wall Street, Vietnam, the Alamo, Pearl Harbor, Watergate, and Grand Central Station.

Last, but not least, the notion of 'PLACE' itself needs a survey, since there are no clear-cut criteria to define a place. Casati; Varzi (1997: 73) point out the vagueness and the diversity of spatial objects and argue that "common-sense reasoning about space is, first and foremost, reasoning about things located in space". Yet, metonymy is expected to help to understand complex and/or abstract notions. One may conclude that the account on complex and abstract notions offered by PNB metonymies is grounded on an unbounded concept.

2. Reference Assignment in Discourse

2.1. Two Types of PNB Metonymic Mappings

In discourse, as Fauconnier (1984) has indicated, metonymy favours indirect relations:

(1) *Plato is on the top shelf. It is bound in leather.*

also called "conceptual anaphora" (Gibbs, 1994)

(2) *I need to call the garage. They said my car is ready.*

Indeed, metonymic subjects need not agree as to number with their predicates and anaphors. The indirect relations generally strengthen referential interpretation. For instance, "It" refers to the book as a subdomain of the author; more concretely, as a part of the encyclopaedic knowledge concerning Plato (1). "They" refers to people working in the garage (2).

PNB metonymies may generate indirect relations as well:

(3) *A 14th straight victory for **Barcelona** has increased <u>their</u> lead at the top of the table to twelve points over **Valencia**, <u>who</u> <u>were</u> fortunate to pick up a point […].* (*Think Spain*, 30.01.06)

In this example, "Barcelona" and "Valencia" agree, respectively, with plural pronouns and predicate. Moreover, one may notice that the relative pronoun determining "Valencia" is "who" [+human]. According to English grammars, plural forms are commonly used with collective nouns when the group is considered as a collection of people doing personal things like deciding, hoping or wanting; in these cases "who", not "which", is used as a relative pronoun. Co-textual data ("top of the table", "points", "goals") indicate that "Barcelona" and "Valencia" refer to some sport-teams of these cities.

On the contrary, singular pronouns and predicates follow the country-name in (4):

(4) ***Brazil** <u>pays</u> <u>its</u> poor to send kids to school: officials say program cuts truancy, hunger.* (*The WP*, 01.07.03)

Co-textual ("the officials") and contextual data suggest that the name "Brazil" refers to the governmental institution.

In examples (3)-(4), metonymic mapping referring to a team is morphologically marked by plural agreement, while metonymic mapping referring to a government is marked by singular agreement. Even though both "government" and "team" can be used with both singular and plural verbs in British English (in American English, singular forms are more common in both cases), I could settle on the basis of extended data that the distinction 'PLACE for TEAM'$^{+PLURAL}$ and 'PLACE for INSTITUTION'$^{+SINGULAR}$ is systematic in British newspapers:

(5) ***Zimbabwe*** *were bowled out for 93, their lowest score in 25 one-day internationals in England, but they – and Heath Streak, their leonine captain […].* (*The Times*, 07.07.03)

(6) ***Zimbabwe****, which already has the fastest-collapsing gross domestic product in the world […].* (*The Times*, 30.07.03)

and current in the American ones (see 5 *supra*). The distinction is sound even when the place name referring to the institution has a grammatically plural form:[3]

(7) *I have made very clear that the* ***United States*** *expects its laws to be respected* […] (*CBS News*, 26.01.06)

How can one explain this morphological distinction? What is its cognitive value?

One may try a grammatical interpretation. Whereas plural agreement indicates that a group is considered as a collection of people doing personal things (see above), singular forms (with "which" as a relative pronoun) are more common when the group is seen as an impersonal unit. Nevertheless, in English, the word "team" is not systematically interpreted as a collection of people doing personal things nor the government is limited to an impersonal unit representation. So, the grammatical explanation is not sufficient.

The predicate and anaphora agreement has been used as a strong argument in order to precise the relationship between source and target in terms of inclusion and in terms of domains and subdomains (Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000: 126). Ruiz de Mendoza (2000) distinguishes two types of metonymic mappings: one in which the source is a subdomain of the target ("source-in-target" metonymies); another in which the target is a subdomain of the source ("target-in-source" metonymies). The author argues that the anaphoric reference to an expression involving a metonymic mapping always concerns the *matrix domain* (*i.e*. the target for source-in-target metonymies; the source for target-in-source metonymies), and not a subdomain (Ruiz de Mendoza, 2002). According to this thesis, if one considers that the plural marking corresponds to the 'TEAM' reference and that the singular marking corresponds to the 'PLACE' reference, then 'PLACE' (*i.e*. "Barcelona", "Zimbabwe") is either a subdomain of the team or a matrix domain of the government. But it is not clear how the relationship between domains should be

3. One pays no attention to the discrepancy between the form and the agreement in this case. Still, Word's corrector suggests plural agreement with "the United States" […]

distinguished (see Warren, 2004: 108). Why should place be a subdomain of a team, while the latter is not even necessarily attached to a place? Besides, since from a grammatical point of view, both plural and singular marking may agree with "team" and "government", the reference agreement is completely opaque as far as target-and-source relationship is concerned.

In line with Nunberg's (1995) suggestion that in some metonymies the predicate is about the explicit rather than the implicit element, Warren (2004: 112) assumes that metonymy is a focussing construction: "the speaker is focussing [more] on the attribute of some entity than on the entity itself". In this respect, metonymy is assigned a topicalization function: in plural marked cases, the utterance would focus on the team (the team is the topic); in singular marked cases, the focus would be on the place (the place is the topic). Supposing that is so, the following question arises: why should 'place' be the topic in all the utterances that refer to the government?

I have examined here three accounts (among others) for predicate and anaphora agreement: one is grammatical, another is conceptual, and the last one is "communicative". None is directly applicable to the case of PNB metonymy. Nevertheless, they can all provide partial answers. Firstly, these accounts are complementary, because they tackle with different levels (and metonymy itself belongs to different levels). Warren's account supposing a topicalization function of the metonymy looks promising from a discursive point of view, particularly to the extent that it would permit to seize the informational aspect of the discourse. However, her account occults the conceptual dimension and in so doing suspends the cognitive dimension of the metonymy. Secondly, the last two accounts both deal with the source-target relationship, which is natural for metonymic mappings. It is this relationship that I will try to clarify with regard to PNB metonymies, while analyzing their reference in discourse.

2.2. Binary Reading

I now propose to consider more closely how reference is assigned to PNB metonymies. One may notice that referential complexity is specific mainly to country-name based metonymies.

(7) *"It's not just **America**, but it's very exaggerated here."* (*Digital Spy UK*, 28.01.06)

Does "America" mean /place/ or /nation/ before being referred to by "here", clearly locative? It looks as though the metonymic use of place-names preserves spatial reference: in discourse spatial value systematically combines with metonymic interpretation. A coordinative model (Radden, 2000) – 'PLACE and INSTITUTION', 'PLACE and INHABITANTS' – is likely to be more adapted for place-name based metonymies than the "stand for" relationship, specific to the conceptual models proposed by Lakoff; Johnson (1980).

Metonymy expects binary reading in such cases. Conceptual coordination plays a crucial role in discourse, in so far as it permits to sum up two referential values. Both

elements A and B are active in discourse. Indeed, metonymy interrelates two entities in order to form a new, complex meaning (Dirven, 1993; Radden; Kövecses, 1999). According to a stronger version (supported by Turner; Fauconnier, 2000; Coulson; Oakley, 2003; etc.), metonymy is a source of *blendings*, *i.e.* mixed concepts resulting from a partial cross-space mapping between two inputs. Being a cognitive tool, metonymy is thus likely to produce new semantic dimensions and relationships. I shall now examine this potentiality from a discursive point of view, based on a corpus study.

2.3. PART-WHOLE Relationship

Considering corpus data, I suggest that conceptual coordination triggers a PART-WHOLE relationship within place-name based metonymies. In (8), for instance, 'PLACE' and 'INSTITUTION' are seen like elements of the same entity, referred to by a proper name.

(8) *I have made very clear that* ***the United States*** *expects* <u>*its*</u> *laws to be respected, expects* <u>*its*</u> *borders to be respected* […] (*CBS News*, 26.01.06)

The referential scope of "the United States" includes 'PLACE and INSTITUTION'. 'INSTITUTION' is retrieved by "laws". The spatial interpretation is semantically confirmed by the mention of "borders". The fact that the possessive "its" accompanies "borders" as well as "laws" clearly shows that reference to the place and reference to the institution are associated, and that both proceed from the same cognitive-discursive level.

As shown in Cislaru (2005) and Lecolle (2005), country-names are polyreferential, and metonymic mappings may be superimposed within the same utterance. In (9), a single token of "Norway" may receive a double interpretation: as 'INSTITUTION', in a co-textual relationship with "legislation", and as 'INHABITANTS / NATION', in a co-textual relationship with "drug-related deaths":

(9) ***Norway****, by contrast, which has stringent* <u>*anti-drugs legislation*</u>*, has the highest prevalence of acute* <u>*drug-related deaths*</u> *in Europe*. (*The Times*, 30.07.03)

'INSTITUTION' and 'INHABITANTS' are here elements of a whole which is referred to by the country-name "Norway".

The capacity of country-names to subsume several concepts has been signaled by Cruse (1996). The author proposes an analysis in terms of *facets*, defined as elements of a global whole, incapable to be subsumed under a hyperonym (Croft; Cruse, 2004: 116); in fact, facets represent different ontological aspects. Cruse (1996) distinguishes three facets of the name *Britain*: these are the categorical concepts *country* (land), *nation* and *state*. Country-names may substitute themselves to any of the three concepts in almost all syntactic-semantic positions. Introducing a country-name in a context selects, highlights or emphasizes one (or more) conceptual facet(s) of its referent considered as a whole.

The facets mentioned by A. Cruse correspond to most of the metonymic concepts cited above (nation *vs*. inhabitants; state *vs*. institution). However, these facets do not include 'TEAM' metonymic mapping (see Cislaru, 2005). As a matter of fact, conceptual coordination as seen in (8) is impossible with 'TEAM' metonymies.[4] It is noteworthy that this contrast between 'PLACE and INSTITUTION / INHABITANTS / NATION' metonymies and 'TEAM' metonymies is symmetrical with the contrast regarding predicate and anaphora agreement.

The immediate self-imposing conclusion is that country-names (and some other categories of place-names treated above) may be used to process at least two cognitively and linguistically different types of metonymic mappings. The first type of mapping generates the 'PART-WHOLE' grasping concept of 'country', semiotized by the country-name. The second type of mapping processes a "local" metonymy referring to the national team. This metonymy is external to the 'PART-WHOLE' grasping concept. Nevertheless, so as a proper-name names a single individual, its use as a linguistic material for the metonymy permits to maintain the connection between the two mappings. Once this is assumed, it is the nature of this difference and its discursive impact, if any, that I shall try to bring to light.

3. Building Social Realities

3.1. Metonymic Convertibility

The points I have addressed up to now concern country names, however the assumptions above apply, to some extent, to capital and institution names. I would like to point out the strong referential relationship that emerges between different categories of place-names. In fact, country-names, capital-city names and institution names are highly convertible. "Russia" and "France" may function as substitutes for state symbols such as "Kremlin" and "Elysee" (see example 10).

(10) ***Kremlin-Elysee*** *hotline to be set up;* ***Russia*** *gives* ***France*** *old documents*. (headline, *BBC*, 21.05.94)

In (11), the country name, "US", stands for the institution name, "The White House". The capital-city name, "Washington", locates the event exposed in the news, and at the same time operates a more direct link between "US" and "the White House".

(11) ***US*** *rejects Iranian "games" on nuclear issue (*headline*)*
*WASHINGTON - **The White House** said Iran was playing "games" with the international community by not accepting a Russian compromise aimed at allaying **US** concerns that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons*. (*AFP*, 22.01.06)

Degressive and progressive chains of PNB metonymic mappings are quite current in newspaper discourse. They enable various social-cognitive projections and trigger the

4. But other forms of binary reading are possible; cf. (16) in 4.4.

interaction of various conceptual levels. This feature is successfully exploited by political discourse as well as by news discourse: responsibility for political actions may be attributed either to the country as a whole or to a single leader, or to a political group (see Cislaru, 2003). This strategy has an important impact on the process of stereotype construction; stereotypes are connected with the country when the discourse itself focuses on the country (see also 4.1.). This strategy also enhances global reference and 'PART-WHOLE' relationship.

However the fact that the convertibility is not valid for 'TEAM'-metonymies should be mentioned. Country names and capital-city names refer to distinct teams (national *vs*. local teams): fans would never mistake them for one another! Once more, 'TEAM' metonymies appear to be different from other PNB metonymies. I propose to explain this clearly marked opposition by different ontological and social-cultural knowledge structures.

3.2. Social Objects

Some parcels of the real world acquire their status of entities only by means of human agreement (Searle, 1995: 13). Social objects are the products of human agreement, in so far as they are dependent on language. According to J. R. Searle, entities depend on language if they are constituted, at least partly, of language dependent mental representations. Metaphor (and metonymy) is one of the cognitive-linguistic tools that contribute to building social objects, as Lakoff; Johnson (1980: 156) point out: "Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies."

I think the 'PART-WHOLE'-type of PNB metonymies functions in just the same way. 'INSTITUTION' is, to some extent, metonymically constructed. This construction may be developed at several levels, all interrelated: objectification, localization, extension.

Objectification is a conceptual adaptation that strengthens object perception. Szwedek (2002: 173) defines "objectification" as follows: "Thus OBJECTIFICATION[5] keeps our world (all our conceivable worlds?) unified, consistent with our physical experience and is in harmony with our original, primeval physical experience of MATTER."

'PLACE-INSTITUTION' metonymic mappings of "the White House" or "the Kremlin" concern the objectification level. The place and the institution overlap, and the latter becomes "tangible", *i.e*. accessible to perception. "Tangibility" (Szwedek, 2002: 165) is one of the necessary conditions for social objects' continuity.

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5. OBJECTIFICATION is used here in the OED sense: "The action of objectifying, or condition of being objectified; an instance of this, an external thing in which an idea, principle, etc. is expressed concretely […] To make into, or present as, an object, esp. an object of sense […]". (Szwedek, 2002:159)

Localization, which cannot really be dissociated from objectification in the cases tackled here, reinforces the institutional status and settles institution's geographic anchoring. "Washington" situates "the White House" and thus prepares extension to country-name based metonymy. This step reveals social conventions about state institutions and capital-cities: a state institution is located in the capital-city, and, conversely, a capital-city becomes a capital when it is chosen as a location for the state institution.[6]

Extension, which is based on reference stretching mechanisms, helps modeling holistic concepts. Country-name based metonymy is elaborated at this level, the most complex and at the same time unitary level. Extension configurates and legitimates the concept of country as a state, as a nation.

Place, as well as institution, state or nation, are parts, elements of the same complex social concept. Cruse (1996) called them facets and argued that country-names are polysemous rather than metonymic. However, from a cognitive point of view, concepts themselves are metonymic products. As social objects are directly dependent on language, this opposition between lexis and cognition, between unity on the one hand and 'PART-WHOLE' relationship on the other hand, is constantly negotiated in discourse.

4. Text and Discourse Analysis

4.1. Metonymy and Forward-labelling

In the following part, I will focus on the contribution of metonymy to text organization in newspaper discourse.

Newspaper discourse is a specific genre, characterized by complex social purposes (Fairclough, 1995) and by constitutive ideology. Events are not only recounted, they are also interpreted and explained, in order to make people see things and act in certain ways (Fairclough, 1995: 91). One could even say that media discourse constructs events out of related facts. I have shown elsewhere (Cislaru, 2005) that, due to their reference potential, country-names play an important role in the configuration of events agents (*France declared…, China decided…*, etc.). Does their part-whole substratum influence discourse organization?

First of all, it appears that discourse itself processes metonymic part-whole relations. Spatial adverbials and place-names have a special discourse status: when mentioned at the beginning of a phrase or paragraph, they forward-label the text, *i.e*. they look ahead and provide instructions for the interpretation (see Charolles *et al*., 2005). For instance, "in Spain" frames the information that follows:

(12) ***In Spain****, it was a very good year* […] (*The WP*, 30.07.03)

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6. Note German government's rather recent transfer from Bonn to Berlin and the modification of metonymic relations it has entailed.

Propositions that follow the frame-introducing expression may include stereotypical beliefs that associate to the referent: "In Brazil, people are hospitable" naturally produces the metaphoric mapping "Brazil is hospitality" and allows, in some contexts, hospitality to symbolize Brazil (hospitality can then be perceived almost like a "product" of Brazil, for instance). The next step is metonymic mapping:[7] "I've brought a piece of Brazil"; "There is a lot of America in everything he does" (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980). Although the process leading to such metonymic mappings is rather long and complex, it is probable that the mapping mechanism itself plays an important cognitive and cohesive role in discourse. In fact, this mechanism facilitates the grasping of information and information hierarchical organization. By filtering out irrelevant data, metonymization produces synthetizing short-cuts to the information that is being focused on.

4.2. Text-provided Interpretation of Metonymy

Let us now examine the relation between the headlines that contain a country-name based metonymy and the articles that follow in newspapers. Headlines optimize the relevance of the information produced by the media (Dor, 2003: 695): they "provide the readers with the optimal ratio between contextual effect and processing effort, and direct readers to construct the optimal context for interpretation". I suggest that, at least to some extent, country-name based metonymies provide instructions for the interpretation of the forthcoming text. Metonymic mappings used in headlines open various referential possibilities; their scope is wide enough to give way to more specific designations.

Systematically, metonymic mappings from headlines are interpreted in the introductory phrase of the text:

(13) ***Iraq*** *Closing Borders Ahead of Election* (headline)
Iraq's government *announced it will close its borders […]* (*Associated Press*, 11.12.05)

In the headline, the country-name based metonymy, "Iraq", blends place and institution. The text of the article proposes an immediate referential interpretation, "Iraq's government". But this interpretation must not be exclusive: it has been assumed in this paper that country-name based metonymies preserve the spatial reference, place being an unalienable element of the holistic concept (see section 2). Thus, the spatial aspect remains available: it is in Iraq that it happens; it is with Iraq that the story deals. The metonymic use becomes a cognitive and pragmatic tool, putting reference at the service of the topic.

In just the same way, the chain "U.S. → [Washington] → the White House → U.S. administration" below is governed by the country-name based metonymy, used in the headline. Extension frames localization ("Washington") and objectification ("the White House").

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7. The intermediation of metaphoric mappings is inevitable here.

(14) ***U.S.*** *looks for positive shift in Canada ties with realistic expectations* (headline)
WASHINGTON (CP) – ***The White House*** *offered congratulations to Stephen Harper […] as* ***the U.S. administration*** *looked for a positive shift in dealings with Canada.* (*Canadian Press*, 24.01.06)

In such discourse configurations, which are rather current, the metonymic mapping activated by the headline enhances the dominance of the WHOLE on its diverse elements (parts?) mentioned in the text of the article. These data unveil the discursive aspect of the social object construction.

4.3. Metonymic Nets in Discourse

Discourse is the place where social objects are given form, reality and tangibility. Social objects have their counterpart, *discourse objects*. A discourse object is a bundle of malleable aspects (properties, functions, relations, etc.) characterized by an "ingredience" relationship, which links the parts to the containing ensemble (Grize, 1998). 'PART-WHOLE' relationship is transferred to the discourse level. Thus a discursive category, the discourse object, works out a cognitive category, the concept corresponding to the social object.

One should also mention that discourse objects are "products of different texts and discourses which emerge in the discursive process of the co-construction of meaning" (Johansson, 2006: 219). Locally, the construction of the discourse object can be observed within *discursive sites*, which are specific "discourse structures organized around a thematic pole and anchored in the materiality of referential expressions; they include semantic, stereotypic and contingent associations" (Cislaru, 2005: 339). The role of the discursive sites is to settle a relational background – comprising reference, associativity, semantics and focus – in order to further the discourse progression and cohesion.

A case study illustrates the mechanism of a discursive site. The example (15) is a summarized reproduction of a half-text from which I have extracted parts of sentences containing referential expressions. The article deals with Iraq, and the name of the country appears in the headline. From the opening sentences, a specific referential chain can be brought out: "the people of Baghdad → they → Abdul Hassan → he → nation". What do these noun phrases share, what do they have in common? How do they relate to the metonymic mapping of the headline, "Iraq wakes up…"?

(15) ***Iraq*** *wakes up and demands to see the bodies of evidence* (headline) – ***the people of Baghdad*** *awoke yesterday to a nagging question: how can they be sure that Uday and Qusay Hussein, Saddam's reviled sons, are really dead? […]* ***Abdul Hassan*** *said as he drank tea at a roadside stall. But, he quickly added: "Are you absolutely sure it is them?" – Such scepticism is hardly surprising from a* ***nation*** *that has twice heard the Americans claim that they might have killed Saddam himself.* (*The Times*, 24.07.03)

Before any attempt to answer the question, let us have a glance at the entire referential chain that one may connect to the occurrence of "Iraq" in the headline. The following figure reflects the text structure, each rectangle corresponding to a paragraph;

the symbol "[…]" indicates a paragraph that contains no element of the referential chain. Each rectangle compiles the referential chain elements that appear in a given paragraph.[8]



Figure 1. A discursive site through its referential chains.

This representation in itself is an interpretation guided by discursive and contextual data. After all, as suggests Emmott (1999: 5), "instead of simply making links between words in a text, a reader is regarded as making inferences about cognitively-constructed entities in cognitively constructed worlds".

Most of the referential expressions listed above are metonymically used. On the one hand, a geographically determined 'PART-WHOLE' relationship is established between "Iraq" and "Baghdad". On the other hand, the reference of "Iraq" narrows to the reference of the noun phrase "people of Baghdad", which is a partial interpretation of the headline metonymic mapping. "People of Baghdad" is the link-point allowing reference to concrete persons, like "Abdul Hassan" or "Miad Salman". Reference to concrete persons in the media discourse is a wide-spread strategy meant to give a concrete expression to events and to incite empathy in order to attract the reader. This strategy provides cognitive tangibility to events and situations (see 3.2.).

The reference to concrete persons stretches to reference to the nation in the article. Both Abdul Hassan and Miad Salman make use of banal national referents (Condor, 2000: 196) like "we" and "here": "We really do need to see the bodies";[9] "We want it to be true but it is hard for us to believe it". The matter is not whether they really use the plural pronoun "we" or whether the journalist himself includes it in their discourse. Be

8. In text linguistics, the paragraph is seen as a potential marker of episode boundaries. An episode "is defined conceptually as a semantic unit in discourse organisation consisting of a set of related propositions governed by a macroproposition or paragraph level theme." (Tomlin, 1987: 460)
9. The bodies of evidence concerning Saddam's sons' death are meant here.

it as it may, this national referent, coupled up with the name of the inhabitants "Iraqi", enables comings and goings between the headline and the text ("Iraq […] demands to see the bodies of evidence" vs. "We need to see the bodies") on the one hand, with the nation on the other hand.



Figure 2. The metonymic circuit.

There is a sustained continuity between all these referential elements. A metonymic network is settled, and it serves to outline, fix and identify a discourse site, within which referential and topic elements converge. The metonymic circuit is closed, but not finished, so that the metonymic nets may be re-arranged in the text continuation.

4.4. Text as Metonymy; Metonymy as a Discourse

Recently, two new conceptual models have emerged in cognitive linguistics: 'TEXT is a WORLD' and 'TEXT is a METAPHOR'.[10] This find marks a significant step in language conception, since it implies to bridge between (or even to superimpose, in a more constructivistic perspective) discourse and cognition. Werth (1994; 1999) describes the development of the text as a world built by means of mental and linguistic tools. Hiraga (2005: 63) provides an example of "text as metaphor": the poem "Love's Philosophy" by Shelley, where different cognitive metaphors form a complex blend. On the ground of text linguistics, Ponterotto (2000) shows the cohesive role of the cognitive metaphor, rhizome-featured, in discourse and conversation.

What about metonymy? One may assume that texts have a metonymic dimension. According to Tomlin (1987: 459), text production takes the following form:



Figure 3. A simplified cognitive model for discourse production (adapted from Tomlin, 1987: 459).

10. The proximity of the two conceptual models is obvious, since WORLD is a METAPHOR, as one may infer from the works of G. Lakoff and M. Johnson.

Let us examine the first two stages, "mental model of X" and "text representation of X". A banal interpretation – which is still very close to Saussure's semiotic triangle object-concept-sign – would be as follows: the mental model stands for X, the text stands for the mental model (text→mental model→X[object]). The stand-for relationship, which is one of the foundations of semiotics, clearly indicates a metonymic mapping (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980).

However, I will not be satisfied with the stand-for interpretation. Firstly, because I have assumed above (2.1.) that metonymy is better accounted for by a coordinative model. Secondly, because text does not substitute itself to the object: the text and the object co-construct one another. The metonymic interpretation may be induced, like in (15), by the discursive proximity of different referential expressions. Metonymy in such a case is a discursive product, but this does not mean it loses its cognitive potential; on the contrary, discourse is an excellent way to convey knowledge. Besides, as has been mentioned above, metonymy continues to play its role in constructing discourse, and, through these means, in the construction and description of social objects.

If text may be regarded as a metonymic mapping, metonymy may develop a discursive dimension. In order to verify this hypothesis, I will go back to the conceptual distinction between two PNB metonymy types: the 'PART-WHOLE' grasping concept and the 'TEAM' metonymy. One might have noticed the formal, functional and ontological differences between these two types: they have different predicate and anaphora agreement; different degrees of referential complexity; different ontological status. I also insist on the fact that, in discourse, the 'TEAM' metonymy has less cohesive force (cf. the non convertibility country-name ↔ capital-city name). Moreover, it is less independent, in so far as it is based on the first type metonymic mapping. When newspaper discourse focuses on the first type metonymic mapping, 'TEAM' metonymy is generally not evoked. Yet, when the article focuses on 'TEAM' interpretation, it may evoke the grasping 'PART-WHOLE' mapping. In some particular socio-historical contexts, such as political conflict between the countries teams of which meet, 'team' and 'institution' almost converge, in so far as the thematic features concerning 'PART-WHOLE' grasping concept are transferred to 'TEAM' metonymy.

(16) *U.S. Drawn Into Difficult Cup Group; Sweden, Nigeria,* ***N. Korea*** *Await* (headline)
[…] ***North Korea****, at a political standoff with* ***the United States*** *over the Asian nation's nuclear weapons programs, is ranked seventh and Nigeria 23rd.* […] *The U.S. government included* ***North Korea*** *in an "axis of evil" and says* ***North Korea****'s nuclear ambitions are a regional threat.* (*The WP*, July 18, 2003)

One may assume that this phenomenon is generated by the dialogical relation (Bakhtine, 1977) between discourses. Lexicon is one of the points of discourse intersection: words can stock imprints of the discourses they traverse (Moirand, 2003). Country-names, which are the linguistic material of the metonymic mappings analysed here, carry along such imprints, independently of the type of metonymy processed.

Besides, I can mention at least one case when 'TEAM' metonymy was used to strengthen the 'PART-WHOLE' mapping. It happened in 2000 in France, just before and during the Football European cup. A quick contextualization is necessary. One must

know that football has recently acquired a special status in France: it is not a "religion" yet, as it is in some other countries (stereotypes are unavoidable here…), but it is very common in everyday discourse. Football has a real social impact: the suburban-ghetto teenager's ideal is to become a professional football-player; in the media, football is sometimes presented as the unique possibility for these teenagers to become successful. Last, but not least, the national team represents the "ethnical diversity" of the country; it thus emphasizes a positive aspect of immigration. Besides, immigration is considered one of the most acute social problems in France nowadays, as a recent media discourse survey shows. The national team becomes a "state affair", and, consequently, 'TEAM' metonymy is integrated to the 'PART-WHOLE' grasping concept.

I have argued that metonymy contributes to text cohesion and coherence. In the field of discourse analysis, cohesion is an internal as well as external phenomenon. As a linguistic unit, a text is cohesive in so far as it has its own internal organization. As a linguistic event, a discourse is coherent with its context of production and with its intertextual environment.

5. Conclusions

The empirical data examined above underline strong correlation between metonymy and discourse, under both the cognitive and the organizational aspects.

On the one hand, some features of the metonymic mapping mechanism may be fully seized only at the discursive level, which favours the connection with sociocultural representations and thus outlines intersubjectively-shared cognitive patterns. The discourse study of two different types of place-name metonymic uses giving rise, respectively, to a 'PART-WHOLE' grasping concept and to 'TEAM' interpretation, brings out their formal, functional and ontological characteristics. This study also indicates the possibility of a pragmatic interrelation between the two metonymic mapping types where the 'TEAM' metonymy strengthens the grasping concept of 'country'.

On the other hand, metonymy plays a crucial role in discourse production and organization. To the extent it implies a coordinative relation, metonymy more than doubles the number of possible referential and topic developments; at the same time, because it has a unifying role that warrants the coherence of these developments. Besides, as a cognitive tool, metonymy participates in the construction of social objects; so it is for the 'PART-WHOLE' grasping concept that represents country-name referents. Metonymy takes charge of the discourse object configuration and thus triggers intertextual connections.

Going further, one can consider the text itself as a metonymic mapping that represents and constructs objects. At a larger scale, metonymy may be understood as a discourse, in so far as it activates intertextual nets and the sociocultural context.

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REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS CULTURALES DE LA UNIVERSITAT JAUME I / *CULTURAL STUDIES JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITAT JAUME I*

Defining Semantic and Prosodic Tools for the Analysis of Live Metaphor Uses in Spoken Corpora

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ABSTRACT: Considering metaphors as hypercoding elements in a genetic outlook, a corpus of twenty six scripted interviews, in British and American English and in French was labelled morphosyntactically and with lsa (latent semantic analysis) coefficients which assess semantic "distance" between words (grammatical words included) and the general topic of the discourse — music in our case. The corpus was first hand-searched then searched by XSLT stylesheets for potentially live metaphors using the lsa tags.
Metaphors in oral discourse differ from those in written discourse in more than one way: They are more spontaneous when innovative, less contrived and linked are endowed with a recognisable intonation. The scrutiny of all the live metaphors trawled from the corpus was carried out and resulted in the establishment of prosodic patterns for assessing metaphoricity. The pattern is not live-metaphor specific, but used along with other factors such as semantic distance, being a good enough indicator for both languages. As a case study, [MUSIC IS A PATH/JOURNEY] metaphor uses are looked into.
An intended live metaphor corresponds to a specific attitude and emotion on the speaker's part. Maturity and Tonus (Piot 2002) are two concepts that can account for the prosodic contours. This feature may be added to the pattern bundle for metaphors which Lynne Cameron and Alice Deignan have coined Metaphoreme. Establishing what is metaphorically alive is a fruitful way of contrasting how cognitive models at play in metaphor are translated in oral discourse and may be seen as the ecology of metaphors, seeing how they coexist in their cognitive milieu. French, English and American radio stations, France Musique, Radio 3, and NPR provided material to test with some success the efficiency of the prosodic template.

Keywords: oral corpus, prosody, maturity, tonus, contrastive linguistics, metaphor, mapping, music.

RESUMEN: Considerando las metáforas como elementos de hipercódigo desde una perspectiva genética, se etiquetó un corpus de veintiseis entrevistas transcritas, en inglés británico y americano y en francés, morfosintácticamente y con los coeficientes del lsa (análisis semántico latente) que determinan «distancia semántica» entre las palabras (palabras gramaticales incluidas) y el asunto general del/la discurso—música en nuestro caso. El corpus se analizó primero a mano, y posteriormente por las hojas de estilo de XSLT para

las metáforas potencialmente vivas usando las etiquetas del lsa. Las metáforas en discurso oral se diferencian de las del discurso escrito en más de una forma: Son más espontáneas cuando son innovadoras, menos elaboradas y ligadas, se dotan de una entonación reconocible. El escrutinio de todas las metáforas vivas recopiladas dio lugar al establecimiento de los patrones prosódicos para determinar la metaforicidad. El patrón no es específico de la metáfora viva, sino que se utiliza junto con otros factores tales como distancia semántica, siendo un indicador bastante bueno para ambos idiomas. Como estudio de caso, hemos analizado usos de la metáfora [la MÚSICA ES UN CAMINO/VIAJE]. Una metáfora viva prevista corresponde a una actitud y a una emoción específicas del hablante. La madurez y el tono (Piot 2002) son dos conceptos que pueden explicar los contornos prosódicos. Esta característica se puede agregar al paquete del patrón para las metáforas que Cameron y Deignan han acuñado como Metaforema. Establecer qué está metafóricamente vivo es una manera fructífera de contrastar los modelos cognoscitivos en juego en la metáfora y su traducción en discurso oral. A su vez, se pueden considerar como la ecología de las metáforas, viendo cómo coexisten en su entorno cognoscitivo. Las emisoras de radio France Musique, Radio 3, y NPR proporcionaron material para probar con éxito la eficacia de la plantilla prosódica.

Palabras claves: corpus oral, prosodia, madurez, tono, lingüística contrastiva, metáfora, proyección, música.

Introduction

Metaphors are an invading figure of linguistics. However most of the times they are a window onto other phenomena. For Lakoff that window gives out on the workings of the mind, for Freud and Lacan it gives out on the unconscious. Here metaphors are used to shed light on how large corpus may be searched, not just for metaphors, but in terms of meaning intensity or coding capacity in a genetic perspective.

This paper looks at new ways of analysing metaphors in a multilingual corpus. It concentrates on the use of prosody as a tool to search and assess metaphorical uses.

26 interviews of music-related speakers, both in English and in French were scripted labelled with p.o.s tags and with latent semantic analysis tags (LSA). The LSA tags (http://lsa.colorado.edu/) give an indication as to the semantic "distance" between words (grammatical words included) and the general topic of the discourse — music. The corpus was first hand-searched, then by XSLT stylesheets to detect words semantically distant from the topic. Metaphors hedgers were used — repetitions, pauses, discourse markers (*you know, a bit like*) but the asset of an oral corpus is the raw data provided by the sound signal. Prosodic contours obtained by the software Praat (prosody analysis tool) turned out to be the only safe indicator of live metaphors, those intended to be live by their speakers, which is what metaphor liveliness means in the context of oral discourse since it is the informer's privilege to choose to signal the conjuring up of both source and target domains, which is what live metaphors seem to be, as opposed to dying metaphors where mainly the target concept is referred to. Consequently, it was then possible to produce a prosodic pattern for live metaphors, and to see how it differed from

one dialect of English to another, and from one language to another. Differences seem to originate not from the metaphor-signalling function but from the prosodic idiosyncrasies of the dialects.

The pattern is not live-metaphor-specific, but used along with other factors such as semantic distance, and information structure, it is a good enough indicator for both languages, and helps redefine what metaphoricity is in the context of oral discourse. In this paper, as an illustration of a prototypical metaphor identification process, ROUTE DIRECTION metaphors are examined. Beyond metaphor spotting, it investigates new ways of coping with the translation of metaphors.

1. Lexicalised and Live Metaphors and Cognitive Mappings

When seen in a genetic perspective, the difference between dead and live metaphors takes on a whole new dimension. Lexicalised metaphors may be seen as a mutation in the semantic evolution of a word, or in the translation of deep semantic structure to a spoken message. These mutations are the result of image schematic models, experiential and ontological models, and also culture dependent stereotypical models (Lakoff; Johnson 1980) which we organise our understanding of the world with. The life expectation of any mutation depends on the environment, in this case the linguistic and cultural environment. Lexicalised metaphors cannot be translated literally since the cultural context they were born in has changed. This is the case for most food metaphors in French the origins of which no French speaker is aware anymore (arrête de raconter des salades! à stop telling fibs) which are culture dependent and have become the most obvious means of expressing the target concept. The source concept is often not translated in English in the same conceptual domain:

(1) Mêle toi de tes oignons (mind your own business)
Cornichon, patate, petit chou, aubergine (daft thing, silly thing, darling, traffic warden)

However, lexicalised metaphors, by definition, may be found in dictionaries, and may be translated with some degree of efficiency (though even lexicalised metaphors have a breath of life remaining in them, and translating them without a metaphor is not satisfactory). This is not the case for innovative metaphors, since by definition they are absent from dictionaries or unregistered.

Innovative metaphors use mappings which are common to most cultures ([PROGRESS IN ACTION IS PROGRESS IN SPACE]) with a few exceptions (Lakoff; Johnson). Live metaphors in oral discourse are either real innovations, or dead metaphors which are reborn by the speaker with a will to superimpose the two original concepts at play, a source concept which is partially projected onto a target concept (only some characteristics of the source domain are concerned). Translations will depend on this status of liveliness, since if ever the metaphor corresponds to a culture dependent-mapping, it will have to be transposed to another mapping. Whereas lexicalised metaphors may sometimes be translated by a non metaphorical term in another language because in those cases the superimposition involved in metaphorising is less of an issue,

live metaphors cannot be. Most metaphors are semantically transposable between French and English (British or American) which are the expression of two very close western cultures. However they may vary in surface morphosyntactic realization, since the constraints are different in both languages at that level.

The hypothesis is that one of the underlying functions of the prosody of metaphors is to point out to the listener and decoder of the message their less obvious decoding, in other words that they are not a literal usage of the term, but also that they are the expression of a conceptual association — a mapping. Major mappings in the corpus are the following.

Table 1. Contrastive distribution according to the main mappings organizing metaphors in the corpora

	Metaphorical mapping	Example in both English and in French
1	[MUSIC IS A VERBAL LANGUAGE]	it's like **writing** your **name** you know **writing** a **note** la musique en fait a **traduit** ce cet état là et
2	[MUSIC HAS POWER OVER BODY AND MIND]	and we we **connected** with these few people who were dancing around the bar at the back c'est le c'est la **communion** euh
3	[MUSIC IS A VIOLENT FORCE, A LIVING BEING]	our music was a little **hot-tempered** for the set éduquer la **brute** à la **souplesse** à l'intelligence c'est à dire le côté moteur
4	[MUSIC PIERCES, GOES IN AND OUT OF THE BODY] =[MUSIC IS AN OBJECT, TOUCHES THE BODY]	something **else** is sort of playing the music **through** you comme une espèce de d'**ouverture** supplémentaire **physiquement** qui me donnait le petit peu d'air
5	[MUSIC IS A CONTAINER, A BUILDING]	but I think it's I think it's there to to **contain** that de mettre de une partie de **moi-même** dans le dans le morceau dans l'expression
6	[MUSIC IS A PATH, A JOURNEY]	and the singer is the main I guess **vehicle** for the band members je peux gérer mon **atterrissage** c'est le côté instinctif

Metaphors are already a translation from one concept to another. Some characteristics of the source concept are mapped (*translatées* in French) onto the target concept. A multi-language corpus, provided it is large enough, is another form of translation, for speakers from two linguistic cultures are expressing their minds about music. Consequently, realisations of mappings in one sub-corpus are likely to be found 'culturally translated' in the other. The surface expressions of those mappings are sometimes surprisingly similar:

(2) "il y avait ce que j'appelais on va pas reparler de la mer hein ce que j'appelais du **flux** et du **reflux** c' est à dire que les mot …mais c'est pas une question de d'accélérer le

> tempo c'est une question de de en fait **d'énergie que l'on donne**' (F5)" is almost translatable by "we kind of kind of make things **ebb** and **flow** a lot you know that contrast **in terms of energy level** and and volume' (210, F7)"

Here, not only do we get the exact translation of *ebb and flow* in the French *equivalent*, but both metaphors are phrasal or organic ones, and both are continued by adding the concept of *energy* (une *question d'énergie que l'on donne* à *in terms of energy level and volume*, which tends show they are being used as a realisation of similar meaning.

2. The Metaphors of Music and the Music of Metaphors: A Prosodic Template for Live Metaphors

2.1. Salience Metaphor and Oral Discourse

Live metaphors are, in informational terms, a subclass of focus. They introduce novel information, and they do so in two ways — new information about the referential external world, and also a novel association of lexicon and concept. The prosodic data show live metaphors to be narrow focus, and also emphases.

The concept of **salience** is crucial in the surface realization of cognitive model mappings. True live metaphors have the source and the target coexist at the same level, though one is seen as the comment of the other. The reading path in a sentence, indicates which is topic, which is focus. But the essential ingredient needed in oral language to determine what is salient is prosody especially in the jumbled syntax of oral discourse. In the example below, there is no knowing which is which without the intonation: "et euh sinon ben les mots c' est c' est les notes en fait (88, F3)". It may look as if the topic is *mots*, and that words are compared to musical notes, but it is in fact the opposite, and there are two clues to the answer:

1/ [music is a language] is a conceptual mapping, as the findings in the corpus illustrates. The opposite is not.
2/ Prosodic contours show that *notes* is not realized with focal contours, and though the speaker usually finishes with a high rise, here ***mots*** has a higher frequency peak (F0max) and is emphatic by its duration. So prosody is at the origin of the focussing process.

Metaphors just as other displacements or tropes (irony, mockery, sarcasm) are recognized for having a specific intonation. They all represent a high input of information which needs to be signalled. In the case of live metaphors, there seems to be an indication of an arduous delivery of the message. Innovative metaphors are often preceded and followed by a pause, repetitions, hesitations.

2.2. Metaphor, Focus and Prosody in the Corpus

The prosodic norm of a term which comments upon the topic by adding new information should be that of a focus, or even a narrow focus.



Fig. 1. (3) *it's a very it's a very sort of er what's the word I 'm looking a very sort of er what's the word I'm looking for a very* ***male*** *kind of thing* (26, E1)

The emphasis is strong in that non-innovating metaphor, but the contours are those of typical focus, though stretched out. Coming back to example (2) the contours show approximately the same phenomenon in French:



Fig. 2. *ben sinon les* ***mots*** *c'est c'est les notes*

Results were obtained thanks to Praat. For all contours in this paper, unless mentioned otherwise, the intensity contour is in olive green, and the frequency in blue.

Topic and focus are almost equivalent in this second example. In terms of category, they are basic-level, and in French, both could be focus out of context. The higher F0max peak for *mots*, and the greater intensity, but most of all, the substantial emphasis in syllable duration (363 ms for mots, 172 ms for notes) leaves no doubt as to the focus — *mots*.

There is an emphasis due to the special attention the speaker is drawing to its metaphorical use but not that typical of live metaphors. The previous clause was: "*il y a la* ***ponctuation*** *ça serait plus ou moins le rythme*" which follows the same information pattern, so the speaker is relating to the discourse itself, and is entering a metalinguistic phase, in which language speaks as much about its functioning as it does about the extralinguistic world it refers to. So to conclude on metaphor informational structure and prosody:

1. Some metaphors do not have focal prosodic contours, are only references to the object they wish to conjure up and do not bring new information—they are lexicalised.
2. Others bear neutral focal contours and fit focal patterns which have been defined for French and English (Féry, 2002; Delais-Roussarie, 2006) according to the position of the stressed word.
3. The third category is innovating metaphors that seem to bear a form of emphasis with different subcategories. Most innovative metaphors are produced in the presence of a reference to the topic (in presentia), which enables searches with lsa coefficients.

The contours of live metaphors deviate from that of narrow focus in several ways, these depend on whether the stressed syllable is word final or not, sentence (or rhythmic phrase—RP) final in English, and whether it is RP final or not in French (see Féry, 2002; Delais-Roussarie, 2006). Also referential values used as a gauge to calculate deviation have to be different for short and long syllables, and were worked out per speaker. Most live metaphors in French tend to appear at the end of the rhythmic group where the pitch accent typically occurs. The deviations caused by the realisation of a metaphor are superimposed on focal contours in accordance with the parallel theory of prominence (cf. Xu *et al.*).

2.3. The Nature of Metaphorical Prosodic Contours

Prosodic parameters characteristic of LM were established by working out deviation from average values for a given speaker and a given position within the word and the RP were worked out in percentage of the whole syllable duration or pitch range. LMCs (Live Metaphor Contours) were found to have the following characteristics:

A duration corresponding to that of narrow focus (average value for syllable type and speaker) ***E(C2-C1)***

A smaller pitch range ***E(dF0)*** than narrow focus
A fundamental frequency peak (F0max) shifted to the right, measured by looking at the distance from frequency peak to syllable offset (C2) ***E(dC2-F)***
A widening of the proportionate distance from intensity peak to frequency peak àpeak delay ***E(Delay/C)***

All prosodic parameters including intensity, are taken into account. For end-of-rhythmic-group stresses in French for instance, the only difference between a classic boundary tone and a LMC lies in the syllable duration, and/or in the position of the intensity peak.

	LMC1 weak F0max gradient + long Duration	LMC2 steep F0max gradient+ long Duration	LMC3 narrow focus + peak delay	LMC4 same as Type1,2 but shorter duration
FRENCH				
	*C'est la **communion** (110, F3)*	*De se **transcender** (238,F5)*	*ça a **lâché** (216,F5)*	*elle lâche pas les **freins** (227,F5)*
ENG+AMER				
	*to be there to **contain** that (26,E1)*	*It's very **dark** (175,A5) (American speaker)*	*there to **contain** the pain (43,E1)*	*An **articulation** (90,E2)*

Fig. 3. Typical prosodic contours for live metaphors in French, British and American English

Typical prosodic contours for both French and English LMCs (live metaphor contours) were classified. They all have in common the deviation in delay of the F0max peak with regard to that of intensity. What are the underlying functions at work? Two notions must be introduced, **maturity** and **tonus**.

2.4. Maturity

Maturity is the assessment of one's familiarity or ability to understand a concept, or the probability that one can cope with it. Maturity is linked to frequency, for we tend to fix frequency at a level which corresponds to the mean frequency at which we spoke at the age when we had this degree of maturity (see Piot, 2002). So if something is really obvious for the speaker the following sentence,

(3) You've never heard of that!
T'as pas entendu parler de ça!

will therefore finish by a high rising pitch, expressing incredulity on the surface, and reflecting the mapping between lack of knowledge and a certain frequency level.

According to the theory developed in Olivier Piot's thesis, (Piot, 2002) both maturity and pitch become associated, or mapped together; and this is an experiential mapping for with age, from birth onwards, mean frequency decreases steadily till the age of 25, whereas knowledge increases (in theory). For interrogations the assessment of this maturity is mostly that of the speaker, for assertions, that of the addressee with regard the information (his likelihood to know it) or the concept (his likelihood to be able to deal with it) and also sometimes that of the speaker. We can thus assess via frequency our representation of the world (the speaker's view of the world linked with one event), our representation of the addressee's world, the addressee's world and the addressee's representation of our world. A long pitch curve may then in turn be the assessment of the addressee and then the addresser's knowledge and familiarity with what is at stake, not only the "thing" we are talking about, but the language we use or the time when the addressee may take the floor. This could be one explanation of the high rise in conversational French — as long as there is this high rise, the speaker is signalling that the other is not ready, mature, to take the floor.

