MASTER'S DEGREE
FINAL DISSERTATION

[The Role of Nonviolent Resistance in Preventing Forced Displacement – A Success Story?]

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Abstract [100 words]:

This thesis uses a mixed-methods approach for generating theory on the determinants of success of nonviolent resistance movements with respect to their ability to prevent forced displacement. The comparison of two cases of nonviolent resistance in Colombia suggests that collective identity, non-hierarchical leadership and dedication to nonviolence on a philosophical as well as practical level are important determinants for long-term success. The findings also suggest that indigenous communities may in some cases be more resilient in protracted conflicts, since they tend to have a stronger emotional connection to their local community and to the territory they inhabit than non-indigenous communities.

This thesis is dedicated to Mila, for making me understand what unconditional love is.

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To my mom, for making me breakfast in the morning, for making me smile even when I am stressed and for being just as nervous about this project as I was.

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Cultural Organization

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Content

List of Abbreviations

ATCC – Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare

AUC – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (1997-2006)

CRIC – Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca

ELN – Ejército de Liberación Nacional

FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

FARC-EP – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP – Internally Displaced Person

IHL – International Humanitarian Law

NGO – Non-governmental Organization

REDEPAZ – Red Nacional de Iniciativas Ciudadanas por la Paz y contra la Guerra

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION

> "A rarely spoken truth about protection is that the main players in the protection of civilians in conflict are the civilians themselves" (Bonwick, 2006a: 274)

Forced displacement is one of the major conflict-related issues in armed conflicts all around the globe. The number of displaced persons has been rising over the past years, currently reaching record numbers of about 65.6 million worldwide (UNHCR, 2017b). Governments, international institutions and academic researchers have started to produce a growing number of high-quality publications on diverse migration-related topics. However, very little of this effort has aimed at analyzing and strengthening the capacities of local communities to protect themselves even though auto-protection is the only accessible form of protection for many civilians at risk of displacement as state recurrently fail to ensure their citizen's safety.

This thesis aims at contributing to the research on the role of nonviolent civil resistance movements in preventing forced displacement in civil wars and civil conflict. More precisely, it presents the result of two case studies of nonviolent resistance in Colombia. Armed resistance is a widely researched experience in Latin America and Colombia specifically, but not much is known about the nonviolent movements, which have contributed enormously to peacebuilding on a local level. Pacifist efforts of the Colombian civil society are chronically underrepresented in mass media and under-researched in academia compared to their violent counter-parts. The present thesis thus forms part of a growing body of literature which promotes a peace studies perspective in the Colombian context.

Nonviolent resistance movements are usually not focused exclusively on preventing forced displacement, but rather at the protection of their members and the persons living in their area of influence from all forms of suffering caused by armed actors. Why then, did I choose to

analyze these movements specifically in terms of their efficiency in preventing only one of their goals?

Choosing displacement as an evaluation variable two main advantages: one, it is easily measurable and two, it has been measured relatively well over a long amount of time. While this is also true for the number of persons killed in the conflict, displacement reflects the severity of the Colombian conflict more accurately. Graph 1 below shows the scope of displacement and civilian casualties in Colombia. If only considering the death toll, the Colombian conflict is classified as a conflict of low intensity, which, in my opinion, distorts the reality that Colombians have experienced over the last decades.

Graph 1:

Casualties and Displacement in Colombia, 1985 - 2016

Data Source: Unidad de Víctimas, 2017

Civilians suffer from a wide range of human rights violations, which severely impact their lives and their well-being. While there are many other conflicts with much higher numbers of civilian casualties, there are few conflicts which have uprooted as many persons as this one. Therefore, displacement can be considered a more accurate indicator than civilian casualties or battle deaths in this case.

Displacement is also an important measure in terms of its correlation with other forms of suffering. The risk of being subject to sexual or physical assault, extortion, abuse, and other traumatic experiences is multiplied for displaced persons. Preventing forced displacement thus also implies preventing other forms of violence and protecting the most vulnerable sectors of society.

The nearly seven decades of armed conflict in Colombia have left their marks on the country and its people. However, within this general framework of violence, civilians have developed a surprisingly large number of initiatives for the promotion of nonviolence and peacebuilding. This vast network of civil society organizations includes several highly interesting cases of local nonviolent resistance movements, which have contributed to building small spaces of peace all over the country. The diversity of these movements in terms of organizational form, ethnic composition of members, and geographical origin provides an ideal setting for conducting research on the determinants of success of nonviolent resistance movements.

This research project is all the more relevant given the historic closure of a peace deal between the Government of Colombia and the largest remaining guerrilla group at that moment, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (FARC-EP; also: FARC). The peace agreement and subsequent disarmament of the FARC combatants constitutes an outstanding achievement for peace, and has been presented as the end to the Colombian conflict in many media outlets (Casey, 2016; CBS News, 2016; AlJazeera, 2016). However, despite the great opportunity for building a more peaceful future which this deal represents, it constitutes by no means the end of the armed conflict.

In fact, displacement is still an ongoing problem in eight departments of the country, including Norte de Santander, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Risaralda, Chocó, Nariño, Arauca and Antioquia, where a total of 7371 persons have been newly displacement between January and May 2017 (El Tiempo, 2017). New armed actors have allegedly entered the territory (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017) and are starting to threaten the local population, as the state has not been able to fill the power void left behind by the FARC. It is therefore more important than ever to work towards the prevention of future violence and displacement in order to assure the possibility of a peaceful future for Colombia.

Taking into account these newest developments and the inability of the Colombian state to protect its citizens even after the peace deal with the FARC, I developed this thesis with the intend to further the academic understanding of the capacities of civilians who engage in nonviolent resistance. I collected and analyzed both qualitative and quantitative data with the aim to develop an emerging theory in endogenous determinants of success in nonviolent resistance movements. I then grouped these determinants into three models of displacement – an identity-based model, a resilience-based model and a leadership-based model – which are interrelated and influence the outcome of resistance movements to varying degrees, depending on the specific characteristics of the respective movement.

The thesis is structured into five chapters, which build the main body of the thesis and are complemented by this introduction and a concluding chapter. In the following paragraphs, I will quickly outline the structure of the thesis and present the content of each chapter.

The first chapter situates the reader within the historical and academic context of this thesis. It first provides a short introduction to the Colombian conflict, explaining that violence has been an issue in Colombia since colonial times and connects the development of political rule to the current issues of conflict-induced displacement. It further details on the rise of the multiple guerrilla organizations and the subsequent counter-insurgence of the paramilitary.

Chapter 1 also introduces the research problem this thesis is focused on, before then presenting a short overview of the most important literature on forced displacement, nonviolence and nonviolent resistance, looking especially at the duality of nonviolence as both a philosophy and a practical methodology. This chapter concludes by providing a justification of the relevance of the chosen research topic.

Chapter 2 presents the methodological framework of this thesis. It delineates the personal and academic background of the author of this thesis in order to enhance transparency and provide the reader with the ability to assess possible research biases. It then explains some general details concerning the choice of methodology, before introducing the grounded theory approach in theory-generating research, which has been used in the collection and analysis of data for this thesis. It then characterizes the main features of expert interviews in general and describes the process of selecting interview partners, setting up and conducting the interviews and transcribing and analyzing their content. Lastly, I introduce the quantitative methodology, which is used to complement the qualitative data gathered from the interviews and to increase the robustness of my findings.

Chapter 3 describes current approaches by four types of relevant actors to prevent forced displacement in Colombia. The first part introduces the efforts of the Colombian state - both on the legal and on the policy level – as the primary responsible entity for the safety of its citizens. It argues that Colombia has one of the most advanced legal frameworks on forced displacement and the rights of displaced persons, but falls short in implementing these laws. On the policy level I analyzed a lack of focus on prevention as the most relevant stage in displacement processes. It is concluded that the Colombian government should strengthen its efforts in terms of implementation, working towards the elimination of the social and economic equalities, which gave rise to the conflict, and negotiate the disarmament of the remaining illicit armed actors.

The second part of Chapter 3 analyzes the contributions of international actors in preventing forced displacement in Colombia. It explains that international interventions are chronically underfunded and lack the necessary mandate and organizational strength to effectively protect civilians throughout the vast Colombian territory, which is a flaw that the third group of actors, national non-grassroots movements, share.

This latter group of actors is being introduced in the third part of Chapter 3, before turning towards nonviolent resistance movements in the fourth and final part of this chapter. Here, the general landscape of these movements in Colombia is presented, as well as the importance of grassroots-mechanisms to overcome the problem of perceiving protection as a commodity provided by outside actors. Instead, this part of Chapter 3 works towards creating an understanding of the relevance of civil activism and presents an outline of the concept of 'peace communities', which has been widely used in Colombia.

Chapter 4 presents the two organizations, which build the base for this research, the *Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare* (ATCC), which is based in the Middle Magdalena valley in the Santander department, and the *Guardia Indígena* of Toribío in the northern zone of the Cauca department (department shown below in Graph 2).

While both organizations engage in nonviolent resistance to the armed actors in their respective territories, there are some significant differences in their organizational structure, leadership styles, self-identification, and the ethnic composition of their member base. I explain the historic context of the creation of these two movements and situate them within the framework of the Colombian conflict.

Graph 2: Colombian 'departamentos':

Source: Wikimedia Commons, 2015

The second part of Chapter 4 analyzes the qualitative data collected in the expert interviews with representatives from both of the abovementioned organizations. I especially focused on the transparency of the process of coding the interview data into concepts and categories. Part of the coding process (the axial coding) is included directly in the pages of Chapter 4, but I moved the more extensive open coding to the Annex of this thesis to preserve the readability of the document.

The last part of Chapter 4 presents the results of the quantitative data analysis. It describes the origin of the data and explains the pooled ordinary least squares regression with time-series

data, which was used to analyze the effect of the number of homicides and threats on the level of displacement in the area of influence of the ATCC and the *Guardia Indígena*. While the impact of threats is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, both variables show the expected effects and thus support the theoretical arguments drawn from the previous qualitative analysis.

Chapter 5 then delineates the emerging theory based on the findings of the qualitative and quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 3 and 4. It introduces three models of displacement as the core part of the emerging theory.

The first model is based on the form of identity in the base community of a nonviolent resistance movement. It suggests that a highly collective form of identity and a relative preference of the safety of the whole community over the safety of individual persons reduces the likelihood and scope of displacement.

The second model focuses on the level of dedication to nonviolence as a philosophy as well as a practical choice to increase the safety of the members of a nonviolent resistance movement. I argue that a movement is more successful in preventing forced displacement if its members are convinced of the moral validity of nonviolence as well as of its efficiency as a method of resistance. This effect is expected to increase over time, as long-term resilience against forced displacement is not easily maintained and needs a high level of commitment to sustain this fight in protracted conflicts.

The third model considers the style of leadership and the level of hierarchization within a nonviolent resistance movement as determinants of the probability of a successful outcome. It suggests that movements are more successful in preventing forced displacement if they have a broad-based, inclusive form of leadership and low levels of hierarchization, which prevent a loss of trust between the organized resistance and their base community and reduce the vulnerability of leaders towards being targeted by armed actors. Finally, it argues that leader in

movements with a small leadership who have high degrees of responsibility tend to be overwhelmed with the amount of expectations they are confronted with.

Lastly, the concluding chapter resumes the most important findings of this thesis and the contributions of each chapter to the research project. It then addresses some additional considerations, which could not yet be included in the previous chapters, and hints at possibilities for future research based on the results of this thesis.

CHAPTER 1: CONTEXTUALIZATION AND RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1 Historic Contextualization – A Short Introduction to the Colombian Conflict

The Colombian conflict belongs to the most protracted and complex conflicts of this planet. The social and institutional structures of violence determining the current situation in the oldest democracy of South America reach back into its colonial past. After the independence from Spain in 1819, local elites quickly tried to fill the power void left by the colonizers, which nearly instantly threw the new republic into a bloody civil war (until 1841).

After the war, the country's political scenery developed towards a bipartisan outlay, with strong tensions and recurrent violent clashes between the polarized political camps of Liberals and Conservatives (Sánchez, 2005: 120). The second half of the 19th century was even more war-torn than the first half, leaving the country in a precarious economic and social state. While the early 1900's remained somewhat more 'peaceful' (if understanding peace in terms of the absence of war), rising social inequality led to growing civil unrest.

The murder of liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 triggered the beginning of the period known as *la violencia*, a period of brutal violence all over the country, which to this day is one of the darkest episodes of Colombian history (Sánchez, 2005: 120). *La violencia* officially ended in 1958 with a power-sharing agreement between the Liberals and the Conservatives, which established an alternation of government in every election.

Far from leading the country into a more peaceful future, the new rule of the *Frente Nacional* resulted in even higher levels of repression and political exclusion. The following decades were characterized by increasing militarization and coercive political rule through the proclamation of a state of emergency over most of the time between 1950 and 1990 (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 98).

The early 1960's gave rise to a new actor in the national power play – the guerrilla. Stemming from left-wing, mostly socialist and communist, political spheres, the guerrilla units gave voice to the desperate need for social reform in large parts of the population. The rise of these

guerrillas was, however, by no means a uniform movement, nor did they all share the same ideology and work towards the same goal. The high fragmentation of the guerrilla landscape is an important feature to keep in mind when trying to understand the overwhelming success of the paramilitary counter-insurgence in the 1990's.

The rise in attacks of the guerrilla on civilians between the 1960's and the 1990's motivated parts of the peasant population to organize in self-defense groups, which then gradually evolved into paramilitary units, aided by both the state and by rich drug lords and large landowners, who were angered by the guerrilla's frequent attacks on their property. In 1997, the initially loosely organized units were subsumed in the umbrella organization *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC).

Despite its origins, the paramilitary quickly evolved into an even more brutal and lawless organization than the guerrilla. Protected by parts of the conservative political elite, the paramilitary acted in a situation of quasi-impunity, which enabled them to take over large parts of the narcotics trade as well as other illicit businesses like kidnapping, extortion and 'cleansing' areas, where large international firms wanted to extract raw materials, from unwanted inhabitants. Despite the official disarmament of the AUC in 2006, *de facto* there are still active paramilitary units, since many former combatants reformed into smaller criminal organizations (Bouvier, 2009: 10).

While recent years have brought many improvements in terms of security, economic and social development and the protection of minority rights, Colombia still suffers from strikingly high levels of lawlessness, human rights violations, and inequality. Part of the problem is rooted in the unequal land distribution – Colombia ranks number one in Latin American (Guereña, 2017: 13). The distribution problem is aggravated by high percentages of informal land tenure. Holding no legally valid property title is especially detrimental to small-scale farmers who are forced to leave their home due to the conflict and later have no means of reclaiming their lost property.

The scenario, which has been outlined in the previous paragraphs is complemented by high levels of government corruption, the para-politics phenomenon, institutional malfunctioning, lacking state presence in many remote areas, a general culture of creatively circumventing the law, lacking access to public education, high incidences of crime, gender inequality, restrictions of press freedom and overwhelming levels of impunity. One report states that:

> Most notable among the causes of conflict are the exclusion of a majority of the population from political life and access to power, constant abuses committed by the military forces against the population, the neglect of the basic needs of the poorer sectors of the society, and the concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch (Fox and others, 2010: 479).

Despite these severe shortcomings, a partial success in constructing a more peaceful future has been reached in 2016, when the Colombian government and the FARC closed a long overdue peace deal. This peace deal, and the subsequent disarmament of the ex-guerrilla fighters creates a unique possibility to build resilience in the population against possible future episodes of heightened violence.

Within this context it is strongly recommendable to work on prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction. The increase in new displacement and spontaneous eruptions of violence after the peace deal demonstrates that the conflict has transformed, but not ended (iDMC, 2017; Valenzuela, 2017) and that internal displacement is still one of the most pressing issues in Colombia.

1.2 Research Problem

Forced displacement affects roughly one fifth of Colombia's population and is one of the biggest obstacles to sustainable peacebuilding, democratic rule and development. It is of crucial importance to prevent further displacement if the country wants to achieve lasting peace. Efforts by the state, international actors, and local organization contributed to the prevention of forced displacement, but have not been able to solve the problem.

Peace theory suggests that grassroots activism is one of the most efficient tools in civil conflict and is especially suited to overcome deeply ingrained structures of violence. However, the different experiences of nonviolent resistance in Colombia have shown quite unequal outcomes and success rates. How can these differences be explained? This thesis seeks to generate a theoretical framework to help understand the determinants of success for nonviolent resistance movements.

1.3 Conceptualization of Research Problem

1.3.1 Prevention of Forced Displacement

This section starts with introducing some relevant definitions and conceptual clarifications in order to establish a common understanding of the terminology used in the following chapters, before following with a short review of the most important literature on the prevention of forced displacement.

The largest group of displaced persons in Colombia are internally displaced persons (IDPs). The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2004: 1) defines internal displacement as follows:

> internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

The definition of displaced persons in Colombian law (Law 387 of 1997) is quite similar to OCHA's definition, although a little more detailed:

> toda persona que se ha visto forzada a migrar dentro del territorio nacional abandonando su localidad de residencia o actividades económicas habituales, porque su vida, su integridad física, su seguridad o libertad personales han sido vulneradas o se encuentran directamente amenazadas, con ocasión de cualquiera de las siguientes

situaciones: conflicto armado interno, disturbios y tensiones interiores, violencia generalizada, violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos, infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario u otras circunstancias emanadas de las situaciones anteriores que puedan alterar o alteren drásticamente el orden público[1] (UNDP, 2011: 39).

There are two small, but important, differences between these definitions, and the one I adopt in this research project.

First and foremost, it is important to note that this thesis does not distinguish between internal displacement and forced migration, since it focuses on the prevention of any kind of displacement, at which point it is impossible to say in which of the two abovementioned categories the displacement will result. The term 'displacement' thus includes movements of people within their national borders and beyond. A 'displaced person' may be either an internally displaced person or a refugee.

Second, this analysis focuses only on conflict-induced displacement, excluding other forms of forced displacement, such as displacement induced by natural disaster, food shortage, economic grievances, or other factors not directly related to armed conflict.

International law on forced displacement has only been formalized in the middle of the 20th century. The Refugee Convention of 1951 set up the first legal standards on refugee's rights, and was later amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967. The Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols, the OAU Convention in 1969 and the Declaration of Cartagena in 1984 were the next big milestones in strengthening the legal framework on forced displacement. In 1998, the UN first published its *Guiding principles on Internal Displacement*, which have since then been updated several times. Since then, several non-state actors, like the

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[1] [every person who has been forced to migrate within the national territory, leaving their place of residence or habitual economic activities, because their life, physical integrity, safety or personal freedom have been violated or are being directly threatened, in the instance of any of the following situations: internal armed conflict, disturbances and internal tensions, general violence, massive human rights violations, infractions of the International Human Rights Law or other circumstances stemming from the aforementioned situations which could alter or are drastically altering the public order; own translation]

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Oxfam, and Sphere, have introduced legally non-binding codes of conduct to ameliorate the standards of humanitarian action in the field.

While the status and rights of refugees are clearly defined in international law, the same does not hold true for internally displaced people. Their position has been strengthened through the London Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons in 2000 and the Pinheiro Principles of 2005, both of which are not legally binding, but widely accepted in the international community.

The first legally binding body of international law on IDPs was the African Union's Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa, also called the Kampala Convention, in 2009. Thus, the international legal framework on internal displacement has moved from 'soft law' to an "emerging right" (Morel and others, 2012: 6).

Graph 1 shows the development of the total number of refugees and IDPs worldwide.

Graph 3: Number of internally displaced persons and refugees (1990-2016)

Source: Lennard, 2017: 25.

As the graph shows, recent years have seen a spike in displacement, leading to a total of 40.3 million internally displaced people worldwide at the end of 2016, with 6.9 million newly displaced in 2016 alone (Lennard, 2017: 10) and a total of 65.6 million forcibly displaced persons in total (UNHCR, 2017b).

The current displacement situation in Colombia is severe. While other countries experienced higher levels of new displacement in recent years (Lennard, 2017: 21), the overall number of internally displaced people in Colombia – 7.3 million – is still the highest in the world (Lennard, 2017: 27; UNHCR, 2017a: 1). In terms of refugees, Colombia ranks much lower in the international comparison, counting about 340.000 refugees at the end of 2016 (UNHCR, 2017a: 1).

The stark difference in the number IDPs and refugees is based on a) the regional nature of territorial control by armed actors, which allows civilians to find safety from direct threats within the country; and b) practicality, considering the cost of international travel, long distances to the next border, the expected safety levels in neighbor countries, unwillingness to leave family behind, and the fact that access to relief is overall better inside the country.

Not all social groups are affected by displacement in the same way and to the same extent. Women, children, ethnic minorities (UNDP, 2011: 49), indigenous communities (UNDP, 2011: 29), people below the poverty line, and people from rural areas are overrepresented in displaced populations.

After having established the concept of forced displacement in the Colombian context, it is equally important to understand the reasons why it happens. Generally speaking, conflict-induced forced displacement happens to some extent in mostly all wars and civil conflicts with high levels of generalized violence, which is rather self-explanatory. Understanding why some conflicts produce higher levels of displacement than others however, is a little more complicated.

While some scholars tend to argue that the "level and type of violence determine the likelihood and size of refugee displacement" (Schmeidl, 1997: 284; see also Moore and Shellman, 2004; Cohen and Deng, 1998; Obregon and Stavropoulou, 1998), newer research favors the argument that armed actors intentionally and strategically displace local population to ensure their political and economic control over a territory (e.g. Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008; Steele, 2011; Guáqueta, 2003; Melander and Öberg, 2007). In the case of Colombia, the latter argument is much more convincing, as it is corroborated by a variety of case studies and statistical data (Waldmann, 2014).

There are various reasons for the high amount of forced displacement in Colombia, which will be introduced in the following paragraphs.

First, armed actors are trying to establish control over certain areas, because they are rich in natural resources, or are apt for the cultivation illegal crops like the coca plant. The control of such areas results in direct economic gains. Thus, "ownership of land has a significant positive effect on the probability of being threatened" (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007: 22; see also UNDP, 2011: 29). The overall scope of land abandonment or loss in Colombia is about 6.6 million hectares (UNDP, 2011: 27-28). The problem of land loss is made more difficult by the various, sometimes semi- or unofficial forms of land ownership, which include collective landownership in some indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities as well as a high percentage of persons in *campesino* communities who do not possess legal titles to prove their land ownership (UNDP, 2011: 43).

Second, all stakeholders in the Colombian conflict try to establish control over people. Evicting them from one's area of influence might seem somewhat counter-productive and illogical at first, but armed actors very rarely displace the entire population of an area. Instead, they target specific groups of civilians, which they consider to be political opponents or difficult to control, like social leaders (Bonwick, 2006b: 5), and threaten only this subset of the local population to achieve a more homogenous and easy-to-rule group of subjects.

Third, armed groups threaten those civilians that are suspected to collaborate with an enemy group, which dramatically increases the risk of displacement in areas, where more than one armed actor is present, and after a change in territorial control (Bonwick, 2006b: 5).

Fourth, some displacement on the hands of the paramilitary was paid for by private firms to clear territories for the exploitation of natural resources, to build pipelines, or make room for banana and cocoa plantations. This kind of displacement affected mostly indigenous populations in forest areas.

Fifth, some parts of the *campesino* population in the areas of influence of an armed actor are forced to cultivate coca crops, which creates both legal problems for them and a base for suspicion of collaboration with the enemy when another armed group gains control of the region.

Given that armed actors have a certain interest in displacing target communities and individuals, what can be done to prevent displacement from happening? This question has, as of yet, received relatively little scholarly attention. The concept of prevention surged in 1986 with the report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Avoid New Flows of Refugees, who drew a connection of human rights violations and refugee movements and gained popularity in the 1990s (Zapater, 2010: 1).

A milestone in the assessment of prevention of forced displacement was Luise Drüke's 1993 doctoral dissertation, which proposed a policy-oriented approach to UN interventions for prevention and was situated within the Cold War and early post-Cold War period. Her qualitative case studies of Vietnam and Honduras/Nicaragua were based largely on her own work experience in the field and extensive interviews with displaced populations. Although her thematic focus is quite different from the one in this thesis, her work has been a model for applying qualitative methodology in this field and is worth mentioning in this context.

A newer study by Stefanie Engel and (2007) focuses on prevention of forced displacement in Colombia by conducting a statistical utility analysis of household-level decision-making

processes. Their research on household determinants in migration decisions was a key contribution to understanding displacement in the Colombian context. Ibáñez has published several related articles (e.g. Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008) and has established herself as one of the most important researchers on forced displacement in Colombia. She has, however, not researched resistance movements to forced displacement as an alternative approach to the policy-oriented outline of her studies.

Although forced displacement is by its very definition a form of migration which is not based on the displaced persons' free decision, it is important to recall that even in extreme conditions, persons retain a certain range of choices – in the worst case, the decision to leave or to stay and die. While the second option is, naturally, an undesirable one for most persons, there is a certain percentage of people who remain unwilling to leave their homes no matter what they face as a consequence.

Understanding the determinants of such harsh, and limited, choices has been the focus of many social science researchers in the past decades. Theories like the "human capital theory provide[…] a justification for the existence of differences between individuals in their propensity to migrate" (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007: 6-7) and personal characteristics like age, education, and risk aversion (Engel and Ibáñez, 2007: 6-7) have been identified as relevant factors in the decision to leave or stay under pressure.

There is a variety of other factors, which play a role in this context, but the important point is that humans make decisions based on rational as well as emotional reasons. While the emotional reasons are hard to assess and impossible to judge, the rational reasons for leaving or staying are based on facts, or what is being perceived as facts, and this is precisely where improvements can be made. Wrong or lacking information inhibits individuals from making the best possible decision for their respective situations, it can unnecessarily endanger them and lead to overall undesirable outcomes. New technologies could help making access to real-time information

easier for persons in remote rural areas and thus contribute to their ability to make informed choices (Donven and Hall, 2012).

Preventing forced displacement is less costly – both in terms of economic cost and human suffering – than responsive action. Despite the moral obligation not to put people through preventable turmoil, prevention is still one of the most neglected areas of displacement in Colombia (Fadnes and Horst, 2009: 114). However, it is important to note that there are some cases where preventing displacement is not the best method to safe civilian lives. Zapater (2010: 3) argues that

> Rather than preventing it, flight and displacement need to be managed so that communities can have maximum control over it and its consequences, for instance through the establishment of assembly centres with stockpiles of food and non-food items as near as possible the places of origin, the drafting of community based contingency plans, and training at national and international protection principles of IDPs so that they can successfully negotiate with authorities protection, assistance and durable solutions (Zapater, 2010: 3).

Zapater refers to short-term displacement as a contingency measure until a situation of normalcy may be restituted. While I agree with his argument that displacement should be safer and better managed, I am not as quick to discard the concept of prevention. Displacement happens under circumstances of chaos, people flee when they are afraid and in a hurry, conflict zones are constantly shifting, outbursts of violence may happen spontaneously and are not always expected, even with early warning systems in place.

I suggest that the best possible approach would be a combination of several strategies for the protection of civilians, including prevention efforts, but also creating safer escape routes and contingency plans. Zapater further argues that communities perceive the root causes of displacement as more threatening than displacement itself, for example the cultivation of coca leaves, which attracts armed actors' interest in a territory.

There are several reasons why focusing exclusively on the elimination of such root causes is unlikely to work. The determinants of the level of interest of armed actors in a territory are rarely in the hands of the local population. Following the abovementioned example, peasant farmers may refuse to cultivate coca, but they cannot erase the lands' ability to nourish coca plants.

Their refusal might thus change armed actors' strategy on dealing with the peasants, but not their interest in the land. Likewise, a community cannot decide to get rid of other lootable natural resources like copper, rare woods, gold or emeralds. Any efficient strategy to reduce displacement thus has to involve some kind of agreement with armed actors to not attack civilians or intentionally cause displacement, which is part of the prevention approach.

1.3.2 Nonviolence and Nonviolent Resistance

This section introduces the philosophical base and the practical application of the concept of nonviolence. It sets forth the argument that the highest degree of efficiency is reached in a setting of coherence between nonviolent ideology and methods. It then goes on to introduce the concept of nonviolent resistance and present some practical examples, before addressing the tension between people's inalienable right to leave situations, which put them at risk, and the conceptual necessity of their staying and engaging in resistance movements.

The philosophy of nonviolence is an intrinsic part of peace philosophy, which proposes that the existence of conflict is neither unnatural nor necessarily of destructive nature and can be transformed into a constructive force by nonviolent modes of conflict resolution (Galtung, 1996). Nonviolence, or *ahimsa* in the Gandhian and Buddhist terminology (Easwara, 1986), is defined as "an abstention from using physical force to achieve an aim, but also a full engagement in resisting oppression, domination and any other forms of injustice" (Dudouet, 2011: 240).

It thus encompasses the rejection of all three forms of violence, as defined by Galtung – direct, structural and cultural violence. Nonviolence is to be understood as a "método, acción y

convencimiento entendidos como imperativos[2]" (López Martínez, 2001: 196). Gandhi's perception of nonviolence as an end in itself (Dudouet, 2011: 243) is reiterated by other contemporary philosophers like Hannah Arendt (1969: 80), who states that "[t]he practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world".

A more methodology-oriented approach to the practice of nonviolence has been developed by Gene Sharp (1973), who specified a catalogue of nonviolent methods for different circumstances. This perception of nonviolence as a tool in the struggle for social change and peacebuilding raises the question of how efficient nonviolent methods are in achieving their goals. Contrary to the widespread idea that nonviolence is a laudable, but ultimately impractical idea in armed conflict, large-scale statistical analyses like the NAVCO datasets (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013) have lately provided important empirical support for the high efficiency of nonviolent methods of resistance.

Chenoweth and her colleagues claim that nonviolent movements are about twice as likely to succeed than violent ones within their study sample. However, they did not include smaller movements and admit that there are still several statistical flaws in the data they used. The authors worked with data from various well-known conflict datasets, among them the Correlates of War dataset, the data compiled by Bethany Lacina and Nils Gleditsch (2005), and the Polity IV Index. While the combination of these different datasets contributes to the robustness of the statistical analysis, it also implies certain difficulties due to inconsistencies in the use of terminology and the resulting incoherence of variable definitions.

Speaking of definitions, nonviolent resistance can be defined as "una forma de acción política no violenta que involucra un conjunto diverso y sostenido de actividades encaminadas a retar un poder, fuerza política o régimen particular[3]" (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 330).

