REGIONAL HUB PORT DEVELOPMENT – THE CASE OF MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY

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Abstract:

This paper reflects on port development in Uruguay in an environment of trilateral interport competition. The regional characteristics of port development in terms of their geographical, functional and operational characteristics are discussed by analysing the port system’s evolution. The case of Montevideo as the success or failure of a regional hub port development strategy is analysed in detail. Particular attention is given to the evolution and impact of the liner shipping service network in defining the role of a port within a regional port system. Further, the evolution of the port of Montevideo in terms of institutional and organisational and the related strategy are described, with focus on the effect on transhipment cargo in the port.

The main findings are twofold. First, port development in Montevideo been driven proactively and under a clear strategy, but still faces a number of challenges. Second, economies of scale in transport, port infrastructure and connectivity are important determinants of port development, of which the latter is principally driven by external actors, the shipping lines.

The paper shows that despite strong efforts Uruguay and its principal port Montevideo are highly dependent on external factors, particularly the level of connectivity, in their strategy to develop Montevideo as a regional hub. Thus the findings are relevant in relation to the discussion of Montevideo’s development potentials as a hub on South America’s East Coast in particular and the effects of external influences on port development from in general.

Keywords:
Regional port development; transhipment, connectivity; distance; Latin America
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1. INTRODUCTION
States and nations are redefining their place in the world at the present time in the wake of the economic, political and cultural transnationalisation processes that have occurred in recent decades. Each country, each region is seeking to recast its role and potential in accord with its geographical location, its history and the times. This positioning is, of course, conditioned by multiple factors, which include conditions of production, economic and political interests and transport related issues especially.

Within this global situation, port development based on a hub port strategy in Uruguay and the River Plate Port range in a wider context, is a particularly interesting case. The way the Uruguayan port sector imagines its place within the regional port system has been greatly changing in the last decade, driven by infrastructural development, institutional reforms, trade liberalisation and globalisation. These developments brought quantitative and qualitative changes to the port environment and the port has been under constant pressure to accommodate changes in the structure of demand.

The current scenario is forcing commercial sea ports to design strategies which allow present and future challenges to be faced in a sector in which deregulation and competition are increasingly present. Taking into account the complexities of port development, this paper reflects on port development in Uruguay in an environment of trilateral interport competition over a congruent hinterland. The regional characteristics of port development in terms of their geographical, functional and operational characteristics are discussed by analysing the port system’s evolution. The case of Montevideo as the success or failure of a regional hub port development strategy does not only impact on Uruguay. It does also have direct repercussions beyond Uruguay’s national borders, particularly in landlocked Paraguay, for which Montevideo is the principal gateway for containerised trade.

The success of a port depends on the ability to integrate the port effectively into the networks of business relationships that shape efficient supply chains, and to not only exploit synergies with other nodes and other players in the hinterland network of the port (Notteboom 2008), but also in its foreland.

The coordination between the land- and seaside actors to be able to form a sustainable intermodal transport system is a key factor, but depends on the behaviour of a large group of actors: shipping lines, terminal operating companies, freight forwarders, hinterland transport companies, inland terminal operators, port authorities, etc. This is particularly true for small and medium size economies that rely on the capture of external trade from third countries to be competitive.

In the case of Uruguay maritime trade is of high importance with almost 70 percent (2008) of its trade in goods using the country’s ports. Uruguay is currently working strongly on its strategy to develop its main port Montevideo as a regional logistics hub. One motivation is the size of Uruguay’s economy and population with its growth potential based on cargoes originating and destined for Uruguay being limited. Consequently, Uruguay needs to capture cargoes from its neighbouring countries, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia to be successful in the strategy. Overcoming interport competition (Sánchez & Wilmsmeier, 2007; Sánchez & Wilmsmeier 2006) on the one hand and providing an efficient gateway to the adjacent landlocked countries (Wilmsmeier 2008) on the other hand are key determinants to reach the set goals.

However, the Port of Montevideo is situated in an intermediate location on the River Plate in the entrance to the Paraguay-Paraná river system to act as a central gateway to the
south-eastern and central (landlocked) markets of South America. The Paraguay-Paraná river system is the main artery to connect with distant hinterlands, which gives the port of Montevideo a potential strategic advantage against its competitors, if exploited successfully.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework of the evolution of port systems particularly in developing countries. The following section evaluates Uruguay’s strategic location and evolution within the context of a competitive port environment in the River Plate port range particularly taking account of the development and strategies in the maritime industry. Section 4 gives insight into Uruguay’s port development and assesses the current situation in the Port of Montevideo by describing the port’s infrastructure, shipping services, regulatory framework. Section 5 discusses the findings and Section 6 concludes.

2. Theoretical Framework

Ports act primarily as gateways and as nodes within international transport networks (Bird 1980, 1983). The role of a port in the regional and global port system is determined by influencing factors from the foreland as well as from their hinterlands. The development of ports is particularly closely linked to their hinterlands in terms of functions and challenges (Wilmsmeier & Notteboom 2009). Besides a port’s hinterland and foreland its competitive position is determined by the relation to other ports in the long run. Bichou and Gray (2005) argue that every port is part of a port group, hierarchy and complex which is functionally interrelated at local, national or international level. They further argue that a port is “a dynamic phenomenon, changing in its morphology, functions and status over time. In national or regional terms, the character and functions of the various ports in a complex or hierarchy are likely to change as a result of the differential impact of factors affecting port growth.”

