Diversity in Peace:
Towards intercultural dialogue in peace studies

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Abstract:
Peace studies in its interdisciplinary and intercultural character acknowledges the plurality of understandings of peace. Moreover, the epistemological statute of the discipline has been revised contesting the value-free approach of modern science, and expanding the notion of scientificity. This thesis looks at the relation of peace studies with other forms of producing knowledge, and examines if cultural recognition in peace studies is accompanied by epistemological recognition. To that effect, interculturality in the work of four peace scholars is analyzed. Thereon, a dialogic proposal is carried out.

Keywords: interculturality, recognition, epistemology, peace studies
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Introduction

Presentation and justification

This thesis addresses the question of the relations between science and other forms of producing knowledge and conceiving existence, and concretely how it has or can been dealt in peace studies. It departs from two premises: on one side, from the commitment of the UNESCO Char of Philosophy for Peace to relieve the suffering between humans and with nature; on the other side, from De Sousa Santos (2007b) tenet that there is no social justice without cognitive justice.

Colonialism, considered in this thesis as one of the constitutive elements of what has been called modernity, the imposition of modern science as the only valid form of knowledge has led to the destruction of the diversity of ways of producing knowledge. This has consequences at many levels, since, contrary to the hegemonic modern science stances that separate (or hide) epistemology and ontology from politics, the form of producing knowledge and conceiving existence is closely linked to the form of conceiving and organizing relations between humans and non-humans, in a social, economic, spiritual and cultural way.

Therefore, one of these consequences is the deprival by modern science of the way certain groups of people experience the world on their own terms (Santos, 2010). Another consequence, and closely related to the first one, is the impoverishment of the world by this monoculture of knowledge, affecting us all, humanity and non-humanity. To illustrate this, in the first chapter I establish an analogy between a forest as a complex set of interwoven relations and a forest product of the state intervention that implements a monoculture program for economic reasons. This impoverishment of human diversity has reduced our capabilities to respond to common threats that, in different degree, affect all humanity.
To that effect, this thesis proposes to look at the forms of knowledge and existence of these groups that suffer from the imposition of Western epistemes and how they resist and creatively combine them. This thesis proposes to look at these neglected traditions which, not only have value and utility in themselves, but can also provide lessons in the light of dominant economic, political, ecologic paradigms (Comaroff, 2012; Santos, 2010; Gomes, 2012). However, in order to do that, as some scholars have argued, (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; Santos, 2010), the Eurocentric arrogance that has disabled the West to learn from other experiences must be rejected.

How this can be carried out is a question with neither a single nor an easy answer. Thinkers from other disciplines like Raimón Panikkar (1990) or De Sousa Santos (2010) propose dialogue and intercultural translation, to establish first a middle ground where different traditions can meet without one imposing the terms on the others. Santos (2010), who will be one of the main theoretical actors in this thesis, calls for a “counter-hegemonic globalization”, by gathering together social groups and movements whose perspectives have been neglected, and to engage in dialogic and cooperative relations to subvert imbalanced relations.

Dialogue and interdisciplinarity are not alien notions to peace studies and to peace practices. Neither is interculturality. Several authors (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; Galtung, 1996; Dietrich, 1997) have talked about peace in plural to outline the importance of recognizing other voices and understandings of peace besides and beyond the Western concepts and views. Furthermore, the epistemological statute of the discipline has been revised (Galtung, 1996; Martínez Guzmán, 2001) pointing towards the expansion of the inner limits of science, towards a broader, more inclusive notion of scientificity.
However, as Alastair Mcintosh (2012) posits concerning indigenous knowledge, these pose a challenge to the academy. What has been called, indigenous “onto-epistemologies” (MacIntosh, 2012), embodied knowledges that do not separate doing, living, feeling and acting from knowing, challenge many modern dichotomies. The result of this tension has been the incorporation or assimilation into modern science paradigms. Following this line of argument, to ask an indigenous group what is peace for them, writing it down and producing theory, would not it be a Western question? Would not it fall into assimilation or appropriation? I endeavor to explore if cultural recognition in peace studies is accompanied by epistemological recognition.

**Personal motivations**

To situate the motivations of this thesis I could trace back four years ago when I naively found myself in Niger as a part of a development project. My initial ingenuity gradually gave way to a sort of stupor as the blindness and assertive attitude in certain aspects of the development system were revealed to me. This contrasted with what was occurring outside of the offices, where multiple ‘informal’ economic practices, of modes of production and redistribution, of ways of social organization and communication, and of ways to relating to the world, were creatively taking place, not exempt of suffering. That led me to think that rather than teach, I should learn.

That learning commitment was one of the reasons that brought me to this program, which revealed full of enriching and unexpected theoretical and practical experiences. To name two, the critical thinking and the post-colonial aspects of the Philosophy for Peace class raised many questions concerning the awareness or the lack of it, of my position in the world. From the political ecology approach of the Sustainable Development and Environment class, it was revealed to me how politics are implicated in environmental practices, and how other forms of knowledge
originate other practices. Thus, if as it was stated earlier epistemology is politics, I might look at the former to see the roots of other power relations, and of other politics.

At the same time, my come back to Spain, amidst of a not only economic crisis, but also a downturn mood, and a sense of stagnation at different levels, albeit counterpointed by bold mushrooming initiatives, made me reflect on the imagination and creativity that in other contexts is employed to cope with difficult situations.

**Thesis statement**

Peace studies has opened up to other voices and understandings of peace. However, in spite of the epistemological proposals leading to expand the limits of the discipline, the treatment of interculturality may still reflect the dominance of Western modern science. I want to explore how Peace Studies might go beyond the dominant paradigm, based on appropriation and assimilation, towards epistemological recognition, and create spaces for dialogue with other forms of producing knowledge.

**Objectives**

The general objective of this thesis is to inquire on the relation of peace studies with other forms of producing knowledge. This is structured around three specific objectives:

1) To analyze how epistemological and ontological diversity has been dealt in peace Studies.

2) To situate, problematize and promote the debate on the unequal relations between different forms of knowledge within the frame of the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace and peace studies in general.

3) To explore how peace studies can engage in equal dialogues with other understandings of peace beyond the dominant scientific paradigm.
Outline of the thesis

The thesis will be structured into three chapters.

The first chapter establishes the theoretical foundations for the rest of the thesis, and sets the basis for the analysis carried out in the second chapter. Although not exhaustive, it reviews literature in regards to the position of science as the hegemonic form of knowledge, it presents a brief discussion on modernity and modern Western rationality, it inquiries into colonialism and the construction of the other, and confronts the works of several authors concerning the subversion of this dominant relation. It ends by situating peace studies, concretely the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace within the debate. This chapter will be the base upon which the case studies of the following chapter will be built.

The second chapter will start by introducing an important conceptual tool for the analysis. Thereon, the work of four peace scholars will be critically analyzed, focusing on the treatment of interculturality and of non-Westerns understandings of peace. In each case, their epistemological position will be clarified and critically analyzed, to then confront the above mentioned aspects of their work with the theoretical framework of the first chapter and with new theoretical incorporations.

The third chapter proposes a change of mood in the thesis. It delves into Fulani people of Niger, cosmology, practices and beliefs. Why I decided to focus on Fulani, is basically due to the close relationships of my everyday life in what not long ago was a Fulani village, now turned into a neighborhood of Niamey. These interactions resulting from the hospitality by which I was received was accompanied by openness to share many aspects and concerns of their culture. I do not explicitly use personal reflections from those everyday interactions, although my own voice as an author was
certainly influenced by these relations. Moreover, this chapter focuses on Wodaabe Fulani, nomadic herders from the Southeastern region whose presence in the capital city is temporary and as migrant labor, as it is explained in the chapter.

In this chapter, I will first briefly define my position in regards to ethnicity and Fulani identity. Theron, I will particularly focus on certain aspects of their cosmology, economic and social practices, relations with the state and development agents, moral conceptions, ways of dealing with conflict, and their relation with the environment, attachment to the land and their sense of place. At this particular point an homology will be established with other traditions that express similar concerns, namely the Germanic concept *Heimatkunde*, and Aymara cosmology. Finally, the perspective of the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace will be brought into this dialogue.

The last section summarizes the chapters, presents some conclusions, and hints at some possible directions for future research.

**Scope of the research**

In this section I define the limits that I established to define the chapters. However, this section may need to be complemented with the reflections on the limitations provided at the end of the thesis.

Modern science, partly because it lies in its own nature and spirit, has been an object of debate, revision and criticism concerning the epistemological, sociological and political inner limits, and the different forms of practicing science. This has been conducive to overcome old paradigms in regards to theoretical currents, methodologies, the marginalization of certain groups as subjects, the relations with the object of study, the autonomy of the scientist concerning the state, research
agencies and economic institutions (Santos, 2007b). These debates, also present in peace studies, have been fed by the contributions of feminists, social and cultural studies, without forgetting the contributions of disciplines like physics or biology. However, as it has been stated, this thesis in general, and the first chapter in particular, do not intend to deal with these aspects, but proposes a look to the conditions of possibility that led to the exclusivity of science concerning other forms of producing knowledge. How these relations have been established, which dialogic possibilities have been or can be opened.

The second chapter analyzes four cases studies of how interculturality has been dealt from a Western epistemological perspective. The last case study covers the organization Peaceful Societies which publishes his work on the website www.peacefulsocieties.org. It is coordinated by Bruce D. Bonta who gathers the work of other scholars whose contributions form the Encyclopedia of Peaceful societies. The other three cases cover the work of Wolfgang Dietrich, Johan Galtung, and Douglas P. Fry. The selection of these scholars that contribute to peace studies from different disciplinary perspectives, philosophy, sociology, psychology and anthropology responds to the need to provide – within the space and time limitations– a sample that tries to show the broad disciplinary, methodological and epistemological spectrum of peace studies. This is not intended to be considered as exhaustive.

The third chapter focused on Fulani nomadic herders, dedicating special attention certain aspects of Fulani worldview, knowledge and rituals, and its intricacy with their economic, social and ecological practices. The last section of the chapter delved into the relation with the environment and the practices that connect them to the land.
Methodology and theoretical framework

To set the aforementioned objectives this thesis employs a qualitative methodology, based on secondary sources, and out of a critical analysis and discussion of the literature reviewed. This thesis enhances the importance of an interdisciplinary approach.

The literature review on the first chapter is based mainly on post-colonial scholars such as Dipak Chakrabarty (2000), Gayatry Spivak (1998), Enrique Dussel (2000), Ania Loomba (1998), and Santiago Castro-Gómez (2000). Concerning the reconstructive proposals on the debate, I will confront briefly Walter Mignolo’s position with de Sousa Santos’, right after I will extend on the work of the latter. To situate peace scholars within the debate I will draw on the work of Wolfgang Dietrich (1997) and Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2001).

The second chapter will confront the treatment of interculturality by four peace scholars with the theoretical framework of the first chapter. New analytical tools will be added to that effect. Namely, the concept of categorical violence from James Scott, and the work of anthropologists like Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2010), Tim Ingold (2000, 2011), and Alberto Gomes (2012). Furthermore, the work of Edward Said (2012), Vandana Shiva (1988), Ramachandra Guha (1989) will play an important role in certain sections of the critical analysis. Finally, a deductive approach will be followed to draw some conclusions.

For the chapter on Wodabee Fulani I have relied on Fulani texts from their oral tradition (Ba and Dieterlen, 1961; Amougou, 2009), for I considered that these tales, mythologies and poetry have presence in the everyday life through the work of griots, in radio broadcasts or cultural and social events.
Concerning scholar work, I have relied on Fulani scholars such as Salamatou Sow and Iba Fall, whose contributions were relevant to certain aspects dealt in the chapter. There is a considerable literature on Fulani in the fields of anthropology, linguistics and development economics. There is also a considerable quantity of media coverage on Fulani. However, both scholar and media tend to measure Fulani worldviews and practices in the light of Western values, and beliefs and standards. Moreover, certain reveal a tendency either to vilify (Lott and Hart, 1977), or to romanticize (Loftsdottir, 2001) this group of people. Therefore, it has not been an easy task to find literature that present Fulani people as active and autonomous epistemological and ontological subjects. On that basis, I have considered that the anthropological contributions of Kris Loftdottir (2001, 2007), Paul Riesman (1977), Nicholaus Schareika (2010) would meet these requirements.

The section that deals with Heimatkunde was entirely sustained by the contributions of ethnologist Ullrich Kockel, and to a lesser extent, of Egbert Daum (2007). Concerning Aymara cosmology I relied on the work of ethnographer and philosopher Rodolfo Kusch, and his approach to think from indigenous and popular thought, rather than to think about or over it. In the corresponding section of the third chapter I will introduce Kusch methodology in more detail and my position towards it.

**Final considerations**

Philosopher Mogobe Ramose (2013: 213) use the concept Africa “under protest” to refer to how the continent was baptised by Greeks and Romans. What was initially meant to designate the northern part of the continent was extended to the rest of it by means of the “power to dictate the meaning of experience, knowledge and
truth on behalf of others.” Like the father baptises the child, terms like indigenous people denote that power imbalances that allow encompassing multiple experiences into a single category.

This does not only have consequences at the level of signs, like discourse is understood in linguistics. For Foucault (1970) discourse consists in a series of statements and practices that form and limit the object which they refer to. According to the author, discourse lies at the intersection between power and knowledge since it is one of the mechanisms through which a normative and disciplinary power is reproduced and legitimized. Through this discursive power regimes of truth are created, which determine and regulate what is considered to be normal or acceptable, depriving the different as inferior.

Therefore, it is not with discomfort that I unavoidably employ terms like West, non-West, North, South, Europe, or indigenous; terms which imply division and denote the asymmetrical relations that I attempt to bring to the debate. These tensions and contradictions derived from knowledge production can be made visible by a critical use of these terms, and it is by using them that they can be criticized.

I want to precise too that throughout this thesis I employ the concept epistemology to refer to, ways of knowing, and ontology to ways of conceiving existence.

Before delving into the thesis, and since a critique of Eurocentrism is going to be a recurrent element in the first two chapters, I consider that another beforehand precision might be convenient here, since it too raised certain discomfort during the writing process. Firstly, too much focus on criticizing Eurocentrism might definitely place Europe at the center again, which is contrary to the objective that I had set.
Secondly, and related to the first, an excessive anger in the name of others might end up positing my own (self-righteous) voice at the center, which is a Eurocentric deviation. I hope not to have fallen in these traps. Notwithstanding, I do not consider this to be incompatible with connection with other people’s struggles and with denouncing unequal relations, for one of the lessons that I personally draw from the cultural perspectives in this research is the sense of togetherness, that there are things that affects us all.
Chapter I

From monoculture to a polyculture of knowledges

“definitions belong to the definers – not the defined.”

(Toni Morrison, 1987: 190)

Introduction

James C. Scott (1998: 13-21) describes the role of scientific forestry advocated by the early European modern states in facilitating their functions and satisfying their economic purposes of timber production. In the already existing utilitarian view of nature, the multiple possibilities offered by the forest were yet to be narrowed down for the state interests, and reduced to the formula tree equals lumber. Leaving aside the intrinsic value of nature, and the complexity of all the negotiated social uses for pasturage, hunting, fishing, gathering, poaching, sheltering, dwelling, rituals and other symbolic uses, the Prussian and Saxon states pioneered the politics of monoculture by engaging in a systematic plan based on reductionist principles for, first, calculating, planning and designing a forest as productive as possible; and second, by transforming the old, diverse, seemingly chaotic and purportedly inefficient forest into a new forest, rationally ordered, the product of scientists’ and state officials’ imaginary, thus turning reality into abstraction. This standardized laboratory forest whose homogeneity and uniformity considerably simplified the variables to be considered – same age, same size, same species, same distance- was easier to assess, manipulate and manage.

This simplification process facilitated the study and the introduction of the more efficient species for timber production. The commodification of the forest offered, in the short term, successful results in terms of wood production, leading to the expansion of the method to other European countries. However, 100 years
later, after the second generation of trees was planted, the negative consequences of
the monoculture became apparent, and the ecological imbalance affected the yield
to the extent that a new term was coined, *Waldsterben* (dead forest). The
interwoven mesh of relations between fauna, flora, fungi, soil, insects and nutrients
had been ignored and impaired. The reduction of diversity turned the soil and the
ecosystem less resilient, more fragile and vulnerable to pests, stress, disease,
epidemics and weather severities. Apart from the economic losses due to lower
yields production, extra expenses had to be dedicated to fertilizers, insecticides,
fungicide, reintroduction of species, raising, nesting, and restoration practices with
irregular results, and a single objective: to reproduce the lost ecological complexity
and diversity.

Different readings can be made from the above-exposed account, my
intention is to establish an analogy connection between the simplified shaping of
the forest in Western science and the way and the effects of the dominance and
exclusivity of scientific rationality as the only valid form of knowledge. The
resulting landscape could be very similar to that Prussian *Waldsterben*. This
chapter focuses on how the transition from a polyculture of knowledges to the
monoculture of science, via colonial relations, has led to the ignorance and/or
erasure of other forms of knowledge, considered inferior, local, or contextual. This
“epistemicide”, in Boaventura De Sousa Santos (Santos, Nunes and Meneses,
2007b: ixv) words, affect directly certain specific social groups, indigenous,
peasants, mostly non-Western, by dispossessing them of their traditional ways to
perceive, experience, and make sense of the world. Moreover, the consequences of
the reduction of the epistemological diversity have resulted in “orthopedic
thinking” (Santos, 2009:110) –the limitations derived from the analysis of
problems with conceptual tools strange to them— with direct consequences on the whole humankind. Western societies find themselves in the dead-end street of the “dwarfed reason” (McIntosh, 2012) where it is assumed that the way we are living, feeling and known is the only and the right one, with the consequent impoverishment of human existence in political, cultural, social, economic, sexual, ecologic and spiritual ways, by limiting it to the frames of modern science and its rationality.

All along this chapter I will deal with the issues that spring from our impoverished soils, their causes and their consequences. Therefore, I have divided it into four sections.

The first two sections will examine the “conditions of possibility”, that is, the social, historical, cultural and epistemological context (Mudimbe, 1988: 9), which made possible the emergence and universalization of modern science and Western rationality.

The first section will examine Cartesian ontology as the epistemological roots of modern science and Western rationality. The split of body from mind, and human from nature led to a series of dichotomies that undergird Western view of reality. The contribution of Descartes, Newton, Hobbes, considered three of the pillars of European modernity will be discussed.

Starting from the basis that the colonial logic pervades under the forms of imperialism, neo-colonialism or global capitalism, the second section analyzes the colonial construction of the ‘other’. It contextualizes Western rationality and modern science by considering modernity and colonialism as constitutive of each other. With colonialism, the concept of man detached from nature was narrowed down to the European, white male of the Enlightenment. Based on a self-
proclaimed ontological and epistemological superiority, the colonized people were denied of their subjectivity, treated as inferior, and deprived of their own ways of live (Dussel, 2000; Latour, 1993). The role of natural and social sciences in the temporal and racial classification of people will be analyzed, mainly through the work of post-colonial scholars such as Aníbal Quijano (2000), Achille Mbembe (2001) or Gayatri Spivak (1988).

The third section will briefly present the debate on Western rationality and modern science from postmodern and post-colonial perspectives; concretely Walter Mignolo’s view of epistemic de-linking. Finally, I will extend on Boaventura De Sousa Santos’ Epistemologies of the South as a proposal that points towards a common, counter-hegemonic construction of knowledge based on the experiences and forms of knowledge that have been discarded by the imposition of Eurocentric paradigms of modern science.

The last section attempts to situate Peace Studies and the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace within the debate by drawing on the contributions of Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2001, 2009) epistemological shift.

1.1 The Man and the Rest

One of the main characteristics of modern science and Western rationality, starting from the subject/object distinction, is its dualistic character and its binary and dichotomy producing logic (Lander, 2000; Santos, 1992; Castro-Gómez, 2000; Anzaldúa, 1987, Willems-Braun, 1997). This dualistic thinking, origin of separations like mind/matter, human/nature, nature/culture, individual/society, savage/civilization, organic/inorganic, secular/sacred, traditional/modern, local/universal, advanced/backward, individual/society, transcendence/immanence
lie at the roots of the objective and universal character of scientific knowledge. As it will be examined in the next section, these separations are linked to the distinctions between the hegemonic form of knowledge, and that of the subaltern cultures (Lander, 2000: 20).

Lynn White (1967) traces the separation of human from nature, and the consequent exploitation of the latter, back to the Judeo-Christian tradition. However, it was with Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon contributions in the seventeenth-century when this view of nature as an object, an empty space at human disposal, crystallized epistemologically and methodologically. This implied the definitive rupture, initiated a century before during the so-called Scientific Revolution, with Aristotelian and medieval knowledge, and a whole new stance towards the world and life (Santos, 1992:13).

Descartes split between mind and body, reason and matter, depicts an objectified portrait of nature, a functional, mechanistic worldview that situates the man as a reasoning, objective observer apart from it (Apffel-Marglin, 1996; McIntosh, 2012). This “ontological cleft” (Apffel-Marglin, 1996:3) voided the world from any possible meaning, a dead extension, in contrast to the organic worldview that had prevailed until then. As Apffel-Marglin (1996: 3) argues, “The cosmos became what it is for citizens of the modern world, a despiritualized mechanism to be grasped by concepts and representations constructed by reason”. Disengaged from the sacred and from any ethical concerns, the world and the living organisms were to be viewed (by the uninvolved observer) as machines that could be studied and understood by separating its building objects and reducing it to the basic material as if studying the functioning of the clockwork (Capra, 1982: 23). Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez, as quoted in Mignolo
(2009:1), describes this as the “hubris of the zero point”, the detached position where the Enlightenment man situates (hides) himself as the knowing subject from where he classifies, explains and orders the world objectively (to his convenience).

The Cartesian disenchanted concept of the world based on separations, (Lander, 2000: 13) set the epistemological and ontological premises for the decontextualized production of knowledge, a trait of Western rationality not shared by other cultures where different ontological assumptions result in different forms of knowledge (Apffel-Marglin, 1996:7; Ingold, 2000).

At this point, it would perhaps be appropriate to digress in order to briefly present the existence of other cases that differ from Western rationality. Although the aim of this thesis is not to interpret indigenous thought, but, paraphrasing Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2010: 201), to experiment with it, and therefore, with ours, it may be important to turn to other ways of conceiving existence and knowledge that might allow us to de-reify the claims for objectivity and universality of Western rationality (Lander, 2000:12). Georg Lukács (1971) uses the term reification to refer to the process by which things are made to look as natural, hiding other implications.

Carlos Lenkersdorf’s (1996) study of Tojolabal cosmology through their language shows what he defines as an intersubjective language, without subordination resulting from the subject/object distinction. For example, the English sentence ‘I told you’, in Tojolabal would be expressed as ‘I told. You listened’. Instead of the subject-object English construction, the Mayan language implies two subjects and two actions that complement each other. The object, the thing said is not expressed since it is implicit in the verbs used. The two subjects are at the same time active and passive, the one who talks listens to the listener, and
the listener talks to the talker. The importance of listening is enhanced in Tojolabal culture regarding respect for the other, learning from it, and fostering the sense of community over the individual. This sense of the communal appears when using the first person plural pronoun to talk about nature.

Oyéronké Oyewùmí (1997; quoted in Lugones, 2000: 8) argues that before colonization, Yoruba society had not a dualistic gender distinction to organize society hierarchically. The mistranslation of their terms obinrin and okunrin into the English female and male respectively, implied a binary opposition of gender that did not exist until then. The introduction of the concept of women as opposed to men, was used by the colonial machinery to remove women from the public sphere, by attributing them the role that women had in the metropolis.

