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FRANCO’S TECHNOCRACY AND SPAIN’S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: HISTORIOGRAPHIC PARADOXES AND NEW CONCLUSIONS

ROBERTO LOPEZ TORRIJOS

Because the history of the very beginning of Spanish relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) has been written according to Spanish expectations and without reference to Spain’s thankless past, one could affirm that the European history of Spain really starts in the future, not in the past. “Cuanto menor es el campo de experiencia más crece la expectativa.”¹ The result is a certain idea of historical progress, and if a historian uses this technique, the result becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Most of the historiography of European-Spanish relations unquestionably chooses a moral preference, in favour of pro-Europeanism. And this moral preference becomes a strategic one that intervenes in the process of historical research. The consequence is a kind of teleology, that Spanish society, following its natural European path towards emancipation, adopted a more progressive European outlook and tone during the sixties and seventies. Implicit in this argument is that Franco’s external behaviour demonstrated the structural impracticability of the late dictatorship in the European context, most obviously Franco’s application to join the European Economic Community, in 1962, was rejected. Europe --the opposite of Franco’s Dictatorship-- was rational and optimal, and eventually Spain went there, but without Franco. This article focuses on the implications of this perspective, pointing out some of its coincidences, clichés and paradoxes and concludes with some new ideas about Spain’s path to Europe that considers Franco’s technocracy and its European ambitions within its ideological tradition.

The article analyses historiographical interpretations of Franco’s application to the EEC in the first two parts, and the last part describes some preliminary conclusions of current research about Francoist technocracy and the intentions of their policies both in the internal and international contexts, introducing the concept that anti-liberal views of European integration for Spain were important. Throughout the article, the phrase ‘specialized historiography’ is going to be mentioned many times, referring to both the scholarly literature related to the European aspirations of Franco’s regime and the historiographical view of Europe as a long-term comparative reference in the study of Francoism and Spanish transition to democracy. Much of this historiographical stream is derived from the work of José María Jover Zamora” and continued by historians of the history of Francoist engagement.

1 Julio Arostegui, La historia vivida, sobre la historia del presente, (Madrid: Alianza Ensayo, 2004), 77.
with Europe, such as Antonio Moreno Juste and Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares. Here, the geopolitical position of Spain within Europe was a hallmark in the study of Spanish external relations:

\[\textit{la posición de España, guste o no guste, es periférica [...] Integrarse en Europa, estar con los del Centro, parece ser la mejor manera de compensar su excentricidad, y esta opción puede considerarse como una constante de la política exterior española [...] carácter fronterizo y periférico de España en Europa.}\(^3\)

\[\textit{Vivimos en un limbo de autosatisfacción: plenamente gozosos con el camino recorrido [...] Tenemos que ser europeos como siempre lo hemos sido, abiertos hacia fuera [...] Nuestra europeidad tiene que ser, como siempre lo ha sido, fronteriza.}\(^4\)

Professor Abellán’s studies of the late eighties, influenced by Ortega y Gasset, offered another influential perspective. Here the key element was the “esteem” for technocracy and politicians as elites that led to the historical process of transition from the late Franco regime to democracy. These historiographies are pro-European, which was again especially influenced by Ortega y Gasset’s two favourite topics: Spanish distance from Europe and Spain’s “Tibetización” (its exclusion from the European cultural mainstream).\(^5\)

The consolidation and spread of this historiography coincided with the growing presence of Spain at the very heart of the European Union (previously to the economic crisis of the Eurozone and its negative consequences for the both Spanish economy and its self-perception, of course). The ‘specialized historiography’ that developed built upon studies that underlined the European convergence of Spanish society and economy during the sixties and seventies. Some of these representative authors, such as Santos Juliá, José Luis García Delgado, José María Beneyto or Javier Varela, are equally important for this article.


\(^5\) José Luis Abellán, “El significado de la idea de Europa en la política y en la historia de España”, \textit{Sistema} 86-87 (1988), 31-44.
Europe as a moral option

For the historiography specialized on Francoist engagement with the world, the Spanish preference for an argument grounded in the persistence of internal conflict and inadequate modernization had become axiomatic until the early eighties. Quoting Ismael Saz, Spanish history of the XXth century had been understood and written as a collective upset, thanks to a collection of weakness, frustrations and failures. In fact, a forty-year dictatorship seemed the result of theses historical dynamics. But the Spanish transition to democracy happened, which was mostly explained as being the start of typical “European” behavior and patterns in Spain. Spain left behind its natural tendency to weakness and radicalism and now bet on union, progress and concorde with the rest of the continent. This recent, successful period in Spanish history led to a renovation of historiographical views, what meant that there was a concerted effort to set Spain within a longer European frame. Spanish historical dynamics were analyzed again and mostly reconsidered as modern, secular and European or, at least, underlining Western European parameters. This process of historiographical renovation was unfinished at late XXth century because the European focus of framing Spanish history suddenly ended in 1939, so that Franco’s Regime was kept out of historiographical reconsideration.6 These renovated interpretations found Franco’s dictatorship to be an important obstacle, even if other obstacles were passed over, such as the industrial revolution or liberalism. But this time was different, because the Transition happened “justo al contrario de como se esperaba” 7

