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dc.contributor.authorBehnk, Sascha
dc.contributor.authorBarreda-Tarrazona, Iván
dc.contributor.authorGarcía Gallego, Aurora
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-01T11:59:31Z
dc.date.available2015-07-01T11:59:31Z
dc.date.issued2015-07-01
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10234/125710
dc.description.abstractAsymmetric information in economic relationships often provides incentives to deceive. Previous findings show that ex ante disclosure of conflicts of interest not only fails to improve these relationships but also leads to even more deception. This study proposes that providing ex post transparency could play an important role in reducing deception. Different scenarios of a sender–receiver game allow us to show not only that disclosing conflicts of interest ex post does not induce more deception but also that a 50% chance of subsequent disclosure significantly reduces deception in the case in which the sender obtains a small gain at the expense of a comparatively big loss for her counterpart. We find no significant reductions under other circumstances. Regarding the receivers, we find that the increase in honest messaging, when it takes place, is not anticipated.ca_CA
dc.format.extent33 p.ca_CA
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca_CA
dc.language.isoengca_CA
dc.relation.isPartOfJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014, 101: 45-64ca_CA
dc.rightsCopyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.ca_CA
dc.subjectInformation transmissionca_CA
dc.subjectDeceptionca_CA
dc.subjectTransparencyca_CA
dc.subjectSocial imageca_CA
dc.subjectExperimentca_CA
dc.titleThe role of ex post transparency in information transmission -An experimentca_CA
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleca_CA
dc.subject.jelC91ca_CA
dc.subject.jelD03ca_CA
dc.subject.jelD63ca_CA
dc.subject.jelD82ca_CA
dc.identifier.doidoi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.02.006
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca_CA
dc.relation.publisherVersionhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268114000390ca_CA
dc.editionPre-printca_CA


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