Market games as social dilemmas
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Otros documentos de la autoría: Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Ziros, Nicholas
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Título
Market games as social dilemmasFecha de publicación
2018-11Editor
ElsevierCita bibliográfica
BARREDA-TARRAZONA, Iván, et al. Market games as social dilemmas. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, 155: 435-444.Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/articleVersión de la editorial
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268118302634Versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionPalabras clave / Materias
Resumen
In an experimental exchange market based on Shapley and Shubik (1977), two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange. In this context, ... [+]
In an experimental exchange market based on Shapley and Shubik (1977), two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange. In this context, although the Nash equilibria of the game involve zero or minimum trade, we obtain intense trade close to levels that maximize social welfare. Going a step forward, we implement communication within pairs of traders from the same (horizontal) and opposite (vertical) sides of the market. Overall, we find that horizontal communication tends to reduce bids whereas vertical communication has no effect. [-]
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