Using the dynamics of economic development Uruguay aims to change its functional and historical position within the container port system (see Taaffe et al, 1963) on the East Coast of South America (ECSA). The ability of a port to develop as a logistics hub depends on both endogenous and exogenous factors. The factors that ports are capable of addressing are to do with infrastructure availability and general port efficiency. Low, Lam and Tang (2009) identify eight factors from literature that have a potentially significant impact on port connectivity: (1) number of port calls; (2) draught; (3) national trade volume; (4) port cargo traffic; (5) turnaround time; (6) total annual operating hours; (7) average port charge per vessel; and (8) inter-modal transport capabilities. While these factors describe key port performance measures they lack to include institutional and organizational factors such as vertical integration, policy restrictions (e.g. cabotage regulation).

Conceptually, at present the ECSA can be seen as a series of load centres, where large amounts of traffic move through a limited number of facilities. However, with the increased availability of container liner services, shipping lines and shippers find it more economical to load & discharge at a single port with feeding services from numerous neighbouring ports. This process of port concentration has long been recognised in the transport model from (Taaffe et al 1963) in different temporal and spatial contexts and been discussed particularly in the African context (see Hoyle & Charlier 1995). From a theoretic standpoint a regional hub port strategy can only be successful, if such a strategy results in a stabilised port system structure. This is particularly crucial in a setting of interport competition and a system where changes in the economic environment such as economic crisis in the past have clearly displayed port concentration being counterbalanced by port diffusion (Sanchez & Wilmsmeier 2007).

There are fundamentally two kinds of cargo: import/export cargo and transshipment cargo. Handling import/export cargo is critical for a country to develop its domestic economy and industry. Transshipment cargo is different; such cargo is not vital but optional for a
country’s economic development. Transshipment gives additional revenue and brings other opportunities to develop a country’s logistics industry based on the resources of the transshipment cargo industry. By attracting economies of scale, transshipment activity can further benefit local exporters and imports through access to more competitive shipping costs.

From the perspective of the shipping line the concept of transshipment is usually defined as the movement of cargo through an intermediate port en route from the origin port to the destination port, while from a port’s perspective transshipment can be defined as all cargo arriving at a port from another country irrespective of the mode of transport. With the development of land transport networks and the opening of land transport borders between countries, ports compete for cargo from a larger hinterland. The hinterland is an important issue in port ranges that are no longer limited by natural boundaries. UN-ECLAC (1999) and Haralambides (2002) discuss port hinterlands becoming increasingly less captive and their geographical reach often extends beyond national boundaries.

It is neither sufficient to see the limits of a port's hinterland as determined by national boundaries, nor is it to restrict the hinterland to the reach of road, rail and inland shipping networks. Sanchez and Wilmsmeier (2006) broaden the concept as they argue for the inclusion of the “maritime hinterland”, which they define by the ports to which it is economically feasible to provide feeder services, and therefore are a potential market. This definition goes beyond the definition and discussion of Notteboom and Rodrigue (2005) and their concept of the expansion of hinterlands (see illustration below). While they are well aware of the landside competition and expansion of hinterlands they leave out the competition in the “maritime hinterland”, which is a key aspect to the development of the hierarchical port network. This development has brought a new level of port competition. Hoyle and Charlier (1995) argue as far that the idea of hinterland is no longer of relevance “in advanced societies and in a context of intermodalism”.

Sánchez (2003) adds that in economic terms it is clear that the port industry has been able to overcome problems of prices, quality and capacity has extended the concept of hinterland in accordance with the efficiency of operation of the transport market and ports. Consequently, a hinterland may be "core" or "extended" or "natural" or "distant", but at heart it is a market. As a result, the hinterland is decisive for port development and success to make discontinuous and “maritime” hinterlands economically accessible and dependent will determine the port's future.

**Figure 1 Expansion and Change of Hinterlands**

![Figure 1 Expansion and Change of Hinterlands](image)

**Source:** Notteboom and Rodrigue (2005)
The growing competition for positioning within the global container port hierarchy can lead to significant changes. Hesse (2006) refers to a tendency that the interconnection between the regional and global transport flow matrices is changing. This can result in a shift in *Bedeutungssüberschuss* within the ports, where intermediacy is the key factor that determines the success of a port in a competitive environment. However, it is not clear if Hesse (2006) refers to intermediacy in terms of geographical distance or from network perspective. Haralambides (2002) argues that shipping lines developed a keen interest in landside operations and in the reconfiguration and synchronisation of liner schedules. He demonstrates that the tendency towards cargo concentration in a limited number of ports has led to the redesign of collection and distribution networks in the hinterland. Further cargo bundling in the foreland-hinterland continuum towards even fewer ports and inland centres is only interesting from a cost perspective if considerable economies of scale and density can be realised in the associated hinterland networks. The more cost-efficient the network becomes, the less convenient that network could be for shippers’ needs in terms of frequency and flexibility. As such, the future spatial development of liner schedules and inland service networks will largely depend on the balance of power between carriers and shippers (Notteboom 2002).

According to Rodrigue (2010) the hinterland shapes growth potential by anchoring traffic and offering cargo rotation for inbound and outbound container flows based. In the case of Montevideo this includes corridor development through barge and rail services to inland production and consumption centres.