2.5. Tonus

Tonus is linked to the somatic nervous system which provides a quicker response to emotions than the autonomous nervous system which is seen as a regulator. Tonus may be seen as the outlet for a nervous charge created by a restraint, an absence or a problem. The resolution of the problem goes with the release of the nervous charge. Both are associated, this is why pain triggers crying and shouting. The lack of a term to encode an existing representation is a form of problem, which is solved when a term is found. The solving of this lexical problem releases almost simultaneously the tonus energy, which works on the respiratory muscles, the phonic system, sub glottal pressure and vocal chords. As an effect, frequency rises steadily, and intensity is quickly released, because it is not regulated.



Fig. 4a. *ça peut être un révélateur d'une personnalité de transcender de se transcender* (238, F5)



Fig. 4b. *I think the structure has to be there to contain if you like the pain (…)yes I think it's there to to contain that* (46, E1)

Figure 4a: Contours for the same word said in what seems to be a normal emphasis and a metaphorical one show the effect of maturity and tonus on frequency and intensity. The intensity peak in the LMC contours (in blue) falls from the syllable onset steadily, whereas the frequency rises steadily. In the neutral emphasis, the intensity is more regulated and the frequency rises to a peak and falls. Both uses are metaphorical but one is meant to be felt as such by the speaker, and that is the second utterance (*de se*

transcender). The latter section of the frequency contours in the LM would theoretically correspond to the self assessment of the speaker with regard the lexical use (its appropriateness), which is a reflexive use of the verb *transcender*. The tail end of the frequency curve remains high, meaning that the speaker herself is not familiar with the usage or has doubts as to its appropriateness.

3. Results of the Use of the Prosodic Template with the [MUSIC IS A JOURNEY] Mapping

Metaphorical utterances with prosodic values that differ enough (>10%) from narrow focus may be classified under the metaphorical prosodic model established (LMC) and considered as being live metaphors.

3.1. Results in French

sp	word	MS	LSA	Environment	*E(dF0)*	*E(C2-C1)*	*E(F -I)*	*E(dC2)*
F9	routière		0.07	C'est un peu comme une carte routière	-65,45	-14,35	57,17	-36,70
F2	partir	VER:infi	0,19	ça c'est pour dire attention pour dire attention on va **partir**	-97,2	12,6	70,6	-50,9
F5	mouvance	NOM	0.03	il y a un genre de euh comment de de liberté de **mouvance** enfin	-83,7	-5,5	53,7	-39,2
F5	accélère	VERB:pres	-0,01	on reprend cette énergie on la **freine** on l'**accélère**	-13,3	-1,9	51,5	-34,6
F9	sortir/sillon	VER:infi	0,18	la métaphore du **sillon** (…) ça implique que c'est quelque chose dont tu peux pas **sortir**	100,5	3,8	48,2	-34,9
F5	mouvement	NOM	0,14	mais euh et qui donne du **mouvement** en fait de dans le	-80,6	-7,3	31,4	-19,2
F8	mètres	NOM	0,04	c'est comme le gars qui qui fait les cent mètres et le gars qui fait les mille **mètres** mais les gars	-29,2	27,7	27,2	-35,6

F5	coincé	VER:pper	0	donc on est **coincé** par le par le **parcours**	-50,2	-35,8	26,4	-11,1
F5	partent	VER:pres	0,11	il fallait que les choses sortent il fallait que les choses se ouais **partent**	-91,9	4,1	20,3	-17,9
F9	repères/ paumés	ADJ	0,05	des fois l' autre te donne des repères des fois les deux sont **paumés**	-9,9	31,6	19,5	-24,7
F8	quelque part	VER:infi	0,16	on va se **rejoindre quelque part** dans une autre **direction**	-1,0	41,9	18,5	-15,3
F5	sorties	NOM	0,08	t'as des entrées des sorties	56,0	-4,6	18,0	-26,3
F2	machine en route	NOM	0,04	enfin je veux dire euh enfin de moteur qui met la **machine en route**	10,0	-22,4	16,0	-8,6
F5	avancer	VERB:infi	0,06	il y a des moments où j'avance où je freine et j'**avance**	-21,3	35,3	14,0	0,1
F9	entre	PRP	0,23	t'as des entrées des sorties et **entre** tu fais ce que tu veux	57,0	-40,3	13,3	2,2
F9	endroits	NOM	0,06	tu sais que t'as des t'as des stops à certains **endroits** t'as des entrées des sorties	-30,2	-7,0	9,8	-9,8

Table 2. Extract of French metaphors classified under [MUSIC IS A PATH]
Metaphors are first classified according to the peak delay parameter then by syllable duration. The potential live metaphors are highlighted in green. The code for speakers is located in the first column

Live metaphors are all variations of a clear cognitive mapping. Music is a road, a journey, a route with stops and turnings, on which musicians move forward, drive, run, and accelerate. Both live and reborn metaphors are present in the classifications and form two subcategories of emphases. Every stage of the metaphorical journey is present:

starting off à (*qui met la machine en route*/switches the engine on), the speed (*on la freine on l'accélère*, you put the brakes, you slow it down)

the route itself à *carte routière* (road map), *parcours* (the route) , *liberté de mouvance* (freedom to roam), *à certains endroits* (in some places), *route* (road), *quelque part* (somewhere), *une autre direction* (another direction)

the navigating process à *t'as des stops, des entrées* (inlets), *des sorties* (turn off), *les deux sont paumées* (both are lost)

Most metaphors classified under that conceptual mapping are phrasal and range from very low (*accélèreà-0.01*) to medium (*partirà 0.19*) in terms of semantic distance from the topic. There is no clear correlation with semantic distance (worked out from written corpora (lsa)), but a clear correlation between mapping and metaphorical emphasis:

(4) *des fois l' autre te donne des repères des fois les deux sont* ***paumés***
(5) *on va se* ***rejoindre quelque part*** *dans une autre* ***direction***

Here for instance both metaphors develop the same model and are realized with approximately the same prosodic contours, they also express the same idea, (*sometimes you follow one another, sometimes you get lost, and sometimes you meet up again*).

3.2. Results in English

sp	word	MS	LSA	Environment	*E(dF0)*	*E(C2-C1)*	*E(F -I)*	*E(dC2)*
A2	full blown	IN	0,14	we don't necessarily go **full blown into** but it 's just like a little hint of this	-69,09	10,26	58,74	-30,94
A9	deviation	NN	-0,03	you do n't have no **room** for **deviation**	-80,17	-19,93	27,69	0,81
A2	on/loosely	IN	0,17	you always fall back **on** your tracks (…) but **loosely**	234,87	9,24	22,97	-16,29
E12	journey	NN	0,05	the musicians do take you **on** a **journey** into into and er it it can be on two **levels** I mean there's there's there's the the there's the **surface** there's just the enjoyment of it	-31,25	77,78	21,47	-30,47

E12	underneath	IN	0,04	I think it ‘s on the **journey** to that change **underneath** the just the enjoyment so	-25,57	-18,42	20,51	-6,26
A7	**Along**	**IN**	**0,13**	‘ll record himself and play **along** with it	15,35	34,02	19,62	-5,31
A4	flowing	VVG	0,04	it ‘s like you know everything is **flowing** but it‘s real **light**	-25,31	-11,62	18,21	-7,99
A10	out	JJ	0,15	he just really he really played it **out**	79,33	-18,97	14,52	12,50
A7	go	IN	0,1	that you that you think about where you might want to **go**	-89,85	62,13	14,32	-32,34
A5	vehicle	NN	0,04	and the singer is the main I guess **vehicle** for the band members	265,57	27,39	12,00	-45,50
E12	journey	NN	0,05	I think it ‘s on the **journey** to that change **underneath** the just the enjoyment	105,33	22,11	8,37	-9,42
A7	dynamical	JJ	0,02	that we do play with dynamical levels	-29,28	17,06	6,73	-9,45
E11	boundaries	NNS	-0,02	he‘s he‘s within known **boundaries** you know he‘s not as er he‘s not as **off** on a **tip** as as as Kelly Joe Felps	-48,11	32,04	4,19	28,48
A2	room	NN	0,11	and often times there‘s not a lot of **room** within that because it has to be very arranged	-33,82	-50,25	2,60	-1,87
A3	wide open space	NN	0,06	then it ‘s just like **wide open space** er I mean it kind of	250,22	32,68	2,40	1,56

Table 3. Extract of English metaphors classified under [MUSIC IS A PATH]
A codes for American speakers, E English speakers

The metaphors considered live by the speakers according to the prosodic gauge vary very slightly from the French findings. They seem to stem to a great extent from the landmark — trajectory — trajector (cf. Cappelle; Declerck, 2004) conceptual model just like their French counterparts, but are more organised around uses of *in*/*into*, and *on*. Uses of the three prepositions *in*, *on*, and *at* may be seen as being functions of *identification*, *differentiation* without rupture, and *rupture* (Gilbert 2002). In other words, the same as for IN, not the same as but continuous to some degree for ON, and separated from, unrelated for AT. Many of the metaphorical uses in English seem to involve this model. Here, the liveliest metaphors (or those intended to be so by the speakers) are a variation on the prepositional model:

(6) *we don't necessarily go **full blown into** but it 's just like a little hint of this*
(7) *you always fall back **on** your tracks (…) but **loosely***
(8) *the musicians do take you **on** a **journey** into into and er it it can be **on** two **levels***

into in (6) is opposed to *hinting at*, and thus coherent with identification. In (7), ON is clearly an expression of differentiation, the musician is on and off the "*tracks*", and *loosely*. This could be opposed to the use of IN in the expression 'in the groove'. In (8) we clearly have a hesitation between IN and ON, ***on** a journey **into into** (…) **on** two levels*, as if the prepositions came first, as a germ around which the discourse is then organised. So apart from the metaphors which may found literally translated in the French corpus there is, to a certain degree, a specificity of the English prepositional model. But the mapping remains the same. Music is seen as a trajectory along which or on which the trajector (moving object) moves, but music may also be the trajector:

(9) *you can feel that feel that **move** the improvisation **moving into** the next section you know it 's coming (E5)*

In that case the musician is seen as being with the music (*I was into it into it* E10), identified with it. Here the PATH model overlaps that of the CONTAINER. Music and the musicians are both conceptualised as containers which are either connected, communicating, or merged into one.

However, if a systematic search is carried out in the French corpus for prepositions that are close to the topical terms, most metaphorical prepositional uses seem to be present in French, and with prosodic evidence of liveliness:

F1	266,348	sur	PRP	0,25	il est arrivé sur un rythme de house euh et
F1	266,348	vers	PRP	0,22	ou ça emmène trop dans le truc là vers quelque chose d'un peu euh ouais je sais pas
F9	522,089	sur	PRP	0,25	un entrecroisement de de rythmes sur les éléments
F9	2721,25	sur	PRP	0,3	jouait euh jouait pas mal sur les mètres
F5	1225,63	vers	PRP	0,2	on va vers la tonique et la note sensible
F8	197,91	vers	PRP	0,2	peux amener vers un autre rythme ouais et il

Table 4. Prepositional metaphor heads trawled by xslt stylesheet in French

The difference lies in the flexibility offered by lexical innovation and freedom. Prepositions glued to phrasal verbs offer a freedom in the expression of spatial mappings that French seems to lack.

4. Discussion: Metaphors as Hypercoding Strands of Discourse

Live metaphors may be seen as hypercoding inasmuch as contrarily to lexicalised metaphors, they refer both to a notion and to the metaphorical process itself. They are also hypercoding in the sense that they innovate and are thus on a higher informational level — a double focus. This double focus is voiced with a specific emphasis the parameters of which were modelled by computing the prosodic data. This template was then tested on English and French samples of radio broadcast.



Fig. 5. 'right from the very first meanderings of writing' a LMC type 1
(Broadcast on Radio 2 - Wed 06 Jun 2007 - 23:00)



Fig. 6. They had a (pause) a **marriage** of music which was not (Broadcast on Radio 2 - Wed 06 Jun 2007 - 23:00) a LMC type 3 (lexicalized metaphor brought back to life by speaker)



Fig. 7. c'est à dire le côté absolument indissociable et le côté langage (france musique Feb, 2007) a LMC type 3 (a refocussed dead metaphor, a process underlined by the discourse marker 'le côté')

Searching for the prosodic template revealed some metaphors which seem to abide by the characteristics established from the corpus findings. Larger corpora will have to be tested in order to refine the template and see what other emphases it might cover. Determining how speakers in different languages cope with innovating metaphorically in one particular conceptual domain may be helpful in many ways. It seems from the findings that the importance of the organisation of spatial cognitive models centred on prepositions in English makes these easier to produce.

So all in all, the ROUTE DIRECTION mapping are close in both languages and three dialects (French, British English and American English), and so are most experiential-based and ontological mappings illustrated in the corpus.

Live metaphors such as these recycling the [MUSIC IS A PATH] mapping, by their very liveliness are often translatable, allowing a few morphosyntactic transpositions. Hence the use of differentiating them from lexicalised metaphors in the context of translation.

5. Conclusion: Redefining the Metaphoreme

Metaphors are the surface realisation of conceptual mappings which do not only work as vectors connecting source and target concepts but also whole networks of concepts giving birth to conceptual models and structural models. Amongst the forces at play in the *metaphoreme* bundle (Cameron; Deignan, 2006), prosodic characteristics, along with other classical markers (pauses, repetitions, discourse markers, informational structure and semantic distance), seem to be a good indicator of metaphor liveliness. Some lexicalised metaphors are prosodically given a new lease of life, and they are coherent with other innovating metaphors pertaining to the same conceptual domain.

The first conclusion which the prosodic approach enables us to reach is that metaphor liveliness is not entirely linked to a deep semantic level of conceptual mappings but to morphosyntactic realization, which may be innovative or not. In French the use of dedans in "quelque part t'es pris dedans" is more live and innovative than

"you're into it" though a literal translation and the expression of the same conceptual mapping. Metaphors are created along the networks made available by the mappings, they both have to abide by and break the morphosyntactic rules of the language (*les choses elles ont lâchées quoi on va dire ça a lâché*, F9 à things let loose, you can say that it loosened up). Metaphors may be brought back to life by speakers and signalled as such by means of an emphasis on the metaphorical process itself. Metaphoricity in oral discourse can only be seen in time, and not as fixed for a given usage.

A second research direction is opened up by the capacity to track metaphoricity. Metaphors are a level of enunciation at which there is a switch from the purely notional referential (referring to the external world) to a mixed reference to both the world outside and the words themselves. This seems to be signalled by prosody, through specific patterns of intensity and fundamental frequency contours. Using these as a gauge allows a form of assessment of metaphoricity.

Why should it be interesting to track metaphoricity? One obvious reason is translation, and especially oral translation. Whether lexicalised or live, metaphors are not straightforward to translate. It is the very nature of the difference between both which makes their translation a different issue. Lexicalised metaphors do not conjure up both source and target concepts, but only the target concept. So if the metaphor is not acknowledged in the other language a literal translation completely often misses the point. As for live metaphors, they need to call up both concepts and provided the mappings exist in both cultures, they will be directly translatable.

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Online Tools

LSA demo site: http://lsa.colorado.edu
Prosody analysis tool: http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat/

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REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS CULTURALES DE LA UNIVERSITAT JAUME I / *CULTURAL STUDIES JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITAT JAUME I*

What Do Learners Need to Know about the Figurative Extensions of Target Language Words? A Contrastive, Corpus-Based Analysis of *Thread*, *Hilar*, W*ing* and *Aletear*

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ABSTRACT: This article provides a detailed analysis based on corpus evidence of the multiple senses of the English verbs *thread* and *wing* and the Spanish verbs *hilar* and *aletear*. Although these verbs derive from nouns with similar or identical referential content, the figurative extensions of their basic meanings are quite different and can be seen to constitute more than one single continuum of senses. Rather, different branches or strands of figuratively related senses can be discerned, with major shifts in meaning often being associated with particular phraseological or grammatical patterns. The findings of this contrastive analysis are discussed in relation to the learning of the semantic potential of target language words in foreign language learning.

Keywords: polysemy, figurative extension, contrastive analysis, FLL.

RESUMEN: En este artículo, presentamos un análisis detallado de los varios sentidos traslaticios de los verbos ingleses *thread* y *wing* y los verbos *hilar* y *aletear* en español. Aunque estos verbos surgen de unos sustantivos que comparten un mismo significado, o un significado parecido, sus extensiones semánticas son muy distintas y guardan una relación muy distinta entre ellas. En el caso de cada verbo, es posible identificar más de una rama de sentidos que se relacionan entre sí, y su uso en el corpus permite discernir que los cambios de significado suelen ir acompañados de otros cambios gramaticales. Los resultados de este análisis contrastivo permiten señalar algunas de las dificultades que supone para el aprendizaje de una lengua extranjera la flexibilidad semántica de las palabras.

Palabras clave: polisemia, extensión figurativa, análisis contrastivo, aprendizaje de lenguas extranjeras.

1. Introduction

It has long been recognised that for foreign language learners the mastery of a limited number of words is often sufficient to meet most of their communicative needs. Because the high-frequency words in any language also tend to be highly polysemous, the same word can be used to refer to very different things, which means that a grasp of the extended meaning potential of the words s/he knows, along with an awareness of their different phraseological patterns, will enable the learner to expand the range of topics s/he can talk about (Littlemore; Low, 2006).

Among the most regular principles motivating meaning extension are metaphor and metonymy (Taylor, 2003). In all languages, words can figuratively extend their meanings, although the figurative extensions of a term in one language may not be possible for the equivalent word in another. For example, the English noun *thread* and the Spanish noun *hilo* share a basic sense (length of spun material for use in sewing or weaving), as well as some figurative extensions: both can be used to denote a long thin line of liquid, light or colour or the linking element or common idea in a story, argument or situation (for example, 'nunca pierde el hilo de la conversación' or 'the thread running through many of these proposals was the theme of individual power and opportunity'). However, in English the word can also be used to describe the raised spiral line on a screw or lid which allows it to be fixed in place by twisting, a sense that is not possible for Spanish *hilo*, which can, in contrast, refer to wires (*hilo telefónico*), the quality of a voice (*un hilo de voz*) or influence (*mover los hilos*), among other things.

This may present a problem for language learners as they will not necessarily know which figurative extensions are permitted in the target language. They may transfer inappropriate extensions from their own language, or they may be over-cautious and not transfer any extensions to the L2. A further problem for the language learner is that these figurative extensions are likely to be associated with particular phraseological patterns (Deignan, 2005), as would be the case of *hilo conductor/argumental* or *hilo de voz*, for instance. Thus, the foreign language learner will need not only to recognise the sense of different uses of *hilo* or *thread*, but also become familiar with the phraseology associated with them, and be aware of the fact that the phraseology contributes in an important way to the overall meaning.

Native speakers of Spanish and English presumably build up knowledge of the semantic extension potential of the words in their language through encountering them used in multiple discourse situations. Frequent, meaningful and varied types of communicative interaction throughout life provide rich input that foreign language learners usually do not have, and which may prevent them from developing full appreciation of the referential flexibility as well as the fixedness of the target language words and expressions that they know. In the absence of such rich and varied input, teachers and material designers must seek ways to help learners develop sensitivity to – if not mastery of– these two aspects of language use.

In earlier work (MacArthur; Littlemore, 2008), we investigated whether direct contact with the data contained in language corpora might be useful in helping learners cope with these two types of difficulty (i.e. referential flexibility and fixedness of expression), working with the hypothesis that corpora can provide the learner with useful

information not only about usage but also about phraseological patterning. A large electronic language corpus can be used to isolate a large number of usage events involving polysemous words, providing learners with the kind of information gained by native speakers over a long period of time in their daily contact with the language. We were particularly interested in how learners made use of the senses they would come across, which we related to Dirven's (2002) notion of a 'figurative continuum'. According to Dirven, word senses may be usefully regarded as being located on a continuum stretching from purely literal senses, through metonymic senses, to metaphorical ones. So, for example, when looking at uses of the denominal verb *shoulder* in the BNC, the Spanish learners of English who participated in the study encountered the verb used to mean 'carry', as in 'sometimes Andrew had been so drunk that Iain had **shouldered** him all the way home' as well as metaphorical uses like 'she **shouldered** the blame for what the media gleefully called: 'Malice at the Palace''. Although this second use of *shoulder* might prove somewhat opaque to the non-native speaker in another context, when encountered alongside other related senses of the verb in the corpus lines, learners in our study had little difficulty in understanding it, and also appreciated its figurative entailments. That is, they appeared to be using the continuum of senses as they worked with the data, using one sense they understood to help them work out the meaning of another. How they did this, however, or the 'core' or 'enabling' sense that they identified was not predictable from our analysis of their behaviour in class. Nor was it predictable from basic frequency measures in the corpus or our intuitions that one sense would be more transparent than another. Moreover, it was impossible to map the senses of the words we explored along a single continuum, and they seemed to fit more naturally into a type of 'tree' diagram with different 'branches' emanating from the same basic sense(s) (See Figures 1-4 for an illustration). For example, *shoulder* was also found in the corpus with the metonymic meaning of 'use the shoulder to move something out of the way', as in 'Erlich **shouldered** his way through the crowd and went after her', as well as a more metaphorical usage in sentences such as 'I mean, I'd really like to, but I've already been **shouldered** out of the nativity play', the latter two senses being related to each other but somewhat different from the 'carry' senses. Where such major breaks in senses occurred, learners in our study had considerable difficulty in assigning a meaning to the new sense(s) encountered. One pedagogical implication that can be derived from this is that if learners are likely to overlook or misunderstand some of the senses encountered in a corpus, a purely data-driven or discovery approach to figurative language is unlikely to be fully effective in foreign language learning. Rather, some manipulation of the data by teachers or material designers might be desirable. And our preliminary findings on the corpus data suggested that this could be done by manipulating the forms of the words and phrases used as search items, because major shifts in meaning seemed to be accompanied by major shifts in grammatical patterns.

The findings from our study raised four interesting further research questions: is it more appropriate to think of the relationships between the figurative extensions of word meaning in terms of a continuum, or of a tree diagram? To what extent do figurative extension patterns in Spanish match those in English? Are major shifts in sense accompanied by marked changes in phraseology in either or both languages? And do any

frequent patterns occur that would be worth pointing out to language learners? In order to address these research questions, we conducted an in-depth, comparative corpus study of two items in English (*to thread* and *to wing*) and their Spanish equivalents (*hilar* and *aletear*). We chose to focus on denominal verbs as these are most often characterised by metaphorical and metonymic meaning extension processes. In this paper, we present our analysis of these denominal verbs, and describe the senses we identified, setting these out schematically as tree diagrams. The major sense shifts are recorded as different branches on the tree; the increasingly figurative senses of each branch visualised as points on the branch increasingly distant from the basic sense of each verb. In our description, we pay particular attention to frequency of senses as well as correlations between form and meaning. Our findings support those of Hunston; Francis (2000), indicating that grammar can convey at least as much information as lexis in figurative language use, and that it is inappropriate to separate the two. We discuss the possible pedagogical implications of this type of corpus analysis for the teaching/learning of figurative language.

2. Word Searches in Two Different Corpora

Figurative uses of words can vary quite considerably in English and Spanish, depending on where the language is spoken. In order to accurately identify the senses most commonly associated with the words in a particular language-speaking community, we decided to restrict our study to data taken from European sources (British English and Peninsular Spanish respectively).

In order to investigate the figurative extensions of *thread* and *wing* in English, the UK sub-corpora of the Bank of English were used. Together, these constitute a corpus of 321 million words (the entire Bank of English contains 450 million words) of literature, journalism, radio recordings, naturally occurring spoken English, and ephemera. The Bank of English is a tagged corpus, which makes it possible to search for specific word types. Searches were conducted for *thread* (as a verb); *threading*; *threaded*; *wing* (as a verb); *winging*; and *winged*. The following sections contain an analysis of the findings for these.

The CREA (*Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual*) was used to explore figurative extensions of all forms of *hilar* and *aletear*. This corpus contains over 150 million words, half of which are taken from Latin American sources, the other half Spanish. When searching for these words as used in Spain, then, the total number of words in this sub-corpus (about 75 million) is considerably smaller than that available in the Bank of English. The description of these two Spanish verbs is therefore not as accurate, detailed or revealing as that of *thread* and *wing*, given that generalisations about their use is based on much more meagre data than those available for the English words. This made it difficult, for example, to make any remarks on correlations between forms and senses in the case of *aletear*, as the number of tokens of the verb was too small to allow any accurate description of this kind. Thus, the analysis of these two verbs in Spanish is only tentative and serves more as a background to the analysis of the English verbs in order to provide some idea of the differences and similarities between their semantic extensions.

3.1. Thread

The diagram shown in Figure 1 shows the distribution of senses of *thread* used as a verb in the Bank of English. For the sake of brevity, all forms of the verb are included (i.e. *thread*; *threading*; *threaded*). Any particularly interesting variations according to verb form are noted. The most productive sense of *thread* in its basic form is the transitive sense of threading cotton, or a similar substance, through a needle:

BRANCH 1

SENSE 1

THREAD + noun phrase (NP) + *through* (Example: *Easy to **thread** the detonator cord through*))

Figurative extensions of sense 1 also carry some sort of transitivity (e.g. *thread the ball across to*). The first category of uses involves a metaphoric transfer from cotton and thread to objects that one might not at first sight associated with threading:

SENSE 2

THREAD + NP + preposition (Example: *and went on to **thread** a super ball through to Coyle*)

Presumably the threading here relates to the type of movement the ball is making; i.e. winding along a trajectory, presumably through a group of opponent players. Many of the examples in the corpus resemble this one in that they come from football commentaries, which could reflect the fact that the Bank of English is heavily weighted towards sports journalism.

In order to get to the next sense, another figurative transformation takes place where the notion of ball is metonymically transferred to the shot that caused the ball to be 'threaded':

SENSE 3

THREAD + NP + preposition (Example: *Kanu's 51st-minute pass to **thread** a low shot under Matthias Asper*)

Similarly, sense 2 can also be metonymically transferred to the sense 4, which refers to the path that is left by the thing or the person doing the threading:

SENSE 4

THREAD + NP (Example: *200 yards away and Woods had to **thread** a path through several large trees*)

Sense 4 has a sub-cluster of senses, which take on a reflexive feel. This is a very productive cluster, particularly in the v-ing verb form. The cluster also exhibits significantly more fixedness than the other senses. One reason for this may be to do with the fact that reflexive uses of thread are non-existent in the basic sense (cotton rarely, if ever, threads itself through a needle!). The fixedness of the expressions may thus be serving as a signal to the reader or hearer that a figurative sense is intended and pre-empting surprise at the incongruity of the idea in a more literal sense (Deignan, 2005). The following illustrate some of these reflexive uses.

The first reflexive use was in fact one of the most common in the corpus, and also the one with the most fixed phraseology:

SENSE 5

THREAD + POSSESSIVE + *way through* (Example: *John Carroll had to* ***thread*** *his way through a field*)

There were many expressions of this type, which is interesting as it corresponds to Sinclair *et al*. (1996: 353) verb pattern '… its way through'. According to Sinclair et al, there are twelve verbs that form this pattern: *dodge*; *ease*; *edge*; *feel*; *grope*; *inch*; *manoeuvre*; *navigate*; *nose*; *pick*; *prize*; *sidestep*; *squeeze*; *steer*; *thread*; *twist*; and *weave*. All of these verbs are apparently 'concerned with moving carefully or avoiding obstacles, either physically or metaphorically' (Sinclair *et al.,* 1996: 353). They go on to say that, of this group, *feel*, *pick* and *thread* exhibit this pattern most frequently. The high frequency of this pattern suggests that it would be well worth pointing out to learners of English.

This sense was also metaphorically extended to fictive motion (see Talmy, 2000), where the agent is not actually doing any moving, but a more 'literal' interpretation of the language would suggest it was:

SENSE 6

NP + THREAD + POSSESSIVE + *way through* (Example: *The river* ***threaded*** *its way through the hills*)

In order to understand 'fictive' motion we have to see the agent both as moving and as stationery. Again, the relative fixedness of the phraseology may be due in part the fact that the meaning here is somewhat removed from anything that is possible in the literal context. Finally, there was one example of abstract fictive motion:

SENSE 7

NP + THREAD + POSSESSIVE + *way through* (Abstract, fictive motion) (Example: *Slavery* ***threaded*** *its way as an issue, a concern, and eventually a threatening problem through the fabric of American democracy*.)

It is interesting to note that when we have these highly creative, abstract extensions of the basic sense, there are rarely more than one or two examples. Sense 2 can also be metaphorically transformed into sense 8, where the motion is curvy, but not necessarily curvy in the same way as thread going through a needle is curvy:

SENSE 8

THREAD + NP + preposition (Example: *But in the end," she says,* ***threading*** *her fingers round Shayler's*)

Finally, in sense 9, the most 'figurative' of all the senses in this first branch, the threading is entirely abstract and refers to intangible phenomena. Here we have examples of things being threaded together, which is somewhat removed from the basic sense of *thread*:

SENSE 9

THREAD + NP + together (Examples: He *manages to thread his ideas together*/*Threading two words together*)

In the middle of the diagram, we have inserted a dummy sense of '*thread through*', where the cotton acquires agency. Although no evidence was found for this basic sense in the corpus, a number of figurative derivations of it were found. This is interesting as it suggests that figurative continua may be complex phenomena, containing 'missing values'.

BRANCH 2

DUMMY SENSE

The cotton threads through the needle (no instances found)

The first figurative extension of this dummy sense is where a person threads through something:

SENSE 10

THREAD + preposition + NP (Example: *He felt as if he were **threading** through a minefield*)

This can be applied to fictive motion:

SENSE 11

THREAD + preposition + NP (fictive motion) (Example: *the St Agnes coast path, **threading** through an expanse of heath to*)

It can also be applied to abstract contexts:

SENSE 12

THREAD + preposition + NP (Example: *accounts interweave, and **threading** through both is the painful tale*)

The other basic sense of *thread* (*thread the needle*) is sense 13:

BRANCH 3

SENSE 13

THREAD + NP (Example: *it looked like someone trying to **thread** a needle at 300mph*)

This sense produces very few figurative uses. Only ten were found in the entire corpus, and were evenly spread across *thread*, *threading* and *threaded*. Of these, nine were relatively tangible:

SENSE 14

THREAD + NP (Example: *His pilgrimage to **thread** the Milky Way*)

There was only one abstract extension of this use of *thread*:

SENSE 15

THREAD + NP + preposition (Example: *Threading the nostalgia with reflections on…*)

But there were a number of passive constructions of thread with this meaning, such as: *The novel is **threaded** with the effects of slavery* or ***threaded** into the book is the sense that….*

These are interesting as they show a certain parallelism between abstract senses and passive forms.

Not all word forms followed the same pattern as that followed by the basic sense. *Thread* as a verb produced 251 hits;[1] *threading* produced 189 hits, *to thread* produced 41

1. The grammatical tagging in the Bank of English is only 90% accurate so this figure needs to be treated with caution.

hits, and *threaded* produced 512 hits. The different forms of the words exhibited different collocation patterns. As Hunston and Francis (2000) predict, it was the collocations to the right that told us the most about the different senses of the words. *Threading* and *threaded* produced the most fixed expression and transitive uses. For *thread*/VERB, *thread a/its /their way through* constituted the most frequent pattern. The higher proportion of collocations such as these suggests that figurative uses of this verb may be more common than uses in its basic sense, strengthening the above assertion that the pattern is worth teaching to learners of English, and that it is worth informing them of the fact that it indicates figurative usage.

Collocations to the right of *threaded* were somewhat similar to those of *thread* (VERB*)*. Again, we identified a *threaded a way through* pattern, but we also had a larger number of prepositions besides through (*between*, *down*, *past*).

Interestingly, *threading* followed a slightly different pattern from both *thread* (VERB*)* and *threaded*. It appeared to trigger the fixed phrase *threading his/her/their etc, way through* far more frequently than the other forms of *thread*. This could be because it is describing current action. It also predicted the pattern: *threading through X is*…, which is often associated with literary and/or abstract contexts.



Figure 1: Senses of **THREAD**

3.2. Hilar

The nouns *thread* and *hilo* share a basic sense, but the verbs *thread* and *hilar* do not. Neverthless, there exists some overlap in their figurative senses (which may facilitate comprehension of these for Spanish leaners of English and English-speaking learners of

Spanish), although the way these particular figurative extensions can be related to other uses of the verbs in each language is quite different, as a quick glance at Figures 1 and 2 shows. The extension patterns of *hilar* appear much more straightforward than those of *thread*, particularly in the case of the most 'productive' branch (branch 3).

Figure 2 offers a schematic representation of the different senses of *hilar* identified in the 179 tokens of the verb found in a word search of the CREA for all forms. As can be seen from the diagram, three 'branches' or extensions of meaning have been identified as arising from the basic sense of the verb.



Figure 2: Senses of HILAR

BASIC SENSE

SENSE 1

The basic sense of *hilar* is glossed by the *DRAE* as '*reducir a hilo el lino, cáñamo, lana, seda, algodón, etc*.', a definition very similar to that of Seco *et al*. (1999): '*transformar en hilo [una fibra textil]*'. That is, the verb means to spin or make thread, a centuries-old activity which may be carried out with or without the help of artefacts or machines. 28% of the CREA entries for HILAR illustrate this first sense:

la lana se llevaba a lavar al río y luego se ***hilaba*** *en la rueca para hacer calcetines y otras prendas*

68% of tokens of the verb used in the sense of 'spin' in the CREA denote on-going activity through the imperfect tense (*hilaba/n*) as in 1, but the sense is also found realised by non-finite forms (infinitive and participles):

allí, en fin, se sentaba la esposa, **hilando** la lana en medio de sus mujeres.

BRANCH 1

SENSE 2

HILAR + *fino/delgado*

Salient in the semantics of the idioms *hilar fino/delgado* is the notion of an action carried out by a human subject with great care and subtlety, no doubt motivated by the skill and care taken by the craftsman in spinning thread. For contemporary speakers, however, the meaning relatedness of these two senses of *hilar* might constitute a major associative leap, more accustomed to machine-aided processes of making thread where the skill of the person is not a central component. Interestingly, 55.8% of the instances of *hilar fino/delgado* found in the corpus are realised by the infinitive, and none by the imperfect, as in these examples:

*una excelente ocasión para intentar **hilar algo más fino** sobre el Big Ensemble TM.*
*por esta corriente ideológica van a tener que **hilar muy fino** para decidir a qué aguas quedarse*

As can be appreciated in these citations, *fino* is subject to modification, being realised by *más fino, del todo fino, muy fino, finísimo, tan fino, algo más fino, por lo fino* and *muy finamente*, a trend also present with *hilar delgado*. The realisation with *delgado* appears to relatively infrequent in contemporary Spanish, only accounting for 14% of the instantiations of the sense of 'do something with great care':

*eso obliga a los periodistas que trabajan en él a **hilar más delgado todavía** a la hora de evaluar cómo*

A not inconsiderable number of uses of *hilar fino/delgado* (34.8%) are realised by present simple (*hila/n*):

*Octavio Paz, que en estas cuestiones **hila muy delgado**, ha visto que la consecuencia de*

For the learner of Spanish as a foreign language, however, it might be useful to encounter the idiom in contexts where the node is realised by the infinitive, because the preceding linguistic context can provide important clues to the positive assessment of the expression. Of the 43 infinitive realisations of *hilar fino/delgado*, 12 are preceded by verbs expressing obligation (*tener que/hay que/obligar a*), while other cases similarly show that it is desirable for speakers that they should know how to be subtle or careful in their doings:

*Un teatro público tiene que **hilar más fino***
*Los pilotos tuvieron que aprender a **hilar finísimo** con el combustible*
*En ocasiones cae en simplificaciones. Pero sabe **hilar más fino** en este azoriniano tapiz de ingenios*

Given that an important aspect of figurative language use is its axiology, the corpus can provide learners with relevant information about this aspect of usage. If, in a

case such as this, a particular meaning appears to correlate with a particular form, examination of corpora can help language teachers and material designers locate and isolate those instances which might prove most helpful to learners in understanding not only what such figurative uses mean but also what evaluation is implied in their use. This is of particular importance if learners have consulted a bilingual dictionary such as the *Oxford Bilingual Dictionary* (1994) which translates *hilar fino/delgado* as 'split hairs'. Apart from the fact that this expression does not accurately translate the sense of the Spanish expression, the English idiom implies unnecessary and unwanted attention to detail, a negative evaluation absent in *hilar fino/delgado*.

BRANCH 2

SENSE 3

A sense closely related to the 'making thread' sense is the use of the past participle to describe the 'thread-like' appearance of substances which cannot properly be said to have been spun. This use is particularly associated with foodstuffs or confectionary (*huevo/azúcar/higo hilado)* but also with other substances such as wax or glass.

BRANCH 3

SENSE 4

The third 'strand' of figurative extensions of *hilar* appears to stem not from the 'spinning' semantics of the verb, but rather from the sense of 'weave'. Although cited as rare by dictionaries, and found to be rare in the CREA, the verb can also be used to refer metonymically to the product of spinning, namely the thread. An example such as the following shows how the process of spinning and weaving are expressed as separate processes:

Primero ***hilaba*** *esta lana, después tejía esta tela*

However, the two steps may be fused, as in the following examples:

donde se ***hilaban*** *y tejían las ropas de los habitantes* or *vestía pardo de estameña,* ***hilado****, según se dijo, por sus propias manos*

That is, transitive uses of *hilar* may be followed by direct objects like *lana* or *lino* or by NPs realising the product of the thread once woven into cloth.

SENSE 5

Focus on the product (the thread) and its linking or joining function motivates figurative uses of the verb with quite different targets; common to all, however, is the notion of joining together. Altogether, this linking sense accounts for 41% of uses of *hilar* found in the corpus, although, as will be seen, it is used to talk about particular topics more frequently than others.

Hilar is used to refer to the connection between actions or events occurring one after another, and in the CREA is particularly associated with descriptions of football matches. It is thus used in the same discourse contexts as senses 2 and 3 of English *thread* :

*su incapacidad de **hilar** jugadas que llevasen algún peligro sobre la meta*

SENSE 6

Used transitively, *hilar* is also found with words denoting destiny or fate as Subject:

*una singular fata que **hila** el sino lastrado*

SENSE 7

Closely related to sense 2 above is *hilar* followed by words such as *argumento* or *trama*. That is, the verb denotes the linking of events, but in this case fictional ones, and thus overlaps with sense 12 of English *thread*. This sense is also associated with Latin *filare*, from which the Spanish verb developed, and accounts for a total of 25 tokens (or 20%) of figurative uses of *hilar* in the CREA:

s*e encuentra con una narración tan bien **hilada** y tan bien narrada*

SENSE 8

Hilar is used figuratively to describe the linking of words or larger units of discourse, as in the following example:

*Gabry decía tacos para **hilar** frases que nada decían*

SENSE 9

14.5% of the tokens of *hilar* were used to denote the linking of thoughts and ideas, realised by nouns such as *teoría* or *ideas*.

*razonaban con torpeza, incapaces de **hilar** correctamente un pensamiento*

This example is again illustrative of the positive connotations of *hilar*: coherence, whether of speech, ideas or elements of plot are highlighted in these uses of the verb.

SENSE 10

Closely related to sense 6 is the use of *hilar* to signify 'infer', but in this case the verb can be used transitively or intransitively:

*La gente está **hilando** la separación con un romance con Melanie Griffith nada es lo que parece.*
*Y sólo **hilando** en el filo de lo sutil puede uno ir descubriendo*

3.3. Wing



Figure 3: Senses of WING

There were far fewer instances of *wing* than there were of *thread*, and the pattern of figurative extensions was much more straightforward. Like *thread*, figurative extensions of *wing* also divide into transitive and reflexive/intransitive senses. Unlike *thread*, transitive uses are relatively rare. This is likely to be because of the lack of parallelism with the basic sense. Although things can be threaded, things are very rarely 'winged' in the real world, and when they are, *winged* is usually operating as an adjective (*a winged creature*). In the first sense, *wing* + noun, wing is metonymically extended to refer to flying, or being transported quickly:

SENSE 1

WING + NP + preposition (Example: *imagine the smoke and flames* ***winging*** *the message to him*)

This can be metaphorically extended to form the fairly fixed, reflexive phrase *wing its way*:

SENSE 2

WING + POSSESSIVE + *way* + preposition (Example: *a heartfelt good luck message* ***winging*** *its way from New Zealand*)

This is similar to *thread*, but the other stages that *thread* passes through in order to get here were apparently absent.

The other main sense was *wing* with a preposition:

SENSE 3

WING + preposition (Example: *send their tickets* ***winging*** *back to Britain*)

Sense 3 can be extended to abstract contexts:

SENSE 4

WING + preposition (Examples: *The trumpet comes* ***winging*** *through*; *Each word* ***winging*** *across the stage*)

Interestingly, this sense occurred more often with *winging* than with *wing* or *winged*. It was thus more common in the present continuous.

The other figurative extension was to '*wing it*', which was a fairly fixed grammatical pattern. Again, this could be being used to mark figurative use and avoid confusion.

SENSE 5

WING + it + preposition (Example: ***Wing*** *it over the trenches*)

It strikes us that this might be a particularly difficult construction for language learners. It is not clear what the 'it' stands for, if anything, and to the best of our knowledge, this dummy pronoun is not present in other languages. It would be worth drawing attention to in the language classroom.

This sense is then figuratively extended to mean 'to improvise/do one's best with inadequate training or experience':

SENSE 6

WING + it (Example: ***Winging*** *it is more realistic*)

Finally, there was another sense, which does not appear to be metaphorically or metonymically related to any of the other senses:

SENSE 7

WING + NP (Example: ***Wing*** *a year's subscription*)

When *wing* is used in this sense, it acquires a sense of freeloading or cheating. There was, however, only one example of this in the entire corpus.

In total, *wing*/VERB produced 56 hits, and *winged*/VERB produced 70 hits; and *winging*/VERB produced 171 hits. The collocation patterns for *wing* and *winged* resembled each other, but those for *winging* were somewhat different. The collocations of *wing*/VERB in the Bank of English show that *wing it* is the most frequent expression. As with *thread*, it was the collocations to the right that told us the most interesting things. They showed that *wing it* and *wing* + preposition were the most frequent forms and senses. After this, there was the series of *wing its/their* etc. *way*.

The collocations for *winged*/VERB were fairly similar to those of *wing*/VERB. Again, the most frequent expression was *wing it*, but unlike with *wing*, this was immediately followed by *wing its way*.

Interestingly, *winging* had a slightly different collocation pattern from both *wing* and *winged*. *Winging its way* was much more significant than other collocations. This is interesting as with *thread*, it was also the v-ing form that exhibited the most unique pattern of senses. It would be worth investigating the generalisability of this phenomenon, as it is likely to have important language teaching implications.

3.4. Aletear



Figure 4: Senses of ALETEAR

Aletear derives from *aleta* ('fin') and thus at first sight appears to bear little relation semantically to English *to wing*. However, the nouns from which both verbs derive denote those limbs on animals that enable locomotion; the medium in which this movement takes place may be different (water and air, respectively) but, as will be seen, movement in or of the air is prominent in the semantics of a number of figurative extensions of *aletear*. That is, although the verb can be used to refer to the movement of fins or flippers, it is most commonly employed to refer to the movement of the wings (whether of a bird or other winged animal). Indeed, this is the core (or first) sense identified both by the DRAE (2001) and Seco *et al*. (1999). Of the 113 tokens of ALETEAR found in the CREA, 41 (or 36%) are used in this sense:

Le despertó, tres horas más tarde, el ***aletear*** *de los primeros buitres.*

The DRAE (2001) notes in its gloss of this sense that the movement of the wings does not necessarily imply that the bird (or other animal) is actually in the air: 'mover frecuentemente las alas sin echar a volar'. However, this lack of movement in the air is not associated with all the corpus uses of the verb:

estábamos mirando una paloma que ***aleteaba*** *inmóvil sobre la fuente de la plaza*

If *aletear* did not imply some kind of airborne movement, the use of '*inmóvil*' would be redundant in this case. Indeed, as will be seen below, frequent collocates to the right of the verb are locational adverbial expressions which situate the bird, butterfly or other winged creature in the air. However, the verb appears to belong to the group that Morimoto (2001: 43-60) classifies as VMMS-I (verbs that denote an 'internal' manner of

movement) or verbs whose semantics highlight a type of movement that does not lend itself to uses in which there is displacement of the Subject to a particular location.

The corpus citations of ALETEAR reveal that this is a verb that readily lends itself to figurative use. It is often found used in similes and metaphors:

tenso, pálido, demacrado, como si en su corazón ***aleteara*** *el ave negra del temor*
Las instancias ***aleteaban*** *en el cuchitril como palomas mensajeras*

In the description that follows, the semantic extensions of *aletear* have been divided, not uncontroversially, into three groups or branches.

BRANCH 1

SENSE 2

This branch consists of the verb used to describe the movement of flippers or fins in the water. This could be seen as the core sense, but in the CREA no uses were found to describe the movement of fish; rather, it is used to describe the movement of a diver's flippers, as in the example below:

una acción nociva muy común en los buceadores inexpertos o insensibles es el levantamiento de sedimientos del fondo cuando ***aletean***

BRANCH 2

SENSE 3

This branch of *aletear* focuses on the movement of humans. The first sense describes the movement of the whole body with no mention of a particular body part:

una criatura inteligente que ***aleteaba*** *y que latía y que parecía comprender su situación*

This sense does not appear to be particularly frequent, as only three uses were found in the corpus (all used to describe a woman).

SENSE 4

More frequently, *aletear* figuratively extends its meaning from describing the movement of a bird's wings to describing the movement of the arms, which may resemble the wings when flapped:

los codos ***aleteando*** *como si fuéramos cluecas a punto de poner*

However, it is also used to describe finer motor movement of different parts of the body, such as lips, hands or eye lids:

sobre la que ***aletean*** *asustadas las larguísimas pestañas de oro en cuanto su nariz respingó* ***aleteante****, mostrando los pelos de sus fosas*

BRANCH 3

SENSE 5

Here, *aletear* denotes the fluttering movement of some material, such as the leaves of a book, curtains or leaves. Although movement is still highlighted with this sense, the Subject is not agent of the movement.

contemplaba el bosque de mástiles y banderines ***aleteando*** *en la dársena del puerto*

SENSE 6

A number of tokens of *aletear* were found to denote the movement of air:

El aliento de la calle ***aleteaba*** *en las cortinas*
Ese soplo que ***aletea*** *entre los labios*

As can be appreciated in this last example, the movement of air may be literally or metaphorically breath expelled through the mouth. This use has Biblical echoes, for in Genesis I, 2, this is the verb used to describe God moving the waters. Rewordings of the famous lines are found in the CREA:

Cuando el viento de Dios vuelva a ***aletear*** *sobre la superficie de las aguas*

SENSE 7

The Subject of the verb *aletear* may be a thought or emotion. In these cases, the verb refers to an unspecified subject's vague apprehension of this.