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[2] [method, action and conviction, understood as imperative; own translation]
[3] [a form of nonviolent political action which involves a diverse and sustained set of activities aimed at challenging power, a political power or a particular regime; own translation]

Notably, the challenged power structure can be of state or non-state nature. Famous nonviolent movements include the anti-apartheid movement of South Africa, the independence struggle colonial India, the movement to end racial segregation in public spaces in the US, and for the most part, the revolutions of the Arab Spring. Most widely known experiences of nonviolent resistance are large movements against oppressive regimes. However, there are also many smaller movements and micro-level resistance (e.g. Domínguez Mejía, 2003), which have had important implications on a local level.

Lately, some authors have started to link social movement theory to nonviolent resistance (McAdam and Tarrow, 2000; Schock, 2005), but without a specific relation to forced displacement. Contrary to suggestions to "mainstream displacement-specific issues into general protective strategies" (Zapater, 2010: 19), I argue that the mechanisms of displacement are distinctly different from those of other forms of victimization. The fact that displacement and other forms of violence towards civilians are intrinsically connected does not mean that they share the same causal relations.

Critique on the exclusion of civilians from relevant decision-making processes concerning them has increased in the past years (Barrs, 2012: 8). As Chapter 3 will show in more detail, the state and international agencies are often incapable – or unwilling – of protecting people sufficiently from being forcefully displaced, and a need for better strategies of self-protection has been identified, but is still under-researched.

An important question to ask is what determines the success or failure of nonviolent resistance movements against forced displacement? While there is no definitive or complete answer to this question yet, it does entail a mix of external (exogenous) and internal (endogenous) factors: a) leadership (endogenous): leaders have a big influence on the direction and success of their movements, but strict hierarchical structures can lead to the loss of critical dialogue. At the same time, an overemphasis of the leadership of a small group puts these leaders at risk as armed actors tend to target leaders to annihilate opposition movements;

b) organizational efficiency (endogenous) to avoid wasting scarce resources;

c) unity of the movement (endogenous): too many different goals and beliefs can split a movement and cause a loss of focus;

d) interest and ideology of the armed actor (exogenous): some armed actors largely refrain from targeting civilians, others intentionally cause as much harm as possible to achieve a higher impact. The interest of an armed actor in displacing certain people or communities may be anything from very weak to very strong and thus the measures they are willing to take to enforce displacement vary greatly;

and e) possibility of negotiation with the armed actor (endogenous and exogenous): relies on the negotiating abilities of the members of a movement, but also on the hierarchical structure of the armed actor – highly-organized paramilitary troops who strictly follow commands from higher ranks are less likely to engage in dialogue with local communities.

An important problem for nonviolent resistance movements is also the chaotic nature of civil conflict, which at times renders it impossible to determine the identity of a perpetrator of violence. In some instances, armed actors are interested in not being connected with certain crimes. Usually, the high degree of militarization, the widespread use of identifying uniforms and a tendency to use operations as a strategy of intimidation facilitate the identification of the perpetrators of specific crimes in Colombia.

However, there are also known cases of armed groups disguising as members of a rival armed group to commit atrocities in their name, as the Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011: 151) describes a practice of the Colombian paramilitary: "pero [paramilitary] también cometían asesinatos a su nombre [guerrilla] con el fin de desprestigiarla". Paramilitary units are generally more likely to remain unidentified as their goals are less political than criminal, which reduces the benefits and increases the costs of being publicly connected to severe human rights violations.

This thesis relies on the assumption, that the currently still active armed actors in Colombia are not interested in and for the most part not willing to commit large-scale massacres anymore[4]. Despite their recurrent violations of human rights and international law, they usually restrict themselves to 'lesser' crimes like selective killings, intimidation, extraction of money, rape, illicit recruitment, beatings, among others.

While these crimes are certainly horrifying enough, they are less costly for the armed actor in question than committing a massacre, which likely attracts a backlash from the state forces. Decades of conflict have reduced the newsworthiness of simple murder or displacement, but massacres never fail to horrify even the numbest of politicians. Insurgent groups, which do not have the strength to face large military operations or which do not wish to draw the state military towards their territory of control therefore usually refrain from killing whole villages.

However, a certain risk of massacres remains and should not be underestimated or neglected. The safety of civilians must always be the first priority and if there is enough reason to believe that resistance may lead to a massacre, then displacement based on contingency plans needs to remain a viable option.

<u>Right to leave vs. need to stay</u>

This section discusses one of the main dilemmas for anyone making the case for nonviolent resistance movements. If moral considerations are entirely excluded, the argument would be much easier to make: nonviolent resistance is the most efficient strategy to protect civilians in the long term and as such clearly preferable to any other options. From a tactical perspective, displacement can work well as a self-protection strategy and has relatively little negative consequences if there is a high likelihood of safe return in the near future. Unfortunately, this is usually not the case in protracted conflicts, which is the case for 85% of all displaced people worldwide (FAO, 2016: 6).

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[4] The past massacres, which have been committed by armed actors in Colombia, are presented in an interactive way in the project *Rutas del Conflicto* (http://rutasdelconflicto.com/), which is an excellent tool to understand more about the regional dynamics of the Colombian conflict.

This argument, however, only assesses the collective level of protection, not the individual one. Any person who joins – or leads! – a nonviolent resistance movement drastically increases his or her chances of being killed, kidnapped, threatened, having a family member being killed or kidnapped, and suffering from a whole range of different detriments to their physical and mental integrity and their property.

In civil conflict, civilians face a limited range of choices in terms of seeking protection. The decision to leave one's home is certainly not an easy one and depends partly on the availability of refuge elsewhere and the likelihood of safe escape (Drüke, 1993: 73). There are situations, where the only choices are to leave or to die, and in such scenarios, leaving is without a doubt preferable. As Zapater (2010: 9) explains, "proponents of the concept of prevention of forced displacement have to grapple with the conundrum of forced displacement being at the same time […] a threat […], and a coping mechanism". Or, in the slightly more drastic words of Barrs (2012: 8):

> It can be argued that civilians have a right to either stay or go as they determine best. For people experiencing violence the issue is more tactical than legal. Our liberal-democratic formula of duty bearers and rights holders does not offer any tactical skills for living out those rights by outliving killers.

Thus, the right to seek refuge (Talviste and others, 2012: 22) needs to be the point of departure for any serious work on the issue. The success of a movement can simply not be put above the protection of its members – at least not by anyone but the members themselves. Just as no person should encourage another person to remain in a high-risk situation, they also should not push them to leave said situation against their wishes and convictions.

Especially in indigenous communities there is a considerable percentage of people who are unwilling to leave their territory no matter what the consequences. This decision is deeply personal and has to be respected. The intention behind this research project is to help develop better strategies of nonviolent resistance for people who already decided to engage in this

endeavor, and thus increase the safety of the path they chose, but not to encourage others to put themselves at risk.

1.3.3 Justification of Research Topic

As the previous two sections demonstrated, there is a dearth of literature which focuses on peace initiatives and civil peacebuilding processes in Colombia as opposed to literature on violence and conflict (Bouvier, 2009: 6). As a result, the many courageous and inspiring experiences of resistance and peacebuilding, which have been created by civilians in the past decades, are neither well-known nor well-researched. Although there has been an increase in the study of such experiences in recent years, especially by Colombian authors, the field is still comparatively small to other areas of social sciences and peace and conflict research.

There is also, to my knowledge, no empirical study of the role of nonviolent resistance movements in preventing forced displacement as a specific form of violence in civil conflicts. Some authors even argue against such a displacement-specific focus in the discussion of the protection of civilians in armed conflict (Zapater, 2010).

This section is thus dedicated to justifying the relevance of such an approach in academic research on civil conflicts by explaining the consequences of large-scale forced displacement on the displaced individuals and communities, on the dynamics of the armed conflict and on the social and economic structure of the state in question.

Experiencing forced displacement is a severely traumatic experience for most affected persons, and affects both their physical and mental well-being. Far from being a way of reaching safety, for most affected persons forced displacement is "often just the beginning of a series of challenges including continuing insecurity, further displacement through attacks on camps and settlements, and exposure to threats including sexual violence, forced recruitment and human trafficking" (Amos, 2012: 4). While the experiences of displaced persons vary greatly depending on personal characteristics like wealth, education, form of income-related activities,

age, gender, and disability, amongst others, almost all displaced persons face severe risks on their journey between their community of provenance and their destinations.

First, leaving a dangerous area does not necessarily result in a situation of post-displacement safety. Civilians "often have to flee in situations of great danger, through or within areas of active conflict, while under attack, and may have to go into hiding or move to other unsafe areas" (Oxfam, 2009: 129). Although the danger of crossing zones of active combat is relatively small in Colombia due to the prevalent post-conflict situation, there are still areas where travelling alone or in small groups is anything but recommendable.

The much more relevant problem, however, lies not in the journey itself, but in the situation displaced persons face on the site of reception: many have to settle in poor urban neighborhoods where safety levels are low and newcomers have to readjust to problems of housing, access to basic services like food, water, sanitation, electricity, healthcare of educational institutions, and high levels of violence from gang members. Given that a large part of displaced persons originates from rural areas, they lack skills relevant for the urban labor markets, and recurrently find themselves in situations in which they have to beg for food or work under precarious conditions and for low salaries.

This situation of impoverishment is not likely to change over time, and even affects second and third generation displaced persons. The effect of displacement on the children and grandchildren of the displaced persons is especially notable. They grow up with less opportunities than their parents, often in disrupted households, are more likely to drop out of school (especially when they are school-aged at the moment of displacement, which disrupts their education and makes reintegration into a normal school difficult to impossible in some cases, or if their parents can't pay the higher cost of urban schools) and tend to suffer a long-term impact on their health. Displacement is thus a key factor in the generation of a class of new urban poor who live in precarious circumstances with little prospects of climbing the social ladder.

In states with little to no state support for persons in situations of poverty, social networks and community mechanisms play a pivotal role in ensuring the survival and humane living conditions for many people who are unable to create sufficient income to support their families (single parents, persons with disabilities, etc.). Especially in rural settings, extended family relations create safety networks for these people by redistributing the income of some family members to those who need support. Displacement disrupts these delicate social structures, and introduces many people to new forms of vulnerability.

On a material level, displacement is often connected to the loss of assets and livelihoods, given the high percentage of informal landownership in Colombia. This implies that even in the case of a possible future return to the site of eviction, many people will not be able to recuperate lost property. Even those who do possess the legal titles which confirm the ownership of their land may encounter major difficulties upon return – the tropical climate in many regions of Colombia causes the rapid decay of unattended farmlands. Other problems upon return include new threats and assassinations – between 2002 and 2010 about seven thousand displaced people have been killed as a result of efforts to return (UNDP, 2011: 50). Unsafe returns are likely to trigger new displacement and lead to a cycle of continued victimization.

The psychological consequences of displacement are no less severe than the physical and material ones. Displaced persons often describe their experience of displacement as leading to a loss of dignity and independence, many feel uprooted and are unable to connect emotionally to their places of reception, they are more likely to develop mental health issues and to pass these issues on to their children and grandchildren.

Beyond the consequence on each individual displaced person, large-scale displacement also severely impacts the social and economic status of a nation. Governments have to invert large sums into emergency assistance for displaced persons in the short term, and lose valuable social capital in the long run, as the integration of displaced persons into the labor market at their reception sites is usually difficult. Not only do displaced persons need special assistance from

the state, displacement also leads to a loss of tax revenues during the periods of displacement and until the reintegration into formal labor markets.

The last argument for focusing on preventing forced displacement in civil conflicts is the mere scale of the problem. The total number of displaced persons is currently at an all-time high since the beginning of reliable record-keeping, which includes the period of World War II (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015), and there is no recognizable downwards trend. States can only attend a limited capacity of displaced persons at the same time, even rich, developed nations such as the European states, which have been struggling with the recent influx of refugees. In a developing nation like Colombia, resources are scarcer and the ability of the political system to react to the threat of displacement is insufficient. Understanding the capacities of civilians to protect their communities and to prevent large-scale displacement is thus pivotal in preventing humanitarian disasters.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Personal background

The decision to include a section on my personal and academic background stems from the desire to provide the maximum amount of transparency for the readers of this thesis concerning any possible personal bias which could have affected the direction and style of the research presented to you in these pages.

I am convinced that "not having the opportunity to assess the degree of consistency between the researchers' beliefs and the research practices used makes it impossible to evaluate the quality of research" (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 19). Therefore, the following paragraphs introduce the most important aspects of self-identification, the academic tradition which has influenced me and my current epistemological beliefs, while trying not to cross "the thin line between being overly self-analytical and overly critical of the external forces that impact a research project" (Engward and Davis, 2015: 1537).

On the broadest level of identification, I identify as female, white, middle-class, European, Southern German, and non-religious. Despite distinctly identifying as both German and European, I do feel a strong personal and emotional connection to Colombia, which I consider to be a second home and which has permanently changed the way I perceive myself and the world around me.

Caring deeply for this country and its people inspired my academic interest in peace and conflict studies in the first place and was the motivation for this thesis. The intimate knowledge of the country I selected for my case study has helped the research process in terms of enabling an intuitive approach to the theory-generating process, that is, it enabled me understand the culturally accepted rules of conversation, while I am still 'foreign' enough to question and explain certain aspects of language and conversation, which might go unnoticed for someone closer to the region and the topic (see Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014: 16).

I tried to counter the danger of pre-conceived opinions with rigorous transparency into my research process and methodology. While assuming a position of complete neutrality is impossible for any researcher, one may strive for "'empathic neutrality', a position that recognizes that research cannot be value free but which advocates that researchers should make their assumptions transparent" (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 13). Hence, my objective was always to be as transparent and reflexive – on the topic and the research process itself – as possible.

The academic discipline that has most shaped my approach to the way research is and should be conducted has been Political Science, which I have studied in Germany and in Colombia. Both countries and universities have provided me with a very different set of skills and outlook on research. While my studies in Mannheim were focused on empirical methods, political theory and the creation of an academic mindset, the courses I took in Colombia provided a more hands-on experience, focusing on discussions of current problems and linking those more closely to the academic world.

During the last two years, while completing the Peace Master program, I have aimed at integrating the lessons learned from these very different experiences into the new thematic corpus, while my personal belief system has evolved to fully endorse nonviolence as a method, a process and a goal to strive for. The fact that I support nonviolence wholeheartedly led me to question its methods and success rate even more critically, since progress can only be achieved through questioning one's convictions thoroughly and repeatedly[5], thus allowing researchers to adapt their hypotheses to new perspectives and data and ameliorate the coherence and validity of their arguments.

In terms of ontological and epistemological views, this work assumes the perspective of subtle realism, a theory introduced by Martyn Hammersley at the beginning of the 1990's. Belonging to the school of critical realism, which combines ontological realism with epistemological

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[5] Martínez-Guzmán (2010) takes this argument even further, claiming that it is necessary to question reason itself in order to find nonviolent ways towards peace.

relativism, subtle realism acknowledges the existence of a reality, which exists independently from the perception of individuals or social groups, but at the same time ascertains that this objective reality can only be assessed through the perspective of the person describing it, that is, through the subjective reproduction of the objective reality (Hammersley, 1992). While other authors share similar views (e.g. Huberman and Miles, 1985; Maxwell, 2004; Putnam, 1990), Hammersley is one of the few authors that thoroughly applied the theoretical implications of critical, or subtle, realism to qualitative social research.

This concept undermines the absolute necessity of transparency as a paramount principle for high-quality research (Flick, 2007: 137). Being a somewhat pragmatic approach to social research, subtle realism focuses on the construction of meaningful insights through rigorously documented research as opposed to the relativist acceptance of multiple, equally valid realities, a view which in its most extreme form undermines the relevance and validity of any and all research (Andrews, 2012). But subtle realism also allows for the possibility of detecting causal mechanisms in qualitative social research.

This new recognition of another kind of research validity in social sciences found in the theoretical assumptions of Hammersley is supported by newer philosophical approaches such as the 'epistemological turn' proposed by Martínez-Guzmán (2009a; 2010), who applies the logic of knowledge as being constructed through mutual interpellation and dialogue to the peace studies field.

Although this is not per se a philosophical study, outlying these theoretical assumptions is not only contributive to the overall transparency of the research conducted for this thesis, they are also a necessary prerequisite for any reader to fully understand and be able to evaluate the choices I made concerning research methodology and data evaluation.

Methodological Framework:

Over the past decades, a vivid debate about appropriate research methodologies in social sciences has developed (Snape and Spencer, 2013: 14-15), with researchers from different theoretical traditions opting for either quantitative, qualitative or mixed methodologies. Standard works on this topic highlight the most important advantages, but also the disadvantages of each of these three options (e.g. Creswell, 2014; Flick, 2007; 2008; Mertens, 2010; Neuman, 2009).

The appropriate methodology for a research project relies as much on the specific research question one is trying to answer and the availability and accessibility of necessary data as on the ontological and epistemological beliefs of the researcher. Different questions call for different approaches to answer them, which at times leads to tensions between the researchers' beliefs, her[6] abilities and external limits to her freedom of choice.

Since this is not a thesis on methodology, I do not include a summary of the above-mentioned debate, but rather focus on first introducing the methodology that I chose for this research project, then situating it within the theoretical framework outlined in the preceding section of this chapter, and lastly, explaining some practical reasons for my choice of methodology.

I chose a mixed methodology design with the main focus on qualitative rather than quantitative elements for this thesis, for a variety of reasons.

First, the complexity of a subject like nonviolent resistance to forced migration, especially in the context of a protracted conflict, calls for an in-depth analysis of a single case or a small set of case. The necessary depth of understanding is best achieved by the careful evaluation of qualitative data.

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[6] The female pronoun is used here and henceforth as a substitute for 'researcher' based on the identity of the author of this thesis. However, male researchers are expressively included in this form, as are all researchers with gender identities different from 'male' and 'female'.

Second, in accordance with postcolonialism and the peace studies field, I found it important to include primary, qualitative data in order to include local knowledge, perspectives, and narratives.

Third, the gathering of adequate and precise statistical data during and shortly after civil conflict is extremely difficult (Höglund and Öberg, 2011). Although there are several databases on internal displacement in Colombia with relatively good records since the mid-1980's, there is no corresponding data for the variables I identified as relevant determinants for the success of nonviolent resistance.

Fourth, while statistical analysis alone is not appropriate for this thesis, I decided to include it into the research design because I believe that any theory should be tested against the perceivable reality with as much objectivity as possible. While the researchers' intuition and familiarity with a topic can be a great help in the theory-generating process, it may also lead to a certain blindness towards the reality beyond her own perception.

Thus, contrasting theoretical assumptions with observable data wherever possible is extremely relevant in creating strong research designs, which is why a variety of authors endorse mixed methods as beneficial for social science research (e.g. Ritchie, 2003; Creswell, 2014; George and Benett, 2004).

Given the explorative nature of this research project, I decided to adopt a theory-generating methodology rather than a theory-testing one. This kind of 'formative evaluation' aims to

> develop new conceptions or understandings of social phenomena […] develop hypotheses about the nature of the social world and how it operates […] generate new solutions to persistent social problems […] identify strategies to overcome newly defined phenomena or problems […] determine actions that are needed to make programmes, policies or services more effective (Ritchie, 2003: 30-31).

It is, therefore, a very praxis-oriented approach to scientific inquiry, which underlines that the aim of understanding the world in which we live is not the mere creation of new knowledge,

but rather the transformative power of this newly created knowledge in working towards building peace and making social processes more peaceful.

Grounded Theory Approach

There are few methodological frameworks, which are as rigorously coherent with their theoretical foundation as the *grounded theory methodology*, developed in the 1960's by Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser, and the base for this thesis. The name 'grounded theory' might be somewhat misleading as grounded theory is to be understood more as a tool or method than an actual theory.

Grounded theory proposes a shift away from the more traditional theory-testing mindset of political scientists and toward the generation of new theory, which is understood as a continuous process, not as a perfect end product (Glaser and Strauss, 2010: 49). Theory is developed on the base of the researchers' initial hypotheses in a topic in which she has gained some familiarity, followed by multiple cycles of data collection and interpretation.

In each of these steps, the hypotheses may get modified, expanded, rejected, or altered in any other way based on the newly found insights generated in the data evaluation process. The initial hypotheses help guide the researcher's attention through the field work phase (Brüsemeister, 2008: 25) and are thus relevant, even if they are partly or completely rejected later on.

The rationale behind the focus on theory-generation rather than theory-testing is that the latter does not offer new perspectives or suggest a viable alternative theory in case the tested theory is rejected. The replacement of an outdated or not suitable theory is, however, imperative for the development of new scientific insight (Bohnsack, 2000: 30). The relevance of qualitative research is hence measured by its ability to generate valid theory which contributes to the development of knowledge in a particular field (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014: 193).

Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (2014: 199-200) describe five basic principles of grounded theory methodology:

First, the research process entails iterative cycles of data collection and analysis, each new round of data collection being different from the previous ones since there are already preliminary results which modify the working hypotheses. The selection of new data happens through theoretical sampling, that is, the decision about what kind of data are to be sampled next relies on the results of the analysis of previous data (Brüsemeister 2008: 172). New data are collected until a point of theoretical saturation – when the collection of new data does not lead to new insights or relevant information anymore – is reached.

Second, the collected data has to be coded, that is, the researcher has to classify the data into different concepts, which are then, in a second step, interpreted and organized into more abstract categories. These categories then serve as the foundation for the emerging theory. For each analyzed case, the specific circumstances (including conditions, actions and consequences) need to be an integral part of the data evaluation process (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014: 203).

Third, the researcher should constantly compare the different concepts and categories she identified, thus working on a "simultaneous maximization or minimization of both the differences and the similarities of data that bear on the categories being studied" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 55). The definition of these *Vergleichshorizonte* [comparative horizons; own translation] will lead to a more precise and robust theory-building process.

Fourth, the researcher should write theoretical memos throughout the whole research process to ensure that no relevant theoretical insights are lost or forgotten. These memos aim at helping the researcher to develop a deeper understanding of the emerging concepts and categories and make it easier to relate them to each other.

Fifth, there is no linearity in the research process. Data collection, coding, and memo-writing happen repeatedly at different stages of the research and mutually inspire and influence each other. The interrelation and non-linearity of the different research stages is thought to enhance

the theory generating potential of the research project, since it allows for several revisions of previous theoretical assumptions.

In summary, grounded theory aims at generating relevant theoretical abstractions of the reality we perceive through systematic categorization and interrelation of the content of the collected data. In the words of Glaser and Strauss, "für die Generierung von Theorie stützen wir uns nicht auf die 'Tatsache', sondern auf die *konzeptuelle Kategorie* (oder eine *konzeptuelle Eigenschaft* der Kategorie), die aus ihr gewonnen wurde[7]" [cursive in the original version] (Glaser and Strauss, 2010: 41). Overall, grounded theory aims at generating the kind of theory which remains close enough to empirical reality to maintain its relevance for practitioners in the field and to lead to actionable recommendations.

While this thesis relies heavily on grounded theory in terms of basic epistemological and methodological considerations, my research praxis deviates from it in several noticeable ways. *First*, I did not set up the initial set of hypotheses based on primary data; instead, I analyzed secondary literature combined with some degree of intuition stemming from my previous extensive knowledge of the research context. Glaser specifically rejects the inclusion of pre-existing literature in the theory-generating process, while Strauss, in his later work, considers it to be an integral part of the research process (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014: 196).

To me, it seemed the most natural starting point in the research process, which may be partly due to lacking experience in research based on primary data. However, I do stand by the choice to base my initial hypotheses on existing literature as I believe that new theory should be anchored in the body of existing theory, not floating around in an empty space with no connection to other scholars' work. Generating new theory out of a complete void seems neither very practical nor conducive to advancing knowledge, for example, it might lead to a researcher

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[7] [for the generation of theory, we do not rely on the 'fact', but rather on the *conceptual category* (or a *conceptual feature* of the category), which has been derived from it; own translation]

spending months on developing a new theory, just to find out that an almost identical version of her theory already exists.

Second, I mixed theoretical sampling with snowball-sampling, that is, the selection of data (in my case, interview partners) through personal networks. While recognizing that this is not the ideal form of data collection, it was the only viable one. A combination of geographical distance to my research objects, which complicated the building of trust to interviewees (given that they continue to live in sensitive post-conflict areas), and a cultural proclivity in Colombia to connect to other people through personal networks (most e-mails to the official contact addresses of organizations are never answered), resulted in personal contacts as the most successful way of data collection.

Third, I do not exclusively work with qualitative methodology, but complement it with statistical data analysis, mainly because of the difficulties in gathering enough qualitative data to generate meaningful theory. However, I am convinced that both a more extensive qualitative sample as well as the statistical analysis of more cases will be extremely beneficial for future research and that both methodologies complement rather than contradict each other.

Despite the above-mentioned differences of the methodology of this thesis to grounded theory methodology, I have tried to follow it as closely as possible, and special effort has been put into highlighting any alterations to improve the clarity of the methodological conceptualization.

Case Study

Within the logic of qualitative research applying grounded theory methodology, an in-depth case study design seemed most fit for this thesis. Case studies excel in achieving conceptual validity, providing the base for new hypotheses about the researched subjects through deep theoretical insights, exploring causal mechanisms and modeling and assessing these complex causal relations (George and Bennett, 2005: 19-22).

Most of the work in this thesis is grounded in research on the *Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare* (ATCC), a *campesino* organization in the Middle Magdalena region of

Colombia. Both the initial literature review and analysis and the first outreach for interview partners have been focused on exploring the determinants of success for the ATCC. In order to compare the concepts and categories built from this initial analysis with another case to make findings more reliable, I later included the *Guardia Indígena* of the Toribío municipality in south-western Colombia as a comparative horizon for the main case study.

The grounded theory approach laid out above helps overcome some of the most severe limitations that most case studies face, which include

> the problem of case selection; the trade-off between parsimony and richness; and the related tension between achieving high internal validity and good historical explanations of particular cases versus making generalizations that apply to broad populations […] a relative inability to render judgements on the frequency or representativeness of particular cases and a weak capability for estimating the average 'causal effect' of variables for a sample (George and Benett, 2005: 22).

These kinds of limitations are based on a different understanding of epistemology and ontology than the ones presented earlier on in this chapter. The often-cited danger of a negative effect of a selection bias on the quality of the outcomes of research (e.g. Geddes, 1990; 2003; Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 59) is mitigated through the rationale of purposeful theoretical sampling. George and Bennett (2005: 23) stress that the appropriate case selection method depends on the kind of research question the researcher is posing and that the logic of selection bias in qualitative studies is considerably different from quantitative studies.

The question of generalizability of findings is of course a certain natural limitation for any case study, but I argue that the experience of different movements of nonviolent resistance against forced displacement is so different across the globe that a rule that fits all of them would have to be so general that it would be practically meaningless. Furthermore, specific suggestions are made in the last chapter of this thesis as to which future research steps would be necessary to corroborate my findings for other Colombian regions.

<u>Expert interviews</u>

Since my research aim focused on gaining a deeper understanding of the determinants of success of nonviolent resistance against forced displacement, I chose to conduct expert interviews with representatives of the civil organizations I selected for the case studies to provide insights into the inner workings of their respective organizations.

This section details the criteria for choosing the interview partners, the form of conducting the interviews, the mode of communication between researcher and experts, research ethics, and the methods of documentation and interpretation of the collected data. Finally, I will outline some limitations I encountered in this process and how they were dealt with.

The question of what exactly makes an expert, in fact, an expert, is highly controversial. For the purpose of this thesis, the criteria for qualifying as an 'expert' are that the person has specific knowledge on a subject, which other persons do not share, that others recognize this person as having such knowledge and that the person herself[8] also recognizes that she has such knowledge (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014: 118). "Der Experte fungiert in dieser Perspektive vor allem als Zugangsmedium zur Organisation und als deren Repräsentant[9]" (Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014: 119), that is, the potential interview partners for this thesis needed to work in the organizations I selected for the case studies and be able to provide insight into the processes and inner workings of these organizations.

A second criterium of 'experts' is their ability to adequately interpret the specific knowledge they hold, and thus help the researcher to not only get factual insights into the area of expertise of the interviewed person, but also contribute valuable theoretical insights.

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[8] The female pronoun is used here and henceforth as a substitute for 'expert' and 'interview partner' based on the identity of the experts consulted for this thesis. The form includes hypothetical male experts or persons with a gender identification different from 'male' or 'female' in any general statements on experts.
[9] [In this perspective, the experts's function is primarily that of an access medium to the organization and as its representative; own translation]

The third, and last, criterium of an 'expert' is their contextual knowledge, that is, their ability to understand and explain issues that are connected to the main topic of research, but not its main focus.

Selecting the right interview partners proved to be difficult given that I could not travel to Colombia and thus had to establish contact and build sufficient trust with the potential interviewees from a distance and through modern communication tools. Given the rural nature of the organizations I selected for the case studies, the persons I could consider as potential interview partners live in remote rural settings, with problematic internet access (generally, there is internet access, but the connection is not very good and often collapses).

Apart from the question of access, most potential interview partners were also not overly familiar with the tool I initially intended to use for the interviews (*Skype*). In order to provide a more comfortable setting for my interview partners, I switched to communicating with them via *WhatsApp*, which is the most commonly used mode of communication in Colombia apart from regular phone calls.

While initially intending to conduct the interviews via *WhatsApp* calls, the quality of connection proved too poor to enable a fluid conversation, which is why I switched to recording voice notes. The advantage of this method was the interview partners were familiar with the tool of communication, the necessity for a stable internet connection was eliminated and the quality of the audio recordings was much better than if I had had to record the conversation with another device.

On the downside, the natural flow of a direct conversation could not be recreated and there is a possibility of self-censoring by the respondents, that is, the respondents could record their answers more than once before they sending them (to correct 'errors', include or exclude different details than in their initial, intuitive response). However, from the time between sending the questions and receiving the answers, this last problem does not seem very likely to have happened, and the respondents' answers in general seemed spontaneous and sincere.

The interviews were set up as semi-structured interviews. Some guiding questions were prepared before the actual interviews, but then partly adapted, extended or dropped during the interviews depending on the interviewee's responses and the perceived relevance of a question or topic to the interviewed person. It is part of the interviewer's tasks to detect these differences in the relevance of interview content for the interviewer and the interviewee, and to adapt the content and style of questioning accordingly.

