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dc.contributorCamacho Cuena, Eva
dc.contributorUniversitat Jaume I. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.authorFerrer Lázaro, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-09T11:07:28Z
dc.date.available2016-09-09T11:07:28Z
dc.date.issued2016-07-18
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/162350
dc.descriptionTreball Final de Grau en Economia. Codi: EC1049. Curs acadèmic 2015-2016ca_CA
dc.description.abstractThe main focus of this report is to present the results of an experimental analysis on the grandfathering as initial allocation scheme under emission trading. The experimental design of this report takes into account an industry composed by only one firm and another one with three firms, both with exogenous firms’ real emissions. The main results confirm that this mechanism does not achieve to allocate the permits that each firm really needs, i.e. there exists over-reporting independently of the industry composition. We also find that, although firms’ reported emissions tend to converge to the Nash equilibrium, the existence of competition hinders it and provokes a non-convergence.ca_CA
dc.format.extent41 p.ca_CA
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.publisherUniversitat Jaume Ica_CA
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/*
dc.subjectGrau en Economiaca_CA
dc.subjectGrado en Economíaca_CA
dc.subjectBachelor's Degree in Economicsca_CA
dc.subjectEmission trade marketsca_CA
dc.subjectGrandfatheringca_CA
dc.subjectExperimentalca_CA
dc.subjectEnvironmentalca_CA
dc.subjectEfficiencyca_CA
dc.subjectAllowancesca_CA
dc.subjectNash equilibriumca_CA
dc.subjectEmissionsca_CA
dc.titleEmission trade markets: an experimental approach on grandfathering as first-allocation mechanismca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisca_CA
dc.educationLevelEstudios de Gradoca_CA
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessca_CA


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