Market games as social dilemmas
Scholar | Other documents of the author: Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Ziros, Nicholas
MetadataShow full item record
TitleMarket games as social dilemmas
In an experimental exchange market based on Shapley and Shubik (1977), two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange. In this context, ... [+]
In an experimental exchange market based on Shapley and Shubik (1977), two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange. In this context, although the Nash equilibria of the game involve zero or minimum trade, we obtain intense trade close to levels that maximize social welfare. Going a step forward, we implement communication within pairs of traders from the same (horizontal) and opposite (vertical) sides of the market. Overall, we find that horizontal communication tends to reduce bids whereas vertical communication has no effect. [-]
Bibliographic citationBARREDA-TARRAZONA, Iván, et al. Market games as social dilemmas. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, 155: 435-444.
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
This item appears in the folowing collection(s)
- ECO_Articles