Thus, despite generally setting the topic for the interviews, I also tried to leave spaces for the interviewees to freely narrate things they considered relevant to the overall topic, which enabled less predictable and overall more insightful responses. This flexibility proved to be extremely useful for obtaining an open and engaged response from the interviewees.

From the first contact to finishing the interviews, the communication with the interviewed persons was based on the respect of their role as local experts with the aim to create a peer-to-peer situation, where interviewer and interviewee recognized each other as experts of different fields and thus as equals in terms of perceived social hierarchy.

The level of formality maintained during the interviews and preliminary conversation was modeled on the interviewees' mode of expression – I simply mimicked the more formal *Usted*, or the more informal *tu* with which I was addressed by the interviewees. The level of formality in addressing unknown people varies across different regions in Colombia, and previous experiences from living in Colombia helped me understand and use appropriate forms of linguistic expression.

I did not use any automated tools to assist the transcription of the voice notes. Considerable time and effort has been put into the manual transcription of the interview content thus assuring the correct reproduction of the original data. I transcribed colloquial language and dialect in the way it most resembles the spoken version, thus the transcripts are not in all parts orthographically correct. I also included sounds like 'um' or filler words like 'pues' and partial words and sentences, which the interview partner did not finish. I did not include the length of

pauses between different sentences or statements nor did I mark the pace of speech, as these two features did not seem all too relevant for my analysis.

In order to maintain ethical research standards, I informed the interviewees about the general nature of my research, the intent to publish my findings and their right to withdraw from the interview at any given moment and to not respond to any question they might feel uncomfortable with before I started conducting the interviews.

Despite the consent of the interviewees to use their true names in this thesis, I decided not to reveal their identities in order to guarantee that they will not experience any negative consequences based on their participation in my research project. It is important to keep in mind that the respondents continue to live in post-conflict areas and that members of their organizations have suffered from threats and physical assaults in the past. Although they likelihood of creating a harmful outcome for the interviewees by revealing their names might not be very high, I consider it unethical to cause even a small risk to their security and well-being.

The interpretation of qualitative data can be understood as "methodisch kontrollierte[s] Fremdverstehen" (Bohnsack, 2000: 20) – the methodologically controlled understanding of the other (referring to a person). Correctly understanding and being able to explain the meaning of another persons' words depends on whether or not one shares "Erfahrungsräume" (Bohnsack, 2000: 67) – 'experience spaces' – with that person.

These spaces include a common culture, language, life experiences etc., which form the base of understanding any conversational exchange, since meaning is expressed through symbols, metaphors and implicit rather than explicit statements. The challenge a researcher faces is to document her interpretation in a way that allows for the possibility of intersubjective control of the interpretation, that is, to make each interpretive step visible and retraceable. In this reconstruction and interpretation of meaning, the researcher has to step away from her own assumption of normality and create a logical and transparent process which will then transform

preliminary assumptions into a valid base for the emerging theory. Bohnsack describes this process as follows:

> Die wissenschaftliche Analyse kann keine höhere Rationalität hinsichtlich der Aussagen, was die (gesellschaftliche) Realität ist, für sich in Anspruch nehmen. Sie kann den Erkenntnisgewinn lediglich auf eine andere Rationalität, eine andere Beobachterhaltung stützen, so durch den konsequenten Wechsel von der Frage nach dem Was der beobachteten Realität zur Frage nach dem Wie ihrer Herstellung, von der Beobachtung erster zur Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung[10] (Bohnsack, 2003: 558)

In order to achieve these observation of the second order, the following steps, based on grounded theory methodology as described earlier in this chapter, have been part of the interpretive process:

a) Open Coding: In the first step, the raw data are organized into topics and thematic clusters, in order to search for common concepts;

b) Clustering the concepts found in the first step into superior categories and describing the different levels of these categories;

c) establishing a key category, which is the base for the emerging theory;

d) contrasting the findings with evidence from other cases to corroborate the emerging theory; and lastly

e) interrelating the different categories into the emerging theory (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014: 209-223). While these steps may sound very theoretical and somewhat hard to grasp, they will become much clearer later on in the analysis, when each step is demonstrated on the actual interview material.

But not only what is being said needed to be analyzed, one can also learn a lot from the things that have been excluded, or marginalized, omitted or altered in the narrative of the respondents.

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[10] [The scientific analysis can claim no higher rationality in terms of statements about the nature of (social) reality. It can only rely its insights on a different rationality, a different observational attitude, and thus, through the constant change from the question of the What of the observed reality to the question of the Why of its construction, get from an observation of the first order to an observation of the second order; own translation]

The responses of the interview partners are more relevant in terms of what can be learned about the interviewee and her positions or opinions than in terms of factual correctness or 'truth' of the statements (Bohnsack, 2000: 75). It is important to always consider the role of the interviewed person as a representative of their organization with their own motives and an interest in presenting matters in a certain way. What does the interviewee aim to achieve with a specific sentence and with the overall narrative? What is the intended meaning of her statements and what knowledge is transmitted in a non-intentional way? The answers to these questions are never fully disclosed, but have to form part of the analysis and as such have to be assessed as thoroughly as possible.

The major drawback of this part of my research project lies in the small number of interviews I was able to gather. While nine people initially responded to my messages and announced an interest in participating in this study, only two interviews could be realized. The other potential interviewees simply stopped responding to my messages for unknown reasons. For a study the size of this thesis, five to six respondents would have been ideal to create a strong emerging theory. Since this number was not reached, I decided to try to corroborate my findings from this main part by including a quantitative analysis, which will be introduced in the next section.

Regression Analysis

I use a pooled OLS analysis with time series data to assess the influence of two factors on the level of displacement in the areas of influence of the ATCC and the Guardia Indígena of Toribío. These two factors are the number of people, which have been murdered per year, and the number of people, which have received threats to their physical integrity or well-being. The hypotheses I am testing are the following:

H_0: There is no statistically significant difference in the explanatory power of homicides on displacement for the territory of influence of the ATCC and Toribío.

H_1: There is no statistically significant difference in the explanatory power of threats on displacement for the territory of influence of the ATCC and Toribío.

I expect to be able to reject hypotheses H_0 and H_1, specifically, I expect the explanatory power of homicides and threats to be higher for the territory of influence of the ATCC than for Toribío.

In a next step, I control the robustness of the model by creating three variables, which show the change rate from one year to the previous year for displacement, homicides and threats respectively. This intends to include a relative measure and show how the change in homicides and threats affects the change in displacement. The resulting hypothesis is:

H_2: There is no statistically significant difference in the explanatory power of the percentage change of threats and homicides compared to the previous year on the percentage change in displacement for the territory of influence of the ATCC and Toribío.

I expect to also be able to reject H_2 and find a higher explanatory power for the ATCC region than for Toribío.

The data for all three variables (displacement, homicides, and threats) was obtained from the *Unidad para las Víctimas* (2017), the agency of the Colombian government for the victims of the conflict, which provides what I consider to be the most complete and long-term dataset on the different forms of victimization for the Colombian conflict.

It is important to notice that these numbers only include registered displacement, homicides and threats, it is likely that the true numbers are higher than the ones in this dataset. However, since I am not interested in assessing the overall magnitude of any of these variables, but rather the differences in explanatory power in different areas, this underreporting should not pose a problem.

The data range from 1985 to 2016 with relatively few missings in comparison to similar datasets. They are disaggregated on the municipal level, which poses a slight problem for assessing the territory of the ATCC correctly, since it is distributed over six different municipalities, but covering none of them completely. I decided to build the sum of the total numbers for each variable and year for these six municipalities and treat them as a proxy for the ATCC territory.

There are, of course, many more variables, which exert an influence on the level of displacement, for example the intensity of the conflict, the number of armed actors present in a region, and the level of drug production. However, this analysis does not intend to explain displacement, but rather to compare the influence of two relevant factors in displacement, homicides and threats, across two different regions.

CHAPTER 3: CURRENT APPROACHES TO PREVENT FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA

This chapter introduces the most important current efforts towards preventing forced displacement in Colombia. For the purpose of narrowing down the vast array of different initiatives, projects, interventions and programs, I have divided the main stakeholders, who engage in prevention efforts, into four categories.

The first category is the state and state agencies on the national, regional and local level. The second category are international actors (state and non-state). The third category are national non-state actors. The fourth category also focuses on national non-state actors, but with one important difference to the third group: it includes only social movements, civil society organizations and grassroots activism, which have been initiated and are led by the people who are directly affected by what they are fighting against. That is, a non-governmental organization (NGO) who works with the people in a village affected by forced displacement would belong to category three, but an NGO set up and managed by the people in the same village and which works on the same issues would belong to category four.

While Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis focus only on the fourth category of stakeholders, it is important to understand the landscape of actors in the field, the strengths and weaknesses they have, and how they are linked amongst each other. This chapter provides the reader with the necessary overview as well as the theoretical and practical reasons why increasing local actors' agency is relevant to make prevention efforts more efficient and effective.

3.1 State and State Agencies

From a legal point of view, the state is the most relevant actor in the prevention of forced displacement as states are primarily responsible for the protection of their citizens, a responsibility which was first recognized explicitly in Colombian law in 1997[11]. This guarantee

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[11] *Ley 387 de 1997* is one of the first laws that defines the term 'displaced person' in the national legislation, recognizes the states obligations' towards victims of forced displacement and specifies victims' rights (Eslava,

of protection is the base of any social contract between a state and its citizens. The sovereignty of any state relies on its ability and willingness to uphold this contract and to prevent breaches of national and international law in its territory.

'The state' is not one single actor, but a multitude of different entities, which simultaneously work both with and against each other. The complex interplay between these actors obscures responsibilities and in many cases, serves to protect established political elites. It surpasses the limits of this thesis to provide a more comprehensive analysis of Colombia's political landscape. However, it is important to keep in mind that state capacity is limited by widespread corruption, involvement of politicians in narcotics trade and paramilitary organizations, and an overall culture on all levels of society of seeing laws more as vague guidelines than as binding rules.

This section examines how state actions on the legal, policy and implementation levels have influenced the prevention of forced displacement in Colombia.

Legal Framework

Current Colombian law on issues relating to forced displacement is very comprehensive, inclusive and in accordance with international humanitarian law, but has been unable to translate the *de jure* status into a *de facto* one (Fadnes and Horst, 2009: 111; Lennard, 2017: 30; Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 4). In fact, some innovations in the legal framework may even have been counter-productive in the effort to erase the underlying problems that cause displacement.

This section argues that, since the Constitution of 1991, the legal framework on forced displacement in Colombia has been notably strengthened, especially concerning the rights of displaced persons, but that this has had very little effect on the lives of those at risk of displacement, which is reflected in the continuously high numbers of new displacement.

2009: 217). It has since been updated, but was an important stepping stone in addressing the issue of forced displacement in Colombia.

The aim of the constitutional reform in 1991 was to promote political inclusion and participation as well as strengthen the status of human rights (Rampf and Chavarro, 2014), "giving international human rights law superior status in cases of incompatibility with domestic law" (Fox and others, 2010: 478). A broad array of different actors formed part of the drafting process, including three guerrilla groups[12], which agreed to demobilize in exchange for their inclusion in the nation-building process (Fox and others, 2010: 473).

The new constitutional framework also furthered the separation and balance of powers (Fox and others, 2010: 477; 480), which may have had unintended negative consequences. As Eslava (2009) explains, the transfer of topics to the judicial branch, which were formerly dealt with by the executive, may have relieved policy-makers from popular pressure and have led to the realization of the incapacity of the judiciary to oblige national politicians to adhere to the Constitution.

This problem is best exemplified by the 2004 ruling of the Constitutional Court which announced an 'unconstitutional state of affairs' in matters of internal displacement (Eslava, 2009: 217). Despite the gravity of this verdict, little real change followed and the exceptional notion of an unconstitutional state of affairs turned into quasi-normalcy.

An anomaly of the 1991 Constitution is the establishment of indigenous reserves as autonomous judicial units[13] (Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2015: Article 246). The latter is important with respect to nonviolent resistance movements, as some indigenous peoples have used this right quite effectively to prohibit their members from taking part in any form of violent conflict. Other communities, like Afro-Colombian or *campesino* communities, were not granted similar jurisdictional autonomy and thus had to find different strategies to further social cohesion and prevent their members from engaging in violent practices.

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[12] The Popular Liberation Army (EPL), except for a splinter group; the Workers Revolutionary Party (PRT) and the Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame, an indigenous resistance movement.

[13] In these regions, indigenous law can be implemented autonomously, given that it does not contradict either the Colombian Constitution or national law (Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2015: Article 246).

However, Afro-Colombian communities could somewhat strengthen their rights when they achieved recognition of the collective nature of their land ownership in 1993 (Congress of the Republic of Colombia, 1993: Article 4 – Article 18). Land-grabbing is a major causal factor for forced displacement, especially in cases of informal land-ownership, which reduces the probability of regaining one's land after being displaced.

The Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011 reiterates the importance of preventing illicit dispossession of territories, which affects five percent of agricultural land in Colombia (Medina, 2012: 34). Additionally, recognition of collective land-ownership raised the chances of successful nonviolent resistance by enhancing key factors such as social cohesion and mutual dependence, thus working both to reduce the risk of displacement and strengthen resilience against the intrusion of armed actors.

While the advancement in Colombian law has achieved some remarkable results over the past decades[14], the overall dysfunctionality of the legal system prevails and restricts its role in the effective prevention of forced displacement. Laws such as the guarantee of non-recurrence (Congress of the Republic of Colombia, 2011: Article 149) seem at best idealistic as forced displacement continues to be a major concern in many regions. As one scholar resumes:

> even though the law is intentionally blind to its social lack of success, it pushes ideologically for a process of egalitarian amalgamation based on presumptions such as equality before the law. The law does not need to be effective: it is sufficient that it is rightly produced and interpreted to formally exist (Eslava, 2009: 195).

The consequences of this dissonance between law and reality are severe. As this section clearly shows, stricter and more elaborate laws alone cannot successfully prevent forced displacement in Colombia.

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[14] An excellent overview of laws and decrees related to forced displacement up to the year 2007 can be found in Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: Annex I (pages 44 to 48).

<u>Policy</u>

This section argues that adequate policy can help eradicate the core problems that lead to displacement in Colombia – most of all the ongoing violent conflict – but falls short in the protection of citizens that are at risk of displacement due to the lack of state presence in remote areas, mistrust of the population in the ability of state agencies to protect them, and widespread corruption at all levels of politics.

Policy approaches to prevent forced displacement can be subsumed in five categories: military operations, human rights training and capacitation for local communities and military personnel, early warning and protection programs, socio-economic policies, and negotiating peace accords with armed actors who cause displacement [15]. The following paragraphs briefly summarize these approaches.

Military Operations:

Over the past 30 years, the number of military personnel in Colombia rose from just over 66.000 in 1985 to over 480.000 in 2015 (World Bank Data, 2017). The increasingly neo-liberal, US-backed[16] expansion in military presence and action since right-wing president Álvaro Uribe took office in 2000 has produced ambiguous results: on the one hand, guerrilla forces have been weakened; on the other hand, the military itself has a rather bad human rights record and turned into an actor causing displacement rather than preventing it in many cases.

The most exemplary case is the 2006 scandal of the *falsos positivos*, incriminating military personnel for having killed over 3.000 civilians and subsequently having dressed the dead like

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[15] These lines of work are complemented by social and economic development programs which aim at strengthening rural regions. These programs work at eliminating core problems such as poverty, inequality, access to arable land, etc., which eventually lead to armed conflict, which in turn causes displacement. However, since they are not directly aimed at preventing forced displacement, they are not included in this section.

[16] Since 2000, the USA have invested nearly 10 billion dollars in 'Plan Colombia', a counter-narcotics program, which started in the 1990s. Plan Colombia strengthened the Colombian military through training of local staff, technology transfers and by involving US military intelligence experts in the coordination of operations on the ground. It had certain success in reducing the military power of guerrilla groups and thus increasing security, but widely ignored paramilitary forces and abuses committed by the military itself. The program has had a high monetary cost as well as a severe effect on the environment and the health of Colombian citizens, through practices like aerial spraying of pesticides to eradicate coca crops. For further reading, see for example Miroff, 2016; Reyes, no date; Rodas Chaves, 2008; Tate, 2001; Mejía, 2015.

guerrilla fighters to increase the official headcount of eliminated guerrilla members (International Federation for Human Rights, 2012). Furthermore, the military seems unable to fill the power vacuum left by newly demobilized FARC units in many regions fast enough to prevent common criminal bands or just plain lawlessness from taking over, leading to a new increase in displacement in early 2017 (Graham-Harrison, 2017; Ávila, 2017; Protection Cluster Colombia, 2017).

Human Rights Training:

An increasing number of workshops and other training on human rights have been offered to both the Colombian military and community leaders over the past decade. Following reform processes in 2007 and 2008, the military reward system has been changed to measuring military success in terms of captures instead of casualties to prevent more cases of *falsos positivos* (Fernandez, no date). Also, the School of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the National Army of Colombia was created in order to ensure access to human rights training for a higher number of military officials.

While an increasing awareness about International Human Rights Law and the strengthening of military disciplinary law has led to a certain decrease in human rights infractions by the military, impunity and unjustified dismissals of cases are still a considerable problem (Montero Perdomo, 2017: 55), and just recently, members of the army have been accused of murdering several *campesinos* in an anti-narcotics operation in the Cauca region of Colombia (Valenzuela, 2017).

On the other hand, increased human rights capacitation for community leaders has led to a better understanding of their rights for many communities, but not necessarily to less infractions on these rights. In fact, with the increased capacitation, more demands have been filed by victims of the conflict, but the percentage of verdicts against human rights violators remains minimal – impunity rates are as high as 96.98% (Le Clercq Ortega and Rodríguez Sánchez Lara, 2017: 37) – possibly leading to a loss of confidence in the judicial institutions of the country.

Another problem of the human rights based approach to displacement that the Colombian government is promoting (National Government of the Republic of Colombia, 2011: 79-81) is that it follows the lines of perceiving forced displacement as an infringement on human rights and thus a humanitarian issue, which leaves aside the political and instrumental nature of forced displacement. This depoliticization of the issue inhibits the implementation of efficient solutions for many of the core problems that lead to displacement.

Early Warning and Protection:

There are three phases of prevention and protection to be distinguished: early prevention (promote respect for human rights), urgent prevention or protection, and guarantees of non-repetition (incl. decreasing impunity) (Conpes, 2012: 27). The Colombian government created various programs and institutions to deal with displacement throughout all three phases, both for individuals and for communities at risk.

The main organizations for the defense of civilian's rights are the *Defensoría del Pueblo* and its *Defensores regionales,* whose efficiency in reaching their goals depends on the quality of the individual *defensor*'s strategy – some have been able to build relationships of trust with armed actors and advance a dialogue with them, which has saved multiple lives in situations of wrongful accusation of civilians of any 'crime'; others have been more focused on upholding their moral principles and enforcing the law, which usually results in a higher likelihood for the population in their areas to be killed or forced to flee.

In 2001, the government created an early warning system (SAT) and the corresponding *Comité Interinstitucional de Alertas Temprana*[17] (CIAT). The SAT has proven to be an innovative system which excels at gathering information in the midst of conflict, but is overall rather slow and chronically underfunded. Additionally, the CIAT has had very little success in getting government agencies to respond to the identified threats. The populations at risk of displacement thus have little trust in this system, since the military is usually not ready to

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[17] [Interinstitutional Early Warning Committee; own translation]

respond to the alerts they receive and in the few cases of obtaining a military response, civilians have not necessarily enjoyed improved conditions after an intervention (Fadnes and Horst, 2009: 114).

Socio-Economic Policies:

Socio-economic policies can play a major role in reducing basic social problems like poverty and inequality, which are highly correlated with violent conflicts. Colombia is one of the first countries worldwide to adopt a very innovative approach in poverty reduction policies. Poverty is understood as a multidimensional phenomenon, and a new index to measure all dimensions of poverty adequately has been introduced in 2011 (Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative, no date).

Colombian officials have put a focus on promoting inclusive growth and economic and social development to overcome inequality with a focus on regional and rural-urban divides (OECD, 2015), and they have allocated more financial resources to public education, the formalization of labor markets, and building infrastructure. One of the main problems in implementing these strategies throughout the country has been the discrepancy between the demands that municipal and communal governments should be responsible for the development of their territories and the lack of revenue transfers from the national to the local level.

The result is a highly unequal development scheme, where more prosperous cities like Medellín have been very successful in reducing crime and multidimensional poverty, but other areas (especially rural areas with few financial resources) have been left behind, although they are the ones that are most affected by the conflict. Overall, the divide between urban and rural areas in Colombia has been growing stronger, and rural populations have become more rather than less marginalized.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I established the relevance of the prevention phase in eliminating forced displacement. However, prevention, along with institutional strengthening, continues to be the phase that is by far supplied with the least financial resources (Conpes,

2015; Conpes, 2012). The graph below visualizes the distribution of resources among the eight components of the IDP program of the government.

While humanitarian aid receives the single largest budget, a big portion of resources also goes towards economic development and stabilization. Policy makers need to focus on a more sensible distribution of the available resources to strengthen prevention as a means of lasting and sustainable peacebuilding.

Graph 4: Distribution (in %) of financial resources by program components (1995-2004)

Distribution of allocations among IDP program areas in Colombia (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 17)

Peace Accords:

Some of the major achievements of the Colombian government in terms of reducing and preventing forced displacement are the peace accords it has been able to sign and maintain with several armed actors, including most recently, in 2016, the largest remaining guerrilla group, the FARC-EP. Peace negotiations were also the base for the process of drafting a new Constitution in 1991, and they laid the grounds for the demobilization of the paramilitary forces of the AUC in 2006. While the *Ejército Nacional de Liberación* (ELN) – now the last active guerrilla group in Colombia – is still operating in some parts of the country, these peace accords have given rise to hopes for a more peaceful future for the Colombian people.

However, previous demobilization processes have shown that after the disarmament process, parts of the ex-combatants tend to join other criminal networks for a variety of reasons: some seek the protection of another armed actor as they fear retributions from their past victims, some have no relevant job skills and desperately need work to sustain their families, some are tempted by the comparatively high salaries in this niche of the labor market and yet others may simply not know another form of existence any more after decades of armed struggle.

On top of that, peace processes are only possible between the government and an official armed actor with an at least minimally defined and negotiable political agenda, which does not apply to the vast array of criminal bands, drug cartels and gangs which continue to cause massive forced evictions of civilians from their homes. Peace processes alone are thus only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to end the perpetuation of violent structures in Colombian society.

<u>Implementation:</u>

To call implementation of laws and policies in Colombia poor can only be considered an understatement. Despite the highly innovative and inclusive legal framework and policy approach to forced displacement, "the Colombian state is doing little in practice to fulfill its legal responsibilities to the displaced population, except to some extent in terms of short-term humanitarian relief" (Fadnes and Horst, 2009: 116).

Decentralization and a complex interplay of responsibilities of different governmental entities (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 2-4) have led to inefficiency and unclear responsibilities. In addition to the fact that "municipalities lack any room to maneuver or rearrange investment priorities for resources transferred by the national government" (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 34), they do not obtain any additional financial allocations for the implementation of IDP policies either (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 34). Such policies are, as a result, often neglected. As one study explains:

> The National Development Plan recognized the weakness of these programs with regard to coordinating between the local institutions and the head offices; […] Although the recognition of this weakness is a positive step, it does not identify concrete mechanisms to overcome the lack of coordination (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 5).

Since financing, program design and program implementation are not dealt with by the same agency, accountability for wrongful or lacking implementation is limited to non-existent.

Successful implementation is also hindered by abrupt changes in the policy approaches after presidential elections. While conservative hardliners like former president Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) focused on combating guerrilla troops with military operations and left little room for dialogue, current president Juan Manuel Santos (since 2010) obtained a Nobel Peace Prize for reaching a negotiated settlement with the FARC.

The involvement of politicians on all levels with paramilitary operations has led to what is commonly described as 'para-politics'. Testimonies from former AUC leaders and documents retrieved from their computers after the official demobilization of the organization in 2006 led to the investigation of roughly one third of the Congress, including then President Álvaro Uribe`s brother and cousin (Sevillano, 2016). Between 2006 and 2016 there have been 519 disciplinary processes against public functionaries for involvement with paramilitary organizations or common criminal bands (Revista Semana, 2016), which is an exorbitantly high number in the international comparison.

Government corruption and the lack of effective state control in many rural territories and even some parts of big cities (*barrios* where the police do not enter) (UNDP, 2016: 11) have led many citizens to perceive the government as a threat rather than an institution that protects them, which leads to low levels of overall trust in the government (Bonwick, 2006b: 3-4).

On a local level, many elected officials in municipal governments and community leaders suffer serious threats from armed criminal actors (Bonwick, 2006b: 9), especially if they have different political positions than the armed actors in question. Investigators describe an example

from the area of influence of the ATCC: "Cuando la UNO alcanzó la mayoría en el concejo de Cimitarra, sus miembros fueron objeto de asesinatos, desapariciones, torturas, encarcelamientos" (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 213). Whenever a party that is not favored by the dominant armed actor in a region comes into power, its members tend to suffer extremely heightened mortality rates. Thus, in many cases, the outcome is a "public policy which, on the surface, respects human rights, but which in practice remains largely unimplemented in the areas where protection is most needed" (Bonwick, 2006b: 1).

Conclusion

States and especially local governments can do a lot to protect its citizens from forced displacement. However, in the case of Colombia, despite efforts by various international actors to strengthen local governments and the ties between civil society and the state, the vast territory and large number of remote rural populations in addition to the obstacles laid out in this section have prevented an effective solution to the displacement problem. As of yet, the state does not provide sufficient support for local populations in areas with strong presence of illicit armed forces, be it guerrilla, paramilitary or criminal bands. Between these hindrances and the manifest "lack of political will and lack of knowledge of the officials" (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 15) about the laws and regulations in place, the ones who suffered the most severe consequences are civilians. As Luis Eslava states:

> In the reformist endeavor, the production of law has become a substitute for the political system, establishing lines of communication between the State and the citizenry without materializing such policies. In other words, the production of law or legal reformism stands in for, often in a merely symbolic fashion, the incapacity of the State to respond the social demands for security, social justice and participation (Eslava, 2009: 196-197).

Even in a more favorable institutional context, the sheer magnitude of the displacement problem in Colombia would be overwhelming: about one in five Colombians, approximately 7.75 million people, is displaced (Unidad para las Víctimas, 2017) and as such entitled to reparations,

millions more are recognized as victims of the conflict in ways other than displacement. Assisting a considerable percentage of the national population while at the same time eliminating the causes of displacement, registering and protecting abandoned land, and also protecting communities at risk is an enormous task for any state, let alone one plagued by corruption, inconsequence, uncoordinated policy-making and overall poor implementation and monitoring.

The lacking regard for local knowledge and experiences in national-level policy might be part of the reason for the poor implementation results (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 9-10). There is a certain absurdity in this disregard, since responsibilities to prevent forced displacement are continuously being pushed towards local authorities without giving them the means to actually guarantee protection or include them in program design (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 10; 17). Better coordination and collaboration with local governments will be a necessary element in restoring the populations' faith in the state and its protection, which will most likely be a long process.

In order to support communities, which engage in nonviolent resistance, states may introduce public policies that support the rights of victims of the conflict who stayed in their places of origin. Displaced people have the advantage of specific laws which regulate their rights and the reparations that they are entitled to. This system of attention to displaced persons is seriously flawed and does not reach all of its target population, but at least there is a system in place, which allows people to reclaim specific rights.

The state, however, needs to strengthen the support to those who suffered different forms of violence in their communities, but decided to stay. This support needs to be administered fast and efficiently, it should encourage people to see a realistic opportunity for positive change while staying in their communities and ensure that they will at least not suffer any negative consequences in terms of access to state benefits, reparations for violated rights and support to

reconstruct their lives which have been deranged by violent conflict due to their decision to stay.

3.2 International Actors

Although the responsibility for preventing or managing displacement lies with the state (Gómez Truedsson, 2012: 10), outside actors may be involved, consulted or help the state in question in the execution of its task without taking away the legal responsibilities of the state. The tasks of the international actors involved in the prevention of forced displacement in Colombia include, amongst others:

> promoting legal recognition and respect of the right to be free from arbitrary displacement, and the consequent prohibition of arbitrary displacement; addressing root causes particularly through conflict prevention; assessment, early warning and contingency planning; and, field-based protective strategies, such as presence, advocacy, community mobilization and information on their rights (Zapater, 2010: 8-9).

States around the globe have assisted the Colombian government in a range of different ways, including in the mediation of peace negotiations (Cuba and Norway in the Peace Talks with the FARC guerrilla), and in the process of adopting international legal frameworks on forced displacement into national law, as exemplified by the Swiss assistance in the formulation of the Kampala Convention (Gómez Truedsson, 2012: 10).

The foreign state that has been most involved in Colombia over the past decades are the USA. Their highly controversial development aid program, the so-called *Plan Colombia*, started in 1999 and focused on combating the rising narco-trafficking organizations, but also included military and technological as well as economic aid (Sánchez Cobaleda, 2011: 6). The almost 11 billion US dollars the United States government has spent on Plan Colombia and its successor programs since 2000 (Norman, 2017) have led to only partial successes (Mejía, 2015;

Sánchez Cobaleda, 2011) and, in fact, have even had severe effects on the environment and on the Colombian population.

While aerial fumigations of coca plants led to environmental degradation and caused health problems to farmers living in the fumigated areas, the over-emphasis on military aid has led to an expansion of the armed forced and an increasing militarization of the country. Supporting military forces which were known to tolerate and partly collaborate with paramilitary forces is a rather questionable policy and has contributed considerably to multiple human rights violations in Colombia (Sánchez Cobaleda, 2011: 79).

Looking at the involvement of non-state international actors in Colombia, the picture is somewhat more positive, at least in terms of upholding the 'do no harm' paradigm. One of the main organizations involved on the ground is the ICRC, which first entered Colombia in 1969 and has had an extensive field presence since 1991. Their work includes the areas of prevention, creation of contingency plans for communities at risk of displacement, information gathering, dialogue, humanitarian assistance and training of the armed forces in International Human Rights Law (IHL). The ICRC has had a unique position in the field, since it is the only international actor, which is legally allowed to interact directly with non-state armed actors, all other agencies must operate through the institutions of the Colombian state (Bonwick, 2006b: 13).