Tim Ingold accounts of hunter-gatherer societies show how their relation to nature differs from Western rationality by not separating between an external reality which has to be deciphered and codified by the mind “as a precondition for effective action” (Ingold, 2000: 42). For the Objiwa people, the formation of the self and that of the environment are part of the same process. To know a person does not mean to go into his mind, but to go out in the world. The self is not conceived as locked in a body that gathers information of its surroundings, but “as a being in the world, caught up in an ongoing set of relationships with components of the lived-in environment” (Ingold, 2000: 100; italics in the original). In relation to this, the author outlines the importance of dreaming for the production of knowledge since, rather than a break from reality, it represents an extension of this open up to the world ontology, it implies complete freedom to wander through the spaces that define everyday life (Ingold, 2000: 101-102).
Anthropologist Eduardo Viveiro de Castro (2010: 34, 54) posits the inadequacy of the nature/culture dichotomy, and all the binary distinctions that spring from it, when considering non-Western cosmologies. The author coined the term multinaturalism, in contrast to multiculturalism, to refer to Amerindian thought. Whereas multinaturalism starting point is the unity of nature and the multiplicity of cultures –grounded on the universality and objectivity of body and matter, and the subjectivity of meanings respectively– the Amerindians conceive the unity of the spirit and the diversity of bodies. The unity of spirit comes from the Amerindian understanding that everything that exists can be considered as thinking, as a “cosmological subject”, it exists, therefore it thinks. If transposed to Western thought, in multinaturalism culture would be universal, and nature would represent the particular.

The Yoruba, Tojolobal and Objiwa relational sense of the self, connecting knowledge with Being, engaging with the environment instead of detaching from it, contrast sharply with Cartesian reductionism. This becomes relevant because of the exclusionist character of the latter supported by its claim for certainty, objectivity, and a value-free science (Capra, 1982:95). In spite of its cultural specificity (Apffel-Marglin, 1996: 9), modern science denied rationality to any other form that does not respect its epistemological principles and methodological rules (Santos, 1992:13). It also promoted the distinction between the non-expert and the expert as the only legitimate knowledge-holder (Shiva, 1988: 88).

By stating the cultural specificity of scientific rationality I am not making a claim for cultural relativism, I intend, as Chakrabarty (2000: 43) posits, “a matter of documenting how—through what historical process—‘its reason’, which was not always self-evident to everyone, has been made to look obvious far beyond the
ground where it originated.” The aim is to point at the logic and the elements that led to the expansion and subsequent naturalization of European rationality. The claimed superiority of the emerging model over the rest was materialized through the convergence of a series of political, cultural, and economic processes which will be dealt with the next section in this chapter.

As it was mentioned above, Francis Bacon was another important figure in the ‘othering’ of nature, whose contributions, together with Descartes, resulted in nineteenth-century positivism. In his search of the human as “the master and the owner of nature” (Santos, 1992:13), Bacon developed a scientific method to free the observer from the inherent constraints of human condition. Based on observation, induction of axioms, and testing the results for further observations, Bacon designed a mechanical process to go from the particular to the general without the interference of the observer’s characteristics’ (Bajaj, 1988:19-23).

The synthesis of Bacon’s inductive empirical method, Descartes deductive and mechanistic worldview, and the previous findings of the Scientific Revolution was achieved by Newtonian mechanical physics. The codification of the laws of the universe reinforced the position of mathematics as the universal language for analysis and representation, and reaffirmed the view of the universe as an extension, a quantifiable, passive, ordered object. This theory of the universe became the model to be followed by natural sciences during the Enlightenment, and in its turn, for social scientists in the nineteenth century (Capra, 1982: 48-52). Another important point of rupture with Aristotelian thought was that produced by the work of Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes, a move was needed from the state of nature to civil society. If nature represented the irrational, anarchy, myth, chaos, dreams and fantasies, civil society is based on science, rationality, order, and
stability. This move would be provided by the state or the sovereign through a contract with its citizens where the former has the monopoly of violence, providing peace and security in exchange of the natural rights (Visvanathan, 1988: 99-100).

For Shiv Visvanathan (1988), the importance of Hobbes thought lies in his view of society as a scientific project. By linking science with society, the origin of society does not lie in a contract but in a theorem, “the state as the source of ultimate power does not antedate science; it is coterminous with science. In that sense, science is the civics of the Hobbesian world. To be is to be scientific, and to become in every sense of the term a subject and citizen” (Visvanathan, 1988:100).

The order/anarchy dichotomy and its relation to nature and society would become one of the pillars for the subsequent construction of other dualisms regarding progress, development, knowledges, and civilization. This dichotomy still pervades in the assumptions of the main currents of disciplines like International Relations (Grovogui, 2006: 85), so it does in the contemporary imaginary derived from the naturalization of science (Lander, 2000: 22).

The set of divisions explored so far constitute what Bruno Latour (1993: 99) calls the “Internal Great Divide”, that between human and non-humans. Western unique separation of nature from culture, and science from society, will be used to differentiate, and classify humans hierarchically, “the External Great Divide”, which will be covered in the next section.

1.2 The dark sides of modernity

The epistemological confidence of the seventeenth-century conflated with a series of processes and changes taking place in European society at economic, cultural, political, religious, and scientific levels that were breaking with the culture of the time, setting the frames for capitalism and the imperialist expansion. What
has been called modernity it is a much contested concept in terms of definition, chronology, main features, and the form and spaces that it covered.

Some authors talk about modernities, in plural, to refer to the different cultural and material interactions that the encounter with the West has provoked, a variety of responses, contingencies, temporalities and spatialities, resulting in a plurality of modernities (Appadurai, 1996; Chakrabarty, 2000; Willems-Braun, 1997; Lander, 2000; Comaroff, 2012; Santos, Nunes and Meneses 2007; Grovogui, 2006).

Wolfgang Dietrich and Wolfgang Sützl (1997:283) define modernity from an Euro-centered point of view as “the societal project characterized by Newtonian physics, Cartesian reductionism, the nation state of Thomas Hobbes, and the capitalist world system.”

For this chapter, I will use a post-colonial perspective due to its concern with the dominant discourse of the West, and the special attention it dedicates to such questions as who produces knowledge, in which context, and to whom is addressed (Santos 2007a: 44). Post-colonial Studies, although difficult to define due to its heterogeneity, focus on the effects of colonialism, and the cultural, discursive, epistemological and political remnants in current social, and cultural practices (Willems-Braun, 1997:3). The post-colonial project questions Western assumptions of moral superiority which have served to justify past and present power relations; it deconstructs the centrality of the West as a political and cultural authority, and the role played by its knowledge which constituted an integral part of colonialism (Omar, 2008: 228).

From a post-colonial standpoint, Castro-Gómez (2000), emphasizes the relation between modernity and colonialism as constitutive of each other. Enrique
Dussel (2000: 43-46) stands for a reconsideration of the concept of modernity and criticizes the dominant view as a parochial, Eurocentric stance on modernity. The author proposes a broader view of the modern world not only limited to the events taking place within Europe. The intra-European side of modernity based on rationality had its counterpoint in an extra-European process characterized by the violence and irrationality legitimized by the first one. Dussel posits that the XVI century did not imply a rupture with the Middle Age, but the beginning of the world history, started with the Portuguese and Spanish expansion, where Europe locates itself at the center of it and the rest at its periphery. This ethnocentric position of Europe distinguished itself from other ethnocentrisms by its universalist claim. In the same line, Santos, Nunes and Meneses (2007:55), argue that the regulation/emancipation dialectics constitutive of modernity only took place within metropolitan societies, the colonized ones could only opt between the violence of repression and that of assimilation:

The dominant versions of the paradigm of modernity turned the infinite into an obstacle to overcome: the infinite is the infinite zeal to overcome it, controlling it, taming it, reducing it to finite proportions. Thus, infinitude, which from the outset ought to arouse humility, becomes the ultimate foundation of the triumphalism underlying the hegemonic rationality, that of orthopedic thinking (Santos, 2009:114).

The lack of humility and its etymological relation to human that relates both to the earth, the ground (Martínez Guzmán, 2009: 28) might be the starting point. The epistemological confidence showed by Descartes, Bacon, and Newton, turned into the arrogance and self-consciousness of the universalist project (Apffel-Marglin, 1996; Grovogui, 2006; Santos, 2007a, 2009, 1992).

In order to accomplish this universalizing mission, which has taken different forms –civilization, evangelization, modernization, development, globalization– (Lander, 2000) Europe was culturally and ideologically constructed as a mythic,
unified, eternal West built on the pillars of a shared race, religion, an intellectual tradition, and the figure of ‘other’ (Amin, 1989:166). Western teleology exemplified by Kant, Hegel, Locke, Montesquieu, posited the moral, political and historical unity of Europe despite its internal conflicts (Grovogui, 2006: 115).

Its counterpart, the ‘other’, is fictionalized in negative terms. The ‘other’, as Achille Mbembe (2001:4) points in regards to the discourse on Africa,

stands out as the supreme receptacle of the West’s obsession with, and circular discourse about, the facts of ‘absence,’ ‘lack,’ and ‘non-being’, of identity and difference, of negativeness—in short, of nothingness.

The problem lies not only in that the West portrayed itself “as other than the other”, (Mbembe, 2001: 4) but also, more importantly, in that
to differ from something or somebody is not simply not to be like (in the sense of being identical or being-other); it is also not to be at all (non-being). More, it is being nothing (nothingness) (Mbembe, 2001: 4; italics in the original).

Fanon’s zone of nonbeing, “an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval can be born” (Fanon, 1967: 20), is also rescued by Santos (2007b) in his abyssal thinking, a system of visible and invisible distinctions that create a line that separates the two sides, the hegemonic from the nonexistent. The abyssal thinking requires a sociology of absences, this will be covered in the next section dedicated to the author’s proposals.

The process of othering was grounded on ontological and epistemological reasons. As it was hinted in the previous section, the Internal Great Divide “accounts for the External Great Divide” (Latour, 1993:99). The ability to distinguish nature from culture, and science from society is used to separate the Western from the other, it defines the premodern/modern distinction. The premodern cannot separate thing from sign, “what comes from Nature as it is from
what their cultures require” (Latour, 1993:99). The premodern lives trapped in that ‘confusion’, whereas the modern has liberated itself from the social and the language through scientific knowledge (Latour, 1993:99-100). In short, the non-Western, the other, is defined by its ontological and epistemological inferiority, which is instrumentalized to justify and legitimize the universalist project (Lander, 2000; Grovogui, 2006, Spivak, 1988). From the original dichotomy mind/ matter, the Man and the Rest explained in the previous section, with colonialism and the worldwide expansion of capitalism and Western rationality, the concept of man as *humanitas* was narrowed down to the modern, Christian, ‘rational’, liberal, capitalist. The European male of the Enlightenment, its moral, its religion, its knowledge, its history and its institutions, becomes the reference, Eurocentrism par excellence (Loomba, 1998:66).

Gayatri Spivak (1988) used the term epistemic violence to refer to the construction of the colonial subject as the other. The violence and domination of the colonial and the neocolonial project is supported and legitimated by the superiority of Western knowledge. The imposition of a dominant form of knowledge denies the validity of any other form of knowledge, dispossessing different groups of people of their own worldviews. In this process of designing what counts as knowledge and who produces it, Europe becomes the explicative subject, whereas the other is turned into an object to be explained (Omar, 2008: 147). Related to epistemic violence, Spivak (1985) coined the term *worlding* to emphasize the way Western knowledge represents, and constitute the world as if it was an empty space, a “mere uninscribed earth, anew, by obliging (…) to domesticate the alien as Master” (Spivak, 1985: 253). To illustrate this, Spivak (1988) provides the example of the codification of the Hindu law by British
scholars “as an alien legal system masquerading as law as such, an alien ideology established as the only truth, and a set of human sciences busy establishing the "native" as self-consolidating other (...)” (Spivak, 1985:250).

In Peace Studies, Johan Galtung (1990: 291) coined the term cultural violence to refer to “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence”. As Sidi Omar (2008: 146) argues, these concepts cannot be used interchangeably since cultural violence focuses on culture in general, and epistemic violence entails specific social and historical events and realities.

In this construction of the other, time plays a key role. Spaces existing outside of Europe were organized through the “ideological device of time” (Grovogui, 2006: 54). The cultural distance between the West and the colonized was measured by historical time. Civilization was the barometer that placed the rest on the waiting room of history. Disregarding the spatial dimension, it was assumed that humanity had evolved through a single continuum of time starting from prehistory that had reached its developmental peak during Western Enlightenment and the nineteenth century (Chakrabarty, 2000; Grovogui, 2006; Lander, 2000). Anthropologist Johannes Fabian (1983:31) called denial of coevalness, to the “persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse.” In other words, the anthropologist and the object of its discourse exist in a separate historical time. This has had clear political implications in the construction of the savage, the primitive, the indigenous, the lowest step in the scale of human evolution (Castro-Gómez, 2000). By means of the denial of coevalness modern
Europe became the geographical and temporal center (Lander, 2000; Chakrabarty, 2000; Grovogui, 2006; Fabian, 1983). The reduction of the space to a single temporal frame is linked to the idea of progress and, therefore, to scientific rationality. The Western modern project, from the watchtower of its central position and the authority endowed by scientific rationality, assigned itself the mission to ‘liberate’ these “contemporary ancestors” from their own pasts (Visvanathan, 1998: 101).

The colonial order entailed a reconfiguration of knowledges, languages, economies and imaginaries. Founded on a particular epistemology, the West neglected other conceptions of time, space, sovereignty, and territoriality (Grovogui, 2006; Lander, 2000). As Edward Said (1978: 62-63) argues, approaches to self and others, and stereotypes about races, cultures and civilizations existed before colonization. The enhancement of the difference of these stereotypes, the us/them logic, was not reduced with the objectivity of science, but reinforced and reshaped (Loomba, 1998: 57-60). Colonization entailed a simultaneous reordering and misrepresentation obeying to the dialectics of materialism and ideology (Loomba, 1998: 57, 113). Mary Louise Pratt (1992) as quoted in Loomba (1998: 61) argues that from the eighteenth-century on, “science came to articulate Europe’s contacts with the imperial frontier, and to be articulated by them”. The hierarchical classification of people according to race was one of the foundational principles of the colonial project. From this “new planetary consciousness” (Loomba, 1998:61) which drove Linnaeus to his systematical classification of plants, in 1770 J. F. Blumebach engaged in a classificatory project of human beings on the basis of their physiological traits. The claimed superiority of white man was reaffirmed by his use of the monogenetic theory of the human origin that dates the
beginning of man back to the white Caucasian man, considering other races as degenerations of this single origin (Young, 1995: 62). Partially due to the assumed objectivity and value-free of science, to the identity of the scientists themselves and their attachment to the European, and to the lack of access to science of the labeled as inferior, the absence of scientific opposition allowed the consolidation and naturalization of the racial paradigm (Loomba, 1998: 64). Scientific rigor was left aside, in theory and practice, in favor of the political and social agenda (Grovogui, 2006: 34). According to Anthony Padgen (1993; quoted in Grovogui, 2006: 34), “scientists easily stepped outside of reigning scientific norms and wisdom when questions of race culture, and civilization implicated the relationship between the West and the Rest.” Anne Laura Stoler (2008) argues that colonial agents relied more on sentiments and emotional elements, than on science and systematical observation. Attachment, resentment, pity, or disdain, were assigned to the treatment of specific social groups as part of the classification process.

Mudimbe (1988:32) distinguishes between two kinds of ethnocentrism, the ideological and the epistemological, both inseparably linked. The ideological refers to the intellectual and behavioral attitude of the individual. The epistemological is linked to an episteme, understood in the Foucauldian sense, as a set of theory that is established as the dominant, setting aside others considered as inferior (Omar, 2008: 145). In sum, ethnocentrism emerges from the complexity of the interaction of the scholar's individual consciousness, the prevailing scientific views, and the values and norms of the society. The model of natural sciences plus the imperialist ideology shaped the epistemological core of nineteenth-century social sciences (Mudimbe, 1988). As had been done with other life forms, human behavior and cultures were removed from their environment and “rewoven into European-based
patterns of global unity and order” (Pratt, 1992; quoted in Loomba, 1998: 61). Disciplines like history, philology, anthropology, linguistics and biology contributed to the “reification of the primitive”, and to the epistemological superiority of Europe, by assigning “to things and beings both their natural slots and social mission” (Mudimbe, 1988: 30). For Mudimbe (1988:32), the conditions of possibility of social sciences lie in its intrinsic link to Eurocentrism, considered by the author as “both its virtue and its weakness”.

Claude Lévi-Strauss (1973; quoted in Mudimbe (1988) thought that through the study of cultural diversity it was possible to overcome ideology and refute the falsehoods imposed by it. Derrida (1976, in Morton, 2002: 32) criticizes Lévi-Strauss’s portrayal of South American tribes as romanticized, recreating the noble savage stereotype, and ignoring the complexity of their practices. Starting from Lévi-Strauss, Derrida extends his critique to Western critical theory’s use of non-Western societies to illustrate the limits of western knowledge. However, these societies are represented as mute, passive, mere objects of Western representation without culture or history.

1.3 Beyond epistemic violence

Epistemic violence needs to be addressed in two simultaneous ways, the revision of the internal plurality of science, and the external plurality of science, the relation of science with non-scientific knowledges (Santos, 2007b: 46).

Social and natural sciences, as part of their constant self-questioning process, have overcome old paradigms, theoretical models of scientificity, methodologies, and attitudes. The blurring of some protective inner barriers has erased the reductionist view of science as a unified single epistemological model. The consideration of science as a construction associated with social and cultural
practices has led to the acceptance of the situatedness and partiality of scientific knowledge. The relation of science with power structures of domination and exclusion of subjects, with institutions, entities and economic interests has also been put into question (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007).

The debate on the external boundaries of science, the recognition of cultural and epistemological diversity, other forms of producing knowledge, has been opened up, mostly, by postmodern, feminists and postcolonial thinkers (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007; Gorovogui, 2006).

As it has been shown in the previous section, the colonial military, political, social and cultural domination was linked to the epistemological exclusivism of science. The legacy of the colonial order and the Eurocentric teleology pervades today under different, political, social, and economic forms and relations, and therefore, its epistemological supremacy. Instead of civilization, evangelization and modernization, Grovogui (2006: 33) argues that, “[t]oday the barometers of reason and legitimacy in Western eyes are liberalism, secularism, democracy, rule of law on governance, property and human rights.”

Postmodernism emerges as a contestation of Western rationality from a spirit of doubt, disillusionment and disbelief in the modern construction of thought (Dietrich and Sützl, 1997: 282-184). It implies a rejection of the big narratives of peace, justice, order, equality, eternal truths, and the power structures embedded in modernity.

Postmodernism questions the fixity of identities, and the social construction of categories like gender, class, and ethnicity, and all the modern referents leading towards emancipation (Grovogui, 2006: 49-52; MacIntosh, 2012); it denies the
universalist ideology underlying modernity and the lineal development of history expressed through concepts such as progress, modernization, and development.

Rather than the modern erasure of differences, postmodern thought opens up spaces for the production of difference, heterogeneity and plurality, and represents an opportunity to a multiplicity of narratives against the centrality of modernity (Castro-Gómez, 2000; Chakrabarty. 2000; Quayson, 2000). Postmodern thinking is grounded on an anti-essentialist, constructivist epistemology (Santos, 2007a: 45). Deconstruction is one of the main theoretical tools employed by postmodern thinkers for critical analysis. For Spivak (Morton, 2002: 32, 39), deconstruction has ethical and political implications since it allows the intellectual to analyze damage caused on the subaltern by political representation.

However, postmodern thought has been criticized by its excessive focus on European modernity. This European standpoint ignores and generalizes other modernities, without acknowledgement of the power relations that affected identity formation, and the subjectivity of non-European (Groogogui, 2006; Quayson, 2008).

The doubt and disillusion that Dietrich and Stülz mentioned are viewed from a ‘Third World’ academics as disengagement and remoteness, as a sign of “Western malaise which breeds angst and despair instead of aiding political action and resistance” (Loomba, 1998: xii). For Santos (2007a: 42), the postmodern attempt to rupture with modernity incurs in a basic contradiction since it is grounded on the critical tradition embedded in modernity; the trap of solipsism as pointed by Raimon Panikkar (2010; quoted in McIntosh, 2012: 44):

Like modernists, some influential postmodernists get trapped in the solipsism - the circular self-referentiality - of their own rationality because they cannot accept the possibility of ways of knowing that go beyond their own ego control and require opening up to the Mythos within which Logos itself sits.
The postmodern claim of the end of the modern metanarratives is in itself another metanarrative (Santos, 2007a). Castro Gomez (2000) warns about the end of the metanarratives if it implies that the emergence of the micro-narratives make invisible the power relations within the current global capitalist system rather than putting an end to it.

Dussel (2000), as it was covered in the previous section, deconstructs the dominant Eurocentric versions of modernity which do not take into account colonization. For Dussel, to dismantle the myth of modernity implies to deny its innocence, to discover its violence and irrationality. By unveiling the Eurocentric dimension and the fallacy of the modernization project it is possible overcome the view of the emancipatory reason as liberation and transcend modernity. Dussel does not reject reason in itself, but the Eurocentric, hegemonic and irrational reason. He calls for a Transmodernity, a subsumed, and redefined modernity as a worldwide project of liberation of otherness, “a multiplicity of decolonial critical responses to Euro-centered modernity from the subaltern cultures and epistemic location of colonized people around the world” (Grosfoguel, 2008:17).

Walter Mignolo (2002, 2009) focuses on the implications for knowledge production of Dussel’s proposal. Mignolo draws from Aníbal Quijano’s concept of the colonality of power and knowledge, to which I will briefly discuss before proceeding on to examining Mignolo’s view on epistemic Eurocentrism.

For Quijano (2000), the previously mentioned racial hierarchy that structured the power relations of colonialism pervades the current global capitalist world. This “element of colonality” (Quijano, 2000: 533), which places white man at the top of the pyramid, serves as the axis that sustains the matrix of power and the current Eurocentric domination in economic, cultural, social, linguistic, spiritual, sexual
and epistemic aspects. For Grosfoguel (2008: 7), these aspects are not additive, but constitutive of the European modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system.

Departing from Dussel and Quijano, Mignolo (2002, 2009) proposes to think from the colonial difference. The colonial difference is characterized by the denial of the ability of non-Western societies to produce knowledge on Western terms. It is from this colonial disinherited that “An-Other paradigm” can emerge. For him, the history of knowledge is determined historically and geographically. Specific languages, institutions and geo-histories lie behind the origin of the imperial knowledge considered as universal, hence the necessity to question the foundations of who produces and controls knowledge. To de-colonize knowledge implies not a mere disciplinary or interdisciplinary critical thinking, but a shift of the locus of enunciation. It is through the geopolitics of knowledge and epistemic disobedience that a “de-linking” from the imperial knowledge and from the matrix of power is possible.