Trade liberalisation, land infrastructure development, and new logistical concepts in the organisation of international transport of containers have had an equally profound effect on port industry. An important question is up to what extent ports are aware of these macro changes and if these developments are included in their current strategies. Governments are increasingly realising that, from mere interface points between land and sea, “*ports have become the most dynamic link in international transport networks and, as a result, inefficient ports can easily wither gains from trade liberalisation and export performance*” (Haralambides 2002). The authors argue that even if governments are aware of these changes, it might be “simple” geographic reasons, which impede even a strong port performance based on a good matching framework fit from developing in the anticipated manner. A major reason is the reduced ‘loyalty’ of a container to any given port and its switches between ports with relative ease. The price elasticity of demand for container handling services has thus become rather high (Haralambides 2002).

Looking beyond traditional spatial concepts of captive port hinterlands the Uruguayan government proactively seeks to shift port competition to the cross-border level. The instigation of new logistics strategies and developing the gateway role for South America’s landlocked countries raises the expectations to be able to effectively compete for far-reaching cargoes with far-distant counterparts (World Bank 2009). However, the increasing channel control and bargaining power of shippers and ocean carriers in international shipping and logistics significantly influences the potential development of Montevideo as a regional hub port. Recognising the importance of the hierarchical port development this work focuses on the actual competitive port situation in Montevideo and the influences in the port’s foreland. The potential of a port from a foreland perspective critically depends on its embeddedness in the global liner service network. This embeddedness is determined by its geographical location particularly intermediacy and the level of connectivity. The latter is influenced by the level of demand, port efficiency, logistics performance, and port accessibility.

The authors argue that these factors are reflected in international maritime transport costs and thus after analysing the port situation analyse these determinants in an econometric model. Since artificial barriers to trade, and more specifically tariff barriers, have been falling
in the last decades, freight costs have emerged as an important determinant of international trade and competitiveness. Generally, countries are likely to benefit more, in terms of welfare, from reducing shipping costs than from a further reduction in artificial trade barriers (Wilmsmeier & Martinez-Zarzoso 2010).

3. HINTERLANDS AND MARITIME CONNECTIVITY

3.1 Setting the scene

The port of Montevideo, is directly located in the River Plate Basin, and is in direct competition with two other ports in the region, Buenos Aires, Argentina and Rio Grande, Brazil. The hinterland of the three ports stretches along the River Plate port range.\(^1\) The River Plate Basin comprises a large geographical region of four countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The River Plate estuary consists of the 450 km long basin made up of the mouth of the Paraná and Uruguay Rivers and the Rio de la Plata. The approach to refer to the River Plate port range as a single market follows Sánchez & Wilmsmeier (2007) who analysed the port performance of Buenos Aires and Montevideo throughout the economic crisis in 2001/2002 and in a subsequent work included Rio Grande to this concept (Sánchez & Wilmsmeier 2006).

Map 1 South America. The three southern Brazilian states and River Plate estuary

Source: Maruba 2010


Population is highly concentrated around the capitals in Uruguay and Argentina creating the greatest demand for imports in the River Plate Basin. Currently, around 1.7

\(^1\) The word “range” refers to a geographically defined area encompassing a number of ports with a largely overlapping hinterland that thus serve much the same customers. See Van de Voorde and Winkelmann (2002), page 6. Similarly, Notteboom speak about ‘port system’, defined “as a group of ports sharing a similar geographic characteristic, e.g. coastline, bay and to some extent serving overlapping hinterland regions”.

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million people live in the port-cities of Uruguay (40% of the national population) and 17 million inhabitants on the Argentina side (44% of national population in 2001), adding up to a total of almost 19 million in the area (Bazan-Lopes 2004). In turn, the state of RS has a total population of 10.6 million people, SC 5.4 million and PR, 9.6 million.2

In terms of port throughput Buenos Aires is the biggest port of the three in 2009, handling 1.412 million TEU (2009) a reduction of 20.7% in comparison to the previous year. Montevideo handled 588 thousand TEU in the respective year a drop of 12.9% in comparison to 2008. The development of Rio Grande (630 thousand TEUs transferred in 2009) has been notable. In 2009 the port was the third busiest port in Brazil behind Santos (2.256 million TEU, 2009) and Paranagua (630 thousand TEU, 2009) and despite the economic crisis displaying a growth rate of 4.7% in comparison to the previous year (UN-ECLAC 2010).

Rio Grande takes an intermediate position in the global shipping network, since Montevideo and Buenos Aires are, in general, the last ports of call in this region. An additional strength of Rio Grande is the economic development in its natural hinterland. Rio Grande's intermediate geographic location in combination with its productive and likewise protected hinterland makes the port competitive to the ports directly based in the River Plate Basin to establish a position as a regional hub. During the last decade Rio Grande has undergone a rapid expansion, leveraging the competitive situation between the Ports of Buenos Aires and Montevideo in the River Plate port range, offering ample conditions to compete for the cargo destined to the River Plate region and the upriver hinterland.

Thus any strategy to develop the port of Montevideo has to this trilateral interport competition take into account.

3.3 Trade development

International trade in Uruguay has grown considerably in recent years. Following the 1999-2002 economic slowdown, both exports and imports experienced high levels of growth. Total exports of goods accelerated between 2002 and 2008, growing at an average rate of 21.8 percent per year. Following the devaluation of the Uruguayan peso in 2002, exports of services grew 188.0 percent between 2002 and 2008. In 2008 exports of goods increased 39.5 percent and reached a record high of US$9.3 billion. This was equal to 21.8 percent of GDP in 2008. Total merchandise imports closely tracked economic activity since 1993. Between 2002 and 2007 imports have grown 23.7 percent per year on average between 2002 and 2007, reaching a value of US$5.6 billion in 2007, increasing from 16.0 percent to 24.2 percent of GDP.