The Colombian government is relatively permissive in terms of allowing international non-state organizations to enter their territory, and even requested UNHCR to enter Colombia in 1999. Their mandate includes some prevention work, but they mostly have an advisory function to the national government and grant assistance to already displaced populations (Ibáñez and Velásquez, 2008: 6).

The vast array of other international agencies and NGOs mostly works on a policy level – while, paradoxically, "the 'policy' marketplace is [already] overcrowded in Colombia" (Bonwick, 2006b: 16) – or in communities where projects have a high chance of succeeding – which are

not necessarily the most vulnerable ones. Bonwick explains that there is a severe lack of coordination between NGOs, networks, and other organizations. at a national level, as well as a lack of common purpose and action (Bonwick, 2006b: 19), which leads to a debilitating fragmentation of the humanitarian system.

One notable effort to positively reinforce the peacebuilding capacities of local government is being conducted by UNDP, who works on extending

> the presence, authority and protection of the state, under a more responsive and inclusive model, to all regions, cities, villages and quarters; build[ing] confidence in the political settlement by enabling resource distribution to the local level; direct[ing] efforts of the state toward responding to the needs of affected communities in a more inclusive manner; and address[ing] drivers of insecurity and conflict by strengthening social cohesion and supporting local resilience (UNDP, 2016: xiv).

Strengthening local governance is herein seen as a long-term, "aspirational overall goal" (UNDP, 2016: 17), which might partially be a reason for the difficulties in finding enough financing for prevention projects: "it is always easier to find money to clean up after a disaster than to prevent it from happening in the first place" (Drüke, 1993: 31).

Conclusion

Some scholars claim that foreign interventions in conflict zones may intensify and prolong internal conflicts and thus lead to more displacement (Schmeidl, 1997: 289) as well as to the depoliticization of displacement issues and the subsequent silencing of displaced persons' voices as a result of perceiving them only as victims, not as historical actors with their own agency (Malkki, 1996).

The involvement of international actors is thus, even under the best of circumstances, to be taken with a grain of salt. Non-state international agencies do a lot of excellent work, and have contributed to saving civilians' lives in many situations, but they cannot be omnipresent, they are subject to limited mandates, often lack sufficient funding, and proper inter-agency cooperation.

States on the other hand usually act in accordance with their own national interests, which may or may not align with the interests of the people they are assisting in other countries, a factor which also applies to the UN with its highly inconsistent approach to different situations of forced and arbitrary displacement (Weerasinghe and Ferris, 2012). In some areas, like assistance in matters of international law and treaties, third states can be an important support for national governments (Gómez Truedsson, 2012: 10), but their assistance is not sufficient to eliminate the threat of forced displacement.

3.3 National Non-State Organizations

Colombia is endowed with a highly developed network of civil society organizations and grassroots movements dealing with issues connected to peace-building, social and economic development, supporting victims of the conflict, women's rights, indigenous, Afro-Colombian and other minority rights, peace education, amongst others. Most of these organizations form part of the National Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against War (REDEPAZ).

As of yet, these initiatives have not received much scholarly attention despite their extensive work on the ground and their impact on Colombian society and politics (Bouvier, 2009). Organizations like the Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (Colombian Association of Lawyers) help pressure the state into complying with national and international laws, and support the fight against impunity by addressing both national government and international legal organizations such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 297).

While civil society organizations play a pivotal role in community development, education and capacitation as well as long-term peace-building through creating a culture of non-violence, there are several problems in tasking them with the protection of civilians at risk of displacement.

First, like their international counterparts, Colombian NGOs depend mostly on donor money, which tends to be allocated for specific projects. This means that their flexibility in terms of immediate and spontaneous actions are limited.

Second, many NGOs are based in Bogotá with limited field presence, and those who are in the field have an obligation to not put their employees at risk of suffering harm to their physical integrity. While a certain risk is of course always involved in working on the ground, it is not an ethically sound, and technically illegal, practice to send employees to negotiate with illicit armed actors (which is a part of any successful effort to prevent forced displacement and protect communities in conflict areas).

And third, despite the high number of civil society organizations, the Colombian territory is so vast and its rural populations so dispersed in remote places, that it is impossible for NGOs to be present in all areas where there is a need of protecting civilians, which is one of the main problems for all external actors.

The following section introduces local nonviolent resistance movements and organizations as a way to overcome the problem of access which outside actors' experience and as a method that empowers local communities and helps to change the overarching paradigm of violence in the Colombian conflict.

3.4 Local Nonviolent Resistance Movements and Organizations

While there is a great amount of literature and academic research on the different dynamics of conflict in Colombia, unfortunately little attention has been dedicated to analyzing local efforts in peacebuilding and nonviolent resistance to armed actors. As Bouvier (2009: 14) describes, "Peace communities, peace laboratories, zones of peace, no-conflict zones, humanitarian zones, sanctuary churches, and territories of nonviolence (or peace or peaceful coexistence) are flourishing in some of the most vulnerable conflict zones in Colombia".

These initiatives demonstrate the enormous capacity of the Colombian people to work towards a more peaceful future despite the overwhelmingly violent history of their country. To my

knowledge, there are no resistance movements, which focus exclusively on the prevention of forced displacement. Communities seek to avoid any form of victimization of their members, including the prevention of murder, torture, sexual assault, loss of land and property, and illicit recruitment of minors, amongst others.

Some villages have coped with the conflict by complying with whichever armed actor held power over them at a specific moment in time in order to protect their inhabitants. While this strategy might seem apprehensible at first glance, it has been pivotal for the survival of civilians in zones where there were no other options at the time and needs to be considered as a form of self-defense.

However, other communities adopted the point of view that staying under the control of an armed actor, especially in disputed territories, did not constitute a lower risk for their members. These communities have developed several innovative and courageous models of nonviolent resistance.

In the following paragraphs, I will introduce the most important reasons for the feasibility of local nonviolent resistance movements as an efficient and sustainable concept to prevent forced displacement short-term and long-term. I will then very briefly introduce the general concept of 'peace communities' in Colombia, before Chapter 4 introduces the two organizations which I selected for an in-depth analysis, the ATCC and the *Guardia Indígena* of Toribío.

The main rationale behind nonviolent resistance on a local level is that it enables people to overcome repeating cycles of victimization and resume different social identities, which permit them to regain a higher amount of self-determination. Local, in the context of this thesis, does not mean restricted to a small area, to one village or one municipality. It is used to specify an area whose inhabitants are affected by the same phenomenon, who identify as part of a community of any sort and who have a common cause.

The two experiences of nonviolent resistance selected for this analysis include three indigenous reservations (Guardia Indígena) and 32 villages (ATCC) respectively, but other experiences

might be either smaller or bigger. The notion that 'local' is not connected to a specific population size or size of a geographic area is utterly important to avoid a confusion between 'local' and 'small-scale'.

While it is important for a movement to be local, being too small can actually be counterproductive, since social movements grow stronger the more people participate in them. The resistance of a single village against the Apartheid regime could not have overcome racial segregation in South Africa. Five hundred people could not have pushed the colonizers' army out of India and achieved independence from Great Britain. Strength in numbers is important to reach larger goals.

However, as of yet there has been no single, large-scale, unified social movement against forced displacement or the conflict in general in Colombia. This thesis thus analyses somewhat smaller, but still impactful experiences of resistance, keeping in mind that many smaller organizations have the ability to transform into a large network of interconnected communities. Many local organizations in Colombia already form part of the loosely organized *REDEPAZ*, an umbrella organization which operates on the national level and serves as a platform for the coordination and exchange between smaller movements. However, the overall landscape of stakeholders in the prevention of forced displacement can still be considered as lacking transparency, coordination, visibility and support by the public.

Based on this understanding of the term 'local', why is it so important to work at a local level? The last three sections of this chapter have shown the deficiencies in relying on external actors to protect civilians in remote, rural locations. Communities therefore have a visible need to develop efficient and effective strategies to protect themselves. As Bonwick (2006b: 21) explains, the "most effective protection takes place at a very local level, and […] the key players in protection interventions are communities themselves". He further affirms that an "[a]nalysis that puts too much weight on dealing with complex macro-level issues may miss opportunities for micro-level solutions" (Bonwick, 2006b: 21). The capacities of local communities to engage

in peacebuilding and a transformation of society from below are reiterated by renowned philosophers like John Paul Lederach (1997) and Paulo Freire (1972).

Understanding protection as something that should start within a community revokes the paradigm of perceiving protection as a "commodity to be delivered" (Bonwick, 2006a: 270) by external actors. It decreases the dependence of a community on the willingness and ability of other stakeholders, which may or may not act in their best interest, and which may or may not have the ability to implement the best strategy to protect civilians.

In the past, external stakeholders have tried to help "communities […] be empowered to protect themselves and reclaim their rights" by providing them with "human rights training, awareness campaigns, and advocacy with local leaders" (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2004: 26). But, still, "protection practitioners need to further explore and develop participatory techniques to assess risks and understand coping strategies of affected populations in the midst of armed conflict" (Zapater, 2010: 20; see also: Slim and Eguren, 2004).

These ideas are highly coherent with the peace studies perspective on the value of participatory methodologies and the focus on working with people instead of for them. It is important to note that nonviolent resistance movements do not and should not seek to undermine the state and international actors in the legitimacy of their efforts to prevent forced displacement and other forms of victimization in the conflict, but rather to complement such efforts with their own knowledge, experience and capacities.

Communities all over Colombia are already working on enhancing their safety[18], sometimes by searching for outside protection (Barrs, 2012: 9), but mostly by strengthening their communities

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[18] Strategies include: "persuade threatening actors they are helpful or harmless; fabricate false identities; persuade community members to remain non-aligned and peaceful; cut deals with threatening actors; improve skills of information gathering, assessment and disinformation; split family up based on safety and economic considerations; commute between home/farm and shadow settlements; establish or build on non-formal policing; establish conflict early-warning/response systems; help specific vulnerable or threatened groups with personal safety measures; help families and other social networks prepare contingency plans for violence; pursue useful ties to powerful patrons; take up arms, or ally with armed protectors" (Barrs, 2012: 9).

and negotiating micro-level agreements with the armed actors which are threatening them, to refrain from inflicting any further harm on civilians.

Colombians have proven to be anything but passive victims, they have a valuable "saberes y […] prácticas […] para enfrentar situaciones como estas [meaning violent conflict] [19]" (González Gil, 2012: 122). Over the past 70 years of conflict, communities have developed high levels of resilience, that is, "an inherent as well as an acquired condition achieved by managing risks over time at individual, household, community and societal levels in ways that minimize costs, build capacity to manage and sustain development momentum and maximize transformative potential" (UNDP, 2016: 6).

The use of new technologies in this – to gather information, organize common action and exchange experiences with other local movements – can prove to be an essential advantage for remote communities. While traditional journalists are perceived as targets as soon as they publish critical pieces on the reality of what is happening in conflict zones, new technologies might help provide the same or at least a sufficient amount of information while not displaying anyone as a public target.

In the context of the *ley del silencio*, new technologies can provide creative ways to allow previous impossible communication by creating safe, virtual spaces, which, unlike real-life assemblies, are easily hidden from unwanted spectators. I expect these technologies to play a more important role in the future as younger, more technologically literate generations take over leadership positions in their communities and as the internet connects increasingly more regions.

Having a competent leadership is key to the success of any movement or organization. While the role of leaders should not be overemphasized in grassroots movements, most experiences do have a leader or a small group of leaders which have had a stronger influence on the

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[19] [knowledge and practices to confront situations like these; own translation]

development of their movements than 'normal' members. Important personal characteristics for a good leader are wisdom, courage, creative imagination and solidarity (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 491), openness, being able to listen to and pacify offensive and aggressive people, engage in real dialogue, being flexible in their strategies but dedicated to the principles of nonviolence, being able to accept criticism, and having a deep understanding of local problems. Since finding all of these qualities in just one person is usually rather difficult, movements often benefit from having several leaders and less hierarchical power structures.

On a last note, the initiation and continuation of any local resistance movement has to be absolutely voluntary and stemming from the desire of the community itself to form such a movement. Engaging in resistance to armed actors in a civil conflict, even resisting in nonviolent ways, is a high-risk endeavor and the possibility of being harmed in the process should never be neglected, negated or diminished.

Being a social leader has been a death sentence for many Colombians in the past and to this day, and making resistance movements visible also means turning them into targets. Only if people understand and accept these risks, it is morally justifiable to assist them in their efforts, but under no circumstances should outside actors push communities towards adapting such strategies. Civilians need to have the right to choose the path they consider the most appropriate for themselves – even if that path is flight, or compliance with an armed actor.

That being said, in cases where people do choose to engage in nonviolent resistance, they should not be forced to reinvent the wheel, but have access to past experiences from similar conflicts and be able to gather knowledge about different nonviolent methods of resistance easily, including their advantages and disadvantages, to be able to make an informed decision based on their own preferences, needs and abilities.

Peace Communities

Peace communities – also titled zones, *asociaciones*, territories or *experiencias* –are a diverse array of different grassroots movements, loosely bounded around the idea of declaring the

neutrality or non-partisanship of a community in a conflict zone (Mitchell and Ramírez, 2009: 245). The diversity of the models of resistance to the armed conflict that these communities adopted is so big that it is hard to describe them in general terms: their initiators are of different ethnicities, different regions and different genders, there is no unanimity of goals, strategies or ideology (apart from 'peace' as an overarching ideal), and there have been success stories as well as experiences which led to a higher risk for its supporters.

Paramilitary forces have often perceived villagers' declarations of neutrality as a cover for secretly supporting the left-wing guerrilla forces and in some cases specifically targeted these communities in an attempt to repress their resistance (Bonwick, 2006b: 7). As a result, many peace communities collapsed over time or fell short of reaching their goals (Bonwick, 2006b: 17). The two *experiencias* I selected for this analysis are among the notable exception that have had considerable success and are currently still operating.

CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIENCES OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE OF THE ATCC AND THE GUARDIA INDÍGENA

The last chapter has clarified the role of local nonviolent resistance in the prevention of forced displacement in the context of the roles of the state and its agencies, international actors and national non-grassroots organizations. It has also introduced a theoretical perspective on the merits of these organizations as a bottom-up approach to overcome the continuous victimization of civilians and as a possibility for local communities to reassume their agency within the general conflict setting.

Chapter 4 will now introduce the two organizations, which build the base for the emerging theory on the determinants of success for nonviolent resistance movements. These will be detailed upon in Chapter 5.

Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare (ATCC)

The ATCC was founded in 1987 by local *campesinos* in the Middle Magdalena Valley as an apolitical movement. Their declaration of absolute non-partisanship enabled them to establish a clearly delimited territory of approximately 100.000 hectares, including 32 villages (Kaplan, 2013: 353), which both guerrilla and the AUC promised to respect and stay out of (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 30). The geographic location of the territory within Colombia is shown on the next page.

The organization constitutes a formalization of previous spontaneous, non-institutionalized acts of resistance in the region (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 370) after an ultimatum had seemingly left the *campesinos* with no other choice but to declare their allegiance to an armed actor or flee the region (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 308). The bold decision to withstand the pressure exerted on them was made without previous knowledge of nonviolent resistance methods and by persons with little to no formal education (Hernández, 2012: 208), but turned out to be life-saving for many inhabitants of the area (Kaplan, 2013: 351).

Graph 5: ATCC Geographic Area of Influence

Within the region (middle), the department (right) and Colombia (left) (Hernández, 2012: 214)

The Middle Magdalena region has historically had very little state presence (Kaplan, 2013: 353), which slowed down access to basic services like road infrastructure, schools, or electricity in the mostly rural area. Land is of essential value, as the main economic sectors are agriculture, cattle-farming, extraction of rare woods, and mining (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 57). The low rates of formalized land ownership and high poverty indices thus made the area especially vulnerable towards armed actors, who entered the region with promises of fulfilling the basic tasks of the absent state institutions in exchange for loyalty and support.

All the more surprising and commendable is the *campesinos'* conscious decision to remain unarmed to avoid creating more violence in the region (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 315; 319). The decision was not exclusively an ethical one (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 320), but based on logical considerations on the possibility of success of an armed resistance, combined with the experience of previous victimization by all armed groups (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 323) and a religious preference for nonviolence. The ATCC is based on the principles of respect for human life, promotion of peace and the right to work as they recognized the need to foster aid-independent economic development in their region (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 326-327).

As most organized resistance movements, they experienced certain backlashes as they challenged established power structures:

> La creación de la ATCC fue vista con malos ojos por los paramilitares y por algunos sectores militares, que percibían en su independencia un desafío a su proyecto de hegemonía regional, una potencial fuente de oposición a sus prácticas violentas y a las formas tradicionales con que desarrollaban la política [...] y, por supuesto, un potencial canal de información y de denuncia hacia la opinión pública y las esferas gubernamentales del orden nacional[20] (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 156-157).

Especially the fear that the *campesinos* might break the *ley del silencio* (rule of silence) – the unwritten law that prohibits talking about anything that might incriminate an armed actor or anything connected with the conflict in general – and start publicly denouncing the crimes against their community disconcerted armed actors, especially those with ties to the military and politics. Thus, the filming of a documentary about the Middle Magdalena region for BBC London, which would have made the human rights violations in this area known to the international community, triggered the assassination of the leaders of the ATCC and the journalist who was filming said documentary (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 19).

The shock of this brutal event led the organization to reconsider some of their strategies of resistance and seek the direct dialogue with all armed actors, including the paramilitary, with which they had formerly interacted through the regular military forces (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 341). The paramilitary proved to be the most difficult opponent for the ATCC, and it was only through pressure from the Colombian government that they eventually reached a partial concession (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 166-167), while a written agreement with the guerrilla had already been signed shortly after the organization's foundation.

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[20] [The creation of the ATCC was badly viewed upon by the paramilitary and by some military sectors, who perceived its independence as a challenge to their project of regional hegemony, a potential source of opposition to their violent practices and to the ways in which they traditionally developed their policies […] and, of course, a potential channel of information and of denunciation towards the public opinion and the national governmental spheres; own translation]

Apart from dialoguing with armed actors, the ATCC engaged in a range of different methods of resistance and peacebuilding. First, they initiated and maintained a dialogue within the community to enhance social cohesion and set up a common agenda for the negotiations with armed actors, with which all members could identify to assure internal unity (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 343-347).

Second, they insisted in the public nature of all actions they took to avoid accusations of alleged partisanship, and they started breaking the previously dogmatic *ley del silencio* by denouncing crimes, recovering and properly burying the dead as well as starting archives of the identified victims (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 348)[21].

Third, they introduced a code of conduct for negotiations and other interactions with armed actors and reiterated their absolute non-collaboration.

Fourth, they set up a local justice mechanism to avoid armed actors taking the role of conflict-solvers in their territory (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 356-357; Hernández, 2012: 213).

Fifth, they started buying territory for *campesino* families who had lost their land in the conflict (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 21).

And finally, apart from working on a more peaceful future, the association also actively promoted the return of persons to their former homes. The safety of these returns remained questionable, but the ATCC tried to establish agreements with armed actors to let these persons return without suffering any repercussions.

While these strategies showed some considerable success, the increase in coca cultivation in the late 1990s and early 2000s intensified the interest of armed actors in controlling the region and in assuring the collaboration of the rural population (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 338). The new territorial disputes between guerrilla and paramilitary lead to increases in

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[21] Parts of this approach were considered too risky after the assassination of the first leaders, where after safer variants of the same mechanisms were adopted, for example the denunciation of crimes before legal courts and directly before the armed actor held responsible for the respective crimes.

violence and displacement. As the value of land went up, the incentives for illicit appropriation of land through the eviction of its rightful owners also increased. The ATCC prohibited coca cultivation for its members but had to be very cautious to maintain neutrality, and suffered from an internal crisis as some of its members allegedly 'got closer' to the paramilitary (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 183). The demobilization of the AUC in 2006 did not significantly reduce levels of violence since other groups (narcotraffickers, re-armed fighters, etc.) took their place in the regional power play.

Previous agreements with the AUC were thus nullified and the ATCC was confronted with an even more fragmented landscape of armed actors to deal with. Moreover, the fear of a possible collaboration of the ATCC with judicial investigations into the AUC's pre-demobilization crimes led to renewed threats against the ATCC. Threats also emerged from the guerrilla, which was still present in marginal zones of the region and felt provoked by the integration of demobilized fighters into the local community.

Apart from these external difficulties, the ATCC also experienced a set of internal problems. *Campesinos* who were dissatisfied with the justice mechanism of the ATCC recurrently asked the guerrilla for help in settling private conflicts, which in turn infuriated the paramilitary and lead to new conflicts. The organization's administration has been the target of accusations of mismanagement of funds, and suffered from the chronic unreliability of cooperation partners whose promises to provide funding were often not fulfilled, both of which affected the external credibility of the ATCC (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 398).

From a peace studies perspective, it is also important to note the lack of women in the upper hierarchy and the public functions of the organization in the first two decades of its existence (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 407-408), a deficiency that has fortunately changed in the last decade.

The ATCC has had considerable international recognition for its work from its early beginnings, winning for example the Right Livelihood Award in 1990, which is considered an alternative

Nobel Prize for Peace. Despite important successes in community development projects (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 394),

> han pasado los años y se siguen registrando los mismos problemas estructurales de salud, educación, infraestructura y producción. Los múltiples proyectos que han gestionado en estas áreas parecen solucionar problemáticas coyunturales, pero no los problemas estructurales frente a los que el Estado no ha sido capaz de responder, de manera contundente"[22] (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 434).

Guardia Indígena of Toribío, Cauca

The *Guardia Indígena*, or Indigenous Guard, of the Nasa people in the Cauca department in southwestern Colombia was officially founded in 2001 as an unarmed self-defense group (Wirpsa and others, 2009: 233), but has been operating in less formal ways since the 1970s, according to the Nasa people (Hincapié S., 2014; Rado, 2016). The guard is comprised of voluntary members, who receive no remuneration, and operates continuously to ensure the safety of their communities at all times. They carry a symbolic *bastón*, "wooden sticks adorned with the red and green flag of the Nasa people" (Wirpsa and others, 2009: 225), but no other weapons whatsoever. They base the idea of protection on vigilance, awareness and community involvement. Although there are several indigenous guards in other municipalities, the analysis only includes the one in Toribío for data accessibility reasons. The different municipalities and guards are however very similar to one another, so there is no reason to assume any theoretical implications for this research.

The *Guardia Indígena* forms part of several larger indigenous organizations, most importantly, the *Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca* (CRIC), that is, the Regional Council of the Indigenous People of the Cauca. The CRIC, established in 1971, is a network of different

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[22] [the years have passed and the same structural problems of health, education, infrastructure and production keep being registered. The multiple projects which have been managed in these areas seem to be solving cyclical problems, but not the structural problems to which the State has not been able to respond in a convincing way; own translation]

indigenous peoples, which connects the whole region. On a political level, they have higher authority than the guard, whose task is the protection of the communities. It is important to keep this separation of politics and protection in mind for the analysis of this organization.

Indigenous reservations in Colombia distinguish themselves from other communities in that they enjoy a higher degree of subnational autonomy, which allows them to set up and enforce their own laws (as long as they do not violate national law). The Nasa people have prohibited the involvement of members of their community in the conflict in any way, and the guard is the internal control mechanism, which enforces this rule. In comparison, there is no penal system for *campesinos* who violated any basic rules of the ATCC, they simply are excluded from the organization (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 346).

Graph 6: Municipality of Toribío in the Cauca department.

Source: Google Maps. Toribio municipality marked in dark red, Cauca department in light red.

The guard also functions as an early warning system, since they tend to notice impending actions by armed actors sooner as state authorities. They help set up contingency plans with emergency locations for the community to gather at, denounce violations of indigenous rights at national and international scale, and take legal action to receive compensation for past violations.

Toribío has been one of the areas most affected by the Colombian conflict due to its strategic position and the possibility to cultivate coca. The local community, however, has proven to be unusually resilient to the violence surrounding them. Their strong connection to the territory they inhabit, the high internal cohesion of their community and the shared common identity and history as indigenous peoples has helped them develop a high level of resilience against attacks on their community and their territory.

Some locals may leave their homes as part of an urgent contingency plan, but usually return after a very short time despite ongoing violence and even accept the risk of being harmed in order to maintain their dignity (Wirpsa and others, 2009: 235). These features turn the indigenous guard into an interesting case of comparison to the ATCC, both in terms of their efficiency to prevent displacement and in their understanding of the consequences of being displaced.

Initial, literature-based hypotheses

I developed the initial hypotheses for this thesis mainly based on an analysis of the report "El Orden Desarmado – La Resistencia de la Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare (ATCC)[23]". The report was written by an investigative team of the *Grupo de Memoria Histórica* (2011). That is, these initial hypotheses do not yet include the lessons that were later learned from the analysis of the experience of the *Guardia Indígena*.

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[23] [The Disarmed Order – The Resistance of the Organization of Land-workers of the Carare Region (ATCC); own translation]

The report describes the history and current situation of the ATCC and focuses on collecting and displaying the memory-based narrative of members of the organization as well as persons who live in the area of influence. Therefore, although this is a secondary source, it provided access to first-hand testimonies of the people involved in the experience of the ATCC.

In this section, I will shortly outline the hypotheses created on the base of these testimonies, before the next chapter assesses their viability by analyzing the evidence gathered in the expert interviews.

The first hypothesis I developed was that the likelihood of preventing forced displacement through nonviolent resistance movements reduces if the institutionalization of said movements leads to an estrangement from the affected local population by reverting the logic of grassroots activism and pushing the local population back towards a state of passivity or non-agency. Estrangement from the community base obliges an organization to dedicate a considerable amount of time and resources to maintaining a relationship of trust and mutual support with the community base, which in turn weakens the movement by leaving less resources for the actual process of resistance.

There are several accounts of locals affirming the growing mistrust in the organization, stating for example that "Ese mandato [the then leadership of the ATCC; own clarification] fue de despilfarro, fue triste, fue de mucha algarabía y mucha fiesta y mucho despilfarro[24]" (Local, 2003; cited from: Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 389). The leaders of the ATCC recognized this growing distance to their base community, stating that "La gente está muy mal porque cree que la Junta Directiva está haciendo cosas a espaldas de la comunidad[25]" (ATCC archive, 2002; cited from: Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 419). The growing rumors of

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[24] [That mandate was wasteful, it was sad, it was a lot of excitement and lots of partying and a lot of waste; own translation]

[25] [The people feel very bad, because they think the Board is doing things behind the back of the community; own translation]

mismanagement of funds and secret collaboration with armed actors were noticed and used by the armed actors to weaken the organization:

> Las sospechas y críticas frente a la directiva han viajado en las redes del rumor haciendo vulnerable a la organización y a sus miembros. Los grupos armados han constituido a 'los chismes' en argumento para no negociar o para afirmar que la Asociación no es un interlocutor válido. Los rumores han generado además múltiples disputas que han incidido negativamente en el nivel de cohesión. Mantener y restaurar la confianza se ha constituido entonces en un reto constante[26] (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 433).

The second hypothesis I formulated was that the likelihood of preventing forced displacement through nonviolent resistance movements reduces if the movements are fragmented and constrained to one region instead of the whole nation. I hypothesized that the scale of resistance movements directly affects their negotiation power with armed actors, which means that they are only successful as long as the armed actor's interest in the region is relatively low.

The introduction of coca crops to the Middle Magdalena Valley presents an example of these power dynamics: the economic benefits of coca cultivation raised armed actors' interest in the area of influence of the ATCC and they stopped adhering to previous agreements with the organization. Further attempts of the ATCC to renegotiate the impartiality and independence of the region were much less successful than before. This loss of negotiating power was also connected to a failure to adapt to changes over time:

> Yo pienso que se ha perdido la dinámica y la connotación política de alguna manera de los diálogos con los armados para ir discutiendo las nuevas problemática y los nuevos fenómenos que se van apareciendo y eso hace que se vaya perdiendo el control. El punto de la coca, por ejemplo, es algo que desde hace mucho tiempo debió someterse a un análisis y a una discusión y a una formulación de estrategias de acuerdos para poder manejar. Entonces creo que en ese sentido se ha sido muy estático; yo pienso que los

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[26] [Suspicions and criticisms of the directive have been passed around as rumors making the organization and its members vulnerable. Armed groups have transformed 'gossip' into an argument in order to not have to negotiate or to assert that the Association is not a valid interlocutor. The rumors have also generated multiple disputes that have had a negative impact on the level of cohesion. Maintaining and restoring trust has thus become a constant challenge; own translation]

diálogos deben revisarse y deben irse actualizando de acuerdo a los cambios que va sufriendo pues como la vida de la región[27] (Campesino leader, 2010; cited from: Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 339).

A last issue I identified was that the population in the area of influence started to expect much more than mere protection from the ATCC – they also expected them to manage the social and economic development in the region. In the instances where the financial benefits of collaborating with an armed actor were higher than those of collaborating with the ATCC, parts of the *campesino* population started choosing economic gain over their moral commitment to the organization:

> Ya que la ATCC no ha diseñado un modelo económico efectivo que le proporcione posibilidades de mejorar su condición de vida, algunos campesinos han optado por aceptar la financiación de los grupos para la instalación de cultivos. Esto representa una desventaja para la ATCC que no tiene alternativas para mejorar las condiciones de vida de sus asociados[28] (Campesino leader, 2004; cited from: Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 414)

This rather opportunistic attitude towards the commitment to the goals and the institution of the ATCC supports the first hypothesis and points towards a growing distance between the local population and the ATCC, which was more and more perceived as an external actor rather than an intrinsic part of the community.

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[27] [I think that the dynamics and the political connotation of the dialogue with the armed groups have somehow been lost in order to discuss the new problems and the new phenomena that are appearing and that makes that the control is being lost. The issue of coca, for example, has long been subjected to analysis and discussion and to the formulation of strategies of agreements to be able to manage it. So, I think in that sense it has been very static; I think that the dialogues should be reviewed and should be updated according to the changes that are going in the life of the region; own translation]

[28] [Since the ATCC has not designed an effective economic model to provide it with a chance to improve living conditions, some peasants have opted to accept the financing of [armed] groups for the installation of [coca] crops. This represents a disadvantage for the ATCC which has no alternatives to improve the living conditions of its associates; own translation]

4.1 Expert Interviews

Selecting the right interview partners to develop my initial hypotheses into an emerging theory was a crucial aspect of this thesis. Since the preliminary hypotheses were based on the analysis of the ATCC, I definitely had to include an interview with a representative of this organization, which would enable me to ask more specific questions and clarify doubts. With respect to the first hypothesis, I decided to include a representative of an indigenous nonviolent resistance movement. Indigenous communities generally have a relatively high degree of social cohesion and it seemed likely that the institutionalization of a resistance movement would lead to less estrangement from the local community than in a non-indigenous case.