It was not easy to explain such a long dictatorship during the rise and consolidation of democracies in West Europe. The dictatorship could only be characterized as a dysfunction of the normal, European course of modern Spain8. It was better to emphasize the emancipating change from the dictatorship to democracy, which finally united Spain with Europe, a point reinforced when Spain joined with both the EEC and the currency union. A past of collective upset; a future full of shining mornings:

Resuelta voluntad española de apertura e integración a escala continental reflejada en nuestra presencia en el grupo del euro. España ha consolidado un régimen democrático tras una larga experiencia dictatorial: el “ayer es nunca jamás” machadiano resuena ahora con más fuerza que nunca. Una capacidad de interlocución en las relaciones

6 Ismael Saz "Paradojas de la historia. Paradojas de la historiografía. Las peripecias del fascismo español", *Hispania*, 51/1 (2000): 207. One of the best samples of the analysys by Saz is the historiographical evolution of the studies by Jordi Nadal.


Consequently, the contemporary history of Spain is now considered mostly normal and European, but only until the Civil War. Franco’s regime is usually characterized as an abnormality, a parenthesis or a singularity. Manifestly this is a regenerationist drift because the future of Spain would be European, but its past was terribly Spanish. Most significant of all, when it comes to how exactly the specialized historiography responds the beginning of the Spanish relation with the EEC, the analysis becomes more predictable. Nobody doubts that Franco’s Regime attempting to join the EEC in the 1960s was a paradox, a joke, a tasteless joke. This embarrassing chapter of Spanish history is used to reveal the definitive contradiction of Spain at this time, because while Franco did not fit into Europe, Spanish society of the sixties and seventies was a “sociedad que cambiaba a ojos vista en la dirección de los países europeos”.

Indeed, the event of Franco’s Regime aspiring to the same Europe, which is proudly considered by Spaniards as the top expression of their current democracy, makes it very easy to understand that many historians and political scientists focus instead on seeing the sixties and seventies as foreshadowing the future of Spain, full of European successes, and thus as a way for exorcising the demons of its shaming dictatorial past.

This is the reason that the final democratic character of the EEC is emphasized in the standard explanation which is taught. In fact, the recent history of Spain has been written with a lot of empathy to the idea of Europe. Beneyto, from a well representative position, for the purpose of “volver a diseñar el aporte de España a Europa y de Europa a España no sólo en términos de contribuciones netas, retornos equivalentes y subsidios al cereal”, clearly expresses, “Europa es esencialmente una realidad cultural, y no en primer término económica o jurídica. Si no se reconoce esto, caemos en la morosidad cultural.” Or Moreno Juste, who advises about the risks of a “valoración de nuestra relación con Europa desde un cálculo meramente instrumental, utilitario y cortoplacista, y que tiende a ignorar la perspectiva

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13 José María Beneyto, Europa: tragedia y razón en el pensamiento español del siglo XX (Madrid, Taurus: 1999), 15.
14 Ibid, 15.
Certainly some historians react with a predictable enthusiasm when it comes to avoid the conflictive factors of the recent history of Spain. Hence all the strange, special, surprising and incoherent stuff is cleared away. And nothing has been more surprising in Spanish recent history than Franco’s application to the EEC. 

Technocracy: Europe as a rational option?

The argument in this historiography makes the obvious connections, that the growing social and economic convergence of Spain with Europe soon led to its corollary: the social request for democracy. However, this idea is based on Rostow’s take-off model. Yet the role of Franco’s technocracy is overlooked. The Spanish edition of Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1959) was introduced by the main technocratic minister of Franco’s dictatorship, Laureano López Rodó (1920-2000), a former jurist with a view of statutory regulation and an enthusiastic follower of Ernst Forsthoff’s theories (1902-1974), who maintained that “current constitutional questions are actually administrative questions.” The title was significantly translated to Spanish as *Políticas y Etapas de Crecimiento*.