Uruguay’s trade balance, typically negative in the 1990s, registered surpluses averaging 2.4 percent of GDP over 2002-2005 and has been roughly balanced in 2006 and 2007, largely due to strong performance of net exports of services. In 2008, led by strong growth of merchandise imports, the trade balance posted a 2.3 percent of GDP deficit in 2008.

Imports from Argentina and Brazil account for about half of Uruguay’s total imports, while Europe and North America are key export destination. Uruguay receives 57% of imports from Latin American and the Caribbean, with Argentina (26.0 percent) and Brazil (25.3 percent) accounting for the bulk of them. Exports are more geographically diversified and only 39 percent of total exports remain inside LAC. Brazil receives 15.3 percent of total exports and Argentina 7.9 percent. Europe, Asia and North America are important export destinations outside of LAC, accounting for 26.6 percent, 12.4 percent and 12.3 percent of total exports respectively (World Bank 2008).

In terms of value 55 percent of external trade is transported by sea, 33 percent by road, 9 percent by air and about 1 percent by rail. Extra-regional trade is dominated by waterborne

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2 According to data from the Year 2000 Census.
transport, while regional trade is dominated by road transport. Despite a substantial coastline, about 80% of Uruguay’s trade with Brazil and with Argentina travels by road.

3.2 The shipping market

The East Coast of Latin America (ECSA) lies outside the triad and of the major global shipping lanes. Multiplication of container trade volumes on the ECSA over the last two decades has lead to changes in shipping services supply and strategies from shipping lines. The ship sizes deployed for services to the region have increased continuously (see UNCTAD 2008, Wilmmsmeier 2010) which has driven port infrastructure development efforts in all three countries on the ECSA. Port infrastructure development has lagged behind and draft restrictions in ports have repeatedly been a concern for trade development and competitiveness in the region (Sanchez & Wilmmsmeier 2005). Traditionally, the port system on the ECSA was constructed of a series of load centres, but in recent years shipping companies have been seeking to establish regional hubs for their services. Due to the overlapping hinterlands of the River Plate basin ports competition in this regard has been significant.

The level of connectivity of a port is one important factor to describe the centrality of a port within the global liner shipping networks. The level of connectivity of a port is a result of a shipping line’s port choice and thus gives an indication of the ports competitiveness (Low, Lam & Tang 2009). The authors use UNCTAD’s Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) which aims at capturing a country’s level of integration into the existing liner shipping network by measuring liner shipping connectivity. LSCI is considered a proxy of the direct accessibility to global trade. The higher the index, the easier it is to access a high capacity and frequency global liner shipping network thus effectively to participate to international trade.

Uruguay displays a lower shipping line connectivity index (LSCI) than its neighbouring competing countries. In 2009 Uruguay scored 22 and was ranked 46 (Figure 1). By comparison Brazil and Argentina had respective ranks of 33 and 40. This suggests that Uruguay in terms of overall direct connectivity trails behind the other two countries. However, this impression is skewed because a) the LSCI only measures direct connectivity and does not take transshipment into account and b) the LSCI measures connectivity at country level and not at port level. Though the country’s score improved from 16 in 2004 its rank decreased from 44 to 46 between 2004 and 2009. Other countries therefore experienced a greater increase in their level of direct connectivity relative to Uruguay (UNCTAD 2009).

A further available indicator that also measures the indirect connectivity of a country is the transhipment connectivity index (World Economic Forum, 2009). This index aims at reflecting the geographical aspects of the liner services supply and is based on the type of liner shipping service connections available to shippers from each country/economy on bilateral routes ranging from a first- to a fourth-order connection. In the absence of a direct liner service between two countries, the cargo will have to be transshipped in a port of a third or even fourth country in order to reach the destination country. A first-order connection is a connection without transshipment; a second-order connection is a connection with one transshipment and so on. First-order connections have the most positive impact on cargo movement. Therefore, the type of connections per country has been weighted as follows: first-order connections are multiplied by 1.0, second order connections by 0.5, third-order connections by 0.33 and fourth-order connections by 0.25. The score is the sum of the four connection types. The indicator reflects the ship deployment in August 2008. The data were indexed by the maximum value in 2008.

Uruguay ranks in 54th position in 2008, while Argentina is ranked in 44th and Brail in 24th position. Even taken into account the weakness of the two previously described indices in their use of data at country level it becomes clear that Uruguay faces strong competition in its strategy to develop as a regional hub.
Considering the given indication of strong competition derived from the level of connectivity at macro level it is necessary to take a closer look at the underlying reasons and consequences.

One significant indicator is the development of capacity supply and the structure of the same. Capacity supply on the ASIA-ECSA trade was almost stagnant between 2000 and 2003, but then quadrupled until 2008 (Sanchez & Wilmsmeier 2010).

Sanchez and Wilmsmeier (2010) describe the cooperation of global shipping lines with regional partners, like Alianca, Maruba, Libra-Montemar and rate is as a key to success as only such alliances allows overcome Brazilian and Argentinean cabotage restrictions, which is of high importance, considering the extensive coast lines of the two countries. They find that CSAV operates a Brazilian sister company to overcome the challenge of cabotage restrictions in Brazil, while the alliance of CMA CGM and partners cooperate with Maruba, for Argentina, and CSAV, for Brazil. This strategy allows these groups to expand in the market between 2000 and 2008. A group formed by Maersk and HSDG uses Alianca as the “entry card” to capture intra Brazilian trade, since Buenos Aires is the last and only port of call in the calling pattern of that group an Argentinean partners is not decisive. Either strategy aims at overcoming restrictions to realising economies of density in the ECSA trades. Observing the expansion of the market share of these groups in the different ECSA trades seems proof for success of this strategy.