En Albacete ***aletea*** *un acusado sentimiento de frustración*
Cuando ***aleteaba*** *todavía la esperanza en su corazón*

SENSE 8

Closely related to sense 3 is the use of *aletear* to denote the apprehension of danger or threat.

Calculaba el peligro de descomposición que ***aleteaba*** *sobre la monarquía tras la alianza de 1699*
Las crisis de subsistencia ***aleteando*** *de nuevo*

The collocation of *aletear* with nouns with negative connotations is curious, given that sense 2 is associated with the benign intervention of the deity. The close relationship of awe or admiration and fear may explain why the semantic prosody of this verb may change so radically in different contexts.

Certain patterns were discernible to the right of the verb. Given that motion is salient in the semantics of the verb (whether used literally or figuratively), it was not surprising to find that *aletear* is often followed by a preposition. These were most frequently the prepositions *en, sobre* and *por,* none of which describe the path of the

trajector to a landmark, thus placing this verb among the group of Spanish verbs that Morimoto (2001) calls VMMS-IS.

4. Implications for Teaching

As has been seen, although there is some overlap between them, the figurative extensions of these verbs are very different in English and Spanish, although the nouns from which they derive denote a similar entity (*wing/aleta*) or the same one (*thread/hilo*). In the case of all four verbs, we have noted that figurative senses cannot be located along one single continuum, but that major shifts in meaning can be discerned, and that these separate meaning branches may or may not be associated with a range of figurative senses. Where such a figurative continuum exists, learners may benefit from exploring corpus examples which reflect these related senses and the patterns associated with them. For example, manner of movement is a salient aspect of figurative uses of *thread*, while *hilar* is associated with linking or joining.

Furthermore, as we developed the classification technique, it became apparent that the different senses of these verbs were often associated with particular grammatical patterns (transitive/intransitive, finite/non-finite verb forms, and so on), which seems to indicate that the learning of figurative uses of words cannot be separated from the learning of their grammatical behaviour. As Hunston; Francis (2000) point out, words acquire meaning through their grammar patterns. Perhaps the clearest example of this, in the case of the verbs explored here, is *thread* as it occurs in the *way* construction. Although verbs like this followed by possessive + *way* have received a great deal of attention (for example, Goldberg [1996] or Jackendoff [1990]), from a pedagogical point of view its occurrence in modern English as one realisation of *thread* expressing a manner of motion may be greatly facilitate learning of the various uses of this verb to refer both to fictive and factive motion. As Israel points out (1996: 221), from a historical point of view, the occurrence of a verb such as this in the *way* construction marks its shift of meaning to denote a manner of movement denoting path creation; but, as has been seen, it can also be used to refer to careful movement without *way*, and is found in the corpus followed also by *path*. Focussing on the use of this particular construction might facilitate learners' understanding of *thread* in other patterns to refer to a particular type of movement. This will be important for learners whose mother tongue is typologically different from English (as is the case of Spanish learners of English) in this regard, and may complement other pedagogical proposals for teaching/learning manner of movement verbs in English (for example, the use of Total Physical Response activities to trigger motor imagery [Lindstromberg; Boers, 2005]).

Likewise, for learners of Spanish whose mother tongue is English, it may be helpful in exploring the corpus to focus on the prepositions that follow the Spanish verb *aletear*, which expresses manner of movement but occurs in very different patterns from similar verbs in English. In terms of pedagogy, it is unrealistic to suggest that learners conduct this kind of detailed study for themselves for every word they encounter, but it may be useful for them to be exposed to one or diagrams of the type shown in this article, for a couple of words in their own and the target language. This would alert them to the types

of similarities and differences that exist between languages and to the importance of phraseology in determining meaning. With advanced language learners who are majoring in the foreign language, or who are planning to teach languages themselves at some point, it may be a valuable exercise to have them make comparative corpus studies of their own as this would sensitise them to the figurative nature of polysemy, as well as making them aware of the potential and limitations of transfer as a communication strategy, and of corpora as a materials development tool.

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The Rhetorical Dimension of Printed Advertising: a Discourse-Analytical Approach

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ABSTRACT: The study of the rhetorical uses of language in advertising can be approached from different disciplines –discourse analysis, media studies, metaphor theory–. Although normally focusing on different aspects according to their objects of study, these fields share two basic assumptions: 1. the recognition that all advertising is clearly rhetorical; 2. the observation that metaphor is a frequent device in this genre (Williamson, 1978; Fiske, 1982; Vestergaard; Schroeder, 1985; Chandler, 1994; Forceville, 1996, 2006; Cook, 2001). Taking this into consideration, this paper attempts to provide a hierarchical top-down model of analysis as a means to examine the rhetorical dimension of printed commercial adverts. For this purpose, I adopt some theoretical and methodological analytical tools provided by discourse analysis and social semiotics, and incorporate elements from advertising studies and metaphor theory. Special attention is paid to studies on visual rhetoric and to representations of one specific trope, metaphor.

Keywords: rhetoric, advertising, discourse analysis, verbal and visual language, metaphor.

RESUMEN: La aproximación al estudio de los usos retóricos del lenguaje en publicidad puede hacerse desde diversas disciplinas (análisis del discurso, estudios de medios de comunicación, teoría de la metáfora). Si bien suelen centrar su interés en aspectos diferentes de acuerdo a sus objetos de estudio, estos campos comparten dos supuestos básicos: 1. el reconocimiento de que todo el discurso publicitario es claramente retórico; 2. la observación de la metáfora como un recurso frecuente en este género (Williamson, 1978; Fiske, 1982; Vestergaard; Schroeder, 1985; Chandler, 1994; Forceville, 1996, 2006; Cook, 2001). Teniendo esto en consideración, el objetivo de este artículo es proporcionar un modelo de análisis jerárquico y verticalista que permita examinar la dimensión retórica de anuncios comerciales impresos. Con este fin el estudio adopta algunas herramientas teóricas y metodológicas proporcionadas por el análisis del discurso y la semiótica social, e incorpora elementos de los estudios de publicidad y la teoría de la metáfora, prestando especial atención a los estudios de retórica visual y las representaciones de un tropo en particular, la metáfora.

Palabras clave: retórica, publicidad, análisis del discurso, lenguaje verbal y visual, metáfora.

1. Introduction

Rhetoric is persuasive discourse, all discourses are unavoidably rhetorical, and advertising is a highly rhetorical discourse in many specific ways. Taking this into account, the present study aims at providing a method to read and interpret the words and images of printed advertisements at the rhetorical dimension of discourse (in this occasion I restrict myself to this type of texts, excluding others such as TV commercials, since their analysis would bring in music and sound as well).

By considering discourse analysis as an essential preliminary to deal with this subject, I herein adopt a model developed by applied linguistics and discourse analysis, and combine it with social semiotics. I opt for this approach as it is multidisciplinary, not only because of the methodology it employs but also because of its objects of study, that is texts. These often belong to two or more media and consist of diverse genres expressed through different semiotic codes – commonly called multi-modality.

Nevertheless, detailed analyses of the rhetorical uses of the verbal and visual modes of advertising have not been carried out; therefore, I look at other fields which have dealt with the subject, mainly advertising theory and pictorial and multimodal approaches to metaphor.

The framework I present is thus oriented towards the construction of a model that is clearly integrative, since some of the problems encountered in one field of study can find an explanation in another related field. Ultimately, this model – which I use in a course I teach on English Advertising Studies – can also be useful to students and researchers in the fields of discourse analysis and metaphor studies.

2. The Rhetorical Dimension of Discourse

Because of its origins, discourse analysis is closely related to classical rhetoric, which was concerned with how to do things with words, to achieve effects, and communicate successfully with people in particular contexts (Cook, 1989). As observed by van Dijk (1988: 28):

> […] both classical and modern rhetoric deals with the persuasive dimension of language use and, more specifically, with the account of those properties of discourse that can make communication more persuasive. These rhetorical structures of discourse, featuring for instance the well-known figures of speech, are also based on grammatical structures but are not themselves linguistic or grammatical. Thus, an alliteration presupposes identity of initial phonemes or morphemes, parallelism requires identity of syntactic patters, and metaphor may involve partial meaning identity and referential identity of expressions. But the transformations involved, such as deletion, repetition, substitution, or permutation, are not as such grammatical. They do not express differences of meaning, nor do they always indicate differences in social context. Rather, the speaker uses them to enhance the organization, and hence the attention, and retrieval of textual information by the listener/reader.

Therefore, rhetoric deals with both context and formulation and can be understood in two senses: 1. in a broader sense, "it as a discipline that deals with all aspects of

persuasive speaking or writing", thus becoming "nearly identical with at least a large part of discourse analysis". 2. In a more restrictive sense, it constitutes "the rhetorical subcomponent of discourse analysis that explicates very specific, rhetorical structures only." Like other discourse dimensions, rhetoric "also has a more empirical dimension, which studies the social psychological aspects of persuasion based on the use of specific rhetorical structures" (van Dijk, 1988: 28).

Since the aim of the present paper is the construction of a model to explore the rhetorical dimension of adverts, identify figurative devices in specific texts, and observe the role they play, the study must move from the broader to the more restricted sense of rhetoric. Together with this, we must take into consideration the 'transformations' mentioned by van Dijk (1988). These are the four basic modifying operations of classic rhetoric – *adiectio, detractio, transmutatio, inmutatio* –, which can be applied to the super-structural organisation of the whole discourse and to the lower dimensions, including utterances, singular words and visual elements.

In general terms, discourse analysis can be approached from two different directions (Cook, 1989: 82-83):

1) A bottom-up approach to language that divides communication into discrete levels, which can be dealt with separately. This type of text processing is *atomistic*, and focuses on form, rather than function. Language teaching for instance, has traditionally adopted this direction, being one of the reasons the fact that it has followed the historical development and procedures of linguistics.
2) A top-down approach, on the other hand, is *holistic* because it regards all levels of language as a whole, working together. This approach, which is frequently used in practices where text comprehension is a preliminary to achieve any discursive transfer operation (translation, for instance), is the direction we are going to adopt here.

Hence, although it is imperative the view of discourse as a whole, the application of an analysis of this kind to specific texts must account for the *communicative and socio-cultural context*; 2) the *textual analysis*, which goes from the macro-structural levels of discourse to the lowest levels. Within this frame, rhetoric can then be observed as another dimension of discourse, which interrelates with other levels – pragmatic, stylistic, syntactic, semantic, graphic (van Dijk, 1995).

3. The Communicative and Socio-Cultural Context

In order to account for discourse, we need to look at the situation, the people involved, what they know and what they are doing (Cook, 1989). Hence, the communicative and socio-cultural context in the case of printed commercial advertising includes information about the medium, and publication details such as nationality, year, number and type of edition, advertising agency, and type of product, which can provide significant data for the analysis. Together with this, we have to understand the work of advertisers, considering that in media practices the process of text production goes from

the producer/s of a specific product to advertising agencies, who produce/create the advert, sometimes taking into consideration certain specific indications of their clients.

In "Text and Discourse, rhetoric, and stylistics", Enkvist (1985) uses 'rhetoric' in its most classical sense of "*ars bene dicendi*, the art of attractive, and therefore effective, expression" , and his observations are most useful to understand the work of advertisers:

> Because of their preoccupation with effectiveness, all rhetorics share an important trait. They are all teleological in approach. They advocate goal-directed strategies of communication and expression. Their basic statements are of the type
> If you want to be effective in situation S, you will do wisely in using communicative strategies and linguistic expressions of types a, b and c. (Enkvist, 1985: 16)

Since the ultimate goal of all advertising is economic, the aim of advertisers is to sell more of the products they promote. For this purpose they construct texts which can persuade the readers to buy a specific product instead of another. Adverts do not have to include detailed information of all the qualities of a product; they normally select certain features for its promotion according to its characteristics. Moreover, their statements do not have to be necessarily true, only plausible, thus more than logical and complicated argumentations advertising uses psychological, social and aesthetic arguments accessible to the mass media (López Eire, 1998). Hence, to create their messages, which must be brief, attractive, new, and at the same time redundant, advertisers have at their disposal a series of rhetorical strategies – visual and verbal –. These are based on conventions and rules as a result of historical evolution, and many of them have become clichés.

4. The Analysis of Multimodal Texts

By 'textual analysis' I mean the analysis of the level of discourse at which whole texts are considered as self-contained, coherent and cohesive entities. Thus, two basic concepts are: text 'coherence', i.e., the network of conceptual relations which underlie the surface text; and 'cohesion', i.e., the network of the surface relations which link visual and verbal units and expressions to other visual and verbal units and expressions. These concepts need to be observed in relation to the 'macrostructure', i.e., the compositional plan or underlying structure which accounts for the organization of the text, and which derives from the notions of 'genre'. Thus organization within parts of the discourse means approaching the level of cohesion, as well as the combination of elements, and thus grammar (Cook, 1989). Together with this, the 'topic' summarizes conceptually the text and specifies its most important information.

The rules that construe the discourse in the macrostructure level however, vary depending on the type of discourse, and different discourses are distinguished by the way in which the topic, propositions and other information are linked together to form a unit. For instance, the textual structure and organisation in a news story takes the form of an inverted pyramid because the main information – the answers to the 5W – is provided right at the beginning of the text. On the contrary, a suspense thriller must present the

opposite structure. A printed advert also shows a specific structure and the constituent parts are organized and related to one another in order to form a meaningful whole; but in this type of discourse the information is not displayed in a linear way, but spatially within a compositional frame. Moreover, advertisements are *multimodal* texts that require an analysis of *visually* and *verbally* expressed meaning.

In general terms, advertising theorists have traditionally adopted a semiotic approach to the study of all sign systems of signification – oral and written language, images, gestures, musical sounds –, and the complex associations of all these. Within this domain the text or message is viewed as "an assemblage of signs constructed – and interpreted – with reference to the conventions associated with a genre and in a particular medium of communication" (Chander, 1994). Hence, semioticians seek to analyse media texts as structured wholes being their main interest to study how meanings are made and to investigate latent, connotative meanings.

Nevertheless, there exist today significant variations in semiotic methodologies for analysing texts and social practices. In this respect, the work carried out by social semioticians and multimodal discourse analysts (Hodge and Kress, 1988; Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996, 2001) is most valuable to gain a better understanding of the images of adverts. Basically, Kress and van Leeuwen (2001: 20) have defined 'modes' as "semiotic resources which allow the simultaneous realisation of discourses and types of (inter)action." With respect to images, these researchers have provided a systematic and comprehensive account of the grammar of visual design, looking at its formal elements and structures: colour, perspective, framing and composition. As for the analogy between visual structures and verbal structures they make the following observation:

> The meanings which can be realized in language and in visual communication overlap in part, that is some things can be expressed both visually and verbally; and in part they diverge – some things can be 'said' only visually, other only verbally. But even when something can be 'said' both visually and verbally the *way in which* it will be said is different. For instance, what is expressed in language through the choice between different word classes and semantic structures is, in visual communication, expressed through the choice between, for instance, different uses of colour, or different compositional structures (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996: 2).

5. Visual Rhetoric

As mentioned, this area of research has not undertaken detailed analysis of the rhetorical uses of images; therefore we have to look at other fields which have dealt with the subject, taking into consideration that this discourse tends to rely increasingly upon images (Cook, 2001). But whilst the study of verbal rhetorical figures in print advertisements – metaphor, metonymy, personification, hyperbole, paradox, etc. –, has been the object of many investigations, research on visual rhetoric is still quite an emergent field. In spite of this fact, the interest in visual rhetoric has increased considerably in the late times, and visual and multimodal metaphors are examined today in different areas: art history, cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, advertising

theory, communication studies. In general, these approaches have theorised about its basis, much of this literature concerning itself with definitions and with specific studies on the role of metaphor in the arts and in the media.

What I mention next is a brief review of what I consider the most relevant investigations carried out within the 1) semiotic tradition of mass communication studies; 2) cognitive metaphor theory, which is currently the dominant paradigm in metaphor research.

5.1. Semiotic Approaches

Within the field of cultural and communication studies, the works produced by Fiske (1982), Fiske and Hartley (1978), and O'Sullivan *et al*. (1994) are most useful to first approach this subject. These authors present a general account of the three possible ways to 'describe aspects of semiosis', and provide several illustrative examples in different media:

The first approach, which the mentioned researchers adopt, is Barthes (1977) systematic model of two orders of signification to analyse the idea of meaning: 'denotation', which is the first order, and then 'connotation', 'myth' and 'symbol'. More specifically, connotation tends to work metaphorically, as observed in this example:

> […] in a photograph of a thatched cottage taken with warm lighting and soft focus, nostalgia is connoted. The lighting is a visual equivalent of the verbal metaphor 'looking through rosed-coloured spectacles,' and the soft focus is a metaphor of the soft heartness of the emotion. (O'Sullivan *et al*., 1994: 93)

A second, alternative approach is Peircean semiotics and its distinction between 'icon', 'index', and 'symbol'. And a somehow different approach to describe aspects of semiosis is metaphor and metonymy, which this school derives from (though it is not quite the same as) Jakobson (1960), for whom these are the "two fundamental modes of communicating meaning."

Departing from a traditional verbal definition of 'metaphor', Fiske (in O'Sullivan *et al*., 1994: 93) defines this figure as "a word (signifier) which is applied to an object or action (signified) to which it is not literally or conventionally applicable." This scholar considers that metaphor is characteristic of advertising because in this discourse "meanings are created out of known cultural myths whose characteristics are then transposed on to the unknown product".

As for metonymy, "the signification depends upon the ability of a sign to act as a part which can signify a whole" (Fiske and Hartley, 1978: 48). Thus in photographic and filmic media many things are considered as functioning metonymically: film is basically considered a metonymic medium; the formal frame of any visual image is also metonymic since it suggests that what is being offered is a 'slice-of-life'; a close-up is metonymic because it involves a selection that can be expanded; or even the frozen moment that the picture is capturing is metonymic in the sense that we can infer the preceding events.

More specific books on the language of advertising have also observed, to a greater or lesser extent, that adverts can be metaphorical and metonymic in several ways, and that they are full of connotations and symbols, because to achieve their goals advertisers appeal to the possible associations, cultural, personal, of readers (Cook, 2001; Messaris, 1997; Vestergaard and Schroeder, 1985; Williamson, 1978).

As explored by Williamson (1978), visual metaphor can involve a function of 'transference', i.e., transferring certain qualities from one sign to another. Advertisers associate a product with a specific set of social values – in semiotic terms, creating distinct signifieds for it. One of the examples she provides is an advert for perfume, whose image presents the French actress Catherine Deneuve next to a bottle of perfume labelled Chanel No. 5. Two key signifiers are juxtaposed in this advertisement and the aim is for the viewer "to transfer the qualities signified by the actress to the perfume, thus substituting one signified for another, and creating a new metaphorical sign which offers us the meaning that *Chanel No. 5 is* beauty and elegance" (Williamson, 1978: 25 *apud* Chandler, 1994, chap 8).

Most relevant in this respect is Cook's (2001) book on the discourse of advertising. Following a bottom-up model of discourse analysis, Cook's analysis of adverts takes into account several dimensions of discourse (stylistic, rhetorical, grammatical, lexical, graphical), and emphasizes on the rhetorical level in several occasions. As for the interpretation of pictures, Cook extends the semiotic principles of 'paradigm' and 'syntagm' and observes that ads in general "foreground connotational, indeterminate and metaphorical meaning, thus effecting fusion between disparate spheres" (p. 217). Considering Lakoff and Johnson (1980) an alternative, the concrete figure of 'metaphor' is defined by this researcher following the traditional view based on Saussurean semiology, i.e., "one signifier refers to two signifieds by virtue of a shared component in the signifieds though not in the signifiers" (p. 67). Together with this, Cook considers the 'intertextual meanings' that derive from the intertextual voices of ads, which can be subdivided into two types:

> Intra-generic intertextuality: containing the voice of another example of the same genre, as when an ad assumes knowledge of another ad.
> Inter-generic intertextuality: containing the voice of a different genre, as when an ad evokes knowledge of a film or story. (Cook, 2001: 194)

5.2. The Cognitive Approach

Nonetheless, the most extensive work carried out in this area is found within metaphor studies, in spite of the fact that most of the work in metaphor research has so far tended to focus on *verbal* examples. More specifically, the study on the visual – or 'pictorial'– representation of metaphor was started by Forceville (1996) with the publication of his *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising*. This book, which is hitherto his most sustained attempt at theorizing metaphor in advertising, has been widely cited and applied in advertising and media studies.

After the observation that cognitive metaphor theory is based on the proposition that metaphor derives from our bodily experience and is thus an essential part of everyday patterns of thinking (Lakoff; Johnson, 1999), this work set up a new field of research that has progressively broadened its scope by using insights from different fields: metaphor cognitive model theory, relevance theory, genre theory, visual design theory, perception psychology, and also semiotics.

Adopting the general view that "metaphors can assume non-verbal and multimodal appearances" (2006: 3), one of Forceville's (2004-2007) main concerns is the classification of metaphorical representations as a method to understand their systematic nature and operating rules. Although not explicitly mentioned, this theory can also be considered as being founded on the classic rhetorical operations –suppression, addition, permutation –, since this scholar defines 'metaphor' in terms of "the replacement of an expected visual element by an unexpected one." (But this does not cover all types: in pictorial simile, for instance, target and source are *juxtaposed*; nothing is "replaced"). In addition, Forceville analyses the features that can be matched depending on the context in which metaphor occurs, and interpretation is based "on the network of which target and source of a metaphor are part in terms of denotations – objective meanings, as found in a dictionary –; and connotations – personal or conventional overtones and emotions associated with the world –" (2004-7).

In his observations on 'multimodal metaphors', this scholar establishes first, the difference between 'medium' and 'mode', defining the first in terms of a more –or less institutionalised carrier of information, and the second in terms of a type of communication or signalling system. Hence, each medium "communicates via one or more signalling systems" (2006: 3). According to this conception, multimodal metaphors are those "whose target and source are each represented exclusively or predominantly in different modes" (p. 6).

Forceville's model has been largely developed with respect to advertising pictorial representations and later expanded to other genres such as art painting, comic and film. Thus this line of investigation also includes the interpretation of other pictorial and multimodal representations of metaphor – written/spoken language, static/moving images, music, gesture, smell, touch.

Although this author expressed at a certain point serious doubts about a number of the claims made by social semioticians (Forceville, 1999), he has also recognised the possibility of establishing closer links with this field since in his own words: "Given its long disciplinary tradition, the robust insights of metaphor scholarship can in turn fruitfully feed into the budding field of multimodality in general" (p.13).

The convenience of combining insights drawn from multimodal discourse analysis with research carried out on cognitive metaphor theories when examining printed adverts is also the direction favoured in the present study, among other things because this integration can contribute to observe the presence of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) orientational, ontological, and structural metaphors not only in verbal language but also in images, and the combination of both.

In this same direction I agree with El Refaie (2003: 75) for whom visual metaphors "must be considered visual representations of metaphorical thoughts." In her analysis of newspaper political cartoons, this researcher combines cognitive metaphor theories with

studies of visual 'grammar' (Kress; van Leeuwen, 1996: 80), and observes that "there seems to be a whole range of different forms through which metaphorical concepts can be expressed visually". Hence, a metaphor can "emerge from the composition of several verbal and visual signs, which through their particular relation to one another, together produce a specific idea".

6. Providing Answers: the 5W

In order to make a comprehensive method of analysis, the discourse-analytical approach suggested so far allows for the integration of research carried out in the above mentioned studies. At this point, the way to carry it on is by considering that all discourses proceed as through answering a series of questions. These questions were also established in classical rhetoric – *quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando* – after observing that the orator had to turn to a series of *loci* or common places, that is, to certain compartments in his memory which would enable him to find the right arguments and the selection of the topics of his discourse. Hence, the answers to these *what*, *who*, *where*, *when*, *why* and *how* are provided by the text and can be applied to all levels of discourse:

- To the communicative and socio-cultural context, as has been already observed: Where does the ad appear? Who is the sender of the text? What sort of person is he/she addressing? What type of discourse is this? What is the purpose of discourse? What role does the advertised product play in a specific culture?
- To the text, and more specifically to its rhetorical dimension. At this level some of the questions to be asked are: What is the relationship of picture and writing, and what does this tell us? What is the theme or topic of the ad? How can the action that is taking place be described and what is its significance? If there are people, who are they and what can we tell from age, ethnicity, gender, body language, class, relationships? What does the background tell us? What information is given of the product and where is it placed? How are the elements arranged? What kind of photographic shot is being used? What font is used, what size, where? What colour? What nets of connections can be established between the different elements? What signifiers allow for a rhetorical interpretation? What are their possible meanings and connotations? What associations can we make that link the narrative to a specific cultural myth or stereotype? Why does the intended audience respond to the ad as they do? What are the ideological, cultural and social implications of the rhetorical uses?

7. Further Suggestions

In keeping with what has been said already, let us make some further suggestions:

1. The possibility of reading an advert focusing on its rhetorical dimension can be done after the examination of context, genre, and then text structure and organisation.

Genre conventions can provide cues for interpretation, while the selection of possible meanings and connotations at the paradigmatic level will depend upon discourse coherence. Moreover, such an interpretation extends into symbols and myths – which in turn can be expressed metaphorically or metonymically.

2. Hence, it is necessary to observe how the different 'units of meaning' have been connected to each other by virtue of conceptual or meaning dependencies as perceived by language users. The analysis of how images and words supply meanings about a product, asks for an examination of how the different elements interrelate in the ad:

   - Regarding images, the use of various devices to divide up the available space, the deployment of captions, shapes, size of objects, lightning, and the different codes of body language – gestures, clothes, dress, proxemics – are all examples of signifiers of immense significance which can construe a visual trope, and consequently allow for a rhetorical interpretation. For instance, the presence of the brand name typically placed on the down angle of the ad is significant since the information placed in the lower zones gives information value 'real' or 'specific'. Or the straight lines and square forms of an advert for cars can produce an effect of contrast and amplification with the elongated shape of the product, which can be emphasized by the use of different sizes and colours. This kind of visual devices can be then interpreted as motivated signs which interact with the words and may also substitute words.
   - Moreover, they must be combined with the meaning of the verbal devices of the written information, such as the presence of verbal and verbo-visual metaphors; the conventional use of the direct address 'you', and the imperative form of the verb to personalise the product and create conviction; the appearance of exclamation marks to connote admiration; or the use of superlatives and the definite article such as 'the ultimate' or 'the newest' to eliminate competition.
   - Also, the many ways in which "advertising exploits the paralanguage of writing" (Cook, 2001: 84) have to be taken into account. Examples of this are: the use of capital letters to highlight an important feature; of handwritten style to signify an individual; and of different typographical style to present the brand name; for instance, a signature indicates authorship and it is a rhetorical convention which can be considered either as a metonymy – the product for the producer – or a personalisation – ads involve many voices, being the voice of the producer the most important one.

   These are but a few examples of how visual and verbal devices allow for a rhetorical interpretation and provide the reader, in a persuasive way, with information and explicit details.

3. Besides, we can also consider the possibility that among the different rhetorical figures, most probably a visual/verbal/multimodal metaphor – here viewed as an operation of transfer of meaning – has been used to represent the topic. For instance, many adverts rely upon the mentioned image of a famous personality to transfer metaphorically his or her qualities to the product (Williamson, 1978), while others

substitute an object for the product. Overall, the visual interpretation can allow us to recognize, among the repertoire of characteristics commonly attached to a product, some of its possible features. To explain this second type of transference in more detail I will use an advert for shoes whose pictorial metaphor – SHOE IS TIE – was extensively analysed by Forceville (1996: 109-113). This specific advert presents the image of a shoe that has been depicted in a place where we would normally expect to find a tie; in rhetorical terms, the expected object has been *suppressed* and *substituted* by another, thus what we have here is a *permutation*. The shoe conventionally occupies a central position, following the portrait technique, and since advertisers always orient their readers towards a preferred reading, the image seems to be stating, using a direct form of address: "Look at *this* shoe. It is so 'stylish', 'distinctive', 'elegant', 'light', 'smooth', etc., that you could wear it in the place of your tie." What has been construed is a most effective visual metaphor, SHOE IS TIE, which transfers synthetically several positive claims about the product; moreover, the visual transfer of features such as 'soft' and 'light' is synesthetic since they pertain to the sense of touch. Together with this, the idea of wearing a shoe in the place of a tie can also be seen as an exaggeration (hyperbole is another general characteristic of advertising). The advertiser has thus achieved his goal, for he wanted to create interest and to arouse the reader's attention towards this shoe, which 'can get really noticed'.

4. As illustrated with this example, the presence of various verbal and visual metaphors and tropes can provide different and complementary information. Such is the case of the meaning of vector. This concept applies to the different ways in which objects can be represented and related to each other (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996), and as well as other signifiers such as framing or lighting, they can be interpreted in terms of orientational metaphors (up/down, in/out, front/back, on/off, near/far, deep/shallow, central/peripheral). This kind of metaphors are primarily related to spatial orientations, and following Lakoff and Johnson (1980), they have given rise to schemas such as RATIONAL IS UP or GOOD IS UP, although we have to take into consideration that they are not universal, but largely determined by cultural factors.
   In advertising, the general assumption that "what is 'higher' is also considered to be 'better'" (Cook, 2001: 84) is crucial. Moreover, this assumption leads to the observation that rhetorical and stylistic choices entail social and ideological implications. In this respect, Fiske has observed how the metaphor UP-DOWN (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980) is used:

   > […] to make sense of a wide range of diverse social abstractions such as God, life, health, morals, social position, earnings, and artistic taste, and in linking them together it works ideologically. There is nothing natural that links high social position, high earnings, and high morals, but making sense of them through the same metaphor is one way in which the dominant values are spread throughout society. (Fiske, 1982: 94)

   Since this is a rhetorical convention of the genre, advertisers have at their disposal various verbal and visual devices to represent the UP metaphor. The most clear example is the use of an ascendant oriented line to provide information which carries

favourable connotations associated with a specific set of abstract values – lifestyle and social success. This is so because "most adverts take for granted that your relative position in the status hierarchy is determined by the number of prestige products which you possess" (Vestergaard and Schroeder, 1985: 65).

5. Finally, the intertextual level of discourse, i.e., the level of shared culture on which texts are viewed as bearing significant external relationships to other texts (by allusion or by virtue of genre membership, for example) can provide important cues for rhetorical interpretation. All texts are constituted by elements of other texts, contemporaneous or prior, and advertisers draw on their existence when making use of their reservoir of professional, cultural and personal experience to create their ads. This discursive dimension can be observed in words as well as in images, since as observed by Barthes (1977), "humanity is doomed to analogy".
6. Ultimately, although this study bases meaning interpretation on textual analysis, it must be taken into account that as readers we all bring to the text background knowledge (cultural and personal experiences, resemblances, remembrances, and emotional reactions) which we use in the interpretation of its meaning, through external references to wider belief systems.

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Mystifying through Metaphors and Lexical Choice[1]

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ABSTRACT: The main aim of this paper is to look into the *Plan for restoring the Islamic wall in Barri del Carme* (València, 2002) to show how the authors of the plan use metaphors to mystify the reality and to illustrate the discursive resistance expressed by residents and residents' associations. We will shed new light on how conventionalized metaphors are commonly accepted as natural ways of naming a reality, and therefore function as a powerful device for constructing consensus. In contrast, image metaphors and less conventionalized metaphors are not pervasive in all kinds of discourses, are not natural ways of naming a reality, and can lead to discursive subversion.

Keywords: image metaphor, conventionalized metaphor, mystification, urban planning.

RESUMEN: El principal objetivo de nuestro trabajo es analizar el Plan de restauración de la muralla árabe del Barrio del Carmen (València, 2002) para mostrar en qué medida los autores del proyecto usan las metáforas para mistificar la realidad y la resistencia discursiva que los vecinos y las asociaciones de vecinos opusieron al proyecto. Mostraremos que las metáforas convencionalizadas son comúnmente aceptadas como formas naturales de designar la realidad y, por lo tanto, son un mecanismo poderoso para construir consenso, mientras que las metáforas menos convencionalizadas no perviven en todo tipo de discursos, no son formas naturales de designar la realidad y pueden llevar a una reacción discursiva.

Palabras clave: metáfora de imagen, metáfora convencionalizada, misficación, planeamiento urbanístico.

1. Introduction

For a long time metaphors were seen as a rhetorical device and more specifically as a matter of poetry. Today, however, many cognitive linguists and analysts of discourse recognize that metaphors structure our perception and understanding of reality, and that

1. Research for this article has been undertaken as part of the Project GV05/213, funded by the regional government of the *Comunitat Valenciana* (València, Spain).

we define our reality in terms of different kinds of metaphors; and proceed to act on the basis of these metaphors. According to Fairclough (1992: 195) "When we signify things through one metaphor rather than another, we are constructing our reality in one way rather than another. Metaphors structure the way we think and the way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief, in a pervasive and fundamental way".

Most of our metaphors have evolved in our culture over a long period, but many are imposed upon us by people in power, and people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define what we consider to be true (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980: 159-160). One of the most salient metaphors *we live by* is the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, which is why we often talk about arguments in terms of war. Although there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle and the structure of an argument (attack, defense and counterattack) reflects this. Another salient metaphor *we live by* is the health metaphor, which is when we speak about abstract concepts in terms of body and health and, therefore, we map onto these concepts some properties of animates or human beings, thus personifying them in some way.[2] But the most interesting thing is that both metaphors, the war metaphor and the health metaphor, have been related to each other for a long time. In the 19th and 20th centuries, for instance, medicine evoked military metaphors against disease to promote the idea that illness is an *enemy* to be *defeated* and to engage people in a common cause, namely, in a treatment focused on medications.

Sontag (1989), on the other hand, gathers an abundant supply of examples of the way we speak about illness in terms of war and shows how doctors, in their *crusade against cancer*, and in order to *kill the cancer*, *bombard with toxic rays* and *chemical warfare*. And vice versa, military *operations* are seen as *hygienic*, as a means *to clean out* fortifications, while bombs are portrayed as *surgical strikes* to take out anything that can serve a military purpose. According to Lakoff (1991), both metaphors, the war metaphor and the health metaphor, are still alive in our culture and have an important role in understanding complex matters such as foreign policy.

The health metaphor is also used to talk about social problems. Fairclough (1989: 120), for instance, has pointed out how disease metaphors are frequently used to speak about social unrest, portraying the healthy situation as the status quo situation and presenting other interests as attacks on the health of society as a whole. According to him, "the ideological significance of disease metaphors is that they tend to take dominant interests to be the interests of society as a whole, and construe expressions of non-dominant interests (strikes, demonstrations and "riots") as undermining (the health of) society *per se*". And he concludes that "different metaphors imply different ways of dealing with things: one does not arrive at a negotiated settlement with cancer, though one might with an opponent in an argument. Cancer has to be eliminated, cut out".

In the following section we will show how disease metaphors are used in urban planning in Spain to hide a social change and to create consensus about it, namely the process of redevelopment of a neglected area – which is generally labelled as *gentrification* in English and as *sanitizing* in Spanish ("sanear") and Catalan ("sanejar").

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2. Kövecses (2002: 50) points out that "personification permits us to use knowledge about ourselves to comprehend other aspects of the world, such as time, death, natural forces, inanimate objects, etc."

2. Metaphors in Urban Planning

2.1. Introduction

As linguists and as residents of an area of the old city which is undergoing a process of redevelopment or gentrification, we became interested in metaphors when we realized that they were often used to mystify the impact some redevelopment processes might have upon the affected residents. More specifically, the *Plan for Restoring the Islamic Wall in Barri del Carme* (València, Spain) allows us to show how the health metaphor functions as a powerful device in constructing consensus and masking reality. The project, which was supposedly aimed at restoring the Islamic wall and constructing some houses and public facilities, affected 200 people (40% of the population of the area) and included the demolition of 16 buildings and the re-use of 17 construction sites. However, the real goal of the plan was to redevelop a residential area into a tertiary one by getting rid of the residents. The affected inhabitants, who were neither consulted nor informed while the plan was being drafted, gathered in associations, organized debates and round tables, launched awareness-raising campaigns for the citizens, wrote press articles and proposed an alternative plan that was sustainable and respectful towards both cultural heritage and neighborhood. Eventually, in 2004, the plan was withdrawn and a new plan was put forward, which is respectful of most of the existing buildings, and spares the population. However, at the moment, the only activity that can be seen in the affected area is that of the real estate agencies, who buy entire buildings, try to throw the inhabitants out through 'estate mobbing' and resell these buildings for twice or three times the original purchase price.

In the following sections we will focus on how architects and urban planners try to create realities and mystify the impact their projects will have on the affected residents by means of metaphors. The data for this study consist of the urban project outlined by the technical specialists, opinion articles from newspapers published from 2003 to 2005, round tables where architects, urban planners, archaeologists and residents have discussed the project, and leaflets from campaigns organized by the residents' associations. These discourses are analyzed through the combination of Critical Discourse Analyses (i.e. Fairclough, 1992, 1995, 2003; Chouliaraki; Fairclough, 1999) and Conceptual Metaphor Theory as used in cognitive linguistics (i.e. Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 1994, 1999; Steen, 1999; Kövecses, 2002).

Our study differs from other research projects on metaphor in that we will adopt a language-in-use approach to metaphor, where metaphors occur naturally and language users become an integral part of the research. We will stress both how metaphors are used to present a particular ideology as well as the interactional aspects of metaphors to shed light on how more-or-less conventionalized metaphors are processed by speakers, since some scholars have pointed to the need to distinguish degrees of familiarity in metaphors processed by speakers (i.e., Giora; Fein, 1996; Low, 1999).

2.2. The Health Metaphor

Conceptual metaphors are grounded in, or motivated by, human experience. According to Boers (1999: 49), when there are various metaphors available to conceive an abstract concept, "the likelihood of a given source domain being used for metaphorical mapping may be enhanced when it becomes more salient in everyday experience". The bodily source domain is one of those experiences, and one circumstance in which the awareness of one's bodily functioning is enhanced is when one becomes ill.

In our case (the restoration of the Islamic wall in València), the health metaphor arises as a powerful device to persuade people of the advantages and disadvantages of the plan; and technicians and institutional representatives used this metaphor both to defend and attack the project. The pro-project technicians, for example, established a doctor-patient (and therefore, an expert/non expert) relationship with the affected environment to justify the urban *operation*. This way, the proposed plan is seen in example (1) as a therapeutic solution, namely as a *sanitizing* by means of *delicate urban surgery*, although it entails the demolition of several buildings and the expulsion of their neighbors:[3]

(1) a) La reordenación supone el *saneamiento* de una zona en declive social y económico mediante una *intervención delicada de cirugía urbana* que respeta y completa la edificación existente. (Project. *Modificación del PEPRI del Carmen en el ámbito de la muralla musulmana*, 2002)

b) The redistribution suggests the *sanitizing* of a district in social and economic decline through the *delicate application of urban surgery* that both respects and adheres to the existing environs.

The anti-project technicians also use the health metaphor, but this time, to make the affected residents aware of the consequences of the *operation*, namely, the expulsion of the affected inhabitants and the redevelopment of the neighborhood into a tertiary area. For them, the project is seen as a matter of *major surgery* (2), and more specifically as a *lineal metastasis* which entails *extirpation* and *amputation* of urban tissue (3).

(2) a) Pero es que además yo creo que viajan poco. Mejor dicho, viajan mal. Porque no son capaces de ver y de aprender lo que sucede en el resto de Europa donde ya hace algunos años se ha abandonado casi completamente las *operaciones de cirugía mayor*, la reestructuración contundente, una forma de intervenir que no es un caso aislado y que se ha aplicado de forma contundente todavía mayor si cabe en el Cabañal. (Fernando Gaja, anti-project, round table)

b) But, in addition, I think they travel little, or rather are bad travellers. They are incapable of seeing and learning from what is happening in the rest of Europe where, some years ago, the idea of *operations of major surgery* was almost completely

3. The sample is written or spoken in Spanish or Catalan. We present the Spanish or Catalan version in section a) followed by the English translation in section b).

abandoned. That is to say, restructuring on an overwhelming scale, a widespread form of intervention that has been employed with drastic effects in the Cabanyal.

(3) a) Que aunque no se diga, la estrategia aplicada se basa en la llamada hipótesis de la *metástasis de línea* que formuló hace tiempo ya Oriol Bohigas. Una reestructuración *traumática*, de *amputación* y *extirpación* de tejidos urbanos. (Fernando Gaja, anti-project, round table)

b) Although it is not acknowledged, the applied strategy is based on what is known as the *lineal metastasis* formulated in the 1950s by Oriol Bohigas, which consists of a *traumatic* restructuring, *amputation* and *extirpation* of urban tissues.

In example (4), the same anti-project representative maps the health metaphor onto the affected residents, who are referred to as *patients*.

(4) a) Para los urbanistas más preclaros se trata de una *operación quirúrgica* que pretende matar al *paciente*". Ese *paciente* son el centenar de familias que tendrán que ser expropiadas de sus casas y la destrucción del tejido económico y social que mantiene vivo el barrio del Carmen. (Reported speech from the Newspaper *Pueblo*)

b) For the more enlightened and eminent urbanists it is about a *surgical operation* that tries to kill the *patient*. The *patient*, in this case, being the hundred families who would have their houses expropriated and would witness the destruction of the economic and social fabric that keeps the Barrio del Carmen [old town] alive.

Thus, groups with different interests share the health metaphor at a general level, but exploit it differently at the level of detail. Put in another way, recontextualization of medical discourse into urban planning discourse means that the planned urban intervention can be perceived, on the one hand, as a necessary measure to be taken, but also, on the other hand, as an operation that can *kill the patient* and the square. It depends on the metaphors used to define the plan.

3. Conceptual Metaphors and Image Metaphors

When one conceptual domain is understood in terms of another conceptual domain, we have a conceptual metaphor. These metaphors can be given by means of the formula *A is B* or *A as B*. They can be more or less conventionalized, but the boundary between an innovative (or creative) and a conventionalized metaphor is fuzzy. Many of the metaphorical expressions we have talked about so far are fixed by convention and are examples of conventionalized metaphors of what Lakoff; Johnson (1980) call *metaphors we live by*. This is the case of the linguistic metaphor *sanitizing*, which is used in urban planning to label the process of increasing the rents by getting rid of the residents or, in corporate discourse, to design the process of increasing gains by getting rid of employees, for instance. Although the real goal in both cases is the wish to increase gains, the aim is to present them as therapeutic solutions to a disease which is taken for granted.

Other metaphors like *extirpation*, *amputation*, *metastasis* and *kill the patient*, for instance, which are drawn upon to refer to the redevelopment of the area, are extensions of what we called the health metaphor; however, they are emergent metaphors, they are more creative and their use is limited to some texts, contexts or speakers. These emergent or active metaphors are more pragmatic, since they are highly dependent on the context and have to do with language use and users within specific contexts.

In addition to these cases, which are part of whole metaphorical systems, there are also metaphors that are not based on the conventional mapping of one conceptual system onto another, but rather on one mental image being superimposed on another by virtue of their similar appearance. They are therefore referred to by the scholars as (*one-shot*) *image metaphors*, since, through them, we bring into correspondence two rich images for a temporary purpose on a particular occasion. A popular example is when we say that a woman has an hourglass figure, which involves mapping the image of an hourglass onto the image of a woman, fitting the middle of the hourglass to her waist (Lakoff; Turner, 1989: 89-91). These metaphors have been described as a special *ad hoc* case. They stand alone and are not involved in everyday communication. Thus, language users will presumably make sense of them using processes specifically suited to this context, since such metaphors do not belong to their conventional repertoire.[4]

We have found some image metaphors in our data. The most salient and controversial one is, without a doubt, the use of an ecological disaster in Galicia, namely, the use of the word *chapapote* ('tar')[5] to refer to the buildings leaning against the Islamic wall, as in (5).

(5) a) Esto solo se conseguirá con un cambio de imagen que se quite de encima el *chapapote* de la marca desarrollista y que busque el acuerdo de lo – necesariamente – actual con un pasado que hoy apenas se adivina. (Juan Pecourt, pro-project, Levante-EMV, 16-2-2003)
b) This will only be achieved through a change of image which does away with the *tar* of the "developmental brand" and which strives for a link between the (necessarily) current moment and an ever-more distant past.

Another instance of what we see as an example of image metaphor is the use of the phrase *song of protest* in (5) to describe the residents' claims, therefore highlighting the idea that they are behind the times or are against progress.

(5) a) Ha habido más reacciones: aguiluchos dibujados en las paredes que acechan a los vecinos, una falla que critica a la Administración con resonancias de *canción de protesta* de Ana Belén, llamadas al «No nos moverán» etc. (Juan Pecourt, pro project, Levante-EMV, 16-2-2003)

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4. For cognitive linguists (one-shot) image metaphors are isolated metaphors and therefore they do not play a central role in conceptual organization. But some scholars have pointed out their importance. Semino (2002), for instance, has analyzed a corpus of texts discussing the economic aspects of the European Union and has found out that isolated one-shot image metaphors are the norm.
5. The term "chapapote" refers to the oil spill that reached the coast of Galicia (north-west of Spain) and caused important environmental damage to the coastline.

b) There has been more reaction: drawings of hawks on the walls threatening the neighbors, a 'falla' [paper maché satirical figure] criticizing the administration with echoes of Ana Belén's protest song, with its calls of "We shall not be moved", etc.

Both metaphors are examples of what Steen (1999: 94) called *degrading metaphors*. But the most interesting one-shot image metaphors are those used in urban planning discourse to hide the destruction of the urban layout. It is well known that redevelopments of neglected areas often lead to demolitions of buildings and to the destruction of the urban layout by opening broader spaces. However, there is a strong regulation that forbids such destructive processes in the old cities, as these quarters are the history of the city and should be protected in order to preserve collective memory. Thus, urban planners try to avoid words such as *destruction* or *demolition*, and instead of these, they use metaphors like *esponjar* ('*sponging*'). Example (6) is very interesting as the speaker, an anti-project representative, unravels these strategies of naming that aim at masking the reality.

(6) a) Que normalmente la confusión terminológica es síntoma de una confusión más grande. Las propuestas que se han hecho en Valencia, y también en Barcelona, de donde viene el modelo, se presentan a menudo como *esponjamientos*. No lo son en absoluto. A pesar de que se ha evitado la asunción de un término que las pueda identificar y definir, creo que este tipo de actuaciones se podrían agrupar bajo la denominación de *reestructuración*. (Fernando Gaja, anti-project, round table)

b) Normally, terminological confusion is symptomatic of more far-reaching confusion. The proposals for València, like those for Barcelona, where they originated, are often described as *spongings*. But they are absolutely not. Although these operations have proved resistant to a general identification and definition, I think that these types of projects can be labeled as *restructuring*.