I analyzed both interviews with grounded theory methodology as described by Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (2014: 213-215). The first step – the open coding – is not listed in detail in this chapter due to its length. The transcript of this step can be found in the Annex to this thesis. The second, and shorter, step – the axial coding – is presented in the tables in the following two sections, as is the description of the findings of this step. Finally, in the last section of this chapter I present the statistical analysis I conducted to enhance the robustness of the emerging theory.

4.1.1 Interview with Marisol Tama[29] of the CRIC / indigenous community of Toribío

The interview with Marisol started very spontaneously and was hence conducted without a detailed catalogue of questions, which turned out to be highly appropriate for the narrative style of her answers. She was suggested to me as a contact to the *Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca* (CRIC), but turned out to be more deeply connected to the *Guardia Indígena* of Toribío. Although the two organizations are interrelated, I chose to specify the *Guardia* as Marisol's institutional affiliation, based on the depth of her responses on this organization.

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[29] Name changed by author.

The communication with Marisol was very amiable and informal, and she showed great interest in the topic of this thesis. Her academic background as a student of communication proved to be beneficial as it enabled her to communicate ideas clearly and with a rich vocabulary. The next pages show the step of axial coding based on Marisol's responses in the interview. The identified categories are then discussed below.

Table 1: Axial Coding for the Interview with Marisol Tama

Concept	Category
- State (regulation) as threat to peace (III) - Commercial value of land as risk factor (II) - Intended rupture of unity of the community - Incompatibility of presence of armed actors and peace - Rejection of armed actors' claim to rightful presence - External versus internal conflicts - Symptoms vs. root causes of violence	External Vs. Internal threats
- Regional hierarchy of organizations - Regional networks - Violence as a unifying experience between indigenous peoples - Peaceful collaboration with non-indigenous peoples	Interconnectedness with other local resistance movements
- Protective function (III) - Meaning of 'protection' – Collective knowledge, unity, territorial integrity	

- Protection: Evidence-based & collectively accepted - Monitoring and conflict-resolution - Long-term need of monitoring & vigilance vs. short-term need of emergency protection - Use of mass media to ensure access to information - Communication & information - Protectory entity: state vs. own people - Reclaiming rights from the state - Community protection: voluntary work vs. remunerated professionals	Voluntary, autonomous protection: Free and equal access to information & Monitoring possible threats
- Respect & Legitimacy - Guard as result of collective decision-making process - Guard rooted in identified protection need - Legitimation through collective acceptance - Membership based on common cause - Authority: voluntary - symbolic vs. coercive power	Legitimacy through voluntary acceptance
- Philosophy of nonviolence - Constructing culture of nonviolence - Visibility of peace process - Tradition and Symbolism - Indigenous identity based on nonviolence - Conflict resolution: Dialogue vs. armed conflict - Failure of direct dialogue - Spiritual belief system	Dedication to Nonviolence: Intrinsic belief Vs. Practical Reasons

- Interdependence of peace and nonviolence - Protecting harmony = confronting armed actors	
- Deep individual connection with territory, - Temporal limitation of absence from territory - Identity & spirituality intrinsically linked with territory - Land as base of life vs. commodity - Personification of the land - Anthropocentric vs. eco-centric world view	Commodification of land Vs. Emotional and spiritual connection to the land
- Pluri-generational consciousness (III) - Collective memory - Individual actions vs. collective consequences - Collective identity based on group homogeneity - Social relationships in the community - Solidarity & Reciprocity vs. capitalist-economic paradigm - Family: relatives by blood vs. by common identity - Collective responsibility for individual members - Strength in unity and solidarity - Collective identity, fluidity of guard 'membership' - Family-like value of community - Collective > individual - Equality of men and women - Rejection of life outside the community and territory	Individual Vs. Collective Identity

- Reclaiming territory as autonomous unit - National law vs. indigenous law & autonomy - Contested authority over territory - Autonomous indigenous law	Sub-national legal autonomy
- Finding peace > remaining alive - Spiritual understanding of death - Collective future > individual life - Morally correct decisions and way of life > personal safety and life - Consequences of being in the guard: higher risk to own security - Violence as source of fear & defeat vs. source of strength and resilience - Resilience in protracted conflict (II) - Resistance vs. Flight	Survival Instincts Vs. Death as acceptable consequence of fight for peace & harmony

Even before the first coding steps, the differences between the narrative used in the report of the Grupo de Memoria Histórica and this interview were clearly perceivable.

Going through the different steps of coding enabled the establishment of five key categories, based on the number of indicators of each category (indicated in brackets): a) External Vs. Internal threats (10); b) Voluntary, autonomous protection: Free and equal access to information & Monitoring possible threats (12); c) Dedication to Nonviolence: Intrinsic belief Vs. Practical Reasons (10); d) Individual Vs. Collective Identity (16); and e) Survival Instincts Vs. Death as acceptable consequence of fight for peace & harmony (8). In the following paragraphs I will discuss these categories in the context of the initial hypotheses.

The data collected in this interview suggest that the state, including the military, is perceived as a threat to the community. The presence of any armed actor, legal or illegal, is perceived as disrupting the community's harmony and peaceful existence. The *Guardia* was thus the result of the community identifying the need to create an organism of auto-protection, or as Marisol explained: "un poco entrandonos a la historia de como nace la guardia indígena yo creo que es a raiz de tanta violencia que se generó en los resguardos del cauca y más en la zona norte del cauca eh en especial de toribío[30]" (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

Another relevant external threat is the commercial value of indigenous land as its use as a commodity. This is opposed to the indigenous eco-centric worldview, which grants the land its own rights and the entitlement to the respect of those who inhabit it. Especially with the rise of coca cultivation in the Cauca region, the increasing interest of armed actors in exploiting indigenous territories diminished the likelihood of their leaving.

While the experience of the ATCC showed several internal risk factors (*campesinos* asking armed actors to resolve conflicts, *campesinos* agreeing to cultivate coca, individual *campesinos* negotiating with armed actors without direct mandate, spread of rumors), there was only one internal risk factor I could identify for the municipality of Toribío, which is the recruitment of members of the indigenous community by the guerrilla and the resulting consequences:

> La guerrilla tambien por su parte que estaba ahi reclutando jovenes, ninos a la guerra [...] estaba la guerrilla tambien diciendo que ellos tenian eh... muchos companeros guerrilleros indigenas, entonces que esos territorios les pertenecian[31]" (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

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[30] [getting a bit into the history of how the indigenous guard was born I believe that it was on the base of so much violence which had been generated in the reservations of the cauca region and more in the northern zone of the cauca region eh especially in Toribío; own translation]

[31] [The guerrillas, too, on their part, were recruiting young people, children to war, [...] the guerrillas were also saying that they had eh ... many indigenous guerrilla comrades, so that those territories belonged to them; own translation]

The involvement of members of the individual community in the guerrilla thus lessened the community's negotiating power with the guerrilla, which was mainly based on their rightful authority over the land and therefore the right to decide who is allowed to be on it.

Protection, Information & Monitoring

The concept of 'protection' established with the data from this interview relies on the mechanisms of gathering information about possible threats, distributing this information to all members of the community and monitoring all relevant actions and occurrences. This model of protection has been approved of by the community – "la guardia pues es un... un ejemplo muy grande no, para nosotros, que es legitima para nosotros como.. como comuneros, que la reconocemos y la respetamos" (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017). The topic of the respect, which the community holds for the *Guardia*, is reiterated several times in the course of the interview, stressing the importance of the legitimacy of the organization through collective acceptance of their work.

Apart from 'walking the territory' to monitor current events, the *Guardia* also frequently engages in direct dialogue with armed actors. While interaction with the military mainly concentrates on the reclamation of the rights the indigenous communities are entitled to by Colombian law, the interactions with guerrilla forces are sometimes more confrontational and have more severe consequences, as in the case of two young guards removing a publicity set up by the guerrilla:

> recuerdo hace tres anos... cuatro anos atrás en ejercicio de control territorial, la guardia pues ehm... iba a quitar una valla ehm.. de publicidad de la guerrilla, de los 50 anos que cumplio aca la guerrilla, esos companeros van a quitar esa valla, y pues son asesinados por la guerrilla en ese momento, son dos compañeros guardia que practicamente entregaron toda su vida a defender esta politica de paz que teniamos los pueblos indigenas, entonces los asesinan[32] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

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[32] [I remember three years ago ... four years ago in the exercise of territorial control, the guard eh... was going to remove a fence eh ... with a publicity of the guerrilla, of the 50 years that the guerrilla had been here, those comrades go to remove that fence, and so they are killed by the guerrilla at that moment, they are two fellow guards

In a clear distinction to the money-related problems which form part of the ATCC experience, there have been no accusations of corruption or mismanagement of funds towards the *Guardia* – such accusations are not even possible since there are no large funds to be managed and the members of the *Guardia* do their work on a voluntary basis, without receiving any remuneration. The independence from financing from external actors is thus an important reason in avoiding the possibility of an estrangement between the *Guardia* and the indigenous community of Toribío.

Dedication to Nonviolence: Intrinsic belief Vs. Practical Reasons

As described earlier, in Chapter 1 of this thesis, nonviolence is both a philosophical posture and a methodology. The coherence between the different levels of nonviolence enhances its potential for success. The ATCC based their decision to remain unarmed more on practical than on moral reason (too many opponents with better equipment, more resources and more fighters), although there was a certain preference for nonviolence based on the religious beliefs of the local population. This is different in the case of the *Guardia Indígena*.

The core of the identity of the indigenous Nasa is their dedication to nonviolence, which is intrinsically connected to their spiritual belief system. The data collected in this interview suggest that the indigenous community of Toribío perceives the construction of peace as dependent on the construction of a culture of nonviolence and on protecting the *harmonía* among their people. These beliefs are deeply rooted in the traditions and the symbolism of the Nasa people, expressed for example with the *bastónes* of the *Guardia*:

> La guardia indigena con un baston y sus, digamos, sus insignias, no, o sus colores, como decir, el rojo y el verde que simbolizan, el rojo de pronto la sangre que.. que pues han

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who practically gave their whole life to defend this policy of peace that we had as indigenous peoples, so they murder them; own translation]

derramado tambien los mayores que han venido siempre en la lucha de... de defender ese territorio[33] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

A strong element of this narrative is that the past suffering of the indigenous people is depicted as something which contributed to the symbolism of nonviolence – the red in the colors of the indigenous guard symbolizes the blood that the ancestors have spilled in the defense of their territory. Instead of expressing this collective grievance through revenge-oriented violent defense mechanisms, the collective memory of previous generations' suffering seems to be a source of inspiration, which deepens the current generations' dedication to nonviolence.

The strength of the nonviolent belief system in the indigenous community helped build enough resilience in the community and in the *Guardia* to enable them to overcome setbacks and failed experiences of negotiation with armed actors:

> por parte de.. de los actores del gobierno que no porque ellos los facultaba las leyes la constitución de que ellos podian estar en cualquier espacio del territorio nacional de colombia entonces ellos no tenían ningun límite, podían estar donde ellos eh pues... quisieran por otro lado estaba la guerrilla tambien diciendo que ellos tenían eh... muchos compañeros guerrilleros indigenas, entonces que esos territorios les pertenecian, aparte ellos habían hecho una lucha para permanecer en esos territorios también entonces tampoco salian[34] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

Despite these setbacks, the basic dedication to nonviolence was never questioned in this experience. It is noteworthy that there has been an armed indigenous resistance movement in the past[35], therefore it is not completely impossible for the Nasa people to opt for a more violent

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[33] [the indigenous guard with a *bastón* and their, let's say, their insignia, no, or their colors, that is to say, the red and the green which symbolize, the red the blood that… well, that the ancestors have spilled who have always been in the fight to… to defend this territory; own translation]

[34] [from the part of… of the governmental actors it was a no because they were empowered by the laws the constitution that they could be in any space of the national territory of colombia so they had no limits they could be where they um well wanted on the other hand there was the guerrilla also saying that they had um… many indigenous comrades so these territories belonged to them and also they had been fighting to remain in these territories as well so they were not leaving either; own translation]

[35] The *Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame*, or Armed Movement of Quintín Lame, which operated in the Cauca region from 1984 to 1991 and dissolved with a peace agreement based on the new Constitution of 1991, which strengthened indigenous people's rights and provided better legal protection of their territories as well as granting them subnational judicial autonomy in their reservations.

route of resistance, but that movement was a rather rare exception, short-lived in comparison to other guerrilla groups and committed comparatively less crimes against the civilian population.

Individual Vs. Collective Identity

This category was by far the one with the most indicators, thus positioning itself as the most pivotal category for the theory-generating process. The concept that surged the most within this category was the pluri-generational nature of the indigenous consciousness and thinking. Several remarks referred to the paradigm of future-oriented behavior of the indigenous people, that is, the constant consideration of the effects of current actions on the lives and well-being of future generations:

> entonces la comunidad dice no pues estos territorios nosotros hemos vivido aqui hemos permanecido aqui nuestros hijos esto es lo que le vamos a dejar a nuestros hijos entonces no podemos dejar que nos saquen de nuestros territorios [...] es que nosotros no estamos pensando en el hoy nosotros estamos pensando en el manana en que le vamos a dejar a nuestros hijos en que queremos para nuestros hijos y que queremos para nuestros nietos y esos.. esos hijos de nuestros nietos en como... como van a vivir donde van a vivir[36] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

This form of long-term thinking would not be possible without the special value the indigenous people attribute to the collective as opposed to the individual. They acknowledge that the actions of individuals have consequences for the whole community –

> porque esto también se consideraba un acto de… de desarmonía por ser indígena si estar pues eh digamos en ese... como metidos en ese tema de... de... pues de estar como una lucha que en ultima se afectaba era a la misma comunidad[37] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017)

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[36] [so the community says no well these territories we have lived here we have remained here our children this is what we are going to leave for our children so we can't let them take us out of our territories [...] it is that we don't think about the today we think about the tomorrow about what we will leave for our children about what we want for our children and what we want for our grandchildren and those… those children of our grandchildren… how they are going to live where they are going to live; own translation]

[37] [because this is also considered as an act of… of disharmony because of being indigenous if being um let's say in this… like involved in this topic of… of… well of being like in a fight who is ultimately affected is the community itself; own translation]

– but also, that the community is responsible for taking care of its members and that the problems of one person affect the whole collective: "si uno de los miembros tiene un problema entonces eh... afecta a toda la comunidad entonces ahí la comunidad tiene que buscarle soluciones a ese problema[38]" (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017). The community is thus to be considered of higher value than the individual.

Building on this notion, the indigenous community is understood as a family. This perception of the community is based on a form of collective identity, where members of the community regard themselves as part of a larger social cohesive, as intrinsically connected to other members of the community as if they were blood relatives, to the past and future generations of the community and to the territory.

The overwhelmingly collective nature of indigenous identity is based in parts on the homogeneity of the community ("el 100% de la comunidad que habita nuestro territorio alla es indigena[39]", Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017). While greatly differing from the individualistic paradigm of independence and freedom of most Western nations, the indigenous community of Toribío draws strength and resilience from their unity and solidarity:

> esa unidad nos ha permitido ehm... pues construir procesos digamos de defensa a raíz del conflicto armado eh... es cierto que fue un momento... o es un momento muy duro con el tema del conflicto... del conflicto armado pero... pero yo creo que esa unidad o ese pensamiento de... de familia nos permite como estar unidos y decir no pues vamos a... a crear estrategias o vamos a defendernos vamos a defender a nuestra familia de todos esos agentes externos que llegan a... a... a desarmonizar no a desarmonizar la familia a desarmonizar la comunidad y sobre todo el territorio[40] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

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[38] [if one of the members has a problem then um… it affects the whole community so in this case the community has to assist him in searching solutions for this problem; own translation]

[39] [a 100% of the community which lives in our territory is indigenous; own translation]

[40] [this unity has allowed us to um... well to construct processes of let's say of defense based on the armed conflict um... it is true that is was a moment... or that it is a very difficult moment with the issue of the conflict… the armed conflict but... but I believe that this unity and this thought of... of family allows us to like be united and say no well we are going to... to create strategies or we are going to defend ourselves to defend our family from all of these external actors which arrive to ... to... to disharmonize no to disharmonize the family to disharmonize the community and most of all the territory; own translation]

This harmony in the collective existence includes valuing all members of the community, which in terms of gender relations leads to the equality of men and women and the respect towards women as peacebuilders, despite the violence they have suffered from the armed actors, who treated them like objects:

> tambien alla la voz de las mujeres indigenas que tambien pues han sido un botin de guerra en nuestro municipio y sin embargo hoy muchas de ellas estan tambien ehm.. perteneciendo a la guardia que hoy tambien defiende la vida y el territorio dentro de nuestras comunidades, que son un ejemplo para todas las demas mujeres[41] (Interview with marisol Tama, 2017).

While formal guard membership thus includes both men and women, all members of the community, including the children, feel as a part of the guard in times of need:

> en momentos de conflicto duros la guardia pues somos todos somos los ninos somos las mujeres somos los mayores todos somos guardia porqué? porque todos defendemos.. pues defendemos el territorio y defendemos la vida[42] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

This fluid understanding of membership in the guard does not inhibit the efficient organization of its function as a protective organism, as there are

> unos companeros que estan de lleno completamente metidos en el tema que son los companeros guardias que todo el tiempo estan disponibles para lo que haya, para las situaciones que se presentan, y estan todo el tiempo alli[43] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

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[41] [there also the voice of the indigenous women who have also been a booty of war in our municipality and yet today many of them are also um... belonging to the *guardia* who today also defends the life and territory within our communities, who are an example for all other women; own translation]

[42] [in moments of intense conflict, the guard well that is all of us that is the children that is the women that is the elders we all are the guard why? because we all defend ... because we defend the territory and we defend life; own translation]

[43] [[there are] some comrades that are completely and fully committed in the topic these are the comrades of the guard that all the time are available for whatever happens, for the situations that present themselves, and they are there all the time; own translation]

The social relation among members of the community and between the community and the *Guardia* are based on the principles of solidarity and reciprocity and a rejection of financial or economic interests, "en un territorio indígena este.... no existe como tanto ese interes económico de pronto sino mas ese interes de la solidaridad de la reciprocidad de lo que eh... uno da eso mismo recibe[44]" (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017). This rejection of the capitalist paradigm creates stronger bonds between the members of the community and permits social relations based on mutual collaboration and support.

A last noteworthy factor in this category is the rejection of life outside the community and territory by the members of the community, which is linked to their strong connection to both the community and the territory. This connection is especially relevant in the context of understanding resistance to displacement, as leaving the indigenous territory to live somewhere else permanently is understood as a process that takes away one's essence of being, the very foundation of what constitutes one's identity:

> porque para donde nos vamos a ir un indio sin tierra no es indio porque donde va a trabajar donde va a vivir su espiritualidad? [...] siempre en contacto permanente pues con la tierra trabajando de lo que se siembra se consume lo que... lo que produce lo que sembramos [...] somos seres demasiado espirituales podria decirlo asi como con creencias de los suenos de las señas ehm de como esta el entorno el clima entonces yo creo que eso nos permite como... como un arraigo a ese territorio de... de que pues si nosotros no' saliamos... no' salimos de nuestro territorio pues en la ciudad no va a ser lo mismo no porque ya son... ya es otro contexto son otras culturas y eh... no hay nada como estar dentro del territorio entonces yo creo que primero empezando que el indigena pues digamos vive... permanece en su territorio conoce su territorio entonces se le hace muy facil caminarlo explorarlo entonces empezando de alla hay un arraigo no con... con la... con la madre tierra ya en el entorno digamos en lo social el contexto social pues tambien porque dentro de nuestras comunidades pues nosotros estamos en... todo el tiempo en contacto con la... con los... con los compañeros, entonces eso nos permite conocernos, conocernos internamente[45] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

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[44] [in an indigenous territory this .... this economic interest does not exist as much perhaps but more that interest of solidarity of reciprocity of what um... what one gives that same is received; own translation]

[45] because where are we going to go an *indígena* without land is not an *indígena* because where is he going to work where will he live his spirituality? [...] always in permanent contact with the earth working with what is sown it is

Being forced to leave their homes is thus especially detrimental to the mental health of the Nasa indigenous people, and is usually followed by attempts to return home, whether that return is safe or not ("de la gente que... que ha salido desplazada tambien de ese municipio [...] y hoy en dia se encuentran nuevamente retornando al territorio[46]"; interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

Survival instincts vs. acceptance of death as part of the continuum of life

This section relates back to the discussion of the right to leave versus the need to stay in Chapter 1.3.2. The indigenous community of Toribío has developed considerable levels of resilience against forced displacement based on their understanding of death as an undesirable, but ultimately acceptable part of the continuous fight for maintaining the peace and harmony in their territory. The possibility of a peaceful future for the community is considered as more important than the survival of an individual member of the community. While it remains the decision of every single person whether to stay or to leave and whether to join the *Guardia* full-time or not, most persons do not wish to leave. They put ethical and moral considerations before their personal safety and even life in many situations:

> preferimos perder la vida de pie que morir acostados, entonces ellos dicen que nosotros preferimos estar caminando y saber que alguien dio la vida para defender a muchas personas y a las que vienen entonces eso es como lo mas importante[47] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

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consumed what ... what is produced what we sow [...] we are very spiritual beings I could say it like that like with beliefs of the dreams of the signs um of how the environment is made the climate so I believe that allows us a sort of ... a sort of rooting in that territory of ... so that if we left ... we leave our territory well in the city it is not going to be the same no because there are already ... there is already another context there are other cultures and um... there is nothing like being inside the territory so I think that first starting with that the *indígena* let's say lives... remains in his territory knows his territory so it is very easy for him to walk it explore it so starting from there there is a rooting no with ... with the ... with the mother earth now in the environment let's say in the social the social context well there as well because within our communities well we are in ... all the time in contact with the... with the... with the comrades, so that allows us to know each other, to know ourselves internally; own translation]

[46] [of the people who… who have also been displaced from this municipality […] and who are now returning to the territory again; own translation]

[47] [we prefer to lose our lives standing than to die lying down, then they say we prefer to be walking and to know that someone gave their life to defend many people and to those who will come so that is like the most important thing; own translation]

This extreme dedication to defend the community and the territory is rooted in the spiritual beliefs, which leads the indigenous community to perceive the possibility of dying as an acceptable consequence of living the right way:

> vamos consciente de que si los espiritus asi lo desean nosotros pasaremos a otro espacio pasamos a otro espacio trascendemos y quedan los demas pero quedan en esa lucha constante hasta que... como dice el lema de nosotros 'hasta que se apague el sol' que significa que estaremos incansables somos un pueblo incansable en la busqueda de esa tranquilidad de esa harmonia[48] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

The violence of the armed conflict and the suffering of members of the community are thus transformed into a source of collective strength and resilience:

> la gente de pronto piensa que al asesinar un guardia, al asesinar un gobernador, al asesinar un lider o un niño, la gente se va a desanimar o a decir que no que a lo mejor le da miedo y se corre, no, yo creo que para nosotros como pueblos indigenas el que una persona derrame sangre por defender toda una comunidad, por defender todo un pueblo es un motivo, es una fuerza que nos permite a nosotros continuar sin... sin miedo o sea seguir enfrentandonos[49] (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

As these past pages have shown, the relationship between the local population of Toribío and the Guardia Indígena is very different from the relationship between the ATCC and the population in their area of influence, just like the level of dedication to nonviolence, the social cohesion of the base community, the relationship of the indigenous peoples to their territory and the range of tasks they expect the *Guardia* to fulfill. The role of the *Guardia Indígena* is focused on protection, information and monitoring, while the ATCC has also assumed

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[48] [we are aware that if the spirits so wish we will move to another space we move to another space we transcend and the others remain but they remain in that constant struggle until... as our motto says 'until the sun stops shining' which means that we will be tireless we are a tireless people in the search of that tranquility of that harmony; own translation]

[49] [people maybe think that by murdering a guard, murdering a governor, murdering a leader or a child, people are going to be discouraged or say no that maybe they are scared and run no I believe that for us as indigenous peoples if a person sheds blood due to defending an entire community due to defending a whole people is a motive it is a strength that allows us to continue without ... without fear that is to continue to confront ourselves [with armed actors]; own translation]

responsibilities in the provision of infrastructure and the social and economic development of the region. These differences have important implications for the theory-generating process and will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5.

4.1.2 Interview with Laura Sánchez[50] of the ATCC

The process of setting up the interview with Laura Sánchez of the ATCC was a little more complicated than the previous one with Marisol Tama. I contacted the ATCC through an e-mail address which had been passed along to me by a personal contact, and received a short, but positive answer of a Maria Colón[51], a representative of the organization, asking me to contact her or her colleague (Ms. Sánchez) via mobile phone. Despite the interest both women expressed in taking part in the interviews, Miss Colón ended the conversation when I asked to set up a date for the interview.

Miss Sánchez did agree to realize the interview, although her responses to the questions I had prepared were relatively short and she avoided answering some questions altogether. While this is of course her right as the interviewee, the omissions in this interview made the communication less fluid and moved the interview from the intended narrative style – similar to the one in the interview with Miss Tama – towards a more formal (although cordial) format of questioning and answering.

There was also a noticeable trend in the length of her answers in relation to the 'uncomfortableness' of a question – questions which related to possibly problematic topics received much shorter answers and were partly ignored. Since these are rather sensitive topics, I did not insist on getting certain answers by reiterating or reformulating questions, even if the respondent had not specifically stated she did not want to provide them.

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[50] Name changed by author.
[51] Name changed by author.

Table 2: Axial Coding for the Interview with Laura Sánchez

Concept	Category
- Connection to community base - Relations with base community + institutions - Trust & Credibility - Trust of community - Knowledge of relevant events - Vigilance, information as protection - Collective identity vs. individual identity - Ability of peaceful conflict resolution - Membership vs. living in the 'area of influence'	Social identity: Organization as part of the community Vs. Organization as independent actor
- Small, defined elite vs. membership - Concept of 'leadership' - Autonomy vs. hierarchy - Hierarchy of decision-making - Democratic leadership - Distribution of responsibilities - Comradery, Equality - Importance of leaders	Internal hierarchy of the organization: Autonomy vs. dependence
- Elimination of direct threats - Emergency actions & Protection - Development as peacebuilding	Long-term vs. short-term tasks
- Maintaining credibility	

- Durability of resistance - Conflict vs. post-conflict - Regional power structures (maintain status quo) - Challenges of long-term resistance - Innovation and transformation over time - Resilience over time - Normalization of crisis moments - Attractiveness of the ATCC for next generations	Protracted resistance: Innovation and transformation Vs. Recurrent crisis moments
- Consequences of joining the organization - Visibility of crimes as security risk vs. base for change	Risk-evaluation: Personal (short-term) safety vs. Collective (long-term) safety
- State as threat, protection = own task - State as opponent, as threat to established local rules	State-dependence vs. regional autonomy
- Social, economic + emotional functions of territory - Land as base for independence - Feelings of belonging, emotional connection to land - Legal property vs. factual property	Relevance of territory / land: Emotional vs. Instrumental

Through the axial coding of the concepts established in the open coding phase, I identified seven different categories (number of concepts per category in brackets): a) Social identity: Organization as part of the community vs. Organization as independent actor (9); b) Internal hierarchy of the organization: Autonomy vs. dependence (8); c) Long-term vs. short-term tasks (3); d) Protracted resistance: Innovation and transformation Vs. Recurrent crisis moments (9); e) Risk-evaluation: Personal (short-term) safety vs. Collective (long-term) safety (2); f) State-dependence vs. regional autonomy (2); and g) Relevance of territory / land: Emotional vs. Instrumental (4).

Selecting the key categories for the data analysis here was based on the number of indicators per category, as in the previous interview, but also on the results of the analysis in the last section of this chapter. Thus, while I excluded Category f) based on the small number of indicators, I kept Category e), which has the same number of indicators, but corresponds with one of the key categories established in the analysis of the first interview. The following paragraphs thus detail on the Categories a), b), d), e) and g).

<u>Social identity: Organization as part of the community Vs. Organization as independent actor</u>

This category strongly correlates with the category on collective vs. individual identity of the last section. The degree of immersion of the nonviolent resistance movement into the local community could thus be identified as a relevant category in all three steps of theory generation until this point – setting up the initial hypotheses, analyzing the first round of collected data and analyzing the second round of collected data.

The content of the interview data of this second interview is however somewhat contradictory to the initially hypothesized estrangement between the ATCC and the population in their area of influence. According to the interviewee,

> la organización a pesar de pues de todos los anos sigue teniendo esa credibilidad por la comunidad [...] todo' nos identificamos, todos nos identificamos pues con toda el area de influencia, nosotros hablamos que, eh, aparte pues, no solamente, no se habla como

tal de área de influencia, sino de territorio [...], de territorio del Carare, o sea, nosotros todos nos identificamos con el todo area de influencia[52] (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017).

However, in the response to another question about the challenges the ATCC has faced in the past and is facing now, she describes the major current challenges of the organization as follows:

> ahorita el principal desafio que tiene es uno, volver a tener, ehh, crea... o sea, volver a tener ehhh... esos lazos de interlocución con la institucionalidad y seguir teniendo la creati.. la credibilidad que ha tenido en la comunidad durante todos esos anos[53]" (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017).

Although it is hard to determine to what degree the trust between the ATCC and the local population has been maintained over the years, it seems unlikely that this issue has not been a major obstacle over the years, based on the many testimonies of local farmers and also notes in official ATCC documents, that have been collected by the Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011). This becomes clearer when instead of focusing on the content of the respondents' answer, the focus is laid on her choice of words. While Tama had recurrently referred to the community as 'family' and made extensive references to solidarity and unity among the members as well as the high levels of respect for the guard, Sánchez' narrative is much less focused on the social cohesion of the territory, she never uses the word 'family' and does not mention social solidarity systems at any point during the interview.