For the most part the studies about the Spanish Transition point out the European behaviour by Spaniards during the sixties and seventies. Many historians and political scientists write about the historical opportunity this created for achieving democracy. As a sample of this Spanish convergence with Europe, there is nothing better than Santos Juliá’s words: “Spaniards had

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16 The European application by Franco’s Regime was made “de forma audaz”, José Reig Cruaños, *Identificación y alienación, la cultura política en el Tardofranquismo* (Valencia: University Press, 2007), 252.
understood that Europe was their future. “This historiographical perspective (and mostly Rostow’s) is based on the conflict between the anachronism of the regime and the convergence with West Europe within social, economic and administrative fields, and this perspective is understood as a confirmation of Weber’s script for development. An obvious question remains: if Spaniards understood Europe was their future in the sixties and seventies, didn’t the technocrats of Franco’s government feel the same? According to this governing view, Spanish modernization was within European parameters and was promoted by technocratic ministers. That would drive anyone to consider positively the work and legacy of the technocratic ministers, which generally has been assumed to have been motivated only for the economic survival of Franco’s dictatorship in the asphyxia caused by autarky.

The legend or cliché of the Stabilization Act takes for granted that Franco accepted it only to avoid or delay a democratic transition. From this comes a predictable second conclusion, that the technocrats as a staff were far away from the presumed essence of the Regime, which was the belief in autarky. This explanation forgets the ideological affiliation of the technocrats and, thus, locates them at a midway point between the Regime and the conditions for its final crisis and Spain’s transformation. In short, Franco’s technocracy is considered as a dynamical elite that knew to see the European horizon, but was unable to see the contradiction between the regime and the modernization (and democratization) character of their European policies. They were an important group in a short part of the transition. Through them, a dictatorship interested in deleting Spanish democracy finally made the conditions for the return of the democracy.

In fact, if one emphasizes that the technocratic policies started the European convergence of Spain that ultimately led to democracy, there is a need to face a disturbing idea: there are other functional prerequisites for

21 Giacomo Marramao, Cielo y Tierra, Genealogía de la secularización, (Barcelona: Paidós: 1994), 57.
achieving democracy. These are overlooked in the studies quoted in the three previous paragraphs, all of which emerged from the modernization paradigm. In this explanation, there is no room for the civil society, the political opposition or the international context. These studies could be criticized for supporting themselves with a renewed, structural update of the Spanish dichotomy that previously produced dysfunction, so that the result—Spanish democracy—was an anomaly, an unforeseen spin-off from the dictatorship. The conclusion is that while the aim of technocratic policies was not to achieve the democracy, nonetheless these policies inadvertently helped create some of the conditions for achieving democracy.

Despite the emphasized importance of the internal differences of Francoist elites as the ones that explain the final evolution of the regime, these are not introduced as some of the main reasons of the final evolution of Spain by the studies from the modernization paradigm. Yet others have been praised for identifying the exogenic factors of the convergence; they link the technocratic policies more directly with the European democratic future of Spain, far away from the technocrat’s ideological tradition. Inherent in these approaches is the idea that technocratic governments were more deliberate in expressing a preference for a future grounded in European rationality instead of Spanish exceptionalism. Franco’s technocratic ministers and senior officers allow us to consider the Francoist regime not as an aberration but rather as a

27 Ismael Saz, “Mucho más que crisis políticas: el agotamiento de dos proyectos”, *Ayer* 68 (2007), 143.
traditionalist and meta-historical one, based on the idea that “en política exterior, el régimen franquista adoptó una filosofía pragmática, a veces cinica, conculcadora de la retórica oficial, basada en la pretensión imperial y en la afirmación nacionalista frente al rechazo europeo” 29

Why did a deeply anti-democratic regime make up its mind to apply for entry into the EEC and thus its adherence to a select club of European democracies? The application was made by a dictatorship, which did not deserve the association. Much of the specialized historiography the article has examined simply emphasizes the tangential character of Franco’s application. 30 According with this view, the surprising application was the result of a process of international opening that was derived from the economic changes after autarky, mostly the policies of deregulation and development, which are regarded as technocratic decisions taken just for the economic survival of Spain. With this as the main explanation for Spain’s application, there is an absence of rhetoric or discourse behind the decision, and the explanation of Spain’s decision is reduced to an economic-institutional one, especially one grounded in the circumstances of trade and diplomacy. The EEC --remember, one of the backbones of Maastricht’s European Union-- is regarded as a mere technical organization. This is a great risk --a new paradox-- for a pro-European historiography, because Europeanism has long been cast as a larger, collective project, which goes beyond the implementation of technical or economic policy.