The essence of a metaphor is that by mapping one concept (the topic) onto another (the vehicle) it necessarily highlights some meanings and hides some others, since metaphors set an equation between two meanings (the meaning of the topic and that of the vehicle) that resemble each other but are not identical. Thus, by using the word *esponjar*, for instance, architects and urban planners do not give an accurate picture of the topic, since this metaphor foregrounds the idea or process of opening spaces, which is congruent with the metaphor of the sponge, but hides the destruction of the historical urban layout and the expulsion of the residents that often precedes the opening of spaces. That, as such is not congruent with the meaning of the vehicle (the sponge). In other words, urban metaphors, like other metaphors, can hide aspects of reality by highlighting some contents and backgrounding some others. But in the area of urban planning metaphors matter more because they constrain our lives and can lead to dehumanized neighborhoods, to quarters without residents, mostly called *tertiary areas*.[6]

6. See Caballero (2003) for further information on image metaphors in the discourse of architects, and Caballero (2002, 2005) for the use of metaphors to talk about space in the genre of the building review.

4. Lexical Choice

Like metaphors, lexical choice can be a means of masking reality. When we, speakers, put ideas, objects or images into words, we usually make choices and choose the words that allow us to highlight some meanings and hide others. In other words, lexical choice has a primarily referential function, but when we choose one term instead of another we can be aiming at downplaying some of the properties of the term and highlighting some others.

In this section we will focus on the words used by both the affected residents and the authors of the plan to label the process of the residents leaving their houses and looking for new ones; and the process of demolishing buildings to open broader spaces. When we speak about *expel*, *expropriate*, *remove* and *evict* we are speaking about actions carried out by an Agent and undergone by a Patient. In our case, the Agent is the RIVA or office which plans the project and sets up the social, economical conditions, etc.; and the Patient is the affected resident, especially those who are led to leave their houses. Thus, the residents choose these lexical items to portray themselves as patients or victims of an action carried out by others, as in (7) to (9).

(7) a) El RIVA (Ayuntamiento, Consellería de Obras Públicas y Consellería de Cultura) con la excusa de actuar sobre la muralla musulmana pretende la *expulsión* de más de un centenar de vecinos de sus legítimas casas. (leaflet)

b) The RIVA (comprising representatives of the Town Hall, the regional Department of Public Works and the regional Department of Culture) with the excuse of attending to the ancient Muslim city wall is planning to *expel* more than a hundred neighbors from their rightful homes.

(8) a) La modificación del planeamiento del Carmen hará visitables 100 metros de muralla árabe / La COPUT *expropiará* 46 viviendas para la reordenación del barrio, pendiente desde 1991.

b) The modification of the plans for the Carmen neighborhood will unveil 100 metres of the old Muslim city wall/The COPUT [Department of Public Works and Transport] *will expropriate* 46 homes for the reconstruction of the old quarter, which has been pending since 1991.

(9) a) El proyecto, en realidad, supone la terciarización de la zona al *desalojar* a los vecinos y sustituir sus viviendas por edificios oficiales que además nadie sabe cuál es su contenido. (leaflet, 7-5-2003)

b) In reality, the project involves the tertiarization of the area through the *eviction* of the neighbors and the substitution of the dwellings with official buildings with, in addition, unknown functions.

On the other hand, the representatives of the RIVA and the authors of the plan choose words that portray this moving from the owned house to another one as a voluntary act

carried out by the inhabitants, as if it were a freely-chosen decision. In (10) to (12) they use words such as *leave* and *move*, which are intransitive and have only one participant, in this context, the affected residents.

(10) a) Teme usted que, de prosperar el derribo de la finca, tenga que *abandonar* el barrio? (Juan Pecourt, pro-project, Levante-EMV, 16-3-2003)

b) Are you worried that the demolition of the building will mean you having to *leave* the area?

(11) a) Vecinos del Carmen: *moverse*, pero sin perder (Juan Pecourt, pro-project, headline, Levante-EMV, 16-3-2003)

b) Neighbours of the Carmen: *move* – without losing out.

(12) a) Todavía le diré más. Familias que estaban alquiladas – incluso jubilados con poca capacidad económica – pidieron comprar la vivienda, pese a que se le ofrecía con un alquiler reducido. Esto es prueba de que entendieron que hacían un buen negocio con ello. No parece que fuera un drama la *mudanza*. (Juan Pecourt, pro-project, Levante-EMV, 16-3-2003)

b) And I will add another thing. Families who were renting, and even those who were retired with few financial resources, asked to buy their houses, even though they were being offered a reduced rent. This proves that they knew they were being offered a good deal. The *move* does not appear to have been a big drama.

With regard to the process of demolishing buildings and opening broader spaces, the authors of the project sometimes use the word *emptying* (along with the metaphor "*esponjar*"), as in (13).

(13) a) Y nos parece muy oportuno el *vaciar* esos interiores en los que más de un 80 por ciento o 90 por ciento es solar, actualmente, para precisamente entrar y salir a esos espacios y poder contemplar lo que fue la muralla musulmana. (César Mifsut, pro-project, round table)

b) And it seems to us suitable to *empty* those interior courtyards, of which more than 80-90 per cent is taken up by construction sites, to allow access to these spaces and be able to view the old Muslim city wall.

The following example is very interesting as well, since an anti-project architect uses the word *emptying* as a synonym for *destruction* and *demolition*:

(14) a) El crecimiento sin medida ni razón de un contexto de estancamiento demográfico no puede hacerse a costa de *vaciar* los tejidos urbanos más débiles. Es una obviedad decir que los *derribos* a gran escala *derriban* y *destrozan* la estructura de estos espacios acelerando los procesos de deterioro social y demográfico, el despoblamiento, el envejecimiento y la terciarización. (Fernando Gaja, anti-project, round table)

b) Unrestricted growth within the context of a demographic paralysis cannot take place at the cost of destroying the most fragile urban fabrics. It is self-evident that large scale *emptying* leads to the *demolition* and the *destruction* of the structure of those spaces and accelerates the process of social and demographic deterioration, depopulation, ageing and tertiarization. (Fernando Gaja, anti-project, round-table).

5. Final Remarks

If metaphors structure the way we think and the way we act, it is reasonable to assume that metaphors play a central role in the construction of social reality and therefore they can change reality and construct consensus or public opinion. However, there are some differences in the way we perceive metaphors. Conventionalized metaphors (called also *inactive metaphors* or *dead metaphors* (Goatly, 1997)) are commonly assumed to be natural ways of naming a reality, as they are pervasive in all sorts of discourses and languages. However, (one-shot) image metaphors are not perceived as natural ways of naming and they can lead to a discursive subversion. This is the case of the innovative metaphors *song of protest* and *tar* drawn upon to describe the protest actions carried out by the residents and the affected buildings, respectively. Both metaphorical expressions led to the reactions shown in (15) and (16).

(15) a) Al contrari, per part de l'equip redactor a la participació veïnal se li va anomenar *cançó de protesta*, a les accions de veïns […] «aldarull al carrer» i davant la defensa legítima de les llars dels ciutadans se li va denominar *finques de xapapote*, i que no mereixien ser conservades. (Josep Montesinos, anti-project, affected resident, Levante-EMV, 28-2-2004)

b) On the other hand, the editing team dismissed the neighbors' actions as *songs of protest*, their legitimate right to defend their houses as "riots", and their buildings were described as *tar*, fit only for demolition and not worth preserving.

(16) a) Se ha llegado a utilizar el término *chapapote* para definir esas construcciones posteriores, término que quiere buscar un paralelo – desde nuestro punto de vista desafortunado – en otro problema totalmente distinto. (Press announcement from the Col·legi d'arqueòlegs de València)

b) The term *tar* has now come to be used to define those later constructions, a term that searches to find a parallel – and from our point of view, not an appropriate one – with a totally different problem.

And the same happened in the case of extension metaphors such as *delicate surgery*. While the term *sanitizing* is assumed as a natural way of naming the redevelopment of the affected area, the expression *delicate surgery* had a subversive effect and aroused a set of discursive reactions, as shown in (17), where the speaker makes a claim for a *minor surgery*, or in (3) (see above), where the plan was seen as a *lineal metastasis*.

(17) a) Somos conscientes de la mayor dificultad gestora, que no económica, que implica optar por la *cirugía menor* y el diálogo y compromiso de los vecinos. (Miguel Ángel Piqueras, anti-project, Residents' association «Amics del Carme», Levante-EMV, 21-02-2004)

b) We are aware of the major management challenge, -and not economic in nature-, implied in opting for minor surgery and dialoguing with the neighbors and gaining their support.

Example (18) is very interesting since, when the authors of the plan refer to the project in terms of surgery, they are taking up the role of an expert (the surgeon), while the affected residents are the patients and, therefore, are implicitly seen as non-experts. Thus, when the speaker in (18), an affected resident, subtly calls the authors of the plan *butchers* he is degrading them to the role of a non-expert.

(18) a) Se trata de trabajar con el *bisturí*, con el cincel, y dejar para otros menesteres el *cuchillo del carnicero* (Jorge Palacios, anti-project, Levante-EMV, 30-03-2003)

b) It is about working with the *scalpel*, with the *chisel*, and putting the *butcher's knife* aside for other tasks.

Summing up, instead of constructing consensus one-shot image metaphors like "*chapapote*" (tar) or less conventionalized metaphors such as *delicate surgery* can have a subversive effect since the reader does not remain indifferent to the images being mapped. However, conventionalized metaphors such as *sanitizing* are not contested or reactivated by the opponents to counterattack or show disagreement, as they are seen as natural ways of naming reality.

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Colours We Live by?: *Red* and *Green* Metaphors in English and Spanish[1]

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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to deepen into the nature of motivation and into the literal and metaphorical continuum of colour expressions for red and green in English and Spanish. We focus on the analysis of colour metaphors in relation to concepts different from those of emotions, in non-literary texts, and where synaesthesia is not the only motivation. Our corpus consists of lexical items, idioms and collocations where colour contributes to meaning, taken from the BNC (English) and the CREA (Spanish). The study shows that a) the literal-metaphorical cline cannot always be observed within the same expression; b) the importance of the centre of the cline made up of chains of entailments is predominantly based on cultural knowledge, as well as on value judgements assigned to colours by the language community.

Keywords: metonymy, metaphor, domain, literal-metaphorical cline, cultural entailments.

RESUMEN: Este artículo profundiza en la naturaleza de la motivación y en el continuo literal-metafórico de expresiones que utilizan los colores rojo y verde en inglés y español. Nos concentramos en el análisis de metáforas con colores en relación con conceptos diferentes a los de las emociones, en contextos no literarios y donde la sinestesia no es la única motivación. Nuestro corpus consiste en elementos léxicos, frases hechas y colocaciones donde el color contribuye al significado, tomado del BNC (inglés) y del CREA (español). El estudio demuestra a) que el continuo literal-metafórico no siempre puede verse dentro de la misma expresión; b) la importancia del punto medio del continuo compuesto de cadenas de implicaturas predominantemente basadas en el conocimiento cultural y los valores asignados a los colores por los hablantes de cada comunidad.

Palabras clave: metonimia, metáfora, dominios, continuo literal-metafórico, implicaturas culturales.

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1. Introduction

The goal of this paper is to deepen into the nature of motivation and into the literal/metaphorical continuum of expressions with colours red and green in English and Spanish. Our study focuses on the analysis of colour metaphors in relation to concepts different from those of emotions (Kövecses, 1990), in non-literary texts (Cazeaux, 2002; Cacciari *et al*., 2004) and in situations where synaesthesia is not the only motivation (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2003).

Three main topics are related to our study: metonymy and metaphor; domain differentiation; and the literal-metaphorical cline.

Metonymy and metaphor are conventional cognitive mechanisms for meaning extension and abstraction. Metonymy implies the projection of subdomains within a common experiential one (Barcelona, 2000 *a*: 4). It can also be conceived as the highlighting of part of a domain (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1996; 2000; 2006) or the active zone within an abstract domain (Langacker, 1993). On the other hand, metaphor is the conceptual mapping from one source domain onto a clearly different target one. In both cases, the concept of domain and the identification of one or two different domains is important to establish cases of metonymy or metaphor.

A domain may be defined as "a cognitive structure that captures relevant material from an ICM within a context of use" (Ruiz de Mendoza, 2006). An ICM (Idealized Cognitive Model) is a conceptual structure that tries to represent the knowledge that is activated at a certain moment, and the extension of that knowledge depends on the situation or the purpose of the cognitive operation we put that knowledge to be used on (Lakoff, 1987). It allows the backgrounding and foregrounding of information (Lakoff, 1987: 133) and thus, it is related to figure/ground theories in Psychology (Koffka, 1955) and Linguistics (Fillmore, 1982; Langacker, 1987). A domain is also understood in a more narrow sense as "a semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one concept profile" (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 15). In fact, according to Taylor (1997: 84) "In principle, any conceptualization or knowledge configuration, no matter how simple or complex, can serve as the cognitive domain for the characterization of meanings". From these definitions, we understand a domain as a general conceptual knowledge pack with no defined boundaries except for those that provide memory activation capacities, purpose of activation, situation and the prompt of knowledge activation. Cognitive Linguists also agree in considering domains to be experiential (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987).

The problem is that the cognitive mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy, as defined here, are basically distinguished by the existence of defined, and thus somewhat bounded domains. Still the question is how to differentiate domains. One possible parameter may be the situational context. In this case, it is possible to claim that a change of situational context implies necessarily a change of domain. For example, in Peninsular Spanish *este chico está como una moto,* [literally: *like a motorbike* = worked up] activates both the domain of emotions and that of motor vehicles, thus, we have two clearly different contexts and two different domains. However, if the context is not changed, it is difficult to see a change of domain; for example, in *Lolita was a good black comedy*, where the collocation *black comedy* no longer refers to a play where black

slaves played a part, and where a characteristic sense of humour is used; but it has a more general meaning that applies to a film or play dealing with things considered serious in an amusing way. Though the situational context - the show business - has not changed, we have to go beyond the original domain to understand the current meaning. The change of meaning leads to activating a domain. The question is: Does this new meaning imply a new domain or is it just a new subdomain in the same context?

Moreover, according to Radden (2000: 94), two manifestations may be imagined as separate parts of the same conceptual domain, mainly by linguists concerned with metaphorical systematicity (Radden, 2000: 95). However, laymen's interpretation may consider two concepts to belong to the same domain, as when people think of a flower and a flowerpot. In these cases, we would face instances of metonymy-based metaphors.

Nevertheless, the question whether two concepts belong to one single domain or two different ones needs further study. However, in this paper we take into account two main theories on the motivation and continuum of conventional expressions: the one that claims that these expressions are metaphor motivated (Lakoff; Johnson, 1999), and the one that supports the metonymic origin of everyday metaphors (Jakobson, 1956; Kövecses, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991; Barcelona, 1986, 2000 *a, b*; Goossens, 1990; Dirven, 1993; Pauwels, 1995; Niemeier, 2000; Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000).

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), idioms and conventionalized lexical phrases are motivated by conceptual metaphorical mappings. Namely, commonplace knowledge and primary metaphors give rise to everyday metaphors. Commonplace knowledge includes cultural models, folk theories, knowledge or beliefs accepted in a given culture. Primary metaphors are part of the cognitive unconscious, and derive from the constant interaction with the world. They are non linguistic and are made explicit through language or any other symbolic system. They imply an inference preserving conceptual mapping from the sensorimotor domain (source) onto the subjective experience domain (target) (Lakoff; Johnson, 1999: 57-58).

Other researchers think that conventional language is metonymically motivated, although it depends on the interpreter's perspective on what constitutes one or two domains. According to Radden (2000: 105), "The metonymic driving forces behind metaphors […] are: (i) a common experiential basis of the two metaphorical domains, (ii) the operation of implicature, (iii) category structure, and (iv) cultural models".

What is common to both perspectives on the motivation of conventional lexical expressions is the role of cultural models as cultural knowledge structures shared by the members of a society (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff, 1987). They are taken-for-granted models of the world (Holland and Quinn, 1987: 4) and may include folk models or naïve theories of the world and account for metaphors in the fields of physical forces, communication and emotions, and also probably in areas of perception, morality and life (Radden, 2000: 103).

For those who defend metonymy based metaphors there is also a continuum from literal to metaphorical interpretations shared both by collocations and idioms. Radden (2000: 105) claims that:

> The classical notions of metonymy and metaphor are to be seen as prototypical categories at the end points of a continuum of mapping processes. The range in the middle of the

> metonymy-metaphor continuum is made up of metonymy-based metaphors, which also account for the transition of metonymy to metaphor by providing an experiential motivation of a metaphor [...]

However, there are different ways to observe the cline between literal and metaphorical meanings. For example:

> We may think of a continuum from metaphor to metonymy where many-correspondence metaphors would be at one end and clear cases of referential metonymy would be at the other, with one-correspondence metaphors and predicative uses of metonymy in the middle [...] (Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000: 115).

Geeraerts (2002) uses Jakobson's (1971) distinction between syntagmatic (metonymic) and paradigmatic (metaphorical) poles. He presents a classification of the different possibilities in the cline based on different types of syntagmatic and paradigmatic associations between conceptual domains. The different levels of the continuum depend on semantic specialization based on two parameters: isomorphism and motivation. Isomorphism is syntagmatic transparency, that is, there is a correspondence or systematic correlation between the parts of the formal structure and the structure of the semantic interpretation as a whole. Motivation is paradigmatic transparency, namely, the idiomatic meaning cannot be derived from the literal reading because the motivating image is lost. The specialization cline ranges from the least specialized (the expression is fully isomorphic and fully motivated) to the most specialized (the expression is not motivated and the literal reading cannot be recovered).

According to Niemeier, whereas conceptualization is close to the metonymic basis at the specific level, i.e. when a salient physical part stands for the whole, the domain is implicit at the most general level of conceptualization. Different sub-folk models are involved in the structure of the domain; the referent is usually given a meaning that is culture specific, that is, "the more general the conceptualization, the more indirect is the metonymic connection to the underlying concept" (Niemeier, 2000: 209).

2. Corpus of Colour Expressions in English and Spanish

Our corpus consists of colour single lexical items, idioms and collocations where the colour contributes to the meaning. Idioms from a cognitive perspective are the product of a conceptual system and they are motivated by cognitive mechanisms such as metaphor and metonymy, for which cultural models play an important role (Kövecses and Szabó, 1996).

A collocation is "a type of word that typically occurs together or in the neighbourhood of" (Taylor, 2002: 191). From our point of view, collocations also form part of the conceptual system and share the same cognitive mechanisms as idioms. In fact, collocations may be regarded as the first step towards the process of idiomatization, although this does not necessarily imply that all collocations will become idioms. Finally, single lexical items also undergo metaphoric and metonymic processes.

The English examples are taken from *the British National Corpus* (BNC) and the Spanish ones from the *Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual* (CREA). These two corpora are comparable. We selected expressions with *red,* 14 in English and 5 in Spanish, and with *green,* 18 in English and 15 in Spanish. The selection is based on examples appearing at least four times in the corpora, with a non-literal meaning.

3. Corpus Analysis

3.1. Red

In our corpus, we find the metonymic idiom *to be in the red* - in Spanish *estar en números rojos*. In both languages the expression is based on a common habit of business clerks to write or mark debts with red ink.

(1) Britain's trade balance was **in the red** on manufactures.
(2) estamos siempre en **números rojos**.

Another metonymic idiom in English is *red and raw* based on the physical result of an action of friction, where *red* stands for *blood* and *raw* for *skin abraded*. There is no Spanish counterpart for this idiom with the colour red. No more abstract or metaphorical uses of this expresion were found:

(3) After a reception for nearly 150 guests, my right cheek was **red and raw**.

Based on socio-cultural activities, both in English and Spanish, we have the metonymic idiom *to roll out the red carpet*, in Spanish *extender la alfombra roja*:

(4) it is very worrying when Kohl himself **rolls out the red carpet** for a man like Waldheim.
(5) Cuando vienen aquí, les dan los empleos y les **extienden la alfombra roja**.

In both cultures, the activity of "rolling out a red carpet" takes place when important events occur, to welcome people in a special way, or with a flattering purpose. The metonymic relationship between the activity and the purpose of that activity is lexicalized in these idioms.

In Spanish and in English the collocation *libro rojo* / *red book* refers to either books that compile information about a topic, as a guide for future actions, a kind of memorial annual, or as a book that compiles names and information about people in an organization (in the latter case only Br. Engl.). In England there is a book that contains the names of all the persons in the service of the State. In the former usage, this comes from an extension of the original function of Mao Zedong's *Red Book*, a compilation of quotations to establish Mao's main ideas to govern China, and used as the Communist Revolution guide. Both books are named after the colour of the covers. Therefore, the origin of this collocation is metonymic, but there has been a broadening of meaning as

the application of the collocation goes beyond the original referents, and it is used in contexts where there is no such metonymic relationship between the covers of the book and its function.[2]

(6) Lo mejor del **libro rojo** de Aznar es su título.
(7) An annual Green Book […] will accompany the traditional financial **Red Book**.

From physical instruments used in certain activities, we have the idiom of metonymic origin *red tape*. This is an XVIII century idiom that alluded to the red ribbons or "tapes" that tied together official documents in Great Britain, that is, one observable typical feature of this type of papers stands for this kind of documents. Nowadays, it has broaden its meaning to "delays caused by bureaucratic complexity" although it is still used to refer to bureaucratic papers. In this second sense, a relationship is established between the object and the actions carried out with the papers, which is linked to the action-consequence experience. In the case of *red tape,* a connection is established between the actions performed with official documents and their consequences. Hence, the metonymy CHARACTERISTIC OF OBJECT for CONSEQUENCES OF OBJECT MANIPULATION.

The metonymic use of this expression (forms, etc.) is shown in (9), whereas (8) depicts the extensional use (bureaucracy).

(8) Bureaucracy and **red tape** make him angrier than almost anything else.
(9) This, says Mr Eggar, will create more **red tape** and more regulations.

Within the metonymic-metaphorical continuum we find *red handed*, based on catching a murderer with blood still on his/her hands, and therefore, metonymic where the RESULT OF PERFORMING AN ACTION stands for THE ACTION. Besides, there is a metonymic relation between the colour and the blood, where RED STANDS FOR THE BLOOD. However, nowadays this is used outside blood crimes to refer to "being caught in the act of doing something illegal", and therefore, with more metaphorical value. It develops from the entailment, based on culturally specific world knowledge, by which we establish a correlation between having blood on one's hands and having committed a crime or an illegal action. This entailment allows us to establish an association between the result of a specific illegal action and illegal actions by semantic generalization.

(10) Police say they've caught a terrorist **red handed** on his way to plant a bomb.
(11) Andy Melville was caught **red handed** on his own goal line.

Metonymic in origin, the metaphorical idiom *to be red hot* has come to refer to something with "frantic activity", as in (12). It is closer to the metonymic end because speakers find a link between *red hot* used in the original sense and its metaphorical application. Originally, it comes from the observed fact that certain materials, such as iron, glow and become red when reaching a heat point. Therefore, a metonymic relationship is established between the action and its observable result - heating – so that

2. Notice that the Spanish example is fairly ironical as Aznar is a staunch supporter of right wing policies.

the metonymy RESULT STANDS FOR THE ACTION leads to a metonymy-based metaphor, GREAT ACTIVITY IS REACHING A HIGH-HEAT POINT; and a further metonymy RESULT STANDS FOR A STATE IN THE ACTION gives rise to the sub-metaphor FRANCTIC ACTIVITY IS BEING RED HOT.

(12) My phone has been **red hot** this week with calls from Sainsbury investors.

Moreover, this expression has developed throughout the metaphorical line, changing the domain or domains onto which it is mapped. For example, nowadays it may refer to the domain of "exaggerated support", as when it refers to a fanatic person (13), "being brilliant, well done" (14); from this domain it has extended to the concept of "being an expert" (15).

(13) I was a **red hot** loyalist at that time. (Fanatic)
(14) Now he is also doing **red hot disco** remixes. (Brilliant)
(15) Guy's **red hot** at limbo, believe me! (Expert)

In Spanish, the expression *al rojo vivo* - closer to the metonymic end, as in (16) - comes from the metonymy RESULT STANDS FOR A STATE IN THE ACTION, which in turn gives rise to the metaphor TO BE IN AN EXCITED MOMENT IS BEING RED HOT.

(16) Lo ocurrido en el Consejo de Europa pone **al rojo vivo** estas contradicciones.

The collocation *red alert* in Spanish, *alerta roja* refers to a state of emergency, although still close to the metonymic end, it is in the metaphorical cline as it refers to the more abstract concept of "maximal alert" due to the metaphorical meaning of *red* as the colour that represents "maximal intensity".

(17) Dr Kavanagh […] is on permanent **red alert** over his brother's reputation.
(18) […] se nos ponía en conocimiento […] que estábamos en **alerta roja**.

The fact of *red* being linked to the concept of "maximal intensity" is probably also based on experiences similar to those that gave rise to the expression *red hot*. This may be the case because colour folk theories assign the maximum shade of intensity to this colour. In any case, the colour domain and the attention domain are linked through the meaning contribution of the second term of the expression, *alert*.

There are some metaphorical phrases such as: *red rag* / *red rag to a bull* (incitement). We classify these phrases as being closer to the metaphorical end of the continuum as the context of application is absolutely different. The metonymic origin THE OBJECT FOR THE FUNCTION is still quite transparent, mainly for those with knowledge about bullfighting:

(19) This, Nuttall remarks, acted as a **red rag**.
(20) Their uniform 'acted like a **red rag to a bull**' on the population.

In the metaphorical idiom *red letter day* (21), the metaphorical focus is on *red letter*, as the nucleus *day* maintains its literal meaning. It means a day of good luck or a day in which something good happens, therefore it refers to the concept of "good luck" or "fortune". Its cultural metonymic origin comes from the practice of marking the holy days in red in Church calendars. To have a bank holiday in the English world is related to the idea of being lucky, probably because there are not many days off. However, this idiom does not exist in Spanish, even though there is the same practice of marking holidays in red. Nevertheless, there is not a link between having a holiday and having good luck. Thus, it is a strongly culturally marked metaphorical idiom.

(21) NEXT Thursday's elections will mark **a red letter day** for tens of thousands of Chileans.

In Spanish, but not in English, the idiom *ser el farolillo rojo* means 'to be the last of a group'. It is experientially metonymic as it develops from the car that used to go at the end of a cycle race carrying a red lantern next to the last cyclist. The link between this car and the position of an element within a group is metaphorical. There is a change of context, but it is still transparent in origin.

(22) El Deba […] Es el **farolillo rojo** de las cuencas guipuzcoanas.

In English, there are some collocations with *red* with reference to the domain of "sexuality", such as *red light area/district* that stands for an area of prostitution. It is originally metonymic as it refers to the red light prostitutes, mainly in Amsterdam, lighted at their doors to announce their availability. However, nowadays this collocation has gone beyond its place of origin and refers to the area where prostitutes are available. It is more abstract, with a broadening of meaning, but still closer to the metonymic end of the continuum:

(23) Carol was working in the **red light area** of Bristol as a prostitute.

Red can also be found metaphorically when referred to the concept of "sexually outrageous". In this case, *red* maps onto the domain of "sexuality". Here the doubt is whether the adscription of the colour *red* to the domain of sexuality is based on the metonymic relationship developed from the same contexts of *red light area*, or whether it is just done by cultural value judgements attached to this colour, as in the case of the Spanish link between the colour *gree*n and this domain.

(24) the street boasted **red descriptions** of every aspect of straight sex.

Another specifically English metaphorical idiom is *red herring,* something that takes people's attention away from the main subject. In this case, it is at the maximum point in the metaphorical scale, as the origin is opaque for most speakers, and it is even difficult to reason about it.

(25) the 'hero' label seemed a **red herring**.

Finally, notice the metaphorical set phrase coined by Tennyson, and nowadays used outside literary contexts: *Red in tooth and claw* (in its very primitive and natural state).

(26) the pecking order they have created will take on a mortal significance, **red in tooth and claw**.

3.2. Green

Green is metonymically associated with Ecology in both languages. Collocations with *green /verde* stand for ecological related matters such as *green party - the green,* in Spanish, *el partido verde - los verdes*.

(27) Less determined countries […] acquire an undeserved reputation for being **green**.
(28) 75 per cent of **Green Party** members opposed abolition.
(29) **The Greens** remained the third strongest party.
(30) el **partido verde** llamó la atención sobre lo que considera una «ausencia» del presidente.
(31) para obligar al SPD a hacer una política progresista son imprescindibles **los verdes**.

Moreover, the OED lists over thirty collocations related to *green*, most of them of a clear metonymic nature, of which *green card, green revolution, green salad, green-stuff, green table* are found in the BNC. Some of them are old-fashioned and related to British history and culture, such as *Green Jackets*, a name applied to the King's Royal Rifle Corps and the Rifle Brigade from the dark green colour of their uniforms.

These metonymic collocations are also found in Spanish. *Green card* is translated as *carta verde/tarjeta verde*. For the American residence permit the collocation in Spanish does not use the colour but refers to the goal of the card: *permiso de residencia*. *Green Revolution* can be translated as *revolución verde* or as *revolución agraria*, and *green salad* is *ensalada verde*. *Green stuff*, translated as *verdura,* does not have a metonymic correspondence in Spanish.

(32) The **Green Card** is issued at the start of the international journey.
(33) La **carta verde** servía como una cláusula temporal y suplementaria del seguro del automóvil.
(34) The **Green Revolution** in Latin America has led to a Kulak path of development.
(35) La **revolución verde** ha logrado un éxito temporáneo en la lucha del hombre contra el hambre.
(36) She would eat hers with mustard, a **green salad** and French bread.
(37) El «Paté de la Casa de Sforza» […] se presentó acompañado de tiernos nabos y espárragos, remolachas y **ensalada verde** con pepinillos.

In the case of *green table* in Spanish we find the collocation *tapete verde*. In both languages there is a correlation between the typical element that covers the place where cards are played, and the action performed. So the COLOUR OF A SPECIFIC PART STANDS FOR THE SPECIFIC WHOLE, and the conceptualization of the whole leads to the action, thus, THE SPECIFIC PLACE FOR THE ACTION.

(38) Since that day I have never spent much time at the **green table**.
(39) Salamanca en la guerra, pasante en Cortes, perseguido de Narváez, amigo de Prim, colgado del **tapete verde** […]

There are several metaphorical expressions with *green* based on cultural dependent values assigned to the colour. For example, the English idiom, *green with envy*, in Spanish, *estar verde de envidia*. Here the colour green is attached to the feeling of envy due to cultural adscription, shared by English and Spanish speakers.

(40) Disney's current production run is being financed […] on terms that make other studios **green with envy**.
(41) Veo que estás **verde de envidia,** Jorge.

Moreover, in Spanish, but not in English, *verde*/*green* refers metaphorically to the concept "lascivious, indecent".

(42) ¿Os parece que acercarse es indecente, es picaresco, **es verde**?

This metaphorical use of *verde* for the concept of lasciviousness is also a culturally dependent value attached to the colour green in the Spanish culture, from which other metaphorical collocations such as *chiste verde* or *viejo verde* are derived.

(43) Me molesta que una chica diga un **chiste verde**.
(44) […] José Bono, tildó a Fraga de «**viejo verde**».

In Spanish, but not in English, *green* refers metaphorically to the concept of "criticism". Namely, the idiom *poner verde a alguien*:

(45) los testimonios de otras alumnas que **pusieron verde** a la pobre señorita O'Shea.

Based on a certain cultural logic, the idioms *to have a green thumb* or *green fingers*, meaning "being good at plants / having a special talent with plants", develop from entailments specific of British culture with no similar expressions in Spanish.

(46) Mia has a talent for mothering the way some people **have green fingers** for gardening.

There are two metonymies at play, the first one relates the object of manipulation, plants, with the prototypical colour of the objects that belong to this domain. Therefore, we have a first metonymy THE COLOUR OF THE OBJECT OF MANIPULATION FOR THE OBJECT. The second metonymy refers to the body part used for the manipulation of plants, according to the English view, the hand. However, from this outstanding part of the body, the conceptual prototype locus for the manipulation of things, the metonymy PART FOR WHOLE is applied, as can be observed from the use of *thumb* and *finger* in the idioms. These two metonymies provide the lexical basis for the metaphorical concept.

When native speakers are asked for the motivation of this idiom, they relate "having green fingers" to innate abilities with plants, since they consider this ability to be a gift.

The question is then that there may be just a mapping from the domain of plants to the domain of abilities without metaphorical entailments.

However, for the metaphorical process the next entailment is needed: a person with a special ability with plants will manipulate them with his/her fingers as a medium to project his special talent onto the plants. This reasoning seems possible in English but not in Spanish. This entailment is based on folk theories applied to very specific situations, and it is this type of cultural reasoning which establishes the metaphorical relationship between the domain of "plants" and the domain of "abilities" "or talents". Thus, A SPECIAL ABILITY IS PROYECTED THROUGH PHYSICAL CONTACT would be a sub-metaphor of the more general one ABILITY IS MANIPULATION. However, these idioms are close to the metonymic end where the domains of "plants", "ability" and "manipulation" may be considered correlated.

The Spanish idiom *verde y con asas*, referring to "obvious ideas or events" is also based on cultural motivation. In this case, the origin is not transparent for most speakers because the literal referent is specific of the Andalusia region, mainly in villages, and it has not been used for a long time.[3]

(47) A partir de aquí, **verde y con asas**.

In this idiom, certain objects or activities are associated to a certain quality or state, in this case "obvious" to "being ignorant". Cultural logic or reasoning is at play. For the expression *verde y con asas*, the most salient characteristics of an object are chosen to refer to that object. So the metonymy CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES STAND FOR THE OBJECT underlies this reasoning. It follows the folk entailment that these features are significantly outstanding in order to recognize the object, therefore, something obvious. The metaphorical mapping appears when we establish the relationship between the recognition of an object and the domain of ideas or events by which IDENTIFYING FEATURES OF THAT IDEA OR EVENT ARE THE OUTSTANDING FEATURES FOR THE RECOGNITION OF AN OBJECT.

Both in English and Spanish *to be green* / *estar verde* expresses the metonymy GREEN FOR UNRIPE, based on the experiential fact that a fruit is ripe or unripe depending on the time that it stays on the tree, unripe fruit being usually green. Thus, there exists an experientially cultural correlation between the fact of something being ripe or unripe, with the passing of time. This correlation provides the necessary entailment to link the domain of fruits with the domain of human development. Therefore, the passing of time in the domain of human development is linked to the acquisition of experience, giving rise to an underlying metaphorical structure such as MORE EXPERIENCE IS MORE TIME / LESS EXPERIENCE IS LESS TIME.[4] The relationships between the domain of fruits and the domain of people give rise both in English and in Spanish to the same metaphor: LACK OF EXPERIENCE IS GREEN.

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3. El dicho completo es «verde y con asas, alcarraza». The alcarraza is a type of drinking jug with spout frequently green and very typical of Southern Spain.
4. This metaphor is also present in sayings such as *más sabe el diablo por viejo que por diablo* (The devil knows more for being old than for being the devil).

(48) I flew as co-pilot, we had a veteran pilot who would be Aeroplane Commander, the rest of the crew **was green** or also on their first mission.
(49) Figo no llega desde la banda con las fuerzas necesarias, Moreno **está verde** y Bakero no puede ya librar una batalla partido sí y otro también.

In English, the metaphorical idiom *green as grass* also refers to "lack of experience". Here, the metaphorical reading is reinforced by the metaphorical meaning of *green* as in the previous case. The simile structure just reinforces the concept denoted by the colour.

(50) […] **as green as grass**, […] like a bunch of lost chickens outside the coop.

In both languages the metonymy GREEN FOR UNRIPE is also at the base of other metaphorical uses of *green*. In this case, the metaphorical mappings occur between two physical or concrete domains, what Collins and Gentner (1987) called 'analogies'. However, when the concept of unripe is mapped onto the domain of things, it develops different metaphorical meanings in each language.

In English we find the use of *green* to refer to not processed food:

(51) 2 x 15ml/tbsp olive oil 1 large onion, finely sliced 225g/8oz **green bacon**, diced 25g/1oz whole-wheat flour bay leaf […]

However, when applied to things, *verde* in Spanish also refers to things that are not totally processed, set or fixed, and need re-examination, as in (52):

(52) CUARENTA días después de las elecciones […] el pacto **está verde**.

Thus, the metaphor UNPROCESSED THINGS ARE GREEN is valid in both languages. In the case of English, the sub-metaphor applied is NON PROCESSED FOOD IS GREEN, whereas, in Spanish, NOT FINISHED PROCESSES ARE GREEN.

Furthermore, in English, collocations with *green* are closer to the metonymic end because the domains of application are too close conceptually, food and fruits, whereas in the case of Spanish, the metaphor is more abstract, as the domains are very different - food vs. non-food things - therefore it is a more developed metaphor within the metonymy-metaphor continuum.

In Spanish, the idiom *a buenas horas mangas verdes* means that something is done too late.

(53) Salamanca es capital cultural de estos y otros reinos, desde hace casi 800 años. Así que, **a buenas horas mangas verdes**.

This idiom originated as a metonymy from a fact that belongs to the Spanish anecdotal history. In the seventeenth century the members of the Spanish Inquisition dressed in green, acted as members of the armed forces, and always arrived late when needed because they had to get to far-away places. The whole idiom probably comes

from the much repeated exclamation at the late arrival of these forces. The first metonymy derives from the sleeves of the uniform of these soldiers, therefore, a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. However, to this general metonymy, the fact that the attention is also concentrated on the colour of that part is added, so THE PART AND THE COLOUR OF THE PART FOR THE PERSON.

Also in English we have the collocation *green shoots* which coexists in its literal and metaphorical usage:

(54) a bush with round purplish leaves and pale **green shoots**.
(55) the Law Society has had to face the question of how to achieve its strategic aims […] in the absence […] of the promised **green shoots** of economic recovery.

It is related to the concept of "rebirth". In this case, it has a clear metonymic origin. This collocation belongs primarily to the domain of plants, and the use of *green* is related to the metonymy GREEN FOR UNRIPE which reinforces the core meaning of *shoots*, as it refers to the first stages of growth. This collocation is related to the concept of blooming of plants, and the observation of that blooming with the appearance of tiny plants in the branches, thus the underlying metonymy GREEN SHOOTS FOR BLOOMING. But when this metonymy is mapped onto "events", the relationship between the domain of plants and the domain of non-living things provides the metonymy-based metaphor FIRST SIGNS ARE GREEN SHOOTS.

Moreover, there is an idiom highly productive in both languages: to give, receive somebody the *green light* / *luz verde,* still quite close to the metonymic origin, although towards the metaphor, at least to a certain extent, because of change of context:

(56) General Thurman still had to receive a final **green light** from the president.
(57) […] el Consejo Superior de Tráfico que ayer dio **luz verde** al Plan Nacional de Seguridad Vial para el 2001.

The metonymy in relation to green is based on cultural principles assigned to the colour green. By social agreement the colour *green* is related to the concept of permission, thus the cultural metonymy GREEN FOR PERMISSION/ALLOWANCE. As this cultural value of green is most frequently coded by means of light, a green light has become the most common image of giving permission. When there is no physical light, this idiom is still metonymic, but there is a certain degree of broadening of abstract meaning as in the previous examples.

Another collocation is *green channel* (free of charge), which has a clear metonymic origin as THE COLOUR THAT DISTINGUISHES THE PLACE STANDS FOR THE PLACE:

(58) If you stared at a customs officer when going out through the **green channel,** the customs officer stopped you.

However, in example (59) the use of *green channel* outside the context of the customs site in the airport suggests a certain degree of higher abstraction due to the

generalization of the meaning, so it can be said not to be exactly at the metonymic end but in the continuum between metonymy and metaphor.

(59) It failed to gain permission for "**green channel**" facilities for the re-exports.

The expression *green field* can be used metonymically as in (60) or metaphorically as in (61) indicating that something is "unspoilt and open to new experiences".

(60) Cramlington is 'non-urban' (…) located on a '**green field**' site quite separate from the Tyneside conurbation.
(61) The organisation is regarded as a '**green field**', able and willing both to accept and adapt to a completely changed information systems environment.

Nowadays, a green field does not necessarily have to be neither green, nor even a field, it can be just a place where nothing is built on. But originally, places where nothing was built on where literally green fields. Thus, the use of the descriptive expression with a generalization of meaning implies a metonymy of the type DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF THE PLACE, whereby the fact of being a green implies being available for construction. In this case the domains of availability and allowance are getting closer.

In the case of (61), we see a broadening of meaning by generalization which is, in turn, achieved by a change of context. Nevertheless, this expression in this type of context is still close to the metonymic end of the continuum.

Moreover, *Green belt* can be used metonymically (62) or more metaphorically as in (63) although still close to the metonymic end.

(62) 2,000 hospitals and clinics, some in **Green Belt areas** are surplus to requirements.
(63) The London Planning Advisory Committee […] recommends the upgrading of all metropolitan open space to **Green Belt status**.

The frequent collocation *green book* comes from the British rule over India.[5] Originally an official publication of the Indian Government with a green cover, nowadays, *green book* refers to a set of regulations, not necessarily legal or Parliamentary. Thus, it is used outside its original political and legal environment. Although metonymic in origin, it is located in the continuum between metonymy and metaphor, being more metaphoric in (65).[6]

(64) The Manual […] a single document which complements the Company's **Green Book** of financial procedures.

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5. Also, it may refer metonymically to Gadaffi's Green book that also has a green cover.
6. In the European Community: Green Paper. Commission Green Papers are documents intended to stimulate debate and launch a process of consultation at European level on a particular Topic. These consultations may then lead to the publication of a White Paper, i.e. practical proposals for Community action.

4. Conclusion

Conclusions to this paper have to be tentative. The study of metaphors and metonymies in everyday language lexicalized expressions depends primarily on the interpreter. The problem of the distinction between concepts that belong to the same or to different domains depends to a great extent on the divisions made by the person who carries out the analysis and his/her perspective on the nature of the correlations and the type of entailments that are needed to find a motivation for non-literal meanings.

In addition, it is possible to see a cline in the continuum between literal and metaphorical meanings, but not always within the same expression. There are examples where only metonymic readings are found, and others where metonymic and metaphorical mappings can be suggested. There are also examples of literal and not so literal meanings where a basic metonymy may be proposed for part of the expression rather than for the meaning of the whole, which seems to be on its way to a metaphorization process. This is mainly due to a change of the situational contexts to which the expression is put to serve.

Finally, the continuum, although it has literal and metaphorical ends, shows a central part made up of chains of entailments, not necessarily metaphorical, but based predominantly on cultural or folk knowledge, as well as on value judgements assigned to colours by the members of the linguistic community.

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The Construction of the Concept Internet through Metaphors

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ABSTRACT: The expressions by which we refer to the Internet reveal how we conceptualize it. Rather than "a network of networks of computers", as it is usually defined, we actually perceive and experience the Internet as a PLACE. This paper will particularly analyse THE INTERNET IS A CITY as one of the most productive metaphors that shape the concept INTERNET in English, whereas THE INTERNET IS A SEA seems to be the most common metaphor for Spanish speakers. Finally, some possible reasons and consequences for this variation will be advanced .

Keywords: metaphor, Internet, conceptualization.

RESUMEN: Las expresiones con las que nos referimos a Internet y a sus posibles usos revelan cómo lo conceptualizamos. Más que «una red de redes de ordenadores», como normalmente se la define, percibimos y experimentamos Internet como un LUGAR. Este trabajo analiza concretamente la metáfora INTERNET ES UNA CIUDAD como una de las más productivas para formar el concepto INTERNET en inglés, mientras que INTERNET ES UN MAR parece ser la metáfora más habitual para los hablantes de español. Finalmente, se consideran algunas de las posibles razones y consecuencias de esta variación.

Palabras clave: metáfora, Internet, conceptualización.

1. Introduction

The Internet is the big revolution of the 20th century. Its impact has been compared to that of the printing press, the telephone and the television. As a matter of fact, the Internet is not only another sophisticated means of communication, but it has also profoundly affected the way in which we work, study or even socialize. Its effects on the language, on the several languages used for the Internet, are also extremely significant. Much work has already been devoted to analyzing the language in the Internet, especially considering that it is such a recent phenomenon (Cumming, 1995; Davis; Brewer, 1997; Ihnatko, 1997; Baron, 1998; Gains, 1998; Hale; Scanlon, 1999; Crystal,

2001; Shortis, 2001; Posteguillo, 2003; among others), as well as its influence on ordinary speech both in English and in other languages (Erickson, 1998; Lebert, 1999; Lan, 2000; Thomas, 2000). By contrast, little has been said about the language we use to speak about the Internet itself, namely those expressions, mostly metaphorical, like *surfing the web* or *information highway* (Stefik, 1996; Ratzan, 2000; Núñez, 2004; Polley, 2006). The expressions by which we refer to this concept are the key to understand how the Internet is conceived and experienced and will therefore affect the way in which we interact with it. This paper will analyze how we talk about the Internet, that is, the common metaphorical expressions by which we usually refer to the Internet and to the various things we can do on it, in order to find out how the Internet is perceived by its users and how the concept INTERNET is constructed in their minds.

The Internet is widely spread in our lives. We all roughly know what it is and how it works, but it is still an elusive concept that we can only fully apprehend by projecting on it what we know better from other areas of experience. We can learn that the Internet is a network of networks connecting millions of computers all around the world so that we can have access to the information stored in any of them. However, for most of us, who are not experts, the idea of such a big amount of connections and all those data travelling through the lines can make us a bit dizzy. For this reason, we prefer to make use of conceptual metaphors in order to shape the concept and make it more manageable.

Metaphors are a very useful tool to interpret reality. The world around us is in permanent change and we must cope with new information and new experiences all the time. Metaphorical projections allow us to understand what is new in terms of what we already know, and to manage complex concepts in terms of other more familiar ones. This is also the case when we have to deal with something as new and impressive as the Internet.

In the following sections, we will see that the Internet is not experienced as a network of computers, but rather as a big container in which we *load* different kinds of things, or else we *search* in it to find others. Since this is the way in which we interact with the Internet, this is also the way in which we conceptualize it, therefore THE INTERNET IS A BIG CONTAINER. We will also see how from this *basic*, *ontological* metaphor (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2002) some other richer, structural metaphors are derived which better evidence how the Internet is perceived and experienced, such as THE INTERNET IS AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA or THE INTERNET IS A CITY. Furthermore, I will consider the possibility that the expressions by which inexperienced users learn about the Internet can affect their perception of it. In order to evidence this, the different metaphors used by English- and Spanish-speaking users will be contrasted.

As for the sample sentences that illustrate the metaphors shaping the concept, all of them have been taken from a number of websites on the Internet. As the aim of this paper is the analysis of the linguistic expressions that Internet users employ to refer to the Internet, it seems obvious that the Internet itself must be the first source. As Posteguillo puts it: "I believe that in netlinguistics language users' views – i.e. Internet users' opinions – are essential in the description and interpretation of language change in cyberspace" (Posteguillo, 2003: 22). Besides, as this work is concerned with the construction of the concept, the websites visited were mostly forums and guides or tutorials for beginners, because expert users like to use more technical, non-metaphorical

terms, e.g. *URL* instead of *address*, and *download* rather than *open a webpage*. The websites consulted have not been listed, though, because it would be too laborious and still irrelevant for the present analysis, since the sample sentences collected are quite common ones and most of them can be also encountered in common speech.