For sociologist Gregor McLennam (2013: 129), rather than theoretical arguments, many of Mignolo’s claims are closer to sociology of knowledge. Santos (2007a: 53-54) argues that Mignolo’s critique is founded on geographical determinism rather than on theoretical contents. A situated knowledge cannot be based exclusively on geographical determinism. For Santos, the idea of a total rupture as proposed by Mignolo’s An-Other Paradigm is idiosyncratic of Western modern reason, which considered itself as the main actor in rejecting and breaking with what is labeled as alien. Moreover, to emphasize exteriority instead of promoting theoretical bonds and understanding reinforces the modern distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Even the idea of an absolute exteriority from which Mignolo departs is put into question when considered dialectically, since the
exteriority is subjected to its exclusion from within the system of domination. For Santos the focus must be brought into the difference between the oppressor and the oppressed, and not into the differences between those contesting oppression.

Western thought is as indispensable as inadequate to understand and transform the world (Chakrabarty, 2000; Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007). It is this inadequacy, hidden behind the naturalization imposed by the hegemonic canon of modernity that has led to the rigidity of orthopedic thinking and the uncertainties of our time. The necessity to open up the canon of knowledge and to establish a dialogic relation with other ways of producing knowledge, to learn with and from these other ways, is the line of argument in De Sousa Santos thinking which will be presented in the next section.

1.3.1 A Common Construction of Knowledge

De Sousa Santos thought runs parallel to that of postmodern and post-colonial scholars, converging and diverging on certain points in their critique of modernity, and of the way that colonial logic underlies the current imperialist relations. Santos (2011:16) proposal of the Epistemologies of the South starts from two premises: The first one is that the cultural diversity of the world, the different modes of experiencing, thinking, acting, relating and making sense of it are infinite. The second premise is that the understanding of the world surpasses Western knowledge. There are many possible ways to live in the world and to transform it that are unthinkable and unimaginable for Western thought, hence the need for a common construction of knowledge (Santos, 2011:17). However, in order to do this, the West has to free itself from the colonial arrogance that has made impossible for it to learn from and with others. Western narcissism has led to its own stagnation and exhaustion. This does not mean to delink or dismiss certain
kind of knowledge but to engage in a dialogue with other forms of producing knowledge where the West is placed as a province of the world (Santos, 2009).

In Santos’ proposal (2007b), rather than rejecting the concept of social emancipation as a political and ethical aspiration because of its Western, modern origin, the author proposes a reinvention of it. Although the West hid the relation between epistemology, ontology and politics, it is not possible to rethink social emancipation without epistemological changes (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: xlviii). To that end, the infinitude of experiences, of ways of making sense of the world cannot be reduced to any general theory. This is what Santos (2007b: 63) calls “negative universalism”, the impossibility to grasp the diversity of the world, its processes and changes, from a universal theory. To avoid the monocultural trap of universal concepts for social emancipation, and the resulting subordination or assimilation to it, Santos posits, the job of translating the different projects of social emancipation is needed in order to create intelligibilities between the plurality of social groups and movements that with their partial, emancipatory projects, form the counter-hegemonic globalization. The work of translation, as it will be explained later, “seeks to turn incommensurability into difference, a difference enabling mutual intelligibility among the different projects of social emancipation” (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: xl). According to De Sousa Santos (2011), the fore-mentioned exhaustion of Western thought manifests itself under two forms, the lack of alternatives, and the crisis of the Eurocentric critical theory.

Concerning the lack of alternatives for social emancipation, Santos (2010:35) argues that modern remedies cannot transform modern problems. The financial crisis we are currently submerged in is just one more symptom of the problems of the West. The most worrying concern is the lack of political imagination regarding
the capitalist system and its underlying monocultural epistemic foundations. Philosopher Mark Fisher (2009) states that today it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. The crisis of imagination has led to an ideological blockage reflected in distopic thought like Fisher’s. What socialism represented in the 20th century has not a clear equivalent nowadays; post-capitalist and post-occidental initiatives emerging in certain contexts are still in embryonic stage and have not defined their direction (De Sousa, 2011:13). The current thought is more easily expressed in negative terms than in a constructive one, it is easier to know what we are against than to define a desired world (Santos, 2011: 9-12). For Santos (2007b, 2011:16) what is needed are not alternatives, but an alternative way to think about alternatives. Since these are already there. There are other concepts of time, other ways to look at the past, the present and the future, to relate to other humans, to nature and to the sacred, different forms to organize life collectively, and different economies; however, this diversity has been made invisible by the hegemonic thought. To activate and visualize these experiences without enclosing them in universal general theories is to look for plural ways of constructing knowledge.

The second manifestation, closely related to the first one, is the crisis of the Eurocentric critical theory. To be aware of it does not imply to reject it or ignore it, but to take distance from it, and get closer to silenced, subaltern positions either Western or non-Western (Santos, 2010:37). De Sousa Santos (2011, 2010) formulates this argument around four main lines:

We live in a time of strong questions and weak answers. Strong questions address “the roots and foundations that have created the horizon of possibilities among which it is possible to choose”, whereas weak answers “are the ones that
refuse to question the horizon of possibilities”. The professionalization and institutionalization of modern science as the privileged form of knowledge has detached itself from basic questions which human beings have asked themselves: the meaning of life, the relation to God, to other human and non-human beings, to nature, the coexistence within society, or questions about a common future in a more just and egalitarian society. This detachment has led to orthopedic thinking (Santos, 2009:110).

Another sign of the crisis lies in the contradiction between the urgency for a change, and its consequent demand for quick measures, and the slow pace that a long-term deep civilizational change requires, since we are dealing with mentalities, values, ways of living and coexisting. For example, this is manifested in a number of institutions agencies, summits, and programs to eradicate poverty, famine, or to fight global warming (Santos, 2011: 14).

A third aspect is what De Sousa (2011, 2010), calls the loss of nouns. By that he refers to how critical theory limits itself by adding adjectives to overturn the meaning of nouns used by liberal thought. Substantives like socialism, class struggle, fetishism, alienation, reification were important elements of critical theories’ discourse. However, critical theory has lost the nouns in favor of the adjectives. Terms like sustainable development, intercultural human rights, radical democracy or subaltern cosmopolitanism may serve as examples. Substantives frame the terms of the debate and determine what exists, what is sayable, possible, and believable, at the same time that determine what is unsayable, impossible and unbelievable (Santos, 2010:30). Nouns have no property, counter-hegemonic movements have used and subverted hegemonic instruments for their own
purposes, but critical theory should be aware of the limitations that it implies (Santos, 2011:15).

The last symptom of the current situation of Eurocentric critical theory refers to the distance between theory and praxis. Santos (2010, 2011) argues that while the Eurocentric critical theory emerged in a few European countries, a view shared by some post-colonial scholars (Mignolo, 2009; Dussel, 2000), the most innovative and progressive advances are taking place far away from these countries, and are being carried out by actors and social movements different from the alternatives foreseen by critical theorists; women, queer, indigenous people, unemployed, peasants, the distance is not only geographical and contextual but also epistemological. Much of these groups and movements forms of knowledge, and existence were not based on the scientism of the Western theories (De Sousa, 2010: 33).

The Epistemologies of the South is a call for other practices, ideas, experiences and forms of knowledge that have been silenced, discarded, marginalized and turned into nonexistent. These knowledges come from groups of people that have been systematically oppressed by capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy, which have been deprived from experiencing the world on their own terms because they do not fit in the hegemonic paradigms of orthopedic thinking (Santos, 2009, 2010, 2011). It is a call to re-think and re-imagine another future, and a call to re-place modern science, and Europe, in a world of infinite particularisms (Goody, 2007; Santos, 2009). In sum, the aim is to establish new relations between different kinds of knowledges, scientific and non-scientific, where the premises of these dialogues are not pre-conditioned by the West (Santos, 2010, 2011).
Before continuing, it may be needed to specify the term South on Santos approach, since it can be interpreted in multiple ways. The South and its relational pair, the North may run the risk of recreating the discourse of the West and the Rest (Hall, 1992), of two monolithic entities, constructed unidirectionally, and binary opposed, where difference is used to legitimate inequalities. The South for Santos is not the geographical south as in Raewyn Connell’s (2007) approach. In De Sousa Santos proposal (2011: 16), the South is not understood geographically, but in a metaphorical way. It is a metaphor of the inequality, the suffering and the injustice caused by the fore-mentioned hegemonic structures. The South is anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and anti-colonialist. As John and Jean Comaroff (2012) also point, there are no clear boundaries between the North and the South, the limits are porous and illegible, there is South in the North, and there is North in the South (Comaroff, 2012; Santos, 2010, 2011). A sense of commonality, as opposed to division, of the problems confronting human condition, is implied in this nuance.

There are, and have been, social groups, movements and thinkers in the North that have been excluded “because they did not conform to the imperialist and Orientalist objectives prevailing after the convergence of modernity and capitalism” (De Sousa, 2009:106). It is the claim “for the exclusivity of the rigor” of Northern epistemologies, and the resulting cognitive injustice, that brings about the need for the Epistemologies of the South (Santos, 2011: 16).

In order to identify and recover these experiences of the world constructed as non-existing, De Sousa (2009, 2010, 2011) proposes two empirical processes, a sociology of absences and a sociology of emergences.

As it was stated in the previous section, the colonial order established an “abyssal line” (Santos, 2010, 2007c) to separate the metropolis from the colonies,
agreements and rights were applied on one side of the line separating the included from the excluded on the basis of the legitimacy of the universal. The sociology of absences seeks an expansion of the present by making visible what has been made invisible (Santos, 2011: 5); it points to show that what has been constructed as non-existent, has actively been constructed as non-existent. The author distinguishes five modes of Eurocentric absence construction: the ignorant, the backward, the inferior, the local, and the unproductive; resulting respectively from the monocultures of knowledge, of lineal time, of the naturalization of difference, of the dominant scale, and of the capitalist criteria of productivity (Santos, 2010: 37).

The sociology of emergences consists in a look into the future through the practices that are taking place in the present. To explain this, De Sousa Santos (2010:41) draws from Ernst Bloch (1986) the concept of “Not-Yet” in his critique of the stillness, that, according to Bloch, characterizes Western thought. The Not-Yet is a “‘forward dawning and pre-appearance (...) Every age contains its horizon, its Front over which this Not-Yet-Conscious flows when the block of static and regressive thinking is lifted” (Bloch, 1986: xxix). Thus, the sociology of emergences attempts to extend “this Front by venturing beyond, by inventing, visualizing the possibilities of the world that is coming over the threshold” (Bloch, 1995: xxix). The Not-Yet is the future hinted at by the concrete possibilities and capacities of the present. Therefore, the sociology of emergences acts upon the horizon of possibilities, knowledges, practices, and agents of the present, in order to increase the probability of hope (Santos, 2010: 41).

The ecology of knowledge and the intercultural translation are the two procedures by means of which the aforementioned horizon of capabilities and possibilities will be expanded. (Santos, 2011: 18).
The ecology of knowledges is “an invitation to the promotion of non-relativistic dialogues among knowledges, granting ‘equality of opportunities’ to the different kinds of knowledge” (Santos, Nunes and Menses, 2007: xx). It re-places the monoculture of science within the polyculture of knowledges as a step towards the reinvention of social emancipation. It implies a decolonizing and democratizing move that takes knowledge regarded as regulation, to knowledge regarded as emancipation (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: li):

Knowledge-as-regulation knows through a trajectory that goes from ignorance, regarded as disorder, to knowledge described as order, while knowledge as emancipation knows through a trajectory that goes from ignorance, conceived of as colonialism, to knowledge conceived of as solidarity.

The principle that sustains the dialogue is that any form of knowledge is not complete, autonomous or self-sufficient in itself. Therefore, “[a]ll ignorance is ignorant of a certain knowledge, and all knowledge is the overcoming of a particular ignorance” (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: xlvii). The idea of prudence and humility underlies this principle, the recognition that there is more than one form of knowledge, and therefore, of ignorance, in the way human beings relate to each other and with nature, and that to learn from others does not imply to reject your own knowledge (Santos, 2010: 44).

The aim of the ecology of knowledges is not to give equal validity to all knowledges, but to look for “a pragmatic discussion of alternative criteria of validity” (Santos, 2007a: xlix). After rejecting universalism, Santos’ proposal ensures to avoid the trap of relativism. The criteria of validity are not the pre-established epistemological hierarchy of modern science, but a contextual, pragmatic hierarchy, that is, depending on the specific case and purpose (Santos, 2007a: xlix).
The intercultural translation is the methodological and political procedure to promote symmetric dialogues in order to create reciprocal intelligibilities between the available and the possible experiences of the world (Santos, 2010: 46). As was mentioned earlier, the aim of the intercultural translation is to turn incommensurability into difference, and from difference, create intelligibilities that enable cross-cultural communication (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: xl). The intercultural translation entails the relations between different cultures, knowledges, practices and cosmologies, and different social movements, their actors and their practices. It identifies isomorphic concerns between cultures and their responses to them. The relation of these knowledges and practices with the hegemonic forms has to be taken into account. The task of translation is twofold. On one side, a deconstructive one, since it must be considered that these knowledges have undergone different processes of oppression, and they have responded and resisted in different ways. On the other side, a reconstructive, non-regressive job of going beyond these Eurocentric remnants is needed in order to revitalize their historic and cultural possibilities (Santos, 2010:46).

According to Santos (2010:46), the intercultural translation of knowledges takes the form of a diatopical hermeneutics, in order to identify their concerns and their responses. The term diatopical hermeneutics was coined by Raimon Panikkar (1999) to refer to the promotion of the dialogue between cultures that do not have direct links or historical contact. For Panikkar (1999:27), in order to reach mutual intelligibilities, it is needed to overcome not only the spatial and temporal distances, but also the cultural *topoi*, that is, the self-evident and naturalized cultural premises on which each culture is founded. Therefore, Panikkar (1999:27)
asserts, “before anything else we have to forge the tools of understanding in the encounter itself, for we cannot –should not– assume a priori a common language.”

As it has been mentioned earlier, Santos (2007: 48) starts from the basis that every knowledge, culture, or experience of the world is incomplete, that they are partial totalities, and they have lacks. Thus, they can be enriched by means of the dialogue with others. However, the tendency is to see one’s experience, culture or knowledge as a totality, a homogenous whole. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999: 30) states,

The concept of totality assumes the possibility and the desirability of being able to include absolutely all known knowledge into a coherent whole. In order for this to happen, classification systems, rules of practice and methods had to be developed to allow for knowledge to be selected and included in what counts as history.

The role of the diatopical hermeneutics is to raise awareness of the incompleteness, and to take it to its maximum point through a dialogue where one keeps an eye on its own experience, and the other eye on the other experience. This relativity of cultures and knowledges must not be confused with a relativist or universalist position, since both consider difference as an insurmountable obstacle and reject the possibility of relation and dialogue (Santos, 2010:65). In contrast, cultural relativity implies the aforementioned incompleteness; it “(…) means that every worldview and every assertion are relative to its contexts. Nobody has a complete and absolute view of reality (…)” (Esteva, 2011: 575).

In sum, rather than transference of equivalents from a cosmovision to another, the intercultural translation is a procedure for a collective construction of knowledge through the identification of common concerns, commonalities between different forms of resistant initiatives and experiences working towards the recognition, redistribution and reconfiguration of knowledges (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007). Rather than difference as inequality, or as an obstacle, in the
meshwork of knowledges that attempts the proposal of the Epistemologies of the South, difference is considered as a relational space to be inhabited. It is in this space of encounters, where tensions, complementarities, interdependencies and clashes take place, where a better understanding of the self and the other may flourish.

1.4 Peaces

Within peace studies, from the University of Innsbruck, Wolfgang Dietrich and Wolfgang Sutzl (1997), talk of “many peaces”, in plural, and situate current peace research within postmodern. The modern understanding based on the eternal truths of security, justice, development and reason took shape in a standardized and mechanistic view of peace. The resulting disillusion and disbelief with modern thinking opened the door to difference and to a plurality of understandings of peace, linked in turn to a plural understanding of the world beyond the universal aspirations of modern thought. Dietrich’s proposal to twist modernity and postmodernity, Transrational Peaces, will be covered in the next chapter.

Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2001) from the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace, uses the plural form of peace, peaces, to include the different possibilities to make peace.

Martínez Guzmán (2001: 15) situates his proposal as Trans-modern, Trans-Kantian, framed within a Western social cosmology. He (2001:16) asserts the resolution of the discipline to renounce to the Western ethnocentric pride and to turn it into responsibility and commitment with the excluded by the universalism of European rationality.

Martínez Guzmán (2001:76) outlines the role of Western white, male science and instrumental reason in imposing a particular worldview and a form of
producing knowledge in the conflation of modern science with colonialism. The author (2001:76) emphasizes the critical function of Philosophy (for Peace) and its commitment with human values. Thus, the author’s critique modern and positivist science based on the notions of objectivity and neutrality is a central point in his proposal. Martínez Guzmán (2001:112) proposes to shift the initial epistemological foundation of Peace Studies conceived as how far or how close it is from the model of natural sciences, to a broader concept of Epistemology, understood as the study of the multiple and diverse human competences to make peace(s), transform conflicts, undo violence, and to leave in peace.

The resulting Epistemological Turn allows disciplines and fields whose scientificity had been denied, the recognition as science. The new paradigm consists of fifteen tenets, however I will only cover the most relevant for this chapter. Rather than objectivity, it emphasizes the intersubjective character of science. The relation between subject and object turns into a relation between subjects, persons, therefore, with the right to interlocution. The concept of nature as a distant object to be dominated is to be replaced by resituating the human being as an integral part of it. To overcome unilateral reasoning, the focus will be put on reasons, emotions, sentiments, tenderness and care (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 114-116).

The Epistemological Turn could be framed within the internal plurality of science. Its relation with other forms of knowledge and existence is mentioned through the commitment to reconstruct “vernacular knowledges”¹ (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 105). In his call for an interdisciplinary and intercultural approach to search for peaceful ways to transform human relations and with nature, the

¹ “saberes vernaculares” (own translation)
The author warns against the dangers of imposing one form of knowledge over the others. The author highlights the need for an intercultural perspective that goes beyond the mere acknowledgement of plurality, and that submits peace research to a “richness of tensions and nuances (…)” (Martínez Guzmán 2009: 24). At the same time, he warns against the ethnocentrism resulting from the assimilation of human diversity within Western assumptions (Martínez Guzmán, 2001:25). The author plays a central importance to dialogue for intercultural understanding. It is through this dialogue “with other cultures that we can learn to unlearn what we have forgotten along the way by not paying attention to the knowledges of the others, and to be critical with our own proposals (…)”¹ (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 108; italics in the original).

Conclusions

According to the authors covered in last section, peace studies has opened the door to different understandings of the world, and to other ways of making peace(s). Nevertheless, interculturality, as Martínez Guzmán warned above about the risks of assimilation, poses a challenge to Academia in general (McIntosh, 2012) and to a field linked to a European tradition.

As it has been briefly mentioned in this chapter, indigenous ways of conceiving existence and producing knowledge do not fit the Cartesian ontological model. Their connection of mind and body implies no separation between knowledge and being in the world, practice and experience, where spirituality is enmeshed in everyday practice. These forms of being in the world can shed light into “deeper strata of reality that might permit us to go to the roots of our problems” (Panikkar, 1979; in Esteva, 2011: 581), by bringing Western thought

¹ “(…) con otras culturas donde aprendemos a desaprender lo que hemos olvidado en el camino por no estar atentos a los saberes de las otras y los otros, y a ser críticos con nuestros planteamientos (…) (own translation)
into contention if the West decides to examine its thought in light of non-Western instead of the other way round.

If we take further the metaphor of the open doors, the necessary expansion of the inner boundaries of science as proposed by Philosophy for Peace might still find peace studies inside the comfort zone of the house waiting to welcome these previously excluded voices to have a conversation in our own terms. Hospitality is a must, but it might be necessary to go out to the forest presented in the introduction, the forest we are a part of, and consider the variety of struggles that creatively combine or resist against the monocultures imposed by the colonial, imperialist and the global capitalist logic. To frame these other voices in peace terms may imply to fall in the trap of orthopedic thinking. The statement of Raimon Panikkar above in this chapter might be a starting point to build these necessary bridges for “existential, intimate and concrete” (Panikkar 2000; quoted in Esteva, 2011: 573) dialogue.

Next chapter gets into that forest by analyzing four cases of how interculturality has been dealt in peace studies.
Chapter II

Diversity in Peace

“You try to draw everything into the net of your faith, father, but you can't steal all the virtues. Gentleness isn't Christian, self-sacrifice isn't Christian, charity isn't, remorse isn't. I expect the caveman wept to see another's tears. Haven't you even seen a dog weep? In the last cooling of the world, when the emptiness of your belief is finally exposed, there'll always be some bemused fool who'll cover another's body with his own to give it warmth for an hour more of life.”

(Graham Greene, 1961: 67-68)

Introduction

Taking Martínez Guzmán’s proposal to expand the epistemological limits of current peace research and recognition of the plurality of peace into consideration, this chapter analyzes how human diversity has been dealt within peace studies, and whether cultural recognition corresponds with epistemological and ontological recognition. In sum, the aim is to look at the relation of peace studies with other ways of producing knowledge and conceiving existence.

The main conceptual tool for the analysis will be what has been called categorical violence drawing from the work of James Scott (1998). The author refers by this to the procedures by which the modern state facilitates its functions and increases its capacity by engaging in processes of simplification to make the complexity of society and nature legible and more convenient for its administrative functions. Among these measures the author includes the design of cities, nature, and transportation systems, establishing homogeneous units of measure and weights, creation of permanent last names and population registers, the standardization of language, land tenure systems. This inventory of society and nature simplified reality to the parts that were of interest for the state’s purposes,
making it more legible, easier to measure, and manipulate; for these measures
provided not only descriptions, but together with the state power they enabled to
remap and remake the depicted reality. According to Scott, the project to make
societies legible is carried out through processes of simplification that require a
narrowing of vision, to slice reality so that the observer can focus on those aspects
that interest him/her. The first step in this simplification process to make legible the
complex and diverse practices, processes, relations, “the infinite array of details”
(Scott, 1998:77) of a social landscape is to create a common unit of measure.
Thereon, to create labels, classifications and categories according to the unit of
measure is a consequent step in order to facilitate “summary descriptions,
comparisons, and aggregation (Scott, 1998: 77). In that sense, Santos (2003: 225)\(^1\)
states that “maps distort reality to introduce orientation”. Scott (1998: 7) posits that
this argument could be transposed to certain kinds of reductive social science.
Therefore, the concept of categorical violence will be complemented with the
critique of modern science presented in the first chapter.

This chapter is organized thusly:

The first section analyzes the works of Wolfgang Dietrich “Interpretations of
Peace in History and Culture” (2012) and “Elicitive Conflict Transformation and
the Transrational Shift in Peace Politics” (2013). In both cases the focus will be
put on how the author draws on different traditions to sustain his theoretical
proposals. The five ‘families of peace’ and his depiction of shamanism as conflict
transformation will be analyzed.

The second section presents briefly Johan Galtung’s view of the
epistemological character of peace studies. Then, it moves to analyze mainly his

\(^1\) “Los mapas distorsionan la realidad para instituir la orientación” (my own translation).
hermeneutical exercise of the concept of peace carried out in the article “Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace” (1981). Other works like “Peace and Buddhism” (1985) and “Peace by Peaceful Means” (1996) will be commented. The work of Peter Lawler (1995) on Johan Galtung and his critique of Galtung’s civilization theory will play a center role in this section.

The third section analyzes Douglas P. Fry calls for an objective. Thereon his ethnographic portray of peace in La Paz, a Zapotec community, presented in his article “Multiple Paths to Peace: The “La Paz” Zapotec of Mexico” will be then analyzed. So it will be his exploration of peace among hunter gatherers as proposed in his work “War, Peace and Human Nature” (2013).