In reinterpreting Spain’s application to the EEC, we can connect many trends. First, the technocracy ruled out the survival of the regime after Franco, because it recognized that Spain’s economic problems were more important and deeper than the nature of the government and continuity for the purpose of national prestige. This led to a more rational character in foreign affairs, and thus it means that the progressive beginning of a new Spanish foreign policy can be linked to the technocrats. As a result, there is an explicit continuity

29 Armengod, Ramón, “Prólogo” in Rafael Calduch ed. La política exterior española en el siglo XX (Madrid: Ediciones de las Ciencias sociales, 1994), 10.
Many would argue that the claimed glorious, autarkic, old-fashioned rhetoric of the regime had presumably been the unique and honest affirmation of its external personality. Yet this historiography is seduced by a notion of a Hispanic Weltpolitik, the delusions of splendors. Here are echoes of the victory of an earlier era that once connected anticommunist rhetoric and collaboration with the powers of Axis, illusions of Austria’s Empire and nationalist reaffirmation across Europe. Therefore when Franco’s Spain applied to join Europe, it was only in order to survive, and the regimes tried to instrumentalize or betray its autarkic essence. This means the application was just the opposite of an ideological project, an idea that is not so divorced from the notion of a technocratic staff driving policy at this time. Foreign affairs was simply driven by the economic policies of the technocracy, as a paradigmatical autonomous Realpolitik. The factors that emphasize Spain’s adaptation to European change have been emphasized and the ideological reasons of the dictatorship for applying have been downsized.

But what if one considers the application rooted in the political tradition of technocratic ministers and staff; now the reasons of the application become less benevolent, and more fully linked to the idea of acting in order to preserve the dictatorship.

The technocrats and an anti-liberal view of European integration

The technocrats of Franco were the third generation of the Spanish, neo-traditionalist ideology, also known as national-catholicism, which included important ideological commitments to economic modernization. The cultural crisis of late 19th century had established the basis of the new anti-democratic right-wing of Europe and the following dictatorial experiences. In Spain, those late-century anti-liberal movements were called Regeneracionism and "Ninety--eightism"(Noventayochismo). Rooted in both regeneration and theological natural law, Maeztu's thinking had articulated the neotraditionalist ideology of Acción Española before the Republican challenge during the thirties. This was the second generation Spanish reactionary nationalism, or National-Catholicism. A similar phenomenon had happened in Western Europe in the form of Action Française, Associazione Nazionalista Italiana and the German National People’s Party, DVNP.

Maeztu’s guidelines assumed the acceptance of Weber’s subjective perspectives of modernization in a limited way. He challenged the coexistence of modern realities and the social community inspired by God and, also, advocated non-democratic politics as a way to avoid the rise of dangerous “perspectives” from modernity, such as republicanism. His solution was a kind of “trickle down theory” which theoretically would guarantee economic prosperity for everyone through modernization and an international place for Spain in Europe. For the purposes of this study, this point is very important. This tradition had a European vocation but rejected enlightened liberal tradition. The Francoist technocrats were the third generation in this line of thought and greatly built on Maeztu’s ideas. Most influential in the views of Franco’s technocracy were the three backbones of Maeztu’s political philosophy, defined as neotraditional, nationalist and productive.\footnote{The Neotradionalist and Maeztu’s influence to be found here: Alfonso Botti, \textit{Cielo y dinero}, (Madrid: Alianza, 1992); Antonio Cañellas Mas, “La tecnocracia franquista: el sentido ideológico del desarrollo económico”, \textit{Studia Historica Historia Contemporánea}, 24 (2006), 257-288; Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, \textit{Acción Española, Teología Política y Nacionalismo Autoritario en España 1913-1936}, (Madrid: Tecnos, 1998); Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, \textit{El pensamiento político de la derecha española en el siglo XX. De la crisis de la Restauración al Estado de partidos 1898-2000}, (Madrid: Tecnos, 2005); Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, \textit{Historia de las derechas españolas. De la Ilustración a nuestros días}, (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000); Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, \textit{Maeztu, Biografía de un nacionalista español}, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003); José Luis Villacañas, \textit{Ramiro de Maeztu y el ideal de la burguesía en España}, (Barcelona: Espasa, 2000).}