2. The Ontological Metaphor: The Internet is a Container

As stated above, the Internet, as perceived by its users, is more than just a network of networks of computers as it is often defined. The experience of accessing the Internet in order to send or receive information could be included in what Kövecses calls "undelineated experiences" and so, it can be given a "more delineated status via ontological metaphors" (Kövecses, 2002: 35). As Kövecses explains it, we typically conceptualize our experiences in terms of objects, substances and containers, e.g. IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, or THE VISUAL FIELD IS A CONTAINER. This way we can refer to the target concept, quantify it and better identify different aspects of the experience (see Lakoff; Johnson, 1980: 25 ff.). Still, at this general level, we cannot understand much of the concept, so ontological metaphors are actually the basis of structural metaphors. In fact, the CONTAINER metaphor is a very frequent one in our conceptual system and there are many abstract concepts that we usually understand in terms of physical containers, including events, actions and states (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980: 30 ff.).

Under the metaphor THE INTERNET IS A BIG CONTAINER, we conceptualize the Internet as a sort of big box where people *store* so many things so that other people can go, *search* the box and if they *find* what they need, they can *load* it *down* from the container and take it to their PCs.[1] The metaphor is evidenced in sentences like the following:

(1) Let's see what I can find *in the Internet* about it.
(2) You can use some resources *stored* in the Internet.
(3) I often *download* music and films *from* the Internet.
(4) I *searched* the net for pictures of the lake.

However, this is not enough in order to fully apprehend a concept. We need richer, more specific metaphors if we are to understand what the Internet is and how it works. As a matter of fact, we will need more than one metaphor in order to consider the different aspects of the concept.

> The fact that people possess alternative, metaphorical models of many experiences and abstract ideas is not a problem, because two different conceptualizations are often needed to solve different types of real-world problems [...] (Gibbs, 1998: 108)

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1. The INTERNET IS A CONTAINER is a metaphor motivated by our experience with the Internet, but it could also be considered a consequence of another common metaphor in the field of computers: THE COMPUTER IS A CONTAINER (see Porto Requejo, 2006 *a*). It is quite straightforward that if A COMPUTER IS A CONTAINER, then A NETWORK OF COMPUTERS IS A BIGGER CONTAINER.

Besides, CONTAINER is just a schematic concept and there is not much of it that we can map onto the concept INTERNET, so further structural, rich metaphors will be derived from this. Structural metaphors created for the construction of a particular concept are not predictable, but they are motivated by the "perceived structural similarity" between the two concepts (Kövecses, 2002: 71 ff.). Perceived similarities are not objective and they usually arise from experience, or can be induced by the basic ontological metaphors that the two concepts have in common.

We will now see some of the most common structural metaphors that shape the concept INTERNET. Most of the source concepts are also containers, thus experiential motivation will be given in order to understand how these metaphors are motivated. Finally, we will see that other metaphors are possible, for example, those developed by Spanish speakers, even if the motivation underlying is still the same.

3. The Internet is an Encyclopaedia

Since the Internet is mostly used to search for information, the Internet is also conceived as a big book, a sort of huge encyclopaedia, containing information about almost anything. Then, THE INTERNET IS AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA with a huge amount of (*web*)*pages* that you *browse* looking up for some specific information:

(5) The *browser* will *open* the *webpages* and allow you to *read hypertext*.
(6) If you find something interesting, you can *bookmark* it so you can go back to it easily.

As a matter of fact, this is not a very productive metaphor and only a small part of the concept ENCYCLOPAEDIA has actually been mapped onto the concept INTERNET.

The pages in the encyclopaedia	the web pages
The text written in the book	the hypertext
To look up for some information	to search the net
To open the book on a page	to download a webpage
To browse the book	to download another web-page (with a browser)
Bookmarks on the book	stored URLs

There may be a number of other possible mappings that have not been developed and therefore do not show up in the linguistic expressions commonly used to speak about the Internet. The emergence of other metaphors that have proved to be far more productive could be one of the reasons why the ENCYCLOPAEDIA metaphor has not developed further.

4. The Internet is a Place

Places are usually conceptualized as containers. Rooms and houses are obvious containers, but we also perceive unbounded places as containers, even the visual field

can be seen as a container, as evidenced by expressions such as *I have him in sight* (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980: 30).

As stated above, the Internet is a container, but it is also a place, the place where you go when you want, for instance, to send a mail, find some information or to meet someone. This is the way in which we experience the Internet. Furthermore, the perceived similarity between the two concepts, INTERNET and PLACE, is probably induced by the basic ontological metaphors THE INTERNET IS A CONTAINER and PLACES ARE CONTAINERS (see Figure 1). In Kövecses's words: "If two concepts (one abstract, the other concrete) share this basic shape or status, this can induce the perception of certain structural similarities between the two" (Kövecses, 2002: 72).



Figure 1. Perceived structural similarity between the concepts INTERNET and PLACE

I would say that THE INTERNET IS A PLACE is the most extended and productive metaphor, considering the number of metaphorical expressions that arise from it, as well as the various specifications that it has developed. Actually, it is so frequent that it is difficult to find an example where only another metaphor, say the ENCYCLOPAEDIA metaphor, is present without combining with the PLACE metaphor:

(7) This *webpage* has had hundreds of *visitors* in a week.
[ENCYCLOPAEDIA] + [PLACE]
(8) You can *browse* the *site* using the *navigation* on the left.
[ENCYCLOPAEDIA] + [PLACE] + [PLACE]
(9) The fact that we may *surf* from a *webpage* to another […]
[PLACE (SEA)] + [ENCYCLOPAEDIA]

However, this is still a high level metaphor, i.e. it is too abstract and too general so as to be useful. PLACE is a superordinate level concept, a wide category that can include quite different kinds of *places*: from physical bounded spaces, such as a *room* or a *drawer*, to more abstract ones like *the right place on the shelf*, or even some metaphorical ones like the *social position*. Consequently, the PLACE metaphor needs to be further elaborated in more concrete terms if it is going to be of any help to construct a mental image of what the Internet is, how it works and the different purposes it can be used for.

According to Lakoff (1993) there is a hierarchy of metaphors from the most abstract general ones at the superordinate level to the most specific instances; and whereas it is at the superordinate level that metaphorical mappings occur, it is at the lower levels where mental images are rich in detail:

> The basic level is the level of rich mental images and rich knowledge structures. A mapping at the superordinate level maximizes the possibilities for mapping rich conceptual structures in the source domain onto the target domain, since it permits many basic level instances, each of which is information rich [...] (Lakoff, 1993, 212)

Therefore, it is at more specific levels that metaphors are useful because, when it comes to making a concept more manageable, the richer the image the better.

Thus, we may perceive the Internet as a working place, a relaxing place or a meeting place, for instance. Depending on what aspects of the concept INTERNET we want to highlight, different specifications are possible, and each one will provide a slightly different model for the Internet: as a WORKING PLACE, a RELAXING PLACE, a MEETING PLACE, or just a STORING PLACE. Figure 2 displays some of the most common specifications of the PLACE metaphor in English, as evidenced by the sample sentences collected.



Figure 2. Specifications of the PLACE metaphor

THE INTERNET IS THE OUTER SPACE lays an emphasis on the huge size of the Net. The Internet is then perceived as an unlimited place (*the cyberspace*) that some people (*internauts*) explore, where there are no roads or paths to follow, so that *internauts* must find their way in it, i.e., they must *navigate* the Net. Also, if they move from a website to another by clicking on a link, it is as if they *jumped* in *hyperspace*, which is a common expression in science fiction.

(10) We encourage young *Internauts* to *explore cyberspace*.
(11) We can create links that can *jump* directly into a specific section on a page.

Also, we may want to shape the concept THE INTERNET as A BIG SHOWROOM, i.e. a place where we can display any information, work, pictures, etc., so that other people can see them.

(12) We will digitalise and *upload to the Internet* all the pictures of tourist sites.

Besides, the Internet is also the place where people can socialize, make friends, join discussions, play games, as in a CLUB, for instance, with even some private areas, too, that you can only access if you have got a *password*.

(13) you can join *discussions, play games, meet people*, etc. on the Internet.

Finally, if we put it all together, the Internet is the place where you can work, study, socialize, go shopping, go sightseeing, make virtual tours, have your own address…, that is, THE INTERNET IS A CITY.

(14) Type the *address* of the *website* you want to *visit*.

This has proved to be the most productive metaphor, with a significant number of mappings, and so it deserves a deeper analysis in the following section.

5. The Internet is a City

The Internet has grown enormously in a relatively short time. Rather than a network of computers, it has become a network of services. In the Internet you can find *online shops*, *online banks*, *online libraries*, *online education*…, besides *e-business* and *e-commerce*, just the same as in a big city. This conceptualization is evidenced in the way we interact with the Internet, as well as in the language we use to speak about it. Consider the following examples:

(15) *Visit* our *website*.
(16) You can *build* your own *site* and *host* it in a server.
(17) If you already know the *address of the site* you're looking for, type it in.
(18) This *site* is *under construction*.
(19) Our web server automatically gives us a report of the overall *traffic of the site*.
(20) Don't forget to include *a map of the web* in your *website*.
(21) The site offers a *Virtual Tour* of Antarctica and South Pole Station.
(22) It's important for all new *Internet citizens*, also called *netizens*, to remember that there are other surfers out there.
(23) *The internet community* had already begun serious debate on the matter.
(24) If a *hacker breaks into* one of these sites, he can steal some sensitive information.
(25) You'll have to *build a firewall* to protect your *site* from hackers.

Whenever you read a webfile on the Internet, it is said you are *visiting a website* (15). These *sites* are often *hosted* in large servers (16). If you want to read a specific file,

that is, if you want to *go* to a definite *site* in the Internet, you will need to know the (*URL*) *address* (17), otherwise you may want to look it up in the yellow and white pages of the Internet (www.wayp.com) or search the whole place by using a search engine. Sometimes, you cannot *visit* a site because it is *under construction* (18), which means it is still being *built*. However, it is also possible that too many people try to visit the same site at the same time, that is, there is too much *traffic* to the site (19) and you cannot access it. Also, while visiting a large site, you may get lost. If so, you may need a *map of the web* to find your way in the site (20). Moreover, in this big city, the Internet, you can become a tourist, you can go sightseeing and make *virtual tours* of museums, art galleries or several other buildings (21).

Furthermore, the communication among the Internet users is possible through an extensive service of *e-mail*, with the corresponding share of *junk mail* or spam. Those who behave well in the city and engage in the development and good use of the Internet are called *netizens* (22). They follow the rules (*netiquette*) and consider themselves a *community* (23). On the other hand, in the Internet there is also crime. There are burglars, i.e. *hackers*, who break into some sites without authorization (24), so you may want to build a wall (*firewall*) to prevent them from entering your site (25). What is more, in the Internet there are also vandals (*crackers*), spies (*spyware*) and even *hijackers* who can force a PC to perform a task that the owner did not intend it to do, not to mention those who spread viruses intentionally. All these mappings are summarized in Table 1.

A CITY		THE INTERNET
inhabitants	☐	netizens, (cyber)community, netiquette
buildings and streets	☐	websites, sites under construction, to host a site, URL addresses, e-mail boxes, traffic
services	☐	online libraries, banks, online shopping, education, e-work, e-business…
tourism	☐	visitors to a site, virtual tours, web maps
crime	☐	hackers, crackers, spyware, hijackers

Table 1. Summary of the mappings for THE INTERNET IS A CITY

Thus, by speaking of *sites*, *addresses*, *traffic* and *netizens*, instead of such things as *webfiles* or *Uniform Resource Locators* (URLs), for instance, the Internet becomes something familiar, manageable even for those who are not experts. It is easier to see the Internet as a city where you move around and visit the sites than imagine all the flow of data travelling at high speed through the wires linking millions of computers interconnected all around the world.

6. The Place Metaphor in Spanish: A Dangerous Sea

Most of the metaphors of the Internet are equivalent in English and Spanish, as most of them are inherited by Spanish speakers when the original English expressions

are translated. However, their salience is often different in either language, which may result in different conceptualizations, as we will see.[2]

Compare the consistency of the ENCYCLOPAEDIA metaphor in the following equivalent sentences:

(26) If you open a *webpage* in your *browser* and find it interesting, you can *bookmark* it so you can find it again easily.
(27) Si abres una *página web* en tu *navegador* (navigator) y te parece interesante, puedes añadirla a tu *lista de favoritos* (list of favourites) para volver a ella con facilidad.

In Spanish, webfiles are also conceived as pages, but the *browser* is usually translated as *navegador* (navigator) or *explorador* (explorer) and the *bookmarks* are referred to as *favoritos* (favourites). We can conclude, then, that the ENCYCLOPAEDIA metaphor is less salient in Spanish than it is in English.

On the contrary, the PLACE metaphor is probably stronger in Spanish. There are two main reasons for this to be so. In the first place, the name of the thing, *the Internet*, is easily decomposable for English speakers, for whom the *Inter-net* will always be a *net*. In Spanish, however, *the Internet* is not translated, it keeps the capital initial and drops the article, which means that *Internet* becomes a proper noun in Spanish, the foreign name of a place. Therefore, for Spanish speakers, THE INTERNET IS A FOREIGN PLACE.

(28) En *Internet* puedes encontrar información sobre cualquier cosa.
(In **Internet you can find the information about anything)

What is more, sometimes, when translated as *la red* (the net), the name is still preserved:

(29) Son muchos los recursos que *la red Internet* (*the net Internet) ofrece para la enseñanza.

In the second place, there is no equivalence in Spanish for the preposition *on* with the sense of "connected". This means that *on the Internet* is translated as *en Internet* (*in Internet), which obviously makes both the CONTAINER and the PLACE metaphors stronger; even more if we consider that the action of accessing the Internet is commonly referred to as *entrar en Internet* (to enter Internet) and logging off as *salir de Internet* (to leave Internet)

(30) Con este ordenador no puedo *entrar en Internet*.

As for the several specifications of the PLACE metaphors in Spanish, they are roughly the same, i.e. we can also find examples in Spanish where the Internet is conceptualized as THE OUTER SPACE, A BIG NOTICE BOARD (rather than A SHOWROOM)[3] or A

2. For a more comprehensive research on the contrast of both conceptualizations in English and Spanish, see Porto Requejo (2006 *b*).
3. For Spanish speakers, THE INTERNET IS A NOTICE BOARD, rather than A SHOWROOM, because the most common expression to mean *uploading something on the Internet* is *colgar* (to hang or put up).

CITY, but, once again, there is a different degree of entrenchment. Thus, the CITY metaphor is not as consistent in Spanish as it is in English. In Spanish, there are also *sites*, *visitors*, *addresses*, but the terms *netizens* and *netiquette*, for instance, have become loanwords without a translation in Spanish, while phrases like *ciudadanos de la red*, that are often used in Spanish as an equivalent, lack the emphasis and the strong associations of the English blends.

Instead of the CITY, the SEA seems to be the source concept to shape the concept INTERNET in Spanish; and THE INTERNET IS A SEA proves to be the most productive metaphor, as it has a higher number of significant mappings. Consider the following examples:

(31) Ayer estuve varias horas *navegando por Internet*.
(Yesterday I spent several hours **sailing* **in Internet)*

(32) Para el correcto funcionamiento de las páginas necesitas un *navegador* con JavaScript y Cookies activos.
(For the right functioning of the pages, you need a **navigator* with active JavaScript and Cookies)

(33) Si el *navegante* lo prefiere, puede *surfear* en la Red con toda seguridad.
(If the ***sailor* likes it better, he can *surf* ***in* the Net safely)

(34) Los *piratas informáticos* pueden intentar robar información sobre sus cuentas bancarias.
(IT *pirates* may try to steal information on your bank accounts)

Among the possible causes for this variation, I would point out that the translation of the term *navigate* has played a major role in the development of the SEA metaphor in Spanish. Moving from a site to another in the Internet is usually referred to as *navigate* in English and *navegar* (to sail) in Spanish. Even if the Spanish word has also the sense of *finding one's way*, just the same as *navigate*, the truth is that this is not the most salient sense for the word, which is mostly used by professionals of aviation or as a nautical term. In fact, the most common sense of *navegar* is *sailing*, and the introduction in the last years of another term, *surfing*, Spanish *surfear*, also related to the sea, has actually reinforced the SEA metaphor in Spanish by only adding the idea of a higher speed to the meaning of *navegar*. What is more, the program that allows navigation is not a *browser* in Spanish, but a *navegador* (navigator, a sort of sailing device), using the same root of *navigating*, or *explorador* (explorer);[4] and the Internet users are called *internautas* or *navegantes* (sailors) (33). Besides, the term *hackers* is usually translated as *piratas informáticos* (IT pirates) (34), which definitely makes the INTERNET a SEA. See Table 2 for the most significant specifications of the PLACE metaphor in Spanish as a consequence of such terminology.

Another possible cause for the development of the SEA metaphor in Spanish could be what Kövecses calls the *broader cultural context* (Kövecses, 2002: 186). In turn, Geeraerts; Grondelaers (1995) consider the relationship between the conception of *anger* today and the classical-medieval humoral theory. In a similar way, the historical tradition

4. There are other terms for the browser like *hojeador* (browser) or visualizador (*visualizer) but they have not been widely accepted.

of sailors and explorers in Spanish culture, namely Christopher Columbus and the discovery of America, could account for the consistency of the SEA metaphor in Spanish.

English		Spanish	
the Internet the Net	☐	Internet La red Internet	THE INTERNET IS A FOREIGN PLACE
to log on / in	☐	Entrar (enter) en Internet	
to log off / out	☐	Salir (exit) de Internet	
to be on the net	☐	estar en (in) Internet	
navigate / surf	☐	Navegar (sail) / Surfear	THE INTERNET IS A SEA
Browser	☐	Navegador (sailing device) Explorador (explorer)	
Internet users	☐	Internautas Navegantes (sailors)	
Hackers	☐	Piratas (pirates)	

Table 2. The PLACE metaphor in Spanish

Therefore, Spanish speakers construct quite a different concept for the Internet. Whereas for English speakers the Internet is a familiar place, a city full of services to wander around and search for anything they may need, a community of citizens that follow the rules, for Spanish speakers, it is a foreign place, a dangerous, unknown sea that must be explored to find what you want, but where you must be aware of pirates and other dangers with foreign, untranslated names.

Given such contrasting conceptualizations of the Internet in English and in Spanish, the question arises as to whether the construction of so different mental pictures of the concept can affect the interaction of English and Spanish speakers with the Internet, especially for beginners, who learn about the Internet before actually using it.

7. Conclusions

The Internet is quite a complex concept to be managed by those who are not experts, and most Internet users are not so. For this reason, we speak and think of the Internet in terms of other familiar concepts. This way, we could say that the Internet becomes a "user-friendly" concept.

THE INTERNET IS A PLACE seems to be the most productive and entrenched metaphor for the Internet. It is easier to conceive it as a physical, bounded place than thinking about millions of bytes travelling in a huge network of computers. Furthermore, among the possible specifications of this high-level metaphor, THE INTERNET IS A CITY has become the most extensive one, as it has developed a higher number of mappings, to the point that most of the vocabulary of the Internet comes from city features and services: *e-mail*, *address*, *tours*, *traffic*, *netizens*… As a consequence, English speakers perceive

the Internet as a familiar place where you can access so many services and resources, a big network that you can navigate for a specific destiny or surf randomly just for the fun of it.

However, as evidenced by the examples above, Spanish speakers have developed a different PLACE metaphor to conceptualize the Internet. Often, as a result of some partial or even impossible translations, and maybe influenced by history and tradition, Spanish-speaking Internet users do not *navigate*, but *sail* and consequently there are not *netizens* and *hackers*, but *sailors* and *pirates*. The mental picture of the Internet for a Spanish speaker is, then, less familiar and friendly. It is still a place, but a dangerous one where you might get lost if you are not an experienced navigator, an Internaut.

It seems obvious that the expressions that we hear and read and those by which we first learn about a concept affect the way in which speakers of a language construct that concept. If so, the differences in the mental images of the Internet for Spanish and English speakers must influence the way in which they each experience the Internet. If the Internet is a vast, unexplored sea with a foreign name for Spanish speakers, this could explain why Spaniards are among the most reluctant users of the Internet in Europe.

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REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS CULTURALES DE LA UNIVERSITAT JAUME I / *CULTURAL STUDIES JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITAT JAUME I*

Internet Metaphors: a Cross-Linguistic Perspective

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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this article is to discuss whether there is any connection between the understanding of a metaphorical concept which emerged in a foreign language and the linguistic means, e.g. loan-translation, loanword, etc., through which this concept is verbalized in other linguistic communities. It is argued that *website* cannot be translated into German as *Netzort* (website), because *website* as it is understood by speakers of German is not a place on the Internet, as the English metaphor seems to suggest, but a collection of connected web-pages. Similarly, *firewall* is not a wall designed to prevent the spread of fire, but a software product that protects against hackers and other malicious intruders.

Keywords: conceptual metaphor, language contact, Internet metaphors, loan-translation, loanword, popular etymology.

RESUMEN: El propósito de este artículo es debatir si hay alguna conexión entre la comprensión de un concepto metafórico surgido en un idioma extranjero y los medios lingüísticos, es decir la préstamo-traducción, el préstamo y otros, a través de los que este concepto está verbalizado en otras comunidades lingüísticas. Se argumenta que el *website* no se puede traducir al alemán como *Netzort* (website), porque website por sí mismo no es entendido por los hablantes de alemán como un lugar en Internet, lo que la metáfora inglesa parece sugerir, sino como una colección de páginas Web conectadas. De forma similar, el *firewall* no es una pared diseñada para prevenir la extensión del fuego, sino un producto de software que protege contra *hackers* y otros intrusos malévolos.

Palabras clave: metáfora conceptual, lenguas en contacto, metáforas en Internet, préstamo-traducción, préstamo, etimología popular.

1. Introduction

The point of departure of the 2nd International Workshop on *Metaphor and Discourse*: *Where Cognition and Communication Meet*[1] was the well-known conceptual

1. I would like to thank everyone who commented on a presentation of this paper at the *Metaphor and Discourse* workshop on February 2-3, 2006.

theory of metaphor formulated in the landmark work by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (L&J) – *Metaphors We Live by* (1980). The focus of this approach is not on individual instances of metaphorisation, but on abstract cognitive structures which underlie the metaphorical use of a group of semantically related items. For example, *attack* in *He attacked every weak point in my argument*; *demolish* in *I demolished his argument*; *target* in *his arguments were right on target*, etc are linguistic realizations of the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, in which the domain of ARGUMENT is partially structured around the domain of WAR.

One point of criticism which can be addressed to L&J is that in the conceptual theory of metaphor no significant role is attributed to the diachronic dimension (see Jäkel, 2003: 49-55). Whereas for a historical semanticist (see Sperber, 1923; Ullmann, 1957; Waldron, 1967; Anttila, 1972; Hock, 1986; Blank 1997) metaphor is mainly a mechanism of semantic change, L&J treat metaphor as a synchronic phenomenon,[2] laying special emphasis on conventionalized metaphorical structures, such as e.g. ARGUMENT IS WAR, MORE IS UP (e.g. *my income rose last year*), LOVE IS JOURNEY (e.g. *our marriage is on the rocks*), TIME IS RESOURCE (e.g. *she is wasting her time*), IDEAS ARE OBJECTS (e.g. *Sally has an idea*) etc.

The fact that the diachronic aspect can be successfully integrated into the conceptual theory of metaphor has been (among other linguists[3]) recognized by students of computer/Internet terminology (e.g. Rohrer, 1997; Schnadwinkel, 2002; Lombard, 2005). Consider, for example, computer-related meanings of *file* ('a collection of data stored and retrieved under a single name'), *folder* ('a collection of files'), *trash can* ('a container for deleted files or folders'), etc. It can be argued that the semantic development undergone by these expressions was triggered by the conceptual metaphor COMPUTER SCREEN IS OFFICE, in which objects on a computer screen are represented as office tools.

It must be also noted that COMPUTER SCREEN IS OFFICE as well as many other conceptual metaphors which emerged in the English linguistic community became part of conceptual systems of other languages. For example, German *Ordner* ('folder'), *Datei* ('file'), *Papierkorb* ('trash can'), etc acquired the same meanings of objects on a computer screen as their equivalents in English. Similarly, *Posteingang* ('inbox'), *verschicken* ('to send'), *Adresse* ('address'), etc. can now be used with respect to both traditional and electronic mail.

Apart from semantic calques similar to *folder* > *Ordner*, *inbox* > *Posteingang*, *trash can* > *Papierkorb*, etc., new metaphorical concepts may emerge as a consequence of direct importations of source language (SL) lexical material. In connection with loanwords, there arises the question how speakers of a target language (TL) understand metaphorical concepts verbalized by SL original expressions. Whereas the loan-translation *folder* > *Ordner* indicates that speakers of German understand the concept [FOLDER] in the same way as speakers of English, it is not quite clear what is the

2. L&J seem to distinguish conceptual metaphor from historical semantic change (see Lakoff; Johnson 1999: 85).
3. See Haser (2003).

metaphorical status of *homepage*, *firewall*, *website* as well as many other English Internet metaphors which in German are not rendered by any indigenous expressions.

Unclear is also the metaphorical status of those TL expressions whose semantic development results from their phonological similarity to SL metaphoric expressions. For example, Russian мыло (*mylo*), literally 'soap', is frequently used to refer to a message sent from one person to another via computer. Similarly, *Emilio* and Емеля (*Emelya*) – Spanish and Russian first names – may denote the system of an electronic mail. Proceeding from the classical (non L&J-based) definition of metaphor as "a use of a given item to refer to some new meaning by implicitly or explicitly claiming a semantic relationship or similarity between its established and its intended new meaning" (Hock, 1986: 285), *mylo*, *Emelya* and *Emilio* cannot be treated as metaphors, since their semantic development was not based on any semantic relationship between their established and their intended email-related senses.

For a cognitive linguist, by contrast, the absence of semantic similarity between the concepts [SOAP] and [E-MAIL MESSAGE] is of little significance. Far more important is the structure of a conceptual domain against which [E-MAIL MESSAGE] is conceptualised by speakers of Russian. According to Clausner and Croft (1999: 2),

> […] concepts do not occur as isolated, atomic units in the mind, but can only be comprehended (by the speaker as well as by the analyst) in context of presupposed, background knowledge structures. The most generic term for this background knowledge structure is *domain*.

Thus, if it turns out that *mylo* (meaning 'e-mail message') collocates with other bathroom-related expressions – e.g. *to cover with soap* is used to refer to writing or sending an e-mail – it can be concluded that [E-MAIL MESSAGE] is conceptualised against the domain of BATHROOM. Moreover, *mylo*, in this case, would be a linguistic realization of the conceptual metaphor ELECTRONICMAIL IS BATHROOM, in which writing or sending a text message via computer is represented as an act of personal hygiene.[4]

The main objective of this article is thus to discuss the role of conceptual metaphor in a situation of language contact. It will be analysed whether there is any connection between the understanding of a metaphorical concept which emerged in a SL and the linguistic means (such as loan-translation, loanword and phonologically similar indigenous expression) through which this concept is verbalized in a TL.

2. Loan-translations

In a recent study on French and Spanish Internet terminology (Jansen, 2002; see also Jansen, 2005), it was suggested that the metaphorical nature of a SL expression

4. However, if *mylo* collocates with terms related to traditional mail, e.g. *to write a mylo*, *to send a mylo*, etc., [E-MAIL MESSAGE] can be said to be conceptualised against the domain of TRADITIONAL MAIL. In this case, *mylo* is a realization of the conceptual metaphor ELECTRONIC MAIL IS TRADITIONAL MAIL.

determines how this expression is dealt with in a TL. Thus, according to Jansen (2002: 58), in both French and Spanish, the majority of English Internet metaphors are rendered by loan-translations:

English	French	Spanish
access provider	fournisseur d'accès	proveedor de acceso
agent	agent	agente
attachment	pièce jointe	(archivo) anexo
bombing	bombardement	bombardeo
bookmark	signet	favorito
browser	navigateur	navegador
email	courrier électronique	correo electrónico, emilio
domain	domaine	dominio
drag and drop	glisser et déposer	arrastrar y soltar
gateway	passerelle	pasarela
homepage	page d'accueil	página principal
server	serveur	servidor
site	site	sitio

A loanword, on the contrary, is used only when literal translation of a SL metaphor is impossible for semantic or formal reasons.[5] This holds true for culture-specific and dead metaphors, such as *spam* and *cookie*.

The word *spam* is originally the name of a canned meat product that has been produced in the USA since 1937 by Hormel Foods Inc. The metaphorisation of *spam* is usually attributed to the Monty Python[6] SPAM-sketch, first broadcast in 1970. The sketch is set in a restaurant where nearly every item on the menu includes SPAM. The path of metaphorisation CANNED MEAT > UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL E-MAIL could not be replicated either in France or Spain, because neither the SPAM-meat nor the SPAM-sketch are known in these countries.[7] *Spam* is thus a culture-specific metaphor (Jansen, 2005: 291).

In contrast to *spam*, the term *cookie* could have been easily translated into both French and Spanish – e.g. English *cookie* > French *biscuit*. The reason why the preference was given to the loanword is that *cookie* is a dead metaphor, i.e. speakers of English are no longer aware of any metaphorical connection between 'a small flat or slightly raised cake' and 'a small text file that certain websites attach to a user's hard drive while the user is browsing the website' (Jansen, 2005: 193-94).

5. Similar ideas are expressed in Dagut (1976).
6. A popular British comic group.
7. Another reason why *spam* cannot be rendered by a loan-translation is that *spam* is an acronym which stands for a *shoulder of pork and ham* (Jansen, 2005: 291).

3. Loanwords[8]

In Tokar (2006 *a*) I argue that Jansen's discovery is not a universal tendency that holds true for all linguistic communities. In German, for example, a number of metaphorical concepts which do not belong to SPAM or COOKIE-type metaphors are verbalized by English loanwords – e.g. *homepage*, *firewall* and *website* could have been rendered by *Heimseite*, *Brandschutzmauer* and *Netzort*.

If concepts expressed by loanwords are not necessarily culture-specific or dead metaphors whose literal translation is impossible for semantic or formal reasons, the choice between different means of dealing with foreign word material is not always rooted in the metaphorical nature of a SL expression. To find out why speakers of a TL decide in favour of a loanword, it is necessary to know how they understand metaphorical concepts verbalized by SL expressions.

With Internet terms, this can be achieved by a careful examination of their TL definitions. If a loanword can be defined in terms of its TL semantic equivalent,[9] it can be said to be understood in terms of the same conceptual structure. As an illustrative example, consider the following German definitions[10] of *homepage*:

1. Zentrale Seite einer Website ('central page of a website');
2. Startseite einer Website ('starting page of a website');
3. Die Seite einer Institution oder einer Person im World Wide Web ('the page of an institution or a person in the World Wide Web').

In all these definitions, *homepage* is referred to as *Seite*, which is the semantic equivalent of *page*. It follows that the concept of [HOMEPAGE] is understood in a similar way[11] by speakers of English and German – as e.g. Tomaszewski (2002) suggests, *homepage* is a realization of the conceptual metaphor INTERNET IS A DATABASE OF TEXTUAL DOCUMENTS in which web-pages are viewed as "text documents much like printed pages in any book or magazine".

By contrast, if a loanword cannot be defined in terms of its TL semantic equivalent, its meaning as it is constructed by speakers of a TL is then conceptualised against a background of a different conceptual domain. *Firewall*, for example, is never defined as *Brandschutzmauer* ('firewall'), but as:

1. [...] ein Programm zum Schutz des Computers vor unbefugten Zugriffen aus dem Internet (a program for a protection of a computer from unauthorised access from the Internet);

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8. This section is based on Tokar (2006 *a*; 2006 *b*; 2007).
9. Or an expression which has a similar meaning.
10. I have consulted the following sources: Peyton (2002), Voss (2000-2006), ComputerBild (German computer magazine) CD-ROM 2005 and Google Definitions Search Tool.
11. *Homepage* is a 'home' page for speakers of English, and a 'central' or a 'starting' page for speakers of German.

2. Eine Software, die den unberechtigten Zugriff auf ein Computersystem verhindert (a software that prevents unauthorised users from accessing a computer system).

According to these definitions, *firewall* is a computer program / a software which serves to block unwanted access to a protected computer network. In contrast to *homepage*, which is defined as a 'central' or a 'starting' page of a website, *firewall* cannot be defined as either a firewall or any other kind of a wall. This is because speakers of German do not conceive of [FIREWALL] metaphorically, i.e. as a fire-resistant wall designed to prevent the spread of fire through a computer system.

In connection with *firewall*, it must also be mentioned that the English FIREWALL-metaphor implies that HACKING IS FIRE-RAISING. If *firewall* is literally a wall built to prevent the spread of fire, *hacker* is metaphorically a fire-raiser, a person whose aim is to set a computer on fire.

This, however, is not true. In neither English nor German is HACKING conceptualised in terms of MALICIOUS BURNING OF PROPERTY. Hackers do not destroy computers by setting them on fire. They break into a computer system in order to steal information.[12] Hence, HACKING IS NOT FIRE-RAISING, but BURGLARY.

This conceptual metaphor has important implications for the conceptualisation of [FIREWALL]. If hackers are burglars trying to break into a computer system, firewalls do not serve to prevent the spread of fire, but to protect against hackers and other malicious intruders. Since [FIREWALL] is not conceptualised in terms of FIRE-PROTECTION,[13] the English loanword is not likely to be rendered by the German loan-translation.

Similar to *firewall*, *website* cannot be translated into German as *Netzort* (website), because [WEBSITE] as it is conceptualised by speakers of German is not a place on the Internet, as the English metaphor seems to suggest. A website is, first of all, a collection of web-pages:

1. Zusammenhängende Sammlung von Web-Seiten, die normalerweise mit einer Homepage beginnt (collection of connected web-pages that usually begins with a homepage).

This is a metonymic conceptualisation, since websites do indeed consist of connected web-pages. However, as follows from definitions 2 and 3, [WEBSITE] can also be understood metaphorically:

2. Webangebot, das mehrere miteinander verknüpfte Seiten beinhaltet (web-offer that contains several pages which are linked with each other);
3. Internet-Auftritt. Umfasst viele einzelne Webpages (Internet-appearance that contains many individual web-pages).

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12. *Hacker* can also refer to "a person who enjoys designing software and building programs with a sense for aesthetics and playful cleverness" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacker#Academic_hackers). This meaning, however, is not relevant here.
13. In both English and German.

Angebot ('offer') and *Auftritt* ('appearance') are German loan-creations, i.e. German words which bear no semantic similarity to the original English expression. *Angebot* stands for a range of products on offer, whereas *Auftritt* refers to an act of appearing in public.

If *website* is defined as *Angebot*, it can be suggested that the concept [WEBSITE] is conceived of as a digital counterpart of any product that one can buy in a traditional store. In the AUFTRITT-metaphor, by contrast, the global computer network is represented as a stage,[14] and websites are seen as performances intended to impress a large audience of Internet users.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the definition test that was proposed in this section – *a loanword = its TL semantic equivalent* – does not always explain why metaphorical concepts are verbalized by loanwords. In the case of *homepage*, for example, the application of the test only shows that the concept [HOMEPAGE] is understood in almost the same way by speakers of English and German. However, it remains unclear why [HOMEPAGE] is verbalized by the loanword in German, whereas speakers of Spanish could translate it as *página principal*.[15]

In the case of *firewall* and *website*, by contrast, the test does indeed provide the explanation why their loan-translations are not possible in German. *Firewall* and *website* cannot be translated as *Brandschutzmauer* and *Netzort* because *firewall* is not a wall designed to prevent the spread of fire, and *website* is not a place on the Internet.

4. Popular Etymology

Another means of dealing with foreign word material is to use a phonologically similar indigenous expression:

English	**Russian**[16]
e-mail (message)	мыло (*mylo* 'soap')
e-mail (system)	Емеля (*Emelya* 'Russian masculine name')
shareware	шаровары (*šarovary* 'wide trousers')
homepage	хомяк (*homyak* 'hamster')

14. Baumgärtel (1998), who calls Internet "an imaginary museum".
15. Speakers of French and Spanish are likely to translate English Internet metaphors because of a lexical similarity between English and Romance languages. E.g. English *site* versus French *site* and Spanish *sitio*; English *server* versus French *serveur* and Spanish servidor, etc. (Tokar, 2006 *a*:103). Speakers of German, by contrast, seem to prefer direct importations of English lexical material because English terms are generally shorter than possible German equivalents, e.g. English *browser* versus German *Durchblätterer*. Another factor which may be relevant here is that Anglicisms when used in German tend to evoke a number of positive connotations, such as e.g. modernity and internationality (Schütte, 1996: 356).
16. One of the peculiarities of the Russian Internet terminology is that words such as *mylo, homyak, šarovary*, etc. co-exist with the corresponding loanwords from English written in a Cyrillic alphabet (Voiskounsky, 2004: 204).

Corel Draw	горелые дрова (*gorelye drova* 'burnt fire wood')
IRC (Internet Relay Chat)	Ирка (*Irka* 'Russian feminine name')

Popular etymology is traditionally defined as a type of semantic change which is triggered by the similarity of two words, usually in sound. According to McMahon (1994: 183),

> […] one word is mistakenly connected with another which sounds similar, and a transfer of meaning then occurs. For example, *country dance* gives rise to French *contredanse*, and German *sintvluot*, the earlier name for the Biblical flood, has become *Sündflut*, literally 'sin-flood' (with *Sünde* 'sin'). A more recent example is the American replacement of *Alzheimer's Disease* with *Old Timers' Disease*.

This interpretation, however, does not seem to explain the use of a phonologically similar TL expression as a linguistic strategy of dealing with SL lexical material. It is very unlikely that speakers of Russian could have mistakenly connected *mylo* ('soap') with *e-mail* ('a text message sent via computer').[17] In my opinion, this instance of popular etymology should be attributed to expressivity, which, as e.g. Geeraerts (1999; discussed in Blank, 1999: 63) suggests, is always at work "when speakers verbalize newly introduced or differently perceived concepts or give a new stylistic use to an already existing word". The use of *mylo* to refer to an e-mail message is intended to create a humorous effect and therefore can be regarded as a means of achieving expressivity.

In connection with popular etymology, there arises the question about how speakers of Russian understand the concepts [E-MAIL MESSAGE], [SHAREWARE], [HOMEPAGE], etc. If e.g. [E-MAIL MESSAGE] is verbalized by *mylo*, is [SENDING AN E-MAIL] conceptualised as, say, washing hands (face, body, etc)?

As was mentioned in the introduction, this question can only be answered by examining the structure of the conceptual domain against which [E-MAIL MESSAGE] is conceptualised in the Russian linguistic community. If *mylo* is not the only Russian expression pertaining to the domain of BATHROOM which is used in the context of computer-mediated communication, it can be concluded that the popular etymology *e-mail* > *mylo* gave rise to the new conceptual metaphor ELECTRONIC MAIL IS BATHROOM.

To my knowledge, apart from *mylo*, it is only намыливать (*namylivat*', literally 'to cover/rub with soap') that can be used to refer to sending an e-mail. This fact does not allow us to state that [SENDING AN E-MAIL] is understood as covering with soap, because *mylo* and *namylivat*' are members of the same derivateme, and therefore the semantic development undergone by *namylivat*' can also be attributed to its phonological similarity to *e-mail*.

More interesting is the phraseme киньте в меня мылом (*kin'te v menya mylom*, literally 'throw a soap at me') which a speaker of Russian can say in order to encourage other people to send her an e-mail. The question here is whether the concept of the

17. This can be justified by the fact that *mylo*, *homyak, šarovary*, etc. are slang terms which originated in the Netspeak of Russian speaking users of the Internet.

request [TO SEND ME AN E-MAIL] verbalized by *kin'te v menya mylom* is indeed conceptualised as a request to throw a soap at the intended e-mail recipient.

To my mind, the phraseme *kin'te v menya mylom* has nothing to do with the literal sense of *mylo* – usually we do not use soap in order to throw it at other people. Instead, *kin'te v menya mylom* seems to be modelled on a corresponding phraseme in English:

> [...] Feel free to *throw an email at me*, check me out on Unruly Politics or MySpace […][18]
> [...] Well that's it for now! *Throw an email at me* if you have any comments or questions![19]
> [...] If you do get one of these you'll want to contact Paypal by their Contact Us page, and probably *throw an email to* […], including the full headers of the email.[20]

The use of *throw* in *throw an e-mail* seems to originate from the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, in which ideas are represented as physical objects that one can give (e.g. *Sally gave the idea to Sam*), take (e.g. *Sally took the idea from Sam*), throw (e.g. *Sally threw the idea at Sam*), etc. If ideas can be thrown at other people, it should also be possible to throw e-mails containing ideas which we want to share with other people.

If Russian *kin'te v menya mylom* is a loan-translation of English *throw an email at me*, it can be concluded that speakers of both English and Russian understand the concept of [SENDING AN E-MAIL] in terms of one and the same conceptual metaphor – TRANSFER OF DIGITAL INFORMATION IS TRANSFER OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS.

Whereas [E-MAIL MESSAGE] verbalized by *mylo* did not give rise to the conceptual metaphor ELECTRONIC MAIL IS BATHROOM, [SHAREWARE][21] verbalized by *šarovary* (originally 'wide trousers') seems to have created a new conceptual metaphor in Russian.

Consider the sentence Бета-тестер примеряет шаровары[22] (*Beta-tester primerjaet šarovary* 'a beta-tester is trying on a shareware'). A beta test is a term for the second phase of software testing where a not-yet-final version of the software is made available to a limited number of users (called *beta-testers*) so that they can test the program and provide feedback.[23] The use of *primerjat'* (originally 'to put on a garment in order to see whether it fits and looks nice') to refer to testing a software product leads to an assumption that [SHAREWARE] is metaphorically conceptualised as a piece of clothing that must be tried on in order to see whether it works or not.

This assumption can also be supported by the phraseme самонадевающиеся шаровары (*samonadevajuŝiesja šarovary*, literally 'self-dressing trousers'). *Samonadevajuŝiesja šarovary* as used by Russian-speaking members of the Internet community is an

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18. http://www.bozzysworld.com/about/
19. http://www.pinballrebel.com/game/pins/ij2/shop/ABOUT_ME.htm
20. http://ufies.org/archives/2003_10.html
21. The English term *shareware* stands for a computer program which is distributed on a try-before-you-buy basis, i.e. it can be downloaded and used for a limited time for free, after which the user is requested to buy the program (http://www.phptr.com/articles/article.asp?p=27569&seqNum=6).
22. "*Beta-tester primerjaet šarovary*" is the title of an article that was published in *Computer* (Russian Computer magazine) on October, 20th 1998.
23. http://technology.findlaw.com/law-technology-dictionary/beta-test.html

expression which denotes a self-extracting archive[24] of a shareware, i.e. a zipped file with the executable extension which ensures that, once downloaded and double-clicked, its built-in unzipper automatically places the extracted files in a pre-determined folder.

Since *šarovary* is not the only term pertaining to the domain of GARMENT which is used in context of software, it can be suggested that the meaning of *šarovary* as it is constructed by speakers of Russian is a linguistic realization of the conceptual metaphor SOFTWARE IS GARMENT.

What is particularly interesting here is that this metaphorical structure is not based on any conceptual similarity between the domains of SOFTWARE and GARMENT. It emerged from the phonological similarity between *shareware* and *šarovary*.

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to analyse whether there was any connection between the understanding of a metaphorical concept which emerged in a SL and the linguistic means through which it is verbalized in a TL. The results of the study can be summarised in the following way:

- A concept which is not a SL culture-specific/dead metaphor can be verbalized by a loanword. E.g. *homepage*, *firewall*, *website* in German.
- If a metaphorical concept is verbalized by a loanword, it is possible that:

  1. Speakers of a TL understand the concept in terms of the same conceptual metaphor. E.g. *homepage* is a page for speakers of both English and German. *Homepage* is thus a realization of the conceptual metaphor INTERNET IS A DATABASE OF TEXTUAL DOCUMENTS.
  2. Speakers of a TL understand the concept in terms of a different conceptual metaphor. In German, for example, *website* is not a place on the Internet, but (among other things) an Internet-performance (*Internet-Auftritt*). In this case, *website* can be said to be a realization of the conceptual metaphor INTERNET IS STAGE.
  3. The concept may lose its original metaphoricity. E.g. *firewall* is not a fire-resistant wall designed to prevent the spread of fire, but a computer program which protects against hackers and other malicious intruders.

- If a metaphorical concept is verbalized by a phonologically similar indigenous expression, it is possible that:

  1. Speakers of a TL understand the concept in terms of the same conceptual metaphor. E.g. *e-mail* verbalized by *mylo* in Russian is a realization of the conceptual metaphor TRANSFER OF DIGITAL INFORMATION IS TRANSFER OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS.

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24. http://www.coredon.clara.net/internet_glossary-n_s.htm#letter_s

2. Speakers of a TL understand the concept in terms of a different conceptual metaphor. E.g. *shareware* verbalized by *šarovary* is a realization of the conceptual metaphor SOFTWARE IS GARMENT.

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Two Levels of Blending with Homophonic Compounds in Japanese

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ABSTRACT: This study states that discourse serves as a crucial factor for a precise understanding of Japanese puns i.e. a word play with homophones, and argues that the double meanings of a pun can be processed at the lexical/phonological level and the discourse level in this order. Homophonic compounds provide speakers of Japanese with a chance to create newly derived meanings from an unexpected use of a given homophonic compound; however, such derived meanings blend right in with the immediate discourse. Such information processing in mind and discourse can be accounted for by Blending Theory (Fauconnier, 1997).

Keywords: Japanese puns, homophonic compounds, discourse, blending.

RESUMEN: El presente artículo muestra que el discurso es un factor crucial para poder interpretar de forma precisa los juegos de palabras japoneses, es decir, homófonos con dobles sentidos. Se defiende que el doble sentido de un juego de palabras se puede procesar al nivel léxico-fonológico y al nivel discursivo por este orden. Los compuestos homofónicos ofrecen a los hablantes japoneses la oportunidad de crear significados derivados novedosos de un uso inesperado de un determinado compuesto homofónico; sin embargo, tales sentidos derivados se integran en el discurso inmediato. Este procesamiento de la información en la mente y el discurso se puede explicar mediante la Teoría de la Integración Conceptual (Blending Theory).

Palabras clave: juegos de palabras japoneses, compuestos homofónicos, discurso, integración conceptual (blending).

