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dc.contributor.authorFerrero-Ferrero, Idoya
dc.contributor.authorFernandez-Izquierdo, M. Angeles
dc.contributor.authorMuñoz-Torres, María Jesus
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-27T10:14:37Z
dc.date.available2015-07-27T10:14:37Z
dc.date.issued2014-08
dc.identifier.citationFERRERO-FERRERO, Idoya; FERNÁNDEZ-IZQUIERDO, María Ángeles; MUÑOZ-TORRES, María Jesús. Top executive pay in Spanish banking system. Journal of Management & Organization, 2014, 20.03: 333-347.ca_CA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/129165
dc.description.abstractThis study examines consistency between compensation systems and corporate performance. The main purpose is to analyse how the performance has affected the short-term executive pay in Spanish banking system during the period 2004–2008. The main results reveal that pay-performance sensitivity is asymmetrical regarding the sign of the variation of the performance, since the pay-performance sensitivity is greater when the variation of the results is positive than when the variation of the results is negative. This finding is consistent with the managerial power theory and calls into question the role of the pay-performance incentives to align interest of executives and shareholders.ca_CA
dc.format.extent14 p.ca_CA
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressca_CA
dc.publisherAustralian and New Zealand Academy of Managementca_CA
dc.relation.isPartOfJournal of Management & Organization Volume 20, Issue 03, May 2014ca_CA
dc.rightsCopyright © Cambridge University Press and Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management 2014ca_CA
dc.subjecttop executive payca_CA
dc.subjectperformanceca_CA
dc.subjectSpanish banking systemca_CA
dc.subjectfinancial crisisca_CA
dc.subjectcorporate governanceca_CA
dc.titleTop executive pay in Spanish banking systemca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleca_CA
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jmo.2014.24
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca_CA


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