Montevideo is currently benefitting from CSAV’s strategy to intensify the use of Montevideo as transshipment hub for cargo from Southern Argentina. The port in this case is also benefitting from the existing cabotage restrictions that restrict foreign flagged vessels from moving cargo between Argentinean ports.

Sanchez and Wilmsmeier (2010) conclude that the ECSA markets are well defined as the main trades are operated using point-to-point and string network structures. However, they find evidences for concentration in liner shipping trades and argue “while concentration might not affect main global trade lanes within the triad more peripheral trades might well be affected”. This bears a potential risk for the economies in these regions and port development strategies as collusive behaviour of liner shipping service providers might significantly impact the level of connectivity of a port and makes ports vulnerable to the use of negotiating power of shipping lines particularly in competitive port ranges, like the River Plate basin.

Besides the general increase in shipping capacity (Sánchez & Wilmsmeier 2009), the capacity for reefer containers has grown more than threefold between 2000 and 2007 (UNCTAD 2008). The changes in trade composition and the growing importance of food products (e.g. fruits and fish) have also increased the demand for capacity for the transport of refrigerated cargo. Montevideo has significant potential to play a role in the reefer trade, based on Uruguay’s tradition as an exporter of food products (i.e. bovine meat) and the related knowledge based in the Uruguayan logistics industry.

Consequences from the development in the liner shipping market are reflected in the relevance of liner shipping network structures for international maritime transport costs.

Wilmsmeier and Martínez-Zarzoso (2010) show in a panel data analysis (2000-2004) the relative importance of geographical distance and liner service network structure on maritime transport costs. The results indicate a significant effect of the liner service network structure (LSNS) on transport costs. The more central a trade route is located in the maritime liner service network the lower the average transport costs. This opens the important discussion on the “cost” of being peripheral. The found elasticities show that the impact of
being peripheral in the maritime network is higher than the impact of distance. Network peripheral countries pay higher prices for transporting their exports, especially when they trade with other peripheral countries. Countries that are both peripheral in the maritime network and distant from other export markets face higher freight rates. Location is an important issue on the ECSA given that countries are located at the endpoint of the global maritime liner shipping network. Thus the expansion of a hierarchical network, with growing importance of transhipment centres bears the risk of certain regions becoming even more peripheral.

Wilmsmeier (2009) integrates the impact of centrality in the empirical analysis using a “transhipment connectivity index” which measures the centrality of a country within the global shipping network taking transhipment requirements into account. His results show, if a country can “double” its centrality in the network, meaning a significant increase in direct and indirect liner services to a wider range of countries, transport costs can decrease up to 15.4 percent. This important finding needs to be seen in the context of the influencing variables of liner network connectivity such as ship size and frequency, which are determined by the overall level of trade, the geographic position and least but not last port infrastructure endowment and development options. Port connectivity has a greater impact on transport costs than transit time and port movements. An improvement in port connectivity of 10 percent reduces transport costs by 9.8 percent for Uruguay imports (8.9% and 9.7% for Brazil and Argentina respectively) (World Bank 2009).

Additionally, the results underline the fact that the position within the maritime network has a more significant impact than the notion of distance which only expresses the geographical distance between the trading partners, but not the quality of liner shipping network to breach that distance.

The functioning of the network and its structure involve complex interaction patterns that subsequently influence the cost of transport and also the potential of a port to act as a regional hub. Economies of scale matter in relation to the liner service structure. Scale economies are the greatest for Brazil, which is to be expected given the size of Brazil’s hinterland. Therefore hinterland expansion in an effort to increase the scale of demand and supply is crucial for Uruguay to increase international competitiveness in maritime transportation.

4. DEVELOPING A REGIONAL HUB PORT IN MONTEVIDEO

4.1 Current port situation and development

Montevideo, Uruguay’s principal port, despite its favourable location, in its development strategy is required to be competitive in terms of commercial and technological evolution (Perez-Labajos & Blanco 2004). Countries in emerging markets, such as the ECSA have had to modify their structures and strategies of ports in order to maintain competitive. In Uruguay this change has been driven by efficiency and effectiveness objectives.

Services within the Port of Montevideo are provided by both the private and public sectors (Sánchez & Wilmsmeier 2007). Within Uruguay inter-port competition exists between port terminals in Montevideo and Nueva Palmira. The regulatory framework for private port operations in Uruguay is progressive, but there are still restrictions on the type of cargo that can be handled, mainly to minimize competition with the public ports. Traditionally Montevideo focused on cross-border inter-port competition particularly with Buenos Aires, Argentina and to a certain extent with Rio Grande, Brazil, (Sánchez & Wilmsmeier. 2007) a second terminal in the Port of Montevideo is expected to be developed by 2015, potentially with a different operator. This will add a new dimension to the competition within the River Plate Basin.
Key aspects of the port's attractiveness from a terminal operator view are its central location in the south-eastern South American market, its free-trade-zone status, more competitive transit times to major destinations than from Buenos Aires, low port costs\(^3\) and the river connection Paraguay-Paraná to the inland production areas. However, key factors determine the competitiveness of a port: physical, functional and administrative intermodality and logistics, the location of the port, its accessibility, capacity for diverse traffics (Winkelmans 1991).