The fourth section covers the work of the organization, Peaceful Societies presented on the website, www.peacefulsocieties.org. The concept of peaceful societies will be examined. Then, the analysis will focus on an entry of the “Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies”, the methodology based on ethnographic research, and concretely the description of Semai people will be examined.

**2.1 Transrational Peaces**

Wolfgang Dietrich’s introduced the transrational peaces approach in his book “Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture” (2012). The author departs from the “many peaces” (Dietrich and Sützl, 1997) introduced in the previous chapter, which try to avoid the violence of “the singular, strong and perpetual concept of peace (…)” (Dietrich, 2012: 2). Therefore the author draws from different times and cultures to organize the multiplicity of peaces, into five categories: energetic, moral, modern, postmodern and transrational peaces. The aim is to call “for an inquiry into the deeper meaning of the different perceptions of peace” (Dietrich, 2012: 8) by looking at “their narratives’ peace philosophical level on a general
level and to show the practical consequences deriving from them” (Dietrich, 2012:12). Methodologically, the author asserts the scientificity of his work (Dietrich, 2012: 10) mainly based on inductive reasoning.

If peace will be considered in this chapter as the unit by which cultures, traditions and societies will be measured and standardized, in this particular section, the above mentioned five types or understandings of peace proposed by the author constitute the categories in which reality will be schematized.

Energetic peaces are described by Dietrich (2012: 53-65) as those based on the harmonious relation between nature, cosmos and society. They do not emerge from an creator God or an absolute truth, but from the self, from the perception of human existence “as embedded in the All-Oneness of all being and assume connectivity of all with all (…), peace to them means the mutual harmony of perceptible phenomena” (Dietrich, 2012: 273). To illustrate this, the author draws on his interpretations of concepts like *wu wei*, *hao ping*, *dharma*, *shanti* and *ahimsa*, being Taoist thought the epitome of energetic peaces. The author states that development, modernization and progress dissolved the awareness of energetic concepts (Dietrich, 2012: 53), although these are to be found in all times and societies. Notwithstanding, the bulk of the samples derive from translations of what the he calls “(…) Eastern wisdom into the enlightened scientific language of the so-called West” (Dietrich, 2012: 12).

For moral concepts of peace the energy lies on an external, creator God. Moral peaces are based on an absolute norm, laws and codes, peace is a pact “that legitimizes itself through its sheer existence and social power (…)” (Dietrich, 2012: 112). Peace is understood as related to justice. If energetic peaces are expressed in the unification of opposites, exemplified in the *Ying/Yang*, the reliance
on an ultimate truth of moral images of peace implies the need for a dualistic thinking that distinguishes true/false, good/bad. Examples of moral peaces can be found in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Mahayana Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism and Confucianism (Dietrich, 2012: 65-112).

Paraphrasing Ramachandra Guha (1989: 97), to categorize these cultures, religions and traditions under the label of energetic or moral, appropriating, fragmenting and reducing them into peace in a very selective reading responds to the desire of presenting peace as an universal concern, and to the need to construct a well-founded lineage of the discipline. Guha (1989: 98) posits that this appropriation denies agency and reason and turns other cultures into raw material, a vehicle for Western projections, independently of the intention of the researcher.

From the tension between moral and energetic concepts emerge the next three families (Dietrich, 2012: 9). Modern concepts of peace rise from a rupture with the holistic and organic worldviews of the previous categories to a mechanistic one, where God is replaced by reason to explain and manipulate the universe. This is reflected in the belief in reason –manifested in the form of science, art, political and social theory, or law– as a universal vehicle to create norms that regulate society and implement peace. The author illustrates the variations of modern peaces in the divergences between Kant, Marx, Hobbes and Rousseau’s thought, guided by the principles of hope, expectation, fear and doubt respectively (Dietrich, 2012: 145-160).

As Dietrich points out, modernity is a contested and difficult to define term. Here, the Eurocentric character manifests itself by oblivion rather than by appropriation. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, Dietrich’s definition of modernity is based exclusively on intra-European events and authors, without
considering the multiple modernities that emerge from the distinct interactions, and also omitting colonialism as a constitutive element of modernity (Dussel, 2000). This implies ignoring that the reason-based regulatory and emancipatory norms applied in the metropolis took the form of violence in the colonies (Dussel, 2000; Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007).

Postmodern peaces emerge from the doubt of the truth of modernity, proposing an incomplete twist from moral and modern concepts of peace by means of the same modern tool, reason. Postmodern peaces unite rationality with relationality (Dietrich, 2012: 274). Peace is relational, contextual and vernacular. Multiplicity is the key concept, therefore peace has to be thought in plural, “(…) multiform and in need of definition within each context” (Dietrich, 2012: 274).

While I agree in the inherent violence of a singular, universal, uniform concept of peace stated by the author, it could be asked whether the “plurality, small, weak, flexible and relational” (Dietrich, 2012: 271) postmodern peaces do maintain this form of violence. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, Martínez Guzmán warned against the risk of assimilation that these open doors could entail. Peace(s) is still a universal concept according to which other forms of knowing, existing and organizing will be measured, classified, given meaning and validity.

For Dietrich, this four categories lead into the fifth one, transrational peaces. If the twisting of modern and moral peaces was incomplete since postmodern proposals were based on the same rational tools, transrational peaces attempts to go beyond this limitation by incorporating elements from energetic and moral peaces to the modern and postmodern, embracing them all; Harmony, Truth, Justice and Security are the components of transrational peaces which aims to
integrate the plural, the relational and the spiritual with the *rational* in search of a dynamic equilibrium (Dietrich, 2012: 266). As Dietrich (2012: 257) states “The interaction of the individual aspects beyond the exterior and beyond rationality is the topic of transrational peace research”. To support this argument, Dietrich draws on transpersonal psychology, systems theory, physics, Buddhism, yoga, Hinduism and Sufism (Dietrich, 2012: 211-269).

The Eurocentric and reductionist character of the transrational peace theoretical framework manifests itself in the assumption that there is only one rationality, and it belongs exclusively to Western ideas. Other forms of conceiving the world are labelled as energetic, spiritual, relational, harmonious, moral, holistic or organic, when indeed are parts of other rationalities if not reduced into peace(s). Paraphrasing Scott (1998:21), to isolate a single element of instrumental value, in this case, peace, risks to dismember a set of complex and poorly understood set of relations and processes.

As it was argued in the first chapter, the reification of modern Western rationality was part of a series of political cultural and economic processes that situated, as in this case, the white male at “the hubris of the zero point”, explaining, ordering, classifying the world, and denying rationality to other ontologies and epistemologies.

What Santos (2004) calls “metonymic reason”, the one which takes the part for the whole, suits the case of transrational peace(s). For the author, metonymic reason is that which “claims to be the only form of rationality and therefore does not exert itself to discover other kinds of rationality, or, if it does, it only does so to turn them into raw material” (Santos, 2004: 162). Metonymic reason has a lazy and arrogant character. Arrogant because it does not valorize other experiences, and
does not find the need to confront itself with other rationalities through dialogue. It has a lazy character too, since it imposes a particular experience as a universal one. Rather than expanding the world, this leads to the shrinking of the present, silencing those subjected to metonymic reason, and concealing existent ways of thinking, producing, living, acting and knowing, with the consequent impoverishment of reality and the waste of human experience (Aguiló, 2010; Santos, 2004).

On his latest work, “Elicitive Conflict Transformation and the Transrational Shift in Peace Politics” (Dietrich, 2013), the author elaborates on elicitive conflict transformation as the practical application of the transrational peaces philosophy. Elicitive conflict transformation, a term coined and developed by John Paul Lederach, moves away from prescriptive approaches toward a systemic view of conflict that understands the mediator as a part of it, and draws from local knowledges and practices of the participants in order to construct changes in the relationships. Dietrich finds the communicative and psychological methods that elicitive conflict transformation requires to be in line with the interpersonal and intrapersonal orientation of the transrational peaces theoretical framework (Dietrich, 2013: 1-24). Thereafter the author collects, combines and interprets different methods of elicitive conflict transformation drawing from human and transpersonal psychology, systems theory, Western philosophy, and non-European practices as diverse as shamanism, budo, aikido or vipassana, revealing “interesting interrelations and similarities across disciplinary and cultural boundaries” (Dietrich, 2013: 225). I will focus my analysis on the reductionist character of the authors’ description of shamanism (Dietrich, 46-54).
Shamanism falls in the category of breath-oriented approaches to elicitive conflict transformation. The author outlines the importance of breath for a relational understanding of conflict, and situates shamanistic breath techniques as an important component of transpersonal psychology and consequently of transrational peace. The author argues concerning these techniques that their “[s]hamanistic roots are often invisible”, therefore his concern is to make them visible in order to facilitate the understanding of other methods (Dietrich, 2013: 15).

According to Dietrich (2013: 45), shamans exemplifies the peace and conflict worker par excellence. In non-European societies, shamanistic techniques to modify consciousness “represent institutionalized forms of healing, self-exploration, and consciousness expansion” (Dietrich, 2013: 45). For the author, shamans belong to the energetic worldview described above since they work within the relation between “nature, society and the supernature” (Dietrich, 2013: 47). That makes them function as mediators between this world and the Otherworld through rituals that deal with life, death, fertility, illness and social relations. The therapeutic role and character of healing rituals – not understood as strict medicine in the European sense – leads to the practice of elicitive conflict transformation, therefore being suitable practices for peace work.

The author illustrates this with the medicine wheel employed by the Twisted Hairs “symbolizing the philosophy, thinking, spirituality, and life of North American indigenous peoples (…)” (Dietrich, 2013: 50). For this group, solutions to conflict emerge from inner transformation. The author argues that the circle shape of the medicine wheel symbolizes the cyclical nature of all beings and the knowledge and orientation for action derived from it. Dietrich outlines the healing
effect of the medicine wheel by its intrapersonal focus, and the unification of
dualities, “the relationship between chaos and harmony in the development of a
person” (Dietrich, 2013: 51), translates itself in balanced relations with oneself,
others, and the Universe. This method was adopted by psychotherapy, and it
underlies elicitive conflict transformation. Another form of dealing with conflict
based on the medicine wheel, Dietrich accounts, is the circle of law, which fosters
community participation in decision making process concerning political, social
and spiritual aspects. It allows governing and transforming conflicts without having
a normative character. Another shamanistic healing ritual based on the medicine
wheel accounted by the author is the sweat lodge, by which a community carries
out a cleansing practice of social, psychological and spiritual transformation.
(Dietrich, 2013: 46-54).

Dietrich acknowledges that shamanism cannot be limited to breath-oriented
methods, being this one of the many shamanistic tools employed for conflict
transformation. (Dietrich, 2013: 46). The same logic could be applied to the strict
association of the shaman to peace work or elicitive conflict transformation.

Scott (1998: 81) argues that the fore-mentioned simplifications product of the
process of legibility have a twofold meaning. First, they must provide a synoptic
view of the ensemble, thereby “facts must lose their particularity and reappear in
schematic or simplified form as a member of a class of facts” (Scott, 1998: 81);
second, and related to the first, this grouping of facts “entails collapsing or ignoring
distinctions that might otherwise be relevant” (Scott, 1998: 81). The author (Scott,
1998: 13-14) posits that it is through this narrowing vision that it is possible to
impose one’s logic on the observed reality. To look at shamanism through the lens
of peace follows this simplifying process that makes legible the diversity of
contexts, functions, relations, ways of knowledge and of perceiving existence, and enables to impose the researcher’s vision on them.

In the case of the so-called shamanism—a category questioned by Clifford Geertz (1966; as quoted in Hultkrantz, 1998: 163) for “dissolving the individuality of religious traditions”—besides dealing with social imbalances and conflicts, it cannot be overlooked that the functions of the shaman, their rituals and practices, are multiple. The shaman’s dealing with the magical, the religious, and the myth works as a dynamic factor in cultural processes, changes and adaptations. It validates and confirms specific cosmologies. Besides the religious aspect, an intellectual and genealogical role is played since the shaman works as the store of knowledge, and the memory of the community. They serve as timekeepers and masters of the calendar. Shamanistic practices are ecologically significant; shamans mediate with animals to assure enough hunting. They employ methods to heal diseases, their causes and augur future. They function as a guide for the souls of the death. The shaman is endowed with economic, social and political influence and authority in the community (Ripinsky-Naxon, 1993: 9, 62-65).

These and other functions cannot be extracted from specific contexts, epistemologies and ontologies. For Viveiros de Castro (2010: 40-41; 2005: 42), from the Amerindian multinaturalist and perspectivist stance, the former stated in the previous chapter, shamanism is a form of acting that implies a form of knowing. The author argues that for modern science to know is to objectify, to distinguish what is intrinsic to the object from what it has been projected on him by the subject, whereas for the shaman to know means to personify, to take the point of view of who is needed to be known, who instead of what because according to their concept of personhood the Other is a subject and a person. For the author, the
shaman unveils the inner human form hidden under the disguise of every species. Perspectivism is the conception “according to which the world is inhabited by different sorts of subjects or persons, human or non-human, which apprehend reality from distinct points of view” (Viveiros de Castro, 1998; as quoted in Ingold, 2000: 424). As Ingold summises:

Thus to be a person is to assume a particular subject-position, and every person, respectively in their own sphere, will perceive the world in the same way – in the way that persons generally do. But what they see will be different, depending on the form of life they have taken up (Ingold, 2000: 424).

Therefore, in this context, the concepts of personhood, the individual, nature, society, supernature, reality, what is social, or political, differ from the objectivist view that Dietrich’s inscribes onto the shaman. For perspectivism, “there are no points of view on things – things and beings are points of view”. Therefore it deals not with “how monkeys see the world but what sort of a world is described through monkeys, what is the world of which they are the point of view” (Viveiros de Castro, 2005: 57; italics in the original).

The author (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 54; 2005: 53) outlines the difference between cultural relativism and the Amerindian perspectivist ontology, arguing that the former offers diverse subjective representations of an objective and external nature, whereas the latter is not a representation but a perspective, that implies a representational unit, the soul, and a diversity of external and objective worlds. One culture, and multiple natures. The representation is a property of the mind or spirit, while the point of view is located in the body not separated from the mind.

The shaman from this epistemological and ontological stance could be defined as

the manifest aptitude of certain individuals to deliberately cross bodily boundaries and adopt the perspective of alo-specific
subjectivities so as to manage the relations between these beings and humans. Seeing non-human beings as these see themselves (as humans), shamans are capable of playing the role of active interlocutors in transspecific dialogues. (Viveiros de Castro, 2005: 42).

Dietrich (2013: 48) states that his reading of shamanism does not attempt at romanticizing practices of forgotten people, but the importance of it lies in the universal capability of “being present, discovering our personal center, the heart of our personality”. However, a romanticized stance of the shamans’ worldviews, rituals and functions pervades in his selective reading which projects onto this instrumental shaman the researcher’s personal concerns. This is probably as a consequence of the recognized influence on the author (Dietrich, 2013: 47-48) of the so-called core-shamanism and neo-shamanism schools, revivalist adaptations of shamanism healing techniques to the West initiated by anthropologist Michael Harner.

These schools constructed a Western imaginary of shamanism as a universal spiritual tradition that stresses the interconnectedness of all beings, re-connects human beings to nature, overcomes dualities, accesses a spiritual reality through altered states of consciousness, and focuses on individual inner healing and self-transformation/help. Neo-shamanism and core-shamanism were presented in the 1960’s and 1970’s as an alternative to a certain public disenchanted with consumerism, urban, modern life, the Judeo-Christian tradition, and Cartesian dualism (Morris, 2006). This view, already overcome by anthropology, has received criticisms that are in tune with the aims of this chapter, namely, misappropriating and romanticizing indigenous knowledge, reification of cultural primitivism, decontextualization and universalization, and an excessive focus on the individual and the psychological (Wallis, 2003: 43).
In sum, as in the case of the five categories of peace, to assimilate shamanism to peace work and elicitive conflict transformation by means of a selective reading that looks at it through a peace lens obeys to the “cannibalistic western logic that readily constructs other cultural possibilities as resources for western needs and actions” (Donna Haraway, 1989; as quoted in Lohman, 1993). Paraphrasing Chakrabarty (2000: 29), shamanism, aikido, budo and vipassana flesh out a theoretical skeleton that is substantially Europe, the producer of theoria. The consequence of this Eurocentric stance, as it has been exposed in the previous chapter and it will be extended along this one, is the maintenance of the imperialist relation of epistemological domination which leads to the sedimentation of other forms of conceiving knowledge and existence under, in this case, the transrational peace or the elicitive conflict episteme.

2.2 Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace

Johan Galtung’s prolific work, which spans over five decades and covers a wide array of topics, has contributed to shape many of the debates of the field. Among them, the epistemological and methodological character of peace research has been one of the recurrent topics throughout his work. Galtung moved from his early reliance on empiricism and orthodox social sciences as the basis of rigorous knowledge (Lawler, 1995) towards a more comprehensive methodological approach including data, theories and values (Galtung, 1985a, 1996; Lawler, 1995). For the author, to promote peace and not only peace studies, “a non-positivistic epistemology is indispensable” (Galtung, 1996: vii), therefore a critical approach based on values has to be accompanied by a constructive one that confronts theories with values to produce changes in realities, and not only in theories (Galtung, 1996, 9-13).
Parallel to his explorations of the cultural aspects of violence, he focused on the elements in cultures that oppose cultural violence. For Galtung,

there is also much optimistic inspiration to be gained from a civilizational perspective. The word peace translates into different words in different languages, all of them having different connotations, showing different facets of peace (1985a: 155).

In that statement peace remains a universal and totalizing reference according to which other concepts will be fragmented. Galtung (1981: 194) disclaims that to translate all the different concepts from different cultures into the English concept of peace may be methodologically open to objection. He counter-argues that these concepts are almost autotelic and that they represent some of the highest goals of their traditions. However, the analysis that follows is based on the assumption that the problem behind this reductionism is not a matter of semantics, but of power. A symbolic power that endows a legitimacy that otherwise the concept of peace would not have, to paraphrase Pierre Bourdieu (1991; quoted in Neoh, 2008: 11-12). This symbolic power sustains relations of domination by concealing them. Bourdieu outlines the role of language and representation in the construction of reality, and the political significance of naming, which “imply a certain claim to symbolic authority as the socially recognized power to impose a certain vision and division on the social world” (Neoh, 2008: 12; italics in the original).

In the article, “Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace” (Galtung, 1981), the author set the basis for his subsequent civilization theory developed in “Peace by Peaceful Means” (1996) which covers other aspects such as development. For the scope of this chapter, I will mainly focus on the earlier paper unless otherwise stated.
Galtung carries out a hermeneutical exercise of the concept of peace across civilizations by means of a taxonomic classification of cultures according to certain aspects. A main distinction is first established contrasting what the author calls the Occident with the Orient. If the core of the Occident is epitomized by Christianity, the Orient is defined by Buddhism (Galtung, 1996: 81). The dualistic cartographic division is sustained, according to Galtung, by the shared features of the social cosmology of the different civilizations contained in the Occident and the Orient.

In his civilization theory, Galtung defines a social cosmology as the “(…) collectively held subconscious ideas about what constitutes normal and natural reality” (1996: 211; italics in the original). Edward Said would have much to say about portraying these two separate entities as real:

the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically ‘different’ inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space is equally a highly debatable idea (1978: 322).

Galtung’s “impressionistic” (1996: 211) portrayal of civilizations is questioned by Lawler (1995: 195) on the basis of his reductionist and objectified view of cultures, civilizations and cosmologies, which verges on essentialism, by “isolating out a definitive cosmological key (…) as an explanatory master category”. Indeed, few evidences are provided to support his argument, except for the few and selected references to the multi-faceted scriptural religious texts. No account is provided of internal diversities, of complexities, interactions, or contradictions within traditions and societies themselves. In a latter text, Galtung (1996: 212, 213) lists what is left outside of his Occident-Orient spectrum, the rest consists of African, Amerindian and Asia-Pacific indigenous cultures, as well as Viet Namese and Korean cultures.
Occidental civilization lumps together the Hebrew, Islam, Christian, Roman, Greek, Middle Age and the Modern Western traditions (Galtung, 1981: 183). This questionable classification juxtaposes historical periods and civilizations, religious traditions and cultures, under the label Occident. Galtung (1981) supports his classification by the shared cosmology of these traditions that is reflected in their concepts of peace which

(…) will tend to make a very clear distinction between in-group and out-group, center and periphery, or however one might refer to a distinction between 'us' and 'them'; and they will tend to be universalizing, encompassing the whole (known) universe (Galtung, 1981: 184).

Consequently, peace is reserved for in-group, and war for out-group relations. This idea pervades in Galtung’s view of peace in the Hebrew tradition, Shâlôm, as defined by a vertical relation, a pact between God and the Chosen People. The author extends the monotheist argument to Christianity and Islam to attribute the same protective tendency towards the self, and aggressiveness towards the others (Galtung, 1981: 184-185). In the case of Islam, Galtung (1981: 186; italics in the original) distinguishes between “dar-al-Islam (the House of Islam, the house of peace) and the dar-al-harb, the house of war” to further argue that jihad is a principle to justify the latter. As Ishida (1969, in Lawler, 1995: 197) states, “the so called bellicosity of Islam (…) is a biased Christian interpretation”. Moreover, the concept of jihad, according to Rabbia Terri Harris (2007: 108), meaning struggle or effort has a twofold component: a greater struggle that involves an inward effort directed to confront “our lower nature”, and a lesser struggle, outwards oriented against social injustice.

The pax romana, eirene, pax ecclesiae, from the Roman, Greek, and Middle Age traditions respectively, are used by the author to confirm his hypothesis of the Occident peace as exclusive and universalist (Galtung, 1981: 185-188). The Middle
Age is described by Galtung (1981: 187) as “the Oriental time pocket in Occidental history”. Edward Said (1978: 67) stated that “[t]o the Westerner, (...) the Oriental was always like some aspect of the West.” Galtung follows here the inverse logic although with the same result.

Galtung’s “ cursory” description of the Orient (Lawler, 1995: 204) amalgams heterogeneous categories such as Indian, Jainism, Buddhism, Gandhism, Chinese and Japanese traditions, since their social cosmologies are characterized by a shared inward orientation or introversion and inner harmony. This argument is grounded on the hermeneutics of concepts like *ahimsa, shanti, hop’ ing, and heiwa* (galtung, 1981: 191).

Lawler (1995: 209) criticizes that “[t]he connection between the abstracted ideal and the historical reality is tenuous.” For instance, in the case of Chinese peace, Galtung distinguishes during “the period of the hundred philosophers” (1981: 192) between the existence of the Buddhist, the Daoist and the Confucian trends, which he briefly proceeds to define. Tam Wai Lum (2007: 38-52) argues that these traditions were only followed by a well-educated elite, whereas grassroots Chinese people practiced different local traditions, religions and rituals. Both spheres influenced each other’s practices.

Following the critique of the Occident and the presentation of the Oriental peace concepts, Galtung (1985b, 1996) focuses on Buddhist civilization since it “is the major system of belief that, to my mind, comes closest in its way of looking at the world to the type of dynamic, highly complex peace theory (...)” (1985b: 3). Lawler (1995: 211) argues that although Buddhism is not portrayed in such a brief and passive way as the other civilizations, “the translatability of Buddhism into a practical discourse of peace (...) rather than [the] exposition of its philosophical
substance (…) differs little from the bulk of Western writing on Buddhist moral philosophy that has largely been confined to the business of ‘simple descriptive ethics’.”