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[52] [the organization despite all the years continues to have that credibility in the community [...] we all identify, we all identify with the whole area of influence, we say that um apart of that not just we do not talk so much of area of influence but of territory [...], of the territory of the Carare that is we all identify with the whole area of influence; own translation]

[53] [now the main challenge is first to have umm to create... that is, to have umm... those ties of interlocution with the institutions and to continue having the creati... the credibility that [the ATCC] has had in the community during all those years; own translation]

<u>Internal hierarchy of the organization: Autonomy vs. dependence</u>

The category of internal hierarchy has not appeared in the analysis of the first interview, which suggests that this topic has not been an issue for the *Guardia Indígena*. Although the *Guardia* forms part of highly institutionalized regional networks with established hierarchical structures, there is no such hierarchy in the *Guardia* itself, which consists of voluntary members of equal rank and is organized through the mayor's office of Toribío ("se empieza a organizar unos compañeros que sean parte del cabildo[54]", Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017). Meanwhile, the ATCC counts with its own organizational leadership, the *Junta Directiva*, which is periodically elected by all members of the organization.

The diversity in tasks that the ATCC has assumed over the years has led to the creation of several committees and working groups which focus on specific sectors of the ATCC's work. Large parts of the responsibility for the continuous functioning and success of the organization has been transferred to its small group of about fifteen to twenty leaders (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017), including the responsibility for transforming the agenda over the years: "son desafíos que la organización tiene que... o los líderes de la organización tienen que irse pensando para ehm.... que la organización siga teniendo esa estatus que ha tenido[55]" (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017).

Further evidence for this argument is also provided by the Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011: 414), which explains how *campesinos* started collaborating with armed actors again after being dissatisfied with the services provided by the ATCC. The transfer of high degrees of responsibility for the social and economic well-being of the community towards the ATCC left the organization in a difficult position: on the one hand, they tried to serve the community in the best possible way and tried to collect funds for realizing development projects. On the other

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[54] [they started to organize some comrades [to form the Guardia] which would be part of the town council; own translation]

[55] [these are challenges that the organization has to... or the leaders of the organization have to start thinking about so umm.... so that the organization keeps having that status it used to have; own translation]

hand, by collecting and managing large sums of money, they laid the grounds for rumors about corruption and mismanagement of funds by the leaders of the ATCC.

The constant tension between living up to the expectations of the local population – which in itself is a highly difficult task – and maintaining the dialogue with the armed actors as well as working on the adaptation of the organization to new circumstances and contexts weakened the ATCC's negotiating power and their ability to prevent forced displacement in their region.

Protracted resistance: Innovation and transformation Vs. Recurrent crisis moments

Maintaining a civil resistance movement over long periods of time is a difficult task even under the best of circumstances. The ATCC is a much older institution than the *Guardia Indígena*, which was formed a whole fourteen years later. Both organizations have been set up in the context of extreme violence towards the communities which gave birth to them and subsequently experienced periods of more stability. Sánchez describes the challenges of maintaining the organization up to date and the effect of a lack of innovation on the local population:

> una organización de muchos años al último se tiene que hacer monótono si las organizaciones no hoy no van para realizar nuevas acciones eh.. también eso ayuda mucho a que... a que el temaaa... a que la base se disperse un poco[56] (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017).

This 'little divide' in the base community is, however, considered as the outcome of the points of crisis, which form part of the experience of all social organizations after a certain time, according to the interviewee, who claims that "es que todas esas organizaciones sociales eh... antiguas pasan por un... por momentos de crisis, momentos de crisis pues... ehm ... eh... fuertes[57]" (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017).

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[56] [an organization of many years finally has to become monotonous if the organizations no today do not start carrying out new actions um… that also helps a lot to that … to the subject … to that the base is dispersed a little; own translation]

[57] [it is that all of these um… old social organizations pass through a… through moments of crisis, moments of crisis well… umm… um… strong ones; own translation]

While there is certainly some truth to the claim that social movements almost always pass through some crises throughout their existence, this does not minder the necessity to analyze why such crises have happened, as the thorough understanding of and subsequent learning from past mistakes is the only way to ensure that similar problems will not form part of the future of an organization.

<u>Risk-evaluation: Personal (short-term) safety vs. Collective (long-term) safety</u>

The strong inclination of the indigenous community of Toribío to put the long-term peaceful existence and safety of their community above the life and safety of individuals was one of the most poignant features of the success of their experience of protracted nonviolent resistance to forced displacement.

A similar process can only partly be assumed for the ATCC. While the official members, and especially the leaders, of the organization accept a higher risk to their personal safety due to their membership (as affirmed by the continuously high number of members after the murder of the first group of leaders demonstrated the severity of the risk related to membership), there is no information on the willingness of the local population to resist displacement in situations of increased levels of violence.

However, the collaboration of the local population with the ATCC by providing them with information on current events, and especially recent crimes, in the territory of influence can be seen as a proxy for their willingness to accept a certain risk as part of their struggle for social change. Passing on information about the actions of both legal and illegal armed actors is generally to be considered as unsafe:

> Una cosa clara del por qué nos enfrentamos a tantas amenazas a nivel nacional por el tema de las denuncias por el tema de las denuncias a lo... a lo que pasa en nuestros territorios eso es un factor esencial en el tema de... de las amenazas tanto actores se puede decir tanto actores legales como ilegales en el tema de las amenazas por las denuncias de lo que sucede en nuestros territorios es el factor detonante para el tema de las amena...[58] (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017).

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[58] [A clear thing of the reason why we are facing so many threats at the national level it's because of the subject of denunciations because of the subject of denunciations of ... of what happens in our territories that is an <u>essential</u>

The lack of data, in the form of narrative accounts of some of the affected persons, inhibits drawing strong conclusions from this section. Further data collection and analysis would be necessary to make this part of the emerging theory more robust.

<u>Relevance of territory / land: Emotional vs. Instrumental</u>

This last section analyzes the role of the relevance of a territory to its inhabitants with respect to the likelihood of forced displacement. Sánchez describes the relation of the *campesino* population in the ATCC's area of influence to their land in the following words:

> Bueno ehh... con relación a como se relacionan ellos [the *campesinos*] con el territorio pues una pues es de autonomía los campesinos en la región son... somos muy autónomos en el territorio dos es... es de mucha pertenencia el territorio se respeta por... por encima de cualquier cosa y lo otro absurdo es que los campesinos no son duenos de las tierras porque el territorio estaba concepcionado en protecciones ambientales y entonces los campesinos no tienen titulos de propiedad de la tierra entonces ehh.. tenemos asi una discordia entre el estado y... y...y.... y los campesinos de la región por el tema de la autonomía y tenencia a la tierra[59] (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017).

The reference to the widespread informality of land ownership is a feature that distinguishes the experience of the ATCC from that of the indigenous community of Toribío, whose land rights are legally secured – although factually not always respected – by the Constitution, which established indigenous reservations as a special form of collective property. Since the *campesinos* do not have access to similar protective measures, they are less likely to recuperate their territories once they have abandoned them. This increases the vulnerability they experience once they are displaced and could work as a factor that pushes them towards staying on their land.

While autonomy and 'belonging' have been named as central aspects of the peasant communities' relation to their land, the emotional and spiritual connection found in the case of

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factor in the issue of ... of the threats by actors it can be said both legal and illegal actors in the issue of threats due to the denunciations of what happens in our territories this is the detonating factor for the issue of the threats...; own translation]

[59] [Well umm... in relation with how they [the *campesinos*] relate to the territory well one well it is about autonomy the peasants in the region are ... we are very autonomous in the territory two is ... it is of much belonging the territory is respected because ... above anything and the other absurd thing is that the peasants are not owners of the land because the territory was conceived in environmental protection areas and so the peasants do not have legal property titles for the land so umm... so we have a discord between the state and ... and ... and ... and the peasants of the region on the issue of autonomy and land tenure; own translation]

the indigenous community completely lacks from the narratives on the case of the ATCC (both the interview I conducted and the report of the *Grupo de Memoria Histórica* (2011)). This factor is highly relevant for the indigenous communities' reluctance to leave their territory, and might thus be a factor which raises the likelihood of displacement in the area of influence of the ATCC.

4.2 Quantitative Analysis

One of the goals of this thesis is to complement the qualitative evidence gathered in the expert interviews with a quantitative analysis, thus using the potential of both methods. As part of the qualitative case study this thesis could show considerable differences between the organizational and social aspects of both groups under scrutiny here.

While the indigenous group based in Toribío is considered to possess stronger social bonds with its base community, the ATCC seems suffer from a certain estrangement of the population in its territory of influence. To contrast the evidence based on two interviews and to put it into a wider context, I chose to present a macro analysis of quantitative data on victimization and especially displacement in Colombia.

As explained in Chapter 2, I used data from the *Unidad para las Víctimas*, the Colombian state agency dedicated to the attention and care for conflict victims. Based on regional data from the municipalities in the territory of influence of the ATCC (Cimitarra, Landázuri, Bolívar, El Peñón, Sucre and La Belleza) in the Santander department I state one model to analyze the effect threats and homicides have on the forced displacement in the *campesino* zone. In contrast I use the data on the municipality of Toribío to investigate the same effects in a territory home to the *Guardia Indígena*.

Thanks to the comprehensive data archive found on the website of the *Unidad para las Víctimas*, I can analyze the trends in displacement for these municipalities over the years 1985 to 2016. The dependent variable in all models is the number of displaced persons in a specific

year and the independent variables are threats and homicides per year, as officially recognized and registered by the Colombian state.

The regression analysis brought forward in this section is designed as a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on time-series data, meaning all municipalities and years are pooled and jointly analyzed. To account for possible time trends external to the independent variables, I included a control for the year of the observation. Robust standard errors are used to cope with the possible problems of heteroscedasticity and I present two different specifications of the models for the ATCC and Toribío.

The first specification (Model 1) uses absolute numbers on displacement, threats, and homicides. The second specification (Model 2), however, considers the different sizes of the regions under the influence of the ATCC and the Guardia Indígena. Since absolute numbers can be misleading when we compare just one municipality to six, I decided to include this model using annual change rates in percent.

Based upon the beforementioned characteristics analyzed in the interviews, I therefore postulate the following hypotheses:

H_0: *There are no measurable differences in the explanatory power of the models explaining displacement for the territory of influence of the ATCC and Toribío.*

H_1: *The model for Toribío explains considerably less variance in the displacement then the model for the territory of influence of the ATCC.*

H_2: *Homicides are less significant for the explanation of displacement in Toribío then they are for the territory of influence of the ATCC.*

H_3: *Threats are less significant for the explanation of displacement in Toribío then they are for the territory of influence of the ATCC.*

The null hypothesis (H_0) describes the baseline assumption of zero differences in the explanatory power of the two different regional models. Following this, there would not be any statistically meaningful difference between the effect of threats and homicides on displacement in the territory of influence of the ATCC and the Guardia Indígena.

However, based upon the findings of the expert interviews I propose hypotheses H_1 to H_3 to account for the organizational and social differences between the groups, and the meaning these have for the effectiveness of nonviolent countermeasures to displacement. The following table presents the results from the four regression analyses run.

Regression Models 1-4:

Effect of Homicide and Threats on Displacement

	Model 1: ATCC Influence	Model 1: Toribío	Model 2: ATCC Influence	Model 2: Toribío
Homicides	9.255***	5.453*		
	(1.996)	(2.611)		
Threats	2.122	3.080		
	(2.953)	(2.118)		
Year	34.05**	6.592	0.408	328.1
	(9.738)	(4.062)	(1.688)	(237.6)
% Change Homicides			0.740*	4.342
			(0.347)	(11.04)
% Change Threats			0.431	-23.78
			(0.357)	(17.57)
Constant	-68219.0**	-13240.4	-806.4	-653882.2
	(19470.7)	(8114.3)	(3372.0)	(473820.6)
Observations	32	32	29	31
R^2	0.6339	0.5897	0.3551	0.1301
Adjusted R^2	0.5947	0.5457	0.2777	0.0335

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

When looking at the table there are several interesting aspects of this analysis, and it can be said the overall results are rather positive towards the proposed theoretical arguments. Starting with the first specification (Model 1) using absolute data, it can be noticed that both regressions for the ATCC and for Toribío have considerable explanatory power.

The R^2, also called model fit, represents the amount of variance over all observations of the dependent variable that it is correlated with, and thus explained by, the dependent variables. Hence, the model fit parameter can take on any value between 0 and 1, meaning 0 to 100% of variance in the dependent variable can be explained by the model.

However, since the R^2 continually rises with each independent variable added, the Adjusted R^2 introduces a punishing term for each additional variable, and is thus a more reliable indication of a well-fitted model. As is visible from the table, all four models portray a model fit (R^2) well above zero, with 0.63 for the first specification of the ATCC model and 0.59 for its counterpart for Toribío. That means both models account for 63% and 59% of the overall variance in displacement respectively, before applying the punishing term.

This is by all means a considerable amount of explanatory power. The same basically holds also true for the second specification using relative change rates in the independent variables, even though in a much lesser degree. While the standard R^2 is given with 0.36 and 0.13 respectively for the ATCC territory and Toribío, taking a look at the adjusted model fit reveals a bigger difference with 0.28 for the ATCC and 0.03 for Toribío.

Linking the data with the proposed theoretical arguments, the null hypothesis states that for both regional models the model fit would not be different. While for the absolute-number-models this might still be partially true (a difference of 4% in the explanatory power might possibly not be considered statistically important[60]), the second models, which are based on relative changes, show a very different perspective.

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[60] Given that the two models are not nested but consist of independent observations it is not possible to test this difference on statistical significance using standard F-test comparisons. Given the scope of this thesis, I adhere to simple comparisons of the absolute differences in the explained variance.

Taking the evidence from both specifications it seems fair to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in explanatory power between the models for the ATCC territory and Toribío. In the context of the case study this would mean the effect of homicides and threats on displacement are not equal for both regions, but deserve a closer understanding.

The second hypothesis (H_2) states that the inequality in the explanatory powers is constituted by a lesser model fit in the regression for Toribío, which can clearly be confirmed by the abovementioned numbers, even if the difference in model 1 does not seem to be huge, the much larger difference in model 2 clearly shows the direction of the trend we are looking at. Thus, the second hypothesis cannot be rejected on grounds of this data and has to be considered accepted for the moment.

Considering the third and fourth hypotheses (H_3 and H_4), a difference in statistical significance levels between the effect of homicides and threats on displacement should be visible between the models for the ATCC's territory of influence and Toribío. Even more, the hypothesis presumes that the effects of both independent variables should be considerably less pronounced for Toribío, due to the special social tissue found in the indigenous organization present there. Looking once again into the data, this too seems to hold true.

While the effect levels, or coefficients, are somewhat hard to compare due to the models not being nested, what can be interpreted is the statistical significance. For model 1 the statistical significance shows a p-value of 0.001 for the effect of homicides in ATCC territories, which can be understood as a 0.001% probability of making a mistake when saying that homicides contribute to greater displacement in this model.

For threats the same value is not significant at a level less than 10%, meaning the error that is linked to stating an influence of threats on displacement is bigger than 10%, and thus the effect is not considered statistically relevant. Comparing the coefficients with the model for Toribío, it is visible that stating a positive influence of homicides on displacement is much more likely

to be an error (5% probability) than it was for the ATCC territories, while the effect of threats is equally insignificant.

Taking into account the second specification using relative data, it can be found that for homicides in the ATCC territories the error probability is already higher than in model 1, with 5%, and for Toribío there is no longer any measurable significance. Threats continue to be insignificant for both regions.

To sum it up, it can be said that the third hypothesis cannot easily be refuted when sticking to the data at hand. It seems that homicides indeed are less effective in explaining the displacement in the Toribío region than they are when it comes to significantly predicting displacement in the territory of influence of the ATCC. The same cannot be said for hypothesis 4, which stated a difference in significance for the effect of threats in displacement. Here it has to be acknowledged that the intra-temporal variance of threats for the ATCC municipalities and Toribío seems to be too big and mainly caused by variables omitted in this regression analyses, so that the hypothesis four cannot be accepted.

Chapter 5: Emerging Theory and Limitations

Chapter 4 has provided an extensive qualitative analysis of the interview data collected for this thesis as well as a pooled OLS regression analysis which aimed at enhancing the strength of the emerging theory by introducing an empirical *Vergleichshorizont*, or comparative horizon, for the level of success of the ATCC and the Guardia Indígena in preventing forced displacement in their areas of influence. Chapter 5 will now focus on setting up a theoretical model on the identified determinants of success of nonviolent resistance movements against forced displacement.

The framework of the emerging theory focuses on three key categories established in the analysis in Chapter 4, which proved to have the strongest support in the collected data. The first key category focuses on the influence of an individual or collective understanding of identity and the relative value which is given to the individual versus the community.

The second key category refers to the level of dedication of the community as a whole to resisting displacement nonviolently. This includes both the commitment to nonviolence as a philosophy and method and the level of resilience against threats and attacks from armed actors. And lastly, the third key category looks at the role of internal hierarchies of nonviolent resistance movements and analyzes the impact of the form of leadership on the likelihood of successfully preventing forced displacement.

5.1 Outcome of the Theory-Generating Process

5.1.1 Individual vs. Collective Identity

Based on the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the last chapter, the form of identity which the members of a nonviolent resistance movement hold have an enormous effect on their ability to resist forced displacement over long periods of time. While spontaneous actions of resistance can emerge in almost any community, the durability of these movements and their impact on the levels of forced displacement in a community heavily depends on the social cohesion of the people involved.

Table 3 presents a simplified schematic version of this argument. The categories 'individual' and 'collective' are hereby not to be understood as a dichotomous variable, but rather as the two extreme ends of a continuous scale. Community can rarely be placed at the most extreme points of this scale – completely individual versus completely collective – but are usually somewhere in the middle.

The emerging theory laid out in this chapter suggests that the further a community moves towards a collective identity, the more resilient it will be against the threat of forced displacement, that is, the likelihood of displacement and the observable total numbers of displaced persons sink.

Table 3: Identity-based Model of Displacement

	Individual Identity	Collective Identity
Individual > Community	Massive Displacement	Moderate Displacement
Community > Individual	Moderate Displacement	Few Displacement

The second determinant in this table is the value that members of the community place on the safety of the community, understood in terms of the possibility of a peaceful future, relative to the value placed on their own life and safety. I argue that communities, where individuals value the safety and well-being of their community as a whole more than their own safety and well-being, are more resilient towards forced displacement.

The data used in this thesis indicates that the nature of identity in indigenous resistance movements is more collective than in their non-indigenous counterparts and that members of indigenous resistance movements place more value on the safety of their community than on their own life, whereas there is no reliable data on the same indicator for members of non-indigenous resistance movements.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze the mechanisms of formation of social identities in resistance movements. However, some basic logical deductions could be made from what this author has learned during the elaboration of this thesis.

First, I argue that high social cohesion is usually found in homogenous communities with a collective memory of shared suffering and shared 'glory'. The truthfulness of these myths is of relatively little importance in this context, what counts is that the community accepts these myths and creates feelings of a shared experience among the members. In this way, the tales about the resistance of ancestral generations is a source of strength and unity in indigenous communities nowadays.

Second, social solidarity systems based on reciprocity and mutual support are beneficial for the construction and maintenance of a collective social identity in a resistance movement. The more social exchanges are commodified and capitalized, the harder it is for individuals to feel connected to each other. Communities and resistance movements thus benefit greatly from seemingly small changes in the way people interact with each other. The *minga* of the Nasa people constitutes an excellent example of a mechanism to increase social cohesion:

> La minga como lo llamamos el pueblo nasa "pi'txya, pi'txyuwe" es una invitación que hace la persona a otra persona pidiendo que si puede colaborar un día en el trabajo hacia diferentes espacios una de las que más sobre sale es la siembra del maíz, Dentro de la agricultura propia el trabajo es muy cuantioso y se requiere un buen numero del manos del hombre por lo tanto el ser indígena practica la minga como fuente de unidad, estrategia solución, a esto lo llamamos (MINGA DE TRABAJO)[61] (Consejo Regional Indígena del Huila, 2012).

Third, the strength of the collective identity among the members of a resistance movement tends to be higher in movement where men and women are treated as equals. Many local

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[61] [The minga, or as we, the Nasa people call it "pi" txya, pi "txyuwe" is an invitation that a person gives to another person asking if they can collaborate one day in the work on different areas, one of the most recurrent ones is the planting of the maize, In agriculture, the work comes in big quantities and it requires a good number of helping hands therefore the indigenous people practice the minga as source of unity, strategic solution, to this we call it (MINGA OF WORK); own translation]

organizations in Colombia suffer from gender inequalities, which results in pre-dominantly male leadership, while women leaders tend to prefer organizing in separate women's movements where their leadership is accepted and encouraged. The lacking collaboration of both genders inhibits the creation of higher levels of social cohesion. Gender mainstreaming should thus be an integral element of the constituent phase of resistance movement and gender equality should be explicitly promoted.

5.1.2 Dedication and Resilience

The protracted nature of the Colombian conflict creates the need to maintain structures of nonviolent resistance over large periods of time. Even movements that enjoy widespread support in their early days tend to eventually struggle with a loss of motivation to keep fighting in the base community. Two key factors in maintaining the success of a nonviolent resistance movement over time are the community's level of dedication to nonviolence and its resilience against threats and attacks from the part of armed actors.

Table 4 visualizes the effect of these two factors on forced displacement. The terms 'massive', 'moderate' and 'low' are not to be understood as referring to actual expected numerical levels of displacement, but rather as a trend: Low resilience tends to increase the likelihood and magnitude of displacement, while high resilience has a reverse effect.

Table 4: Resilience-based Model of Displacement

	Pragmatism	**Ideology**
Low Resilience	Massive Displacement	Moderate Displacement
High Resilience	Moderate Displacement	Low Displacement

The extreme points of the scale of dedication to nonviolence are indicated as 'pragmatism' and 'ideology', referring to the purely instrumental use of nonviolent methods on assumptions of efficiency and to the moral and philosophical belief in nonviolence as an end in itself and as the only way to build sustainable peace respectively.

I argue that the stronger the commitment to nonviolence is among the members of a nonviolent resistance movement, the more likely is the movement to prevent forced displacement over longer periods of time. Movements where large quantities of the base community see nonviolence as a merely pragmatic choice tend to suffer from the dissidence of members if the context changes towards a situation where nonviolence might not seem like the most practicable and efficient solution anymore.

5.1.3 Hierarchy and Leadership

Any successful resistance movement has to have some form of organizational entity, which decides about specific activities, distributes tasks among the members of the movement and serves as an official representation of the movement when dealing with external actors. However, the level of hierarchy within such an entity and the form of leadership of those who comprise it varies greatly across different experiences of nonviolent resistance.

Table 5: Leadership-based Model of Displacement

	High hierarchization	**Low hierarchization**
Elite leadership	Massive Displacement	Moderate Displacement
Collective leadership	Moderate Displacement	Low Displacement

Table 5 illustrates the basic connections between displacement and the concepts of hierarchy and leadership. Higher levels of hierarchization and elite leadership are correlated with a higher

likelihood and magnitude of displacement, while lower levels of hierarchization and collective or community-based forms of leadership have the adverse effect. These effects are clearly visible in the analysis in Chapter 4 – while the ATCC counts with a small, elite leadership and comparatively high levels of hierarchization, the *Guardia Indígena* of Toribío has a more equalitarian organizational structure.

The institutionalization of resistance, which creates a perceived social distance between the 'organization' and the base community, undermines the logic of 'people's power' in nonviolent resistance movements. The transfer of agency and responsibility for community processes to a new local elite reverts the local population to their pre-resistance state of passivity. Mistrust of the base community against the elite leadership of highly-organized resistance movements may be reduced by a strong sense of collective identity and the resulting belief that the persons in decision-making positions truly have the whole community's best interest at heart.

In terms of transfers of responsibility for an increasing number of social and economic issues in the base community towards the leadership of the nonviolent resistance movement – on top of the prime mandate of protection – it needs to be ensured "que los miembros vean a la organización como proyecto compartido y no como salvavidas[62]" (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 433).

Estrangement between a resistance movement and its base community effectively converts such a movement into another stakeholder in the conflict, which operates in a similar space and suffers from the same structural flaws as the national, non-governmental organizations described in Chapter 3.

Recently, there have been notions of micro-level resistance movements as a possible solution to this problem. These movements distinguish themselves from other forms of resistance

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[62] [that the members see the organization as a shared project and not as a life jacket; own translation]

through the low visibility of their actions and their barely perceivable existence, which can at times be an important factor in the protection of the individual members of such movements.

A 2003 study by Marta Dominguez Mejía analyzed such processes of micro-level resistance in the Afro-Colombian communities of the Colombian Pacific region. She finds that the micro-activism of local women in the municipality of Buenaventura lacked organization and methodological training, but "sin embargo estas acciones fugaces evidencian niveles importantes de coordinación y comprensión entre actores[63]" (Domínguez Mejía, 2003: 2). The author describes how the women in the region of the river Anchicayá started socially excluding families of young people who joined either guerrilla or paramilitary groups. This strategy aimed at exerting pressure on these families not to let their children join any armed group while at the same time distancing (and protecting) themselves and their families from being seen as collaborators.

The advantages of such methods of micro-level resistance are the protection of its members through the low levels of visibility of the movement, the continuous active engagement of all members in the movement, and the independence from access to economic resources. However, the overall efficiency of these methods is difficult to assess and analyze empirically. Further research is needed before meaningful conclusions can be drawn.

5.2 Limitations

"The researcher cannot produce a definitive account or explanation, and any attempt to do so is a form of tyranny because it suppresses diversity" (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 9)

This quote perfectly expresses the essence of research as an imperfect and continuous effort to enhance the understanding of certain social phenomena. This section is dedicated to making the imperfection in this research project visible and transparent, so the estimated readers have a better estimate of the robustness of its findings.

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[63] [nevertheless, these fleeting action show evidence of important levels of coordination and understanding among actors; own translation]

There is an inherent danger of falling into the trap of paternalism or neo-colonialism when doing research on a country of the global south as a researcher originating from a country of the global north. I tried to avoid this danger as consequently as possible by relying on local knowledge and experience as the main source for the generation of the emerging theory described in the first half of this chapter.

I firmly believe that the best solutions to a community's problems come out of the community itself, therefore I want to stress that this research project should be understood as an attempt to assist local communities in the practices that they developed and that they are already quite successfully executing, not as an attempt to impose alien structures and mechanisms on them.

My perception of my role as a researcher is reflected in this quote by the Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011: 474):

> Lo que los académicos (y en nuestra opinión también los políticos) tenemos que desarrollar con cada una de las comunidades con que trabajamos son nuevas formas sociales de producir y usar conocimientos: el saber abstracto y frío de los primeros y la experiencia concreta vibrante de las segundas tienen que integrarse.

In terms of methodological limitations, it is important to note that my analysis relies on a very small sample, and despite the validity of in-depth qualitative methods in theory-generating research, the emerging theory needs to be tested and compared with data from more case studies to develop higher levels of robustness. Especially concerning the statistical analysis, "determining […] relative causal weights for variables can be difficult to do with any precision in a single case or a small number of cases" (George and Benett, 2005: 27).

Regarding the generalizability of the findings of case studies, George and Bennett (2005: 31) note that

> Case study researchers are more interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise.

The high level of case specificity implies that what works in one setting or one community may not necessarily work in another, and not considering the individual characteristics of each case can result in creating an increased risk for the local population (Oxfam, 2009: 101-102).

Conducting interviews over distance is certainly not the most desirable or scientifically sound method. However, within the restrictions I faced, this form of interviewing represented the only accessible possibility to include the knowledge and opinions of local experts. The persons I interviewed live in remote rural areas in Colombia, which means that they do not have access to high-speed internet, or to any internet connection at all, for that matter. Connection via some kind of video-chat was therefore hardly possible.

Additionally, the selected participants did not have any prior familiarity with skype and seemed to feel more comfortable with the use of WhatsApp as a medium. In my role as an interviewer, I tried to create the most comfortable setting possible for the interviewees, and this includes the respondents' familiarity with the medium used for communicating. By using voice notes no additional recording tool was required and the interview stayed traceable both for the interviewer and the interviewee, therefore avoiding any later uncertainty about what was said by each person.

Grounded in the firm belief that research should not be conducted about a population without their inclusion in the research process, I took the decision to use a somewhat flawed method in order to avoid treating persons only as research subjects and placing my own opinion over theirs.

The interview participants still live in zones with relatively high levels of violence and are continuously affected by the conflict. Questions thus had to be asked in a sensitive manner and with much respect of their intimacy. I tried to word every question in a delicate and culturally

appropriate manner, abstained from the use of technical or academic terms and adapted my language to mirror the one used by the respondents (e.g. the use of formal or informal pronouns for the other person). To avoid any possible negative consequences for the interviewees as a result of their partaking in my research, their personal information (name, address, phone number, etc.) will not be used in this thesis or any future research in any form and the interviews will be kept anonymous.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis aimed at contributing to the body of literature on the prevention of forced displacement and contribute a unique perspective by focusing on the role of nonviolent civil resistance in this context and thus contributing to an overall better understanding of the complex mechanisms of civil conflicts. The combined use of qualitative and quantitative methodology was used to enhance the robustness of the findings by contrasting theory with empirical evidence.

This last chapter is dedicated to resuming the most important lessons and reflecting on the findings of the previous chapters as well as to analyzing their implications for current approaches to prevent forced displacement. Finally, I will address outline possibilities for further research, which have surged as a result of this work.

Chapter 1 introduced the reader of this thesis to the most relevant aspects of the Colombian conflict in order to situate the research topic within the socio-historic context of this case study. It further presented the research problem and the relevant theoretical framework on the concepts of forced displacement, nonviolence and nonviolent resistance. Finally, it provided a justification of the relevance of this research topic considering especially the impact of forced displacement on its victims and the dearth of literature dedicated to understanding this issue from an academic perspective.

Chapter 2 explained the research methodology and design of the thesis. It introduced the meta-theoretical framework of the grounded theory approach, which is one of the most detailed and thorough methodologies for theory-generating research, and especially apt for a qualitative research design. It provided background information on the process of data collection and analysis, that is, the development from primary qualitative data extracted from expert interviews over several steps of coding and analysis towards the emerging theory. Lastly, it presented the basic outline of the quantitative part of the analysis, informing the reader about the data I used – their origins and characteristics – as well as the methodology I used to analyze these data.

Chapter 3 compared several approaches to prevent forced displacement by focusing on the different actors in the field who are usually involved in prevention approaches. The first part of Chapter 3 focused on the state and governmental institutions, the second part on international actors, as for example the UN, the third part explained the role of national non-grassroots organizations and the last, and most important, part focused on nonviolent civil resistance movements and their comparative advantages *vis-á-vis* the other actors.

