• openAccess   A gender bias in reporting expected ranks when performance feedback is at stake 

      Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; García-Gallego, Aurora; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ritschel, Alexander Elsevier (2022-03-22)
      We introduce a mechanism for eliciting beliefs that combines the simple use of monetary incentives with the desire to know the own performance. In our experiment, participants performed a real-effort task that naturally ...
    • openAccess   Additive adjudication of conflicting claims 

      García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Springer (2022-11-29)
      In a “claims problem” (O’Neill 1982), a group of individuals have claims on a resource but its endowment is not sufficient to honour all of the claims. We examine the following question: If a claims problem can be decomposed ...
    • closedAccess   Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 

      Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Springer (2017-11-04)
      Many bargaining solutions anchor on disagreement, allocating gains with respect to the worst-case scenario. We propose here a solution anchoring on utopia (the ideal, maximal aspirations for all agents), but yielding ...
    • openAccess   Ethical allocation of scarce vaccine doses: The Priority-Equality protocol 

      Alós Ferrer, Carlos; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Frontiers Media (2022)
      Background: Whenever vaccines for a new pandemic or widespread epidemic are developed, demand greatly exceeds the available supply of vaccine doses in the crucial, initial phases of vaccination. Rationing protocols must ...
    • openAccess   Habituation does not rescue depletion: Two tests of the ego-depletion effect 

      Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Ritschel, Alexander; García-Segarra, Jaume; Achtziger, Anja Elsevier (2018-11-08)
      The recent literature on ego depletion and self-control is plagued with failed replications. It has been argued that publication bias might have inflated estimated effect sizes. Doubts go so far that the very existence of ...
    • openAccess   On the consistency of the individual behavior when facing higher-order risk attitudes 

      Colasante, Annarita; García-Segarra, Jaume; RICCETTI, LUCA; Russo, Alberto Elsevier Inc. (2022-08-27)
      We propose and analyze three procedures to elicit participants’ behavior regarding their higherorder risk attitudes. Our procedures relax the rigidity of having to choose among only two alternatives (as usual in the ...
    • closedAccess   Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy 

      Szwagrzak, Karol; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Springer Verlag (2019)
      We study the problem of distributing the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm among its creditors (O’Neill, Math Soc Sci 2(4):345–371, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, J Econ Theory 36(2):195–213, 1985). Real-life distribution ...
    • closedAccess   Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems 

      García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Springer-Verlag (2017-12)
      Some bargaining solutions may remain unchanged under any extension of a bargaining set which does not affect the utopia point, despite the fact that there is room to improve the utility of at least one agent. We call this ...
    • closedAccess   Super-additivity and concavity are equivalent for Pareto optimal -agent bargaining solutions 

      Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Elsevier (2017-08)
      We show that, for Pareto optimal n-player bargaining solutions, the conditions of super-additivity and concavity are equivalent. Further, either condition implies homogeneity.
    • closedAccess   The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: A strengthening of Roth’s result 

      García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel Elsevier (2015)
      There is a fundamental tradeoff between Pareto optimality and monotonicity in bargaining games. We show that there exists no solution fulfilling strong Pareto optimality and restricted monotonicity for n≥3 agents. The ...
    • openAccess   The Role of Payoff Valence on Voting: Egalitarian for Gains and Selfish for Losses 

      Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Garagnani, Michele; García-Segarra, Jaume Frontiers Media (2021)
      We study how payoff valence affects voting behavior on the distribution of monetary outcomes framed as gains or losses in a group when using standard plurality voting (PV) procedures and when using approval voting (AV). ...