Galtung relates Buddhist notions of dukkha (avoidance of suffering) and sukha (bliss, joy) to the concepts of negative and positive peace respectively (1996: 2), as parts of the processes towards the “goal of the whole exercise in human space” (Galtung, 1985b: 10): nirvana. “Nirvana is entropy, peace is entropy - hence, in a certain sense peace is nirvana and nirvana is peace” (Galtung, 1985b: 11), an adventurous statement considering the amount of context that such a concept, and the experience of Buddhahood require. Bibhuti S. Yadav (1977: 451) outlines the silence surrounding the definition of nirvana in Buddhist texts: “[t]he issue is clearly methodological, of showing that a Buddhist must reject epistemology as the methodology of talking about Nirvana.” Yadav (1977: 451) refers to the ancient Indian philosophers Chandrakirti and Nagarjuna rejection of the is/is-not thinking, the former “equates the logic of 'is' and 'not-is' with suffering, and argues that the Buddha's silence about Nirvana is a therapeutical proposal to liberate mankind from either/or logic.”

Summing up, Galtung’s hermeneutic proposal is based on the abstraction of certain features to define and contrast cultures according to peace. In line with the categorical violence of the previous section, Claude Alvares, (1988: 36) states that abstraction is accompanied by the other side of the coin, restriction: “[I]n the process of abstraction, one restricts reality by abstracting certain features and ignoring others.” Scott (1988: 77) posits that the broader the categories, the less detailed and accurate, the more sketchy and schematic the information, the more
useful the process of apprehending a complex reality is, since its purpose is to simplify, to reduce the range of variations.

This goes hand in hand with the scientific reduction of diversity stated in the previous chapter, since in its inability to reproduce it, science creates “more simplified, mechanized designs instead” (Alvares, 1988: 44). The result is a taxonomic and dichotomic proposal that presents a simplified and objectified version of cultures not very conducive to the authors’ attempted dialogue between cosmologies. In spite of his critical and value-charged approach, the pervasive scientific attitude and empiricist character of the research is evident in Galtung’s position as an external observer labelling, categorizing, and drawing quick conclusions from a set of premises (Lawler, 1995).

2.3 The human potential for peace

A recurring thesis in Douglas P. Fry’s work (2007, 2005, 2013) is that the assumptions of war as innate, universal, and the intrinsic tendency to violence of human being are deeply rooted in Western cultural beliefs. For Fry (2007, 2013), this naturalized view of human nature, that spans from Hesiod and Thucydides to Hobbes, impregnates Western perceptions of the world and consequently biases scientific practices and peace research. The author claims that to go beyond the distortion produced by ingrained and unquestioned cultural beliefs, the reinforcement of scientific objectivity in peace research is needed.

Rather than relax the striving for objectivity and adherence to the canons of science, the way to address this serious problem, I suggest, is to develop a greater awareness of the powerful grasp that cultural beliefs have on research related to peace and war, strive for self-awareness of one’s own beliefs and biases regarding this topic, and apply the rigors of well-practiced science to one’s own research and to the assessment of the findings of others (Fry, 2013: 1).
What Fry calls to overcome is what Bacon called the Idols of the Theatre in his Four Idols doctrine, constraints that interfere between the world, human mind and its understanding of the world; constraints which divert science from being “seen as a faithful representation of the truth about the world, as a transcript of the divine mind” (Bajaj, 1988: 29). Thomas Kuhn (1962) questioned the positivist notion of objectivity arguing that the so-called objective reality is determined by the influence of the prevailing scientific paradigms on the scientist. However, Vandana Shiva considers Kuhn’s view as incomplete since “it failed to provide an adequate epistemological framework for handling the violence of reductionist science” (1988: 90). Kuhn limits his critique to the scientific world without considering how social, political and economic interests determine scientific facts.

The call for the high standards of truth and objectivity might be in itself a reflection of the cultural and disciplinary values which Fry calls to be alert of. As it was covered in the previous chapter, the view of science as an objective authority contrasts with the local, contextual consideration of other systems of knowledge. The position of science as the only way to understand and interpret reality denies the validity of other forms of knowledge, therefore it rejects the possibility of articulation of different knowledges, reproducing and maintaining colonial relations (Santos, 2007b, Scott, 1989).

Drawing on archaeology, cultural anthropology, paleontology and behavioral ecology, Fry explores and compares the views of peace and war across different times and cultures to provide evidences of a less violent view of humanity.

Fry calls “to learn from peaceful societies” (Fry, 2005) since societies “with extremely low levels of expressed physical aggression offer insights for developing
a culture of peace” (Fry, Bonta and Basarkiewicz, 2009: 20). The concept of peaceful societies will be covered in the next section.

Based on ethnographic research, Fry identifies values, beliefs and behavioral attitudes toward conflict, decision making processes, conflict management procedures, social control mechanisms to prevent conflict, and socialization processes that characterize these societies and are conducive to peaceful coexistence. According to these parameters, and supported by data, he identifies more than 60 cultures of peace, in their most, indigenous groups, which he places on a non-violence / violence continuum (Fry, 2005: 152-167). However, Fry’s writing reflects more a learn-about or learn-over approach than a learn-from one, since it is the scientist who imposes the terms of the dialogue taking for granted that his premises are accepted by the communities.

The author (Fry, 2005) compares two Zapotec communities, La Paz and San Andrés, according to the parameters mentioned above to contrast their approaches to conflict and peace. For Fry (2005), La Paz is a peaceful community, with low levels of aggression, peace is based on respect for others, supported by a value system that promotes cooperation, and creates an affective environment for children to be socialized, whereas research conducted in San Andrés shows a higher level of physical and verbal aggression.

From a categorical violence point of view, Fry isolates certain elements that he considers relevant for the study of peace to make these two societies legible, obtaining a schematic and static view of them, more convenient for his analysis. As Scott (1998: 11) argues,

Certain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of vision. The great advantage of such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality. This very simplification, in turn, makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of
vision more legible and hence more susceptible to careful measurement and calculation. Combined with similar observations, an overall, aggregate, synoptic view of a selective reality is achieved, making possible a high degree of schematic knowledge, control, and manipulation.

Scott (1998) points out that this process of categorization is not necessarily harmful, it is in connection with the authority of science that enables manipulation and control. As a sample of re-mapping and re-ordering reality, La Paz, whose administrative or local name is not mentioned, receives its academic name from anthropologist Carl W. O’Nell, whose fieldwork in the 1960’s in the Valley of Oaxaca outlined the peacefulness of the community (Fry, 2005: 60). Following Scott’s line of argument, Joshuah Neoh (2008: 11) calls for not to underrate the importance of naming and labelling since they “play a vital role in determining identities, cultural affiliations, and histories; they can help fracture or unify groups of people.”

The intricacy and complexity of Zapotec reality is simplified, presented in a frozen, ahistorical way, and assimilated into a grid which codifies observed elements like the value of respect, the frequency of physical fights, swearing, child and wife-beatings, the self-image of the community, the homicide rate, the response to child misconduct, and the level of obedience of children in both communities. Vandana Shiva (1988: 89) denounces a threefold exclusion derived from this methodology,

(i) ontological, in that other properties are not taken note of; (ii) epistemological, in that other ways of perceiving and knowing are not recognized; and (iii) sociological, in that the non-expert is deprived of the right both of access to knowledge and of judging the claims of knowledge.

Among the “psychocultural mechanisms” identified to prevent conflict and deter aggression in La Paz, Fry (2005: 67-69) outlines fear of illness and of witchcraft.
Concerning illness, Fry (2005: 69) states that Zapotec from La Paz believe that *coraje* and *bilis* can cause aggression, these exempts the patients from being judged. He concludes that “[t]he key point is that by interpreting anger and aggression as resulting from an illness, La Pazians deny the existence of hostility” (Fry, 2005: 69). The author (Fry, 2005: 69) posits that people from La Paz belief that the experience of aggression can be frightening and that causes fright sickness or *susto*. Fry (2005: 69) states that “[b]eliefs that violence can cause susto in oneself or others provide another psychocultural check on aggression.”

Fry analyzes illness and conflict from his own ontological standpoint, regardless of the ontological and epistemological conceptions of the Zapotecs of La Paz, who are positioned as a “theoretical patient” (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 70) rather than as an agent. The dichotomy between interior mental states and external behavioral responses underlies Fry’s analysis which places *coraje*, *susto* and *bilis* as products of the human psyche. Paraphrasing Ingold (2000: 95), for Lapazians, aggression causes *susto* because they experience it as such, whereas for the scientist *susto* is a construction of the people’s mind.

By this move, (...) [Lapazian] metaphysics appear to pose no challenge to our own ontological certainties. Turning our backs on what (...) people say, we continue to insist that ‘real’ reality is given independently of human experience, and that understanding its nature is a problem for science. (Ingold, 2000: 95)

The studied communities’ conceptions of being and knowing, their cosmologies and “ontological self-determination” (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 18)¹ do not prevail over “(...) the reduction of human (and non-human) thought to a device of

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¹ “autodeterminación ontológica”, own translation.
The researcher has defined the terms in which these two communities will be put into relation. These terms mirror the values, beliefs and intellectual concerns of the society that carries out the study rather than that which is studied. Since Fry’s intention was to learn from other cultures, by projecting the self onto the other, the opportunity to surprise ourselves by reflecting an image where we do not recognize ourselves is missed (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 15).

A similar analysis could be made from Fry’s work on nomadic forager societies which occupy a central place in his research (Fry, 2005, 2007, 2013). For the author, the two million years of existence of this lifestyle allows to obtain insights about the past and the peacefulness of human nature (Fry, 2013: 6-12).

From the position of the explicative subject, and with the synoptic view that science provides (Scott, 1998), the author engages in a taxonomic exercise that classifies forager societies into simple and complex hunter-gatherers through the isolation of certain features. The former includes nomadic bands with small, simple, egalitarian and non-hierarchical forms of social organization. The latter consists of horse-dependent or sedentary groups with higher population density, a hierarchical political system with class distinctions, and the use of slaves.

A subsequent step places simple and complex hunter gatherers as parts of a classificatory grid which uses peace and war –according to the above mentioned parameters– as a unit of measure to distinguish between warring and non-warring societies. The synoptic facts that it provides allows to conclude that “social
complexity and adoption of the horse go along with warfare” (Fry, 2007: 78), whereas nomadic bands tend to be more peaceful (Fry, 2007: 77-80).

Consequent with his schema, on a latter work, he focuses his research on the nomadic bands since their simple organization and their peaceful nature allow “to draw inferences about the past” (Fry, 2013: 9). An evolutionist point of view that places the researchers’ Time as the reference, and situates these groups as contemporary relics, an example of the denial of coevalness (Fabian, 1983) discussed in the previous chapter.

As in the case of the Zapotec analyzed above, his study presents several specific cases of nomadic forager bands drawing on ethnographic research where the rate of homicide, the values and attitudes towards violence, the causes of conflict and the mechanisms for its resolution are examined (Fry, 2013). These serve as processes of simplification and standardization to make hunter-gatherer’s realities legible, comparable, and classifiable. The author assumes that these units of measure are accepted by the rest, and therefore they define the terms of the conversation. This way of abstracting peace by isolation of certain elements in hunter-gatherers societies silences the way they apprehend the world, not based on detachment and mental representation, but on engagement, “not of making a view of the world but of taking up a view in it” (Ingold 2000: 42). The author states concerning hunter-gatherers that, 

(…) knowledge does not lie in the accumulation of mental content. It is not by representing it in the mind that they get to know the world, but rather by moving around in their environment, whether in dreams or waking life, by watching, listening and feeling, actively seeking out the signs by which it is revealed. Experience, here, amounts to a kind of sensory participation, a coupling of the movement of one’s own awareness to the movement of aspects of the world. And the kind of knowledge it yields is not propositional, in the form of hypothetical statements or ‘beliefs’ about the nature of reality, but personal – consisting of an intimate sensitivity to other ways of being, to the particular movements, habits and temperaments that reveal each for what it is (Ingold, 2000: 99).
2.5 Peaceful Societies

The organization Peaceful Societies is dedicated to the study of social groups with low levels of internal violence and absence of external warfare. It publishes its work on the website www.peacefulsocieties.org which was started in 2005 by Bruce Bonta, inspired by the work of Elise Boulding, and it is maintained by the contributions of a group of peace researchers, among them Douglas P. Fry, whose work, introduced in the previous section, shares many similarities with this project.

The website contains the Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies which compiles descriptions of 25 societies that “promote harmony, gentleness, and kindness toward others as much as they devalue conflict, aggressiveness, and violence”, in order to “inspire —and challenge—anyone interested in the processes of peace building” (Peaceful Societies, 2014).

Although the authors state that their intention is not to dichotomize between peaceful and non-peaceful societies, but to situate them in a peace-violence continuum (Peaceful Societies, 2014), it has a twofold exclusionary character since the abyssal thinking (Santos, 2007c) referred to in the first chapter, structures the whole theory of peaceful societies.

On one side, paraphrasing Guha (1989), the positivist category of peaceful societies, which is used to label certain social groups based on observation and abstraction of selected features, constitutes a romantic and positive Other, “a body wholly separate and alien” (Guha, 1989: 97) from the self, and defined by a peaceful essence. Concerning the dangers of creating categories that lead to us/them distinctions, Edward Said asks,
Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? (Said, 1978: 45).

On the other side, whether peaceful or not, it is the hegemonic subject of the scientist who decides and classifies societies, “[i]n the field of knowledge, abyssal thinking consists in granting to modern science the monopoly of the universal distinction between true and false (…)” (Santos, 2007c: 47). This is made explicit by the authors of the website in their “criteria for inclusion” (Peaceful Societies, 2014) for the Encyclopedia: (i) they have to be described by an anthropologist or a sociologist as peaceful or nonviolent, (ii) the scientist must provide “convincing evidence” about the peacefulness of the society, in case of contradictory evidences the society will be excluded, (iii) the existence of “enough scholarly literature about the society to allow a reasonably well-formed picture to emerge about their social, psychological, and cultural makeup” (Peaceful Societies, 2014).

Paul Robbins (2012: 125) argues that, considering the exclusive and arbitrary character of any classification and categorization, the main difference between science and other forms of knowledge is not accuracy but the political and social power linked to the former. He then draws on Foucault to ask,

> when we establish a considered classification, when we say that a cat and a dog resemble each other less than two greyhounds do, even if both are tame or embalmed, even if both are frenzied, even if both have just broken the water pitcher, what is the ground on which we are able to establish the validity of this classification with complete certainty? On what “table,” according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things? (Foucault, 1977; quoted in Robbins, 2012: 125)

Santos (2007c: 68) explains the contrast between the progressive increase of the recognition of cultural diversity during the last decades and the lack of recognition of the epistemological diversity, relying on the distinction between beliefs and ideas as posited by Ortega y Gasset. Whereas beliefs are an integral part of our
identity, they come from the absence of doubt, ideas, that is, science and philosophy, are exterior to us, their origin lies in uncertainties and remain associated with them. This implies a distinction between being and having, “we are what we belief but we have ideas” (Santos, 2007c: 68). Modern science belongs to both, ideas and beliefs. “Belief in science greatly exceeds anything scientific ideas enables us to realize” (Santos, 2007c: 68). The critique of science during the second half of the twentieth century contrasted with an increasing popular belief in science. As Santos contends “The relationship between beliefs and ideas as related to science is no longer a relationship between two distinct entities but rather a relationship between two ways of socially experiencing science” (Santos, 2007c: 68). This duality is what separates cultural from epistemological recognition of diversity.

Back to the Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies, the ethnographic present tense used to describe these societies, as in the previous section, represents them as frozen, timeless, with few accounts of historical changes, political struggles or responses to the interactions with modernity in economic, social and cultural terms. For anthropologist Renato Rosaldo (1993: 31), these are characteristics of the first ethnographic writings, whose complicity with colonial practices was mentioned in the previous chapter. The portrait of colonized cultures as harmonious, homogeneous and unchanging fostered the civilizational mission, the idea that these societies need to progress in economic, cultural and moral terms. The view of the anthropologist as the detached observer that objectifies and extracts raw material to be processed later has been overcome by the discipline (Rosaldo, 1993).
Moreover, this way of presenting them as static, almost isolated strongholds of nonviolence reveals a tendency to romanticize these societies, in spite of the authors’ disclaimer against a utopic, idealist portrayal of these groups, arguing that descriptions are supported by scholar evidences (Peaceful Societies, 2014).

Every entry of the Encyclopedia is described according to sections that briefly present information about the geographical location and economic activity, beliefs that foster peacefulness, forms of avoiding and resolving conflict, gender relations, socialization of children, social practices, sense of the self, moral values, and a conclusion (Peaceful societies, 2014).

Rosaldo (1993: 26) warns against the imposition of categories and the tendency of trying to understand other forms of life in Western terms. To analyze 25 different social groups by the same grid risks falling into orthopedic thinking, which results in silencing and denying theoretical imagination to these groups. As it was argued in the previous section, this form of analyzing peace as a category product of the summation of separate aspects and indicators added together may not coincide with the way these societies perceive peace, in case they have a separate objetified concept of peace. The authors attempt to identify and compare psychological, cultural, social, ethical and religious structures of these groups to explain peace, reflects their own assumptions, As Alastair McIntosh puts forward,

(…) the reductionist worldview is blind to alternative ways of knowing such as aesthetic sensibility, inner vision, intuition and mystical experience (which can be empirically studied). It has canonised reason alone, but a dwarfed reason that rattles around in the vacuum of its own echo chamber, imagining itself to have trumped the divine mystery (McIntosh, 2012: 43).

To illustrate this, Semai people, a group of Orang Asli, Malaysian Aborigines, included in the Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies, do not conceive peace as a separate category, “(…) equality, sustainability and peace, rather than existing as
three separate cultural ideals or attributes, are intertwined and interconnected” (Gomes, 2012: 1062).

Although I will not extend on the details, anthropologist Alberto Gomes (2012) explains how Semai knowledge is connected with nature and embedded in cultural and religious practices and beliefs. These reveal an eco-centric perspective which is translated in a respectful relation with nature. Spiritual practices underpin physical reality –there is no separation between the sacred and the secular– and shapes ecological knowledge. The centrality of nature as part of Semai identity is manifested in their relation with the past, since history is expressed through the place where an event took place rather than temporalized.

Concerning practices that foster social cohesion, Semai people are organized through a consensual political system that promotes inclusion and discourages the imposition of power. Sharing and reciprocity are generalized practices that have a moral and economic component, they serve to balance possible inequalities and avoid accumulation. In that sense, cooperation and interdependence is not at odds with individual autonomy, understood as social flexibility rather than individualism. Land ownership is another cohesive aspect of Semai people since it is not held privately but through a communal system that assures access to land and resources on an equal basis. The communal ownership entails not only humans but spirits too, to whom permission has to be asked for before working the land.

These tenets, beliefs and practices are conducive to peace. Conflicts are avoided and when they arise, strategies for resolving conflicts in a nonviolent way are employed.
Gomes (unpublished work) accounts of the implications on Semai lives of the increasing contact with modernity and capitalism. Commoditization, privatization and over-exploitation of resources result in the impoverishment of their lives in economic, social and cultural ways and the displacement of their traditional knowledges, values, perceptions and practices.

Semai, as other indigenous groups referred to in the previous chapter, do not suit Cartesian ontology, their knowledge is interconnected with their everyday practices. Nature, economy, relations with the past and other social and religious practices are interconnected. Therefore, to isolate and objectify peace from these practices assimilating Semai worldviews to Western concepts denies validity to Semai knowledge and subjectivity. As it was argued in the previous chapter, this is a manifestation of the imposition by modern science of the conception of knowledge-as-regulation, rather than knowledge-as-emancipation, the former conceives knowledge as order, the latter, as solidarity (Santos, 2007b). In that sense, scholars from different disciplines (Gomes, 2012; McIntosh, 2012; Santos, 2010, 2007b) call to learn from and with these discarded epistemologies instead of learning about them:

“[W]e can learn to seek unity less by attempting to recruit others as subcontractors to build our own utopias, or by trying to find a monolithic "truth of nature" to impose on the world, and more through solidarity with subordinate groups pursuing, on different terrains, purposes that may be related to our own. That solidarity requires that even our most cherished dichotomies be challenged by the stories other societies tell” (Lohman, 1993).

Conclusions

The four cases analyzed in this chapter evidence the unequal relations between different forms of knowledge. Despite the existent proposals to expand the
epistemological limits of the discipline, a narrow view of science characterized by a positivist epistemology pervades peace studies.

The hegemonic subject of the scientist conditions and defines the premises of the conversation, labelling, ordering, classifying, and imposing his/her own views on other realities through a narrow vision that discriminates and ignores what he/she considers not to be convenient for the re-ordering of the world. Therefore, in these examples, the attempted intercultural dialogue covered in the previous chapter turns into a dialogue between peace researchers.

Through this Western lens, peace, either singular or plural, is conceived as an unquestioned universal concept to which other cultures will be brought into – mainly through appropriation or assimilation – turned into raw material for the production of theory and presented in an objectified form. Inscribing Western concerns and conceptual tools onto other people strange to them is what has been called orthopedic thinking.

The consequence of these orthopedic peace is the exclusion and devaluation of other forms of knowledge and practices, discarding, silencing and removing other people from their ways of experiencing the world, thereby maintaining imperialist relations of epistemological domination, a reflection of economic, social and political relations.

Next chapter proposes what Santos (2010) called “sociology of absences” and a move to knowledge-as-solidarity. It proposes to look at Fulani worldviews and practices, and attempts to establish dialogues with Heimatkunde from Germanic tradition, and with Aymara cosmologies.
Chapter III

Fulani Cosmology

Introduction

To overcome the metonymic reason—the one that asserts to be the only form of rationality—that characterizes the four cases analyzed in the previous chapter, De Sousa Santos (2007a, 2007b, 2009) proposes “the sociology of absences”, a procedure oriented to reveal that the non-existent has been actively produced as no-existent. As it was discussed in the first chapter, according to Santos there are five major forces that lead to the production of non-existence: the monoculture of knowledge, the monoculture of linear time, the monoculture of the naturalization of the difference, the monoculture of the dominant scale and the monoculture of the productivist logic. To question the monoculture of knowledge, which this thesis is focused upon, Santos (2007c) formulates the necessity of an “ecology of knowledges” that identifies and puts into dialogue forms of knowledges, values, practices, beliefs, and other criteria of rigor that seek a global cognitive justice, since, as it has been contended, forms knowledge and of existence cannot be delinked from politics.

In a similar vein, Gomes (2012) calls for the recovery of marginalized indigenous knowledges, for the ecologically sensitive values and principles that sustain them may contribute to question and shift current economic and ecologic paradigms. Recovery is not meant as a look to the past in the search for idyllic and romanticized lifestyles, but as a look to currently existing and resisting perspectives of people that creatively combine their lifestyle with the forces of modernity. As Leonhard Praeg (2014: 14) posits, the point is not to tell the “world about lost, ancient
civilizations because they are interesting, but because every act of recollection is an act of struggle that seeks to make a point.”

In accordance with that, this chapter focuses on certain facets of Fulani, concretely of Wodaabe Fulani nomadic herders from Niger, knowledge, practices, and beliefs. To this effect, I draw on ethnographic and linguistic accounts, and on initiatory tales and mythological texts from Fulani oral tradition.