Suffice it to say here that Franco’s regime became characteristic of this synthesis of both the great European nationalist and anti-liberal streams: reactionary nationalism and fascism, having an ideological predominance of the first and a certain rhetorical predominance of the second.\footnote{Ismael Saz “Paradojas…”, \textit{Op. Cit.}} This reactionary tradition will reach three generations of 20th century Spanish monarchists, including the technocrats from \textit{Opus Dei}, but not only them. The first generation in Maeztu’s wake was related to the subvertive goals of neotraditionalism via the review \textit{Acción Española}. The Civil War was understood a necessary stage for eradicating \textit{Anti-España}. After the Civil War, the second generation became concerned with nationalism and it showed an interest in the scholarly debate with the Falange: “the problem of Spain”. Now the Spanish “body” could be developed with no danger of secularization (economy, administration, foreign affairs).\footnote{Ismael Saz, \textit{España contra España, los nacionalismos franquistas}, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003); Santos Julíd, \textit{Historia de las dos Españas}, (Madrid: Taurus, 2004). The metaphor is mine.} The technocracy was the third generation and represented an update of this Spanish neotraditionalism in the fifties and sixties. It was the ideological line of Maeztu’s vision: the
development of and institutionalization of a political project which was to become an impersonal, administrative and predictable dictatorship.\textsuperscript{36} This means a kind of an essential, sophisticated theocracy. Some descriptive studies, even recent, underline the similarities and differences between the postwar European right-wing tendency to Christian Democracy and Spanish neotraditionalism, then paradoxically surprise themselves because the government of the dictatorship did not follow the same stream that European, democratic right-wings did.\textsuperscript{37}

The technocratic ministers tried to take advantage of European transformations. The technocrats, as with any dictatorial elite, could not pretend to be excessively cynical towards exercising power. The dictatorial elite needed to demonstrate that, over time, power was becoming as representative as possible, at least in appearance. So, by the fifties, the pragmatic and technical programmatic references of the regime became more important than the emotive ones in the rhetoric: if the dictatorship allowed the achievement of welfare, focusing the energy of the people in productive work, then this could be used to demonstrate to the world a kind of passive consensus about the dictatorship existed in Spain; thus more overt political and ideological debates could be avoided. In the domestic context this was the discourse of exercising-legitimation: the legitimation of Franco's regime regarding pragmatic and handy terms, supposedly European and Western ones, emphasizing the power of the economic development. In terms of foreign policy, this meant the international and European projection of the regime in the good context of the economic growth and the Cold War anti-communism. Linking Spain to the EEC and Western context would encourage both the necessary stability of the Spanish economy to extend welfare to the population, á la Europe, and would also solidify the institutionalization of an anti-liberal regime after the predictable death of Franco.

However, it seems that for the most part, the quoted historiography assumes that Franco’s dictatorship decided to apply for the EEC from an ideological vacuum. In fact, it applied to the EEC within a context of institutional desires and different ways to view the power of integration. The dictatorship tried to get support from an international arena full of points of attraction to Spain, which did not necessarily or totally exclude each other.


Franco’s regime only tried to suit them and link them to their own goals. The integration of external markets, the function of Monnet’s original logic for integration; the intergovernmental model of cooperation (De Gaulle’s favorite); linking up with the profitable and adaptable elements of the governing discourses in European forums; capitalism, but not liberalism; Cold War, but counterrevolutionary-obsessed; pro-Europeanism, but preferably a supra-national Europe; all of these help explain Spanish preferences of Europeanism at the moment of the application to the EEC.

Considering the ideological affiliation of Franco’s technocracy, there is not such a contradiction between the maintenance of the regime and a European horizon. Franco’s technocrats were more than money doctors. Their economic policies were designed to do more than just ensure the survival of the regime. They were the product of a strategic certainty, the last update of the reactionary and financially modernizing tradition of Spanish political thinking. They were not the lack of ideology or a relaxed ideology, nor even a strategic mistake of the regime.

The progressive deregulation of Spanish economy and the opening, in different steps, to the international arena all through the fifties, were all pieces of evidence in the argument that the technocrats were gradually strengthening the importance of neotraditionalist ideology in Spain’s policies. The 1953 Concordat with the Holy See, the 1953 Military Bases Agreement with United States of America, the growing role of Spanish Embassies in spreading throughout the Western World, the final admission of Spain to International Organizations such as the UN (United Nations), 1955, the ILO (International Labour Organization), 1956, the IMF (International Monetary Fund), 1958, the WB (World Bank), 1958 and the OEEC (Organization for European Co-Operation), 1958 (later called OECD, Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation) were all part of this broader movement.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the studies about Franco’s application to EEC have underlined the historic importance of the event, but have dodged the strategic reasons for technocrats and neotraditionalists to advocate such a policy. These reasons emphasized the links between anti-liberalism and European integration. The technocrat’s connection with their political past was stronger than their connection with the Spanish democratic future in Europe. In conclusion, Franco’s technocracy and its actions were not a contradiction of the dictatorship, but in fact, a resounding confirmation of it.