The Port of Montevideo has an average depth of 10.50m (the approach channel is 11.50) but is prone to siltation. Authorities are currently dredging the approach channel to between 11.50 and 12.50 metres. Already completed work enabled the River Plate Hamburg Sud vessel to operate in Montevideo and Buenos Aires for the first time in early 2009, carrying 5905 TEU.

Port volumes handled at Montevideo have more than doubled over the past 9 years (Figure 2). In 2008, transshipment cargo accounted for 52 percent of the 637,000 TEU handled by the Port of Montevideo. Transshipment increased sharply from about 70,000 TEU in 2000 to 350,000 TEU in 2008, due to a sharp increase in transshipment from Argentina, which increased from 4,000 TEU to 128,000 TEU over the same period of time. Transshipment cargo from Paraguay makes up a small portion of overall transshipment cargo (19,000 TEU). Sgut (2009a) estimates that 71.1 percent of cargo transshipped in the Port of Montevideo is destined to Northern Europe, 21.0 percent to the Mediterranean and 6.1 percent to North America (Figure 3).

**FIGURE 2. CONTAINERIZED CARGO TRAFFIC IN THE PORT OF MONTEVIDEO, IN THOUSANDS OF TEU**

![Graph showing containerized cargo traffic in the Port of Montevideo, in thousands of TEU](image)

The strong growth in transshipment cargo from Argentina since 2002 has been driven in particular by refrigerated containers of fruit and vegetables from Patagonia. This development can be explained by three main factors. Firstly, in 2002, the container port terminal Cuenca del Plata became operational. TCP is operated by the Belgium consortium Katoen Natie which holds 80 percent of the shares; the National Port Authority (ANP) owns

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\(^3\) Up to three times lower than in Buenos Aires in 2003
20 percent. The privatization of the terminal consolidated the modernization process of the port system which began in 1994 with the Free port law and was not restricted by conditions to horizontal merges as in the case of Buenos Aires. Thus this development allowed Montevideo for the first time to proactively engage in interport competition with Buenos Aires. Secondly, Argentine exporters have increasingly used the Port of Montevideo, because transshipment operations in Montevideo save one day of transit time for fruit exports; by way of example transshipment of fruits and vegetables from San Antonio Este and Bahía Blanca account for 70,000 TEU of total volume handled by the Port of Montevideo. Thirdly, lower port costs made the port of Montevideo more attractive to exporters, particularly during the economic crisis and the years thereafter. The port in Argentina continued to operate free tariffs in USD during the period of devaluation of the Argentinean peso in 2001/2002, which weakened the port’s competitiveness in comparison to Montevideo.

FIGURE 3. TOTAL EXPORTS OF CONTAINERIZED CARGO TRANSSHIPPED IN MONTEVIDEO, DISTRIBUTION AND DESTINATION

The number of containers handled is also affected by the quality and quantity of support infrastructure provided, such as the number of container berths and gantry cranes. The number of quay cranes is closely related to the number of TEUs per quay crane hour. Presently available infra- and superstructure is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE FOR CONTAINER OPERATIONS, PORT OF MONTEVIDEO, 2009 AND PLANNED FOR 2010

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminal Cuenca del Plata (TCP)</td>
<td>Public Berths 3,4,5,8 &amp;9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gantry cranes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile cranes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berth (m)</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (hectares)</td>
<td>15,2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANP (2009)
4.2 Institutional development and role of port reform

“We should not forget that our country was born as an independent nation mainly due to the conflict of interests between the Buenos Aires and Montevideo ports. Ultimately, this was the only actual reason why Uruguay came to be, not just the ‘Eastern Bank’ but a Republic. It was precisely the interests of Buenos Aires, favouring that city, and the comparative advantages of Montevideo which have always been behind the conflict that gave rise to our nation. Also, it shows what Great Britain ultimately pointed out: that the River Plate should not be a port of only one nation.” (Senator F. Bouza in the Uruguayan Senate 1991, quoted in Gorosito Zuluaga 1993).

Uruguay’s restricted internal market and historic development leads the port to seek success in inter-port competition at the operator and port authority level (for details on the concept of port competition see Van de Voorde & Winkelmans 2002), focussing on capturing transhipments and offering value-added services in addition to its own cargoes. Uruguay’s port strategy to increase its regional influence and finally to develop as a regional transshipment and logistics hub has its roots in the 1992 Port Law and its associated decrees - Ley de Puertos (Port Act) No. 16246 and Decretos (decrees) 412/1992 & 413/1992 (Hodara, et al. 2008).

These were landmarks in the process of enhancing the competitiveness of Uruguayan ports. As the legal basis of Uruguayan port policy they introduced eight main principles: (a) Continuity of services, “service started, service completed” principle; (b) provision of safety; (c) provision of regularity; (d) maximum productivity and efficiency; (e) mandatory coordination and collaboration for the best service; (f) free competition; (g) equal rights; (h) freedom of choice for consumers. The port law also reflects the idea that the efficiency, safety and reliability of a port system are its guiding principle, as well as defining free-port contexts and their operational arena, port customs areas, the basic merchandise system and foreign-trade zones. The hence clear port policy (section 3 of decree 412/1992) and the defined role of the Administración Nacional de Puertos (ANP) delivered towards a greater efficiency of ports and competitiveness in foreign trade. Consequently, ANP has been proactively pursuing the aims of ensuring free merchandise circulation and competition, as well as advising the Government on transportation policies.