This chapter is organized in four sections. The first section briefly situates Fulani and Wodaabe, and defines my position concerning ethnicity. The second section covers Fulani cosmology, specifically the role of the cow and the milk in their economic, social, spiritual and cultural practices. The third section focuses on the moral code of Fulani and presents a case of conflict resolution by means of its application. The fourth section proposes first, a look into Fulani relations with the environment, their conceptions of place and their connection to the land; and second, a comparison with other traditions that share similar concerns, namely Heimatkunde from the German speaking tradition, and Aymara cosmology through the work of Rodolfo Kusch and his philosophy of estar.

3.1 Introductory considerations

Fulani people, with a population of circa 15 million, live scattered in more than a dozen countries, from the Senegal to the Nile rivers, being only a majority in Guinea Conakry (Fig. 1). The disparity of political, social, economic and environmental contexts, and the derived interactions, shape their activities, and worldviews in different ways. Consequently, and following feminist approaches that consider identity as multiple, and their formation dynamic, contextual, negotiated and tied to their historical and political contexts (Loftsdottir, 2001, 2007), it would be too
adventurous to provide any general statement about Fulani identity as a monolithic and homogenous ethnic group in spite that, as some scholars (Gordon, 2000; Sow, 2005) posit, their sense of identity and kinship transcends national boundaries.

As Terence Ranger (1999; quoted in Lotftsldotti, 2007: 67) argues, concepts like tribe and ethnicity have been associated with African societies in an essentialist manner. Therefore, since I am going to prioritize ethnicity, certain aspects have to be considered, for ethnonyms, as the term Fulani, risk of being assigned with a single reference (Amselle, 1998: 46). Some anthropologists (Barth, 1969; Wimmer, 2013) stress the role of boundary making, and social closure expressed “along ethnic lines” (Wimmer, 2013: 14), rather than shared, objective, defined cultural traits to establish ethnic distinctions in a society. Thereby, “two ethnic groups should differ in worldviews and values only if the boundary between them is marked by high levels of exclusion and closure” (Wimmer, 2013: 14). Thus, the focus on ethnicity is not understood as objectively defined cultures, but as the subjective forms in which social groups define the boundaries “by pointing to specific diacritics that distinguished them from ethnic others” (Wimmer, 2008: 23).
Another aspect not to be overlooked is the colonial influence on identity formation and the reification on ethnicity. Jean Loup Amselle (1998: xiii) puts forward that the colonial administrators’ rigid attempt to organize and define human diversity transformed existing “chains of societies”, flexible and interconnected, into different institutionalized ethnic groups. The author illustrates this by questioning the concept of Fulani in itself. In that sense, anthropologists (Amselle, 1998; Breedveld and De Bruijn, 1996) argue that the construction of Fulani ethnic group is linked to nineteenth and early twentieth century historiography and anthropology. The idea of racial struggle transposed to West Africa by historians placed different races as conqueror and conquered, and situated a fantasized Fulani origin outside of the Black African context. Inquiry on their origin and the quest for a Fulani essence continues today focusing on the construction of Fulani herders as a “self-sufficient enclave” (Amselle, 1998: 46) independent of their context. On the contrary, Fulani as an entity is the result of continuous modifications of political and religious formations (Amselle, 1998: 49). However, Breedveld and De Brujin (1996) differ with Amselle arguing that it is not that Fulani did not exist before colonization, but the colonial and the postcolonial states altered and reinforced ethnicity.

Without denying the importance of colonial and postcolonial powers in shaping and stiffening ethnic categories, to overemphasize this angle of ethnicity might simplify and reduce to colonial constructions the complexity of ethnic boundary making. This might be at odds with the idea of the fluidity and contextuality of identities, for it completely displaces Fulani agency on colonial and postcolonial states, and ignores “the embodied experience of cultural understandings of the world” (Loftsdottir, 2001: 282) which provide meaning to belonging to a specific group (Loftsdottir, 2007: 82-83; 2001: 281-282). The latter point is particularly significant.
since, as it will be broaden in this section, Fulani sense of identity is understood as closely linked to their conceptualization of the environment, coming their cosmology and organization of the world from their everyday physical experience with the environment and animals (Loftsdottir, 2001; Sow, 2005, 2006). In that sense, following Anthony Smith (1999: quoted in Loftsdottir, 2007: 67), “earlier ethnic ties and memories” have to be taken into account without ignoring that these ties and memories can acquire different meaning in a continuous changing process of meaning construction, and can be used differently depending on the context and the individual. The dynamic conception of life and identity is expressed in the Fulani proverb, “A man has not been completely created until his death” (Sow, 2001: 557).

Fulani recognized themselves originally by their language, Fulfulde, and by their economic activity, the transhumant bovine livestock breeding. This identity trait was broaden by their incorporation of Islam and its territorial expansion in which they actively participated; later, with French colonialism they were established within the limits of the current nation-states. Fulani traditionally distinguished between Ful’be na’i (cow fulbe), nomadic herders; Ful’be diina (book fulbe), linked to Islam teaching and Koranic schools; and Ful’be tube (drum fulbe), who held power in big territories and ancient states (Sow, 2006: 2-3).

Today, Fulani differentiate between Fui’be si’iire (town fulbe) and Ful’be na’i. The latter can be found in a variety of settings and occupations; some may live as sedentary combining agriculture and shepherding, others have a semi-nomadic lifestyle although living in agricultural areas from where they organize their displacements, whereas certain groups, like Wodaabe, carry a nomadic transhumant life.

1 “Tant que l’homme n’est pas mort, il n’a pas fini d’etre cree” (Sow, 2001: 557 my translation).
Fulbe’si’iire, which constitute the majority of Fulani population, participate in the activities of the big city and modern life with no direct relation to pastoral practices, although anchored to the bush and their villages of origin by their family ties to whom they entrust their cattle (Sow, 2001: 557, 2006: 2). This strong link to the family and the place of origin is maintained from Senegal until the West side of Niger, where the four initial Fulani clannish surnames are still functional (Sow, 2006). Besides the clannish link, Fulani sense of kinship is illustrated by the concept dyokkèrè endan, meaning to “follow the sap of the tree” (Gordon, 2000: 314), a metaphor which calls to maintain family, in-laws, and community ties and bonds of solidarity. Moreover, the instrumental use of ethnicity in certain postcolonial West African countries contributes to maintain the sense of ethnic affiliation (Gordon, 2000: 314-315).

Wodaabe Fulani live mainly in the southeastern side of Niger, bordering with Chad and Nigeria (see Fig. 2). They are transhumant herders that live in mobile communities, whose size depends on the season, that cover the Sahelian range in a planned way. This area is characterized by dry heat, and low rain rates, fluctuating from year to year. The region soil is classified as sub-arid, not very fertile and with sparely distributed trees (Loftsdottir, 2001).
Migrations, despite the existing certain household autonomy, are planned by a council of men of the community. During the rainy season, from May to June, short-distance mobility is constant and groups remain closer, whereas during the dry season they settle dispersedly next to wells and pastures closer to sedentary and agricultural populations, thereby reducing interactions within the community, and increasing them with members of other ethnic and social groups. These interactions are significant for economic exchanges take place, mainly millet for milk, the two main tenets of Wodaabe nourishment (Loftsdottir, 2001; Schareika, 2010).

3. 2 The cow and the milk

The cow plays a central role not only in the economic life, but in the symbolic too. Fulani herders society revolves around the cow and its needs, it is considered as a gift of God, therefore a relation of cooperation and reciprocity is established, taking care of each other (Loftsdottir, 2001). The strong presence of the cow dates back to their origin myth: two siblings suddenly started to speak an unknown language, scared, their parents rejected them, the children wandered through the bush until they reached the shore of a lake where they lit a fire. Cows started to emerge slowly from
the water, the children became herders and the cows their herd. Isolated because of the language the two siblings ended up getting married. Their offspring, the Fulani, inherited a herd and a language (Sow, 2006:1-2).

The cow in Wodaabe Fulani society exemplifies the symbolic, social and economic role of the animals (Sow, 2006, 2005; Riesman, 1977; Loftsdottir, 2001). It provides milk and transforms shrubs for human production in the Sahelian environment. Moreover, it is integrated and an active participant in the social system. They assist and attend to life transitions ceremonies like birth, death and marriage. It is part of the habana’i, a system of distribution of cattle through loans and gifts that helps to reduce risks and inequalities within communities, and contributes to establish social relationships. Woodabe Fulani raise, among others, a particular breed of cows, the Mbororo, linked to their identity as a group. This cow is characterized by having a close bind to the breeder to whom it obeys and responds, but does not cooperate with strangers making them very difficult to steal. The Mbororo are known for being independent and fierce, and are considered by the Woodabe as semi- domesticated animals, and having djikku or character, a quality that Fulani associate with humans. As it will broaden throughout the next sections, to lose self-control is considered as a negative quality in humans (Riesmann, 1977: 226), therefore to associate djikku to cows, conceived as animals with independent personalities, puts them at the same level than humans. Another sign of the intimacy with the cow is that, in contrast to other animals, cows carry the same name as their mothers in a systematic way. This matrilineal system creates a link of continuity with the past, since different animals carry the same name that their forebears’. Thus the relation with the cow is not only based on reason and instrumental uses, but these are inseparably linked with emotions like affection. Since the wellbeing of the cow implies the wellbeing of the people, the
relation established is not one of dominance but of reciprocity and equality. *Sibiiru* is another practice that exemplifies the bond between people, land and cattle. After a child is born, his/her umbilical cord is buried next to the wood pieces that hold the calf rope for milking. This links birth to the land. The twofold meaning of *sibiiru*, navel and umbilical cord, shows a sense of continuity, the nourishing bond is not cut after birth. The fact of digging it in a symbolic place next to another rope which represents livestock and nourishment reinforces this sense of continuity associating the womb to cattle –their form of nourishment–, and to the land of origin. As it will be argued in the following sections, cows play an important role in Wodabee conceptualization of the environment; they function as mediators between the bush and the village (Loftsdottir, 2001; Riesman, 1977). What is nature and what is society is flexible for Wodabee, sometimes dichotomized, others not, and cows play a key role in it (Loftsdottir, 2001: 287-289).

Milk is another fundamental element in Fulani society for nourishing, economic and symbolic reasons. According to Fulani mythology, the universe created by Gueno sprang from a drop of milk containing the four cardinal points, and from it emerged an hermaphrodite bovine, symbol of the universe. Gueno entrusted the cattle to Tyanaba, a mythical snake who took them out of the waters, from the ocean to the Débo Lake, assisted by a herder and his wife, Koumen and Foroforoundou. This couple was in charge of unveiling the initiatory secrets of shepherding to those who want to dedicate their lives to it (Ba and Dieterlen, 1961: 199). Fulani descriptions of paradise portray a garden where rivers of milk flow, it is the reward of pure souls. The religious component of milk appears in everyday practices, taboos, and ceremonies like baptism or marriage (Sow, 2005: 439).
Therefore, milk is one of the vital energies of the camp. It has a strong identity component, almost narcissistic; it is offered and shared with any guest or member of the community as part of the pulaaku code of conduct to which I will refer later. Drinking it is associated with physical and moral wellbeing and beauty.

Since cows are rarely sold and never sacrificed for intensive butchery or to feed the family, milk represents the main nourishing and economic source that the cattle provide (Sow, 2005: 425). The two mentioned elements, the cow and the milk, determine the division of tasks within the family. While men are in charge of the cattle management, surveillance and displacement, women’s tasks cover everything related to milk management: collection, transformation, commercialization, and medical and aesthetic uses. “Milk belongs to women” (Sow, 2006: 4), says the Fulani proverb. The role of women is important for the transmission of all the knowledges and practices related to these processes (Sow, 2006: 3).

If the cow is considered as a gift of god, milk is the raison d’être of the Fulani herder. When it is abundant, it is consumed in every meal as a drink or as the main ingredient of the dish. Therefore, Fulani practices and knowledges revolve around obtaining milk, not only about obtaining quantity but also quality. These entail the knowledge about the bush, selection and management of pastures, the caring and selection of the cattle, the production of a variety of products for different, and their storage, conservation and commercialization (Sow, 2005).

Concerning the property of cattle, it belongs first to the family, and then, at a symbolic level, to the whole community. Each member of the couple contributes to the family cattle with their own cows, and children receive a cow as a present when

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1 “Aux femmes appartient le lait” (my translation).
born or after certain initiatory rituals (Sow, 2006:3). In spite of the autonomy and flexibility of the familial unit, Fulani herders tend to assemble in higher forms of social integration. Cooperation is needed for migration, protection of the cattle, information sharing and efficient occupation of the pastureland, cohabitation and political alliances (Schreika, 2010:4). This familial and individual autonomy, which suits more easily the transhumant lifestyle, is not at odds with a community sense. This is explained by Eduard Spranger (1952, in Kockel, 2012: 61) with the ecologically based concept of individuality as “existential connectedness”, rather than to the egocentric and insular concept of individualism. This point will be covered later in detail.

Fulani lifestyle, like that of other transhumant people, has been labeled as stagnant and traditionalist, and their economy, precariously self-sufficient, contemplative and technically retarded (Puillon, 1990; Khazhanov, 2001). This is, to certain extent, a paradox considering the mobility, dynamism, and the adaptive solutions found in face of the challenges of their political and environmental contexts. This discourse, recurrent among state officers and development agents, is rooted in the construction of the image of nomads as culturally isolated, archaic societies, to which coeval is denied (Fabian, 1983), and serves to legitimize paternalist, external development interventions in order to break with this archaic heritage (Puillon, 1990).

François Pouillon (1990: 175) proposes to replace the triad isolation-specialization-stagnation that sustains the afore-mentioned discourse, by another model based on flexibility-relation-multiple resources, which adjusts better to economic practices of Fulani herders. For, all along history organic relations have been established with markets, neighboring agricultural communities, villages, and
states. The author enhances (Pouillon, 1990: 176) that Fulani idiosyncrasy appears at its best when having to negotiate the validity of their strategies with forces that surpass them.

Nevertheless, from a political ecology perspective, isolation would not be removed from the model but translated into marginalization, which may not be incompatible with relation, but derived from certain relations. In other words, marginalization is produced by contact with dominant groups – in this case, colonial and postcolonial states, and international aid (Pouillon, 1990) – , making “otherwise environmentally innocuous production systems undergo transition to overexploitation of natural resources on which they depend” (Robbins, 2004: 159). The author posits that this contact leads to the cycle of poverty and environmental degradation, which is often attributed to the practices (and ignorances) of traditional, subsistence communities (Robbins, 2004: 117, 159).

Fulani mobility patterns are usually structured according to the season. During the rainy season, the aim is to settle the camp next to a pond, and from there to seek for pasturelands in the nearby. During the dry season the priority is to find water, so the cattle is drawn back next to agricultural communities where reciprocity relations, not exempt of tension, and economic exchanges are possible (Pouillo, 1990; Sow, 2005; Loftsdottir, 2001).

Pouillon (1999: 179-184) accounts how colonial administrators attempt to activate remote, unexploited pasturelands without permanent water ponds. The exploitation of underground water would permit to nourish the cattle during the dry season and to settle and regroup herders within a specific land. The aim was to solve a structural problem derived from the increasing space provided for agriculture,
reducing pastureland. The initial success led to a reduction of mobility as expected, but at mid-term it brought a lot of imbalances that showed the inefficacy of the settlements provoked an increasing self-subsistence economy. The contract between sedentary and nomadic populations was broken, interrupting the economic flow, and impending temporaries combination of agriculture and shepherding. The characteristics of arid zones with low rains, unequal distribution of pasturelands and periodic droughts demand mobility along bigger areas. Instead of concentration, colonial measures provoked the dissemination of Fulani herders. To that it must be added that the appearance of new sicknesses stemming from underground waters reduced livestock and increased the dependency on veterinary. Therefore, Fulani herders engaged in what they call *perol*, among the different word used to refer to mobility, this is associated to out of the ordinary migrations for adaptive purposes in case of political and ecological difficulties, being forced to abandon *gari*, or the area of attachment.

The postcolonial state and international development projects oriented to intensify production to strengthen and integrate Fulani herders into an expanding meat market – restructuring cattle breeding methods– have sharpened Fulani strategies to respond and correct imbalances. Pouillon (1990: 188-189) posits that Fulani logic concerning these proposals presented as progress does not fully respond to the dichotomy tradition/modernity, for there are as many convergences as divergences between Fulani societies and development actors.

Due to the marginalization derived from the state policies and the periodic severe droughts which result in the loss of livestock, Fulani herders diversify their economic activities ranging from agriculture to urban migration in order to obtain income to reestablish the cattle. Hence, Wodaabe migrate to big cities to engage
mainly in craft selling to tourists. This has led to an increasing interest on Wodaabe people in the West, portraying them as a traditional, exotic people that live outside of history and time. Therefore, relations with Westerns are framed within power imbalances. Westerns, from their privileged position, seek authenticity in the increasing poverty of Fulani herders, whereas the latter resort to the commodification of their culture as a subsistence strategy (Loftsdottir, 2001: 11-13).

3. 3 Pulaaku

The person, Neddo, is thought to be composed by multiple persons, Neddaaku. According to Iba Fall (2010: 140-142), this reflects the different aspects of the container, Neddo, which veils more realities than what it shows. It is not only through the social aspect the Neddo finds equilibrium, but through an inner work that orders, balances, and masters this concentric and superimposed inner multiplicity. I will focus in this section on the social aspect of the Fulani person.

Pulaaku is a moral code that guides Fulani conduct and interpersonal relations within a community of herders (Sow, 2006; Loftsdottir, 2001; Riesman, 1977). Amselle (1998: 44) posits these values are not exclusive to Fulani, since similar codes exist in neighboring societies. The author’s assertion is with in line with his deconstructive attempt of Fulani identity, the latter consider Pulaaku as one of their distinctive identity traits. Whether distinctive or not, these shared values may explain why Pulaaku can be used, and accepted as a social institution that shapes relations with other ethnic and social groups outside of the community (Riesman, 1977).

Paul Riesman (1977: 124) translates the term as “the qualities appropriation to the Fulani” and also refers to it as the group of people possessing these qualities. For
Fulani linguist, Salamatou Sow (2006), it has the twofold meaning of moral code and community.

*Pulaaku* entails conventional rules of politeness and the moral qualities of an ideal behavior in social life, whose central element is the mastery of needs, impulses and discomforts. (Breedveld and De Bruijn, 1996: 802; Riesman, 1977). This contributes to social cohesion since *pulaaku* does not emerge from the individual but on the necessary presence of others, who will examine the acts of the individual in the light of this ideal. At the same time, not following *pulaaku* risks dismembering a group; an individual who lacks *pulaaku* is considered as not being who he/she claims to be, therefore it may become the object of criticism, ostracism or ridicule (Riesman, 1977: 138).

The moral aspect consists of four tenets: *hakkillo*, understood as wisdom, common sense, prudence; *seemtende*, shame, reserve, self-control; *munyal*, resilience, patience; and *teddengal*, respect. This code of conduct is used for conflict resolution and mutual agreement since it allows to preserve the autonomy of the community by avoiding to resort to legal or political institutions (Schareika, 2010; Riesman, 1977; Breedveld and Mirjam De Bruijn, 1996).

*Pulaaku* is the reference that frames the mediation and negotiation processes of two conflicting sides. *Pulaaku* is used in political discourses and can shape political events depending on its strategic use. This not only occurs by means of its moral values, but the term itself is appealed to as a rhetoric resource during negotiations. Its conflict resolution significance is outlined when the situation of Fulani herders requires dealing with internal conflict without resorting to state authorities (Schareika, 2010).
Wodaabee political organization rests mainly on the leadership of male elders of every household, integrated in bigger social units, wuro which result from kinship, co-residence, joint migration, pastoral cooperation, political alliances and intermarriage. These are ruled by a traditional leader, lamiido, who, in its turn, is subordinated to a traditional regional leader. The state makes itself present in pastoral communities by means of the social association of the traditional regional leaders to state officers. The former have a limited influence on daily economic, social and juridical life of wuro, being their function reduced to tax-collecting and “a generally accepted yet loose leadership role in lineage and clan affairs” (Schareika, 2010: 209). Wodaabee, and other nomadic groups, reliance on the state is rare even when protection of the cattle or access to public wells is needed. This is due to the reluctance and disdain of the state towards nomads, and the mistrust on the uncertain and arbitrary outcomes of state interventions. (Schareika, 2010: 209-210).

Nicholaus Schareika (2010: 215-217) documents an episode of mediation by a Lamiido and the elders of two Wodaabee families in conflict because of a wife stealing accusation. Right from the beginning of their statement the accusing party argued that pulaaaku had been abandoned. This implied that the agreement that the basic agreement had been broken and the doors were opened for the state laws intervention. The consequences of this would result in the loss of autonomy of the community, and economic fines that had to be paid with cattle. The speaker referred to the loss of the track of the cattle – one of the two images to evoke the pulaaaku – to summarize the situation in the community.

The intervention of the other conflicting part alluded to the other image of the pulaaaku, the rope of the cattle, to present his view of the situation, arguing that the track had not been lost, but the rope had thinned. In this way he turned the argument
of the other part maintaining *pulaaku* as a valid framework, and at the same time he touched the sensitive point of the inconvenience of community separation. In that sense Schareika (2010: 216-217) posits,

> the duty of the assembled Wodaabe was to retie the rope of *pulaaku*, [which] emerges when humans master conflicts by sticking to the personal virtue of *pulaaku*, which is self-control, reserve, and the ability to endure duress instead of seeking confrontation.

At that point, the *Lamido* called for the “shameful reserve” (Schareika, 2010: 217) as the practical expression of *Pulaaku* and as a way of resolving the conflict by mutual agreement instead of retaliation or resorting to the law. His speech condenses the core of the *pulaaku* as community and moral code (Schareika, 2010: 217):

> Community of Fulbe [*Pulaaku*], wherever you hear the word of *pulaaku*, does that mean that one seizes a person in order to give him a dressing-down? When Bammoowo [from the Muuse] slapped your son's face, Ardo Kaad'o [from the Jiijiiru], [and] you kept him away from retaliating the blow, did not Bammoowo feel ashamed? Didn't he do as one does when feeling ashamed? You see, this is *pulaaku*, only this. When you hear "they mock at us, they do this or that against us, let's take them to court," then there is not a grain of *pulaaku* in that, or am I not telling the truth? When the bad talk makes enemies of you, then give it up. This is *pulaaku*. You understand?

To show reserve to the culprit provokes his embarrassment and enhances his own previous abandonment of *pulaaku*. Moreover, it reaffirms the moral code as an “alternative political order” (Schareika, 2010: 217) which maintains the autonomy and self-control of the community away from the state authorities. For involving the state would imply the reduction of property in the community (cattle), and would define the frame for their future interactions.

Ostracism is the sanction for the lack of *pulaaku*; the culprit is not expelled from the community but it is temporary excluded from social intercourse by not speaking to him. The ceremony of reincorporation consists of asking for forgiveness
to the elders, and offering millet and milk to the community. However, as in the case accounted here, this resource does not work when the conflicting parts represent a big number of the community. In this case, the mention of the separation represents a first warning before adopting harsher measures in case of a recurrent abandon of *pulaaku*. In light of the receding access to pastures the need for unity, not only within Wodaabe communities but with other nomadic herders, turns *pulaaku* into a political resistant resource in order to try to balance the weight of the state (Schareïka, 2010: 220-222).

