Suggestion of a theoretical framework to analyze auditor's apparent independence
Metadatos
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comunitat-uji-handle2:10234/71324
comunitat-uji-handle3:10234/97664
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Título
Suggestion of a theoretical framework to analyze auditor's apparent independenceAutoría
Tutor/Supervisor; Universidad.Departamento
Barrachina Monfort, Alejandro José; Universitat Jaume I. Departament de Finances i ComptabilitatFecha de publicación
2018-06-12Editor
Universitat Jaume IResumen
In this paper we suggest a theoretical framework to theoretically analyze auditor’s
apparent independence as perceived by external users of financial and audit reports of
a certain company. The framework suggested ... [+]
In this paper we suggest a theoretical framework to theoretically analyze auditor’s
apparent independence as perceived by external users of financial and audit reports of
a certain company. The framework suggested is based on a game-theoretical model of
imperfect information in which an auditor has to decide whether or not to keep his
independence when issuing a report about the financial situation of a company he is
auditing. Once the company’s audit report is published, it is checked by an external
user in order to decide whether or not to establish a financial relation with the company
without knowing the decision taken by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor’s context
generates a signal about his independence which is correct with certain probability and
helps the external user to better decide whether or not to trust the audit report. [-]
Palabras clave / Materias
Descripción
Treball Final de Grau en Finances i Comptabilitat. Codi: FC1049. Curs: 2017/2018
Tipo de documento
info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisDerechos de acceso
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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