The success of Uruguay’s port and transport strategy became visual during the economic crisis 2001/2002 (Sánchez & Wilmsmeier, 2007), when Uruguay was able to sustain the negative impacts from the crisis in a better way than Argentina and even expanding its market shares over Buenos Aires. Since then Montevideo has maintained the strategy of inter-port competition and peripheral services over time, including transshipment capture goals, value-added services and free merchandise systems, with corporate and historical precedents.

The important institutional aspect of its free-port status has brought advantages in terms of inter-port competition. Montevideo can benefits in several ways form its foreign trade zone. Voss Hall (2002) argues that these benefits can be defined as static and dynamic. He refers to the tax advantage to be a static advantage, while the dynamic benefits arise from the possibility to use the policy as a regulating tool to cope with arising uncertainties in demand levels, product mix, trade regulations etc. Further he adds that it is a tool that allows

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4 The Port of Montevideo has operated as a Free Port since 1992. It was the first terminal in the Latin-American Atlantic coast to have merchandise circulating freely without the need for formal authorization and paperwork. This transformed the port into a logistics centre, where international companies could centralize their merchandise for later distribution in the region. The operations which this law permitted were those referred to as "logistic commodity", which includes loading and unloading, stuffing and un-stuffing of containers. The Free Port provisions act as an umbrella protection for the merchandise in the region.

5 National Port Administration
to institutionalise relationships between the port authority and trade firms in regard to trade promotion, real estate development etc. In fact, one of the major reasons behind the sustained growth in traffic over the last eight years in the Port of Montevideo was its development as a free port.

4.3 Current challenges in increasing port competitiveness of Montevideo

Though the port regulatory framework in Uruguay is progressive, it still has several weaknesses. Specifically, there are four main restrictions at all levels, domestically and at regional level:

• There is no one government agency vested with all the necessary structure and resources to execute policies for the Merchant Navy. Currently, control functions are divided between the Ministry of Defence and the division that deals with maritime and river transport within MTOP.

• The absence of a bilateral cabotage regulation with Argentina provides a competitive advantage to shippers who export from the Argentine river coastline area, where regular services do not exist. The exporters in these ports choose to hire feeder services to Montevideo and then use river transport to the destination port. By so doing
  o they can use any ship i.e. ships running flags of convenience in the stretch from the origin to Montevideo at a lower cost than the freight cost to Buenos Aires, where an Argentine ship would need to be used;
  o Patagonia traffic transhipped in Montevideo saves one day in comparison to Buenos Aires as Montevideo is the entrance and exit through the River Plate.

• The Brazil-Uruguay agreement of water transport does not protect Uruguay from bilateral water traffic with Argentina. Even though Uruguay has entered into a treaty with Brazil, according to which bilateral traffic must be made preferably with ships having both flags, in practice there is little bilateral traffic between them and even then it is typically made by road. The agreement therefore does not significantly add much to the available transportation options. In fact given that Uruguay practically does not have a fleet, the country authorizes third parties to operate in both countries almost systematically.

• Restrictions to freedom of navigation through the waterway affect the participation of the vessels registered under the Uruguay flag.

For some time MERCOSUR’s sub group 5, based on a Brazilian-Argentine initiative, has been discussing the possibility of entering into a “MERCOSUR Water Transport Agreement”. In particular, Brazil and Argentina have promoted the agreement with the support of Paraguay, Bolivia, and Venezuela. However, Uruguay’s stand on this issue differs from the rest, as it seeks to limit the scope of the agreement regarding exchange cargo, while Argentina and Brazil want to include all transit cargo. Uruguay perceives the multilateral water transport agreement between all MERCOSUR countries as a threat to the participation of the Uruguay registered vessels (Andean Development Fund 2008).

This difference arises from the fact that if the agreement were to be concluded the cargo being transported today between Argentina and Uruguay and is transhipped in the latter would be exclusively carried by vessels holding flags of the region. This would limit the access to this service, and, in practice, freight prices would rise and the Port of Montevideo would have a reduced competitive advantage.

In fact users are as well generally against the proposed agreement as they fear that limited supply would increase transport costs. The Confederación Nacional de la Industria (CNI) in Brazil, the Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA) in Argentina, and the Unión Uruguaya
de Exportación (UEU) in Uruguay have different stands regarding the possible agreement. This is despite the fact that the agreement is not consistent with the general tendency towards global water transport liberalization and that the hypothesis of a cross trade restriction in virtually all the East and North coast of South America would probably imply retaliations if applied.

Within MERCOSUR the various agreements between countries influence the relative competitiveness of the ports and shipping services in the region. In particular the agreements affect feeder transit services and ultimately the possibility to grow transshipment services (Table 2):

**TABLE 2. CONNECTIVITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PORT OF MONTEVIDEO WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>There is high competitiveness, both in the Ro-Ro land connection through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bahía Blanca –</td>
<td>Juan Lacaze and in the direct river connection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Puerto Madryn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Santa Cruz de la Sierra</td>
<td>There is great potential to develop river transport but this has not yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Santos-San Paulo</td>
<td>developed due to an infrastructure deficit and an undeveloped market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>Neither land nor maritime transport are considered competitive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Asunción</td>
<td>River transport to Montevideo is competitive. However, this is not the case</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally several problems create inefficiencies in port operations. It is not possible to track cargo through the port, a requirement in certain markets due to raised international security standards. Currently, there is a lack of a system that connects public and private agents operating in the port. This unnecessarily multiplies transactions. The tendency in the region is to adopt single windows to speed paperwork processing both before and after the import/export authorization in the port, independently of the need to optimize interactions between those involved in port operations. The estimation is that for every container passing through the port, a minimum of 27 documents are generated at a cost US$ 5 each. The total cost of paperwork is therefore, as much as US$ 135 per container (Sgut 2009).