In each of these four parts, I provided information about the past and current actions of the respective stakeholder and on how these actions affected the local population at risk of displacement. I concluded that none of the first three actors is both willing and capable to sufficiently protect Colombian civilians from being forcefully displaced, which undermines the importance of creating better approaches to nonviolent resistance as an alternative method of protecting civilians and working towards sustainable peace in the country.

Chapter 4 narrowed the focus down to the two nonviolent resistance movements which I chose for the in-depth analysis and the base for the emerging theory. It briefly introduced the most relevant aspects of the historical development of the *Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos del Carare* (ATCC) of the Middle Magdalena region and the *Guardia Indígena* of the Toribío municipality in the South-West of Colombia. It introduced the initial, literature-based hypotheses, before analyzing the qualitative interview data, which helped develop a more profound understanding of the structure and inner workings of nonviolent resistance movements. In the last part, I presented the results of the pooled OLS regression which corroborated the findings from the qualitative analysis of the expert interviews.

Finally, chapter 5 presented the three parts of the emerging theory created on the base of the findings from the previous chapters. It introduced three tables visualizing the effects of the following variables:

  a) the strength of collective identity of a nonviolent resistance movement and the relative
     preference members of such a movement attribute to their own life and safety vis-á-vis

the community's possibility of a peaceful and harmonic future (Identity-based Model of Displacement);

b) the dedication of the members of a nonviolent resistance movement to nonviolence as a philosophical imperative instead of merely an efficient methodology and their long-term resilience against the threat of forced displacement (Resilience-based Model of Displacement)

c) the degree of hierarchization of social relations within members of a movement and their base community and the form of leadership which the movement adopts (Leadership-based Model of Displacement).

The second part of Chapter 5 concludes the main part of this thesis by outlining its limitations, related to both content and methodology. This section aimed at increasing the transparency of the research process and at making it easier for the readers of these pages to assess the validity and reliability of the conducted research.

Recap: Main Findings

The issue of conflict-induced forced displacement is highly complex and subject to a number of different variables, including the degree of intentionality and the reasoning behind displacement, the degree of international presence, the response of state institutions, and many more. It is clear that there can be no 'one size fits all' solution or explanatory model to a problem of this complexity.

Instead, every case should be analyzed carefully, which creates a certain tension between the need for thorough and detailed analysis and the imperative to act fast in times of ongoing conflict to prevent the loss of civilian lives or severe harm to their well-being and physical and mental integrity. All the more importance is to be assigned to preventive measures that transform society towards a more peaceful version of itself, which enhances the ability of communities, but also of state institutions, to resolve conflicts peacefully.

The findings of this thesis suggest that there are several endogenous factors which determine the likelihood of a nonviolent resistance movement to successfully protect its members and its base community from being forcefully displaced by an armed actor.

First, the Identity-based Model of Displacement established a strong connection between the way the members of a nonviolent resistance movement define their identity and their ability to prevent forced displacement. I argued that the more the involved population understands their own identity in terms of the collective identity of their whole community, the easier it is for them to collaborate among each other and the higher the levels of trust between individuals and between the base community and the organized resistance will be.

The same model also put forth the argument that the probability of preventing forced displacement rises when the members of the resistance movement and the base community value their own life and safety less than the life and safety of the other persons in that community. Engaging in nonviolent resistance against armed actors in a civil conflict is a risky endeavor. Members of a resistance movement thus need to be willing to endure negative consequences based on their actions, in some cases these consequences might be threats or physical assaults, in others it could be the person's murder or the murder of a close relation. In order to accept the possibility of such drastic repercussions, the individual has to put others before themselves and think about the long-term implications of their efforts to rebuild a culture of peace in a context of overwhelming violence.

Second, the Resilience-based Model of Displacement focuses on the concept of nonviolence and how its different interpretations affect the outcome of nonviolent resistance movements. At the moment a resistance movement is initiated by a part of the local population, there are several factors which influence the choice of methods of resistance: questions related to the efficiency of the different methodological options usually weigh as much in the final decision as do the moral and philosophical, or also religious, beliefs of the constituent members. Both

considerations are absolutely valid and should indeed be thoroughly reflected upon before choosing which way to go.

The perceived efficiency of a method does, however, depend partly on the previous knowledge about it. Nonviolent resistance is still a rather new phenomenon for most communities (with the exception of some indigenous peoples, who have traditions of nonviolent resistance reaching back to the early days of the colonization of the American continent), thus, most movements start from zero, having to think about all the possible actions and take decisions in a state of highly incomplete information. Therefore, nonviolence might not be considered as effective a method as it actually is.

The reasons why many local communities still chose to remain nonviolent are quite diverse: some recognize that they would not be able to defeat the threatening armed actor in an armed battle due to the opponents' superior strength in number, weapons and sophistication of war tactics, others are driven by their faith or spiritual beliefs, and yet others are simply tired of the decades of violence they have suffered through and, more than anything, just want no further violent actions.

The protracted nature of the Colombian conflict forced nonviolent resistance movements to remain active over large periods of time. Years of struggle and setbacks are likely to reduce people's motivation to keep on resisting, and may weaken their dedication to nonviolence. Seeing nonviolence not just as a matter of efficiency and practicality, but also as an end in itself and believing that it is the only way to build sustainable peace therefore drastically increases a movements' long-term resilience.

Third, the Leadership-based Model of Displacement looks at the organizational structures within a nonviolent resistance movement. I argued that the outcome of a resistance movement may be negatively impacted by high degrees of hierarchization and an elite form of leadership. More specifically, if a movement is led by a small number of people, which take decisions

without consulting the base community, the latter may lose trust in the leadership's ability and willingness to work towards the best interest of all persons in the local area.

These mechanisms are exponentially stronger if the leadership is responsible for managing large financial resources. Accusations of corruption and mismanagement of funds – justified or not – are likely to rise among the members of the base community. The less transparent the processes of decision-making over how to use funds are, the more likely are such accusations and the loss of trust in the organized resistance.

Another problem rising from elite leadership models is the increasing amount of responsibility that the base community transfers towards those leaders. From being responsible for negotiating the non-interference of armed actors in their areas of influence, the leaders of an organization may go to being held responsible for a range of issues connected to the social and economic development of their base communities, which technically, are the responsibility of the state and its regional institutions. Such an increase in responsibilities over a short period of time puts the leaders in a rather difficult position, since they usually lack proper training, experience and also resourced to deal with all of the problems they are suddenly supposed to resolve.

A last issue of this form of leadership consists in the high risk for the leaders to become the victims of threats, assault, murder or other forms of violence, which armed actors are willing to engage in. The smaller the leadership of a resistance movement, the easier it is to target the few leaders and thus weaken the movement considerably. Targeting the leaders of a movement does not always imply a subsequent loss of willingness of locals to maintain the resistance, depending on other factors. However, it is in the interest of a movement to protect its members, thus a broad-based leadership with low levels of hierarchy does not only help to increase trust and cooperation, but also avoid or minder the targeting of individual leaders.

All of these three models are, of course, highly interrelated. I separated them in order to be able to show their individual characteristics and make their effects as easily visible as possible. Depending on the research case, either one or a combination of these three models may be the

best fit to explain the specific outcome. Regarding the two movements which were analyzed in this thesis, all three models are considered highly relevant.

In the case of the ATCC, I identified a medium-high level of hierarchization in the organization and a relatively small leadership, with about 15 to 20 people of the approximately 600 members of the organization carrying most of the responsibility (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017). These number also have to be seen in relation to the size of the base community, which spans about 7000 people, not all of which identify with the organization.

The ATCC has shown considerable resilience over time, they have maintained active resistance for three decades now and show no signs of giving up. Despite the circumstances they have faced along the way, they never lost the "ganas de seguir", the will to keep on going (Interview with Laura Sánchez, 2017). Despite the mostly practical consideration in choosing a nonviolent form of resistance, they have managed to maintain the dedication to this paradigm and not defect towards more violent forms of dealing with the threats of armed actors and the continuous lack of support by the state.

Concerning the Identity-based Model of Displacement, I could not draw definitive conclusions for the ATCC due to the lack of data on this specific aspect of the organization, but my preliminary findings suggest that the level of social cohesion in the ATCC's area of influence is much lower than in the municipality of Toribío. This difference between the two organizations has been evident throughout all of the investigation. It would be interesting for further research to look at this factor in more absolute than relative terms.

For the *Guardia Indígena* and the municipality of Toribío I found a very high level of collective identity and an overwhelming willingness of individuals to risk their own lives to protect their community. The social cohesion of the homogenous indigenous population of the municipality contributes to this understanding of the individual as part of an abstract social construct, which includes the present members of the community of Toribío, but also the ancestral and future

generations, which provide the people with inspiration from past struggles and hope for what is still to come.

The long-term resilience of this community is thus expected to be relatively high, although it is still more difficult to assess than for the ATCC, since the *Guardia* has only been officially established in 2001. However, my data suggest that time is understood in different terms in the Nasa community, and the past, the present and the future are intrinsically intertwined, which could suggest that the *Guardia* is only the currently visible expression of much older structures of nonviolent resistance. The strong identification of the Nasa people with nonviolence as one of the constituent factors of their identity supports this point of view.

The extremely high levels of collective identity and dedication to nonviolence render the third model somewhat less relevant in this case. The *Guardia* itself shows very low levels of hierarchy, but is embedded in a larger regional structure of different indigenous organizations, which have a much stronger hierarchy than for example the ATCC.

However, the concept of leadership is defined in different terms for the Nasa people of Toribío. The decision-making processes are much more collective and one of the main tasks of the *Guardia* consists in continuously maintaining the contact with all families in their territory and collecting and exchanging information with them. This mechanism allows the base community to feel involved in the Guardia's actions and achievements, and leads to a high level of identification with it. As Marisol explained to me, "la guardia somos todos" (Interview with Marisol Tama, 2017).

Other Considerations:

The ultimate measure of efficiency of an approach to preventing forced displacement needs to be whether the affected population is safer after the implementation of said approach than they were before (Bonwick, 2006b: 20). The combination of different approaches may help to "reduce their [civilians'; own explanation] vulnerability to armed conflict", including projects "such as training of leaders, strengthening of community-based justice mechanisms in order to

avoid armed actors adopting the role of conflict-solvers, gaining thereby control of communities, and developing community-based contingency plans for forced displacement" (Zapater, 2010: 4). Although I found convincing evidence for the efficiency of nonviolent resistance movements in preventing forced displacement, I support the argument that help from the outside can be an important factor in the protection of civilians, given the right circumstances.

In the long term, there is a need for deep social change to overcome the base problems which lead to displacement, including the existence of armed actors. Communities can only withstand a certain amount of pressure, even those with high levels of resilience, collective identity and a broad-based leadership. Nonviolent resistance is an effective and efficient method, but it does not work miracles. National and international actors can thus contribute in "Environment Building" (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2004: 44), that is, in transforming the culture of violence towards a culture of peace, for example through the channels of education, art, and sports. As Engel and Ibáñez (2007: 25) affirm: "Obviously, any real solution of the displacement problem requires the end of violent conflict".

Displacement is not an isolated issue, but rather one of the many dimensions of an intricately complex conflict, which has developed its current state over a substantial amount of time. Therefore, any solution to the problem of forced displacement has to work on a much broader level of conflict prevention, promotion of nonviolence and grassroots activism. While one may deeply care about displacement as an issue in itself, the connection to all the other facets of violent conflict cannot in any moment be ignored.

The concept of global localism, as developed by Martínez-Guzmán (2009b) should be increasingly promoted through strengthening grassroots movements and the "proliferation of constituent assemblies at the municipal and regional levels" (Bouvier, 2009: 14). There is a need to overcome the historical, quasi-dogmatic political dichotomy in order to create spaces

of real communication and connection between people who have different *Weltanschauungen*, that is, different ways of seeing and thinking about the world.

In order to do this, identity needs to be understood as a multi-layered concept to avoid danger of what Maalouf (1999) titled 'identidades asesinas', or assassin identities, referring to an understanding of one's own identity as restricted to one key factor, which leads to perceiving people with identities different from one's own identity as threats.

The implementation of concept like reconciliation and transitional justice in a society can help people learn to live together again, not just side by side, after a period of violent, which created strong divisions between different groups. Building sustainable peace is a continuous work in progress, which requires dedication and long-term efforts to maintain and expand on peaceful coexistence. Just like nonviolence, peace is both method and goal in itself.

In this framework, civic activism enhances the levels of true democracy in a society. Since it is not very likely to leave behind the system of nation-states that was set up with the Treaty of Westphalia, for now one should work on strengthening the components of this order that are in line with peace philosophy, for example strengthening community action and individual involvement in community processes, while at the same time connecting with other communities at national and international level.

Building networks of peace, which share experiences and help each other through communication and exchange helps in leaving behind the hierarchical mindset of the traditional patriarchal society. While I am not negating the importance of leadership for specific tasks, I argue that it is important to assure a separation of powers, the democratic election of leaders for set periods of time and de-personalizing political and social action by focusing on the collective instead of the individual level, the we, not the I.

Apart from the moral responsibility of helping each other, it is important to also recognize the efficiency of doing so and to further the understanding that peace is less costly than war and that humanity can only advance if it stops excluding and exploiting certain social groups. The

armed conflict in Colombia started due to great inequalities and social grievances, which resulted in the formation of guerrilla units with strong political and social ideas based on a modern version of Marxism. Sadly, they chose the wrong, the violent way to achieve these goals and lost morals and integrity on the way, leading to an overall deterioration of the situation instead an improvement.

The academic community has made considerable advances in the peace studies field over the past decades and has shown that a different approach to reach the ideals of political inclusion and social justice is possible. In order to achieve such high goals, citizens need to remain active and working jointly towards these aims. The education system should promote the efficiency as well as the implicit ethical value of nonviolence from an early age on, because if nonviolence is seen as a beautiful, but impractical utopia, it will not be seriously considered as a practice and a mechanism for resolving conflicts.

Nonviolent methods need to be taught and practiced, discipline and dedication do not turn up overnight, and critical and independent thinking need to be fostered in schools and outside, both for children and adults. It is important to overcome current tendencies to dehumanize those who are different or have different opinions, and work towards creating more empathy and consideration for one another.

Returning to a less philosophical level, "Modesty and realism must be at the heart of any intervention" (Bonwick, 2006b: 20). Peace-building processes need time, dedication and resources, there will be no instantaneous solution to these complex problems. Step-by-step approaches are necessary to incentivize long-term, sustainable change. Peacebuilding processes are reversible, and at no given point in time can it be expected that peace is a necessary future development, thus it is important to never lose sight of working towards it.

Funding for projects to prevent forced displacement is usually limited and often starts too late and ends too soon, which is why it is so important to help communities develop better strategies to protect themselves, if they chose to do so. The theoretical framework proposed in this thesis

may be helpful in some contexts but not in others: nonviolent resistance is not possible in all situations and at all times, it depends on the possibility to negotiate with those who are threatening a community and there should be much caution not to promote impulsive behavior and thus increase the security risk for local populations.

Social movements are often based on one common factor of identity, which can be race, sex, gender, sexual orientation, or regional identities, among others. This leads to the formation of strongly cohesive sub-groups of society, which practice solidarity within their organization and with the part of the population that can identify with their specific shared trait of identity, but excludes others and subsequently results in the fragmentation of what could grow into a larger national movement.

The diversity in interests, political opinions, and beliefs makes this convergence difficult, but not impossible, given the possibility of creating a stronger common goal, which could for example be the end of the violent conflict. Overall, micro-level and macro-level interventions both have their merits. As Bonwick (2006b: 21) states, "If it is the efficiency of the macro-level interventions that needs to be improved, it is the quantity of micro-level interventions that must be addressed".

Resistance, especially nonviolent resistance, requires a high degree of organization, training, endurance and discipline to become a powerful and effective tool for self-protection and – ultimately – peacebuilding. People who engage in it need to be prepared for many difficulties along the way, their actions may not always have the desired effect and sometimes even fail completely. For those cases, it is essential to have well set-up contingency plans which may include temporary displacement.

It is important to remember that the problem itself is not displacement, but the conflict which forces people to become displaced and which includes many other violations of Human Rights. Displacement may sometimes prevent worse harm to a person's physical and psychological well-being and should always be a viable option. Thus, NGOs on the ground should work on

contingency plans with communities even if those communities are prepared and willing to stand their ground for as long as possible. Massacres need to be avoided at all costs, and in some instances, displacement may be the only way to do so.

However, this does not imply that displacement cannot be prevented in a considerable number of cases. Communities have found an array of methods of nonviolent resistance which have proven effective at least to some degree. The purpose of this thesis was to analyze these methods and identify best practices of self-protection for communities in low-scale armed conflict. I sincerely hopes that I could contribute to finding strategies and solutions which could help some communities to avoid being displaced, but also to avoid being harmed in other ways. There is no response strategy that fits all cases and that works for all communities in question, but the framework laid out in this thesis may help to improve the safety of some people affected by a conflict that has lasted for over 60 years. This alone is a purpose worth working for.

<u>Possibilities for future research</u>

The emerging theory I have outlined in Chapter 5 of this thesis is but the beginning of developing a deeper understanding of the exact mechanisms of nonviolent resistance to forced displacement in civil conflicts. It should be understood as a point of departure for future research, which could focus on various interesting issues that could not be included in this specific research project.

First, it would be highly interesting to conduct a greater number of interviews with experts from the ATCC and the *Guardia Indígena*, but also from similar movements in Colombia (for example, the peace communities of San José de Apartadó and Villahermosa) and in other countries with large incidents of displacement. In order to provide a more robust framework, the comparison of data from different interviews with experts of the same organizations and across different organization would be useful. I highly recommend to conduct these interviews in person to eliminate some of the flaws of the method of data collection used in this thesis, if possible.

Second, in addition to this amplifying of the base of qualitative data, it would be fascinating to find ways to quantitatively assess the three models of displacement developed in Chapter 5. One possible option would be setting up standardized interviews with quantifiable answer schemes. I do not see this option as an independent project, since it seems too narrow in its approach to stand by itself, but in combination with the first suggested topic, it would result in a highly interesting research design.

Third, apart from being forcefully displaced, communities may also be forced to stay in a certain place, which is explained in the concept of 'blocked communities' or 'communities under siege' (Zapater, 2010: 16). Displaced people can claim certain rights and are entitled to, for example, the restitution of their territories, but the same does not apply to people who remained in combat zones and tried to survive there, even though their livelihoods may have been just as affected. These people may develop grievances against returnees if those are the only ones to receive support, which could potentially lead to new forms of conflict. These cases are very little researched to this day and could potentially reveal a whole new set of strategies of nonviolent resistance.

Fourth, an analysis of the influence of knowledge about nonviolence and strategies of nonviolent resistance prior to the initiation of a nonviolent resistance movement on its outcome could be an interesting aspect for future research on such movements. This topic could be extremely well linked with research on state support for nonviolent resistance versus state support for violent resistance. In the Colombian case, "había disponibilidad de recursos para emprender una acción armada, mientras que no existía ningún grupo externo que ofreciese un apoyo explícito para la acción no violenta antes de la fundación de la Asociación[64] [referring to the ATCC]" (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2011: 321).

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[64] [there was an availability of resources to undertake an armed action, while there was no external group which would offer explicit help for nonviolent action prior to the foundation of the association; own translation]

A last topic, which I would consider relevant for future research concerns the topic of geographical isolation of communities. Colombia has huge land masses and dispersed population in rural areas with little or no means of mobility. This renders large-scale actions of resistance involving people from all parts of the country rather difficult. The use of new technologies to connect a large number of small, local movements across vast territories and how to connect people effectively without being able to physically bring them all together would be an interesting niche for academic research.

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Annexes

Pre-Interview Guide for the Interview with Laura Sánchez (ATCC)

<u>Introduce myself, my work, obtain relevant permissions:</u>

Where I am from, what I study, why I am writing this thesis, topic of the thesis, how I intend to use the interviews.

Clarify:

- Participating in the interview is entirely voluntary

- Right to not answer a question if she does not want to (for whatever reason)

- I will only use her name with her authorization and only in the context of this thesis[65]

- After finishing the thesis, I can send her a copy, if she so desires. The thesis is in English, but I offer to make a write a short summary in Spanish.

- Her contact data is absolutely confidential

Ask permission to record the interview[66], transcribe her answers, use direct quotes, use her answers in the context of this thesis as well as future publications (explicitly state that these are publicly accessible).

State that if she has any questions or doubts, she can voice them at any moment before, during and after the interview.

<u>Initiating questions:</u>

How many people currently work for the ATCC? How many of them would you consider to be 'leaders' or persons in positions with high responsibility?

Which role do you have in the organization and how many years have you been working with them?

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[65] Later decided not to use real names.
[66] At this moment, I still intended to conduct the interview via a WhatsApp call.

Have you ever had any problems due to your work in the ATCC? If so, which? (e.g. threats, problems with members of the community, etc.)

Deeper Questions:

From your perspective, which are the major challenges the organization has had to face?

How is the level of trust between the ATCC and the non-affiliated persons in the area of influence?

How could the vulnerability of social leaders to threats and assaults be reduced?

How would you describe the relationship of the campesino population with their land/territory?

Collective vs. individual identity – community as family or as friends, neighbors, co-workers?

What would you say are the most important tasks of the ATCC? What does the community expect from the organization?

What could be reasons for some people to seek help from the guerrilla or the paramilitary to resolve conflicts amongst members of their community instead of asking the ATCC or the according state institutions?

At the end, explain aim of thesis and hypotheses, ask for opinion or concluding remarks!

Interviews: Open Coding

Interview 1: Marisol Tama

Interview Section	Indicator	Concept
...pues yo hago parte de un municipio que ha sido muy azotado por la violencia no, eh donde pues ehm, ha estado presente siempre la guerrilla de las Farc y que digamos han hecho muchos eh atentados no que... que han involucrado mucho a la poblacion civil que en este caso pues ha sido la más afectada...	High levels of violence against civilians	Threats from the outside vs. intra-community conflicts
...pues nosotros tambien somos un resguardo y dentro de nuestro resguardo TAMBIÉN tenemos un plan de vida y ese plan de vida esta asociado a la Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca, el ACIM, ehm, y a su vez pertenecientes tambien al CRIC,	Connection with other regional networks	Regional hierarchy of organizations
...la guardia ha sido como un actor pues principal de... de control dentro... dentro del territorio, dentro de los territorios indigenas, eh, la guardia indigena ehm, que ahorita pues esta a nivel del Cauca	Guard controls territory	Protective function
que un poco entrandonos a la historia de como nace la guardia indigena, yo creo que es a raiz de tanta violencia que se genero en los resguardos del Cauca, y más en la zona Norte del Cauca, eh en especial de Toribio donde pues.. al resguardo al que pertenezco, donde pues digamos ha sido un municipio muy azotado por la.. por el conflicto armado,	Violence triggered creation of the guard	Protectory entity: state vs. own people
y que se conocen muchas, muchas experiencias no, de la gente que.. que ha salido desplazada tambien de ese municipio, pero tambien unas que pues resistieron pese a las dificultades y hoy en dia se encuentran nuevamente retornando al territorio,	Different response mechanisms to violence	Resistance vs. Flight
porque pues por estos dialogos del gobierno y las farc y la dejacion de armas pues ehm es cierto que un poco el conflicto armado con la guerrilla pues terminó a raiz de eso pues tambien vienen otros conflictos, eh, ahora tenemos la presencia de un grupo que se hace llamar el EPL, ehm, un nuevo grupo armado,	End of conflict with FARC is not the end of all conflict	Symptoms vs. root causes of violence
pero que igualmente la guardia sigue en estos territorios y sigue haciendo control pues desde... desde varios puntos, no, de las entradas y salidas de cada uno de los resguardos,	Guards control territory	Protective function
eh, en contacto permanente con las demas guardias de los otros resguardos	Connection to other guards	Regional networks
y yo creo que la guardia pues es un.. un ejemplo muy grande no, para nosotros, que es legitima para nosotros como..como comuneros, que la reconocemos y la respetamos como..	Respect for and legitimacy of the guard	Respect and Legitimacy

como un ente, pues, que pertenece, que controla, que harmoniza el territorio que está pendiente de los lugares, de los comuneros, y pues que tambien defiende la vida de la gente que... que permanece en los territorios.	Guards protect territory and people	Protective function
...tambien alla la voz de las mujeres indigenas que tambien pues han sido un botin de guerra en nuestro municipio y sin embargo hoy muchas de ellas estan tambien ehm.. perteneciendo a la guardia que hoy tambien defiende la vida y el territorio dentro de nuestras comunidades, que son un ejemplo para todas las demas mujeres,	Women form part of the resistance and the guard	Gender roles, Equality of men and women
...esa experiencia, no, de como se forma la guardia y.. y como este... pues se resiste, no, a traves de la guardia, nosotros pues resistimos a todo tipo de violencia, de violencia que... de conflicto armado dentro de nuestros territorios	Resistance against violence, not a specific actor	Philosophy of nonviolence
...a nivel del cauca son nueve, son diez pueblos indigenas y todos amenazotados por el conflicto armado, pero en algunos digamos resalta mas eh.. el atentado y toda la, la, todo lo que han hecho pues dentro de los territorios con la comunidad, con las victimas que fueron la comunidad, los ninos, las mujeres,	Different levels of violence in the region	Violence as a unifying experience between indigenous peoples
el norte del cauca tiene experiencias muy bonitas frente a la construccion de paz ahora, sin armas,	Nonviolent peacebuilding	Constructing culture of nonviolence
y tambien con... con esa comunicacion tambien que tienen con los afrodescendientes por el tema del territorio porque pues a raiz de las masacres que han ocurrido en el norte del cauca ehm, este el gobierno se comprometio a entregar unas tierras a los indigenas y resulta que entrego esas tierras dentro de territorios donde habitaban afrodescendientes, y a raiz de eso pues se generó una pelea por territorio entre los afro y los indigenas	State policies affect relationship between indigenous and afro communities	State regulation as threat to peace
entonces pues se buscaron estrategias como hacer hermanamiento pues con los afrodescendientes e indigenas y pues no pelear entre estos dos sino mas bien aliarse y pues exigir al gobierno tambien la reubicacion de las comunidades indigenas cumpliendo pues a las exigencias que habian hecho las comunidades y tambien pues respetando el territorio donde se encuentran los afro	Collaboration with afro communities against the state	Reclaiming rights from the state, Peaceful collaboration with non-indigenous peoples
entonces ehm, son experiences que pues, yo creo que eso aparece en internet	Public nature of peacebuilding experiences	Visibility of peace process
Entonces a raiz de todo eso pues ehm, eso nos ha permitido resistir, eh... yo pues puedo contar desde lo que conozco, desde la experiencia, yo toda la vida he vivido en Toribio, vivi	Interviewee's personal	Deep individual connection with territory,

en Toribio, ahora pues de pronto por cuestiones de estudio a veces estoy en la ciudad, y.. pero siempre estoy dentro del territorio, salgo pero regreso, entonces puedo contar un poco desde lo que conozco, desde lo que he vivido, un poco la experiencia	connection with the territory, Leaving is temporary	Temporal limitation of absence
es que recuerdo mas o menos en el 2001, desde el 2001 hacia atras donde el conflicto armado se agudizo en el territorio,	Establishing timeline	
entonces yo recuerdo que se creo un... los lideres de la comunidad y la comunidad pues plantearon que existieran unos companeros que se dedicaran como a estar pendiente de lo que ocurria en el territorio	Whole community decides to create the guard	Guard as result of collective decision-making process
pues habian anunciado la llegada de los paramilitares, entonces porque alla pues, digamos se centra mucho el tema de los cultivos ilicit... para uso ilicito,	Imminent external threat because of drug cultivation possibilities	Commercial value of land as risk factor
entonces se organiza la comunidad muy preocupada por esta situacion y se empieza a organizar unos companeros que sean parte del cabildo	Community worries → guard organizes	Guard rooted in identified protection need
que eran algo asi los que cumplian como la funcion de, pues de llevar la razon, a las com.. de casa en casa, pues llevar las razones de lo que venia ocurriendo entonces se recogen esos companeros y se crea un... algo que se llamó la guardia civica, en ese momento se llamaba la guardia civica, que cumplia esa funcion, no, por ejemplo, de convocar, de informar, de caminar el territorio, eh.. de ir a las familias, a contar o a citar a la gente para las asambleas para.. para lo que estuviera ocurriendo.	Tasks of the guard: gathering and distributing information, assembling people, 'walking the territory'	Meaning of 'protection' – Collective knowledge, unity, territorial integrity
Ya mas adelante se.. se piensa en que eso hay.. eso debe crecer porque se vio que esa estrategia era buena, la gente estaba comunicada,	First experiences were positive	Protection: Evidence-based and collectively accepted
sirvieron mucho tambien los medios de comunicacion tambien propios, que en ese tiempo habia una emisora, y esa emisora fue tambien la que pues ayudó un poco para esta defensa y esta formacion de pronto de... de estar alerta pues ante las amenazas que habia por parte de los actores armados.	Information distribution through local media (radio)	Use of mass media to ensure access to information
Ya ellos se conforman y se crea la guardia indigena que ya se dice que que pues van a ser personas que van a ser las encargadas de controlar el territorio, de controlar eh... todos los conflictos que haya dentro de nuestro territorio, y esta fue la guardia indigena.	Guard charged with monitoring the territory and all conflicts occurring within it	Monitoring and conflict-resolution