1. Introduction

This study states that discourse serves as a crucial factor for a precise understanding of Japanese puns i.e. a word play with homophones, and argues that the double meanings of a pun can be processed at the lexical/phonological level and the discourse level in

this order. The theoretical contribution of this study is that such information processing in thought is facilitated in immediate discourse and can be accounted for by Blending Theory (Fauconnier, 1997). Japanese words consist of syllables which usually include a consonant and a vowel; compound expressions are often found to serve an effective unit for puns, because they can create a newly derived meaning from each part. Due to such grammatical properties, homophonic compounds abound in the history of Japanese. In order to precisely understand the double meanings of a pun, the expression should be used in a stretch of discourse, at least in a clause. Otherwise, the double meanings hidden in the expression cannot be fully understood.

In Japanese, the pronunciation of a given Chinese character is written in *hiragana* i.e. the cursive phonetic Japanese syllabary. Hiragana is mostly used for grammatical particles, verb inflection, and Japanese words which are not written in *kanji* (i.e. Chinese character) or which are too difficult even for an educated person to read or write in *kanji*. According to Goo Dictionary (http://dictionary.goo.ne.jp), for example, the sequence of sounds [katei] written in *hiragana* hits twelve words written in Chinese character. For native or fluent speakers of Japanese, such a pronunciation may possibly bring to mind the following Chinese characters with their respective meanings: 家庭 'family', 仮定 'hypothesis', 課程 'course' and 過程 'process'. If the word pronounced [katei] is used in discourse, the Japanese people can imagine which of these [katei] is indicated in the utterance or the mind of the speaker; however, even in discourse, there is the possibility that hearers may misinterpret the real intention that the speaker had in his/her mind. That is, because of such troublesome same pronunciations, homophonic compounds are likely to cause misunderstanding, or might lead to an interpersonal conflict if you take one wrong step (Takashima, 2001).

Nevertheless, homophonic compounds can serve to make an effect on poetry, giving full scope to one's imagination; they can derive two distinct but related meanings in the immediate discourse, and speakers can create a newly derived meaning from an unexpected use of a given homophonic compound. Considering the fact that such a classical and quick-witted training is still part of Japanese compulsory education, the Japanese people seem to be more or less expected to have some knowledge about the effective use of such puns in either poetry or ordinary communication. Whether poetic or ordinary puns, the mechanism for conceptual mapping is the same, and Blending Theory can handle such conceptual mappings in Japanese puns, giving a unified account of them.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will give a brief account of Japanese homophonic compounds, while in Section 3, I will explain Blending Theory. In Section 4, I will probe into discourse functions of Japanese homophonic compounds in conversation, cosmic story-telling and poetry. In Section 5, I will summarize and discuss the role of Blending theory in homophonic compounds with respect to Chinese character. Section 6 is the conclusion of this study. In what follows, I will use homophonic compounds as a cover term for puns unless otherwise specified.

2. Japanese Homophonic Compounds

As explained in the above, the basic phonological structure of Japanese words comprises a consonant and a vowel, and such a simple syllabic structure necessitates of a large amount of homophones. In this section, I will first present the definition of homophone and compound, respectively, and illustrate two cases of homophonic compounds in Japanese.

2.1. Definitions

'Homophones' and 'compounds' are defined respectively. Homophones are defined as a class of words, either mono-morphemic or compound, which are pronounced alike but written differently (Leech, 1969: 208; Lyons, 1977: 558-59). As to compounds, I will adopt the definition of compounds by Li and Thompson (1981: 46): "all polysyllabic units that have certain properties of single words and that can be analyzed into two or more meaningful elements, or morphemes, even if these morphemes cannot occur independently.[1] Combined together, homophonic compounds can be defined as follows: A group of compounds that are pronounced alike but written differently.

2.2. Two Examples of Japanese Homophonic Compounds

Now, let us consider the following two cases of Japanese homophonic compounds; they are pronounced [kanshou] and [kitoku] respectively. These homophonic compounds are searched by Infoseek (http://dictionary.www.infoseek.co.jp), one of the established on-line dictionaries by which we can search a huge data bank of information for Japanese vocabularies. These are summarized in (1) and (2).

(1) [kanshou] by Infoseek (http://dictionary.www.infoseek.co.jp)
{[kan] 2401 examples,+,[shou] 2244 examples} > [kanshou] 46 examples
(2) [kitoku] by Infoseek (http://dictionary.www.infoseek.co.jp)
{[ki] 7681 examples,+,[toku] 377 examples} >[kitoku] 5 examples

The compound pronounced [kanshou] can be decomposed into the words pronounced [kan] and [shou], while the compound pronounced [kitoku] can be decomposed into the words pronounced [ki] and [toku]. As explained above, Japanese has produced huge quantities of homophones. When we look up the word pronounced [kan] for Infoseek, for example, we can find 2401 Chinese characters; the word pronounced [shou] hits 2244 Chinese characters. Even the combinatory sound [kanshou] still hits 46 examples of Chinese characters. The other compound [kitoku] is also a good example of homophone. The first part [ki] hits 7681 examples of Chinese characters,

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1. For the classification of compounds in Chinese and Japanese, see Li and Thompson (1981: 48-84) and Shibatani (1990: 237-254), respectively.

while the second part [toku] hits 377 examples of Chinese characters. The compounded expression [kitoku] still has the five forms of Chinese characters.

The homophonic compounds that correspond to these sequences of sounds are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. The meanings of each compound expression are based on Todo (1965); while several etymological meanings of each compound are listed there, I picked out the meaning which is more or less directly associated with the character form in Japanese. For example, 感傷 in Table 1: When the first part 感 'feeling' is combined with the second part 傷 'hurt', the whole meaning becomes 'sentiment'. Note that, out of 46 examples of compounds pronounced [kanshou], I chose to display the five examples of homophonic compounds, not necessarily because of their high frequency in Japanese discourse, but because of the relatively clearer transparency of the original meanings of each part.

Table 1. Homophonic Compounds [kanshou] in Example (1)

Characters [meanings]	Meaning	Pronunciation
観　賞[2] [observe + award]	appreciate, enjoy, etc.	[kanshou]
鑑　賞 [glass + award]	appreciate, enjoy, etc.	[kanshou]
干　渉 [infringe + cross]	interfere with, intervene in, meddle in, etc.	[kanshou]
感　傷 [feeling + hurt]	sentiment, pathos, etc.	[kanshou]
観　照 [observe + reflect]	contemplation	[kanshou]

Table 2. Homophonic Compounds [kitoku] in Example (2)

Characters [meanings]	Meaning	Pronunciation
危　篤 [danger + alert]	critical condition, seriousness of an illness, very seriously ill, etc.	[kitoku]
既　得 [already + obtain]	already acquired, vested, etc.	[kitoku]
奇　特 [crooked + unique]	beneficent, benevolent	[kitoku]
貴　徳 [precious + virtue]	a type of solo dancing in the traditional Japanese dance	[kitoku]
耆　徳 [senior + virtue]	virtuous seniors	[kitoku]

2. 観賞 and 鑑賞 have similar meanings. If we translate 'aquarium fish' into Japanese, we use 観賞 instead of 鑑賞 and produce 観賞魚 [観賞+魚(fish)].

In this section, I have presented the definitions of homophones and compounds, and illustrated two types of homophonic compounds in Japanese. The point of relevance here is that, when such examples are used in conversation or written in *hiragana*, the hearer or the reader may not fully understand what the speaker or the writer really indicates in the expression. Therefore, discourse factors become inevitable in the precise interpretation of homophonic compounds. In the next section, I will introduce the basic ideas of Blending Theory.

3. Blending Theory

Fauconnier and Turner's basic suggestion is that we need a network – i.e. a many-spaced model – in order to give a unified account of the complex phenomena of human thought (Fauconnier; Turner, 1996); they regard the issue of conceptual metaphor (e.g. Lakoff, 1993)[3] as a special case of a much larger one: the conceptual system operates with domains (not just with source and target ones), projecting elements from one domain to another. It is obvious that such a network model – i.e. Blending Theory – is now prevailing in the field of cognitive semantics (Fauconnier; Turner, 2002).

Blending operates on two input mental spaces to yield the third space, Generic Space, and the fourth space, the Blend. The blend inherits partial structures from the input spaces and has an emergent structure. Figure 1 is the basic model of blending. Fauconnier (1997: 149-50) sets forth some conditions to be satisfied when two input spaces are blended.

1. CROSS-SPACE MAPPING: there is a partial mapping of counterparts between the input spaces 1 and 2.[4]
2. GENERIC SPACE: there is a generic space. This generic space reflects a certain abstract structure and organization which two input spaces share, and establishes the core cross-space mapping between them. The generic space maps onto each of the inputs.
3. BLEND: the blend is the fourth space projected partially from the input 1 and 2.
4. EMERGENT STRUCTURE: the emergent structure occurs in three ways: 'composition' (in which new relations emerge from projections from the inputs); 'completion' (in which the composite structure projected into the blend is completed into the larger system by background knowledge and cognitive and cultural models); 'elaboration' (in which the blend is further elaborated according to its own emergent logic).

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3. For the critical comments on Lakoff's (1990) 'invariance hypothesis' see Turner (1990) and Brugman (1990).
4. For the analysis of compounds such as homographs, this partial mapping does not always seem to be required (Shibasaki, 2001, 2006). Yet for the semantic analysis of single Chinese characters or Kanji, it seems obligatory. See Hiraga (2005: ch.7) for a brief blending analysis of Kanji.



Figure 1. The Basic Blending Model

According to Fauconnier, the basic direction of cognitive mapping is from Generic via inputs to Blend, so the blend is a rich space integrating them. Importantly, the completion of the blend depends on background knowledge and cognitive and cultural models; subsequently the blend is further elaborated of its own accord via an 'emergent logic'. In Fauconnier's opinion, blending becomes conventional and is not consciously perceived. This description is not quite clear; however, it implies an important thing: the process of elaborating the emergent structure may be culture-specific. In other words, the 'emergent logic' may unfold from common inputs to culture-specific blends. This possibility has not yet been explored as fully as it could be in the blending literature. In fact, a series of studies on blending (e.g. Turner; Fauconnier, 1995; Fauconnier; Turner, 1996; Fauconnier, 1997) seem to be only based on the conceptual structure of a given language.[5]

Blending Theory has neither fully been applied to any phenomenon in cultural areas in which Chinese characters are more or less used, nor pervasively throughout the culture in one way or another, i.e. China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam (Hanna, 1997; Murata; Lamarre, 2005; but see Hiraga, 2005; Shibasaki, 2001, 2006, for pilot studies). The objective of this study is to uncover the potentiality of Blending Theory to serve a unified account of homophonic puns with Chinese characters. Homophonic compounds, as explained in the previous section, have the same pronunciations with different meanings, which intuitively goes against the idea of the blend. How can we produce the different meanings from the same sound? How can listeners or readers choose to imagine a compound appropriate for the immediate discourse? If homophonic compounds can be explained in the framework of Blending Theory, that expands the theory's potential. In the next section, I will thus examine three cases of Japanese homophonic compounds.

5. Coulson and Oakley (2005) include several new proposals on Blending Theory. However, no blending models with many empirical data seem to have been suggested.

4. Homophonic Compounds in Japanese Discourse

We have thus far reviewed the key words for this study: homophone, compound, and Blending Theory. In this section, I will account for the way in which homophonic compounds can be processed in discourse from the perspective of Blending Theory. The three examples of homophonic compounds to be examined in this section are from different sources. The first one is from my Japanese conversational database; the second is from a historical text which includes various types of puns; the third consists of traditional Japanese poems which often include *kakekotoba*, i.e. a homophonic or syntactic device used to create multiple readings. These examples are excerpted from different genres of discourse; however, they can be accounted for in a unified way in the framework of Blending Theory.

4.1. Homophonic Compound from a Conversational Discourse

The first example is from my conversational database,[6] which includes the word pronounced [kitoku] explained in Section 2. Let us look at the following passages.[7] The elements in focus are underlined and boldfaced. In the romanized transcripts (on the basis of IPA), the underlined *kitoku* appears to be the same; however, the meanings are totally different from each other, as in the translations. Nevertheless, Speaker A can understand what Speaker B indicates in the expressions. As shown in Table 2, there are five examples of *kitoku* that can be realized with different Chinese characters. How can the Japanese people make a choice of one particular form among several others?

(3) Discourse 1

A:	*souieba*	*kare*	*wa*	*dou*	*shimasita?*
	by.the.way	he	TOP	how	did
	'So, how about him? (i.e. Is he doing okay?)'				
B:	*aa,*	*kare*	*wa*	***kitoku***	*da*	*yo.*
	well	he	TOP	KITOKU	COP	FP
	'Um, he is in a critical condition.'					

(4) Discourse 2

A:	*souieba*	*kare*	*wa*	*donna*	*hito*	*desu*	*ka?*
	by.the.way	he	TOP	what.kind.of	person	COP	FP
	'So, what kind of person is he?'						
B:	*kare*	*wa*	***kitoku***	*desu*	*yo=*		
	he	TOP	KITOKU	COP	FP		
	'He is beneficent.'						

6. These conversational databases were recorded and transcribed in 2005. The speakers were all male and in their early thirties at that time.
7. The glossing conventions are as follows: ACC=accusative; COMP=complementizer; COP=copula; FP=final particle; GEN=genitive; NOM=nominative; PERF=perfective; POL=politeness; PST=past tense; PT=particle; QP=question particle; TOP=topic; 'lengthening.

Figure 2 summarizes the process in which conversational participants decode the intended meaning of *kitoku* in each discourse. In what follows, I will give an account of this blending process, referring to the three steps of blending i.e. 'composition', 'completion' and 'elaboration'.



Figure 2.

First, each part of the compound, [ki] and [toku], is blended and produces compounds; this step corresponds to 'composition', because new phonological relations emerge from the inputs. Second, the newly derived compounds are associated with their respective Chinese characters in Japanese; this step is compatible with 'completion', because each compound is completed in the Japanese writing system, and creates a sound-form pair with Chinese characters; in other words, homophonic compounds emerge at this stage. Notice that Chinese characters are directly related to their meanings in essence (DuPonceau, 1838): homophonic compounds take on their meanings at this stage. Third, these homophonic compounds are sorted out in discourse, and only possible homophonic compounds can be chosen as expressions appropriate for the immediate discourse. This step can be regarded as 'elaboration', because the selected

homophonic compound plays a role in making the discourse coherent, semantically and grammatically.

These three steps of blending can be categorized as the one without discourse factors and the one with discourse factors. In this study, I will label the first as 'lexical/phonological' blending and the second as 'discourse blending'. The lexical/phonological blending serves as a step for producing possible blends, lexically and phonologically, associated with their respective Chinese characters, while the discourse blending serves as a step for making a choice out of those blends in relation to a given discourse. These two steps can single out possible homophonic compounds for a given discourse.

In discourse 2, Speakers A and B were worrying about their friend's physical condition; in other words, this discourse condition invites health-related expressions. Then, Speaker A asked Speaker B about their friend's health condition, and Speaker B answered that the friend slipped into critical condition, indicating that the word *kitoku* [kitoku] means 危篤 [kitoku] 'in a critical condition'. Speaker A immediately reacted to this sound [kitoku], imagining possible Chinese-character forms in this context. Finally, Speaker A succeeded in relating *kitoku* [kitoku] to 危篤 [kitoku]. The same is applied to Discourse 2. Speakers A and B were talking about their friend, and Speaker A went on to ask Speaker B about the friend's personality; this discourse topic brought to their mind related expressions. Speaker B told Speaker A that the friend is beneficent, referring to the word *kitoku* [kitoku] with the form of 奇特 'beneficent'. Speaker A promptly responded to this sound [kitoku], imagining possible Chinese characters. Finally, Speaker A came to make sense of this sound in relation to the form 奇特. This series of blending is processed for a fleeting moment; however, considering the fact that native speakers of Japanese sometimes need time to make the connection between the sound and form of a word, the actual sequence of blending is likely to be from lexical/phonological to discourse blending.

In this section, I have examined homophonic compounds in Japanese conversational discourse. Through the analysis of such an on-line information processing of homophonic compounds, I have suggested two levels of blending. One is lexical/phonological blending in which the Japanese speakers put inputs together into a compound; subsequently, the compound is completed with its associated Chinese characters. At this level, the Japanese speakers are supposed to have several homophonic compounds in their mind. The other level is discourse blending in which completed homophonic compounds are sorted out with respect to discourse factors. This series of blending serves as steps for searching for appropriate choices of homophonic compounds.

In the next section, I will apply this information process of blending to homophonic compounds to a historical text.

4.2. Homophonic Compound from a Cosmic Story-telling

The next example of homophonic compound is from a historical text called *Kaseiki Rakugobonshuu*, a collection of cosmic stories. This text, which includes cosmic stories from 1789 through 1802, seems to have been edited in the early nineteenth century. In

Pre-Modern Japanese i.e. the Edo period (1603-1867), there were many books on cosmic stories, amorous anecdotes, entertaining yarns, etc., and the following example is from one of those books. Since early cosmic story tellings still have some effects on puns in present day Japanese (Muto, 1988), the following example is worth investigating.

(5) *Kaseiki Rakugobonshuu* (18th-19th C. [c. 1789-1802])

Maru:	*Watashi*	*wa*	*mata,*	***uma***	*mo*	*anata*	*mo*
	I	TOP	again	horse	too	you	too
	onaji	*koto*	*ka*	*to*	*zonji*	*masi*	*ta.*
	be.the.same	thing	QP	COMP	judge	POL	PST
Oshoo:	*Naze.*						
	why						
Maru:	*Anata*	*no*	*koto*	*wo,*	*yoku*		
	anata	GEN	thing	ACC	often		
	hito	*ga*	***hin-soo***				
	people	NOM	neighing/horsy/poor-looking/poor priest				
	to	*mousi*	*masu*	*kara.*			
	COMP	say.POL	POL	because			

Maru: I thought that both horse and you are (classified) the same.; Oshoo (priest): Why?; Maru: (That's) because people often say that you are a poor-looking/ horse-looking priest.

Example 5 is part of a conversation between a priest and his disciple. In the disciple's first utterance, he tells the priest about his thinking that the word *uma* 'horse' refers to the priest as well as actual horses. In this utterance, both readers and listeners are supposed to imagine something relevant to *uma* 'horse' in the following interaction. The priest could not understand what the disciple really meant by that, and then asked 'Why?'. The disciple answered: people often say that the priest is *hinsoo*. Either quick-witted readers or listeners would have burst into laughter; even those with no resources could likely enjoy this pun, if sharp-witted people had told them about how to blend *uma* 'horse' with *hinsoo*. Then, what kind of role did the word *hinsoo* play in this cosmic story-telling?

First, the word *hinsoo* usually means 'a meager or poor-looking face' with the Chinese character 貧相 [poor + countenance]; 貧僧 [poor + priest] 'a poor priest' would also be possible because the above interaction is part of a conversation between a priest and his disciple; these two Chinese characters are listed in Japanese dictionaries (e.g. Shinmura, 1973). Grammatically, these interpretations of *hinsoo* have no problem as long as we do not care about the discourse effect on the interpretation of *hinsoo*; however, the blending of *uma* 'horse' with *hinsoo* is crucial for generating fun and excitement around this pun. Second, we have to take into account one specific aspect of Japanese i.e. the sound of neighing in the language. In Japanese, horses are considered to neigh *hin*, *hihin*, *hinhin*, etc. (Shinmura, 1973; Hashimoto, 1980; Kamei, 1998). Once we get to know this culture-specific description of sound symbolism, it becomes easier to associate *uma* 'horse' with the *hin-* part of *hinsoo*. The important thing is that the word *uma* in the prior discourse serves to evoke the neighing interpretation from *hinsoo*. Third, we have

to decode the contextual meaning of *soo* in this discourse, which is related to the culture-specific aspect of Chinese character. The word indicating 'priest' is written 僧, and it is pronounced [soo]; in other words, the blending of *hin* 'horsy' or 'meager' with *soo* 'priest' creates either 'a horsy-faced priest' or 'a poor priest' both of which have a direct correlation with one and the same sound *hinsoo*: a homophonic effect on puns. Fourth, we can take into further consideration the sound-form combination of *soo*. The sound [soo] is also a good example of homophonic compound; in this context, the Japanese speakers may possibly imagine the word 相 'countenance', which is pronounced [soo]. Suppose that the Japanese speakers can make the connection between these choices, we have the following four possible interpretations of *hinsoo*.

(7)	a.	*hin* meager	+ *soo* priest	= *hinsoo* a poor priest
	b.	*hin* horsy	+ *soo* priest	= *hinsoo* a priest with a horsy face
	c.	*hin* meager	+ *soo* countenance	= *hinsoo* (a priest with) a meager face
	d.	*hin* horsy	+ *soo* countenance	= *hinsoo* (a priest with) a horsy face

Of course, it is not easy to state which of these homophonic effects speakers of Japanese tend to imagine. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the homophonic pun in (5) is interwoven with several possible blends, lexically and phonologically, in discourse. Some might hit on the blended correlation between *hin* 'horsy' and *soo* 'priest', as in (6b), and get a lot of fun immediately; others might only imagine *hin* 'meager' and *soo* 'priest', as in (6a), and need some time to realize the homophonic and discourse effect on this pun. Either way, the Japanese people can be considered to process the blending of homophonic puns with help from discourse. Otherwise, people in those days may not have realized the amusing nature of the pun, let alone people in modern times. Figure 3 summarizes the process.

Since this example allows for several possible interpretations of *hinsoo*, I made an experiment with my undergraduate students to see which of these interpretations would be most likely and why. The result was quite clear: they chose (6b) as the best interpretation with no exceptions. They explained that the 'laff' in (5) depends on whether either readers or listeners can combine *uma* 'horse' and the *hin* sound 'neighing' of *hinsoo* i.e. 'a priest with a horsy face'. At the dictionary level, a usual interpretation of *hinsoo* is 貧相 'a poor-looking priest' or 貧僧 'a poor priest'; however, the priming effect of *uma* 'horse' enables another witty interpretation of *hinsoo* i.e. 'a priest with a horsy face', which can only be generated with a specific discourse factor. This conceptual blending across words and morphemes is compatible with the essence of Blending Theory.

In this section, I have scrutinized the blending of a homophonic pun in a historical text. As demonstrated in the analysis of homophonic compounds in conversational discourse in Section 4.1, we could confirm the two levels of blending 5. At the level of lexical/phonological blending, speakers of Japanese make a compound putting together each input, and search for possible meanings. Then at the level of discourse blending, they stretch the interpretation of the compound to the limit, or flesh them out with some more information from discourse. The sequence of blending may not be reversible, because some people cannot promptly realize the discourse effect on the literal/phonological blending of a given pun.



Figure 3.

In the next section, I will probe into one traditional Japanese poem called *waka* 'Japanese song', and see how the two levels of blending work in the interpretation of *kakekotoba*, a homophonic device to create multiple readings in *waka*.

4.3. Homophonic Compound from a Traditional Japanese Poem

The last example of homophonic compound is a traditional Japanese poem which includes *kakekotoba*, i.e. a homophonic device to create multiple readings. With multiple readings, *kakekotoba* sometimes impedes a continous narrative flow by frustrating a one-to-one correspondence between words and their meanings. Nevertheless, the poetic attributes of these words open up a new space in the narrative/poem by drawing on the metaphorical and metonymic aspects of language.

The following *waka* example is by Muneyuki Minamoto (?-939), one of the Thirty-Six Mater Poets in the history of Japan. The *waka* example is included in *Kokinwakashuu*, A Collection of Ancient and Modern Poetry, which was compiled by the imperial command of Emperor Daigo around 905. Muneyuki's *waka* poem was listed as the 315th of 1111 poems, and the unspoiled quality of his work still impresses us beyond time and space. Note that, for convenience, I have added the original Japanese form along with the romanized description.

(7) *Kokinwakashuu* (10thc. [a.905])

山里	は	冬	ぞ	さびしさ	まさり	ける
yamazato	*fa*	*fuyu*	*zo*	*sabisisa*	*masari*	*keru*
mountain village	TOP	winter	PT	loneliness	increase	PST

人め	も	草	も	かれ	ぬ	と	思へ	ば
fitome	*mo*	*kusa*	*mo*	***kare***	*nu*	*to*	*omofe*	*ba*
people	too	plants	too	KARE	PERF	COMP	think	when

In the mountain area, (we) feel increasingly loney in winter when (we) think that people don't visit (us) and (that) plants have died down.

The *kakekotoba* word in this example is *kare*, and how to associate this sound with its Chinese character forms is crucial for the interpretation of this poem. The whole process of this blending is summarized in Figure 4, and I will explain the two levels of blending based on it. Since this is the final example and is relatively easier to display the two levels of blending, I have illustrated them separately in the figure.

First, consider the possible grammatical combination of the verb *kare* with the auxiliary *nu*. In Old Japanese, the auxiliary *nu* follows the linking form of a given verb, so the inflectional form of the verb *kare* is considered to be its linking form. Second, we have to decode the intended meanings of the whole expression *karenu*. In classical Japanese dictionaries (e.g. Saeki *et al*., 1989), there are two verbs that can take the linking form and be combined with the perfective auxiliary *nu*: *karu* 'die down/run dry' and *karu* 'become estranged'. These two steps can be completed at the lexical/phonological level of blending, but how they become meaningful in this poem is yet to be done. In other words, the key to what makes this *kakekotoba* successful is to integrate discourse factors into it. Then third, broadening our perspective, we have to find those expressions that can be semantically meaningful with *karenu*. The possible candidates are the grammatical subjects of this verb: *fitome* 'people' and *kusa* 'plants'; since both of them are juxtaposed by the coordinate particle *mo* 'too', it is unlikely that we can take other options. The possible grammatical combinations are summarized in the following.

(8) a. *fitome* 'people + *karenu* 'become estranged'
b. *fitome* 'people' + *karenu* 'die down/run dry'
c. *kusa* 'plants' + *karenu* 'become estranged'
d. *kusa* 'plants' + *karenu* 'die down/run dry'



Figure 4.

These are 'grammatically' possible blends. However, we still have to narrow down the options to 'contextually' possible ones in this discourse. The combination of (8a) is appropriate for this context, because 'people don't visit us' can be compatible with the first part of this poem *fuyu zo sabisisa masari keru* '(we) feel increasingly lonely in winter': since people don't visit us, we feel increasingly lonely in winter. The combination of (8d) is also congruent with the first part of this poem because we can easily imagine that, when plants have dried up, we will feel much lonelier in winter. On the other hand, the expressions in both (8b) and (8c) are grammatically or semantically unlikely combinations. In (8b), when *karenu* means 'die down/run dry', the grammatical subject should be a plant or an inanimate thing at best; in (8c), when *karenu* means 'become estranged', the grammatical subject should be human beings in the real world. Due to such semantic inconsistencies, we can exclude (8b) and (8c) from the possible

blends. The remaining blends (8a) and (8d) can be processed at the level of discourse blending, as in Figure 4.

In this section, I have examined one traditional Japanese poem in the framework of Blending Theory. The information processing of *kakekotoba*, proves to be the same as that of homophonic compounds in both conversational and historical cosmic story-telling discourse in the previous sections. In other words, blending emerges first at the lexical/phonological level, and then at the discourse level; the sequence of blending is fundamental for the successful interpretation of discourse effects on homophonic compounds.

In the next section, I will summarize and discuss what we have found in the analysis of homophonic compounds with respect to Blending Theory.

5. Discussion

Coulson; Oakley (2005: 1507) state that "Whether the inputs to blending are grammatical constructions or complex cultural concepts, the integration processes are governed by the very same structural principles and constraints". In fact, there are many interdisciplinary works on conceptual blending: irony, relevance, cultural issues, etc. (e.g. Hiraga, 2005; Kihara, 2005; Slingerland, 2005). In this study, we have examined the possibility that discourse may facilitate and manage the way inputs are blended in a unified way. I have proposed the two levels of blending, analyzing three examples of homophonic compounds from different genres of discourse, and confirmed that the sequential processing from lexical/phonological to discourse blending is common among these examples. In what follows, I will give a further account of blending at different levels.



Figure 5.

Figure 5 focuses only on the blending process from inputs to outputs, based on the analysis of homophonic compounds. First, two inputs are blended in the blended space; at this level, the blends are not influenced by any discourse factor. Speakers of Japanese

try to imagine any possible combination of blends, drawing on their background cultural knowledge of Chinese characters. We have called this level the lexical/phonological blending, the one without discourse factors. Yet, we have to pay attention to a triangular relation of form-sound-meaning of Chinese characters (Kwan, 2001; Saussure, 1972: 27). There is no doubt that, whether the relation of form to meaning is stronger than the relation of sound to meaning or vice versa, both sound and form are correlated with the meaning of Chinese characters (see Tyler et al., 1999 for such a controversial issue). Namely, at the lexical/phonological level, speakers of Japanese can associate the sound of a given blend with its possible meanings, imagining their respective Chinese character forms. Second, at the discourse blending, speakers of Japanese are obliged to choose possible homophonic compounds considering discourse factors. As explained in Section 4, some speakers need time to decode the blending process of homophonic compounds in the immediate discourse; others might need some help from sharp-witted people in order to better understand certain blends of homophonic compounds with discourse factors. To put it differently, it is likely that they struggle with realizing the correlation between a sound and its possible form of Chinese characters associated with a given discourse. Therefore, the sequential order of blending is from lexical/phonological to discourse blending, not the reverse. Finally, speakers of Japanese come to understand the intended meaning of a given homophonic compound in the discourse.

Homophonic compounds in the writing system of Japanese may be regarded as being different from those in the writing system of alphabets, in that native speakers have different cultural backgrounds or culture-specific associations with a given sound. In spite of that, we cannot completely ignore discourse factors on the usage of homophones in any language (e.g. Farb, 1993). For example, the English sound [peəʳz] enables us to evoke the words *pears* and *pairs* at least. In the utterance "I've no idea how worms reproduce but you often find them in [peəʳz]", we can blend the word *worms* with either *pears* or *pairs* in this stretch of discourse, producing two possible interpretations. Of course, a cross-linguistic analysis of discourse factors on homophonic compounds or homophones goes beyond this study. However, the important thing is that speakers of a given language can hit upon forms of a given sound, and then single out possible forms in relation to discourse. The sequential order of blending – i.e. from lexical/phonological to discourse blending – can be confirmed. Of course, these three examples are not enough to conclude that Blending Theory can always predict the most preferred interpretation among several possible choices. This potentiality of Blending Theory will be pursued in my future work, hopefully in relation to text development and lexical cohesion in a wider context.

6. Concluding Remarks

In this study, I have explored two levels of blending be analyzing three examples of homophonic compounds in Japanese. Although the examples are from different genres of discourse, the information processing proves to be done in the same order: from lexical/phonological to discourse blending. Homophonic compounds abound in Japanese at each synchronic stage due to its simple phonological structures. While

speakers of Japanese are faced with such expressions in their daily lives, they can cope with interactions full of ambiguous or vague expressions. Furthermore, they can enjoy homophonic puns in either conversation or poetry. This linguistic situation is seemingly complicated, especially to non-native speakers of Japanese. However, Japanese people have been familiar with this for more than one-thousand years. The key to coping with this linguistic situation is to understand how to code and decode the usage of homophones in discourse. Japanese people utilize discourse to make sense of homophonic expressions. The process is common among them irrespective of genres, and Blending Theory can handle them all.

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Who Is to Believe When You Bet: on Non-Referential Indexical Functions of the Pronoun *You* in English

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ABSTRACT: Using English-language material this paper presents an account of a number of functions of the pronoun *you* that are not directly related to reference. The analysis focuses on occurrences of the second-person pronoun in utterances of prediction, judgment and generalization. The possibility of non-referential uses of the pronoun *you* stems from double indexicality as an inherent property of personal pronouns. As a non-referential item the pronoun *you* is shown to be indexed to the speaker's internal experiences and/or communicative activities.

Keywords: personal pronoun, reference, index, internal experience, communication.

RESUMEN: Con material en lengua inglesa, este artículo presenta una explicación de una serie de funciones del pronombre *you* que no están directamente relacionadas con la referencia. El análisis se centra en ejemplos del pronombre de segunda persona en enunciados de predicción, juicio y generalización. Se demuestra que la posibilidad de usos no referenciales del pronombre *you* surgen de la doble indexicalización como propiedad inherente de los pronombres personales. Como elemento no referencial, el pronombre *you* indica las experiencias internas y/o las actividades comunicativas del hablante.

Palabras clave: pronombre personal, referencia, índice, experiencia interna, comunicación.

1. Referential and Non-Referential Properties of Personal Pronouns

One of the most common accounts of the meanings of personal pronouns is that which is based on generalizations over their referential properties. From a referential perspective, meanings of first-, second-, and third-person pronouns are realized, respectively, through the indication of the speaker (*I*), the hearer/addressee (*you*), and the person or entity (*he, she, it*) referred to in a particular speech event. For example, English

personal pronouns are characterized in terms of reference to speech-event participants in such well-known grammar manuals as Jespersen (1933: 147), Huddleston (1998: 97), Quirk *et al*. (1999, ch. 4). Complementary to accounts of personal pronouns in terms of their referential properties, pragmatic theories of meaning (see, for example, Levinson, 2003: 62; Mey, 2001: 52-56) relate pronouns to items of person deixis, that is, words which function as "pointers" to someone or something in a particular context.

However, quite a number of uses of personal pronouns can hardly be explained in terms of reference alone. Here belong, for example, the generic uses of pronouns. For instance, in (1) the pronoun *I* does not refer uniquely to the speaker, but, rather (according to the context), to the whole group of (independently-minded) people:

(1) *I can counter my nemo by conflicting; by adopting my own special style of life. **I** build up an elaborate unique persona, **I** defy the mass*. (J. Fowles, *The Aristos*, 38)

Generic reference is one of the functional properties of the second-person pronoun *you* which frequently occurs in utterances such as the following:

(2) ***You** never know what will happen next.*

In (2), it is generic reference of the second-person pronoun which makes the latter correlative with the indefinite pronoun *one* occurring in utterances like (3) (that are popular in American English):

(3) ***One** never knows what he expects will happen next.*

Occasionally, a third-person pronoun singular can have generic reference, as is the case with the pronoun *he* when the latter is used in proverbs or sayings, as in (4):

(4) ***He** laughs best who laughs last.*

On the other hand, personal pronouns can be used with "shifted reference", or as indexical signs pointing to "false" participants of the respective speech event. For instance, the pronouns *I* and *you* can alternate in speech, both, either directly or indirectly, indicating the speaker. This usually occurs in three cases.

First, alternations of *you* and *I* are to be found in collocations with the verb *bet* in utterances of prediction, as in (5):

(5) ***You** (vs. **I**) bet they are going to win.*

Second, both *I* and *you* can refer to the speaker in utterances of judgment, as in (6):

(6) ***You** would think (vs. **I** think) they are working.*

Finally, example (7) below demonstrates one of the most frequent uses of the pronoun *you* with reference to the speaker in utterances of generalization:

(7) *As an unashamed "romantic", I have always been subject to boredom.* […] ***You*** *feel* ***you*** *can't ignore it, can't take your eyes off it* […]. (C. Wilson, *Mind Parasites*, 81)

There are two interrelated questions in connection with the occurrence of *you* in examples (2), (5), (6) and (7). First, there are no obvious reasons or logical motivations for using the pronoun *you* in the mentioned examples with (partial) reference to the speaker. Second, it cannot be stated with sufficient certainty whether it is reference alone which is at issue in the given uses of the second-person pronoun.

With the formulated questions as a background, the next section of the paper gives a brief overview of how the problems are commonly treated in the literature and suggests a working hypothesis for further investigation.

2. On the Double Indexicality of Personal pronouns: A Hypothesis

Interpretations of referential properties of personal pronouns are often based on the assumption that pronouns are inherently multifunctional, or polysemous. For example, it is observed in Jespersen (1933: 151) that one of the meanings of the pronouns *we* and *you* in English is the meaning of 'generic person' which, in turn, may lend emotional coloring to the utterance in familiar speech.

It is pointed out in Marmaridou (2003: 78) that many pragmatically oriented studies treat the functional variety of deictic words (including personal pronouns) on the basis of differentiation between different types of deixis, such as, for example, personal and social deixis. This approach is, in part, reflected in Kamio (2001), where the pronouns *we*, *you* and *they* are regarded alongside the pragmatic (and social) parameter "speaker's territory of information", with only occasional remarks on how this parameter relates to the (more prototypical) function of the pronouns, which consists in indicating participants/non-participants of communication.

On the other hand, some attempts have been made to subsume the pronouns' referential and non-referential uses within one unified framework. Thus, it is claimed in Smith (1989) that uses of linguistic indexicals (including personal pronouns) are governed by invariable and generalized high-order metarules that, in turn, determine variable reference-fixing rules governing indexicals on particular occasions of use. The author's claim is substantiated with reference to a number of indexicals, including the pronoun *I* in English (Smith, 1989: 182-186). From a psychologically oriented perspective, the common denominator for the variety of uses of indexical expressions is established on referential grounds in Clark (1996). Specifically, the symbolic constituent of meaning of the personal pronoun *I* is defined as "oneself" or "the person uttering this item", whereas the indexical core of the pronoun is understood as "the self indicated by origin of voice" (Clark, 1996: 162).

Acknowledging the above overviewed observations on correlations of referential and non-referential properties of personal pronouns, this paper, however, suggests a somewhat different perspective on the phenomenon under discussion. The proposed study will proceed from two theoretical points of departure. First, the paper takes up Benveniste's (1966: 232) point that the pronouns *I* and *you* are tied up by "correlation of

subjectivity", which presupposes, in turn, the constitutive role of the subjective component in the pronouns' meaning.

Second, the paper follows Adamczewski and Delmas' (1982) treatment of grammatical, or function words in English, which postulates that words of this kind (including pronouns) function as "indices" or "tracers" of the speaker's internal(ized) operations, such as perceptually and/or conceptually grounded judgments, evaluations, subject-predicate linking procedures. With reference to English indexicals, it is shown by Delmas (1982, ch. 8, 9) that indexical words do more than simply pointing to external entities. Namely, the demonstratives *this*, *that*, as well as the personal pronoun *it* (Delmas, 1982: 221-227) are shown to be indexed to such internal operations of the speaker as self-positioning inside or outside a particular situation, recalling something or appealing to the hearer's memory, differentiation between new (rheme) and known (theme) information.

From a semiotic perspective, Adamczewski's account of English grammar presupposes that the notion of linguistic indexicality could be extended to include – besides the function of pointing to external entities in a particular context – the function of *indicating the speaker's internal positioning towards what is being referred to.*

The semiotic implication of Adamczewski's theory links to the account of basic vocabulary items (called "primitive vocabulary") suggested – from an evolutionary perspective – in Allott (2001). One of the key claims of the book consists in the assumption that structures of individual words "carry within them either a direct representation of a percept or action or an indirect clue or indication of the percept or action to which the word relates" (Allott, 2001: 60). With reference to the pronoun *you* in English, it is observed that the pronoun relates, on the one hand, to a particular gesture ("a strong forward pointing with the forefinger") and, on the other hand, contains an internal component (Allott, 2001: 100) which, in turn, is understood as a particular internal state or activity (Allott, 2001: 95).

With these briefly overviewed theoretical assumptions as a backdrop, the paper puts forward the following hypothesis:

> *One of the inherent properties of personal pronouns as items that have both referential and non-referential functions consists in their double indexicality. As referential items, personal pronouns perform the function of pointing to speech-event participants/non-participants. The function of personal pronouns as non-referential items consists in (implicit) indication of the speaker's internal states, experiences and/or communicative activities.*

The suggested hypothesis will be further substantiated with reference to linguistic data drawn from English-language fiction. The corpus of literary texts has included works of British and American authors written within a time span of about fifty years: from the middle up to the end of the twentieth century. The corpus has comprised over three thousand pages of printed text.

3. The Pronoun *You* as an Index of Internal Experiences and Communicative Activities

3.1. The Contribution of the Pronoun *You* to the Expression of Uncertainty: The Case of *You Bet*

Most frequently, the pronoun *you* refers to the speaker in collocation with the predicate *bet*, as in (5). Below is another example of the same usage type:

(8) *You're thinking what I'm thinking?* ***You*** *bet I am* […]. (M.H. Clark, *Before I Say Good-Bye,* 302)

According to the context, the character saying *you bet* is not quite sure about his own words. The utterance, however, would sound with greater certainty as soon as the pronoun *you* is replaced by *I*, as in (9):

(9) *You're thinking what I'm thinking?* ***I*** *bet I am* […].

The modality of uncertainty which is often conveyed by the expression *you bet* (contrastively to *I bet* expressing the opposite modality) is implied in most dictionary definitions of the expression. Thus, Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1994: 108) gives the following typical example of using *you bet*:

(10) ***You*** *bet I'll be there*

As explained in Merriam Webster (1994: 108), the expression *you bet* in the given example means "to be able to be sure". In vein with this definition, A.S. Hornby's *Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary of Current English* (1980: 78) says that *I bet* is equivalent to "I'm certain", whereas *you bet* means "you may be certain".

The question which arises in connection with the briefly overviewed examples in (8) – (10) concerns the contribution of the pronouns *I* and *you* to the expression of certainty and uncertainty respectively.

The contribution of the pronoun *I* to the expression of certainty can be explained by the fact that – alongside reference to the speaker – the pronoun also introduces a first-person mode of thinking (Runggaldier, 1995) and, thus, introduces the psychological structure called 'self'. Consciousness of one's own 'self', in turn, involves the whole range of subjective experiences, of which the basic ones, according to Gallagher (2000), are preconceptually grounded senses of agency and ownership for action, as well as the experience of immediate access to one's own self. One's sense of agency and/or ownership for action can be held responsible for the significant role that, according to Austin (1962), the pronoun *I* plays in performative utterances. On the other hand, it is possible to assume that the speaker's access to his/her own internal experiences is responsible for the modality of certainty conveyed by utterances with the expression *I bet*. Some support for this assumption can be provided by examples like (11) in which *I bet* collocates with another expression of certainty, namely, *I'd put money on it*:

(11) […] ***I*** *bet he's looking at her grave. I'd put money on it.* (V. McDermid, *Killing the Shadows*, 365)

Importantly, in case of switching from the first- to the second person-pronoun, as demonstrated in (12), the resulting utterance would hardly be acceptable, if possible at all:

(12) […] ***You*** *bet he's looking at her grave.* ??*I'd put money on it.*

The constraint on using *you* in (12) can be explained with due consideration of the contrast in the epistemic implications of *you* and *I* as used, respectively, in *you bet* and *I'd put money on it*. Whereas the pronoun *I* in general and, especially, in the mentioned expression presupposes the speaker's egocentric space (Runggaldier, 1995: 138) and, thus, conveys a high degree of experientially anchored certainty, the second-person pronoun *you*, by contrast, does not presuppose the speaker's subjective experience, which, in turn, leads to the expression of uncertainty in *you bet*.

Though the expression of uncertainty appears to be the primary function of the pronoun *you* in collocation with the verb *bet*, it does not mean that the pronoun's referential function is in this case entirely suppressed. Consider the following utterance:

(13) […] ***You*** *can bet your bottom dollar it would have been a long time before the police managed to nail him.* (V. McDermid, *Killing the Shadows*, 393)

In (13), the epistemic connotation of the pronoun *you* is that of the speaker's uncertainty. On the other hand, the context of *vis-à-vis* communication in which the utterance in (13) is pronounced presupposes that by using *you* the speaker makes direct reference to the addressee, literally inviting the latter to take some responsibility (*you can bet*) for the suggested prediction. However, though the pronoun *you* in (13) functions both as a referential and non-referential item, it is obviously the pronoun's non-referential (epistemic) function which plays the dominating role in the general communicative structure of the utterance. Thus, a switch from the second-person pronoun used in the original utterance in (13) to the first-person pronoun in the transformed utterance in (14) would result (not so much) in the change of reference ('addressee' – 'speaker'), but in the transition from the modality of uncertainty (*you can bet*) to the modality of certainty (*I can bet*):

(14) […] ***I*** *can bet my bottom dollar it would have been a long time before the police managed to nail him.*

A case when the speaker is in a state of hesitation between asserting and hypothesizing about a particular state of affairs is demonstrated in (15):

(15) *Diesel fuel doesn't cause explosions, he thought.* ***I****'ll bet anything that if that boat was turned into confetti, it was because somebody planted a bomb on that;* ***you*** *can bet on that.* (M. H. Clark, *Before I Say Good-Bye*, 74)

By contrast with the example in (13), the given fragment of discourse makes part of the character's inner speech. As a consequence of this, the pronoun *you* in *you can bet* has the same referent as the first-person pronoun in *I'll bet*: in both cases it is the speaker (and author of the inner monologue) in an instance of self-reference. The difference between *I* and *you* is of epistemic rather than of referential nature. Whereas the pronoun *I* – because of the implicit indication of the speaker's egocentric space – presupposes the speaker's certainty (see above), the pronoun *you* implies, according to Langacker's (2000: 205) viewing arrangement, the speaker's positioning as the subject of perception and thus (probably) hypothesizing and prediction. This positioning of the speaker directly relates to the function of *you* as a means of expressing uncertainty. The contrast in the epistemic implications of *I* and *you* in (15) is emphasized through the same kind of contrast between the expressions the pronouns collocate with. Thus, whereas the pronoun *I* agrees with the expression *will bet anything* in conveying the idea of the speaker's certainty, the pronoun *you*, by contrast, agrees with the expression *can bet* in connoting the speaker's state of hesitation and lack of certainty. The epistemic indexical value of each pronoun (especially of the pronoun *I*) is so closely tied up to the implication of the ensuing expression that a switch from one pronoun to the other one (e.g. from *I* to *you*) could result, as was the case in (12), in a low degree of acceptability of the transformed utterance:

(16) *Diesel fuel doesn't cause explosions, he thought. ??**You**'ll bet anything that if that boat was turned into confetti, it was because somebody planted a bomb on it* […].

The analysis of this subsection has shown that the pronouns *I* and *you* in collocation with the verb *bet* perform *the communicatively relevant function of indicating the speaker's internal positioning with respect to the designated speech act*. The pronoun *I* indicates the speaker's egocentric space and agentive power, which makes the utterance *I bet* a (semi-)performative and thus – to a high degree – equivalent to actual bet. The pronoun *you*, on the contrary, indicates the speaker's position as the subject of perception and hypothesizing, which lends the modality of uncertainty to the utterance *you bet* and makes it a kind of prediction rather than assertion.

In what follows it will be shown that non-referential indexical functions of the pronoun *you* feature prominently in utterances of judgment (3.2.) and generalization (3.3.).

3.2. Indexical Functions of *You* in Utterances of Judgment

The pronoun *you* can be used alternatively with the pronoun *I* in collocation with either cognitive verbs (e.g. *think, believe, consider*) or speech act verbs in the transferred meaning of cognitive categorization (e.g. *say, tell, call* in the meaning "interpret", "classify as"). Consider the example in (17) where the subject of inner speech and (simultaneously) the subject of opinion are represented in the predication *you'd think*:

(17) […] *He could see the beaks tucked into the feathers. '**You**'d think they'd be feeding,' he said to himself, 'not just standing in that way.'* (D. Du Maurier, *The Birds*, 40)

The use of *you* in (17) may seem to carry the same connotation of uncertainty as the use of *you* in *you bet*. Thus, a switch from *you* to *I* in (17) would yield a more certain expression of the character's opinion, as the transformed utterance in (18) clearly shows:

(18) […] *He could see the beaks tucked into the feathers. '**I** think they are feeding,' he said to himself* […].