Another resource employed to relief tensions, mainly with members of other ethnic group, are the joking relationships (Riesman, 1977:124), consisting in bantering, cursing and teasing. *Cousinage à plaisanterie* is a practice promoted by the Nigerien state, and celebrated as a cultural trait that fosters peaceful cohabitation between the different ethnic groups of the country (Barké, 2008). This is related to what Gomes (2012: 1069) calls “sly civility” to refer to the “form of civility which conceals or evades the true feelings of a person to avoid reprisals, humiliation or oppression.” The author posits that the unequal status may determine the use of this strategy oriented to avoid a bigger conflict.

3. 4 The place where people sit down

The relation of the Fulani herders with the environment is based on values of integration, respect and protection. Mamadou Dia (1975; quoted in Fall, 2010: 41)\(^1\) refers to it as a friendship relationship:

\[\text{"La nature, loin de s’opposer à l’homme, lui assure sa vie, son efficacité, sa protection. Il suffit de ne pas la blesser, de respecter les liens qui l’unissent à l’homme (…). Il n’est donc pas la question, dans le cadre de cette mentalité, d’une lutte entre la nature et l’homme, mais d’une communion constante, et tout l’activité de l’homme tend à maintenir cette harmonie dont la rupture ne peut engendrer des catastrophes." (my translation)}\]
“Nature, far from being the opposite of the human being, it assures its life, efficacy and protection. It just requires not hurt it. (…). Thereby, this relation does not consist of a struggle between humans and nature, but a constant communion; all human activity tends to maintain this harmony whose rupture can only engender catastrophes.”

This statement is in tune with Fulani oral tradition. After the creation, whose myth was mentioned above, Gueno created *Neddo*, the human being, as a synthesis of all the elements of the universe, both positive and negative, without bestowing him/her the supremacy over the rest of the creation. The only difference between humans and the rest is that *Neddo* was bestowed with a partial knowledge, not the totality of it, which gave him the competence and the mission to act as a caretaker of the universe. Therefore, the role of *Neddo*, was to protect and to *manage* nature (Amougou, 2007: 11).

The importance of a harmonic relation with each other and with nature is exemplified in Fulani mythology by the tale of the country of Heli et Yoyo: an idyllic place created by Gueno where harmony, happiness, life and abundance reigned, and where humans were supposed to be the caretakers of nature. This contract between Gueno and *Neddo* which allowed them to obtain from nature what was strictly necessary was broken when the inhabitants of the country started to abuse of nature and to behave greedily to each other. *Njeddo Dewal*, the sorcerer who brought sickness, poverty, natural catastrophes, and death of animals, represents the disruption of the interdependence and natural harmony caused by humans. The arrival of Bâ Wam’ndé, personifying the initial moral virtues of humans, helped to reestablish the contract (Amougou, 2007:12-13). Thus, in Fulani traditional thought the relation between humans and nature is of interdependence and respect, and the knowledge of humans is at the service of a harmonious and balanced relation with the environment.
On a physical level, the conceptualization of the environment and the relation with it is a core element of Fulani sense of identity. Although expressed in seemingly contradictory ways, their conceptualization of the environment is complex and contextual. In the context of their relations with sedentary populations, Wodaabee Fulani called themselves “people of the bush” outlining their social and economic links with the environment and considering the town and the bush as oppositions, positioning themselves as part of the bush (Loftsdottir, 2001: 281). However, within the context of the bush and the animals, they see themselves as separated from nature, differentiating between the non-socialized and socialized space, ladde (bush) and wuro respectively, the latter translated as home (Loftsdottir, 2001), or community (Riesman, 1977).

Wuro, as it was stated earlier, is not merely a house, but a temporary assembly of social and political mobile organizations joined by kinship, political and neighborhood ties (Riesman, 1977: 30). From the perspective of wuro, Wodaabe place themselves as a part of the bush, although differentiated from the rest of the surrounding bush. Wuro is a place of safety and cooperation in contrast to ladde. There are several different concepts of ladde according to level of intimate knowledge that people has of it. Ladde wati is an overpopulated bush, with agricultural fields, no wild animals, and cut down trees. In contrast, ladde hurram is a space without human population, wells or water ponds (Loftsdottir, 2001: 285). This is considered unsafe and dangerous, and occupied by ginnol, evil spirits, that stay away from wuro and normally appear when travelling alone in the bush. Thus, ginnol functions as a cohesive element and outlines the importance of social networking, since ginnol can affect wuro as a “moral reminder of solidarity” (Loftsdottir, 2001: 292), when a wealthy herder does not engage in habana’i, or cattle distribution practices.
Thus, the more intimate the knowledge of ladde, the more secure it becomes. In that sense, the cow, considered a semi-domesticated animal, is believed to be sensitive to both the bush and the herder; therefore it plays the roles of mediators between ladde and wuro, to turn the space into place (Riesman, 1977: 255).

When herders enter the bush to take care of the cow, new and different relationships with nature are established. Concerning land utilization, migrations, and resource management, Fulani use the concept gari, underlining human settlements integrated in the bush. Gari shares with wuro similar connotations of safety, coexistence, reciprocity and cooperation. This is reinforced mainly during the dry season, when camps are separated by bigger distances, settled around a pastureland with permanent wells, and coexisting with other social groups increases, this “area of attachment” or gari, is referred to by Fulani as “the place where people sit down” (Lofstsottir, 2001: 285).

What I want to outline from this account is not the connection of place with Fulani identity, or their position towards a nature/society distinction, but the cultural connections with place and the environment, which are embedded in their knowledge and their practices, and has significant implications at different levels (Kockel, 2012; Basso, 1996; Ingold, 2011).

For Keith Basso (1996: xiv), senses of place reach deep other cultural spheres since they are an active part of “shared bodies of local knowledge”. Thereby gari, wuro and ladde as deep involvements with social and the natural environment are practices that construct knowledge out of the combination of the ecologic, the economic, the social and the spiritual. These experiences apprehend the world by actively sensing a place through dwelling, through “lived relationships” (Basso, 1996: 106) with and within the place. Fulani knowledge suits what Ingold (2000: 25) calls sentient ecology:
(…) the kind of knowledge people have of their environments (…). It is knowledge not of a formal, authorized kind, transmissible in contexts outside those of its practical application. On the contrary, it is based in feeling, consisting in the skills, sensitivities and orientations that have developed through long experience of conducting one’s life in a particular environment.

Ingold (2011: 158-161) distinguishes between the genealogical model and the storied model of knowledge transmission. The former goes together with the transmission of a conceptual and explicative knowledge that vertically places elements on slots regardless of their context, relations, precedents or continuations, since these are not necessary to know what things are. The latter departs from these relations to identify and position the elements, “stories (…) draw together what classifications split apart” (Ingold, 2011: 160), it involves a finer sensitivity to perceive and respond to signs in the environment. Sentience ecology and the storied model go hand in hand with what the author calls an “ontology of dwelling” (Ingold, 2000: 42), referred to in the previous chapter, a way of apprehending the world out of engagement rather than building and representation. Ingold (2011: 162) concludes:

Thus knowing is relating the world around you, and the better you know, the greater the clarity and depth of your perception. To tell, in short, is not to represent the world but to trace a path through it that others can follow.

“Wisdom sits in places places”, assert the Apache (Basso, 1996: 124). Similar concerns to the concepts of wuro, ladde and gari as active relations to places of belonging through dwelling and deep knowledge of them, are expressed, among others, in the German speaking tradition by the controversial concepts Heimat and Heimatkunde, which scholars (Kockel, 2012; Daum, 2007) call to revisit and reclaim.

Nineteenth century Heimatkunde was based on Volkskunde – a German discipline focused on the study of people and traditions – and included on school curricula as the
sensory and experiential study and appreciation of *Heimat* – “the place where we come from” (Kockel, 2012: 59) – within a larger world, by moving from the familiar to the unfamiliar (Kockel, 2012, 2010). Its ideological use by romantic regionalists first, and the misappropriation by Nazis later, led to a vilification of the concept, and its association with parochialism, territorialism and intolerance. Hence its consequent replacement after WWII as a school subject first by *Sachkunde* (knowledge of things) material oriented and with a cosmopolitan approach, and later by the more objectifying and detached *Umweltkunde*, the study of the environment (Kockel, 2009).

Ullrich Kockel (2012: 57) draws on the work of philosopher Eduard Spranger to propose a revision of *Heimat* that fosters a better understanding of the self and the other by considering them all as a part of a common local household, which expands the concept of *Heimat* to the place where we are *from* or *towards*. Hence, *Heitmakunde* is defined as

> the careful appreciation of the connectedness of human beings in all their natural and spiritual life-relationships with a particular place on earth, which is their native place or at least a place of permanent dwelling (Kockel, 2012: 59).

Spranger (1952; in Kockel, 2012: 59-60) outlines the grounded sense of *Heimat*, and the deep experiential connections of oneself with the elements of the place, human, non-human, past, present and future, needed to develop it. This is not necessarily created by being born in a place, but by “living oneself into a place” (Kockel, 2010: 105), either of birth or far away from it.

To the above stated criticism received by this position for its similitudes with Nazi terminology and its emphasis on the local and the connectivity, it must be added that ecological basis of it was considered as an eccentric obstacle to progress in post-war
Germany (Daum, 2007; Kockel, 2012). Thus, departing from Spranger, Kockel argues that a reestablishment of Heimat is needed, beyond parochial, melancholic and romanticized stances, since globalization and environmental crisis affect the material and spiritual aspects of place, leading to its disappearance, turning Heimat into an abstraction rather than an experience (Kockel, 2012; 62).

The author introduces a related German concept, Hiesige, “from-here-ness” (Kockel, 2012: 62), to distinguish it from being native. Hiesige is about the encompassing encounter of the self and the other rather. Constructing Heimat leads to become Hiesig, from here, a comprehensive, inclusive and ecologically grounded anchor which differs from being native in that the latter does not necessarily entail “the recognition of concrete cultural-ecological networks and their everyday actuality” (Kockel, 2009: 152) of the experience of Heimat. Therefore, being from here is not so much about nationality, ethnicity or religion, but about being defined in active relation to a particular place of dwelling which may even include movement” (Kockel, 2012: 66; italics in the original). This movement from A to B, in the light of being from here, becomes being now here, not understood as detachment and displacement, unconcerned by the connectedness of the individual with the past left behind in A for an indeterminate future in B, discarding both. It is not about “seeking out the next horizon, finding Eden in some other locale and ultimately in glory above” (Kockel, 2010: 166).

Being now here is regarded as homecoming, a circular cyclical movement, which “grounds the now deeply in the past and future; it is about at-tachment and re-placement” (Kockel, 2012: 65; italics in the original). It is understood as turning the world into Heimat by achieving “a very clear intuition of what it means to live with integrity right where they are” (Kockel, 2010: 166). Thereby, Heimatkunde proposes a different view of the world by “investing a particular world version with patterns of
meaning generating authentic belonging” (Kockel, 2010: 166) that aspires to create a sense of community which departures and goes beyond the individual.

*Heimatkunde*, is based on three main premises, (i) the world is an organic whole, our knowledge of the world is also organic and interconnected, (iii) the human being is a part “of these organic relationships of life and truth” (Kockel, 2012: 68). The author (Kockel, 2012: 68) contends that connectedness has been widely discussed in and outside academia, therefore, his ecological reading of Spranger puts the emphasis on the engagement with truth and the sacred. Truth, in German, *Wahrheit*, coming from *wahren*, meaning to keep safe, to preserve, is hence understood “as a function of ecological relationships” (Kockel, 2012: 68).

A third element I would like to bring into this discussion aimed at establishing cultural homologies is the Aymara cosmology as expressed in the thought of Argentinian philosopher and ethnographer Rodolfo Kusch.

Kusch’s work with Andean indigenous populations as well as with peasants, workers and *mestizo* populations from rural areas of Bolivia and Argentina seeks not a “scientific exhumation” of people’s thought, but to “reinscribe and rescue” (Mignolo, 2010: xxxiv; italics in the original) a way of thinking, and to think from it, not about it. His rejection of a scientific approach is understood as a de-colonizing act towards the emancipation of being and knowing. This could not be accomplished if these people had to be “authorized by Western epistemology as something to be studied” rather than being considered as “a source, an energy, and a way of thinking” (Mignolo, 2010: xxxiv). Therefore Kusch distances himself from disciplinary categories of thought and social sciences descriptions that were shaped and gave shape to the imperial and colonial world. His personal ethnographic method aims not to represent, translate or
reinterpret indigenous thought, positioning them as objects to be ethnographically explained, but to accompany this thought by attempting “to dwell on the questions, paths and possibilities” (Lugones and Price, 2010: lxvii) of the Andean cosmos. The author does not attempt to contribute to abstract knowledge either, since this knowledge is at the same time a way of thinking, being, feeling, and living engaged with the material world which shape their everyday practices (Mignolo, 2010; Lugones and Price, 2010; Kusch, 2010).

An aspect I do not share with Kusch’s work is his attempt to present it as a radical rupture with Western tradition by seeking for a differentiated thought rooted deeply in, a silenced part of what he calls, América, posited as completely antagonist to a monolithic West (Kusch, 2010: lxxiii). Although my intention is far away from denying the subaltern position, the resistant character, and the emancipatory potential of indigenous and Andean populations thought in relation to the imposition of Western epistemes – as it was covered in the first chapter of the thesis –, Kusch’s epistemic de-linking approach, in line with other Latin American authors – also mentioned in chapter one – may not be in tune with the spirit of this thesis. Notwithstanding, Kusch’s (2010) explicit aim does not impend that aspects of his work can be profitable for this chapter and used in a more conducive to dialogue manner. For the aim of this thesis is to look for shared concerns, commonalities, and legibilities, basically to try to gather together rather than to disjoint silenced epistemologies, and these can be found in the West too, as in the case of Heimatkunde.

For the topic that concerns this section, I am going to focus on a central aspect of Kusch’s work, the notion of estar in opposition to ser as two “irreconcilable ways of situating oneself in the world” (Lugones and Price, 2010: lv). Both Spanish verbs can be translated in English as the verb to be. Ser comes from the Latin sedere, to be sitting
down, and it is used to define and to attribute essences and fixed qualities, in a subordinated relation to the subject, that set the basis to define it. *Estar*, from the Latin *stare*, to stand up, does not convey inherent qualities of the subject, it informs about place, duration, mood or purpose. It has a transitory and restless character that does not change the subject. *Estar* “points directly to the world” (Kusch, 2010: 159), the conditions, circumstances or accidents in which the subject is immersed (Kusch, 2010: 159; Von Matushcka, 1994).

For Kusch (2010), Aymara verb *utcatha* characterizes indigenous sensibility, which is closer to *estar*. *Utcathata* means *estar*, and also, and paradoxically, to be sitting down, and to dwell. The root *Uta* meaning house is also associated to womb, shelter and germination (Kusch, 2010: 5). It indicates passivity, understood as the lack of one particular kind of activity: enterprise. It is a non-instrumental approach to the world, rather than objectifying and controlling it as a separate external reality. “*Estar* (...) situates one within the world, where one senses its volatility, its mutability, its instability, its bearing fruit” (Lugones, 2010: lvi).

Instability is a key notion in Aymara conception of the world. *Kuty* or *vuelco* designates the possibility of a turn, “from the auspicious to the inauspicious” (Kusch, 2010: 44), which is always present, hence for the subject to *estar* bien (*estar* well) he/she must be embedded in a community, *plaza, nayru* or *amu*, that is, a “place of equilibrium in an unstable world” (Lugones, 2010: lvii). This communal sense balances and compensates a instability that cannot completely disappear. The link subject-community-world is inseparable for Aymara. Their conception of cosmos oscillates between two extremes, growth and disintegration. This alternation is perceived by the individual by affectively sensing the “favorable or unfavorable tonality (...) of this movement” (Kusch, 2010: 41), derived from the inseparability of the
individual from the world, rather than from an external *understanding* of the world. The relation of the person to the community and the world has to be dealt at an individual level too. Therefore, *uk’u*, human interiority, “is an opening to affectivity” (Lugones, 2010: lvii), the place to look for solutions to these unfavorable turns without resorting to external interventions. Hence, *Utcathata* is dwelling among these cosmic elements, some of which are hostile forces, in the search of stability. The response to hostility, instead of action, lies in identification with the environment, with the habitat of the here and now (*pacha*), with the communal (Lugones, 2010; Kusch, 2010). Mere *estar* is a vegetal quality, it implies a way of installing oneself in life, an inner movement that uproots from the ground and inserts the individual in a reality (Von Matuschka, 1994: 142-143).

Thus the possibility of *kuty*, the overturn, is integrated in *utcathata*, hence its meaning of seed and source. Ritual’s role is to germinate the seed of life by entering into oneself, inhabiting and contemplating the world from there (Lugones, 2010: liv). The Aymara cosmos, consists of two levels, the *guauque* or the visible, nameable, and tactile, and the unnamable. Both levels are inseparable dimensions of the concrete *Estar*, which, in a dialectic manner, results in a third one, *guaque* which is a “visible presence of the divine, the tactile, physical plane of the sacred object” (Lugones, 2010: liv). *Utcathata* is to inhabit at the intersection of the *guaque*, and at the same time, inwardly accessing to the other levels through the knowledge of ritual that gives “the community its possibility of pulling toward germination, life, metamorphosis” (Lugones, 2010: lv). *Estar* places oneself at the intersection of the *guaque*, and at the same time, things and a vertical line of mystery. From this balancing of the cosmos springs the constant re-creation of community by ritual, and at the same time, the possibility of *estar bien* through *estar con* (*estar* with), that is, through community and solidarity.
This does not occur at the level of abstraction, but at the level of practices that determine everyday life activities (Lugone, 2010; Kusch, 2010: 164).

Kusch (2010: 9- 16) accounts of an episode during a visit to a village, when some of his students proposed an Aymara old man to install a hydraulic bump in order to better irrigate the dry fields of the Andean plateau. The old man withdrew into himself and became more silent and distant. His son, to relief the uncomfortableness of the silence, reluctantly affirmed that they were already thinking about it. After that, the silence continued and they left. For Kusch, his students (and himself) represent the ser understanding of the world. To look for the solution in the outside means to conceive reality as populated by obejcts, etymologically from ob-jacio, to place in front (Kusch, 2010: 11).

For the old man, the pump had no meaning since he relied on his own resources and rituals to balance the situation, rather than to force an external intervention in order to “enter reality impetuously, (…) to foreground the will in his sense of life” (Kusch, 2010: 12). This reality is conceived not as composed by fixed objects, but by intense movements, which need to be affectively sensed in order to respond to “the auspicious or ominous sign of each and every movement” (Kusch, 2010:11). This is regarded as ignorance and passivity from the perspective of the city dweller and their understanding of life based on ser alguien (to be someone) characterized by modifying an external reality based on the logic of causes and effects. Hence, Kusch (2010) reflects on the sense of alienation and dispossession of the city dweller in América in its rejection of the logic of the mere estar, since for the author, to be able to ser it is first necessary to estar, to dwell, to be rooted in a environment, to inhabit with others.
The aim of this section was to present neglected forms knowledge and existing with similar concerns as a step for a further search of commonalities and differences that allow to creatively work together against these common threats. From the three onto-epistemologies presented, the focus has been put on the relations of the individual and the community with the environment, and the importance of the connection with place, rather than space, and the multiple relationships that from there emerge, in order to situate oneself in the world. Martínez Guzmán (2005: 38) outlines the importance of place in contrast to the abstract and homogenizing space, since the former allows empowerment and recognition of the different identities and the implications derived from them. The three cases covered enhance the deep knowledge of the environment and the sense of belonging as embedded with different aspects of life, since it pervades personal economic, spiritual, and ecological relations. This knowledge is not instrumental, classificatory and objectifying, but experiential, sensitive and affective; they enhance the role of the sacred through bodily and material spirituality that reconnects with nature. As Kusch and Kockel in this section, other authors (Williams, Roberts, and McIntosh, 2012) warn against the sense of alienation, dispossession and dislocation of the contemporary human condition amidst ecological and economic current threats.

Without ignoring the social, political, economic and environmental contextual factors that determine these conceptions and practices, to draw practical lessons from them it would be more appropriate to look at the ideals and values and values that sustain them (Gomes, 2012: 1070).

A main difference between these perspectives is the role of the individual in forming a community. For Heimatkunde it is the individual who makes the community – although distinguishing between individuality and individualism–, in the case of Fulani
and Aymara is the other way round. In these two cases, the role of the unknown, *ladde* for Fulani, and the possibility of *kuty* for Aymara, and their association with insecurity play a different role than the concept of *Fremde* in contrast to *Heimat*. For Fulani and Aymara, the unknown and the accident are an integral part of a symbiotic relation with the environment, and it is this deep sensitive knowledge and the practices derived from it that contribute to reduce unsafety and imbalance, although acknowledging the impossibility of a complete overcome.

From a more anthropocentric stance, Martínez Guzmán (2005: 18) reflects on the need to recognize the fragility, humility and earthly nature of the human being in opposition to the self-sufficiency of Western approaches to life. For the author, from the awareness of the fragility of human relations, understood as “the difficulty to foresee the result of what we do to one another” (Martínez Guzmán, 2005: 28), can spring cooperation and reciprocity which leads into politics rather than into violence.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to present several aspects of Fulani nomadic herders knowledge and conceptions of existence in relation with the environment. These show the importance of the cattle, not only as an economic resource, but also reveal an affective relation with it. The cow shapes and participates actively or symbolically different social practices. It is embedded in their moral code, social organization, ritual practices and in their sensitive and ecological understanding of the environment. In their oral texts this is conceived as something to be respected and preserved, which is reflected in respectful and efficient resource management practices.
Despite the mobility of Fulani herders lifestyle, the sense of belonging to the land is established through rituals, sensitive knowledge of it, and the intermediary role of the cattle who contributes to turn the space, which reflects the unknown, the unsafe, the fragility of human condition, into a place of cohabitation, cooperation with ecologically sensitive attitude towards it.

Similar concerns regarding the sense of belonging, the importance of place, and a deep sensuous knowledge of the environment are present in other traditions, as it has been shown in this chapter with the comparative examples of Aymara cosmology from Rodolfo Kusch’s work, and in the German *Heimatkunde*. These concerns are neither alien to peace studies as it is revealed in some aspects of the work of Martínez Guzmán (2005) which enhance the importance of place, the need to recognize fragility, and in the ecological dimension of his peace philosophy which departs from an earthly understanding of human beings.

The parallelism that derives from these epistemological homologies opens the door for further understandings of traditions whose beliefs, values and practices creatively coexist, with the tensions that it implies, with the alienating, individualist, and the linear logic of growth of development and neoliberal epistemes. It is through these resistant and neglected practices and values that lessons can be drawn in the need to face common threats.
General Conclusions

“Nada más hago que escucharte y atender. Estoy preparado para no sé qué.”

(Antonio Rigo, 2014)

This research departed from two main premises. On one side, from the spirit of the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace in its commitment to relieve the suffering in the between humans and with nature, and, on the other side, from De Sousa Santos’ (2007b) tenet that there is no social justice without cognitive justice.

In other words, this thesis departed from the premise that unequal epistemic relations, namely the hegemonic position of modern science, undergird economic, social, political and ecologic relations between humans and with nature, discarding certain groups of people from experiencing the world on their own terms. Furthermore, the consequent impoverishment of the diversity of conceptions, knowledges and practices by dominant narratives of modernity has deprived the world from the creative responses through which these groups of people face economic, social and ecologic threats that, without ignoring contextual, specific differences and privilege positions, are shared by humanity.