La guardia indigena con un baston y sus, digamos, sus insignias, no, o sus colores, como decir, el rojo y el verde que simbolizan, el rojo de pronto la sangre que.. que pues han derramado tambien los mayores que han venido siempre en la lucha de... de defender ese territorio	Guard has symbolic *bastónes*	Tradition and Symbolism, Collective memory
porque pues hoy en dia las multinacionales, los grupos armados, todos tienen interes en esos teritorios pues por la... la... por lo que se encuentra dentro de ellos.	Interest of external actors in their land	Commercial value of land as threat
Entonces la comunidad dice, no, pues estos territorios, nosotros hemos vivido aqui, hemos permanecido aqui, nuestros hijos, esto es lo que le vamos a dejar a nuestros hijos, entonces no podemos dejar que nos saquen de nuestros territorios.	Territory as legacy for future generations	Pluri-generational consciousness
Porque para donde nos vamos a ir, un indio sin tierra no es indio, porque donde va a trabajar, donde va a vivir su espiritualidad?	Territory is the base for spiritual living	Identity and spirituality intrinsically linked with territory
Entonces mh, ya esta guardia se conforma y tiene un impacto grande, donde... pues la comunidad la legitima, y es respetada y se sabe que donde hay guardia pues que la situacion tiene control.	Guard is respected in the community	Legitimation through collective acceptance
Esta guardia se ha enfrentado en varias ocasiones con los grupos armados cuando se... se.. en una asamblea se ha mandado pues que... que los actores armados debian salir de nuestros territorios porque no eran garantes de... de la harmonia dentro del territorio.	Conflict with armed actors over their presence in indigenous territory	Protecting harmony means confronting armed actors Vs. staying 'safe'
Primero los... los... los actores armados del gobierno, del gobierno nacional, como es el ejercito y la policia, no garantizaban esa harmonia, pues teniamos miedo a que el mismo ejercito pues podia ser los mismos paramilitares	No trust in government, supposed links w/ paramilitary	State as external threat
que era gente que se filtraba tambien dentro de las comunidades y que venia a hacer dano. Muchos de ellos, como estrategias utilizaron a las mujeres, no, enamorandolas, muchas de ellas las embarazaron, tambien trajeron enfermedades pues de transmision sexual dentro de la comunidad.	'infiltration' of the community by the military / paramilitary	Intended rupture of unity of the community
Eh, hicieron cantidad de... ocasionaron cantidad de conflictos que pues entonces la comunidad dice no, es que el ejercito no es, la policia pues tampoco por otro lado porque tambien este... involucraba a la comunidad en informar sobre pues cosas que.. que a veces no debe.. no nos ibamos a involucrar.	No trust in any state entities (police)	State as threat

La guerrilla tambien por su parte que estaba ahi reclutando jovenes, ninos a la guerra, entonces no... eso no nos.. no nos garantizaba esa tranquilidad y esa paz dentro del territorio.	Guerrilla recruit minors	Incompatibility of presence of armed actors and peace
Entonces no, pues dijim..., se mandaba dentro de toda la comunidad de que ellos debian salir. Entonces inicia toda esa lucha de que ellos deben salir del territorio y se...	Decision to make armed actors leave	Reclaiming territory as autonomous unit
pero primero ir a dialogar. Se buscaba un poco las cabezas visible de.. de pues de estos grupos armados y conversar a lo que ellos responden.	Seeking solutions through dialogue	Conflict resolution: Dialogue vs. armed conflict
Por parte de.. de los actores del gobierno que no porque ellos los facultaba las leyes, la Constitucion de que ellos podian estar en cualquier espacio del territorio nacional de Colombia, entonces ellos no tenian ningun limite, podian estar donde ellos eh pues... quisieran.	State forces decline leaving	National law vs. indigenous law and autonomy
Por otro lado estaba la guerrilla tambien diciendo que ellos tenian eh... muchos companeros guerrilleros indigenas, entonces que esos territorios les pertenecian, aparte ellos habian hecho una lucha para permanecer en esos territorios tambien entonces tampoco salian.	Guerrilla claims territorial authority	Contested authority over territory
La gente muy preocupada, los companeros muy preocupados,	Community worries	Failure of direct dialogue
ehm, les dijeron que salieran ehm, o que no los querian ver cerca de la... de la comunidad o de los territorios porque pues ya se habia mandado de quitarle armas y...	Second attempt at negotiating with guerrilla	Rejection of armed actors' claim to rightful presence
y este, companeros que fueron indigenas que estuvieran alla, pues se les iba a aplicar remedio, es decir, se les iba a corregir,	Community does not accept members joining the armed conflict	Autonomous indigenous law
porque esto tambien se consideraba un acto de.. de desarmonía, por ser indigena, si estar pues eh, digamos en ese... como metidos en ese tema de... de... pues de estar como una lucha,	Incompatibility of being indigenous and being in an armed group	Indigenous identity based on nonviolence
que en ultima se afectaba era a la misma comunidad.	Effects on community	Individual actions vs. collective consequences

[...]pues yo creo que nosotros ehm pues nos encontramos en un territorio que eh... ancestralmente ha sido pues de comunidades indigenas, ehm.. la mayoria, el 100% de la comunidad que habita nuestro territorio alla es indigena entonces ehm,	Homogeneity of population in the area	Collective identity based on group homogeneity
siempre en contacto permanente pues con la tierra, trabajando de lo que se siembra, se consume lo que... lo que produce, lo que sembramos, entonces estar todo el tiempo en...	Agriculture-based life-style	Land as base of life vs. commodity
somos seres demasiado espirituales, podria decirlo asi, como con creencias de los suenos, de las senas, ehm de como esta el entorno, el clima, entonces yo creo que eso nos permite como... como un arraigo a ese territorio de...	Spiritual connection to the territory	Spiritual belief system
de que pues si nosotros no saliamos... no salimos de nuestro territorio, pues en la ciudad no va a ser lo mismo no, porque ya son... ya es otro contexto, son otras culturas y eh...	Unwillingness to live anywhere else	Rejection of living outside the community and territory
no hay nada como estar dentro del territorio, entonces yo creo que primero empezando que el indigena pues digamos vive... permanece en su territorio, conoce su territorio, entonces se le hace muy facil caminarlo, explorarlo, entonces empezando de alla hay un arraigo, no, con... con la... con la madre tierra,	'madre tierra'	Personification of the land
ya en el entorno, digamos en lo social, el contexto social, pues tambien porque dentro de nuestras comunidades pues nosotros estamos en... todo el tiempo en contacto con la... con los... con los companeros, entonces eso nos permite conocernos, conocernos internamente, conocer las familias,	Close-knit community	Social relationships in the community
en un territorio indigena este.... no existe como tanto ese interes económico de pronto, sino mas ese interes de la solidaridad, de la reciprocidad, de lo que eh... uno da eso mismo recibe,	Rejection of capitalist ideology	Solidarity & Reciprocity vs. capitalist-economic paradigm
entonces eso permite que la comunidad es como una familia,	Community = family	Family: relatives by blood vs. by common identity
una familia que si uno de los miembros tiene un problema, entonces eh... afecta a toda la comunidad, entonces ahi la comunidad tiene que buscarle soluciones a ese problema.	Individual problems affect everyone	Collective responsibility for individual members
Esa unidad nos ha permitido ehm... pues construir procesos digamos de defensa a raiz del conflicto armado eh... es cierto	Indigenous definition of	Strength in unity and solidarity

que fue un momento... o es un momento muy duro con el tema del conflicto... del conflicto armado pero... pero yo creo que esa unidad o ese pensamiento de... de familia nos permite como estar unidos y decir, no, pues vamos a... a crear estrategias o vamos a defendernos, vamos a defender a nuestra familia de todos esos agentes externos que llegan a... a... a desarmonizar, no, a desarmonizar la familia, a desarmonizar la comunidad y sobre todo el territorio.	community as family builds strength and resilience	
Ehm, exis.. han existido bastantes ehm... conflictos, discusiones entre la guardia y... y estos grupos armados, sin embargo la guardia se ha posicionado mucho en los territorios entonces eh.. esto les permite como... como tener como facilidad de moverse	Guard stands their ground against armed actors	Resilience in protracted conflict
y tambien unas capacidades comunicativa muy grande entre la guardia y las comunidades,	Continuous communication	Communication & information
en momentos de conflicto duros, la guardia pues somos todos, somos los ninos, somos las mujeres, somos los mayores. Todos somos guardia,	'todos somos guardia'	Collective identity, fluidity of guard 'membership'
porque? porque todos defendemos.. pues defendemos el territorio y defendemos la vida.	Common purpose	Membership based on common cause
Pero si hay unos companeros que estan de lleno completamente metidos en el tema que son los companeros guardias que todo el tiempo estan disponibles para lo que haya, para las situaciones que se presentan, y estan todo el tiempo alli, entonces esto nos ayuda mucho pues para que la gente este todo el tiempo alerta, este pendiente y ya va avanzando,	Core group of 'professional' members of the guard	Long-term need of monitoring & vigilance vs. short-term need of emergency protection
la guardia es simbolo de paz porque a raiz de todo este conflicto, ellos solamente con un baston,	Symbol of peace	Interdependence of peace and nonviolence
un baston que nosotros decimos que simboliza esa autoridad, que simboliza de pronto que... este... ese control pues, entonces pues la guardia es muy respetada y es como la garante, no, de todo lo que ha pasado,	Symbolic authority	Authority: voluntary - symbolic vs. coercive power
ehm... recuerdo hace tres anos... cuatro anos atras en ejercicio de control territorial, la guardia pues ehm... iba a quitar una valla ehm.. de publicidad de la guerrilla, de los 50 anos que cumplio aca la guerrilla, esos companeros van a quitar esa valla, y pues son asesinados por la guerrilla en ese momento,	Guards being killed by the guerrilla	Consequences of being in the guard
son dos companeros guardia que practicamente entregaron toda su vida a defender esta politica de paz que teniamos los	Misguided notion of armed	Violence as source of fear &

pueblos indigenas, entonces los asesinan, y yo creo est... que la gente de pronto piensa que al asesinar un guardia, al asesinar un gobernador, al asesinar un lider o un nino, la gente se va a desanimar o a decir que no, que a lo mejor le da miedo y se corre, no, yo creo que para nosotros como pueblos indigenas el que una persona derrame sangre por defender toda una comunidad, por defender todo un pueblo es un motivo, es una fuerza que nos permite a nosotros continuar sin... sin miedo, o sea, seguir enfrentandonos,	actors to scare away indigenous people by murdering leaders or children	defeat vs. source of strength and resilience
y yo creo que mi sentir y mi pensar es igual al de los demas companeros cuando decimos es que nosotros no estamos pensando en el hoy, nosotros estamos pensando en el manana, en que le vamos a dejar a nuestros hijos, en que queremos para nuestros hijos, y que queremos para nuestros nietos y esos.. esos hijos de nuestros nietos, en como... como van a vivir, donde van a vivir	Future-oriented thinking	Pluri-generational consciousness
entonces yo creo que el.. al nosotros enfrentarnos y decir vamos a hacer control territorial, vamos a hacer liberacion de la madre tierra, vamos consciente de que si los espiritus asi lo desean, nosotros pasaremos a otro espacio, pasamos a otro espacio, trascendemos,	Acceptance of death as possible consequence of resistance	Spiritual understanding of death, Collective future vs. individual life
y quedan los demas pero quedan en esa lucha constante hasta que... como dice el lema de nosotros 'hasta que se apague el sol', que significa que estaremos incansables, somos un pueblo incansable en la busqueda de esa tranquilidad, de esa harmonia,	Fight for harmony and peace will never stop	Finding peace vs. remaining alive; Resilience in protracted conflict
que nos dejen en nuestros territorios vivir, que podamos no tener conflictos como los que se han, pues se han atravesado y es.. y esa unidad, ese sentido de defender,	Conflicts are brought into the community	External vs. internal conflicts
y ver a nuestra madre tierra como una madre de verdad, Usted sabe que a la mama... a la madre uno la quiere, uno la respeta, si se enoja a veces, si pasan cosas, pero Usted siempre está alli,	Perpetual connection with 'mother earth'	Anthropocentric vs. eco-centric world view
ehm luego ese sentir de que la comunidad es su familia le permite como defenderla tambien y yo creo que eso es lo que nos pasa a los indigenas y las demas organizaciones que tomado consciencia de.. para que es lo que queremos y para donde vamos.	Perceiving the community as family helps in defending it	Family-like value of community
Yo creo que eso como la experiencia de pronto de la guardia que conozco a nivel personal que he vivido, que he caminado tambien con ellos,	Personal connection to the guard	
y si uno les pregunta a veces dentro de mis entrevistas a veces como estudiante de comunicacion, preguntarles a un guardia por que esta alli, por que lo hace, por que se para en la panamericana, a exigir sus derechos o por que va a liberar la	Motivation for being in the guard	Community protection: voluntary work

		vs. remunerated professionals
madre tierra, por que hace control del territorio, es por lo mismo, porque tienen esa consciencia, y ese corazon tan entregado a la comunidad que dicen en cualquier mom..		
preferimos perder la vida de pie que morir acostados, entonces ellos dicen que nosotros preferimos estar caminando y saber que alguien dio la vida para defender a muchas personas y a las que vienen entonces eso es como lo mas importante y lo que le permite a nosotros...	Life and safety of future generations more important than one's own life	Collective vs. individual; pluri-generational consciousness
esa es la esencia del ser indigena, esa el la esencia del ser... del ser Nasa y del estar dentro de un territorio, esa es la esencia de nosotros, no, en cualquier momento trascendemos, pasaremos a otro espacio, pero no sin haber dado una lucha antes.	Indigenous identity focus on living right, not living long	Morally correct decisions and way of life vs. personal safety and life

Interview 2: Laura Sánchez

Interview Section	Indicator	Concept
Bueno, mi primera pregunta... ehm... seria cuantas personas trabajan actualmente con la ATCC, y cuantos de ellos consideraría Usted como líderes o personas en cargos con alta responsabilidad?		
Bueno, la ATCC como tal pues tiene un area de influencia de... de 32 veredas de seis municipios, entonces pues se habla mas o menos que hay unos 7000 habitantes en toda el area de influencia	'area of influence'	connection to community base
entonces estaria hablando pues de ese area de influencia hay unos asociados que manejan pues la organización por todos los temas legales hay mas o menos unos 600 asociados, entonces ehm...	size of the organization	membership vs. living in the 'area of influence'
de cuantos de esos son lideres, pongámole que hayan unos 60 de esos 600, que haya unos 60 lideres y que tengan al... alto grado de responsabilidad por ahi unos 15 o 20 personas son muy pocas las que tienen grave responsabilidad	leadership of the organization	small, defined elite vs. membership
pues los demas son lideres porque cada uno es lider en su vereda o sea en su... en su zona, cada persona es lideres	individual leadership	concept of 'leadership'
porque además pues existe la organización pero esos estan conformados por la junta de dirección comunal pues cada junta de acción comunal es autónoma en el territorio	organizational hierarchy	autonomy vs. hierarchy
pues teniendo limitaciones pues todo lo que pone ATCC	common regulations	hierarchy of decision-making
pero igual cada uno es autonomo en su vereda o en su lugarcito donde hagan eh... el lugar de incidencia.	reaffirming individuals' autonomy	autonomy vs. hierarchy

Bueno, ehm, Usted dentro de la organización que cargo tiene y cuántos anos de experiencia lleva con ellos, o sea, eh... como asociada, no como persona en el área de influencia.		
Bueno eh ya como asociada y como lider en la organizacion, llevo más o menos unos 5 anos desde que me gradué del colegio, he estado de lleno en la organización, pues ehh...	Joining organization right after high school	Attractiveness of the ATCC for next generations
pues lo que realizo pues especificamente es más el tema de asistencia, ehh... pues en la organización le votaron el ano pasado, el ano que ha pasado, el Banco de Maquinaria entonces en ese momento estoy eh... trabajando como asistente contable en eh.. en el Banco de Maquinaria pero además pues desempeno funciones de líderes, todo lo que tenga que ver ehm... de búsqueda y cosas de recursos	Describing her own role in the organization, relatively vague	Democratic leadership, Distribution of responsibilities
pues igual todos trabajamos como de la mano en el tema.	'everyone works together'	Comradery, Equality
Dentro de su tiempo con la asociación, se ha visto enfrentada con algun problema que eh... surgió por su trabajo con la ATCC? Podría ser un problema como alguna amenaza o cualquier otro problema que podría surgir en la comunidad.		
No pues eh... no pues eh... en el tiempo que llevo yo como líder dentro de la organización, gracias a Dios pues ya llegamos nosotros en un tiempo donde las cosas con los grupos armados habian parado, entonces eh.. no hemos recibido... hasta el momento no he recibido pues ninguna amenaza por el tema... por el trabajo que realizo.	No threats received personally	Consequences of joining the organization
Mirando el.. todo el proceso de la organización, me podría contar, desde su perspectiva, cuáles son los mayores desafíos a los que se tenía que enfrentar la ATCC durante el tiempo de su existencia?		
Bueno, al principio eh... cuando inició la organizacion pues en el 87 yo creo que el mayor desafio era pues mantener los dialogos, la firma de los dialogos con los grupos armados, yo creo que ese era el principal desafio en ese entonces,	Initial difficulties	Elimination of direct threat
ahorita el principal desafio que tiene es uno, volver a tener, ehh, crea... o sea, volver a tener ehhh... esos lazos de interlocución con la institucionalidad y seguir teniendo la creati.. la credibilidad que ha tenido en la comunidad durante todos esos anos,	Change in major challenges over time	Maintaining credibility Relations with base community + institutions
o sea, yo creo que el mayor desafio de la organizacion es seguir mantener... o sea, mantener lo que se ha construido y seguir... y seguir pues en ese mismo camino, yo creo que es...	Keeping the organization going	Durability of resistance
y todo el tema pues ahorito el desafio mayor también que tenemos, todo el tema del conflic... del posconflicto a nivel nacional, eso son temas que...	Post-conflict challenges	Conflict vs. post-conflict

son desafios que la organización tiene que... o los lideres de la organizacion tienen que irse pensando para ehm.... que la organización siga teniendo esa estatus que ha tenido.	Maintaining social status	Regional power structures
El punto que menciona sobre la confianza entre la ATCC y la comunidad de base me parece muy interesante. Usted como describiría el nivel de confianza actual que hay entre la organización y las personas en el area de influencia, o sea, las personas que no estan afiliadas, que no están dentro las 6.. eh, 600 personas, sino todas las demás personas en el área de influencia.		
Yo la describiría como buena, porqué? Porque pues la organización a pesar de pues de todos los anos sigue teniendo esa credibilidad por la comunidad,	Trust between community and organization	Trust & Credibility
o sea toda... toda... toda cosa o acción que pasa en el territorio la organización siempre es la primera en enterarse pues de la... de lo que vaya a suceder entonces creo que la cr... la credibilidad todavía en la comunidad existe y es buena.	Organization knows about what happens in the community	Trust of community → knowledge of relevant events
Según la información que he leído, en el pasado habia bastantes amenazas contra lideres de la ATCC y en algunos casos también había asesinatos. Ehm, Usted qué cree cómo se podría reducir el nivel de amenazas en una organización como la ATCC por lo general, decimos en caso de que, ojalá que no, pero en caso de que habría otro actor armado en el futuro, para asegurar la protección y la integridad de una organización como la ATCC?		
Bueno, yo creería que la... que una de las herramientas ehm... principales que necesitaría una organización [inintelligible] una organización como la de nosotros es una, la autopr.. la autoprotección entre lideres, o sea, eso es fundamental que entre los lideres haiga esa confianza de protección, o sea, eh.. la información de qué... qué hace cada persona, donde se encuentra cada lider, es fundamental y con qué persona se puede...	Protection of leaders	Importance of leaders
o sea, es... es fundamental el tema de que exista un comité, cierto, de protección ..... en cada organización, porque eso, uno, da a saber qué.... que acción y en qué lugar se encuentra cada lider, y dos, es... es.. es fundamental para el tema de nuevos actores en el territorio.. nuevos actores de conflicto en el territorio.	Knowledge about leaders' whereabouts	Vigilance, information as protection
Si la entiendo bien menciona a la autoprotección como el punto más importante en la protección de los lideres. Usted qué cree por qué se enfrentan a tantas amenazas los lideres sociales en Colombia?		
Una cosa clara del por qué nos enfrentamos a tantas amenazas a nivel nacional, por el tema de las denuncias, por el tema de las denuncias a lo... a lo que pasa en nuestros territorios, eso es un factor esencial en el tema de... de las amenazas,	Threats because of denouncing crimes	Visibility of crimes as security risk vs. base for change

tanto actores, se puede decir tanto actores legales como ilegales, en el tema de las amenazas, por las denuncias de lo que sucede en nuestros territorios es el factor detonante para el tema de las amena....	Threats by illegal and legal actors	State as threat, protection = own task
Hablando un poco sobre el tema del territorio y de la tierra, como describiría Usted la relación de las personas en el área de influencia de la ATCC con su territorio? En la mayoría, según yo entiendo, son campesinos y dependen de la tierra ehm... en un sentido económico, pero como calificaría también la relación emocional que tienen estas personas con sus tierras?		
Bueno, ehh... con relación a como se relacionan ellos con el territorio,	Relation with territory	Social, economic and emotional functions of territory
pues una, pues es de autonomía, los campesinos en la región son... somos muy autónomos en el territorio,	Territory gives autonomy	Land as base for independence
dos, es... es de mucha pertenencia, el territorio se respeta por... por encima de cualquier cosa	Respect for territory	Feelings of belonging, emotional connection to land
y lo otro absurdo es que los campesinos no son duenos de las tierras, porque el territorio estaba concepcionado en protecciones ambientales, y entonces los campesinos no tienen titulos de propiedad de la tierra entonces ehh..	*Campesinos* do not legally own their land	Legal property vs. factual property
tenemos asi una discordia entre el estado y... y...y.... y los campesinos de la región por el tema de la autonomía y tenencia a la tierra.	Tensions between campesinos and state	State as opponent, as threat to established local rules
Usted cree que las personas dentro del área de influencia de la ATCC se identifican mucho con la comunidad, con todo el área de influencia, o más bien se identifican con su vereda, con su familia, con ehm... sus vecinos, por ejemplo, o sea, el nivel... como el nivel más importante para las personas sería ese nivel más pequeño o sería todo el área de influencia?		
No, todo' nos identificamos, todos nos identificamos pues con toda el area de influencia, nosotros hablamos que, eh, aparte pues, no solamente, no se habla como tal de área de influencia, sino de territorio [inintelligible], de territorio del Carare, o sea, nosotros todos nos identificamos con el todo area de influencia.	Identification of local population with ATCC area	Collective identity vs. individual identity
Bueno, perfecto. Entonces, volviendo un poco al tema de las tareas de la ATCC, Usted qué diría que son las tareas más importantes, y qué podrían ser unas cosas que la comunidad exige a la organización, entendiendo que durante los ultimos		

anos la ATCC ha asumido muchas, muchas tareas y han hecho y realizado muchos proyectos muy importantes en la región, algunas de las cuales teóricamente deberian ser tarea del Estado pero como durante algunos anos por lo menos no estaba tan presente, eh... la ATCC asumió mucha responsabilidad, entonces dentro de todo lo que ha tenido que hacer, cuáles eran las cosas más importantes y cómo... cómo caía esa responsabilidad sobre las personas que estaban involucradas?		
La tarea más importante que... que se [inintelligible] El tema de salvaguardar la vida a los habitantes del área de influencia, eso fue uno... uno de las tareas	Saving peoples' life as principle task	Emergency actions & Protection
del tema del desarrollo económico, social político ... [inintelligible] El desarrollo de la región, de la microregión del Carare, la asumió... la asumió de lleno la ATCC.	Economic, social and political development	Development as peacebuilding
El reporte del Grupo de la Memoria Histórica menciona también como tarea importante de la ATCC resolver algunas discusiones o ehm.. peleas que podría haber entre vecinos o entre personas de la misma eh... vereda, entonces ese mecanismo de resolver conflictos en la comunidad, dicen ellos que es otra tarea muy importante de la ATCC y que en algunos momentos del pasado ha ocurrido que algunas personas, unas pocas personas, han recurrido a la guerrilla o a los paramilitares también para pedirles su ayuda en la resuelta de esos problemas. Usted por qué cree que las personas podrían preferir en algunos momentos y en algunas instancias preguntar a los actores armados para que les ayuden y no a la ATCC, por ejemplo, o también al Estado?		
Un factor importante, bueno, una de las acciones que se realiza como ATCC la consultación mediación y el diálogo, ehh... bueno la consultación y mediación se realiza ante las comunidades, cualquiera discusión o cualquier problema que haigan entre vecinos o entre diferentes actores son problemas o situaciones que se resuelven como ATCC, por eso pues al momento de elegir la junta directiva se elige a una persona encargada del tema de conciliación que ella encarga pues de reunir un comité con el que va a trabajar para resolver todos esos temas, entonces el tema de conciliación y mediación es un factor que toda la vida ha existido en la ATCC.	ATCC as mediator in conflicts among the population	Ability of peaceful conflict resolution
Bueno, eh, para terminar la entrevista me gustaría un poco hablar de los movimientos de resistencia noviolenta en Colombia por... por lo general, o sea, ya no pensando en la ATCC como enfoque, sino por lo... por general, todas las ehm.. todos los movimientos de resistencia noviolenta en Colombia. Ehm, yo tengo dos hipotesis principales para la tesis y me gustaría mucho escuchar su opinión que me podría decir si... si estoy equivocada o si tiene alguna idea sobre ello. Bueno, la primera hipotesis es que cuando una organización de resistencia noviolenta se vuelve muy institucionalizada o jerarquizada, que eso puede producir un alejamiento de su base, o sea, que las personas de base podrían perder		

confianza ehm, en algunos casos había gente que decía que alguna de estas organizaciones era corrupta o que no... que los lideres no representaron sus intereses de verdad, entonces que la... que la alta jerarquización de una organización asi podría crear como ese sentimiento de... de que la base ya no forma parte de ese proceso. Esa es mi primera hipótesis. Luego la segunda hipotesis es que, cuando son unos pocos lideres estos lideres tienen mucha responsabilidad y a la vez se sienten o son mas vulnerables, porque si son unos pocos lideres ehm.. en muchos casos había amenazas o asesinatos eh... u otras formas eh... de crimenes contra los lideres sociales en Colombia. Entonces la... la hipotesis aqui es que si son mas personas en el liderazgo de una organización que la vulnerabilidad para la persona individual disminuye, porque simplemente una persona ya no tiene tanta relevancia para el proceso de la organización, sino se distribuye entre más personas que todos colaboran y todos ayudan a mantener vivo el proceso de paz y el proceso de resistencia noviolenta. Si, eso son como las hipotesis que tengo o en las que he podido pensar y me gustaria, o sea, me vale muchisimo la opinion de las personas, que realmente pues han vivido lo que estoy intentando entender, o sea, cualquier idea o cualquier pensamiento que pueda tener, me encantaría escucharlo.		
Hola, si, eh, la hipótesis es totalmente valida, lo que tu dices, lo que has podido encontrar, es muy cierto, pero además también es muy cierto que cuando eh... es una organización de muchos anos al último se tiene que hacer monótono, si las organizaciones no hoy no van para realizar nuevas acciones eh.. también eso ayuda mucho a que... a que el temaaa... a que la base se disperse un poco.	Monotony of actions in older organizations	Challenges of long-term resistance
	Support of the community depends on new actions	Innovation and transformation over time
Perfecto. Ehm, voy a tener muy en cuenta ese punto, que me parece muy, muy interesante también, voy a estar ehh.. atenta a ese... a ese detalle para incluirlo también en el análisis que estoy haciendo. Ehm, no se si tienes alguna recomendación, alguna idea final que... que quisieras decir. Ehm, sino en cualquier caso quisiera agradecerte por participar en la entrevista. Ehm, para mi de verdad tiene mucho valor tener la concexión directa con ehh... las personas que están en Colombia trabajando estos temas. Y no creo que podría hacer la tesis igual de buena si no contaría con el apoyo de personas como tú. Entonces, pues nada, estoy... lo que quiero decir es que muchisimas gracias. Y de cualquier modo estamos en contacto y me escribes o me avisas si hay alguna cosa más o si puedo devolver el favor en algún momento. Bueno, un saludo.		
Hola, disculpame por no contestarte, nada más ahorita he podido porque no he podido descargar el audio, pero no, dale, gracias a ti por tenernos en cuenta para tu tesis y no pues, ehm, una recomendación, no pues, es que todas esas organizaciones sociales eh... antiguas pasan por un... por	Crises as normal part of long-term resistance movements	Normalization of crisis moments

momentos de crisis, momentos de crisis pues... ehm ... eh... fuertes,		
pero igual eh, yo creo que deben de seguir con la ilusión de seguir adelante. Entonces eso mismo nos pasa con nosotros, entonces nosotros, pues nada, las ganas de seguir, de seguir adelante como organización nunca van a faltar y no pues, por ahora muchisimas gracias.	Hope for the future, intention to keep going	Resilience over time

Stata Do-File Code

```
clear all

version 11.2

set more off

capture log close

cd "C:\Users\Larika\Documents\Uni\Master UJI\18 Master Thesis\Data"

use "mergeset", clear
***************************************************************************

sort year munic

tab munic, m

replace exp_pers = 0 if missing(exp_pers)

replace homicides = 0 if missing(homicides)

replace threats = 0 if missing(threats)

save "mergeset_2", replace

drop if munic == 1

collapse (sum) exp_pers homicides threats munic, by(year)

save "Data_rest_sum", replace

use "mergeset_2", clear

drop if munic != 1

append using "Data_rest_sum"

gen tor_dummy = 0 if munic != 1

replace tor_dummy = 1 if munic == 1

* relative change rate

sort tor_dummy year

bysort tor_dummy: gen exp_pers_gr = (exp_pers/exp_pers[_n-1] - 1)*100

bysort tor_dummy: gen homicides_gr = (homicides/homicides[_n-1] - 1)*100

bysort tor_dummy: gen threats_gr = (threats/threats[_n-1] - 1)*100

replace threats_gr = 0 if missing(threats_gr) & year != 1985

lab var exp_pers "Displaced Persons"

lab var exp_pers_gr "% Change in Displaced Persons"

lab var homicides "Homicides"
```

```
lab var homicides_gr "% Change in Homicides"

lab var threats "Received Threats"

lab var threats_gr "% Change in Received Threats"




*****************************************************************************

* Analysis


reg exp_pers homicides threats year if tor_dummy == 0, robust

        eststo spec_1_atcc

reg exp_pers homicides threats year if tor_dummy == 1, robust

        eststo spec_1_toribio

reg exp_pers_gr homicides_gr threats_gr year if tor_dummy == 0, robust

        eststo spec_2_atcc

reg exp_pers_gr homicides_gr threats_gr year if tor_dummy == 1, robust

        eststo spec_2_toribio

esttab spec_1_atcc spec_1_toribio spec_2_atcc spec_2_toribio ///

        using models.rtf, replace label nonumbers se ///

        title(Effect of Homicide and Threats on Displacement) ///

        mtitles("Model 1: ATCC Influence" "Model 1: Toribio" "Model 2: ATCC Influence" "Model 2:
        Toribio") ///

        r2(4) ar2(4) sfmt(4)

save "mergeset_final", replace

clear
```