However, the occurrence of *you* in cases like (17) involves the realization of one more important function of the pronoun besides the function of connoting the speaker's uncertainty. Consider the example below, where, unlike (17), the speaker has a "real" interlocutor:

(19) '[…] *I'm two-faced, 'cos sometimes I want to stand on my hind legs and tell Elaine exactly what I think of her, but do I do it? No…' 'That's not being two-faced, lass, that's diplomacy. That's what **you** call diplomacy.*' (C. Cookson, *Justice Is a Woman*, 176)

The example in (19) represents a fragment of conversation between a young lady, who is imagining she is "two-faced", and an elderly man, who is trying to convince the lady to be less self-critical and to characterize her attitude towards her own sister (called Elaine) in terms of "diplomacy". The use of *you* in the man's utterance (*That's what you call diplomacy*) presupposes, in part, direct reference to the addressee. Besides, by using *you* in combination with the verb *call* the speaker is signaling that the person he is addressing could (potentially) share his views and beliefs. In other words, the pronoun *you*, as used in (19), points to *the speaker's interactive strategy of involving the addressee into his system of opinions and assumptions*. Due to this interactive implication of the pronoun *you* the utterance with the verb *call* used in the present indefinite form receives interpretation as the speaker's appeal to share his point of view, not as the speaker's description of the addressee's point of view (which would be a more common way of interpreting the present-indefinite predication). The interactive implication of the utterance *You call it diplomacy* makes it, on the one hand, synonymous to *I would like you to call it diplomacy* and, on the other hand, different from *I know that you call it diplomacy*.

The transformed example in (20), where *you* is replaced by *I*, demonstrates a low degree of the speaker's cooperativeness:

(20) '*That's not being two-faced, lass, that's diplomacy. That's what **I** call diplomacy.*'

Though the indication of the speaker's interactive strategy is communicatively important in uses of *you* like those in (19), the second-person pronoun's indexical link to the speaker's positioning as the subject of viewing and, in part, as the subject of (not quite certain) prediction (see 3.1.) is not entirely suppressed. Consider the example in (21), where *you* combines with the modal predication *could say*:

(21) *Christopher Dawe held up a hand. "Just one moment. Tell me how he moves.* […] *How he moves. Walks, for example." "Fluidly," Angie said. "**You** could say he almost glides."* (D. Lehane, *Prayers for Rain*, 231)

In (21), the use of *you* in the statement of the speaker's own (tentative) opinion indicates that the speaker (Angie) is inviting the addressee (Christopher Dawe) to join her in making perceptual judgments about the person being discussed. At the same time, the pronoun *you* invokes the speaker as the viewer and thus – as the one who can only *predict* the possibility for the addressee to share a particular point of view, not impose it in a straightforward and certain manner. In (21), the hypothetical nature of the addressee's involvement is marked by the modal auxiliary *could*: *You could say he almost glides* (*vs*. more categorical, if acceptable, *??You say he almost glides*).

The pronoun *you* functions as a complex index pointing to the speaker's involvement strategy, on the one hand, and to the speaker's positioning as the subject of perception and prediction, on the other, in the following example:

(22) *For that matter, could **anyone** say that Mrs. Stoner was a bad person? No. **He** could not say it himself, and he was no freak. She had her points, Mrs. Stoner. She was clean.* […] *She had her other points, to be sure – her faults, **you** might say. She snooped – no mistake about it* […] (J. F. Powers, "The Valiant Woman", *Love Stories*, 72)

In (22), the pronoun *you* occurring in the expression "you might say" indicates that the speaker (who is at the same time the subject of inner monologue) is willing to share his opinion about another character (Mrs. Stoner) with any person within his communicative domain. This indexical function of the second-person pronoun makes it different in the given example from the pronoun *anyone*, which locates the potential subject of the same opinion outside the speaker's immediate sphere of communication. Since it is the relationship of perception and hypothesizing which links the speaker to any individual even within his own sphere of communication (*you*), the verb *say* that refers to an individual's judgment-making appears with the modal auxiliary *might*: *you might say* (*vs*. *??you say*).

Utterances of judgment with second-person subjects have one more important peculiarity besides those discussed in this subsection. Namely, such utterances, in contrast to their counterparts with first-person subjects, produce the effect of generalization. The special contribution of the pronoun *you* to this effect would be the concern of the next subsection of the paper.

3.3. Indexical Functions of *You* in Utterances of Generalization

Uses of *you* in a generic sense are among most common ones in Contemporary English. In many cases the so-called "generic" *you* indicates the speaker's mental image produced in an instance of self-reflection. Illustrative in this respect is the following example:

(23) *If I'd stayed all night, she thought, in the morning when the fog burned off I'd have known how far* ***you*** *could see from the top of the hill*. (E. Parsons, "The Nightingales Sing", *Love Stories*, 38)

From a referential point of view, the pronouns *you* and *I* in (23) appear to be very near equivalents, so that a switch from the second- to the first-person pronoun, as shown in (24), would not result in any change of reference:

(24) *If I'd stayed all night, she thought, in the morning when the fog burned off I'd have known how far* ***I*** *could see from the top of the hill.*

On the other hand, whatever the degree of interchangeability of *I* and *you* in utterances like (23), the use of the second-person pronoun brings about the effect of generalization. What could be the source of this effect?

It has been mentioned previously that the use of *you* invokes the speaker as the subject of perception and hypothesizing. From a broader discourse oriented perspective, this may mean that the second-person pronoun could activate the whole situation of perception (Hausendorf, 2003) in which the subject and object of perception (the referents of *I* and *you* respectively) are separated by *a spatial distance*.

Assuming that the pronoun *you* is (implicitly) indexed to distance between the speaker and addressee, it becomes clear that the generalizing effect of *you*-utterances comes as a natural result of an inherent link between distance and generalization. With reference to the second-person pronoun in typical generic uses this link has been pointed out in Reilly *et al*. (2005: 189, 198). In cases like (23), the pronoun *you* invokes the speaker's mental image, as well as viewing this image as if from a distance.

Consider another example involving the occurrence of *you* in inner speech:

(25) *And taking care of somebody made* ***me*** *feel good. Like discovering* ***you****'re more than* ***you*** *thought* ***you*** *were*. (B. Greene, *Morning Is a Long Time Coming*, 33)

In (25), the contrast between the pronouns *I* and *you* is foregrounded due to the contrast of clauses in which the pronouns occur. Thus, the pronoun *I* (occurring in the objective case "me") refers to the subject of inner speech as an actual experiencer of the predicated state ("feeling good") and, accordingly, makes part of the factual proposition. The pronoun *you*, by contrast, is indexically linked to the mentally construed image of the experiencer, which agrees with the occurrence of the pronoun in the counterfactual clause introduced by the comparative conjunction *like*. The idea of distance evoked by the second-person pronoun in (25) correlates with the mentally conceived distance between the world of reality (reflected in the clause with the first-person pronoun) and the world of one's imagination (referred to in the clause with the second-person pronoun).

Distance and generalization appear to be two realities indexed by the second-person pronoun in the example below:

(26) "*Now that's loyalty," Stevie Zambuca said. "**I** try and instill that in my men, but **I** can't. They're only as loyal as their wallets are thick. See, **you** can't teach loyalty. **You** can't instill it. It's like trying to teach love*. […]." (D. Lehane, *Prayers for Rain*, 198)

In (26), the 'I'-participant of communication switches from *I* to *you* in the instance of generalizing over his experience of teaching loyalty. The effect of generalization comes as a natural result of *the speaker's establishing a distance* between himself as a bearer of actual experience (*I try* […] *but I can't*) and his construed image of any individual having the same experience (*you can't teach loyalty*). The verb *see* which introduces the utterance of generalization indicates the speaker's appeal to his interlocutors to *have a mental view and comprehension* of the situation being spoken about. On the other hand, the pronoun *you* in (26) refers, in part, to the people the speaker is addressing and indicates the speaker's attempt to involve the addressees in sharing his experience. The multiple implications of the pronoun *you* in the analyzed example (as was the case with some previously analyzed uses of *you*) reveal the possibility of the pronoun's functioning as a complex indexical integrating the properties of a referential item and, at the same time, a non-referential word which connotes the speaker's internal positioning with respect to the designated event.

4. Conclusion

The proposed analysis of the pronoun *you* in English has revealed that there is a number of uses of the pronoun that cannot be adequately interpreted with recourse to the pronoun's basic referential property – pointing to the addressee in a canonical speech event. The present study singles out three types of utterances in which the second-person pronoun functions as either a non-referential item or (more commonly) as a word with "shifted" reference, i.e. pointing to the speaker rather than the addressee: (i) predictions; (ii) judgments; (iii) generalizations. In accounting for the possibility of using *you* without direct reference to, or even in the absence of, the addressee the paper puts forward and substantiates the hypothesis that this possibility stems from the inherent property of personal pronouns (and, maybe, some other indexical words) which manifests itself through the pronouns' double indexicality. Namely, it is shown that besides indicating the addressee as an external participant of a speech event the second-person pronoun functions as *an indexical pointing to internal experiences of the speaker* with respect to the content of the proposition expressed in the utterance. When the speaker-related indexical function of the pronoun *you* becomes highly relevant for the purposes of discourse the pronoun's basic referential function (pointing to the addressee) may be partially suppressed. In most cases this leads to the effect of either indefinite or "shifted" reference.

The suggested account of non-referential indexical functions of the pronoun *you* in English maps out a model for the study of other pronouns and/or indexical words in general which would envisage all kinds of explicit and implicit semiotic links of the words in question and which could thus reveal the variety of facets in their semiotic potential.

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Metaphoric Extension and Invited Inferencing in Semantic Change

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ABSTRACT: Two models of semantic change, *metaphoric extension* (Sweetser, 1990) and *invited inferencing* (Traugott and Dasher, 2002), have been offered as explanations for changes such as "see" > "know/understand". In this paper, I will show that, while either model works for some of the changes, each model can explain changes that the other cannot. Metaphoric extension and invited inferencing can therefore be considered as two types of change rather than two competing theories. I furthermore suggest that changes such as "see" > "know/understand" occur when metaphoric extension and invited inferencing reinforce one another via *parallel chaining* (a concept adapted from Goossens, 2003).

Keywords: semantic change, invited inferencing, metaphor, primary metaphors, primary scenes, parallel chaining.

RESUMEN: Dos modelos de cambio semántico, la *extensión metafórica* (Sweetser, 1990) y *la inferencia invitada* (Traugott y Dasher, 2002), sirven para explicar cambios como «ver» > «saber/entender». En esta presentación, muestro que los dos modelos funcionan con un grupo determinado de cambios, pero cada modelo puede explicar unos cambios que no puede explicar el otro. Por consiguiente, se consideran la extensión metafórica y la inferencia invitada como dos tipos de cambio antes que dos teorías rivales. Además, sugiero que los cambios como «ver» > «saber/entender» ocurren cuando la extensión metafórica y la inferencia invitada se refuerzan por la *parallel chaining* (un concepto adaptado de Goossens, 2003).

Palabras clave: cambio semántico, inferencia invitada, metáfora, metáforas principales, escenas principales, *parallel chaining*.

1. Two Types of Semantic Change

In recent years, the linguistics community has been divided on how to describe semantic extensions like the sense of *see*, meaning "know/understand", as in (1).

(1) Oh, I *see* what you're saying. (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040604-2.html)[1]

Some attribute the extension *see* "know/understand" to metaphor (Sweetser, 1990; Haser, 2003), while others ascribe changes of this type to the metonymic process called *invited inferencing* (Traugott and Dasher, 2002), also termed *pragmatic inference* (Hopper and Traugott, 1993) or *metonymic extension via inference* (Koch, 1999). The debate over metaphoric extension versus invited inferencing has focused closely on extensions that can be successfully explained by either model of semantic change, such as the extension *see* "know/understand". These examples give the impression that metaphoric extension and invited inferencing are competing explanations for the same set of changes.

I argue in this paper that metaphoric extension and invited inferencing should instead be considered as two different types of semantic extension, both of which must be recognized in a thorough account of semantic change. As evidence that metaphoric extension and inferencing are distinct processes, I discuss an example of invited inferencing that cannot be described as metaphoric extension, and an example of metaphoric extension that fails to work as invited inferencing. These unequivocal examples of the two processes reveal several distinct characteristics of each process not shared by the other. These characteristics, in turn, permit a more precise analysis of the disputed extensions like *see* "know/understand".

The characteristics of metaphoric extension and invited inferencing show that extensions like *see* "know/understand" share the defining properties of *both* processes. These characteristics suggest that metaphor and inferencing may be working together to produce extensions like *see* "know/understand", via a process of *parallel chaining* (a concept adapted from Goossens, 2003). I will refer to the set of extensions like *see* "know/understand" as the *metaphor/inferencing overlap*. The parallel chaining explanation of this overlap recasts the relationship between metaphoric extension and invited inferencing as one of potential cooperation, rather than pure competition.

2. The Contested Territory

As a brief overview of metaphoric extension, invited inferencing, and the overlap between the two, let us compare how the two models explain the extensions *see* "know/understand", *warm* "friendly/affectionate" and the future-tense marker *going*.[2]

The extended senses of these three items are given in sentences (2)-(4).

(2) Oh, I *see* what you're saying. (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040604-2.html)

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1. Italics in quotations throughout this paper are my addition. They are intended to draw attention to the extended senses of relevant lexical items.
2. For more in-depth explanations of metaphoric extension and invited inferencing, I suggest Sweetser (1990) on the former, and Traugott and Dasher (2002) on the latter.

(3) She always has a friendly and *warm* attitude [...] (www.geocities.com/SouthBeach/Boardwalk/3265/DSindex2.html)
(4) I'm *going* to stay here in America. (www.montereyrepublicans.org/PressReleases/index.cfm/ID/73.htm)

There is no question that these sentences involve extended, non-central senses of these familiar lexical items. In (2), the verb *see* must mean "know" or "understand", since no one can literally "see" what someone is saying (at least not in a spoken language). Likewise, in (3), *warm* means "affectionate", because an attitude cannot literally be "warm"; and in (4), *going* refers to a future intention, not to literal motion, because the speaker of (4) cannot both "stay in America" and be going somewhere else. Clearly, the meanings of these items in (2)-(4) are extended from the older, more central senses. But how did the extensions occur?

2.1. The Metaphor Model

On the metaphor account, the "know/understand" extension of *see* reflects the well-documented conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING (Sweetser, 1990). This extension may have begun in Indo-European, when the item **sek^{w}-* (> Eng. *see*) was used by a speaker as a novel metaphor to mean "know" (Sweetser, 1990: 33). The conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING was shared by both participants in this theoretical Indo-European conversation, which allowed the hearer to understand the verb *see* as meaning "know" in a context consistent with KNOWING, such as in example (2). The structured mappings of KNOWING IS SEEING allowed the hearer to find the counterpart of the visual source-domain meaning of *see* in the target domain of KNOWING, which is the meaning "know/understand".

Synchronically, a speaker communicates the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING to a hearer in much the same way, using a lexical item from the source domain (*see* from SEEING) with a target-domain meaning ("know/understand" in KNOWING). The hearer understands from the surrounding language or context that the lexical item *see* refers not literally to vision, but metaphorically to comprehension (Fass, 1997; Croft, 2003).

The metaphor model offers similar explanations of the senses of *warm* and *going* in (3) and (4). On this theory, *warm* reflects the metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH, and *going* involves CHANGE IS MOTION (Lakoff; Johnson, 1999: 50, 52-54).

2.2. The Invited Inferencing Model

The invited inferencing account of the extended senses in (2)-(4) is qualitatively different from the metaphor model. On the invited inferencing account, the extension of *see* to mean "know/understand" began with usages like (5).[3]

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3. Of course, the extended sense predates written evidence of the item *see*, but the extension would have occurred in contexts similar to (5).

(5) Nou wend and *seh* wher hit be. (c.1310, Anon., *Marina*)

Even before the item *see* had the extended meaning "know/understand", the item *see* "visually see" invited the inference of "knowing" in contexts like (5). This is because if the addressee of (5) went to "see where it is" (the central meaning), the addressee would also "know where it is" (the inferred meaning). The context is ambiguous as to which of these two interpretations was intended by the speaker. In fact, the speaker probably intended for the hearer to understand both the literal meaning and the inferential meaning, and expected the hearer to both "see" and "know" the location in question.

Over time, the repeated use of *see* in contexts like (5) allowed the inferential pattern to spread throughout the language community, resulting in a *generalized invited inference*. This generalized inference then eventually became lexicalized as a polysemous sense of *see*.[4]

The invited inferencing account can explain the extended senses of *warm* and *going* in much the same way. Examples (6)-(7) represent ambiguous contexts which permitted reanalysis of *warm* and *going*.[5]

(6) Oh take this *warme* kisse on thy pale cold lips. (1588, Shakespeare, *The Lamentable Tragedy of Titus Andronicus*)
(7) I'm *going* to seek him Love Gregory, / In's lands where e'er he be. (1100-1500, Anon., *Love Gregory*)

In (6), *warm* could mean either physically warm, or "affectionate". In (7), *going* means physically travelling around the lands, but it also refers to a future action of seeking. Examples like these form the basis of the metaphoric extension/invited inferencing debate. Invited inferencing, like metaphoric extension, provides a plausible explanation of extensions like *see* "know", *warm* "affectionate" and the future-marker *going*. The next two sections put this metaphor/inferencing overlap in perspective by considering an extension which unambiguously represents invited inferencing, and one which unambiguously reflects metaphoric extension.

3. Unequivocal Invited Inferencing

Some semantic extensions can be explained as invited inferencing, but not as metaphoric extension. As an illustration, let us look at the sense of *seeing* that refers to romantic "dating" as in (8), a quote from an internet chat room.

(8) I am *seeing* this really hot girl named Sarah. She is awesome. I just had to tell everyone. (www.fordtruckworld.com/Trucksnducks)

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4. For more on these stages of development, see Traugott and Dasher (2002: 34-35, 44).
5. Traugott and Dasher (2002: 82 ff) offer a variety of excellent examples of *going* at various stages of the inferencing process.

On an invited inferencing account, the "dating" sense of *seeing* arose in two steps. First, the verb *see* accrued the extended sense "meet with". This meaning was available as an inference, because visually perceiving someone is usually an essential and salient part of meeting with that person. As a result, ambiguous contexts such as (9)-(10) were frequent.

(9) This is the Ladie which you came to *see*. (c.1593, Anonymous [Elizabethan], *Faire Em, A pleasant commodie of 1592*)
(10) For he knew wel that Raymondyn his brother wold neuer loue hym nor *see* hym. (c.1500, compiled by J. D'Arras, tr., *Melusine*)

In (9) it is unclear whether the addressee is more interested in meeting with the lady in question or merely in seeing her. In (10) it seems evident that "Raymondyn" wants to avoid a meeting, as well as visual contact, with his brother. Both contexts are interpretable with either the central visual sense of *see* or the inferential "meet with" sense.

The "meet with" sense of *see* later became generalized and lexicalized, as evidenced by the possibility of modern examples like (11).

(11) Look, I can't *see* you now [...] so you're going to have to come back later. (www.northshire.com/siteinfo/bookinfo.php?isbn=0-671-01988-0&item=0)

The speaker of (11) is face-to-face with the addressee and can visually "see" the addressee, so the utterance in (11) only makes sense if the extended meaning "meet with" is available as a lexical polysemy of *see*.

Four hundred years after the generalization of *see* "meet with", a second inference-based change gave rise to *seeing* "dating". Imperfective *seeing* "meeting with" generally referred to iterated meetings, which invited the inference of a romantic rationale for the meetings (romantic dates being prototypically repeated over a period of time).

This "dating" extension of *seeing* began in contexts such as (12), a passage from one of the Pollyanna books. The context prior to the direct quote makes it especially clear that Pollyanna is deriving an inference of romantic interest based on the fact that the two other characters are seeing and meeting each other repeatedly.

(12) Being so sure now that Jimmy and Mrs. Carew cared for each other, Pollyanna became peculiarly sensitive to everything that tended to strengthen that belief. And being ever on the watch for it, she found it, as was to be expected. First in Mrs. Carew's letters. "I am *seeing* a lot of your friend, young Pendleton," Mrs. Carew wrote one day; "and I'm liking him more and more [...]" (1914, Eleanor H. Porter, *Pollyanna Grows Up*)

The implied romantic interest here is still an inference based on context, and not yet a generalized inference or part of the lexical meaning of imperfective *seeing*. However, following the same pattern described for *see* "know/understand", the extended "dating" sense of *seeing* later became generalized throughout the English-speaking population. Eventually, the sense was lexicalized, making it possible to use *seeing* "dating" unambiguously, as in (13) below.

(13) I know you're not married, but are you *seeing* anyone right now? (www.elektronicsurveillance.homestead.com/interviews_RazinBlack.html)

The speaker and hearer of (13) are meeting in person and can see each other. In this context, a visual interpretation of *seeing* makes no sense. Here, *seeing* refers unambiguously to "dating", demonstrating that the "dating" sense of *seeing* has been added to the lexicon.

3.1. How *Seeing* "Dating" Fails Three Tests for Metaphor

The "dating" sense of *seeing* has several characteristics that make a metaphoric extension explanation impossible. If the extension *seeing* "dating" were based on a conceptual metaphor, we would first have to postulate the existence of a metaphor such as "DATING IS SEEING". We would expect to find the same kinds of evidence for "DATING IS SEEING" that is found supporting documented metaphors like KNOWING IS SEEING. Evidence of this metaphor could come from extralinguistic evidence, systematic semantic extensions, or a new source of evidence that I call the *inflection test*.

Genuine metaphors like KNOWING IS SEEING show up extralinguistically, such as in artwork in which thinkers or books are shown as surrounded by light.[6] Although KNOWING IS SEEING is common in visual metaphors, there are no documented visual examples of metaphors relating SEEING and DATING, which suggests that there is no conceptual metaphor relating these two domains. Unfortunately, relatively little extralinguistic data has been collected on most metaphors, so lack of documentation cannot be taken as proof that a given "metaphor" does not exist. Linguistic data is more readily available, and with this in mind, the next two subsections will discuss linguistic tests which show that the extension *seeing* "dating" cannot be conceptual metaphor.

3.1.1. The Systematic Extensions Test

The systematic extension of semantically related lexical items is the most commonly cited evidence of metaphoric mappings. It has been an assumption of conceptual metaphor theory (starting with Lakoff; Johnson, 1980) that the correspondences between lexical items' source-domain (central) and target-domain (extended) meanings provide evidence of underlying metaphoric mappings. Most of what we know about metaphoric structure comes from collections of related semantic extensions that are taken as evidence of conceptual metaphoric structure.

When several semantic extensions provide evidence of systematically related mappings, this is believed to indicate that a genuine conceptual metaphor underlies the extensions. By the same token, if a semantic extension is *not* part of a systematic set of extensions, I argue that it is unlikely to be a metaphoric extension.

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6. A number of authors have addressed visual metaphor in depth. For example, Forceville (2002) writes on metaphor in film, and McNeill (1992) and Cienki (1998) discuss metaphor in gesture.

An examination of semantically related lexical items can therefore answer the question of whether a given semantic extension is metaphoric or not. For example, the disputed extension *see* "know/understand" is part of a substantial collection of linguistic evidence for the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. Several mappings documented in this way are shown below.



Figure 1. KNOWING IS SEEING and SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE ARE LIGHT SOURCES

As an example of how an extension can provide evidence of a metaphoric mapping, let us examine the mapping SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE ARE LIGHT SOURCES. This mapping allows a source of light (which enables SEEING) to map to a source of knowledge (which enables KNOWING). In the SEEING source domain, literal LIGHT SOURCES may be described by adjectives like *bright, brilliant* and *illuminating*. These adjectives are additionally used metaphorically to describe a book, idea, or person that makes knowledge more accessible, as in examples (14)-(16).

(14) Often it was someone from the community with a *bright* idea that triggered a new activity. (www.ptreyeslight.com/stories/sept20_01/dance_palace.html)
(15) I have taken what that *brilliant* reading teacher taught me and applied it to the way I teach. (www.mathchannel.com/Portals/0/3of3lesson.pdf)
(16) We had an *illuminating* discussion on that particular work. (www.geocities.com/mizzenwood/features.htm)

The metaphoric uses of *bright, brilliant* and *illuminating* reflect the mapping SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE ARE LIGHT SOURCES, which is just one mapping of the many involved in KNOWING IS SEEING. Other items from SEEING provide evidence of further mappings. For example, the ABILITY TO SEE maps to the ABILITY TO COMPREHEND, so that people who are unable to understand something are called *dim, myopic* or *blind*. Extensions like these demonstrate the structural correspondences between SEEING and KNOWING that make metaphor possible.

There is no evidence of mappings like these from SEEING to DATING. A source of light never maps to anything in the realm of "DATING", such as a source of dates. In example (17), *illuminating* cannot mean that the "singles club" is a good source of dates.

(17) ?That singles club is so illuminating.

Likewise, the ABILITY TO SEE cannot map to "the ability to date", and people who cannot get a date are not called *dim, myopic* or *blind* for that reason. In fact, no items or phrases other than *seeing* "dating" hint at a conceptual metaphor "DATING IS SEEING". The absence of systematic extensions from SEEING to "DATING" suggests that "DATING IS SEEING" does not exist, and that *seeing* "dating" cannot be a metaphoric extension.

3.1.2. The Inflection Test

The extended sense of *seeing* meaning "dating" offers further evidence that this extension cannot reflect a conceptual metaphor. Only imperfective-aspect *seeing* can mean "dating", as in the (a) sentences in (18) and (19) below. These examples cannot refer to "dating" if *seeing* is replaced with simple-present *see,* as in the (b) sentences.

(18) a. I know you're not married, but are you *seeing* anyone right now?
(www.elektronicsurveillance.homestead.com/interviews_RazinBlack.html)
b. # I know you're not married, but do you *see* anyone right now?

(19) a. In fact, I heard she's been *seeing* that guy for over two years. Tom had no idea.
(www.firstlightplayers.org/Images/PDF_Files/First%20Light%20Zone%20-%20The%20Tongue.pdf)
b. # In fact, I heard she's *seen* that guy for over two years. Tom had no idea.

The speaker of (18a) is asking whether the hearer is currently dating, but (18b) can only be interpreted as asking whether the hearer visually sees any likely candidates for marriage at the moment. Example (19a), likewise, clearly refers to dating, whereas (19b) is difficult to interpret.

If the "dating" sense of *seeing* reflected a conceptual metaphor, there would be no reason for it to be arbitrarily limited to a particular inflection of a lexical item in the manner shown in (18)-(19). Metaphor, as a potentially extralinguistic conceptual process, can usually draw from any available vocabulary, derivations or inflections that reflect the mappings of the conceptual metaphor. For example, we can use all the different forms of the root *brilliant* to mean "intelligent" via KNOWING IS SEEING, as in *brilliant idea, a brilliantly reasoned argument,* and *the professor's brilliance* in (20)-(22).

(20) I have a *brilliant* idea that will make a lot of money [...]
(www.melaniecraft.com/faq.htm)

(21) We agree with the *brilliantly* reasoned argument in a recent letter to the Observer [...]
(www.broward.com/mld/charlotte/news/columnists/doug_robarchek/9614893.htm)

(22) Elena, initially taken with the professor's *brilliance*, now finds the self-centered and ill older man an unsympathetic husband.
(www.nytheatre-wire.com/LK99082T.htm)

The trend suggested by (20)-(22) is robust, insofar as I have found no cases of metaphoric extension that are limited to particular inflections of an item, and only a few

rare instances in which a metaphor can be expressed with one derivation of a root but not with another.[7]

On the other hand, inferential changes often affect very particular uses of an item. Invited inferencing is frequently limited to the derived or inflected forms that occurred in the ambiguous contexts that made the inferencing possible (Traugott; Dasher, 2002: 82-84).

The inflection test will be of interest once again when we return to the disputed examples of change in the metaphor/invited inferencing overlap, particularly the future-marking use of *going,* which fails the test. Since the inflection test has not been part of the metaphor/inferencing debate, it has the potential to provide a new understanding of contested extensions like *see* "know/understand" and future-marking *going*.

The inflection test, like the other tests in this section (nonlinguistic evidence and systematic extensions), cannot always prove that an extension is invited inferencing. These tests can prove only that a semantic extension is *not* pure metaphoric extension. In the case of *seeing* "dating", where an invited inferencing explanation is readily available, these tests rule out a metaphoric interpretation and leave invited inferencing as the best explanation of the change.

Besides ruling out a metaphor-based explanation of extensions like *seeing* "dating", the tests discussed in this section highlight some crucial differences between invited inferencing and metaphor, summarized below (setting aside, for the moment, the disputed examples like *see* "know/understand").

Table 1. Characteristics of metaphoric extension and invited inferencing

	Metaphoric extension	**Invited inferencing**
Item with source-domain meaning in target-domain context	YES	NO
Extralinguistic evidence of metaphor	YES	NO
Related items undergo extension (Systematic extensions test)	YES	NO
Limited to particular inflections (Inflection test)	NO	Sometimes

Unlike metaphor, invited inferencing shows no evidence of an underlying conceptual metaphor, including extralinguistic evidence, and the ability to affect any inflected forms; and no evidence of systematic mappings, such as systematic semantic extensions.[8]

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7. For example, adjectival *bright* can mean either "intelligent" as in *bright idea* (via KNOWING IS SEEING) or "cheerful" as in *bright mood* (via HAPPINESS IS LIGHT); whereas adverbial *brightly* means "cheerfully", as in *smiled brightly,* but cannot mean "intelligently", as discussed by Sullivan (*forthcoming*).
8. According to these criteria, the epistemic meanings of modal verbs (as in English) cannot be considered as metaphoric extension at all, contrary to claims in Sweetser (1990), Haser (2003), and Goossens (2003). Extensions such as epistemic *must* (from deontic *must*) do not share the characteristics of

4. Unequivocal Metaphoric Extension

Now that we have looked at the inferencing-based extension *seeing* "dating", let us turn to an unequivocal example of metaphoric extension. For this, we need look no further than the familiar domain of SEEING, and the uses of *bright, brilliant* and *illuminating* in (14)-(16), which refer metaphorically to the demonstration of intelligence.

According to the metaphor explanation, extensions like *brilliant* "intelligent" are linguistic instantiations of the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. As part of this metaphor, LIGHT SOURCES map to SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE, as we saw in Figure (1). The mapping SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE ARE LIGHT SOURCES captures the fact that a light source makes objects visible, which maps to the situation in which a thinker, book or idea makes knowledge more accessible to others. The mapping SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE ARE LIGHT SOURCES allows speakers to retrieve the target-domain meaning "intelligent" from the source-domain "light-emitting" meaning of *brilliant*, following the mapping from the source-domain meaning to the target-domain meaning.

It does not matter whether intelligence and light-emission are co-occurring phenomena, and it is not necessary for *brilliant* to be used in a context which is ambiguous between a "light-emission" and an "intelligence" interpretation. In fact, metaphoric extensions almost never occur in ambiguous contexts. Without some contextual cue indicating the target domain, a hearer will tend to understand the central (source-domain) sense of a given item (Bartsch, 2003).[9] Ambiguous contexts therefore discourage metaphoric extension, whereas unambiguously target-domain contexts encourage it.

4.1. Why *Brilliant* "Intelligent" Cannot Result from Invited Inferencing

Although metaphoric extension rarely occurs in ambiguous contexts, the lack of ambiguous contexts between "light-emission" and "intelligence" is an insurmountable problem for an invited inferencing explanation of *brilliant* "intelligent". People who are smart never literally radiate light, and as a result, emitting light will never lead to inferences of intelligence. Light-emission and intelligence do not co-occur in the way of, for example, visual experience ("seeing") and awareness ("knowing") of a phenomenon. As a result, there are no linguistic contexts which can be ambiguous between light-emission and intelligence, and there are no historical examples of this kind of ambiguous context that could have led to invited inferencing.

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metaphoric extension demonstrated by *brilliant* "intelligent" or even by the disputed extensions such as *see* "know/understand". It would be difficult to find an extralinguistic instantiation of a metaphor like "EPISTEMIC IS DEONTIC"; extensions between these domains are instantiated only by the modal verbs themselves, failing the systematic extensions test; and the extensions can be limited to particular tenses and/or moods, failing the inflection test.

9. Once a metaphoric extension has been lexicalized, the extended target-domain sense can become more central than the original source-domain sense. But when an extension first occurs the central sense will always be the default interpretation.

The importance of ambiguous contexts can be added to our summary of metaphoric extension/invited inferencing characteristics, as in Table (2).

Table 2. Characteristics of metaphoric extension and invited inferencing

	Metaphoric extension	**Invited inferencing**
Item with source-domain meaning in target-domain context	YES	NO
Extralinguistic evidence of metaphor	YES	NO
Related items undergo extension (Systematic extensions test)	YES	NO
Limited to particular inflections (Inflection test)	NO	Sometimes
Possibility of ambiguous contexts	NO	YES

Without ambiguous contexts, invited inferencing is impossible. If no potential linguistic context could be ambiguous between a central and an extended meaning, the extension cannot have been the result of invited inferencing. In the case of extensions like *brilliant* "intelligent", the inapplicability of an invited inferencing explanation leaves metaphoric extension as the best description of these changes.

5. The Invited Inferencing/Metaphoric Extension Overlap

Based on examples like those in the previous sections, metaphoric extension and invited inferencing seem like fundamentally different processes. These differences shed new light on the contested extensions like *see* "know/understand", *warm* "affectionate", and future-tense *going*. If we accept both metaphoric extension and invited inferencing as valid types of semantic change, items like *see* "know" pose a problem, because we must decide whether to categorize them as metaphoric extension, invited inferencing, or some combination of the two.

Logically, the characteristics of the unequivocal examples of metaphor and inferencing should help us understand these disputed extensions. If these extensions share most of the characteristics of unequivocal metaphoric extension, then we would have reason to call them "metaphor"; whereas if the extensions have more in common with invited inferencing, then we would feel justified in grouping them with inference-based extensions. Unfortunately, the situation is more complex.

In fact, extensions like *see* "know" share the most important characteristics of both metaphoric extension and invited inferencing, as shown in Table (3), expanded from Table (2).

Table 3. Characteristics of metaphoric extension, invited inferencing, and the contested extensions

	Metaphoric extension	**Invited inferencing**	**Metaphor/inferencing overlap**
Item with source-domain meaning in target-domain context	YES	NO	YES
Extralinguistic evidence of metaphor	YES	NO	YES
Related items undergo extension (systematic extensions test)	YES	NO	YES
Limited to particular inflections (inflection test)	NO	Sometimes	Sometimes
Possibility of ambiguous contexts	NO	YES	YES

The contested examples clearly display the characteristics which are most indicative of conceptual metaphor. As we have seen, the extensions *see* "know/understand", *warm* "affectionate", and future-tense *going* appear to reflect the metaphors KNOWING IS SEEING, AFFECTION IS WARMTH, and CHANGE IS MOTION. These metaphors all show up extralinguistically. In paintings and cartoons, literal illumination (such as a light bulb over someone's head) indicates intellectual awareness via KNOWING IS SEEING. The use of colors that are metonymically associated with warmth, such as reds and yellows, can give an impression of friendliness via AFFECTION IS WARMTH. The metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION is frequently used in gesture, even in the absence of linguistic instantiation of the metaphor (Cienki, 1998).

The extensions also pass the systematic extensions test. Section (3.1.1) discussed a number of items instantiating KNOWING IS SEEING, such as *illuminating, myopic* and *blind*. The metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH is expressed, for example, by adjectives such as *icy, frigid, cold,* which have the extended sense "unfriendly"; and CHANGE IS MOTION participates in expressions like *we're coming up on / hurtling towards / getting close to finals week,* or even in discussions of the *distant past* and the *near future*.[10]

By these measures, extensions like *see* "know/understand" appear to instantiate well-documented conceptual metaphors. Like unequivocal examples of metaphor such as *brilliant* "intelligent", these contested extensions involve an item with a source-domain meaning that acquires a target-domain meaning.

However, the contested changes also share the most critical characteristic of invited inferencing. For example, all of these items can occur in ambiguous contexts. We saw examples of these contexts in (5)-(7) in section (2.2), repeated below as (23)-(25).

10. In these examples, as in most of its instantiations, the primary metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION participates in more complex metaphors, such as the Moving Time or Moving Observer metaphors for TIME (Lakoff; Johnson, 1999).

(23) Nou wend and *seh* wher hit be. (c1310, Anon., *Marina*)
(24) Oh take this *warme* kisse on thy pale cold lips. (1588, Shakespeare, *The Lamentable Tragedy of Titus Andronicus*)
(25) I'm *going* to seek him Love Gregory, / In's lands where e'er he be. (1100-1500, Anon., *Love Gregory*)

Another wrench is thrown into the works by the results of the inflection test. The extensions *see* "know/understand" and *warm* "affectionate" pass this test, as suggested by the various inflections of these stems in (26)-(29) below.

(26) Pope Leo XIII clearly *saw* the intent of the evil one. (www.dailycatholic.org/issue/2002Apr/apr8ed.htm)
(27) I'm not *seeing* what you are saying and you aren't *seeing* what I'm saying. (www.wordpress.org/support/topic/40853)
(28) For example, an advisor to Herbert Hoover suggested the candidate would appear to have a *warmer* personality if he had a dog. (www.briefme.com/archive.php/article/16920)
(29) Her mother is this incredibly friendly woman with the *warmest* smile you can possibly imagine [...] (www.omgjeremy.com/OMGBlog/2005_09_01_)

However, this test for metaphor runs into trouble with the future-marker *going*. Like *seeing* "dating", future-marking *going* always has imperfective aspect. Sentence (4), repeated as (30a), loses its future reference when rephrased with the infinitive *go* as in (30b).

(30) a. I'm *going* to stay here in America. (www.montereyrepublicans.org/PressReleases/index.cfm/ID/73.htm)
b. # I will/intend to/always *go* to stay here in America.

The inflection test, then, confirms what the earlier tests suggested. The contested extensions share some of the characteristics of metaphor, and some of the traits of invited inferencing. These tests will not simply allow us to relegate these extensions to one category or the other. Instead, they seem to indicate that *both* metaphor and inferencing are at work in these examples. The next subsections explore how this interaction might occur.

5.1. Primary Metaphors and Primary Scenes

One well-known process combines metaphoric structure with the potential for ambiguous contexts: the *primary metaphors* (Lakoff; Johnson, 1999). Primary metaphors are different from complex metaphors in that they have a direct experiential basis. For instance, children develop the primary metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING by experiencing recurrent situations in which KNOWING and SEEING co-occur, such as when they SEE an object and KNOW something new as a result, like its shape, color, or location (Johnson, 1997). I will follow Grady and Johnson (1998) in calling these co-occurring experiences *primary scenes*.

All the extensions in the metaphor/invited inferencing overlap appear to involve primary metaphors. For instance, *see* "know/understand" reflects the primary metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING; *warm* "affectionate" fits the pattern of AFFECTION IS WARMTH; and the future-marker *going* matches the structure of CHANGE IS MOTION. I have found no examples in the metaphor/invited inferencing overlap which fail to match the structure of primary metaphors.

There is a reason why some inference-based extensions might be expected to follow the pattern of primary metaphors. Invited inferencing happens only in contexts which involve two co-occurring situations, one which is literally referred to and one which is implied. A convergence of two co-occurring situations is, therefore, a prerequisite for invited inferencing, just as this convergence is an essential part of primary scenes. It is only to be expected that a subset of these co-occurring situations would coincide with the primary scenes that give rise to primary metaphors.

However, there are a number of differences between primary scenes and the contexts that lead to invited inferencing. Some co-occurring situations that result in invited inferencing never lead to primary metaphor because the prerequisite structural correspondences between domains are absent (as in *see* "meet with" [section 3]). Additionally, inferencing requires an ambiguous *linguistic* context (as in the sentence *Go and see where it is!*), as well as an ambiguous situational context (such as seeing an object and learning its location). On the other hand, primary metaphors are established through co-occurring situations, but once established they are conceptual structures in their own right. They can then facilitate semantic extensions in the same range of linguistic contexts as complex metaphors.

Primary metaphors can also accumulate purely structural mappings which are not part of their experiential basis. These complex mappings – like complex metaphors – no longer overlap with invited inferencing. For example, the mapping SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE ARE LIGHT SOURCES, evident in *brilliant*, *bright* and *illuminating* in (14)-(16), is not part of the experiential basis of KNOWING IS SEEING. As we saw in section (3.1), this mapping does not represent a correspondence between real-life situations of "sources of knowledge" and "light sources", but is instead based on structural similarities between KNOWING and SEEING. These complex mappings, like complex metaphors, are learned later than the primary mappings, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 49) discuss regarding the item *illuminate*. Complex mappings, like complex metaphors, do not normally occur in ambiguous contexts and can never be confused with invited inferencing.

Despite the differences between primary scenes and the contexts underlying invited inferencing, the common experiential basis of primary metaphors and invited inferencing is crucial to understanding the metaphor/invited inferencing overlap. We will look at the basis of this overlap in the next section.

5.2. The Parallel Chaining Explanation for the Metaphor/Invited Inferencing Overlap

The characteristics of the metaphor/inferencing overlap fall into place if we think of metaphor and invited inferencing as cooperating in the production of extensions like *see* "know". Goossens (2003) has suggested the term *parallel chaining* to describe

metonymic processes that operate in tandem, rather than sequentially. I will adopt this term to refer to a similar relationship between metaphor and invited inferencing.[11] In parallel chaining, two (or more) processes of change that lead to the same outcome take place simultaneously, each contributing to that final outcome. One process may play a greater role for some speakers, and a different process, with similar effects, may play a greater role for others.

If metaphoric extension and invited inferencing can happen side-by-side to produce a given change, this explains why the contested extensions always demonstrate the prerequisites for both metaphoric extension and invited inferencing. Parallel chaining would, by definition, be possible only in contexts which are appropriate for both metaphoric extension and invited inferencing. The characteristics of the metaphor/inferencing overlap are summarized in Table (3).

Extensions like *see* "know" specifically share all of the *restrictions* of both metaphoric extension and invited inferencing. They occur in contexts that are more specific than those required by either process alone. These contexts must be consistent with a target-domain interpretation (as in metaphoric extension) yet they must also be potentially ambiguous between central and extended interpretations (as in invited inferencing). The central and extended meanings of items like *see* must fit neatly into the source and target domains, respectively, of a conceptual metaphor; and this metaphor should be documented through extralinguistic instantiations and multiple semantic extensions from source domain to target.

Alongside the restrictions imposed by the extensions' underlying primary metaphors, the extensions also must display the prerequisites for invited inferencing. These include, as we have seen, the possibility of linguistic *and* situational contexts which are ambiguous between central and extended interpretations. The results of the inflection test corroborate the necessity for ambiguous linguistic contexts. If ambiguous contexts are frequent only when a particular inflection of an item is used, as in the case of the future-marker *going,* then only this inflected form will undergo extension.

Despite these stringent requirements, extensions like *see* "know/understand" are surprisingly common, both in English and cross-linguistically. This type of extension was documented throughout Indo-European languages by Eve Sweetser (1990) and noted in over a hundred non-Indo-European languages by Verena Haser (2003).

The parallel chaining explanation predicts the frequency and ubiquity of extensions like *see* "know/understand". The cooperation of two processes of change makes it more likely that a given change will occur, and also facilitates the propagation of the change through a population. The details of the interplay between chained processes require more in-depth study, but inescapably, two cooperating processes will encourage a given extension more than either process alone.

A final measure of support for parallel chaining comes from early unambiguous uses of extended senses like *see* "know/understand". All of the extensions in the metaphor/inferencing overlap occurred in ambiguous contexts. However, unambiguous

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11. I will not limit my use of the term *parallel chaining* to processes that are "partially sanctioned" (Goossens, 2003), meaning that they are only viable in combination.

examples occur surprisingly early in the extensions' development. For example, compare the early ambiguous contexts in (23)-(25) with the early unambiguous examples below.

(31) "Lauerd," he said, "now *see* i well Mi sin me has seit in vnsell." (a.1300, *Cursor M.*)
(32) [...] *warm* wordes [...] bryng louers warm hartes / And so haue your wordes warmed my harte euyn nowe [...] (1534, John Heywood, *A play of love*)
(33) The Queen's faen sick, and very, very sick, / Sick, and *going* to die [...] (1100-1500, Anon., *Queen Eleanor's Confession*)

The abstract state of unhappiness *(unsell)* in (31) cannot be visually "seen"; likewise *words* in (32) cannot literally be "warm"; and (33) does not mean that the Queen is literally journeying to a location to die, but rather that she will die in the future.

The examples of *see* "know/understand", *warm* "affectionate", and the future-marker *going* in (23)-(25) are dated within a few decades of the unambiguous examples of the same extensions in (31)-(33). If invited inferencing alone were operating in these extensions, unambiguous examples like (31)-(33) would only be predicted to occur after lengthy processes of generalization and lexicalization. The early evidence of unambiguous uses of these extended senses suggests that metaphor was active even in the earliest stages of these extensions.

6. Conclusion

In order to make further progress in characterizing semantic change, we need to recognize both metaphor and inferencing as two distinct processes with different characteristics. It is pointless to act asif metaphoric extension could explain all semantic change, and it is equally inaccurate to argue that invited inferencing can completely replace it.

Once we recognize metaphoric extension and invited inferencing as distinct types of change, we can narrow down the debate over metaphor versus invited inferencing to the examples that matter: the extensions in the metaphor/invited inferencing overlap like *see* "know/understand". We can then use the characteristics of metaphoric extension and invited inferencing to decide whether we should pursue a parallel chaining explanation of this overlap; to refine our understanding of how metaphor and inferencing interact in these extensions; and ultimately, to resolve the debate between adherents of metaphoric extension and proponents of invited inferencing.

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REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS CULTURALES DE LA UNIVERSITAT JAUME I / *CULTURAL STUDIES JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITAT JAUME I*

Metáfora, sinestesia y otras figuras retóricas en *El perfume. Historia de un asesino*, de P. Süskind

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ABSTRACT: This article questions the author's intention in the so frequent use of metaphors and other rhetorical figures in *Perfume. History of a Murderer*. This novel is a landmark in the German narrative of the XXth Century, due to the originality in the plot and to the great load of poetic images. Along with hyperbole, litotes, parallelism, personification, metonymy, comparison, polysindeton, and other figures, we will observe that it emphasizes metaphor, particularly literary synaesthesia. Within synaesthesia we will analyse the mixtures of senses and will classify the metaphors in their corresponding semantic fields. Finally, we analyse whether the use of such a number of tropes makes this work similar to some other literary tendencies within the universal narrative of the XXth century, and whether Süskind's poetic and sensorial narrative might be included in any literary trend of the XXth century.