Whence, the general objective of this thesis was to inquire on the relation of peace studies with other forms of producing knowledge. Therefore three specific objectives were established:

1) To analyze how epistemological and ontological diversity has been dealt in peace Studies.
2) To situate, problematize and promote the debate on the unequal relations between different forms of knowledge within the frame of the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace and peace studies in general.

3) To explore how peace studies can engage in equal dialogues with other understandings of peace beyond the dominant scientific paradigm

To achieve these main objectives, I organized this work in three chapters which I proceed to summarize.

The first chapter, which served as a theoretical framework, explored the processes that conduced to the reification of modern scientific rationality. The first section presented modern Western rationality as departing from the contributions of Descartes, Newton, Hobbes and Bacon. Following what Apfel-Marglin (1996) called “the ontological cleft”, it was argued that the work of these authors led to othering of nature as a step before the othering of humans and cultures during colonialism and imperialism. Cartesian distinctions of body and mind, reason and matter was expressed mathematically by Newton mechanistic formulation of the universe, together with Bacon’s methodological proposal set the foundations for the detached, value-free and rigorous model of natural sciences, which in its turn, was followed by social sciences.

In the second section I contended, following post-colonial scholars such as Enrique Dussel (2000), that this dominant Eurocentered narrative of modernity should not be delinked from the economic, political and military processes and events of colonialism. Therefore, the rupture of modernity through reason and rationality had its counterpoint in the colonies by means of violence. Thus it is through irrationality and violence that a constructed and Europe situated itself in a centered explicative
position and scientific reason sustained its claims for universality. The modern dichotomies that separated subject and object, mind and body, man from the rest, what Santiago Castro-Gomes (Mignolo, 2009: 1) called “the hubris of the zero-point”, were narrowed down to separate hierarchically the European, white male from the rest.

Hence, from the epistemological and ontological superiority of the white male emerged the figure of the other, the savage, who had to be liberated by means of civilization, evangelization, modernization, and now development. Thereof, I drew on the terms worlding and epistemic violence from Gayatri Spivak (1988) to refer to the construction of the other by processes through which European morals, religion, time, knowledge, history and institutions became the reference and the authority, and were inscribed onto a world conceived as an empty space.

In disagreement with certain scholars (Nandy, 1998; Shiva, 1998; Castro-Gómez; 2000) that enhance the inherent violence of modern science. I relied on other thinkers (Santos, 2007c; Mudimbe, 1998; Stoler, 2008; Grovogui, 2006) who contend that it was in conjunction with the dominant ideology of the society that scientific disciplines like history, anthropology, biology or linguistics – sheltered behind the supposedly detached, rigorous and value-free approach–, set the basis for the colonial and imperialist projects. The consequence of this was the reordering, reshaping and reinforcement of previous constructions representation of other cultures, assigning them their place in civilization.

If the second section covered the “conditions of possibility” (Mudimbe, 1988) that led to the reification of modern scientific rationality, the next section dealt with the reconstructive attempts to subvert this unequal relation. I focused on two authors,
namely Walter Mignolo, and De Sousa Santos. Mignolo (2003, 2009), departs from the coloniality of power of Anibal Quijano (2000) to propose an epistemic rupture, de-linking from Western knowledge. In that sense I argued, relying on Santos (2007a) and McLennam (2013), that his proposal was based on geographic determinism, moreover the rupturist character was in itself a modern deflection.

Santos (2007a; 2007b; 2010) argues that colonial arrogance has not only imposed science as the valid form of knowledge with the consequent impoverishment of the lives of the colonized, but it has also impeded the West to learn from other traditions. The author proposes to de-monumentalize modern science and critical theory by outlining its exhaustion and its loss of contact with reality. In a few sentences, he proposes to identify forms of knowledge and experiencing reality that have been silenced, to include modern science in a broader context as a part of a non-hierarchical ecology of knowledges, and to engage in dialogic translations – where the West does not set the premises and the terms of the discussion – between resistant forms of knowledge that share similar concerns.

In the last section of this chapter I finally attempted to situate the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace within the debate. Martínez Guzmán (2001) talks about peace in plural. In his epistemological shift, the author proposes a revision of the epistemological statute of the discipline not by taking modern science as the reference, but, “on the contrary, (...) [by] question[ing] the capacities or competences that we human beings have in order to be able to affirm that we have competencies or capabilities to make peace” (Martínez Guzmán, 2009: 39). The proposed paradigm consists of fifteen tenets which mainly deal with the inner limits of science. The most relevant for this thesis is his position towards including “the
outlook of the "people from the South" (Martínez Guzmán, 2009: 34), and his commitment to reconstruct vernacular knowledges.

Regarding interculturality, the author (Martínez Guzmán, 2009) warns against the risk of assimilation of human diversity by dominant Western assumptions and values, and calls for an intercultural perspective –beyond the mere acknowledgment of plurality– which can enrich and put into question our assumptions. To that effect, Martínez Guzmán contends that a dialogic approach is needed that allows us to be critical with ourselves and learn from others.

The second chapter took as a reference Martínez Guzmán’s above-mentioned considerations, to analyze four case studies of how the intercultural approach has been dealt in peace studies. To this effect, the concept “categorical violence” employed by James C. Scott (1998) turned to be a useful tool. Scott analyzes the simplification processes by which the modern state facilitate its functions by making a complex reality legible, and thereby measure, categorize, compare, manipulate and remake reality. As the author indicates, this could also be applied to certain reductionist approaches of modern science. To that, it was added the theoretical framework established in the first chapter, and the contributions of scholars like Edward Said (1978), Vandana Shiva (1988) and anthropologists such as Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2010), Tim Ingold (2000) and Alberto Gomes (2012).

The first section covered the treatment of interculturality in two Wolfgang Dietrich (2012, 2013) works. From “Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture” (2012), the focus was put on the author’s five categories of peace which served him to classify the different understanding of peace throughout time and cultures and his transrational peaces approach. The transrational proposal draws on the four previous
categories in order to put forward a complete twisting of modern and postmodern understandings of peace by incorporating aspects from the energetic and moral categories of peace. I contended that in the whole theoretical framework, and concretely in the concept of transrationality, a Eurocentric stance pervades. This concept takes the part for the whole by assuming the existence of a single rationality, which is Western. This does not differ from the colonial logic. Whereas, derived from the reductionist approach that assimilates other rationalities into peace, these are narrowed down to the energetic, moral, spiritual, holistic, organic or relational, which are only aspects of them.

From the work “Elicitive conflict Transformation and the Transrational Shift in Peace Politics” (Dietrich, 2013), I focused my analysis in the categorization of shamanism as a breath-oriented method for elicitive conflict transformation. Following Viveiros de Castro (2010), I have argued that, besides the peace and the healing (not only understood as Western medicine) shamanic practices, the shaman carries out different functions in the society which functions are linked to specific epistemological and ontological approaches. Therefore to associate shamanism as elicitive conflict transformation by only looking at it from a peace angle, veils the shaman’s “ontological self-determination”. Moreover, a romanticized view of the shaman was detected by Dietrich’s drawing on core-shamanism, an adaptation of shamanic practices to a Western audience, widely criticized by anthropologists (Wallis, 2003) for misappropriation and romanticization of indigenous knowledges. I concluded that the passive portrayal of interculturality in both works analyzed here obeys to what Donna Haraway (1989; as quoted in Lohman, 1993) called a “cannibalistic logic” that uses other cultures for Western purposes.
The second section covered the hermeneutic work of Johan Galtung (1981, 1985, 1996) on the different concepts of peace across different civilizations. Previously, the author’s epistemological proposal for peace studies was briefly presented. In contrast to his own epistemological formulation, Galtung positioned himself as an external observer in order to establish a taxonomic classification of cultures on the basis of isolating certain essential defining features of these cultures and ignoring others. This is reflected by the division he establishes of the world according to their understanding of peace, the occident and the orient. Following Edward Said I contend that this classification, that juxtaposes religions, periods of time, currents of thought, states and empires, borders essentialism. I put forward, sustained by the arguments of Peter Lawler (1995) and Edward Said (1978), that Galtung conveyed a simplified, objectified, and sometimes Orientalist, view of cultures through their reduction to their concepts of peace.

Finally his reading of peace in Buddhism (Galtung, 1985b, 1996) is briefly analyzed. He equates Buddhist concepts such as dukkha and sukha to his positive and negative peace concepts, and the concept of Nirvana to entropy, and therefore to peace. According to ancient Indian philosophers Chandrakirti and Nagarjuna, quoted in (Yadav, 1977), defining Nirvana betrays the logic of the concept itself which entails a rejection of the is/is-not type of thinking. Following Ramachandra Guha (1989: 94), I argued that coupling peace studies with ancient Eastern traditions might respond to the attempt to universalize and to “construct an authentic lineage” of the discipline.

The third section covered the work of Douglas P. Fry (2005, 2007, 2013) which revolves around indigenous forms of peace, and the inherently peaceful nature of the human being. After having situated the author’s work methodologically and
epistemologically in the positivist tradition, I focused on his ethnographic research on peacebuilding in La Paz, a Zapotec community. Following James Scott (1998) I contended that the author makes Zapotec complex reality legible by isolating a series of categories which, in his opinion, lead to the study of peace in that community. This approach, for Vandana Shiva (1988), implies a threefold exclusion: epistemological, ontological and sociological. Moreover, sustained by the work of anthropologists Ingold (2000) and Viveiros de Castro (2010), I posited that the authors’ psychological reading of Zapotec beliefs on witchcraft and illnesses such as susto and bilis, separating interior mental states from external behaviors, responds to his own ontological and epistemological certainties and assumptions rather than to Zapotec experience of the world. These are positioned as a “theoretical patient” (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 70) rather than as agents; thereby reducing their cosmology and “ontological self-determination” (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 18).

Finally I proceeded to analyze Fry’s (2013) study of nomadic forager societies, which is carried out in a similar vein as the Zapotec. The author expresses his interest on these groups since they allow “to draw inferences about the past” (Fry, 2013: 9) concerning the peaceful nature of human being. My main argument in that sense is based on what Johannes Fabian (1983) called “the denial of coevalness”, by which the scientific imposes his own linear and evolutionist view of Time and treats the object of study as a contemporary relic.

The last section covered the work of the organization Peaceful Societies and the online Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies, available at the website www.peacefulsocieties.org. Before delving into the study case I presented the methodological requirements and the criteria of inclusion in order for a society to be labelled as peaceful. I argued that both, the criteria of inclusion and the concept of
peaceful societies itself, are exclusionary. The former for it reasserts the hegemonic position of science as the valid form of knowledge. My position concerning the latter was that, following Guha (1989) and Said (1978), the concept of peaceful societies is a positivist category that creates a romanticized and positive ‘Other’ by means of the abstraction of certain features that reveal a peaceful essence.

Thereon, I analyzed one entry of the encyclopedia, namely the ethnographic account on the Semai people from Malaysia which is carried out following an ethnographic approach, in a similar vein as Douglas Fry work. This society is presented as frozen, static, without historical changes, political struggles or resistances derived from their interaction with modernity and the state. According to Renato Rosaldo (1993) this ethnographic paradigm where the anthropologist is a detached observer that extracts raw material to be processed later has already been overcome by anthropology. I relied on Alberto Gomes (2012: 1062) work on Semai knowledge. The author posits that for the Semai peace is not conceptualized as a separate category, but “intertwined and interconnected” with equality and sustainability ideals and practices. The author accounts that these practices and beliefs are being displaced by the increasing contact with capitalism, modernity, commodification, privatization and over-exploitation of their resources.

As a departing tenet for the next chapter I concluded this section with Santos (2007b) distinction between knowledge-as-regulation and knowledge-as-emancipation. The former conceives knowledge as order and ignorance as disorder, whereas the latter conceives knowledge as solidarity and ignorance as colonialism.

From the four study cases, the main conclusions can be summarized thusly:
These examples show the unequal relation between different forms of knowledge. A narrow, positivist view of science pervades, where the scientist is the hegemonic subject who orders, labels, categorizes, defines the terms of the conversation, and imposes his views on other realities. Therefore, cultural recognition does not go hand in hand with epistemological recognition.

These examples reflect the rigidity of orthopedic thinking, that is, when Western concerns and conceptual tools are used to analyze other cultures (Santos, 2009).

Knowledge-as-order prevails over knowledge-as-emancipation.

The proposed intercultural dialogue is turned into a dialogue among peace researchers.

Peace, singular or plural, is conceived as a universal concept to which other cultures will be brought into by assimilation or appropriation.

There is a twofold example of “metonymic reason” (Santos, 2004), the type of reason that takes the part for the whole, (i) to take science as the only valid form of knowledge, (ii) to conceive peace as a universal category that can be isolated and objectified.

Interculturality is used as raw material to be extracted for the production of theory. This denies other cultures agency and reason, positioning them as theoretical patients (Guha, 1989; Chakrabarty, 2000; Viveiros de Castro, 2010).

The consequence of this is the exclusion and devaluation of other forms of knowledges, silencing and depriving other cultures from the way they experience the world.
Different knowledges, practices and ways of being in the world rise different questions and propose different and *unexpected* answers. It is through these *unexpected* dialogues that our own assumptions and certainties can be challenged, so that it can be learnt from others.

I retake certain scholars (Santos, 2010, 2007b, 2007c; McIntosh, 2012; Pannikar, 1999) assertion that tools and spaces for dialogue need to be opened up re-integrating science as a part of a broader context of knowledges.

The last chapter proposed to change the mood and to engage in what certain scholars have called “a pedagogy of hope” (McIntosh et al., 2012). It departs from what Santos (2010) called “sociology of absences, a look at forms of knowledge, practices, experiences, and beliefs that have been neglected and made look as non-existent. It is not a romanticized recovery of lost practices and idyllic lifestyles, but a look at the knowledge and practices of people who suffer. Therefore, I endeavored to explore certain aspects of Fulani people, concretely Wodaabe Fulani, cosmology, knowledge, beliefs, values and practices. To that effect, I have relied on anthropological and linguistic accounts, and on texts from Fulani oral tradition, initiatory tales and mythologies.

Wodaabe Fulani inhabit the Southeastern regions of Niger, a Sahelian region characterized for low rain rates, inconsistent from year to year, a semi-arid soil, and spare vegetation. They are mainly nomadic herders although during severe droughts certain groups combine shepherding with agricultural activities, whereas others can be found in big cities as migrant workers. During the rainy season, from May to June, migrations are intensified, becoming more frequent but covering short distances, therefore communities stay closer. During the dry season, long distance migrations
take place to normally settle around a well next to agricultural populations. At that
time, communities are more dispersed and interactions with sedentary social groups
increase, having a significant economic component.

The second section of this chapter presented some aspects of Fulani cosmology
related to the two main elements of their interwoven economic, social, political and
religious life, the cow and the milk. Besides providing milk, their main source of
income and nourishment, the relation with the cow is a based on reason as it is on
emotion. Human qualities are attributed to the cow. It implies a relation with the past
and the bond to the land through rituals, it is a part of cohesive distributive practices
in the community, and is a central element of their moral code. Similarly, milk
occupies a central place in Fulani society, as expressed in their mythology and
practices. Fulani knowledge and social organization revolve around obtaining,
processing and commercializing milk.

In this section I focused on the relations of nomadic herders with the state and
development agencies. Certain scholars (Pouillo, 1990) argument that nomadic
people employ an isolation strategy that leads to stagnant and retarded economies
(Khazanov, 2001). However, following a political ecology approach (Robbins, 2012),
rather this isolation could be considered as marginalization, which is derived from
unequal power relations rather than from the absence of contact. Cooperative
relations are established with neighboring populations as well as within the
community (Loftsdottir, 2001). I accounted how several state and development
projects to settle Fulani herders and to engage them in the intensive exploitation for
meat market have found unexpected responses and resistances from Fulani part, not
because of an obstinate traditionalism, but because their diverse strategies for
resource management have revealed to suit better to the context (Pouillon, 1990).
The third section covered Fulani herders social organization and focused on their moral code, *pulaaku*, which is used to avoid conflict, as a tool for conflict resolution, and it has a political character too since it is employed as a cohesive tool to avoid the intervention of authorizes which, in the context of the tensions with the state, would affect the community negatively, in economic terms and the level of autonomy (Schareika, 2010).

The last section focused upon how Wodaabe Fulani relations with the environment, connection with the land, and their conceptualization of place are embedded in their everyday activities. In Fulani oral tradition it is enhanced the importance of an harmonious and respectful relation with the environment. The human being as a part of nature does not occupy a dominant position but plays the role of caretaker. To that effect the human being has been bestowed with a partial knowledge, not the totality (Amogou, 2007). As it has been argued throughout this chapter, the cattle, through their participation in rituals and by their own qualities, play an intermediary role in many aspects of Fulani life, such as the relations with the past, with birth and death, and with the land. In that sense, they act as a mediators between what is considered the unknown and the unsafe, *laddu*, and *gari*, “the place where people sit” (Loftsdottird, 2001) that not consist in a stop-over of a nomadic life, but places grounded on multiple relations, that spring from an intimate, sentient knowledge, which is linked to a way of being in the world (Ingold, 2011). Thereon, I established a comparison with other neglected tradition, namely the German *Heimatkunde* and Aymara cosmology that share similar concerns concerning the intimacy of the connection to the land.

I drew on ethnologists Ullrich Kockel (2012, 2010) call for a revision and the reestablishment of *Heimatkunde*, the deep knowledge of a place “by living oneself
into it”, a concept that once was part of the school curricula, to be later vilified after being appropriated and misused by regionalists and the Nazis. Kockel proposes a political and ecological reconceptualization of *Heimat*, the place where we come *from* or *towards*, and *Hiesige*, from-here-ness, out of an inclusive ecological understanding, beyond ethnicity, nationality or religion.

Aymara cosmology was brought into this chapter through the work of Argentinian philosopher and ethnographer Rodolfo Kusch (2010). Although in the core of the author’s work lies an epistemological de-linking approach, in tune with other Latin American post-colonial scholars discussed in the first chapter such as Walter Mignolo, I contended that some aspects of his work can be used to establish dialogic relations rather than absolute ruptures. The author compares the two Spanish verbs *ser* and *estar*, to contrast between the Latin American city dweller and the indigenous way of situating oneself in the world. For the author the verb *estar* is closer to Aymara sensitivity represented by the verb *utchata*, associated with home, womb, germination and shelter. This implies a non-instrumental approach to the world, not conceived as an external reality, but a sensitive understanding of the it that includes the constant instability (*kuty*) of the here and now of existence (*pacha*), and responds to it *inwardly*, at an individual and a communal level, rather than by imposing oneself over the external reality.

Finally I related these concerns to peace studies as expressed by Martínez Guzmán (2001, 2009) epistemological turn. From his relational understanding of peace, he emphasizes the importance of place in contrast to the abstract, empty and homogenizing space, for the intersection of human relations allows to recognize the multiplicity of identities. Furthermore, the author stresses the earthly, fragile condition of the human being as an integral part of nature. Guzmán outlines the
central role of the relationships between humans and with nature, rather than between subjects and objects.

To conclude this chapter, I do not contend that Fulani practices, Aymara or Heimatkunde conceptions can be transposed from one context to another. However, as Gomes (2012) states, if we look at the level of values, these challenge dominant economic and ecologic narratives. These forms of being in the world, of connecting to the land, of relating to the mode of production, of sensing the fragility of the human condition and its environment, outline a sense of togetherness that contrasts with the values of competition and alienation in which we are imbued.

Concerning unequal epistemic relations, and following Santos (2011) following Santos (2010) line, in contrast to the positivist attitude that freezes the other, the fact of recognizing that these absent experiences produce knowledge, a knowledge that allows them to actively inquire back the dominant position, a knowledge that can gather these experiences together around similar, shared concerns, has already implications for the displacement of these and other imbalanced relations.

Limitations

This study presents certain limitations. The four case analyzed in the second chapter may not be a large enough sample to represent the situation of the discipline concerning interculturality. Although I tried to reflect the interdisciplinary character of peace studies, an analysis of interculturality from the contributions of religion studies could have been included. Time constraints impeded to carry out a content analysis of peace journals. By analyzing the presence and absence of non-Western forms of peace, and their epistemological treatment, in current peace research, a
better view would have been obtained of the dominant concepts of peace and epistemological currents of the discipline.

The chapter on Wodaabe Fulani was focused on nomadic herders, who constitute a vast majority of the group, mentioning only other economic strategies that they employ, among them, urban migration. To broaden the research by means of an intersectional approach that provides more and deeper accounts of urban migrants’ perspectives would have shed light on other realities.

**Concluding Remarks**

In the introduction, I quoted McIntosh’s (2012) assertion that indigenous knowledge challenge the compartmentalized assumptions and paradigms of academic knowledge. However, the challenge is twofold. On one side, it challenges our epistemological and ontological imagination, on the other side, and closely related to it, there is a political challenge, a call for recognition as producers of valid knowledge, an assertion for presence as a part of the conversation, rather than apart from it (Praeg, 2014).

As it has been discussed, Western traditions have concealed their ethnospecificity behind claims for objectivity, neutrality, detachment, rigor and universality, values which have been contested by several epistemological revisions proposed within peace studies (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; Galtung, 1996).

The epistemological debate, albeit rich and enriching, has mostly revolved around the different forms of doing science. This may definitely have consequences in the relation of the discipline with other forms of producing knowledge, but in my opinion, it demands another debate. The work of Martínez Guzmán in that sense, expressing the commitment with vernacular knowledges, the importance of
interculturality, the need for dialogue in order to learn from others so that we can put into question our assumptions, and warning against assimilation may represent a starting point.

The four case studies analyzed, although a small sample, may indicate that more steps may be needed so that the intercultural dialogue can happen. If dialogue is based on listening, as much as on talking, a first step would be to rethink the frame, the terms of the dialogue, so that the parts can express themselves on their own terms.

In those four cases, what defined the terms of the conversation was peace, assumed as the a priori common language. As Praeg (2014: 13), observes, historically marginalized traditions have had no choice but to depart from the recognition of their thought as ethno-specific, “which is the very condition, the sine qua non, upon which a conversation between equals who are not yet equals must be premised.”

If, as it was contended, to ask what peace is, is a Western question, with all that it involves and conceals, and if different experiences raise different questions and different answers, the first step would imply to look for new questions and to listen to different and unexpected answers. How to look for new questions may involve to engage in a critical and introspective analysis that leads to overcome the cultural topoi (Panikkar, 1999:27), the dominant and naturalized premises of the discipline, which impend from listening and hearing what the others are saying.

. Further research

Since dialogue is a never-ending practice and process, this thesis represents a mere foundation from which it can be departed in different directions:
• Considering the limitations of this study, a more in-depth analysis of interculturality in peace studies, with a larger sample and a content analysis could be carried out. In it, some development texts and theoretical proposals could be included. As it was stated in the limitations, an intersectional approach that focuses on Fulani migrant workers community, alongside with a deeper reading of oral tradition and literature in general.

• Similar explorations of human diversity could be carried out inquiring on concepts like Asabyyah, and worldviews such as Ubuntu, or Sumak Kawasay, that not only have ontological and ethical, but also have politically emancipatory implications.

• In order to move from theory to practice, it can be interesting to analyze how might the university, as the hegemonic institution of knowledge, re-think its role in subverting asymmetrical epistemic relations, beyond individual research, to actively promote intercultural dialogues, translations, and spaces of encounters. To that effect, the Popular University of Social Movements in Brazil could be a starting point of the analysis.
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