Traffic in the River Plate Basin is expected to reach 3 million TEU by 2015 and 3.5 million TEU by 2020 (World Bank 2009). This demand in growth can only be absorbed if port access in Montevideo and Buenos Aires are improved in order to overcome congestion and reduce the impact of the ports on these two cities. Further the currently available infrastructure will not be able to cope with this growth efficiently, which gives room for discussion on introducing a further competitor in the market by developing a new terminal or port.

**5. DISCUSSION**

The analysis illustrates the role of Montevideo in the River Plate Port range, the current liner shipping strategies to serve the region and the development of interport competition. The case of Montevideo exemplifies the struggle of historic load centres in the
current period of restructuring of liner shipping networks. Rio Grande can be seen as a Newcomer port in the region and after a short period of time is challenging traditional structures on the port network (Sanchez & Wilmsmeier 2007). Brazil’s economic growth and implied export oriented trade strategy paired with the growing demand of shipping lines in through increases in ship size (draught) and cost efficiency deliver to convert the traditional competition between Montevideo and Buenos Aires in a tripartite competition.

While the geographic position is crucial, that the position in the liner shipping network is decisive in terms of competitiveness and is very likely to be reflected in maritime transport costs to a specific country. Consequently, Uruguay is in an inferior position to the other two countries at this point in time. Further the decision to use a port as a port of call in a liner service is made by the shipping line and does not grant any direct influence from the port. Further Rio Grande has recognized its beneficial position of intermediacy for the services on the ECSA, which in combination with the centrality to the direct hinterland in Southern Brazil and the access to the discontinuous hinterland in Argentina, Uruguay and along the Paraguay-Parana river system, puts it into a favourable position to develop as a regional hub. While the geographic position is crucial, Montevideo suffers from missing economies of scale in its direct hinterland and infrastructure deficits particularly in terms of maritime accessibility. However, institutional uncertainty and inter-terminal competition in Buenos Aires as well as the current cabotage regulations play in favour of Montevideo.

Based on its geographical location, Uruguay can serve as a sub-regional hub for the Southern Cone. In particular, Montevideo is well located to serve Paraguay and other traffic from all its immediate neighbours. For this to happen there is the need to develop seamless interfaces between the sea and land transport systems, which are still a weakness. Competitiveness in maritime transportation costs is essential for Uruguay’s position as a logistical hub. Lower shipping costs will not only benefit local exporters and importers, but also strengthen Uruguay’s position as a transshipment hub and gateway for regional trade. This is especially true since the country is the smallest economy on the East coast of South America and thus in order to be able to develop as a hub is dependent on the use of its infrastructure by its neighbours. Further, Uruguay in general and Montevideo specifically are the gateway for Paraguayan East bound trade. The more Uruguay can facilitate Paraguay’s access to maritime trade services the more it will benefit from increasing trade and the related positive effects. The development of inland shipping as well as a rail link to Southern Brazil would seem imperative.

Montevideo does not at present have a large number of vessel calls. If the Port of Montevideo can strengthen its position as a hub port and consequently increase the number of direct services calling in the port, resulting lower transport costs would benefit transhipments, transit as well as local trade. Furthermore, economies of scale through a greater scale of port operations are identified. Improved access to the extended port hinterland as well as investment in port infrastructure to attract greater levels of transhipments would be important to increase the scale of port operations. However, such economies can only be realized, if the investment in infrastructure is matched with the required growth in demand.

Uruguay has a progressive regulatory framework for sea and river transport services. However, the use of bilateral agreements has created an environment of uneven competitive arrangements. It is important that there is harmonization in the regulatory frameworks, ideally developed under the umbrella of MERCOSUR.

Finally, improvements in customs efficiency would also help to increase Uruguay’s competitive advantage as a regional distribution centre and a trade gateway for MERCOSUR.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The paper shows that despite strong efforts Uruguay and its principal port Montevideo are highly dependent on external factors, particularly the level of connectivity, in their strategy to develop Montevideo as a regional hub. In terms of its position within the global liner shipping network Montevideo is in an inferior position to its two competitors Buenos Aires and Rio Grande. Beyond this empirical evidence confirms that the greater the connectivity of a port or country the lower its international transport costs. This again is a factor that can impact on Montevideo’s competitiveness. However, the current evidence is taken from a country level analysis and further analysis at port level should be conducted in the future to overcome these restrictions. The current generalization gives the analysis a similar weakness as described for the LSCI and transhipment connectivity index, because it does not account for the differences between individual ports.

The proactive nature of the related Uruguayan institutions and agencies has made important contributions to drive Montevideo’s transhipment traffic and success in capturing transhipment in the past has proven the effectiveness of the strategy. However, with the expected continued traffic growth infrastructural restriction can become evident soon and the effectiveness of the institutions will then be proven, if they manage to prepare port development to cope with the arising demand. Further, the discussion also shows that the current attractiveness of Montevideo as a transhipment port is partly driven by the existing cabotage regulations and the strategies developed from the shipping companies to overcome these restrictions. Therefore the current benefit from the situation will last as long as shipping lines’ strategies continue in their current form. Finally, future development will significantly depend on the ability to further develop value added and logistics services that attract cargo beyond the reason of the previously mentioned cabotage regulation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Captain Martin Sgut a true mariner, dedicated and visionary man, and a good friend.

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