Keywords: trope, synaesthesia, German literature.

RESUMEN: El siguiente artículo cuestiona la intención de su autor en el empleo tan frecuente de metáforas y otras figuras retóricas en *El perfume. Historia de un asesino*. Hemos escogido esta novela porque marca un hito en la narrativa alemana del S. XX debido a la originalidad en el argumento y a la gran carga de imágenes poéticas. Junto con hipérbole, lítote, paralelismo, personificación, metonimia, comparación, polisíndeton, y otras figuras, observaremos que destaca la metáfora, en concreto la sinestesia literaria. Dentro de la sinestesia analizaremos las mezclas de sentidos en ella y clasificaremos las metáforas en sus correspondientes campos semánticos. Finalmente nos cuestionamos si el empleo de tan elevado número de tropos aproxima esta obra a alguna otra corriente literaria dentro de la narrativa universal del S. XX. Queda abierta una línea de debate que cuestiona la similitud de la narrativa tan poética y sensorial de Süskind y la posible inclusión de este autor en alguna corriente literaria del S. XX.

Palabras clave: tropo, sinestesia, literatura alemana.

1. Consideraciones generales sobre la metáfora

La metáfora, como recurso literario, social y creativo, forma parte de la manera del autor de entender y percibir el mundo. Asimismo influye en la forma en que el lector lo percibe. Con la metáfora sustituimos un término real por otro que lo evoca. Constituye un fenómeno habitual y cotidiano en el pensamiento y en el lenguaje, en definitiva es mucho más que un simple recurso poético.

Desde el punto de vista de la lingüística cognitiva, es un poderoso proceso cognitivo que permite una comunicación de ideas y pensamientos eficiente y eficaz. Tal y como afirman Cameron y Low (1999: 91): «Metaphor takes a range of various forms [...] it has a surprisingly large number of functions, cognitive social affective, rhetorical and interaction-management». Para otros lingüistas como Ungerer y Schmid (1996) la metáfora puede tener fines explicativos o constitutivos.

En esta misma línea, Lakoff (1990: 40) considera el pensamiento metafórico de la siguiente forma:

> Metaphorical thought, in itself, is neither good nor bad; it is simply commonplace and inescapable. Abstractions and enormously complex situations are routinely understood via metaphor. Indeed, there is an extensive, and mostly unconscious, system of metaphor that we use automatically and unreflectively to understand complexities and abstractions [...]

Así pues, la metáfora es un mecanismo de analogía en el que se concibe un concepto que pertenece a un dominio conceptual determinado en función de otro dominio conceptual, y en el que se establecen correspondencias y proyecciones entre los atributos de los dos dominios. En este sentido, se habla de dominio origen (atributos salientes) y dominio destino, y de correspondencias entre ellos (Lakoff, 1987).

De esta forma, la metáfora permite una proyección ontológica a través de la interconexión de elementos que pertenecen a los dos dominios, así como una correspondencia epistemológica en la que el conocimiento del dominio origen, normalmente más básico y familiar, hace posible y facilita el razonamiento, la expresión, o la comprensión en el dominio destino, más complejo y abstracto. Es un proceso cognitivo cuyo uso es muy extendido y frecuente, e impregna nuestro lenguaje y pensamiento habitual. Como dicen Lakoff y Johnson (1980: 3): "[...] metaphor is persuasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action"

2. La abundancia de figuras retóricas en *El perfume. Historia de un asesino*

En esta novela observamos una presencia muy marcada y muy variada de figuras retóricas. Entre ellas cabe destacar las siguientes:

- Hipérbole

p. 125: El cuerpo se cubrió de pequeñas *ampollas* rojas, muchas de las cuales reventaron [...] otras crecieron hasta convertirse en verdaderos *furúnculos*, gruesos y rojos que se abrieron como *cráteres* vomitando pus espeso y sangre [...]

p. 288: La consecuencia fue que la inminente ejecución de uno de los criminales más aborrecidos de su época se transformó en *la mayor bacanal* conocida en el mundo *después del siglo II.*

- Lítote

p. 9: En el S. XVIII vivió en Francia uno de los hombres más geniales y abominables de una época en la que *no escasearon* los hombres abominables y geniales.

- Paralelismo

p. 10: Las calles *apestaban* a estiércol, los patios interiores *apestaban* a orina, los huecos de las escaleras *apestaban* a madera podrida [...] hombres y mujeres *apestaban* a sudor y a ropa sucia; en sus bocas apestaban los dientes infectados. Apestaban los ríos, apestaban las plazas, apestaban las iglesias. El campesino *apestaba* como el clérigo, el oficial de artesano, como la esposa del maestro; *apestaba* la nobleza entera, y sí, incluso el rey *apestaba* como un animal carnicero.

- Personificación

p. 27: Y se recogió la sotana, agarró la *cesta vociferante* y echó a correr por el laberinto de callejas.

- Comparación

p. 163: ... no careció de sueños que lo cruzaron como jirones fantasmales. Como si se hallara en medio de un pantano que emanara una espesa niebla [...] como si lo quemaran vivo, Agitó los brazos como si quisiera dispersar la niebla inodora que quería asfixiarle.

- Metáfora

p. 31: Esa garrapata era el niño Grenouille. Vivía encerrado en sí mismo como una cápsula y esperaba mejores tiempos.

p. 156: Su corazón era un castillo de púrpura situado en un pedregoso desierto, oculto tras las dunas y rodeado de un oasis pantanoso. Contenía mil cámaras, mil bodegas y mil elegantes salones, entre ellos uno provisto de un elegante canapé de púrpura [...].

p. 44: Su finísimo olfato desenredaba el ovillo de aromas y tufos, obteniendo hilos sueltos de olores fundamentales indivisibles.

p. 44: La garrapata Grenouille volvió a moverse; olisqueó el aire matutino y sintió la atracción de la caza.

p. 44: Miles y miles de aromas formaban un caldo invisible que llenaba las callejuelas estrechas [...].

La metáfora aparece con tanta frecuencia en esta novela que en ocasiones el lector olvida que se encuentra ante ella. *El perfume* se presenta estructurada en cuatro partes, cada una de ellas con veintidós, once, quince y un capítulos respectivamente. La primera y la tercera parte son básicamente descriptivas y abundan en empleo de figuras poéticas y metáforas. Por el contrario, la segunda y cuarta partes son más narrativas, menos descriptivas y en consecuencia no presentan tan elevado número de éstas.

3. Primera parte: metáfora, metonimia y sinestesia

Gracias a la metáfora, metonimia y sinestesia esta obra resulta muy sensorial. Desde nuestro punto de vista la sinestesia está totalmente ligada a la metáfora, se basa en ella. La sinestesia, figura en la cual los sentidos se mezclan y entrelazan, es un recurso tan presente en la poesía como en la prosa. Ya en las primeras páginas de *El perfume* observamos la aparición frecuente de la sinestesia como recurso literario. Sirve a su autor para enfatizar una escena, para amplificar las sensaciones al lector, incluso en ocasiones la emplea para dar continuidad al relato.

La escena del nacimiento del protagonista, al comienzo de la primera parte, es el primer cúmulo de sensaciones en que nos sumerge Süskind. La sinestesia domina en ella. Esa mezcla de calor insoportable, sabor, dolor y hedor, resalta significativamente la escena. El protagonista nace en los barrios pobres de París, que apestaban a podredumbre:

> El calor se abatía como plomo derretido sobre el cementerio y se extendía hacia las calles adyacentes como un vaho putrefacto que olía a mezcla de melones podridos y cuerno quemado [...] sin embargo la madre de Grenouille no percibía el olor a pescado podrido o a cadáver porque su sentido del olfato estaba embotado y además le dolía todo el cuerpo, y el dolor disminuía su sensibilidad. (*El perfume*, 11)

Grenouille nace entre los desechos malolientes del puesto de pescado, donde trabajaba su madre, sentenciando con su nacimiento la muerte de ésta. Curiosamente Süskind nos descubre en esta novela la cara poco amable de la Ilustración, no exenta de miseria, pobreza y enfermedad.

A lo largo de la primera parte, el recorrido por la vida del protagonista, infancia, adolescencia y madurez, está salpicado de innumerables metáforas, tropos y comparaciones. La nodriza que se hace cargo del pequeño observa la peculiaridad de ese niño, es un bebé que no huele como un lactante, que no huele a nada. Estupefacta se extraña ante el padre Terrier y afirma: «Es él, el propio bastardo, el que no huele a nada» (*El perfume*, 18). En el segundo capítulo de la primera parte Süskind mezcla de nuevo hábilmente varios sentidos corporales, tacto, sabor, olor y temperatura, en un derroche magistral de comparaciones que nos transmitirán el olor de un recién nacido. La mezcla de los distintos sentidos logra de nuevo una magistral descripción:

> Veréis, padre, los pies, por ejemplo, huelen como una piedra lisa y caliente..., no, más bien como el requesón...o como la mantequilla...eso es, huelen a mantequilla fresca. Y el cuerpo huele como...una galleta mojada en leche. Y la cabeza, en la parte de arriba, en la coronilla,

> [...] aquí precisamente es donde huelen mejor. Se parece al olor del caramelo, ¡no podéis imaginar padre lo dulce y maravilloso que es!. Una vez se les ha olido aquí se les quiere tanto si son propios como ajenos. Y así, y no de otra manera, deben oler los niños de pecho. (*El perfume*, 20)

Las dos primeras apariciones de sinestesia, el nacimiento de Grenouille y la descripción de la nodriza, muestran claramente al lector lo extraordinario de la situación. Süskind logra con la sinestesia amplificar las sensaciones del lector en ambas escenas.

Otras figuras como la metonimia aparecen frecuentemente en la primera parte. A continuación una metonimia carnal con connotaciones negativas, nos acerca a la inocente figura del recién nacido:

> Al padre Terrier le pareció que le olfateaba hasta atravesarle la piel para oler sus entrañas. Los sentimientos más tiernos y las ideas más sucias quedaban al descubierto ante aquella pequeña y ávida nariz, que aún no era una nariz de verdad, sino sólo un botón, un órgano minúsculo que no paraba de retorcerse, esponjarse y temblar». (*El perfume*, 26)

Algunos de los últimos estudios especializados sobre metáfora y metonimia (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza y Díez Velasco, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza y Otal, 2002) están encaminados a diferenciar entre ambas. La diferencia principal es que la metáfora es un mapeo entre dominios y la metonimia dentro de un único dominio conceptual (dominio matriz- subdominio).

La metonimia no establece vínculos entre dominios conceptuales diferentes, sino que es un mecanismo de referencia, donde nos referimos indirectamente a una estructura implícita utilizando otra de mayor preeminencia en el mismo sistema conceptual. Lakoff y Turner (1989: 103) denominan a la estructura explícita Punto de Referencia y a la implícita Zona Activa.

Volviendo al argumento, y al pequeño protagonista, éste fue criado en el hogar de la nodriza Gaillard, pudo sobrevivir al sarampión, varicela, cólera, etc. Süskind lo califica con innumerables comparaciones y metáforas del campo semántico de la naturaleza en sentido negativo: «Era fuerte como una bacteria, resistente y frugal como una garrapata [...] Igual que esta garrapata era el niño Grenouille» (*El perfume*, 30). Nos encontramos de nuevo ante la sinestesia que aporta continuidad al relato, anunciando la afinidad del protagonista con la sangre. Vista, tacto, olfato y temperatura se entrelazan en la siguiente descripción.:

> Aquella garrapata del árbol, para la cual la vida es sólo una perpetua invernada. La pequeña y fea garrapata que forma una bola con su cuerpo de color gris plomizo... que hace su piel dura y lisa para no secretar nada, para no transpirar ni una gota de sí misma. La garrapata, que se empequeñece para pasar desapercibida, para que nadie la vea y la pise. La solitaria garrapata que se encoge y acurruca en el árbol [...] y sólo husmea a kilómetros la sangre de los animales errantes. (*El perfume*, 31)

La infancia del protagonista a cargo de la nodriza y su extraordinario sentido del olfato abundan en descripciones coloristas. Observamos a partir del séptimo capítulo un súbito incremento en el empleo de metáforas. El autor califica a Grenouille en el

hediondo París con una rotunda metáfora: «un pez voraz en aguas caudalosas, oscuras y lentas» (*El perfume*, 44). La vida del joven aprendiz de curtidor transcurre en un París hediondo donde: «Miles y miles de aromas formaban un caldo invisible». El finísimo olfato del protagonista crece en París y «desenredaba el ovillo de aromas y tufos obteniendo hilos sueltos de olores fundamentales» (*El perfume*, 44).

La vida del protagonista en su adolescencia transcurre trabajando con un curtidor. Empieza a llevar una existencia más digna y sobrevive a todo tipo de enfermedades. La metáfora aparece de nuevo:

> La garrapata Grenouille volvió a moverse; olisqueó el aire matutino y sintió la atracción de la caza. El mayor coto de olores del mundo le abría sus puertas: la ciudad de París [...] miles y miles de aromas formaban un caldo invisible [...] su finísimo olfato desenredaba el ovillo de aromas y tufos, obteniendo hilos sueltos de olores fundamentales indivisibles. (*El perfume*, 44-45)

El momento desencadenante de la trama central acontece en el capítulo octavo, cuando le llega: *«una migaja, un átomo de fragancia»* (*El perfume*, 50). Es un pasaje ilustrado con clara presencia de sinestesia y coloreado por términos alusivos a la naturaleza, en esta ocasión en sentido positivo. Tacto, sabor, olor y temperatura componen una mezcla inigualable de sensaciones y percepciones que embriagan al lector. Süskind emplea la sinestesia para amplificar sensaciones y resaltar la escena:

> Esta fragancia tenía frescura, pero no la frescura de las limas o las naranjas amargas, no la de la mirra o la canela o la menta [...] no la de la lluvia de mayo o el viento helado [...] y era a la vez cálida, pero no como la bergamota, el ciprés o el azmicle, no como el jazmín o el narciso, no como el palo de rosa o el lirio [...] como un trozo de seda fina y tornasolada, pero tampoco como la seda, sino como la leche dulce en la que se deshace la galleta [..., lo cual no era posible, por más que se quisiera: ¡seda y leche! (*El perfume*, 52)

Observamos que Süskind relaciona el término «fragancia» con seres vivos, mientras que «perfume» presenta connotaciones a muerte y asesinato. A partir de este momento se inicia la interminable sucesión de crímenes.

Persigue a su presa deambulando por los lúgubres callejones parisinos. Tras acercarse a ella, descubre que es la fragancia de una muchacha y de súbito se sucede la avalancha de comparaciones con elementos de la naturaleza. De nuevo la sinestesia en este pasaje cumple dos funciones, aportar continuidad al relato y destacar la escena. Dos sentidos, olor y tacto, invaden al lector.

> Su sudor era tan fresco como la brisa marina, el sebo de sus cabellos, tan dulce como el aceite de nuez, su sexo olía como un ramo de nenúfares, su piel, como la flor de albaricoque [...] y la combinación de estos elementos producía un perfume tan rico, tan equilibrado, tan fascinante, que todo cuanto Grenouille había olido hasta entonces en perfumes, todos los edificios odoríferos que había creado en su imaginación, se le antojaron de repente una mera insensatez [...] era la belleza pura. Grenouille vio con claridad que su vida ya no tenía sentido sin la posesión de esta fragancia. (*El perfume*, 54)

Con el asesinato de la primera muchacha Süskind anticipa al lector el argumento de la obra. En efecto lo hace con una metáfora:

> Había encontrado la brújula de su vida futura. Y como todos los monstruos geniales ante quienes un acontecimiento externo abre una vía recta en la espiral caótica de sus almas, Grenouille ya no se apartó de lo que él creía haber reconocido como la dirección de su destino. Ahora vio con claridad porqué se aferraba a la vida con tanta determinación y terquedad: tenía que ser un creador de perfumes. Y no uno cualquiera, sino el perfumista más grande de todos los tiempos. (*El perfume*, 57)

Tras este pasaje, los capítulos 9 hasta el 22 de la primera parte no presentan en absoluto metáfora o sinestesia y se transforman claramente en más narrativos.

Observamos numerosas comparaciones, aunque no metáforas. Grenouille pasa de manos del curtidor Grimal a las de Baldini, un perfumista venido a menos. Con la adquisición de Grenouille la casa Baldini adquiere un prestigio nacional. El perfumista Baldini, gracias al protagonista, se introduce en la corte de Francia con sus exclusivos perfumes y se convierte en uno de los ciudadanos más ricos de París. Más tarde lo despide. Aquella misma noche caen al río dos muertos: el perfumista y su esposa.

El rastro de sangre dejado por el protagonista de la obra inunda el argumento. La primera parte de la novela ya ha comenzado con la muerte de su madre, sigue con la del curtidor, la del perfumista y termina con la de una joven muchacha virgen.

4. Segunda parte: ausencia de figuras retóricas

La segunda parte enlaza con el estilo de los últimos capítulos de la primera parte, ya que es más narrativa que descriptiva. En general escasean las figuras retóricas. El protagonista se aísla del mundo y se convierte en un ermitaño errante. Encontramos abundancia de sustantivos pertenecientes al campo semántico de la naturaleza, así como numerosas comparaciones que muestran la naturaleza en su aspecto hostil, desagradable y putrefacto. «[...] como si fuera su propio cadáver, respirando apenas [...]» (*El perfume*, 151) «[...] profirió un grito fuerte y terrible como si lo quemaran vivo», «Agitó los brazos como si quisiera dispersar la niebla que quería asfixiarle» (*El perfume*, 163). Presenta escasez de metáforas y no encontramos ejemplo alguno de sinestesia.

Tras abandonar París inicia su vagabundear sin rumbo fijo por el campo convertido en un ser solitario durante siete años y se hospeda en una caverna de una montaña. Un marqués lo encuentra enfermo, lo cura y lo utilizará para demostrar su teoría propia del fluido letal terrestre. Al final de la segunda parte el marqués encuentra la muerte en las montañas en plena tormenta de nieve.

5. Tercera parte: predominio de sinestesia, metonimia y metáfora

La tercera parte es narrativa a la par que descriptiva. Los pasajes descriptivos se caracterizan por la presencia de cadenas metonímicas, sinestesia, comparaciones, y metáforas, éstas últimas casi siempre florales o alusivas a la naturaleza. Observamos de

nuevo la sinestesia como recurso de continuidad en la actividad del asesino. En el siguiente ejemplo comprobamos la combinación de calor, vista y olor.

> A Grenouille le sudaba la frente. Sabía que los niños no olían de manera tan particular, tan poco como las flores aún verdes antes de abrir sus pétalos. En cambio ésta, este capullo casi cerrado del otro lado del muro, que ahora mismo empezaba [...] a abrir sus odoríferos pétalos, olía ya de modo tan divino y sobrecogedor que, cuando floreciera del todo, emanaría un perfume que el mundo no había olido jamás. (*El perfume*, 208)

Süskind aporta con la sinestesia no sólo continuidad en el relato, sino también énfasis en la escena, amplifica las sensaciones del lector. A continuación observamos la asociación de tacto y oído, con ella presenta la descripción magistral de cómo el asesino Grenouille mata de un golpe seco a las víctimas:

> El ruido del golpe fue seco y crujiente. Lo detestaba. Lo detestaba sólo porque era un ruido en una operación por lo demás silenciosa. Sólo podía soportar este odioso ruido con los dientes apretados y cuando se hubo extinguido continuó todavía un rato inmóvil y rígido. [...] y el silencio reinó de nuevo en el dormitorio, un silencio incluso intensificado, porque ahora no se oía el aliento profundo de la muchacha. (*El perfume*, 261)

En otros pasajes presenciamos claros ejemplos de cadena metonímica y metáfora. Obsérvese en concreto el siguiente, con la clara referencia del autor a la naturaleza en sentido positivo:

> La sangre le bullía de felicidad en las venas: ella continuaba allí, la planta de belleza incomparable había sobrevivido indemne al invierno. ¡Estaba llena de savia, crecía, se expandía, lucía las más espléndidas inflorescencias!. [...] El perfume que hacía sólo un año se derramaba en sutiles gotas y salpicaduras era ahora un fragante río ligeramente pastoso que refulgía con mil colores y aún así los unía sin desperdiciarlos». (*El perfume*, 230)

Destaca en la tercera parte la presencia de numerosas metáforas referentes a la fragancia y juventud de la muchacha:

> En la capa de aromas de la ciudad, aquel velo tejido por muchos millares de hilo, faltaba el hilo de oro. Durante las últimas semanas ese hilo fragante había adquirido tal fuerza que Grenouille lo percibía claramente incluso desde su cabaña. [...] Está muerta, pensó y enseguida algo peor: ¡otro ha arrancado mi flor y robado su fragancia! (*El perfume*, 255)

También encontramos metáforas alusivas al asesino de doncellas, «el asesino era el mismo diablo» (*El perfume*, 272) «El hombre que estaba en el lugar de la ejecución era la inocencia en persona» (*El perfume*, 285), y metáforas alusivas al pueblo «la multitud [...] era sólo un líquido amorfo y únicamente sentía el latido incesante de su corazón». (*El perfume*, 286) Hay paisajes en los que la presencia de metonimia refuerza la imagen y aporta énfasis a la escena, parece que la congela ante los ojos del lector: «De repente el silencio fue total, [...] la multitud fue sólo ojos y boca abierta» (*El perfume*, 274).

Tras los asesinatos de veinticuatro jóvenes doncellas Grenouille es finalmente apresado. Süskind lo narra de manera fugaz e impersonal, parece que no quiera

transmitir importancia a ese momento. No se regodea en la descripción del momento en que lo cogen preso y por ello no emplea figuras retóricas. Tras el apresamiento del asesino repican las campanas. La ciudad entera de Grasse clama por su ejecución y exige ver al asesino. Quieren estrangularlo con sus propias manos, despedazarlo, desmembrarlo. Los ciudadanos se preparan para el acontecimiento como para una gran festividad.

Segundos antes de su ejecución Grenouille abre la botella de perfume y consigue el perdón de la muchedumbre. El pasaje es narrativo a la par que descriptivo y en él su autor transmite un aire fantástico a la narración empleando el pretérito imperfecto.

> El hombre que estaba en el lugar de la ejecución era la inocencia en persona. En aquel momento lo sabían todos [...] absurdo cariño infantil, y sí, Dios era testigo de amor hacia aquel pequeño asesino y no podían ni querían hacer nada contra él [...] La multitud ya era sólo líquida. Se había diluido interiormente en su alma y en su espíritu, era sólo un líquido amorfo y únicamente sentía el latido incesante de su corazón; y todos y cada uno de ellos pusieron este corazón, para bien o para mal, en la mano del hombrecillo de la levita azul: lo amaban. (*El perfume*, 285)

El momento en que libera el perfume desata pasiones y transforma la plaza en una bacanal en plena calle. Süskind adorna este momento y se regodea en él con la hipérbole y el empleo de superlativos, rasgo muy típico suyo. Junto con ello introduce el empleo de estructuras paralelas, paralelismo.

> La consecuencia fue que la inminente ejecución de uno de los criminales más aborrecidos de su época se transformó en la mayor bacanal conocida en el mundo después del S. II antes de la era cristiana: mujeres recatadas se rasgaban la blusa, descubrían sus pechos con gritos histéricos y se revolcaban por el suelo con las faldas arremangadas. Los hombres iban dando tropiezos, con los ojos desvariados, por el campo de carne ofrecida lascivamente [...] copulaban en las posiciones y con las parejas más inverosímiles, anciano con doncella, jornalero con esposa de abogado, aprendiz con monja, jesuita con masona, todos revueltos y tal como venía. (*El perfume*, 288)

El desenfreno y la lascivia se convirtieron en vergüenza, y todos se sintieron culpables. El magistrado anuló su sentencia de muerte y todos los testigos se retractaron de sus acusaciones.

6. Cuarta parte

Es básicamente narrativa y presenta escasez de tropos y comparaciones. Grenouille, convertido de nuevo en un hombre libre, se siente infinitamente poderoso. Se encamina de vuelta a París y pasada la medianoche se encuentra en un campo de batalla plagado de cadáveres. Cerca de un grupo de ladrones, asesinos, prostitutas y forajidos destapa el pequeño frasco y se salpica varias veces con el contenido de éste. Todos sienten la necesidad de acercarse más a Grenouille. La única metáfora que encontramos es la siguiente:

> Se sintieron atraídos hacia aquel ángel humano del cual brotaba un remolino furioso, un reflujo avasallador contra el que nadie podía resistirse [...] Se abalanzaron sobre el ángel, cayeron encima de él, lo derribaron. Todos querían tocarlo, todos querían tener algo de él [...] En un tiempo muy breve, el ángel asesino quedó partido en treinta pedazos y cada miembro de la chusma se apoderó de un trozo, se apartó y llevado por una fuerza misteriosa e inexplicable lo devoró. (*El perfume*, 306)

Poco después no quedaba ni un pedazo de Grenouille sobre la faz de la Tierra.

7. Conclusiones

Al principio de este artículo nos cuestionábamos la intención del autor en el empleo tan frecuente de metáforas, metonimias y otras figuras retóricas. Hemos encontrado en *El perfume* gran cantidad de figuras retóricas, entre las cuales destacan en número las metáforas, comparaciones y sinestesias. Gracias a las figuras retóricas Süskind logra una mezcla de narrativa y poesía que inunda la obra. Asimismo, la alternancia de pasajes narrativos y descriptivos aporta a la novela un ritmo incomparable.

Con la lectura de la obra hemos comprobado que Süskind emplea metáforas para transmitir al lector el desarrollo interno del personaje, para describir la evolución de sus sensaciones más íntimas y su finísimo sentido del olfato, especialmente en la primera y tercera parte. Ello hace de *El perfume* una novela muy rica en descripciones no solamente visuales, sino también olfativas, táctiles, de sabor, etc. En nuestra opinión ahí reside la originalidad de la obra, dado que Süskind llega a conseguir con el empleo de sinestesia y metáfora que el lector huela lo que el protagonista huele.

Hemos comprobado que las metáforas y metonimias de *El perfume* pertenecen a dos campos semánticos claramente definidos, el de la naturaleza y el del cuerpo, ambos en sentido negativo y putrefacto o armónico y bello. Antes de los asesinatos aparecen metáforas positivas, referentes a la naturaleza y que aluden a las muchachas. Por ejemplo abundan términos florales como *pétalo, capullo, planta de belleza incomparable, nenúfares, flor,* etc... Al contrario, la naturaleza en su aspecto desagradable y putrefacto acompaña al protagonista Grenouille desde el momento de su nacimiento, *tufo*, *caldo hediondo de olores,* en la descripción de su persona, *bacteria, órgano minúsculo, pez voraz, garrapata, garrapata solitaria, monstruo,* y en su deambular errante como ermitaño. Asimismo encontramos metáforas que enfrentan el campo de lo carnal y de lo espiritual, *inocencia, ángel humano*, opuesto a *campo de carne, bestia*.

Distinguimos una doble intención o finalidad en el empleo de la sinestesia. Por un lado Süskind la utiliza para aportar continuidad al relato y por otro para amplificar las sensaciones al lector con esa mezcla sensorial. Además, la sinestesia aporta énfasis a las escenas, es como si las congelara, como si las detuviera en el tiempo.

Desde el punto de vista literario, Süskind nos sitúa con esta novela en la frontera entre el mundo real e imaginario. En nuestra opinión el empleo de comparaciones junto con pretérito imperfecto y la gran cantidad de figuras retóricas aproximan esta obra al realismo mágico, tan abanderado por G. García Márquez. En las obras del realismo mágico, al igual que en *El perfume*, observamos que lo importante no es el personaje

sino el acontecimiento, el halo fantástico que rodea a la narración. *El perfume*, al igual que las obras de esta corriente literaria, presenta un argumento con mezcla de ficción y realidad: en él se confunden los límites entre realidad y fantasía. Süskind y G. García Márquez mezclan magistralmente la realidad con la fantasía, lo cotidiano con lo ilusorio. La similitud de la narrativa tan poética y sensorial de Süskind con el realismo mágico podría causar la inclusión este autor alemán en esta corriente literaria.

Dejamos abierta esta cuestión, dado que cabría realizar una lectura paralela de ambos autores y estudiar comparativamente el empleo de tropos en ambos.

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REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS CULTURALES DE LA UNIVERSITAT JAUME I / *CULTURAL STUDIES JOURNAL OF UNIVERSITAT JAUME I*

Reseñas / Book Reviews

Culturas cara a cara. Relatos y actividades para la comunicación intercultural. Por **GRUPO CRIT**. Madrid: Edinumen, 2006, pp. 166; ISBN: 84-95986-85-X; 19,23 €.
Reseñado por Dídac Llorens Cubedo, Universitat Jaume I

Culturas cara a cara es fruto de la investigación del grupo CRIT de la Universitat Jaume I de Castellón y tiene por objetivo, según los autores, «poner de manifiesto que cada cultura puede abordar de manera diversa las diferentes dimensiones de la interacción comunicativa» (p. 17). El libro consta de tres partes claramente diferenciadas.

En la primera se describen los contenidos del libro y se sugieren posibles usos de las dos secciones siguientes. Cabe destacar lo detallado de esta introducción y su coherencia con la parte central del libro. En esta primera sección, los autores justifican la presentación de los incidentes críticos que contiene la tercera de acuerdo con un orden narrativo, pero también ofrecen dos itinerarios alternativos, según el grado de dificultad o las dimensiones comunicativas tratadas. Estas dimensiones son seis, a saber: veracidad (mentiras sociales), cantidad y tipos de informaciones, manera (dirección y formalidad), conversación y turnos de palabra, espacio (lenguaje no verbal) y actos de habla realizativos. La «Presentación» demuestra que, a la hora de elaborar los incidentes críticos, no se ha dejado nada a la improvisación.

En la segunda parte («Conversaciones interculturales: algo más que palabras»), se definen con suma claridad conceptos clave, tales como paralenguaje, modelo comunicativo, minorización, etc. La conveniencia de este apartado teórico viene determinada por la utilización de la terminología definida en los comentarios de cada uno de los incidentes. Podría cuestionarse su inclusión en segundo lugar: quizás hubiera sido más lógico que la introducción general a los incidentes (en la primera parte del libro), los precediera inmediatamente, apareciendo por tanto en segundo lugar. Al final de esta sección teórica, se exponen los rasgos definitorios de modelos comunicativos complementarios (próximo/distante y simétrico/asimétrico) y se presenta una clasificación de culturas en cuatro grandes grupos, tomando como criterios el grado de igualdad existente entre los interlocutores y el grado de preocupación por el conflicto. Los autores insisten, acertadamente, en que estas clasificaciones no deben entenderse de manera absoluta o simplificadora, sino «más bien como un continuo, como los extremos de una escala» (p. 34).

La tercera es la parte central del libro, y la conforman dieciocho incidentes críticos que podrían considerarse unidades didácticas de extensión breve. Cada incidente se articula a partir de un diálogo entre dos o más interlocutores pertene-

cientes a culturas que siguen modelos comunicativos diferentes o incluso opuestos. Previsiblemente, en estos diálogos, la comunicación se ve limitada o frustrada no por razón del desconocimiento lingüístico de uno de los interlocutores, sino por el desconocimiento cultural de uno o todos ellos.

Los incidentes son introducidos por un personaje narrador: un inmigrante de origen indefinido, llegado recientemente a España, que, al enfrentarse a situaciones cotidianas (buscar trabajo, alquilar un piso, coger un tren, etc), es testigo de intercambios comunicativos en los cuales el entendimiento no es plenamente satisfactorio. Este narrador se muestra invariablemente irónico, lo que constituye uno de los aspectos más originales y atractivos de este libro. Por ejemplo, en la introducción del incidente 13, el narrador recuerda cómo, estando con unos amigos que tenían un puesto de artesanía, «nos honró con su presencia una pareja de policías municipales», y añade: «Como mis amigos no tenían el permiso de venta y no habían pagado las correspondientes tasas, tuvimos que levantar el puesto, todos con la satisfacción de haber salvado una vez más el equilibrio de la economía mundial» (p. 126).

Considerando los episodios que narra esta voz, no sorprende que se parodie también el tipo de personajes y situaciones que podríamos encontrar en libros de texto al uso: «Saqué un libro de español para extranjeros que me habían dejado [...] Lo abrí por una página cualquiera, nuestra protagonista, Kerstin, modelo de alta costura, ha acudido a un cóctel con Harry, su novio fotógrafo; están muy preocupados, no están contentos con el servicio de su hotel» (p. 85). Esta referencia no es anecdótica: sirve para constatar que *Culturas cara a cara* responde a necesidades de aprendizaje nuevas, adoptando un enfoque realista e innovador. Los autores son conscientes de que una buena parte de los usuarios del libro no estará familiarizada con una metodología comunicativa, y así lo expresa el narrador: «Aquí el aprendizaje se basa mucho en comunicarse y expresarse oralmente en clase, nosotros aprendíamos en mi país traduciendo muchos textos» (p. 114).

Los diálogos son comentados por el narrador, que se guía por su experiencia y su intuición para tratar de discernir por qué la comunicación no ha ido del todo bien. En el incidente 16, por ejemplo, se refiere a la minorización en estos términos: «yo antes pensaba que mi actitud era la normal» (p. 146). Los autores abordan los problemas comunicativos ejemplificados por cada incidente de manera más incisiva y técnica (aunque concisa y muy accesible) en un recuadro final. Cada incidente se completa con ejercicios de expresión oral en los que se anima a los estudiantes a que compartan experiencias y comparen la cultura de acogida con la propia, con ejercicios de comprensión lectora o auditiva y con un ejercicio de redacción en el que los estudiantes deben rescribir el diálogo de manera que la situación se reconduzca.

Este libro del Grupo CRIT incluye además un DVD en el que se representan los dieciocho diálogos. A excepción del profesor de *capoeira* del incidente 13, que lógicamente tiene un deje brasileño, todos utilizan un español no marcado por acento alguno. Esta circunstancia puede justificarse, como parecen indicar los autores en su introducción (p. 8), por el deseo de no explicitar el origen de los interlocutores no españoles, con el fin de que los usuarios del libro puedan identificarse con cualquiera de ellos. En cualquier caso, el DVD puede ser de gran utilidad y en la pre-

sentación del libro los autores proponen diversas maneras de explotarlo.

De lo dicho hasta aquí, cabe concluir que *Culturas cara a cara* es un libro novedoso y versátil. Será bien recibido por profesores y estudiantes de español como lengua extranjera, estudiantes de traducción y filología, mediadores interculturales y trabajadores sociales.

In-roads of Language. Essays in English Studies. By **NAVARRO I FERRANDO, I.; N. ALBEROLA CRESPO** (eds.) 2006 Castelló de la Plana: Servei de Publicacions UJI, 179 pp. ISBN: 84-8021-545-3.
Reviewed by José Fernando García Castillo, Universitat Jaume I

The eleven articles that make up this volume cover a number of issues that concern the most relevant trends in present English Studies. The editors have tried to meet the demands of those new trends by selecting a series of articles whose contents range from so diverse topics as insights into construction grammar to explorations in 20th century North-American literature. Along with topic selection, the approach and organisation presented hereby offer an excellent perspective which may serve both for teaching and research purposes.

Prof. P. Harder presents the first contribution to this volume. His article "Function, Semantics and Subjects in English" provides an overall frame to describe meaning and structure in language from a functional perspective. Prof. M. T. Turell analyses code-switching patterns in speech and writing. The author emphasizes the importance of considering cross-linguistic and interdisciplinary frameworks in order to explain the variability observed in those patterns elicitation. Prof. R. Mairal's article deals with typology and linguistic phenomena classification. The rich variation of languages allows for different interpretations. His paper offers an alternative view to the generativist principles of parametric variation departing from functional-typological models which interpret variation in language as broader language types. Focusing on FLL, Prof. A. Sánchez compares the benefits of both the "Task Based Approach" and the "Content Based Approach". There is not one method better that the other: Teachers should look for method complementarity. Prof. B. Pennock looks at the long-time overlooked topic of 'voice' and the fact that it can be moulded to convey linguistic information. Thus, voice becomes a means of individual identification. Prof. P. Edwards elaborates on the type of specific discourse that characterizes the recently created degree of Tourism in Spanish Universities. The pervading concept that shows through these pages is that of 'interdisciplinarity'. Prof. M. Aguirre explores the issue of 'liminarity' in Vladimir Nabokov's *Pale Fire*. Prof. K. Lackey compares Marylynne Robinson's *Hausekeeping* with Melville's *Moby-Dick*. The author insists that *Hausekeeping* is not an adaptation of Melville's quest to the world of women, rather in her novel, Robinson transforms 'Melville's aquatic interface between phenomena and veiled force in a pioneering subversion of the domestic novel'. Profs. D. Machin and T. Van Leeuwen present their idea of "choice" as

a suitable option in order to carry out discourse analysis when dealing with consumerism and identity. Prof. N. Alberola's concern with presenting a unitary view of arts arises in her contribution. This time, links are established between Pop Art and Raymond Carver's short stories focusing on the process of women's objectification of late capitalism. Finally, Prof. I. Navarro takes a cognitive point of view so as to present a model for semantic analysis of prepositions. The model integrates all relevant aspects heretofore identified in order to characterize prepositions: topology, dynamics and function. The model takes 'the embodied mind' as a premise for its development.

How can we think of a common 'organisational' ground when dealing with such diverse subjects as those presented in this volume as English for Tourism or Phonology? Excellence here comes from the fact that one same thread can be traced from all eleven articles, namely: the authors' concern with taking context and frameworks as the basis for their work. That is, the need to expand the focus of analysis to wider grounds, including in their analysis a greater number of factors, to such an extent that, 'variability in code-switching' can not be accounted for without those explicit references to context; that 'phonology' lacks accuracy without the wider context resource and 'subjects' cannot be understood as 'objects' unless the coordinate axis widens to unveil those possible readings.

Readers will have the opportunity to verify that the final references to three explicit contributions apply to all the articles in this volume.

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Normas de publicación CLR

0. Consideraciones generales. Política editorial

CULTURA, LENGUAJE Y REPRESENTACIÓN. CLR es una publicación de carácter científico-académico, de periodicidad anual, dedicada a la investigación en el área de los Estudios Culturales. Cada número aborda de manera monográfica alguno de los espectros relevantes de las representaciones de la cultura en sus diferentes manifestaciones (social, política, educativa, artística, histórica, lingüística, etc.), poniendo un especial énfasis en los acercamientos interdisciplinares e innovadores en el análisis de las mismas.

Su objetivo consiste en la divulgación de propuestas relevantes para la comunidad científica internacional dentro de la disciplina de los Estudios Culturales, para lo cual expresa su compromiso con la publicación de contribuciones originales y de alto contenido científico, siguiendo los parámetros internacionales de la investigación humanística.

La aceptación de artículos para su publicación estará condicionada al dictamen positivo de dos evaluadores externos. La presentación de un trabajo para su evaluación implica que se trata de material no publicado previamente y que no se encuentra en fase de evaluación para otra publicación.

En el caso de que un artículo previamente publicado en *Cultura, Lenguaje y Representación* quisiese ser publicado por su autor en otro medio, el mismo deberá mencionar a esta revista como lugar de publicación original. Para cualquier duda al respecto se recomienda consultar con la Dirección de la Revista.

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- Los originales podrán presentarse en español o inglés.
- La extensión de los artículos no sobrepasará las 20 páginas (6000 palabras aprox.) a doble espacio.
- Las reseñas de publicaciones relevantes tendrán 3-5 páginas (900-1500 palabras aprox.).
  - La reseña deberá incluir: título completo del libro; los nombres completos de los autores en el orden en que aparecen citados en el libro; lugar de publicación; editorial; año de publicación; número total de páginas (eg. xii + 234); ISBN; precio (si se conoce).
  - El autor de la reseña debe enviar 2 copias de la misma a la editorial del libro reseñado.
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La información personal y de contacto del autor aparecerá en una hoja aparte. Se incluirá la siguiente información: *a*) Título del artículo; *b*) Nombre y apellidos del autor; *c*) Institución de trabajo; *d*) Dirección postal de contacto; teléfono; fax.; dirección de correo electrónico.

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- Para las notas se utilizará la letra Times New Roman, 10 e interlineado sencillo. En ningún caso se utilizarán las notas al pie para acomodar las citas bibliográficas.

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c) Libros con editor

HALL, S.; D. HOBSON; A. LOWE; P. WILLIS (eds.) (1980): *Culture, Media, Language*, London, Hutchinson.

d) Artículos en publicación periódica

NADIN, M. (1984): «On the Meaning of the Visual», *Semiotica*, 52: 45-56.

BURGESS, A. (1990): «La hoguera de la novela», *El País*, 25 de febrero, 1-2.

e) Capítulo de libro colectivo

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Cuando exista más de una publicación del mismo autor y del mismo año, se indicará por medio de una letra minúscula en cursiva, separada del año por un espacio.

Lukács, G. (1966 *a*): *Problemas del realismo*, México, FCE.

— (1966 *b*): *Sociología de la literatura*, Barcelona, Península.

Guidelines for publication CLR

0) Notes to contributors. Editorial Policy

CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND REPRESENTATION. CLR is an annual scholarly publication devoted to the discipline of Cultural Studies, whose scope is aimed at the international academic community. Each issue deals monographically with a relevant aspect of the representation of culture in its various manifestations (social, political, educational, artistic, historical, linguistic, etc.), encouraging interdisciplinary and innovative approaches in the field of cultural research. The Journal is committed to academic and research excellence by publishing relevant and original material that meets high scientific standards.

Submission of a paper will be taken to imply that it is unpublished and is not being considered for publication elsewhere. Articles will undergo an independent evaluation by two external referees, who will advise the Editors on the suitability of their publication.

Publication elsewhere of an article included in *Culture, Language and Representation* requires that the author acknowledge that it has first appeared in the Journal. If in doubt, authors are advised to contact The Editors.

1) Manuscript submissions

- Contributions may be written in English or Spanish.
- The length of the articles should not exceed 20 pages, 6000 words approximately.
- Book reviews will be 3-5 pages (900 to 1500 words aprox.).
  - Reviews should include: full title of book; full name of author(s) in the same order as they appear in the book; place of publication; publisher; year of publication; number of pages (e.g. xii + 234); ISBN; price (if known).
  - Reviewers are encouraged to send two copies of their review to the Publishers of the book reviewed.
- Submissions should be made in a 3.5" diskette (WORD or RTF document for PC), accompanied by 2 double-spaced printouts.

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Personal and contact information of the contributor must appear on a separate sheet, including the following: *a*) Article title; *b*) Full name of contributor; *c*) Institutional affiliation; *d*) Contact address; telephone number; fax.; e-mail address.

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- Manuscripts should be double-spaced and justified throughout, using Times New Roman, 12 points fonts.
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- When reference is made to more than one author in a parenthesis, these should be separated by a semicolon and arranged chronologically.
- Textual omissions will be indicated by suspension points in square brackets [...]; authorial commentary in a quoted text will also appear in square brackets.

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- Surname and initial of the author(s) should appear in SMALL CAPS and BOLD type.

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b) Two or more authors

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c) Book by an editor

HALL, S.; D. HOBSON; A. LOWE; P. WILLIS (eds.) (1980): *Culture, Media, Language*, London, Hutchinson.

d) Article in a Journal or Periodical

NADIN, M. (1984): «On the Meaning of the Visual», *Semiotica*, 52: 45-56.

BATE, J. (1999): «A genious, but so ordinary», *The Independent*, 23 January, 5.

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HALL, S. (1980): «Encoding/Decoding» in HALL, S.; D. HOBSON; A. LOWE; P. WILLIS (eds.) (1980): *Culture, Media, Language*, London, Hutchinson. 128-138.

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Contribuciones para CLR

Volumen 6

El volumen 6 de la Revista *Cultura, Lenguaje y Representación*, con fecha de publicación mayo 2008, estará dedicado al tema monográfico de «La *intermedialidad* en la cultura contemporánea».

La intermedialidad se asocia con la difuminación de las tradicionales fronteras formales y de géneros propiciada por la incorporación de los medios digitales a las prácticas culturales. Esto ha llevado a la aparición de espacios intermediales entre modelos de representación y creación de significados, así como a la proliferación de textos, intertextos, hipertextos, hiperficciones. La intermedialidad constituye la forma moderna de aprehender la experiencia vital a modo de interfaz o interrelación entre el ser humano y el mundo digital o virtual, de tal manera que se hace difícil distinguir entre aquellos actos «en vivo o en directo» y los que están «mediados» digital o tecnológicamente.

Entre los posibles temas a abordar estarían: reflexiones teóricas sobre la intermedialidad y sus procesos asociados; análisis críticos de ejemplos específicos de intermedialidad en la literatura, arte, cine, televisión, medios digitales, artes escénicas, danza, música; representaciones intermediales de género e identidad en la cultura contemporánea; educación e intermedialidad; espacios intermedios entre lo real y las realidades imaginadas del discurso intermedial; comunidades y culturas intermediales; performatividad e intermedialidad.

Los artículos deberán ajustarse a las Normas de Publicación de la Revista, disponibles en www.clr.uji.es

Para cualquier consulta puede contactar con los directores de la revista:

José Ramón Prado (prado@ang.uji.es)
José Luis Blas (blas@fil.uji.es)

Fecha límite de presentación de originales: 15 de diciembre 2008

Call for contributions CLR

Volume 6

Volume 6 to appear in May 2008 will be devoted to "Intermediality in Contemporary Culture".

Intermediality is associated with the blurring of traditionally ascribed generic and formal boundaries through the incorporation of digital media into all forms of cultural practice, and the presence of one or more media in the space and form of another medium. This has led to the creation of intermedial spaces in-between media and a proliferation of texts, inter-texts, hyper-texts, hyper-fictions, and acts of remediation, transmediality, multimediality, hypermediality and a bewildering blur of associated realities. In this screen-saving world we are not sure what is "live" and what is "mediatized" and if we can differenciate between them anymore.

Suggestions for investigation are given below: theoretical reflections on intermediality and intermedial processes; critical analysis of specific examples of intermediality in literature, cinema, television, the digital media or the performing arts of theatre, dance and music; intermedial representations of gender and identity in contemporary culture; education and intermediality; in-between the real and the imagined realities of intermedial discourse; intermedial communities and cultures; performativity and intermediality.

Articles and book reviews must follow the Journal's Guidelines for Publication available from www.clr.uji.es.

Enquiries concerning this Call for Papers may be addressed to:

Freda Chapple (f.m.chapple@sheffield.ac.uk)

Any other enquiry should be addressed to the Editors:

José Ramón Prado (prado@ang.uji.es)
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Deadline for Submissions: 15 December 2008